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EVALUATION REPORT

UDF-RWA-09-302 – Promoting democratic and human rights values among Rwandan youth

17 February 2014
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All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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**Table of Contents**

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 5

III. PROJECT STRATEGY 10
   i. Project strategy and approach 10
   ii. Logical framework 12

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS 13
   (i) Relevance 13
   (ii) Effectiveness 16
   (iii) Efficiency 20
   (iv) Impact 22
   (v) Sustainability 23
   (vi) UNDEF added value 23

V. CONCLUSIONS 24

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 25

VII. ANNEXES 26

   ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS 26
   ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 27
   ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 28
   ANNEX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS 29
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(i) Project data
This report is the evaluation of the project “Promoting democratic and human rights values among Rwandan youth”, a two-year, US$275,000 project implemented by Never Again Rwanda (NAR). The project ran from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012. According to the project document, it sought to “empower Rwandan youth to play an active role in the democratic process and good governance of their country, and to understand and stand up for human rights to further nation-building processes.” The project targeted 7,000 youth members of NAR clubs and associations to make them “ambassadors of change”. The targeted youth were to “reach out” to other young people and the general public through “knowledge and skills sharing and advocacy initiatives and drives”. The key activities of the project were to:

- Train youth on human rights and advocacy skills; and
- Hold debates and theatre shows on human rights and democracy;
- Support trained youth to play a role in democratic processes and good governance.

(ii) Evaluation findings
The project was relevant. There were many reasons to empower young people to understand and address issues of democracy and human rights, and the project proposal identified many of them. Various elements of context additional to those highlighted in the proposal also contributed to its relevance. For example, the 14-27 age group targeted by NAR had known mostly post-genocide Rwanda and could possibly be less sensitive to the dangers inherent to violence than the older generation, particularly those who had lived through the genocide as adults.

The project was generally well designed in that it took into account the sensitive socio-political context of Rwanda under its post-genocide government. NAR has a record of supporting survivors of the genocide, which is contributing to its credibility with authorities. The organization also has an explicit strategy which it calls “internal influence”, consisting in conducting non-public advocacy, thus avoiding antagonizing the authorities by airing concerns publicly. However, some aspects of the project design have reduced its relevance. They included the following:

- The project did not have adequate plans to provide support to participants who formulated human rights-related grievances.
- The engagement with authorities at local and national level – including government representatives as well as officials from independent institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights – was not built into the project in a comprehensive manner.
- The project essentially targeted existing NAR members, to the detriment of outreach towards other young people not yet involved with the organization.

A baseline survey was conducted at the start of the project. It showed respondent’s level of agreement with a number of statements about human rights and democracy in Rwanda, but not their level of knowledge. The project would have benefited from a more qualitative approach in which respondents could explain the rationale for their views.
The project was generally effective in the sense that many of the planned activities took place as anticipated in the project proposal. The Final Narrative Report to UNDEF reviewed in detail the activities implemented by the project. It concluded that about 5,450 young people were trained, which represented about 77% of the planned 7,000. Although not unsatisfactory in itself, this number is somewhat disappointing in view of the fact that NAR had claimed the 7,000 were already NAR members – there was therefore no need to conduct specific outreach to identify the targeted young people.

The third prong of the project – engagement with authorities – was the weakest in terms of effectiveness. There were a number of instances of such engagement, for example when local government representatives were invited to attend public debates, as happened in Bugesera District. Despite these examples of engagement with the authorities, the project fell somewhat short of the sustained lobbying and advocacy for human rights and democratic consultative processes that was outlined in the project document.

The quality of project implementation was a good indicator that the project was soundly managed and efficient. A project team made up by the NAR Executive Director and the Project Director was responsible for project management, while relevant board members provided strategic direction. The team was widely appreciated by project participants and trainers for its willingness to engage with them and its pro-active attitude dealing with young people’s concerns and needs. The quality of project management was also visible in NAR’s way of dealing with the political sensitivity of the issues raised.

The project achieved its main impact as a result of its training and public debate components. ToT participants acquired knowledge on democratic processes and human rights, which they were likely to disseminate beyond the project period, because most of them were teachers – a kind of multiplier effect that was likely to go beyond expectations during project planning. NAR members who participated in training sessions also said they acquired valuable skills, which were relevant to their future.

That a number of Rwandan young people became aware of past abuse and were emboldened to seek assistance was far from anodyne in the Rwandan context. Several interviewees noted that silence about past abuses is widespread in Rwanda. As a result, the project’s ability to encourage young people to “break the silence” and seek individual was a notable achievement.

The project drew sustainability from its high level of integration with NAR’s broader mission and activities. It has entrenched a training dissemination approach whose effectiveness was proven during the project. In particular, it helped NAR connect with a key sub-group of young people: those who are not in formal education. The project, by targeting young people cooperatives and other local associations of interest to “non-schooling” young people, was able to sensitize them to democracy and rights issues, without detracting from their interest in income generation – and more generally moving out of poverty.

Like all training-based projects, it is clear that the skills and competences acquired by the trainers will continue to be used, in at least some cases. It is regrettable, however, that some ToT participants only performed one or two subsequent training sessions.

The institutional engagement element of the project drew its sustainability mainly from NAR’s pre-existing relationship with the relevant institutions. The project’s failure to provide for explicit follow-up mechanisms thus reduced its sustainability in this respect.
(iii) Conclusions

- **The project was well designed and based on a proven methodology.**
- **The baseline survey conducted at the outset constituted good project management practice, though its methodology was perfectible.**
- By highlighting young people’s individual stories in public debates and videos, the *project made a significant contribution to “breaking the silence”* among some of the targeted young people, about trauma and abuse they suffered, including as an indirect consequence of the 1994 genocide.
- **The project achieved significant skills development outcomes among trainers.**
- **The project targeted some young people not usually addressed by human rights awareness raising activities.**
- **The ToT participants were underused.**
- **There was insufficient engagement with the authorities.**

(iv) Recommendations

- **NAR should review its baseline survey methodology.** The organization should be encouraged in particular to include a qualitative dimension in its baseline surveys, which would make it easier to compare the starting situation with that at the end of the project.
- **NAR should make more intensive use of trainers.** The organization should make it a formal requirement for ToT participants to commit to conducting a significant number of subsequent training sessions.
- **NAR should review its future lobbying and advocacy strategy.** Engagement with authorities should be more formally resourced and planned, and the organization should provide on-going support to its members to conduct regular consultations with government representatives, members of the National Assembly and representatives of state institutions.
- **NAR should reinforce its partnership with legal assistance and psychological support organizations.** As it successfully encouraged some young people to “break the silence” on past trauma and abuse, it is important that the organization be prepared to direct them to a range of NGOs that can provide tailored support, including legal and socio-psychological.
- **UNDEF should encourage applicants to conduct short “ex-post” surveys at the end of project, to compare these with baseline data.** UNDEF has been encouraging applicants to compile data (as part of the initial application procedure) demonstrating the need
for their proposed intervention. It should also provide guidance to applicants concerning the implementation of simple surveys to be carried out toward the end of a project, to help assess its outcomes.

