

**UNDEF**



The United Nations  
Democracy Fund

**PROVISION FOR POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS  
DEMOCRACY FUND  
Contract NO.PD:C0110/10**

**EVALUATION REPORT**



**UDF-NIR-09-301: Civil Society Support Initiative on Political Marginalization in  
the Niger Delta in Nigeria**

**Date: 17 September 2013**

**Acknowledgements**

The evaluators would like to thank Ms. Emem Okon, Executive Director and the team at Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre (KWDRC), as well as Mr. Ifeanyi Ajaegbo, of Youth Now, the Project Manager, for meeting with the National Consultant, answering questions posed by the International Consultant, providing documents and making arrangements for the field visits by the National Consultant. Thanks are also due to all of those who met with the National Consultant in the course of the field mission.

All of the photographs used in the report were provided by KWDRC.

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**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the Evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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# I. Executive Summary

## *i. Project Data*

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled Civil Society Support Initiative on Political Marginalization in the Niger Delta, implemented by the Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre (KWDRC), based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Project implementation began on 1 January 2011 and was completed on 31 December 2012 (24 months). The project benefited from an UNDEF grant of \$295,000, with a project budget of \$270,000 plus an UNDEF monitoring and evaluation component of \$25,000.

KWDRC is active throughout the Niger Delta region, and describes itself as a community action, education and advocacy NGO. It focuses on the promotion of social justice, gender equality, environmental justice, and democracy and good governance. The project was undertaken in association with two other NGOs, Youth Now and Gender and Development Action, also based in Port Harcourt, which served as implementing partners. Both organizations were represented on the Project Implementation Committee. However, KWDRC maintained full responsibility for managing the project and supervising implementation.

The Niger Delta has been the site of political conflict and violence since the early 1990s, centring on struggles by ethnic minorities against international oil companies and the Nigerian state over perceptions that they were being exploited and their land degraded. Conflicts have also taken the form of competition among ethnic groups for oil wealth, with the emergence of armed groups and criminal gangs, youth violence and brutal, indiscriminate repression by security forces.

The Project Objective was three-fold, and was stated as follows:

- a) To build the capacity of civil society organizations and other non-state actors in the Niger Delta working with politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups;*
- b) To build the capacity of politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups in the Niger Delta to acquire the means of political expression and thus participate in the political/democratic process without resorting to violence;*
- c) Encouraging Political Pluralism.*

## *ii. Evaluation Findings*

### **Relevance:**

The project was built on the experience of KWDRC in understanding and seeking to act on the most urgent problems of local communities in the Niger Delta, and particularly of women, youth and other vulnerable groups. It aimed to engage with three sets of stakeholders: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) at local level in the nine Niger Delta states; representatives of marginalized groups (women, youth and the disabled); and officials from the three branches of government. The project's focus on working with the CSOs and beneficiary groups in strengthening the basis for broader-based citizen participation in the political process was highly relevant to addressing the democratic deficit in a region where there is widespread distrust of the governing authorities and the absence of a belief that the voices of the people will make a difference in decision-making.

***Effectiveness:***

Two key factors in the project's effectiveness were the well-produced Baseline Study and the recruitment of local coordinators in each of the nine states. Both of these factors contributed to the detailed knowledge of the local context on which the project was able to draw. In addition, local knowledge from these two sources was used effectively in identifying capacity gaps and the learning needs of specific participant groups to be trained.

The training program provided focused on, firstly, Civic and Political Education, and secondly, on Engagement/Advocacy with Government. Altogether, 230 activists and leaders of local CSOs were trained, along with 185 Women and Young People, representing the marginal communities and vulnerable groups supported by the project. The numbers for each group of trainees exceeded targets set for enrolment. The trainees were extremely positive about the relevance of the training to their work and their ambitions to play a more active and effective role in public life.

