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Democracy Fund

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**EVALUATION REPORT**



**TRANSTEC**  
PROJECT  
MANAGEMENT

**UDF-PHI-08-261 – Strengthening Philippine democracy at the grassroots**

**Date: 13 March 2012**

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**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF nor of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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## I. Executive Summary

### (i) **Project Data**

The project *Strengthening Philippine democracy at the grassroots* was part of a broader initiative focused around the Philippine national and local elections in May 2010, and ongoing work in electoral reform and voter education. UNDEF grant duration was for work between 1 October 2009 and 30 September 2011. It amounted to USD250,000, including USD25,000 for final evaluation costs. An over-spend of USD2,768.08 was met by the grantee.

The grantee was the Philippine Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER); the major implementing partner identified was the Consortium on Electoral Reform (CER), a coalition of 49 national organizations working in the area of electoral reform, for which IPER currently provides the secretariat.

The project had three components: 1) citizen-voter education (CVE); 2) leadership training for marginalized and vulnerable groups; and 3) the establishment of a nationwide election monitoring network.

### (ii) **Evaluation questions**

Evaluation questions relating to **relevance** revealed the project was clearly implemented with care and with insight into political processes in the Philippines and the remaining gaps in democratic rights among marginalized and vulnerable groups. The evaluators further focused on how the three components of the project were organized, in particular in relation to the large numbers of participants involved at different levels and the multiple sources of funding and phasing of the components.

In exploring the project's **effectiveness**, it was noted that the project achieved most of its aims, although inadequate planning to take account of the May 2010 elections meant that some activities had to be pushed into the closing months of the project and as a result not all outcomes were satisfactorily completed.

The large numbers of participants in the various activities attested to the effective outreach of the grantee. Not all of them were supported with UNDEF funding, however: 50 of the 656 CVE ToT participants; 500 CVE 'educators' of a total of an estimated 3,000; 10,000 volunteer election monitors of a total of 21,809. The leadership course was entirely funded by UNDEF, as was an Election Summit for reporting back to 100 stakeholders on the results of the monitoring process.

Three of the planned outputs were not completed by the end of the project implementation period: eight of the proposed 10 CVE Centres were established; the leadership training course modules and materials were piloted but not finalized; only four of the proposed 10 marginalized/vulnerable groups were reached through the leadership course.

The grantee noted in its final report the complexity of implementing projects which receive funding from more than one source, especially when different components of that project have different start and end dates and share personnel. However in gauging the efficiency of the project, the evaluators also noted that **efficient** implementation of a multi-donor project also requires careful planning within the framework of an overall organizational strategy and work plan that encompasses all activities and outputs. The grantee does not have such a strategy and work plan maybe because the organization's funding is tied to projects. This has

implications for the relationship between budget expended and results obtained, compromising those results (in terms of effectiveness, impact and sustainability)

Many of the participants contacted and interviewed responded favorably to questions relating to the **impact** of the project on them personally and on their work. They gave examples of how they were integrating what they had learned, or the experience they had had, into their own contexts. The impact of the election monitoring on the election process itself is impossible to demonstrate. The grantee suggested that the presence of domestic monitors in larger numbers at polling stations contributed to a reduction in violence and a more transparent, fair election. The cause and effect of this, however, is impossible to determine. In relation to the CVE component, most respondents had received the training, and felt empowered by it, but it was not possible to assess the extent of this nor, importantly, the exact nature of the secondary training being undertaken because of the lack of tracking of participants. Most of the leadership trainees who responded to requests for input had followed up by training their own constituencies. Again, however, the trainees have no formal ongoing support as they carry forward the leadership lessons they have learned.

An Election Summit held in September 2010 had two main aims: to report to a selected number of key stakeholders on the results of the election monitoring; and to set an agenda for electoral and political reform and advocacy between elections. The former was achieved through a CER report distributed to participants and launched at a media briefing. The latter took the form of a Summit Declaration presented to the meeting, however interviewees who attended the Summit indicated that the Declaration was in many ways a 'wish list' rather than a plan of action. One interviewee could not remember the Declaration at all, others were not sure what it was meant to achieve nor what happened to it after the summit.

The most obvious example of **sustainability** found was the integration of CVE modules and materials into the National Service Training Programme (NSTP) that is a compulsory element of all public universities and colleges. Some 3.5 million students undertake NSTP courses nationally each year. The grantee sees the preparation of trainers, however, as the end of its engagement with the CVE process. It does not follow up the trainers nor has it put in place any means of monitoring the content or the quality of their classes. Despite some examples of positive re-interpretation of the CVE materials for grassroots use, the grantee admitted that generally it did not know what was happening once the ToT had been completed. IPER's tendency to step back from the people who participate in its actions once the action itself is completed was underscored by all of the donors interviewed. The grantee has a good reputation for following up broader political processes and for analysis and insight, however it is seen as lacking the operational capacity to build on the processes it has put in place. One participant summed this up, noting that there seemed to be a lull in activity between project-related events: "Elections are every three years," he said, "but democracy is every day".

The evaluators found that many of the thousands of people who had been engaged in various elements of the project (21,809 volunteer election monitors, 656 CVE trainers, 3,000 CVE educators, 128 leadership trainees) had 'moved on', indeed the grantee had not kept a record of their contact details, and this raised concerns about the longer-term strategy of the grantee in building on the considerable efforts made in organizing the election monitoring and various training sessions. The respondents and interviewees who were contacted remained enthusiastic and mobilized, but often expressed a need for continuing support.

It became clear that the support from UNDEF had brought more than an expansion and extension of the grantee's work; it added a legitimacy deriving from perceptions of the UN as a 'neutral party'. Additionally, both the grantee and donors interviewed believed that UNDEF support brought to the technical challenge of voter education and monitor preparation a focus on human rights and the credibility of the UN as a guardian and defender of international human rights law. The UNDEF emblem also gave the grantee the legitimacy to recruit

election monitors in a non-partisan context, adding to their credibility and acceptance by the voting public and election authorities. In short, there was clear **value-added** in the support provided by UNDEF to this project.

### **(iii) Conclusions**

- ***It is clear from the outputs produced and the interview responses that all three components of the UNDEF-supported project were well organized and much valued. However many of the participants suggested that they needed more ongoing support,*** more materials and more guidance and these were not planned. To a large extent this seems to be because the grantee's dependence on multi-donor funding and the need to formulate activities into projects to acquire this has led to an 'event rather than process' approach that means that human resources in the form of engaged participants disappear when a project ends – a significant loss of resources.