Public debate with young people, Nyagatere 2011 ©NAR
II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

“Promoting democratic and human rights values among Rwandan youth” was a two-year, US$275,000 project implemented by Never Again Rwanda (NAR). US$ 25,000 of this budget was retained by UNDEF for evaluation and monitoring purposes. The project ran from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012. According to the project document, it sought to “empower Rwandan youth to play an active role in the democratic process and good governance of their country, and to understand and stand up for human rights to further nation-building processes.” The project targeted 7,000 youth members of NAR clubs and associations to make them “ambassadors of change”. The targeted youth were to “reach out” to other young people and the general public through “knowledge and skills sharing and advocacy initiatives and drives”. The key activities of the project were to:

- Train youth on human rights and advocacy skills; and
- Hold debates and theatre shows on human rights and democracy;
- Support trained youth to play a role in democratic processes and good governance.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger set of evaluations of the Rounds, 2, 3 and 4 UNDEF-funded projects. The purpose of these evaluations is to “contribute to a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project, which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”.

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took place in April and May 2013 with field work done in Rwanda from 29 April to 3 May 2013. The evaluation was conducted by an international expert and a national expert. The UNDEF Rounds 2, 3 and 4 evaluations are more qualitative than quantitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluations questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex1). This is to allow meta-analysis in cluster evaluations at a later stage. This report follows that structure.

The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on democracy and governance in Rwanda. In addition to formal project documentation (Initial Project document, Mid-term and Final narrative report), NAR provided the evaluators with other project-related documentation, including: baseline survey, brochures, handbooks, magazines, reports of public events, photographs, etc. UNDEF provided the evaluators with a note indicating that the project implementer has respected all its reporting obligations. The evaluators also consulted recent documents on human rights in Rwanda, including human rights education, issued by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the European Union, and those submitted by Rwanda to the United Nations Human Rights Council in the context of the Universal Periodic Review of Rwanda in January 2011.

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1 Operational manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, page 6
The evaluators carried out detailed interviews with the NAR Director and staff. They held panel discussions with trained youth in Rwanda’s capital Kigali and in Bugesera, a district about 40km south of Kigali. They also met:

- Trainers used by the project;
- A locally elected youth council member;
- Participants in training sessions;
- Representatives of a legal assistance NGOs who took part in some of the activities;
- A senior representative of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in charge of peace-building;
- A teacher at the Kigali Lycée (secondary school) who collaborated with NAR on project-related activities;
- Representatives of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, involved in activities on governance;
- The author of the baseline study submitted to the evaluators by NAR;
- A senior journalist who has written on conflict resolution and national reconciliation in Rwanda.

Some meetings could not be held due to constraints on the availability of some informants (Electoral and Human Rights Commissions in particular). In the case of the Ministry of Youth, personnel changes meant that no representative with specific knowledge of the project was available to meet the evaluators. Despite these problems, the meetings that were held were appropriate to give the evaluators a well-rounded view of the project, including achievements and shortcomings. The list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work (Launch Note UDF-RWA-09-302,) the evaluators identified several issues, which they followed up on during interviews. These included:

- Project results compared to baseline survey. NAR had carried out a baseline survey at the start of the project. Its methodology appeared appropriate, but NAR reports contained no specific information comparing the situation at the end of the project period with the situation outlined in the baseline report.
- Training of trainers. The evaluators were keen to meet trainers who implemented the ToT to assess their actual skills and capacities, and see their views on the actual training activities.
- Public debates. Dozens of public debates on human rights and democracy were meant to be covered in the media so as to benefit a broader audience. The evaluators sought information about the media coverage these debates achieved, and any synergies with the planned radio and TV broadcasts.
- Magazines, brochures and other publications. A number of those were produced by NAR and the evaluators sought to clarify how widely these were distributed and how they were used to raise awareness about rights and democracy.
- Project outcomes. The reports set out a number of anticipated project outcomes, and the final report gives some anecdotal information suggesting that the planned outcomes were broadly achieved. The evaluators gathered more information about achievement and challenges.

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2 The same team of evaluators, joined by Aurélie Ferreira, carried out the evaluation of another project in Rwanda during the week of 6 May 2013. Some of the meetings held on that occasion also contributed to provide the evaluator with contextual information relevant to this project – legal experts in particular. See UDF-RWA-09-303 evaluation report.
Sustainability and impact. The evaluator also assessed how the project sought to ensure sustainability, and to maximize impact. As part of this, the evaluators sought to assess the extent and quality of NAR’s collaboration with the authorities in this regard.

(iii) Development context

Good governance and human rights: the role of young people

Rwanda, landlocked Central Africa, has a population of close to 11 million people\(^3\), of whom about 39% are classified as “youth” (between 14 and 35 years of age)\(^4\). With regards to education of the population in that age bracket, results of the EICV3 thematic report on youth reveal that “the majority of youths aged 14–35 in Rwanda have either never been to school or not yet completed primary (62.2%). 31.5% have completed primary school, and just 4.9% have completed post-primary, vocational, secondary, or higher education\(^5\).

The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda’s fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country’s ability to attract private and external investment. Rwanda is a poor rural country with about 90% of the population engaged in (mainly subsistence) agriculture and some mineral and agro-processing. Tourism, minerals, coffee and tea are Rwanda’s main sources of foreign exchange\(^6\).