A third component of the project, aimed at a selected sub-group of participants, consisted of the organization of Advocacy Visits to meet with government officials. This activity was intended to promote engagement of government officials with local CSOs and beneficiary groups, while also equipping the trainees with the experience of beginning such engagement. In practice, while the activity was worthwhile, to be truly effective, it required a longer-term investment of time and resources by the Project Team.

Despite some limitations, overall, the project proved to be effective in building the capacities of both target groups, in enhancing their self-confidence, and in motivating many to take further action. Follow-up activities undertaken by participants included "stepping down" the training to others in their local networks, and organizing advocacy and public awareness initiatives. Summing up its achievements across all activities, it may be concluded that the project succeeded in contributing to increasing the levels of participation in the public realm by both CSOs and beneficiary groups.

***Efficiency:***

The project generally did an effective job in managing resources efficiently and deploying them in working towards results. To be set against this general statement, it should be noted that the decision by the grantee to stretch activities across all nine states in the Niger Delta diminished the level of investment available for activities at each project site. While the geographic span of activity increased the visibility of the project, it reduced the prospect for impact and enhancing prospects for sustainability of results.

***Impact:***

The project contributed to the three parts of the Development Objective specified. The first two concerned: (i) capacity development for CSOs to take an active and effective role in representing the needs of the marginalized and vulnerable groups, and (ii) enhancing the capacity of the beneficiary groups to take part in the political process. Its contribution to the third part of the Objective, political pluralism and opening up the political process to a wider range of voices, was less direct. Its influence on this element of the objective may only be judged in a year or two.

The project had some success in supporting the engagement of beneficiary groups in advocacy with government. However, it is clear that much more remains to be done to enhance the motivation, self-confidence and capability of members of these groups to enable them to maintain and build their involvement with the political process.

***Sustainability:***

Given the need by CSOs and beneficiary groups to maintain independence from federal and state governments which have done nothing to earn the trust of the people of the Niger Delta, sustainability of results achieved will depend, in large part, on the continuing flow of international donor funds. For all this, through the project, a number of valuable tools for capacity development work with local CSOs and beneficiary groups were designed and tested. A number of those who were trained acted to “step down” the training to other activists and members of their wider networks. With additional support in the future, these innovations will contribute to further strengthen civil society networks in the Niger Delta and reinforce their presence as actors in governance processes.

***UNDEF Added Value:***

The project’s explicit emphasis on democratization and enhancing political participation by marginalized communities was an easy fit with UNDEF’s mandate. For this reason, the grantee was able to address its priority issues directly, without adjusting project objectives to fit the particular requirements which many other donors bring forward.

***iii. Conclusions***

- The project strategy was sound as it worked, locally, with local communities to broaden the base of participation, and, hence, enhance local democracy. However, the ambition to hold project operations in all nine states in the region was realized at the cost of depth of involvement and continuity of support to project participants. A more focused project, restricted to fewer states would have been more effective.

- The Baseline Study was well conducted and served positively to project effectiveness as a training tool.

- The project’s training components were organized and delivered in a professional manner. Trainees’ reviews on workshops and seminars were extremely positive. The numbers of trainees involved exceeded initial targets.

- The Advocacy Visits had a positive impact on building practical skills and enhancing self-confidence. It was a worthwhile beginning to a process of engagement by participants. However, the visits were an opening only, and, in many cases, though not all, participants seemed hesitant to build on the experience.

- In general, the budget was managed in an efficient manner but further attention should be paid to expenses presentation and supporting documents.

- While long-term progress will depend on continuing external assistance, the project contribute to civil society capacity building and made a number of contributions which will facilitate further positive developments in building the demand for good and responsive governance, thus challenging the top-down political process in the Niger Delta.

***iv. Recommendations***

***It is recommended that:***

- It is recommended that UNDEF develop a template for financial reporting that would enable explaining on a line-by-line basis, any departure from the initial plan.

KWDRC gives careful thought to the presentation of its budgets, since current approaches, as exemplified in this project, do not provide enough information to enable a funding agency to determine whether resources have been used appropriately.

- For future projects, it is recommended that KWDRC targets a smaller area of intervention.