- ***In the same way, both the fact that the organization does not maintain contact details of many participants, and from what respondents told the interviewers, the lack of follow-up of trainees after ToT*** also raises concerns about long-term quality control. Once trainers have completed their training and moved back into their constituencies, there is no way of knowing what they are teaching. This is particularly risky given the political nature of the issues being discussed.

- The evaluators noted that UNDEF's support of election monitoring, CVE and grassroots leadership initiatives sits comfortably in its mandate, ***however support of multi-donor funding is potentially problematic when there is no longer-term work plan that includes a comprehensive annual budget, broken down by activity and output,*** showing where each donor's funds are to be used. The fact that no overall budget for all activities implemented between 2009 and 2011 was produced means that it is impossible to ascertain how all UNDEF monies were allocated.

### **(iv) Recommendations**

- ***Volunteers, trainees and other participants*** in the various activities are a precious resource so, when planning any activities, ***put in place a plan for keeping in touch with those who have participated.*** To keep participants engaged and mobilized, consider ways to offer support, advice or extra materials.

- ***Keeping in touch with those who have participated in ToT*** and are now themselves training others is important in order to ***ensure quality control,*** whether that is in relation to CVE or leadership training.

- In relation also to the first recommendation, ***consider developing a medium-term plan that looks beyond events*** such as elections and translates the organization's vision for political reform, voter enfranchisement and the creation of democratic spaces into ongoing activity.

- If medium-term planning requires further support, ***discuss with regular donors the potential for funding for organizational capacity building,*** or bring in additional staff/short-term consultants to help.

- ***Communications materials are important ways to transmit clear messages to the audiences*** at which they are targeted, so these messages must be clear and effective. This will never be the case when they are formulated 'by committee', so while

continuing to invite grassroots constituents to participate in discussion of materials, ensure that such discussion is guided by someone with communications expertise, and buy this in short-term if necessary.

- ***UNDEF may Consider requiring all grantees to submit a total activity budget, with UNDEF's allocation clearly indicated***, when supporting actions that have several donors. This is the only way to ensure that funds are used appropriately.

## II. Introduction and development context

### (i) ***The project and evaluation objectives***

The project *Strengthening Philippine democracy at the grassroots* ran with UNDEF support from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2011. UNDEF's grant amounted to USD250,000, including USD25,000 for final evaluation costs. An over-spend of USD2,768 was met by the grantee. The project had three components: 1) "comprehensive, long-term, continuing citizen-voter education (CVE), 2) " leadership training for marginalized and vulnerable groups; and 3) the establishment of a nationwide citizens' political and election monitoring network. The project was part of a longer-term, broader initiative described below.

The grantee was the Philippine Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) and the major implementing partner identified was the Consortium on Electoral Reform (CER), a coalition of 49 national organizations working in the area of electoral reform, for which IPER currently provides the secretariat.

Citizen-voter education was to be achieved through Training of Trainers (ToT), with the participants selected predominantly from academia, NGOs and people's organizations. These trainers would then undertake CVE for "educators" who had access to people at grassroots level, most notably those belonging to 10 identified marginalized and vulnerable groups: women, indigenous people, urban poor, people with disabilities, young people, workers, peasants, the elderly, fisherfolk and Moro. To support the trainers, the project aimed to establish 10 regional and one national CVE centres, and produce or update training materials. This component of the project was co-funded by a number of donors at various stages, including the European Union (EU), USAID through the Philippine office of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and UNDEF.

The introduction of automated voting for the elections called for May 2010 pushed the importance of independent monitoring of elections higher up the agenda, since it was seen as fundamental to building confidence in the new system and thus encouraging people to vote. UNDEF support was used as co-financing of a national initiative of CER called *Bantay-Eleksyon 2010*. Within this broader monitoring initiative, UNDEF's support allowed for monitors to be prepared and become operational at provincial levels, as well as for the reprinting and dissemination of a domestic monitoring guide.

The leadership training component, including a summit reviewing the conduct of the 2010 elections, was wholly funded by UNDEF. Because priority was given to preparation for and monitoring of the elections, this component did not begin until 2011 and consequently ran as a pilot only. Pilot materials prepared for this component were finalized after the project had ended.

The multi-donor funding of two components of the project resulted in complications both at planning and implementation stages. The grantee's final report notes that "although, in the main, the various deliverables under each contract were accomplished and management arrangements were adhered to, adjustments were made as to which staff function or activity to charge each funding partner. Among these adjustments were the composition of Project Teams at various periods, and the re-shuffling of activities to maximize funding availability. However, the UNDEF team was not affected much by these."

Despite these complex arrangements, the UNDEF project was acquitted on time and with only a small budget overrun. The anticipated total project budget was US\$337,000 – of which UNDEF would provide US\$250,000. Final accounts show total expenditure as US\$227,768.08.



### **(ii) Evaluation methodology**

An international expert designated to lead the evaluation prepared a preliminary planning note (Launch Note) in December 2011 based on a review of project documentation (see Annex 2: documents reviewed). A number of questionnaires were prepared in consultation with a local expert, tailored to the different respondent categories (CVE trainees and educators, election monitors, leadership trainees) and to take account of unfavorable conditions that limited travel within the Philippines.

Preliminary questions were also sent to the grantee before the field visit, to allow staff to prepare. All the questionnaires were followed up by SMS (more common than e-mail in the Philippines) as well as e-mail, telephone conversations and where possible face-to-face interviews. The international and local experts conducted interviews in the Philippines for one week from 16 to 20 January 2012.

### **(iii) Development context**

The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands divided into three island groups: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. It has been a consistent economic under-performer, with macroeconomic growth anaemic by regional standards and an income poverty rate that has remained virtually unchanged in recent years at about 30 percent. One of the main challenges to administration (including elections) and poverty reduction in the Philippines is that of remoteness. Substantial areas of the archipelago, virtually all disadvantaged in material terms, are difficult to reach.

The country is divided into a number of political subdivisions: cities, provinces, municipalities and *barangay* (municipal sub-divisions). Government agencies have offices based at the regional and provincial levels, while the legislators (congressmen) have offices at the district level (each district comprising several cities and/or municipalities). The country is currently divided into 17 regions, 80 provinces, 138 cities, 1,486 municipalities and 42,025 *barangay*. The mayors, governors and their legislative members (*sanggunian*) are elected for a three-year term with the *barangay* officials elected for a five-year term. Basic services, resources and regulatory powers, including the provision of mechanisms for civil society participation in local governance, are devolved to local level.