In recent years, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy to pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 7%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. Nonetheless, a significant percent of the population still live below the official poverty line. Official figures indicate that around 44.9% of the population lived under the poverty line in 2010/11, 24% under extreme poverty conditions in 2012 and over 90% of poor people living in rural areas\(^7\). Moreover, poverty is not evenly distributed in the country as some groups are significantly more marginalized than others (e.g., orphans, adolescent girls).

In general, development is guided by two major policy documents:

- The first one is Vision 2020,\(^8\) a framework for Rwanda’s development, presenting the key priorities and providing Rwandans with a guiding tool for the future. Vision 2020 defines

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\(^3\) National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2012 Population and Housing Census, Provisional Results

\(^4\) The project proposal incorrectly states that the age group 14-27 represents 67% of Rwanda’s population. This is only the case of the 0-27 age group (i.e. children and youth).

\(^5\) National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Youth EICV3 Thematic Report, Pvi Youth

\(^6\) http://www.indexmundi.com/rwanda

\(^7\) EDPRS 2008 - 2012

\(^8\) Rwanda – Vision 2020
the transformations needed to improve the social and economic situation of the nation. That document does not include a specific strategy concerning young people, although it does emphasize the need for universal education (see below an overview of the current situation). It also prioritizes “good governance and a capable state”, to be achieved through accountability, transparency and efficient deployment of state resources. In this context the document highlights the promotion of “people’s participation at the grassroots level”, particularly through the decentralization process whereby local communities will be “empowered in the decision making process”.

- The second guiding document is the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)\textsuperscript{9} that seeks to address constraints towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the country’s Vision 2020. The EDPRS emphasizes “accountable governance”, to be achieved through citizen participation and improved service delivery. Youth are not specifically targeted in the context of this policy, but another of the EDPRS key pillars is the development of youth employment, explicitly connected to enhancing their education and skills.

According to the situational analysis done by the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport prior to the formulation of the National Youth Policy, the youth in Rwanda are facing major challenges, which hamper their development and that of the country as a whole. Unproductive mindsets, lack of appropriate skills and limited access to financial services, were identified among other factors barring the youth from attaining considerable levels of development.

Existing data source point out there is a huge segment of the youth that is affected by ignorance, which stems from their lack of access to information on pertinent issues which could have improved their lives. Furthermore, access to finance is one of the most critical issues youth entrepreneurs face today. Among other challenges highlighted was limited support from local leaders, especially at stages when youth activities need it most. Some youth organizations lack sustainability strategies, which cause them to fail soon after their establishment, leaving the youth they have been supporting lingering without jobs.

In that context, the Government of Rwanda has set up a Ministry for Youth and Information Communication and Technology (MINIYOUTH). This later has formulated a National youth policy whose general objective is to promote the youth economic, social, cultural, intellectual and moral welfare. The Ministry of Youth and ICT in partnership with Youth organizations local and international partners is committed create synergies in addressing youth problems. Its end is also to create conditions that are favorable for their integration in all sectors of the society so as to let them become stakeholders of sustainable development\textsuperscript{10}. A number of initiatives to educate youth on positive values and the causes of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and its consequences are underway, purposely to curb “diversionist” ideology and thus bring about unity and reconciliation among groups with differing backgrounds that make up the Rwanda society to date.

**Baseline**
The objective of the baseline survey commissioned by NAR and implemented in the first quarter of 2011 was to “determine the extent to which (...) youth understand democratic principles and the fundamental human rights upon which good governance is founded”. The survey was based on a desk review of relevant literature and on a questionnaire targeting about 1,000 of the 7,000 youth then participating in NAR activities (including secondary [60%] and university [25%]).

\textsuperscript{9} Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)
\textsuperscript{10} Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport, National Youth Policy, p 24
students, and young people outside school [15%]). Non-participating youth (students from the National University in Butare, southern Rwanda) were also interviewed, for comparison purposes. Respondent's knowledge in a range of areas was scored; the process concluded that, on a scale of 0 to 4 (where 4 was the best level of understanding) only university students exceeded the aggregate score of 3. The survey recommended a range of topics for inclusion in the training program. These included: Information on international human rights standards and their status in Rwanda;
  - Principles of good governance and sustainable development;
  - Government accountability;
  - Rights of women;
  - Conflict prevention and resolution;
  - Youth and politics.

Since the baseline survey was an activity of the project – as opposed to research undertaken ahead of the project proposal – its methodology and approach are reviewed in the evaluative chapter of the present report. Irrespective of its strengths and weaknesses, however, its very existence added value to the project and constituted a good indication of the context in which the project operated.

**Political and post-genocide context**
The evaluation took place when Rwanda marked the 19th anniversary of the 1994 genocide. This was a reminder of the fact that the post-genocide period had been one of widespread reconstruction, including in the fields of governance, politics and public administration. As the policy documents highlighted above make clear, citizen participation is seen as an integral part of good governance. This is a particular challenge in a context in which local administration had to be rebuilt virtually from the ground up, partly because many local authorities had taken part in, or facilitated, the genocide.

A national debate on responsibility for the genocide has taken place, which involved a broad range of government and non-government institutions. Meanwhile, the government – with apparent widespread popular support – has engaged in a strategy of accelerated economic development, which is clearly bearing fruit: Rwanda's growth is fast by regional standards, and has been sustained. Some international human rights organizations, however, have stated that political and media freedoms have not been fully respected in this context. Amnesty International, for example, has noted in recent annual reports that freedom of expression remained “severely restricted” during the years of the project: laws prohibiting hate speech have been used, according to the human rights organization, to “criminalize criticism of the government”.

III. PROJECT STRATEGY

i. Project strategy and approach

Overview
The project refers to the government policies of building democracy, supporting good governance, protecting equal rights for all citizens and “unifying the people”. It aims at “empowering Rwandan youth to play an active and visible role in the democratic process and to understand, promote and defend human rights”. The overall objective of the project was to empower and build the capacity of young people to promote and protect human rights and to support democratic processes. The project sought to achieve this objective by enhancing access to information by young people through training, public debates and other means.