- Considering KWDRC's proven expertise in undertaking and leading advocacy efforts, it is recommended that the organisation takes as a priority the building of an effective platform for supporting the continuing engagement of marginalized communities and vulnerable groups in advocacy activities and dialogue with government authorities.

## II. Introduction and development context

### *i. The Project and Evaluation Objectives*

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled “Civil Society Support Initiative on Political Marginalization in the Niger Delta”, implemented by the Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre (KWDRC), based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Project implementation began on 1 January 2011 and was completed on 31 December 2012 (24 months). The project benefited from an UNDEF grant of \$295,000, with a project budget of \$270,000 plus an UNDEF monitoring and evaluation component of \$25,000.

KWDRC was founded in 2003 and began operations the following year. It is active throughout the Niger Delta region, and describes itself as a community action, education and advocacy NGO. It focuses on the promotion of social justice, gender equality, environmental justice, and democracy and good governance. It has a particular concern with gender mainstreaming in public policy and political life. The project was undertaken in association with two other NGOs, Youth Now and Gender and Development Action, also based in Port Harcourt, which served as implementing partners. Both organizations were represented on the Project Implementation Committee. However, KWDRC maintained full responsibility for managing the project and supervising implementation.

The project was built on the experience of the grantee and its leadership in understanding and seeking to act on the most urgent problems of local communities in the Niger Delta, and particularly of women, youth and other vulnerable groups. Hence, the project drew on a careful analysis of options for addressing the current deficit in terms of the ability of local communities to take action in the public realm to improve their circumstances. *The Civil Society Support Initiative on Political Marginalization in the Niger Delta* aimed to engage with three sets of stakeholders: civil society organizations at the local level in the nine Niger Delta states, representatives of marginalized groups (women, youth and the disabled), and officials from the three branches of government.

The Project Objective was three-fold, and was stated as follows:

- a) To build the capacity of civil society organizations and other non-state actors in the Niger Delta working with politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups;*
- b) To build the capacity of politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups in the Niger Delta to acquire means of political expression and thus participate in the political/democratic process without resorting to violence; and,*
- c) Encouraging Political Pluralism.*

### *ii. Evaluation methodology*

The evaluation was conducted by two experts, one international and one national, under the terms of a framework agreement between UNDEF and Transtec. The methodology of the evaluation is set out in the Operational Manual governing this framework agreement, as well as in the evaluation Launch Note. A set of project documents was provided to the evaluators in the weeks preceding the field mission. On that basis, they prepared the Launch Note (UDF-NIR-09-301), setting out key issues and particular areas of focus to be considered during the field mission, which took place from March 18 - 22, 2013, with follow-



up meetings with KWRDC in Port Harcourt the following week. Additional documents used in the Evaluation were obtained from the grantee during the field mission and from other relevant sources.

The Evaluation took place concurrently with that of a second UNDEF project in Nigeria, NIR-08-233. It was determined that, because of the security situation in the Niger Delta, it would be unwise for the International Consultant to travel to the area. Instead, the field mission was conducted by the National Consultant under the guidance of the International Consultant. A set of guidance notes on the field assessment was prepared by the International Consultant to facilitate this way of managing the situation. In addition, the National Consultant travelled to Abuja to meet with his international counterpart on two occasions: for a briefing and exchange of views prior to the field work, and, afterwards, for a debriefing and discussion of the shaping of the field reports to follow.

In the course of the field mission, meetings were held in Port Harcourt with project principals, and with local coordinators and project participants in Imo State and in Akwa Ibom State.

### **iii. Development context**

*The Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment and under-employment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor and endemic conflict.*<sup>1</sup>

The Niger Delta region has been the site of political conflict and violence since the early 1990s, centring on struggles by ethnic minorities against international oil companies and the Nigerian state over perceptions that they are being exploited and their land degraded. Conflicts have also taken the form of competition among ethnic groups for shares of the oil wealth and the trade in stolen oil, with the emergence of armed groups and criminal gangs, youth violence and brutal, indiscriminate repression by security forces. The social and economic costs to the population of the region have been enormous, as have been the losses of revenues by the oil companies and the state.