This highly complex, decentralized system has been applauded as empowering people at grassroots level. The Local Government Code enacted in the Philippines in 1991, is considered “the most radical and far-reaching policy to address the decades-old problem of an over-centralized politico-administrative system with most significant and administrative decisions concentrated in Manila”.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Brillantes, Alex B Jr: “Decentralized democratic governance under the Local Government Code: A governmental perspective” in V. A. Bautista et al: *Introduction to Public Administration, A reader* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), University of the Philippines, 2004, p.329.

The civil society movement in the Philippines is one of the strongest and active in Asia. However, decentralized government and the plethora of levels at which government functions have also increased the opportunities for vested interests to influence officials and, where they cannot corrupt, use violence and electoral fraud (vote buying, vote rigging) to seize power. This has occurred at all levels, most notably around presidential elections, when election violence has killed hundreds of people in so-called 'hot spots' such as Masbate and Mindanao (see map).

Politics in the Philippines has also long been in the grip of powerful families, dynasties that use force and money to ensure that they stay in power. Traditionally this power passes from father to son or brother, however where there is no male family member to take up the mantle, female members step up. This has resulted in a much misunderstood high rate of participation of women in government, including as heads of state. At grassroots level, women are often disenfranchised because of a lack of trust in democratic processes and fear of election-related violence.



**Map of the Philippines showing electoral regions**

Equitable outcomes of development and economic growth are closely linked to democratic leadership and universal suffrage. The Philippine election system has however often been characterized by intimidation, violence and vote-buying. The nation-wide implementation of an automated election system in 2010 was therefore seen as a critical step in ensuring that the local and national elections of 2010 would be free, fair and credible.

### III. Project objectives, strategy, and implementation

#### (i) Project approach and strategy


The project's stated aim was "to empower key leaders and citizens at the grassroots; specifically, to raise the political awareness of marginalized and vulnerable sectors, to heighten their participation in the electoral process, and to develop their capability for political leadership."

To achieve its aim, the project strategy focused on three components:

- Citizen-voter education (CVE), specifically the Training of Trainers and educators for "comprehensive, long-term and continuing voter education";
- Domestic election monitoring, specifically at the local level as part of the broader *Bantay-Eleksyon 2010* initiative; and
- Leadership courses, designed to train leaders of the identified marginalized groups to participate in governance.

Activities and projected outputs are summarized in the logical framework diagram that follows.

#### (ii) Logical framework



## IV. EQ answers / findings

### (i) *Relevance*

#### ▪ *Election monitoring*

UNDEF support for the IPER project began in October 2009 and the Philippines national and local elections were called for May 2010, just seven months later. The imminent date for elections had been known at the time of the grantee's submission.

The preparation of volunteers to monitor the elections, however, had begun sometime before UNDEF support was agreed. In fact, IPER has been involved in election monitoring and the preparation of domestic monitors since the 2007 elections as a lead partner in the CER consortium. In anticipation of the 2010 elections, CER again prepared and coordinated election monitors under the umbrella heading *Bantay Eleksyon* (Election Watch) 2010. A number of donors supported *Bantay Eleksyon*, including the EU and USAID through IFES. To this extent, the UNDEF funding went into an existing pot of donor funds. Additionally, however, the grantee explained that this additional funding allowed monitors to be prepared at municipal and provincial levels in addition to national level.

Between October 2009 and May 2010, therefore, IPER contributed to *Bantay Eleksyon* preparation actions as well as coordinating the preparation of materials and lobbying. As a lead member of the NGO advisory group to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), IPER had privileged access to information on the automated system that was to be introduced and was well positioned to monitor procedures throughout the electoral process, not just on election day itself.

Monitoring of the elections, and reporting regularly through media liaison activities, was seen as a vital stage in increasing voter confidence in the elections and thus encouraging people to vote. Given the country's history of rigged elections, vote buying and strong-arm tactics by powerful families and interest groups, voters needed to be convinced that their vote still counted. As the presidency of Gloria Arroyo came to an end, additionally, there was a widely held lack of confidence in democratic processes and serious disenfranchisement of vulnerable and marginalized groups.

CER's final report on the elections was positive, concluding that the elections had been fair and open, with fewer incidents of procedural inaccuracies and incidents, and lower levels of election-day violence than in past elections. Not all electoral reform organizations agreed. USAID/IFES, which supported seven different organizations to prepare and coordinate domestic monitors and report on the elections, advised that many other organizations raised concerns about the automated voting system and the conduct of the elections. IPER/CER's high profile with the media and relationship with COMELEC, however, gave its conclusions more weight with both media and public. IPER's close relationship with COMELEC was also cited by another donor as potentially affecting CER's perspective on the election monitoring results. However, the wide gap between the winning and second-placed candidates left little room for doubt that the will of the people had been upheld.

The evaluators sent a questionnaire to 399 volunteers to seek input on their participation. Sampling of the monitors' list resulted in 588 potential respondents however this was reduced when some advised that they had discussed the questionnaire with others and would only respond through their provincial coordinators. Despite persistent reminders, text messages and telephone follow-up, only 18 completed questionnaires were received.

Most of those who responded to the evaluation questionnaire were students or had some sort of link with one of the CER organizations, although they came from a wide variety of backgrounds. The overwhelming majority were happy with the preparation they received, the coordination and their personal safety, although there were differing perceptions of how well the monitors were accepted by the COMELEC personnel on the ground. Some of the volunteers had also monitored the 2007 elections; all the respondents said they were much more interested in politics since volunteering, and would definitely volunteer again.


One volunteer who had monitored both the 2007 and 2010 elections said that the difference in 2010 was that IPER/CER preparation took an entirely non-partisan approach. It did not engage in political recommendations, but focused on the roles of political leaders, emphasizing the importance of voting for candidates whose values and actions clearly demonstrated concern for the rights of all people.

The election monitoring component accounted for USD45,000 of the UNDEF grant: USD25,000 for training of monitors; USD5,000 for coordination with COMELEC; and USD15,000 for media advocacy. EU funding of approximately 200,000 Euros was intended to be used for volunteer allowances, office overheads and equipment (computers, cellphones).

In support of its work in election monitoring, IPER continued to position itself to facilitate and act as a catalyst at a number of levels. For example, IPER targeted “hot spots” in which to build cooperation or at the very least a stand-off among leaders and groups involved in violence and corruption. In Masbate, for example, a small island in Region 5 on the Philippines electoral map, rampant warlord-driven violence accompanied by a vibrant arms trade and smuggling rackets had produced a near “no-go” zone where even government hesitates to work. IPER succeeded in bringing together church leaders to mediate between the warlords and military to negotiate to reduce election-day violence.