The project targeted 7,000 young people who were already members of NAR clubs and associations, in 3 districts of Kigali and 7 district of the Eastern Province, including 20 secondary schools, 3 universities and 5 associations of “non-schooling youth”. NAR expected the 7,000 young people targeted by the project to disseminate the project’s messages to other young people in their environment. The project was, in essence, organized around 3 components:

- Training and awareness raising about human rights and democracy. This component included the training of trainers (ToT) directed mostly at university students.
- Public events and meetings. This component was to be implemented primarily by NAR members who had participated in training, and targeted the broader community in which the trained young were active. TV and radio broadcasts were included in this component.
- Engagement with authorities. Under this component, authorities were engaged at different levels. At the national level, NAR held meetings with representatives of government ministries and national institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the National Youth Council, etc. At district level, NAR group representatives addressed local officials. At both the national and local levels, the project document indicated that the concerns of young people would be conveyed to the relevant authorities through this engagement component.

Approach
The rationale for the project is, in essence, the need to make sure that Rwandans from the targeted age group (14 to 27) take part in greater numbers in “democratic processes”, though the project document does not specify the precise nature of the processes it aims to contribute to. Since the project proposes to engage with local authorities and some national institutions, it can be surmised that the democratic processes it has in mind are consultations at local government level and with government institutions dealing with youth issues. The project does not appear to be specifically geared towards enhancing participation in national electoral processes.

The project explicitly aims at contributing to the “reforms and initiatives” of the Government of Rwanda in relation to democracy and governance. It does not question the government’s policy, nor does it seek to establish a critical distance with the stated aims of the authorities. As a result, the project presents itself as a continuation of what it says are government policies to foster
debate and consultation. This approach raises the concern that the project may not adequately address the constraints imposed by the government on freedom of expression.

Strategy
The three components of the project – training, public events and engagement with authorities – effectively represented the three stages of a strategy aimed at involving young people in policy dialogue with decision-makers. The first stage was training, to ensure that the youth had a sufficient understanding of the human rights and governance issues at stake. The second stage was about debates and related public events (such as theater shows) to disseminate notions of democracy and seek views from the broader public. The third stage was dialogue with the authorities, to address with decision-makers the concerns formulated by young people.

The project document left open, reasonably, the question of what these concerns would be. Implicitly, however, the document suggests that the concerns would revolve around issues of socio-economic development and good governance. There was no explicit expectation that the youth would raise concerns about democratic accountability or human rights.
### ii. Logical framework

The framework on the next page aims to capture the project logic, attempting at the same time to eliminate confusion between activities, intended outcomes, and impacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Activities &amp; Interventions</th>
<th>Intended outcomes</th>
<th>Project general objective</th>
<th>LT Development Objectives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline survey to collect data and the initial level of understanding of human rights and democracy by targeted young people.</td>
<td>To raise awareness among young people on issues of democratic process.</td>
<td>Young people understand and value democratic processes.</td>
<td>To enhance democracy and the promotion and protection of human rights in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of trainers on democracy and human rights based on the baseline survey outcomes.</td>
<td>Awareness empowers young people to debate socio-economic and political issues affecting them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training modules designed for the target young people groups.</td>
<td>Youth engage in advocacy and lobbying about human rights.</td>
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<td>Public debates on democracy and human rights in schools and universities, and in communities.</td>
<td>Partnership between NAR groups and key stakeholders to promote and protect human rights of concern to young people.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production of radio and TV broadcasts on topics relevant to democracy and human rights.</td>
<td>Youth participate in democratic decision-making and public policy formulation processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production and distribution of a magazine and brochure on the relevant topics.</td>
<td>Youth engage in advocacy and lobbying for democracy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of human rights and democracy content for the NAR website.</td>
<td>Central and local authorities understand better the need to engage youth in democratic and decision-making processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification of new districts to host NAR clubs, and awareness raising visits on democracy and human rights in these districts.</td>
<td>Young people engage with relevant authorities to address their concerns on good governance, democratic processes and human rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invitations to local government representatives to attend and participate in public and community events.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meetings with local government officials to raise specific issues of concern to young people in relation to democracy and human rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meetings with officials of national institutions (elections commission, human rights commission, etc.) to address concerns identified by young people at local level.</td>
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IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This evaluation is based on evaluation questions formulated to meet the evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The questions and sub-questions are found in Annex 1 of this document.

(i) Relevance
The NAR project correctly identified the need to enhance young people’s capacity to take part in democratic processes and in the promotion and protection of human rights. The steps it proposed to take in the project were appropriate to the stated objective. In both of these senses, the project was relevant. There were many reasons to empower young people to understand and address issues of democracy and human rights, and the project proposal identified many of them, including these two:

- Young people (understood for the purposes of the project to be the 14-27 age group) form a sizeable proportion of the population. Despite some confusion in the project document about the exact proportion of young people in Rwanda, there was no doubt that this age group was key to the sound and sustainable development of the country.
- The proposal also correctly noted that this group of people often lacked appropriate information about democratic processes and human rights, as well as the experience and skills necessary to contribute to local or national policy debates in this field.

Various elements of context additional to those highlighted in the proposal also contributed to its relevance. For example, the age group under consideration had known mostly post-genocide Rwanda and could possibly be less sensitive to the dangers inherent to violence than the older generation, particularly those who had lived through the genocide as adults. The proposal also suggested implicitly that the young generation had a key role to play in socio-economic development and that, failing this, a resurgence of violence might take place, fuelled by economic frustration.

These elements confirm that the need to support young people’s understanding and capacity in relation to democracy and human rights was appropriately identified by the project, thus making it relevant. Elements of the project approach enhanced its relevance further, by helping to ensure that the project’s response to the need was appropriate. These elements were the following:

- The project was generally well designed in that it took into account the sensitive socio-political context of Rwanda under its post-genocide government (see context section). NAR has a record of supporting survivors of the genocide, which is contributing to its credibility with authorities. The organization also has an explicit strategy which it calls “internal influence”, consisting in conducting non-public advocacy, thus avoiding antagonizing the authorities by airing concerns publicly. There is of course a thin line between sensitive engagement with authorities and mere obedience to official demands, and the project was clearly designed to thread carefully when addressing issues of democracy and human rights. This may have had some impact on its effectiveness, as described in the next section. However, the project largely made the most of the margin of action available to civil society organizations working on democracy and human rights in Rwanda.
• The three-pronged approach (training; public events and dissemination; and engagement with the authorities) were broadly appropriate:
  o Training (and related activities such as ToT, design of training modules, etc.) was clearly a prerequisite to ensure that targeted young people developed an adequate understanding of democratic processes and human rights. It was particularly relevant since most of the trainees had had minimal or no exposure to human rights in the past.
  o Public and closed-door debates (including in schools and universities), as well as publications, broadcasts and theater plays were also helpful to ensure that the targeted young people gain exposure to the views of broader groups of people and that they disseminate the skills acquired.
  o Engagement with the authorities – that is, lobbying and advocacy with relevant officials and representatives of institutions – was clearly a logical step following empowerment, and one that could lead to actual improvements in the situation of targeted young people.