With the negotiation of an amnesty in 2009, violence has been much reduced. However, there has been a failure of governance in subsequent years, with the inability – or absence of will – on the part of the state to build on the amnesty by searching for a solution to local grievances and seeking to come to terms with the region's problems.

The people of Nigeria and those of the Niger Delta region in particular, are victims of what has come to be called in development circles “the oil curse”. Oil and gas revenues provide 40 per cent of GDP, 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 65 per cent of government revenues.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the government has been able to generate most of its revenues from sources other than taxes on its citizens. The combination of the “gift” of oil revenues and decades of authoritarian rule in the post-independence years resulted in an absence in Nigeria of the “politics of accountability,” whereby government is held responsible for using money provided by taxpayers to provide public goods.<sup>3</sup> Control of the oil revenues and their distribution has led to the emergence of a strongly-entrenched political elite, and “state capture” by those who stand to gain from a continuation of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: UNDP [Niger Delta Human Development Report](#), 2006.

<sup>2</sup> From sources quoted in: Inge Amundsen, [Good Governance in Nigeria: A Study in Political Economy and Donor Support](#), NORAD, August 2010, p. ix.

<sup>3</sup> See: Pat Utomi, Alex Duncan and Gareth Williams, “Nigeria: the Political Economy of Reform: Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth”, [The Policy Practice](#), Updated Version, October 2007, pp.14-15.

status quo. The beneficiaries of this state of affairs have little interest in reforms which would dilute their power and influence, while few of the benefits derived from oil wealth have flowed to the people of the Delta region.

Abuse of power through corruption of public officials, including providers of basic services, is widely recognized as endemic at all levels in Nigeria. A Human Rights Watch report in 2012 commented that graft “has turned public service for many into a kind of criminal enterprise.”<sup>4</sup> The Niger Delta region, more than any other part of Nigeria, has suffered the consequences of deep-seated corruption.

A side-effect of system-wide corruption has been the distortion of state priorities and the diversion of public resources from support to basic services. Hence, despite its oil wealth, which gives it the status of a middle-income country, Nigeria’s performance in terms of reducing poverty and improving human development achievements in recent decades has been poor. It is ranked at 142 of 169 countries on the Human Development Index, placing it in the “low human development” category, and at around the median for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that more than 53 per cent of the population survives on an income of \$2 per day. Levels of educational attainment are low, with school enrolment at 50 per cent of the age-group, an adult literacy rate of 60 per cent, and government expenditures on education at only 0.9 per cent of GDP.<sup>5</sup>

In the nine states in the country’s South and South-east which constitute the Niger Delta region, readings on social indicators are even worse. Paradoxically, this state of affairs coexists with relatively high levels of expenditure in the region by government and oil companies in the post-Amnesty period.<sup>6</sup> The explanation to this conundrum lies in “the extraordinarily poor expenditure quality” in government programs, with development spending aimed at short-term results, reinforcing patronage channels, investing in political advantage, or protecting stable levels of oil production by using cash payments to placate local communities.<sup>7</sup>

Thirty-two million people (over 22 per cent of Nigeria’s population) make their home in the region, 62 per cent of them being younger than 30. Environmental damage caused by oil spills and gas flaring has had a severely detrimental effect on poor communities, impacting heavily on fishing and agriculture, and hence on the livelihoods of the rural population. Oil extraction and transportation are capital-intensive industries, providing little employment for local people. Unemployment levels are higher than in the rest of the country; 50 per cent of those of working age are without work. Youth unemployment rates are far higher. Infant mortality levels are 20 per cent higher than elsewhere in the country (120 per 1,000 live births, compared with 100/1000 for Nigeria as a whole). In rural areas, 76-80 per cent of the population does not have access to clean drinking water. In urban areas, the figure is 50-55 per cent. Only 34 per cent of the region’s people have access to electricity, when power is available.<sup>8</sup>

Local communities have come into conflict with oil companies and the security forces over such issues as land acquisition, environmental damage, cash payments, employment

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<sup>4</sup> As quoted in report in *Financial Times*, Section on Investing in Nigeria 2012, Tolu Ogunlesi, “Corruption: system is rife with abuse”, November 27, 2012: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ceca4c64-3493-11e2-8b86-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2QYcY3QV1>

<sup>5</sup> UNDP, Human Development Indicators: Nigeria, Country Profile 2011; and, *BTI 2012*.