## BE 2010 Activities and Results

### ORGANIZING and RECRUITMENT



Area	Volunteers
Area 1a	1,390
Area 1b	1,731
Area 2	3,222
Area 3	690
Area 4	2,673
Area 5	1,228
Area 6	1,138
Area 7	3,993
Area 8	1,660
Area 9	1,995
Area 10a	648
Area 10b	1,441
<b>Total</b>	<b>21,809</b>

### Distribution by sex



### Distribution by age

15-25	26-35	36-45	46-up	Unsorted
51.3%	6.9%	4.3%	10.5%	27.0%

### Profiles of the BE volunteers recruited



- **Citizen-voter education (CVE)**

Citizen-voter education (CVE) also has a longer history than the UNDEF project. IPER explained that the ‘C’ is added to the simple concept of ‘voter education’ to differentiate technical education in voting procedures from the kind of rights-based education that emphasizes the importance of voting, the right to be represented and the importance therefore of making choices that will respect citizens’ rights regardless of who they are. Ultimately, IPER said, the aim of CVE is “to produce a groundswell from below, disempowering corrupt actors”.

CVE was first promoted during a National Electoral Reform Summit in 2003 and IPER/CER have been working in this area since that time, including by developing a CVE training module (with UNDP support).

IPER intended to step up CVE activities in preparation for the May 2010 elections “to motivate and prepare voters to fully participate”, however the focus on recruiting and preparing election monitors meant that in reality CVE activities did not begin until after the elections. IPER


emphasizes that CVE must be seen as an ongoing action.

IPER’s approach to CVE aims to reach into vulnerable and marginalized groups in particular by training trainers who can then train “educators” who already have reach into these groups, in particular NGOs, media representatives, academics, church groups and the social action arm of the Catholic church.

IPER has trained 656 trainers, 50 of these with UNDEF support. Some of those trained were trainers in NGOs working with vulnerable groups, members of church groups and media, however most were academics teaching in the National Service Training Programme (NSTP), a nationwide programme covering 111 public universities and colleges (and some private institutions on a voluntary basis). The NSTP is compulsory for all students, who usually take this subject in their first or second year (see also “Sustainability” below).



**Poster with the CVE message “Your vote. Our future.”**



**Pyramid model of outreach to grassroots level**

As a resource to the CVE trainers who had been trained, the project also included the setting-up of a national CVE centre and 10 regional centres. These would act as a repository of the training and resource materials, a communications hub for the trainees and a centre for organizing training sessions. IPER explained that they originally targeted schools to host these centres, but soon realized that this was logistically difficult – too many committees and levels of approval – so focused instead on identifying organizational hosts that had the facilities or committed personnel. By the time the project ended, because of this shift in organizational structure, only eight of the 10 regional centres had been established. By January 2012, the ninth has been set up and the tenth is in negotiation. IPER admitted,

though, that the CVE centres are at the moment passive, maintained through the focal point but without a strategy. They are not aware whether they are actually being used. The CVE ToT and educators' support component of the UNDEF project accounted for USD25,000. This did not include the materials, which cost USD18,000 to produce. A series of posters targeting the various marginalized/vulnerable groups was also produced. These are in English. The messages they aim to transmit were decided by the trainers 'in committee' within their networks and are therefore not consistent except for the generic CVE slogan "Your vote. Our future."

- ***Leadership training***

The third component of the UNDEF project included the development of a module for basic leadership training in democracy, and the implementation of training in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Because of the focus on election monitoring and then getting the CVE component up and running, the leadership training component was pushed into 2011. Four meetings of the project team took place between March and July 2011 to develop the materials, and training sessions were then organized in August and September 2011. Because of this truncated implementation period, the training was considered only as a pilot. Fifty-five national/regional trainers went through the leadership training, along with 73 sectoral leaders. IPER explained that, while the CVE training had focused on the transfer of information and concepts to trainees, the leadership training was much more interactive. The training targeted potential leaders, generally involved with one of the identified vulnerable groups, and engaged them in thinking about and sharing the context in which they work and the challenges their constituencies face. IPER saw the leadership training as a third stage, building on the CVE and monitoring to build a strong voter constituency by being able to demonstrate the validity of participation in voting and preparing participants to consider engaging in leadership at a higher level.

The trainees received copies of sector-specific training manuals and modules. The contents are generic, derived from the basic module, but have a short sector-specific section at the back of each booklet. All the materials are in English. Only six participants in the leadership training responded to the evaluation questionnaire sent out (and followed up with text messages and phone calls). Five respondents additionally were interviewed by phone and two in person. UNDP explained that their strategy for 2012-14 will focus on leadership and in particular equipping grassroots leaders so that they can challenge existing leadership. Their initial targets will be women and young people. The costs of the leadership training component amounted to USD25,000.

- ***Election Summit***

Programmed under the leadership component but more logically bracketed with the election monitoring component, was an Election Summit organized by CER to share its final election monitoring report with approximately 100 stakeholders, including government, NGOs, donors and media. The conclusion of the summit saw the adoption of a Summit Declaration which IPER explained was aimed at setting the agenda for electoral reform between 2010 and the next elections. The summit costs were not detailed in the final budget, however non-specific costs of the UNDEF project included staff (USD39,500), travel and expenses, rent, a vehicle, computer equipment and sundries (USD60,000) and programme support (planning, staff development, monitoring and reporting) amounting to USD12,500.

## ***(ii) Effectiveness***

The project was completed within the planned time-frame, however the final report states that a number of activities had to be rescheduled or truncated because of the timing of the Philippine elections (May 2010, seven months after the start of the project). Materials for the CVE were not completed before the elections, although the emphasis on "continuing" voter

education in the project plan suggested that they would be used in the future. For the first six months of the project, the focus was on preparation of election monitors.

The planned leadership training was not really begun until after the elections (there was one planning workshop early in the project). This meant that, by the time the training had been piloted, there was only time to schedule training for six of the 10 identified marginalized groups: women, indigenous peoples, urban poor, people with disabilities, young people and workers. In the event, the sessions for people with disabilities and young people were cancelled when Typhoon Pedring hit the Philippines in September 2011, and a protest rally by the Philippines Airlines Labour Union led to the cancellation of domestic flights and consequent cancellation of the planned educators' training.