• The project drew from NAR’s previous experience, including governance and peace-building programs. It was also consistent with the broader professed mission of the organization, which in its director’s words is “to stand out as an inclusive organization supporting young people”.

However, some aspects of the project design have reduced its relevance. They included the following:
  • The project design did not explicitly outline what it meant by empowering young people to engage in “democratic processes”. In practice, the project encouraged its beneficiaries to raise concerns and consult with the authorities at local level and to debate issues of concern at local level. There was little emphasis on citizens’ right to demand accountability from government.
The project did not have adequate plans to provide support to participants who formulated human rights-related grievances. A number of interviewees (participants in training, trainers themselves and NAR representatives) said that several young people recounted traumatic events they suffered as an indirect result of the genocide — including for example ill-treatment at the hands of adoptive families after their relatives were killed. The project had not anticipated that this situation would emerge as a result of awareness raising activities on human rights, and consequently had difficulty supporting the traumatized victims. NAR eventually partnered with AJPRODHO, a legal assistance NGO, to provide some support. However neither NAR nor its partner was able to provide psychological support.

The engagement with authorities at local and national level — including government representatives as well as officials from independent institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights — was not built into the project in a comprehensive manner. Several institutions were mentioned in the project document, but engagement with them was not systematically prioritized in project design. As a result, some of the engagement remained superficial (see section on effectiveness).

The project essentially targeted existing NAR members, to the detriment of outreach towards other young people not yet involved with the organization. Although some clubs were established in the Eastern province during the project period, this was not a deliberate priority. A more deliberate targeting of new groups of young people would have enhanced the project’s relevance by disseminating its benefits more broadly.

**Baseline survey**
The fact that the project design included the implementation of a baseline survey constituted good practice and helped enhance the project’s relevance by helping to identify specific training needs. However, the baseline survey had methodological flaws that reduced its relevance.

The baseline survey consisted in a questionnaire administered to about 1,000 of the 7,000 young people targeted by the project, mostly existing NAR members. The survey was based on a questionnaire covering 11 themes (human rights, elections, rule of law, government accountability, role of the media, etc.) through about 80 statements. Respondents were asked to react to each statement by selecting one of five replies, ranging from “strongly agree” to “don’t know”. Each response was converted into points (“strongly agree” = 5; “agree” = 4; “fairly true” = 3; “not sure” = 2; down to “don’t know” = 1).

Using this information, the survey analysts could rate the level of respondents’ agreement with each of the 80 statements. For example, there was a relatively high level of agreement with statement 13 (“In Rwanda women participate in political life and public office at all levels”, average rating about 3.5). Conversely the rating of statement 4 (“In Rwanda the state disseminates and has put in place mechanisms for disseminating information relating to human rights”) achieved an average rating of about 2.6, suggesting most respondents had doubts on that point.

The survey was therefore effective at assessing respondents’ level of agreement with statements, but not their level of knowledge. For example, statement 17 was: “In Rwanda there is freedom of assembly, demonstration and open public discussion on all issues”. The survey showed that most respondents doubted this statement (average score: 2.7) but it was not possible to know why they made this relatively negative judgment. Moreover, since the survey was not repeated at the end of the project, it was not possible to know whether project participants’ views changed.
The project would have benefited from a more qualitative approach in which respondents could explain the rationale for their views. This would have helped enhance the project’s relevance, by identifying young people’s level of knowledge and the areas in which information dissemination was most needed.

(ii) Effectiveness
The project was generally effective in the sense that many of the planned activities took place as anticipated in the project proposal and that several of the expected outcomes (summarized in the previous chapter’s table) have been achieved. However some activities were implemented to a lesser extent than originally envisioned, and some outcomes – particularly in relation to engagement with the authorities – were effectively set aside.

Activities
The Final Narrative Report to UNDEF reviews in detail the activities implemented by the project. The report concludes that about 5,450 young people were trained, which represented about 77% of the planned 7,000. Although not unsatisfactory in itself, this number is somewhat disappointing in view of the fact that NAR had claimed the 7,000 were already NAR members – there was therefore no need to conduct specific outreach to identify the targeted young people. The report does not explain the shortfall in coverage, but the evaluators concluded that it was at least partly related to the lack of commitment and skills of some of the trainers. Above all, the shortcoming in coverage happened because several, if not most, of the trainers failed to hold more than one or two onward training sessions, as explained below.

This was made clear as a result of interviews with ToT participants and trainers. The 66 ToT participants undertook a 5-day workshop on democracy and human rights, which they widely considered to have been relevant and of good quality. Each trainer received a handbook, in Kinyarwanda or English, which they could use as a basis to conduct onward training sessions, normally lasting 2 days each.

According to trainers, the first of the 2-day onward sessions covered definitions and basic concepts of human rights and democracy, as well as the historical and legal background of human rights and their implementation in East and Central Africa. On the second day, sessions would usually address practices relating to the monitoring of human rights and good governance.

The ToT sessions addressed these issues in much more detail. Some ToT participants noted that they represented a good use of time and had a potential multiplier effect beyond the NAR project, since many of the ToT participants were future primary and secondary school teachers, who would potentially be able to disseminate their knowledge beyond the NAR members involved in onward training. However the ToT process had two flaws:

- It was mostly focused on explaining the domestic and international laws and policies underpinning democratic processes and human rights, and did not give sufficient attention to enhancing trainers’ pedagogical and training skills. As a result, NAR (and trainers interviewed by the evaluators) acknowledged that the trainers had acquired a good understanding of democracy and human rights issues, but did not know precisely how to convey this knowledge to groups of younger, less educated people. As a result, some ToT participants were reluctant to conduct onward training.
• Another flaw of the ToT is, precisely, that the participants were not formally required to commit to conducting a number of onward training sessions. NAR organized at least one onward session per trainer, but found it difficult to organize more because trainers were not available. Some, for example, had to complete their teacher training curriculum, which logically took precedence over involvement with the NAR project. As a result of this situation, ToT participants conducted fewer onward sessions than anticipated, thus reducing the project’s coverage.