<sup>6</sup> In the 2011 Federal Budget, the budget ceiling for the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was higher than that for the Ministries of Health, Water, Agriculture or Defence, and half the size of that for the Ministry of Works. (Source: Chris Newsom, “Conflict in the Niger Delta”, *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*, Special Report 271, June 2011, p.6).

<sup>7</sup> USIP, *Op. Cit.*, p.7.

<sup>8</sup> Source: Paul Francis, Deidre Lapin and Paula Rossiasco, *Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2011, pages 2-12.

opportunities and the provision of social services and local infrastructure. The people of the Niger Delta feel politically disenfranchised and disadvantaged in comparison with other Nigerians. The government, both at the federal and, more particularly, at the state level, is seen as unresponsive and corrupt, and as having little interest in the security and well-being of ordinary people.<sup>9</sup>

The absence of a culture of accountability in public life and the centrality of oil revenues to government funds also goes along with weak state-society relations, and low public expectations of the government. At the same time, bonds linking members of ethnic, communal and local groups are strong. The weakness of citizen participation in the public realm reinforces the persistence of a state captured by private interests.<sup>10</sup> In Nigeria as a whole, civil society remains relatively weak and lacking in both financial resources and a strong membership base, though it is growing to a modest degree in importance as a political force.<sup>11</sup> Advocacy groups are increasingly visible and effective, but, as of yet, civil society organizations lack the capacity to mobilize and sustain civic engagement in politics.



The Niger Delta Region in Nigeria and West Africa

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<sup>9</sup> Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 6-21; and, Good Governance in Nigeria: A Study in Political Economy and Donor Support, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>10</sup> See, "Nigeria: the Political Economy of Reform", *Op. Cit.* pp. 14-15.

<sup>11</sup> See: Inge Amundsen, "Who Rules Nigeria?" Norwegian Peace-Building Research Centre (NOREF) Report, November 2012. See also: Carl LeVan and Patrick Ukata, "Nigeria", in Countries at the Crossroads, Freedom House, 2012; and, "Nigeria" BTI 2012, *Op. Cit.*

### III. Project strategy

#### *i. Project approach and strategy*

In designing the project and developing detailed implementation plans, KWDRC drew on its prior experience in the region in supporting the engagement in political life of women and other vulnerable groups. The first of a number of initiatives relevant to this objective concerned support to enhancing women's participation in decision-making (Action Aid Nigeria 2006-2008), focusing on both training and advocacy. Similarly, also with the support of Action Aid, KWDRC organized the State Policy Dialogue on the Niger Delta in Akwa Ibom State in December 2008. The same target groups involved in the UNDEF project were supported in this initiative. The following year, the organization was responsible for the Niger Delta Women's Policy Dialogue.

More recently, Oxfam Novib supported KWDRC's project to train women democracy monitors in Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States. In addition, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funded the grantee's efforts to support marginalized communities in the Niger Delta to undertake advocacy activities to protest their exclusion from the implementation of the post-Amnesty program, implemented by the Federal Government, and to press for re-integration processes to be driven at the local community level.<sup>12</sup>

In the project supported by UNDEF, in addressing the political marginalization of disadvantaged groups in the Niger Delta, the grantee and allied organizations sought to take action to improve the capacity of local civil society organizations (CSOs) to undertake and lead advocacy activities on behalf of, and in cooperation with, their beneficiaries. The advocacy initiatives were to be directed at state institutions with a mandate in policy and program formulation, implementation and appraisal.