The following outcomes and outputs were achieved:

- 50 participants were trained as trainers in CVE with UNDEF funding (of a total of 656);
- 500 "educators" were trained by the trainers in CVE (of a total of an estimated 3,000);
- 500 CVE training manuals, 500 CDs and 1,000 posters were produced (of a total 900 manuals, 2,080 CDs and 2,000 posters);
- An election monitoring guide was revised and distributed to volunteers;
- 10,000 volunteers were recruited, trained and deployed as election monitors (of a total of 21,809);
- 7 national reports on election progress were circulated;
- 5 press conferences and 3 briefings were organized for media on the election monitoring;
- A pilot leadership course was developed and tested in two national ToT sessions for 55 trainers;
- The leadership course was then rolled out and tested with 73 local sector leaders;
- An Election Summit was convened for reporting back to 100 stakeholders on the results of the monitoring process.

Three of the planned outputs were not produced by the end of the project implementation period:

- Eight of the proposed 10 CVE Centres were established; a ninth was subsequently in place by January 2012 and the tenth is still being negotiated;
- The leadership training course modules and materials were piloted but not finalized until after the project had ended;
- The grassroots outreach linked to the leadership exercise was affected by the rushed timetable towards the end of the project, with only four of the proposed 10 marginalized/vulnerable groups being reached.

The CVE, which had originally been planned to take place before the May 2010 elections, was postponed and did not begin until June 2010. Materials were also not produced until after June 2010. Questioned why CVE began after the elections, when it had been intended to promote understanding and to encourage voting, IPER explained that the election monitoring exercise (recruitment, training, deployment) had taken more time than anticipated and that, in its view, CVE is an ongoing activity that is not necessarily linked to one specific election period.

The delay in starting the leadership training sessions, after planning workshops to develop the course early in 2011, was also explained as a result of the focus on election monitoring in 2010 and then the rush to begin CVE. Recruitment of trainers was not begun until other activities had been completed and so materials production was also delayed. The pilot training sessions eventually took place in August and September 2011, so the modules could not be finalized until after the end of the project (30 September 2011). The delay in this component of the project also meant that the plan to organize leadership training outreach to 10 marginalized/vulnerable groups was revised, and only four training sessions took place.



An educators' training session scheduled for the last week of September was also cancelled when the Philippines Airlines labour union called a strike and flights were cancelled.

IPER/CER recruited and prepared 21,809 volunteers as election monitors (10,000 with UNDEF funding), equipped them with basic materials, produced seven reports on progress and engaged the media (through five press conferences and three briefings) to get out information about the elections and the new automated system. This work was all non-partisan, with CER members that have a political preference removing themselves from the actions.

Initially IPER had intended to recruit 80,000 volunteers as election monitors, but this proved too costly (each volunteer received a small honorarium and expenses). There was additionally a challenge because most of the volunteers were students, and had to be recruited before educational establishments closed in March, two months before the elections. As a result, on election day, some 25,000 of the 85,000 polling stations were monitored, substantially below expectations. Volunteer monitors were provided with a monitoring manual, primers and brochures, posters, final testing and sealing kits and an election-day monitoring kit, including IDs, vests, visors and t-shirts.

The evaluators had an opportunity to review the posters produced for all of the marginalized and vulnerable groups targeted by the project. The posters are attractive but the messages on them are unclear, often not messages at all but explanations. In communications terms, this is unlikely to be effective in encouraging those seeing the posts to act (for example by voting, or not selling their vote). IPER explained that the posters were designed "in committee", with the trainers, educators and target groups discussing the wording and proposing the text. While this consultative process may seem laudable, it does not necessarily result in effective communications materials.

### ***(iii) Efficiency***

#### **▪ *Complexity of multi-donor projects***

IPER noted in its final report the complexity of implementing projects which receive funding from more than one source, especially when different components of that project have different start and end dates, share personnel and inter-relate in relation to jointly funded materials, temporary staff, meetings and events.

Multi-donor funding also makes evaluation of the relationship between expenditure and outputs difficult, especially in the absence of a total activity budget (i.e., one that reflects all donor inputs and all outputs so that each donor's contribution can be seen as part of an overall budget). The budget submitted by the grantee, however, shows that UNDEF funds were directed to anticipated costs and, moreover, that target numbers for participants and printed outputs were exceeded.

Nevertheless, efficient use of funds goes beyond simply ensuring that clear budget allocations are made and demonstrated to donors. It requires careful planning within the framework of an overall organizational strategy and work plan that encompasses all activities and outputs. Neither IPER nor CER had such a strategy and work plan and, in IPER's case, this may be precisely because the organization's funding is tied to projects. As a result, funds expended may not give the longer-term results that would be possible if a strategic ("linear") rather than project-focused ("cyclical") approach were taken.

#### (iv) Impact

##### ▪ Election monitoring

As already noted, the monitoring of elections in May 2010 took place as anticipated, with recruitment, preparation and deployment of monitors taking place, albeit in smaller numbers than anticipated (overall – the numbers planned for the UNDEF-funded part of the monitoring activities was achieved).

There was, as evidenced above, some impact on individual monitors, who expressed an accrued interest in democratic process and a desire to engage further in monitoring and/or to take an interest in national politics.

However the impact of the monitoring on the election process itself is impossible to demonstrate. IPER suggested that the presence of domestic monitors in larger numbers at polling stations contributed to a reduction in violence and a more transparent, fair election. The cause and effect of this, however, is impossible to determine. Moreover, as the EU and USAID representatives interviewed stressed, not all organizations fielding monitors were as impressed with the electoral process as IPER/CER was.

The views of the volunteer monitors themselves differ. Some were enthusiastic with the automated voting system while others saw it as potentially corruptible. Some were impressed with the fact that COMELEC accepted them as monitors while others felt that COMELEC was unresponsive to reports of problems.

##### ▪ CVE follow-up

There are some positive examples of re-interpretation of the CVE materials for grassroots use (see box), however IPER admitted that generally it did not know what all the trainees were doing with their training once the ToT had been completed. IPER estimates that the trainers have passed on CVE training to some 3,000 educators, with UNDEF funding supporting 500 of these (mainly through materials provision and overheads), however there is no way to objectively measure this.