By contrast with the training activities, the public debates were implemented as planned. According to NAR, they involved 1,300 young people, government officials, experts and activists. In addition, 3 debating competitions were held in secondary schools, familiarizing students with the practice of debating democracy and human rights. NAR provided the evaluators with a list of topics addressed during the debates (and reproduced in the final narrative report). An analysis of the list shows that the topics chosen were predominantly related to development matters: about two-thirds of the debates covered issues such as “necessity of democracy for development”; “youth empowerment and development”; “youth involvement in income-generating projects”, etc. Only a few of the debates focused on human rights issues: one debate concerned media censorship; another was entitled “Stereotyping and discrimination”; and some concerned the commemoration of the 1994 genocide). This choice of topics was not inappropriate in itself, but it contrasted with the contents of the training given to trainers, which focused on a much greater extent on the promotion and protection of human rights, legal safeguards for rights, etc.
In addition, the project also held public talks by experts, attended by young people and broadcast on local radio. These covered topics such as reconciliation and good governance; post-genocide and democracy; and youth employment. Radio and TV broadcasts were also produced and aired as planned, including a series of 18 radio broadcasts on an FM channel. Topics ranged from peace and democracy to social issues (access to health services or water in rural areas), the fight against HIV, family planning, etc. Magazines and brochures were produced with information on democracy and rights, and the information also appeared on the NAR website.

In general, the number of public debates, broadcast and publication activities implemented was therefore consistent with the plans outlined in the project document. However, the range of topics addressed in these activities went significantly beyond the democracy and human rights issues that were central to the project, and included economic development, employment and other topics which had not been explicitly foreseen in the project proposal.

The third prong of the project – engagement with authorities – was the weakest in terms of effectiveness. There were a number of instances of such engagement, for example when local government representatives were invited to attend public debates, as happened in Bugesera District. Similarly, the project organized other debates with public officials:

- A talk on unity and reconciliation in development involving 50 Kigali secondary school students and the Executive Secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission;
- A talk on Rwanda’s transformation from post-genocide to democracy, bringing together 150 university students and a representative of the Rwanda Governance Advisory Council;
- A talk on youth unemployment, between 60 young people and parliamentarians.

In addition to these, NAR representatives met on several occasions with representatives of the Elections Commission, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Ministry of Youth, and other relevant institutions. These meetings were all relevant to the project, and participants interviewed in Kigali and Bugesera assessed them positively. Local government officials in Bugesera also gave a positive assessment of their interaction with NAR groups, saying that the discussion with them was fruitful and that they found the youth well informed and articulate. The officials also noted that they were able to address some of the concerns raised by the young people, particularly in relation to the development of income generation schemes.

**Training on democratic processes – the views of some trainers**

NAR staff and trainers knew that participating young people would be wary of talking in a critical way about democracy and human rights issues. Trainers told the evaluators that they got over this concern by discussing processes in general and by stimulating discussions through “fictional” scenarios or by referring to incidents that happened in other districts than those where training was taking place.

NAR sought to address young people’s concerns in an inclusive way, bringing them together with officials in an environment where trust could be developed. Such meetings were held, for example, with district officials in Bugesera and parliamentarians in Kigali.
Despite these examples of engagement with the authorities, the project fell somewhat short of the sustained lobbying and advocacy for human rights and democratic consultative processes that was outlined in the project document. The evaluators understood that any such engagement is politically sensitive, and that NAR has been effective at making the most of those advocacy opportunities it had. However it would have been desirable to seek more contacts with authorities and institutions (such as the independent bodies on human rights and elections) that have a mandate directly related to the issues covered by the project.

Outcomes

The project doubtless achieved some of the planned outcomes listed in the logical framework. In particular, the skills development aspect of the project was effective. Participants in the ToT stated that they benefited from new awareness and understanding of democratic consultation process and of human rights standards at international and national levels; this view was substantiated by the quality of the training material developed by NAR and the quality of the trainers selected by the organization to conduct the ToT. Similarly, participants in onward training sessions interviewed by the evaluators had clearly acquired an understanding of democratic processes and human rights, which some of them had been able to disseminate to others in their community.

The planned outcome in relation to participation in awareness-raising activities and debates was also achieved, though it was difficult to assess how many of the young people sensitized to democracy and human rights had actually been involved in subsequent public debates, theater plays and related activities. Some of those who had conducted such activities, however, had clearly benefited from the input of the project, which can therefore be said to have helped develop their skills.

The weakest area of achievement in outcome terms has been in relation to advocacy and lobbying with authorities. As indicated above, the activities planned in this respect were not systematically carried out, and as a result there were few outcomes in the field of engagement with authorities and officials.
It should be noted that the project had the unplanned additional outcome of enhancing some young people’s participation in economic development and income-generation activities. Some of the participants interviewed by the evaluators referred to other NAR activities they engaged in subsequently to the training, including small lending schemes. Some youth in Bugesera who joined a district-administered vocational training scheme felt that the debating skills they acquired through the project helped them get selected into the scheme.

(iii) Efficiency
The project was generally efficient: financial and human resources were appropriately used, largely according to the original proposal. Project management was sound. However, there were some weaknesses, summarized below, mainly related to issues of management skills and strategic direction.

Human and financial resources
The planned budget was used correctly. Within the overall envelope of US$250,000, the main items of expenditure were the following:

- Personnel costs amounted to US$47,000; they included a full-time project director and a part-time assistant. 50% of the salary of the NAR Executive Director was also covered by the project budget.
- The largest single area of spending (US$92,000) concerned training and public events. Participants received “reimbursement” for transport costs, amounting in practice to a form of moderate payment (for example in the case of meetings in districts, where participants did not actually incur significant travel expenses). This practice, though unfortunate,
common among NGOs. The training budget included the cost of training materials. Trainers’ fees were not budgeted in a separate line item\textsuperscript{11}.

- Travel costs (all domestic) were moderate, amounting to US$12,000.
- Under “contractual services” the project spent a total of US$38,000 for producing and broadcasting shows and debates on TV and radio. This amount included production costs and fees paid to broadcasters for airtime.
- A significant amount (US$40,000) was spent on publications, research (baseline survey) and website contents production and hosting.

While these expenses were generally justified, the evaluators noted that there were no specific expenses planned for the advocacy and lobbying element of the project in relation to local and national authorities, on the assumption that these activities would involve virtually no cost. Although such engagement may indeed be largely free of significant costs, the failure to provide for any budget may have contributed to the lack of achievement in this respect. In hindsight it is clear that a formal engagement strategy should have been devised prior to the project, or in its early phase, and adequately budgeted. Related costs, though moderate, could have included formal events (press conferences, launch of publications, seminars with officials) and possibly also the fees of advocacy professionals. In view of the quality of the training and public events elements of the project, a moderate addition of skills and focused advocacy work would most likely have been sufficient to achieve the planned engagement outcomes.

Project management
The effectiveness of project implementation was a good indicator that the project was soundly managed. A project team made up by the NAR Executive Director and the Project Director was responsible for project management, while relevant board members provided strategic direction. The Project Director changed twice during the project period: the first Project Director became NAR Executive Director, and his replacement was himself changed once. This led to some discontinuity, and perhaps also to a slight reduction of the skills level of the project management team towards the end of the project.

The team was widely appreciated by project participants and trainers for its willingness to engage with them and its pro-active attitude dealing with young people’s concerns and needs. However, the evaluators noted that the Project Director in post at the end of the project had a relatively weak understanding of the overall project strategy, and was not fully aware of the importance to the project of engagement with senior authorities at national and local levels.

The quality of project management was also visible in NAR’s way of dealing with the political sensitivity of the issues raised. In Rwanda, addressing concerns about democratic processes and human rights violations may leave NGOs open to criminal accusations. NAR was able to circumvent difficulties in part by discussing young people’s complaints behind closed doors, and in part by emphasizing social and political rights through the economic development lens. On the other hand it also arranged for individuals with specific complaints to get some support from specialist human rights groups providing legal aid. It remains, however, that some civil society representatives perceive NAR as being relatively close to the Government of Rwanda. The evaluators could substantiate no claims or evidence of such collusion. However, it is important

\textsuperscript{11} The evaluators noted that at least one of the trainers implementing the ToT was related to a NAR board member. The trainer was fully qualified and provided excellent input according to participants. However, as a matter of good management and ethical practice, it would be appropriate for projects to avoid paying for the services of people related to implementing organizations’ management.
that NAR should continue to cultivate its independence as a civil society organization, including by reaching out to all sectors of Rwandan society that address the situation of young people.

(iv) Impact

The project achieved its main impact as a result of its training and public debate components. ToT participants acquired knowledge on democratic processes and human rights, which they were likely to disseminate beyond the project period, because most of them were teachers – a kind of multiplier effect that was likely to go beyond expectations during project planning. NAR members who participated in training sessions also said they acquired valuable skills, which were relevant to their future.

The training component also had an impact by enabling some participants to raise and deal with trauma from past human rights violations or abuse, often for the first time. According to NAR, some participants understood as a result of the training that they had been in abusive situations – “the training opened their eyes”. NAR could offer some help to these young people by referring them to human rights, legal assistance or psychosocial support organizations – for which NAR had developed a roster of relevant organizations. Beyond NAR members in training sessions, a broader group of people who viewed NAR’s videos shown on local TV also became aware of past abuses and were directed by NAR to support organizations.

It is of course difficult to assess the impact of TV and radio broadcasts on the general public’s understanding of democracy and human rights. However, NAR representatives pointed out that, by raising examples during public debates and video screenings of traumas suffered by young people, it was able to encourage individuals to contact NAR and join groups, or to get directly in touch with legal assistance NGOs, mentioning the broadcasts’ “trigger effect”.

That a number of Rwandan young people became aware of past abuse and were emboldened to seek assistance was far from anodyne in the Rwandan context. Several interviewees (staff members of the Roman Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, trainers who intervened in the ToT, members of NAR’s board, etc.) noted that silence about past abuses is widespread in Rwanda – mostly for “good” reasons:

• Young people may not wish to cause further suffering to their entourage who may have survived the 1994 genocide;
• Young people are grateful to adoptive families and do not necessarily realize that adopters may have made inappropriate material gains;
• The very fact that many people suffered from the consequences of the genocide in Rwanda may make it harder for individual young people to “recognize” their own situation as one of abuse that can be remedied through support or legal assistance;
• Interviewees also noted that official emphasis on reconstruction, national reconciliation and the general priority given to “moving forward” may discourage individuals from raising personal concerns arising from the past.

The area with the seemingly weakest impact concerned engagement with the authorities. NAR could certainly point out a number of occasions when this engagement led to local authorities changing their course of action, or at least taking better into account the issues raised by young people. This included engagement at national level with the Ministry in charge of youth, members of Parliaments and – on a few occasions – members of the national commissions on human rights and on elections. However, this engagement was largely ad hoc and owed much
to NAR’s pre-existing working relationship with these institutions. There was little follow-up, and as a result it was not possible to identify specific new on-going relationships or coordination mechanisms between NAR groups and the institutions concerned.

(v) **Sustainability**

The project drew sustainability from its high level of integration with NAR’s broader mission and activities. It has entrenched a training dissemination approach whose effectiveness was proven during the project. In particular, it helped NAR connect with a key sub-group of young people: those who are not in formal education. The project, by targeting young people cooperatives and other local associations of interest to “non-schooling” young people, was able to sensitize them to democracy and rights issues, without detracting from their interest in income generation – and more generally moving out of poverty. In some cases mentioned to the evaluators in Bugesera District, young people continued to be involved in a dialogue with the local youth committee on matters concerning district economic development.

Like all training-based projects, it is clear that the skills and competences acquired by the trainers will continue to be used, in at least some cases. It is regrettable, however, that some ToT participants only performed one or two subsequent training sessions. According to NAR, it was not possible to have trainers do many sessions without paying them a salary, hence the constraint on this aspect of sustainability.

As mentioned above in relation to impact, the institutional engagement element of the project drew its sustainability mainly from NAR’s pre-existing relationship with the relevant institutions. The project’s failure to provide for explicit follow-up mechanisms thus reduced its sustainability in this respect.