Although some respondents gave examples of what they were doing, most did not respond to requests for information, many had simply fallen out of contact and IPER itself

##### Grassroots CVE follow-up

The Philippine Educational Theater Association and the organization Freedom to Create used the CVE basic training manual to develop a theatre piece and accompanying study guide called *The Virgin Voters' Campaign: I want my first vote to count!*

The play (DVD) tells the story of Juan Tamad, the son of two overseas workers, and is set in the imaginary land of Isla Filiminimon. Juan registers to vote but is concerned at political corruption. He is disturbed when his preferred candidate is not elected, but decides he can at least make sure the elected person does his job properly, so gets involved in youth community groups in order to “transform the nation one person at a time – starting with himself”. In time he becomes an inspiration to others.



The package is designed for teachers, educators and community-based organization leaders involved in voter education. It aims to:

- Explain the importance of the right to suffrage and why people should vote;
- Identify criteria for choosing a candidate: Effective, Ethical, Empowering;
- Understand the mechanisms of voting and how to safeguard one's vote;
- Underline the importance of citizen participation in good governance;
- Help users define an agenda/wish list for the candidates.

The package also includes checklists on security and processes, as well as lists of further resources and reminders of dates and times.

admitted that one of the problems of targeting students as educators is that they move on after a year or two, thus reducing both the impact of the training and the sustainability.

Twelve participants in the CVE component responded to requests for information, most of them teachers or NGO trainers, and all of them positive about the training they received. Most gave examples of how they are using the training. This ranged from including it as part of NSTP community immersion placements, through inclusion of the issues in school classes on government, to integrating the lessons into work in a farming community. A number said that they needed more materials and further support. There is no way to assess the contents of the secondary CVE that is being implemented.

#### ▪ **Leadership training**

Participants in the leadership training emphasized the value of the training. Most had followed up by training their own constituencies. One participant had organized out-of-school training for young people and said that they are now organizing themselves to advocate their needs to *barangay* officials. Another applauded the level of political analysis in the leadership training and said that he had been able to integrate the materials into courses he leads for the Department of Agriculture. Although he has been asked to consider running for office at *barangay* level, he has decided to use his leadership skills to work with other candidates, influencing rather than standing himself. Yet another respondent explained how he has used the lessons he learned in the leadership pilot within his work constituency – the jeepney drivers in his city.

In the “hot spot” of Masbate, the leadership training has had different results, with the trainees joining together to challenge the existing leadership. They belong to colleges, community and farmers’ associations, women’s groups, bankers’ and church associations. One respondent from Masbate said that he saw the leadership training as a way of leading transformation in his area. Since the training, he and other participants had created a group called Masbate Advocates for Peace (MAP), a multi-sectoral group of 15 that meets weekly and discusses local leadership issues. On a personal level, he said, he had come to realize that leadership is for all sectors, not just one group, even in conflict areas.

#### ▪ **Election Summit**

The aim of the Summit was twofold: to report to a selected number of key stakeholders on the results of the election monitoring; and to set an agenda for electoral and political reform and advocacy between elections.

The former was achieved through a CER report distributed to participants and launched at a media briefing. The latter took the form of a Summit Declaration presented to the meeting.

Interviewees who attended the Summit indicated that the Summit Declaration was in many ways a ‘wish list’ rather than a plan of action. One interviewee could not remember the Declaration at all, others were not sure what it was meant to achieve nor what happened to it after the summit.

One donor suggested that neither CER nor IPER has the capacity to



**Leadership training: Youth sector trainees**

operationalize such a plan in the absence of dedicated operational staff and access to core (non-project) resources. As a result, while IPER/CER move the agenda forward, there is little external engagement.

### **(v) Sustainability**

#### **▪ Loss of resources**

The “cyclical rather than linear” approach to programming has implications for the sustainability of the project. The election monitoring component effectively ended within days of the May 2010 elections (with the final report-back at the Election Summit being seen as a separate action). This left 21,809 volunteers at a loose end. While many, even most, would not have expected further contact, some would most certainly have gladly remained part of a pool of willing workers ready to be activated when needed – for example in actions such as campaigning, awareness raising, potentially also CVE. Of the 17 completed questionnaires received from election monitoring volunteers, 15 said they would definitely wish to remain engaged, one said “maybe” and one did not respond to the question. Failing to harness this large pool of human resources, now trained and motivated to volunteer to promote democratic process, is a lost opportunity and suggests a lack of longer-term planning and strategic vision.

#### **▪ CVE and the NSTP**

To a lesser extent the same is true of the CVE and leadership training components, where the approach was very much to ‘plant a seed’ and then rely on others – trainers, educators – to then nurture the plant and sow further seeds. The difference here is that the first-level trainees, at least, were carefully chosen from groups already known to IPER and engaged in one way or another in training, democracy or relevant linked activities. Nevertheless, the fact that the databases kept on trainees and participants across the project do not systematically include contact details, are not kept updated and no ongoing contacts are made suggests, again, a lack of awareness of the enormous resource project participants represent for the organization in the future.

Once it had left the hands of IPER, CVE is vested longer-term in the academic institutions mandated to include it in their curriculum as part of the NSTP. This programme aims to develop community service among students and CVE has recently been included as a compulsory component. Following CVE training, students do a two-month placement in the community. Currently approximately 3.5 million students undertake NSTP courses nationally each year. The coordinator of NSTP courses in a Manila university explained that the curriculum used there is based on the IPER modules and takes a rights-based approach. Because it is a compulsory element of the curriculum, it is budgeted by the university. Alongside the NSTP programme, a teachers’ and educators’ unit, PSNET, has also been established; it has been supported by UNDP since 2005.

IPER sees the preparation of trainers, however, as the end of its engagement with the CVE process. It therefore does not follow up the trainers nor has it put in place any means of monitoring the content of their classes or the content or quality of either the trainers or the educators that take the CVE further into the various grassroots communities. IPER explained that this was because of a lack of resources, however there is also no specific strategy for follow-up. Despite some examples of positive re-interpretation of the CVE materials for grassroots use, IPER admitted that generally it did not know what was happening once the ToT had been completed. IPER estimates that the trainers have passed on CVE training to some 3,000 educators, with UNDEF funding supporting 500 of these (mainly through materials provision and overheads).

One NSTP trainer said that her faculty monitors the CVE training she gives, and that she uses IPER publications as reference materials. She also said, however, that not only do teachers translate the materials but also the ideas. Another trainer, a teacher in a religious institution, explained that he introduced 'spiritual context' into the CVE materials – something that IPER said it had specifically removed from voter education because historically religious affiliation has been used to influence people to vote for a certain candidate.