(vi) **UNDEF added value**

As mentioned in the previous chapter and above under relevance, NAR operated under somewhat difficult circumstances, to the extent that the subject matter of its project is widely considered to be sensitive in the Rwandan context. NGOs dealing with matters of rights and democracy, particularly when they address issues of genocide-related human rights violations, may be closely monitored. In this context, it was important for NAR to be able to demonstrate its independence, including in terms of its sources of funding. UNDEF, thanks to its status as a UN organization, was an appropriate source of funds for this project. A bilateral funder supporting a similar project might have caused added scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSIONS

(i) The project was well designed and based on a proven methodology. The three-pronged approach (training, public debate, engagement with authorities) was familiar to NAR and suitable to achieve planned objectives.

(ii) The baseline survey conducted at the outset constituted good project management practice, though its methodology was perfectible. The baseline survey was useful for NAR to identify specific areas where respondents’ knowledge appeared weak. However, the survey methodology was overly quantitative and did not include a qualitative dimension – which could have taken the form of interviews with a subset of the 1000 respondents. Such a qualitative methodology would have made it easier to repeat the survey at the end of the project – on a smaller scale – to assess the changes achieved by the activities.

(iii) The project made a significant contribution to “breaking the silence” among some of the targeted young people, about trauma and abuse they suffered, including as an indirect consequence of the 1994 genocide. Training sessions and TV and radio broadcasts encouraged some young people to come forward to NAR with accounts of past abuses. NAR directed those making the complaints to relevant legal assistance NGOs. This was a significant achievement in a context in which “silence” on past traumas often prevails.

(iv) The project achieved significant skills development outcomes among trainers. Those who attended the ToT clearly benefited from receiving information that was not widely available about international human rights mechanisms. As many of them were studying to become primary or secondary school teachers, they were likely to have significant opportunities for future dissemination of these skills.

(v) The project targeted some young people not usually addressed by human rights awareness raising activities. In addition to thousands of secondary school students (and some university level participants) the project addressed hundreds of “non-schooling” young people, partly by helping them also with income generating activities. This helped ensure exposure to the project by a constituency that is often difficult to motivate.

(vi) The ToT participants were underused. One weakness of the project was that ToT participants for the most part conducted only one or two subsequent training sessions. This was largely because the trainers had to prioritize their full-time studies, but had the unfortunate consequence that the ToT was not as effective in terms of follow-up as could have been expected.
(vii) **There was insufficient engagement with the authorities.** The key weakness of the project was that its third “prong” – support to young people to engage in dialogue with authorities at local or national levels – was insufficiently planned and was not adequately budgeted. As a result, activities in that field were relatively limited and lacked follow-up.

### VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

**(i) NAR should review its baseline survey methodology.** The organization should be encouraged in particular to include a qualitative dimension in its baseline surveys, which would make it easier to compare the starting situation with that at the end of the project.

**(ii) NAR should make more intensive use of trainers.** The organization should make it a formal requirement for ToT participants to commit to conducting a significant number of subsequent training sessions.

**(iii) NAR should review its future lobbying and advocacy strategy.** Engagement with authorities should be more formally resourced and planned, and the organization should provide on-going support to its members to conduct regular consultations with government representatives, members of the National Assembly and representatives of state institutions.

**(iv) NAR should reinforce its partnership with legal assistance and psychological support organizations.** As it successfully encouraged some young people to “break the silence” on past trauma and abuse, it is important that the organization be prepared to direct them to a range of NGOs that can provide tailored support, including legal and socio-psychological.

**(v) UNDEF should encourage applicants to conduct short “ex-post” surveys at the end of project, to compare these with baseline data.** UNDEF has been encouraging applicants to compile data (as part of the initial application procedure) demonstrating the need for their proposed intervention. It should also provide guidance to applicants concerning the implementation of simple surveys to be carried out toward the end of a project, to help assess its outcomes.
## ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
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| Relevance     | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | - Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
- Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
- Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | - To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?  
- To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?  
- Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
- What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? |
| Efficiency    | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | - Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
- Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?  
- Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives? |
| Impact        | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | - To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
- Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?  
- To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
- Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples? |
| Sustainability| To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | - To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
- Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)? |
| UNDEF value-added | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | - What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.).  
- Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

**Project documents:**
- Project Document, UDF-RWA-09-302
- Mid-term Progress Report
- Final Narrative Report
- Milestone Report
- Milestone Verification Mission Report
- NAR Baseline Survey
- Youth clubs and association workshop 2012 Eastern Province

**External sources:**
- Entries on Rwanda, Amnesty International Report, 2010-2012
- Submission by the Government of Rwanda to the Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, January 2011
- Annual report 2010-2011, Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
### ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function and Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eric Mahoro</td>
<td>Director, NAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Ndagijimana</td>
<td>Former Project Coordinator, NAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Ndizeye</td>
<td>Project Coordinator, NAR, former ToT participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bosco Mukeshimana</td>
<td>Finance Director, NAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Bigirimana</td>
<td>ToT participant, former student at Kigali Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty Mutesi</td>
<td>Lawyer, ToT trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clavère Gakundi</td>
<td>NAR club member, Bugesera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther Watese</td>
<td>NAR club member, Bugesera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole Wisizye</td>
<td>NAR club Secretary, Bugesera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dévote</td>
<td>NAR club member, Bugesera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrice</td>
<td>ToT participant, now lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Gahizi</td>
<td>Coordinator, Bugesera District Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Kananga</td>
<td>Member, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Director of Peace Building and Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mugao &amp; Gabi Muhiro</td>
<td>ToT participants, former Kigali Institute of Education students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Mugabo</td>
<td>Teacher, Kigali Lycée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enock Nurunziza</td>
<td>Executive Secretary, AJPRODHO human rights NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacharie Mugaribira</td>
<td>Assistant, good governance program, Justice and Peace Commission, Rwanda Episcopal Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Semarinyota</td>
<td>Consultant, author of Baseline Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gakuba</td>
<td>Journalist and author</td>
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# ANNEX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJPRODHO</td>
<td><em>Association de la jeunesse pour la promotion des droits de l’Homme et du développement</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>EDPRS</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIE</td>
<td>Kigali Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINIYOUTH</td>
<td>Minister of Youth and Information Communication and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Ner Again Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
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