The lack of a strategy for follow-up was illustrated in the difficulty of contacting CVE trainees and educators for this evaluation. Despite being given access to a full database of participants in the UNDEF-funded CVE exercise, the evaluators found that only 40 per cent of the participants' entries included contact details; many of the phone numbers and email addresses given were no longer valid. Questionnaires were sent to 78 people (44 trainers and 34 educators), sampled through purposive sampling based on area/region, sex and contact availability. Only 18 responses were received, and three phone interviews were made with respondents who sent messages to say they did not have Internet access.

IPER's tendency to step back from the people who participate in its actions once the action itself is completed was underscored by all of the donors interviewed. IPER has a good reputation for following up broader political processes and for analysis and insight, however it is seen as lacking the operational capacity to build on the processes it has put in place. One participant summed this up quite succinctly, noting that there seemed to be a lull in activity between project-related events: "Elections are every three years," he said, "but democracy is every day".

#### **(vi) UNDEF value-added**

IPER noted that the support from UNDEF brought more than an expansion and extension of its work; it added a legitimacy that came from broad perceptions of the UN as a neutral party. Additionally, UNDEF support brought to the technical challenge of voter education and monitor preparation a focus on human rights and the credibility of the UN as a guardian and defender of international human rights law. IPER believed that conducting training under an UNDEF banner was much more effective than simply quoting national human rights legislation, particularly at grassroots level. IPER said that many participants in the project were surprised, at first, to learn that there is an agency within the UN system that is dedicated to democracy. They noted that most democratic debate in Asia is organized outside UN institutions and processes and that, in fact, at most meetings the UN is seen as a target for advocacy on democracy, not a proponent. People were pleased that the UN, through UNDEF, was in fact a partner in building democracy.

As a result, IPER explained, the relationship with UNDEF was given high visibility. This is in contrast to the funding relationship with the EU, which is strictly controlled and limited in any case to specific instances where the EU emblem can be used, and USAID branding which is 'problematic' in the Philippines context. IPER also explained that the UNDEF emblem gave IPER the legitimacy to recruit election monitors. Whereas COMELEC had in the past only recognized domestic observers, foreign observers and the media as acceptable monitors, in 2010 the BE monitors were allowed to observe alongside them. The UNDP representative interviewed expressed his pleasure that UNDEF had stepped in to fund IPER's work when UNDP's support ended (UNDP has shifted priorities to focus on local democracy, with a pilot strategy targeting young people and women). There was a perception that UNDEF 'does' democracy and that other UN agencies might sow the seeds for more sustained UNDEF activity in-country, as well as provide some technical support to implementing organizations.

## V. Conclusions

*i. The three components of the UNDEF-supported project were implemented with care and with insight into political processes in the Philippines and the remaining gaps in democratic rights among marginalized and vulnerable groups.*

The election monitoring component was completed early in the project by June 2010; however the focus on this one component meant that the other two components, CVE and leadership training, were not effectively begun until July 2010 and so the opportunity was missed to feed into the 2010 elections. Whether or not they will have any impact on the next elections is therefore unclear, especially because they are seen as completed actions and, despite statements that they are ongoing, any continuing activity is beyond the reach of the grantee. There is a real concern that, come the next elections, the monitoring, training and leadership activities would have to begin again almost from scratch.

*ii. From the responses of participants in all three components of the UNDEF-funded activity, it is clear that the actions undertaken – recruiting, preparing and deploying election monitors; organizing CVE ToT and educator training; developing and piloting leadership training for grassroots leaders – were well organized and much valued.* However many of the participants suggested that they were now left on their own and needed more support, more materials and more guidance. This was not foreseen and is not planned.

*iii. It is evident from the timetabling and implementation of activities, and the advice of donor representatives interviewed, that IPER's dependence on multi-donor funding and the consequent need to formulate activities into projects has led to an event rather than process, approach* that means that human resources in the form of engaged participants easily are easily lost between projects, representing missed opportunities and reinventing of the wheel.

*iv. This stepping back from on-training after ToT also raises concerns about long-term quality control.* IPER admitted that, once trainers had completed their training and moved back into their constituencies, there was no way to know what they were passing on to their students and trainees. This is particularly risky given the highly charged political scene in the Philippines and the very high level of political partisanship.

*v. The focus on project rather than process also indicated a lack of longer-term strategy* that would guide a work plan and allow IPER to operationalize its vision and capitalize on its hard-won and privileged position as a recognized source of expertise and experience in political process and reform in the Philippines.

*vi. In order to develop longer-term strategies, plan outputs and demonstrate results, donors confirm, IPER needs to develop its technical capacity in areas such as programme planning, and monitoring and evaluation.*

*vii. From the review of materials, it is also evident that IPER's outputs would benefit from bringing in some communications expertise so that the messages to*



**be conveyed – through posters, leaflets, manuals and modules – are clear** and targeted to the very specific audiences for which they are intended. All outputs would also benefit, donors agreed, from being passed through both a human rights and a gender perspective lens, to be developed within key staff or bought in from outside.

**viii.** UNDEF's support of election monitoring, CVE and grassroots leadership initiatives is a close fit to its mandate. **However support of multi-donor funding is potentially problematic when there is no longer-term workplan that includes a comprehensive annual budget**, broken down by activity and output, showing where each donor's funds are to be used. The fact that no overall budget for all activities implemented between 2009 and 2011 was produced means that it is impossible to ascertain how all UNDEF monies were allocated.

## VI. Recommendations

**i. (Based on Conclusions ii and iii): It is important to remember that volunteers, trainees and other participants in the various activities are a precious resource – both now and in the future.** When planning any activities, put in place a basic plan for keeping in touch with those who have participated, for example through an on-line network, an electronic/hard copy newsletter, a six-monthly forum (perhaps organized regionally through a nominated focal point) or some other suitable mechanism. To keep participants engaged and mobilized, consider ways to offer support, advice or extra materials – this ongoing network/help desk facility could be presented in project form for external funding.

**ii. (Based on Conclusion iv): Keeping in touch with those who have participated in ToT and are now themselves training others is particularly important in order to ensure some form of quality control**, whether that is in relation to CVE or leadership training. Obviously IPER staff cannot monitor every trainer, but spot checks, or a regular get-together, or some form of on-line forum at which issues can be discussed and ideas can be shared are just some of the ways of monitoring progress and quality.

**iii. (Based on Conclusion v): In relation also to the first recommendation, consider developing a medium-term plan that looks beyond “events”** such as elections and translates the organization's vision for political reform, voter enfranchisement and the creation of democratic spaces into ongoing activity. In short, remember the advice given by one participant that “elections happen once every three years; democracy is every day”.

**iv. (Based on Conclusion vi): If medium-term planning requires further support, discuss with regular donors the potential for funding for organizational capacity** building, or bring in additional staff/short-term consultants to help. This is in no way meant as criticism of current staff, but recognizes that the modest size of the organization now might be boosted for specific purposes such as help with strategic planning and programme design. When possible, think also about sponsoring staff capacity building in gender-appropriate design and implementation.

v. ***(Based on Conclusion vii): IPER sensibly involved grassroots participants in the preparation of materials such as posters. However these materials are important ways to transmit clear messages*** to the audiences at which they are targeted, so ***these messages must be clear and effective***. This will never be the case when they are formulated 'by committee', so let the participants give their views on messages that have already been carefully developed by communications experts, and suggest formats and design, but let the experts guide them. This will mean buying in communications expertise (short-term).

vi. ***(Based on Conclusion viii): UNDEF may consider requiring all grantees to submit a total activity budget, with UNDEF's allocation clearly indicated, when supporting actions that have several donors***. This is the only way to ensure that funds are used appropriately and that there is no double-dipping. This may require the cooperation of other donors – facilitated perhaps by an in-country counterpart (in this case UNDP might have been prepared to help).



## ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Evaluation questions

#### *General evaluation question categories*

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</li> <li>Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Documents reviewed

### Background documents

Human Development Report 2010  
CVE Basic Module, CER with support from UNDP  
2010 National and Local Elections: Peace Breakthrough, Vote for Peace, November 2010  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for indigenous peoples, CER and IPER  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for persons with disabilities, CER and IPER  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for detainees, CER and IPER  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for first-time voters, CER and IPER  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for internally displaced persons, CER and IPER  
Board of Election Inspectors Quick Guide, May 10 2010 National & Local Election, COMELEC

### Project outputs (UNDEF-supported)

Basic Leadership Training Course on Democracy, IPER  
*Bantay-Elekasyon 2010* Monitoring Manual, CER  
*Bantay-Elekasyon 2010* Election Day Monitoring Manual (CER)  
Report on the 2010 national elections, Bantay Elekasyon, CER, 2010  
Declaration of the 2010 Stakeholders' Electoral Reform Summit  
Women and the elections: Raising women's voices, A voters' education training manual for the women sector, CER  
Women and the elections: Raising women's voices, A voters' education training module for the women sector, CER  
Undocumented workers, registered voters, A voters' education training manual for the Philippine informal sector, CER  
Undocumented workers, registered voters, A voters' education training module for the Philippine Informal Sector, CER  
Casting nets and votes: Fisherfolks and suffrage, A voters' education training manual for the fisherfolk sector, CER  
Casting nets and votes: Fisherfolks and suffrage, A voters' education training module for the fisherfolk sector, CER  
Enhancing citizen-voter education for peasants, CER, IPER and PDI

### Project documentation

Project Document UDF-PHI-08 261, dated 30 July 2009  
Final Project Narrative Report UDF-PHI-08-261, dated 31 October 2011  
*Bantay Elekasyon 2010* Volunteers Profile  
IPER/CER Citizen-Voter Education timeline (2002 – 2010)  
Participants' lists, Leadership Courses (Quezon City, August 2011; Cagayan de Oro City, August 2011)  
List of participants, Electoral Summit  
Election monitors' database  
CVE participants' database  
2010 Stakeholders' Summit: Report

### Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

Activity	Dates
Preparatory phase start	December 2011
Travel to/from Philippines	15 January/21 January 2012
Effective mission dates	16 – 20 January 2012
Reporting	23 – 31 January 2012
<b>16 January 2012, 10 am – midday and 1 – 5 pm</b>	
Ramon Casiple, Director IPER and Coordinator CER, Responsible for Leadership Training component	Presentation Round-table discussion
Andie Lasala, IPER staff member, Responsible for CER networking	Round-table discussion
Edsil Bacalso, IPER staff member, Responsible for BE monitoring component	Round-table discussion
Rosa Bella Quindoza, CVE component	Round-table discussion
Kristina Gadaingan, CVE component	Round-table discussion
<b>17 January 2012, 9 am – 12 pm</b>	
Danilo Purzuelo, Leader of VILJODRASS (CVE)	Telephone interview
Tigs de Jesus, LALIGA (CVE)	Telephone interview
Johnny Payod, C4CC/PASCRES (Leadership)	Telephone interview
Lalaine Apugan, South Mindanao (BE regional coordinator for Southern Mindanao)	Telephone interview
Egay Cabalitan (BE national capital region coordinator)	Telephone interview
Alvin Astronomia (BE Western Visayas coordinator)	Telephone interview
Review of approximately 36 questionnaires (anonymity promised) and follow-up by SMS/telephone	
<b>17 January 2012, 1 – 5 pm</b>	
Cristina Roperez, Leadership trainer	Interview
Antonio Villasor, Consultant to COMELEC	Interview
Arnando Avelino, CER network assistant	Interview
<b>18 January, 8.30 am – 5.30 pm</b>	
Margarito Raynera, EU Project Manager	Interview
Emmanuel Buendia, Manager, UNDP-Manila Fostering Democratic Governance portfolio	Interview
Karla Gula Senior Project Officer, IFES Philippines	Interview
Beverly Hagerdon-Thukas, Chief of Party, USAID/IFES	Interview
Prof. Florida Labuguen, President, PSNEI	Interview
<b>19 January, all day</b>	
Review of newly received and outstanding questionnaires (anonymity promised) and follow-up by SMS/telephone	
<b>20 January, 9 am – 12 pm</b>	
Prof. Rowena Zoilo, Bicol University (CVE)	Telephone interview
Rahib Abdullah, ARMM (CVE)	Telephone interview

Joan Cris Gonzales, Moving Mindanao-LGU (Leadership)	Telephone interview
Edna Fuentes, Barangay-LGU (Leadership)	Telephone interview
Father Ignatio Leo Casas, Masbate (Leadership)	Telephone interview
Arturo Guerrero Linan, Southern Tagalog (CVE)	Telephone interview
20 January, 12 – 4 pm	
Round-up meeting with IPER team	
Round-up working session international and local experts	

## Annex 4: Acronyms

CER	Consortium on Electoral Reform (NGO coalition)
COMELEC	Commission on Elections
CVE	Citizen-voter education
EU	European Union
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IPER	Institute for Political and Electoral Reform
MAP	Masbate Advocates for Peace
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NSTP	National Service Training Programme
PSNET	Public Service Network
SMS	Short message service (mobile messaging)
ToT	Training of trainers
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development