The marginalized groups identified by the grantee were: women, youth, the physically challenged and People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIVs). The intention was to build active and effective communication channels between the marginalized groups and the state and to ensure that the issues of direct concern to the beneficiary groups would be placed on the government agenda.

The project was ambitious in its aim to carry out its program in all nine Niger Delta states. The plan was to provide support to representatives of ten CSOs, as well as representatives of five beneficiary groups, in each state. Advocacy activities with government institutions were to take place in each of the nine states.

The principal activities of the project were:

- i) A situation/baseline study and needs analysis carried out in all nine states;
- ii) Training-the-Trainer workshops for 90 CSOs, 10 in each of the 9 Niger Delta states; a similar number of beneficiary representatives were also included. There were two rounds of training. The first was concerned with *Civic and Political Education*, and the second with *Public Engagement and Advocacy*;

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<sup>12</sup> This is a selection of the most relevant of the grantee's other projects.

iii) The production of two short training manuals: the *Marginalized Groups Participation Handbook* and the *Training Manual on Civic and Political Education*;



The Nine States (in italics) and the Major Urban Centres of the Niger Delta

iv) The organization of advocacy visits made by trained CSOs and beneficiaries, with members of the Project Implementation Team, to government officials in each of the 9 states;

v) The production and transmission of a radio program, built around a “Democracy Roundtable”;

vi) The production and distribution of “branded project-specific awareness materials” in the 9 states.

The situation analysis, or baseline study, also provided needs assessment data concerning the beneficiaries of the project, CSOs and beneficiary groups, representing marginalized communities. The data derived from the study was employed as a guide to determining the issues to be addressed during the project. It also assisted in the selection of the CSOs and beneficiary groups with which the project would engage. The study represented the first step in project implementation. Once data analysis was completed, the project team developed what it termed “a structured plan of engagement”. This guided the subsequent activities, as listed above.

#### *Management arrangements:*

The project was implemented by the grantee, with the Executive Director serving as Project Director. She was supported in the main office by a Project Coordinator and three Project Officers. The Project Coordinator was a staff member of Youth Now, one of two NGOs brought in as implementing partners. In addition to the core team, the project was served by three supporting technical staff: two media consultants and an information communications

technology (ICT) Officer. None of the costs for staff were charged to the project. Beyond the project headquarters in Port Harcourt, in recognition of the wide territorial span to be covered by the project's activities, as well as the need to build close working relationships in every state, the grantee also retained the services of nine local coordinators, one in each state.

The project was managed through a Project Implementation Committee, chaired by the Executive Director of Kebetkache. The membership of the committee included the nine local facilitators, the ten members of the KWDRRC project team, and one representative of each of the two implementing partner organizations. In the course of the project, a few resource persons, active in project training, were added to the Committee.

### ii. Logical framework

The chart is based on detailed information included in the project's results table and Final Report. There are difficulties in working with the Objective, which, as discussed above, includes three parts. Furthermore, in project documents, outputs are not clearly related to outcomes. In addition to this, while the Project Document lists five outcomes, only four are included in the Final Narrative Report, and two of these are, in practice, two parts of the same outcome result. These three outcomes (including two collapsed into one) relate well to the three principal areas of activity. However, none of them encapsulates the activities dealing with the radio program production, or the special materials prepared and distributed. These activities have been included under one outcome, but their place in the results chain may be somewhat theoretical.

Project activities	Intended and actual outputs	Medium-term impact/outcomes	Long-term development objective
<p>Situation analysis and needs assessment survey to be completed by 9 consultants, one for each state;</p> <p>Hold validation workshop;</p> <p>Prepare assessment reports</p>	<p><b>Baseline survey completed; provides basis for planning other activities, and in providing baseline data against which to measure results.</b></p>	<p><b>Contributes to all outcomes</b></p>	
<p>Selection of 10 CSOs in each of 9 states to send representatives to training course</p> <p>Capacity building train-the trainer courses held in each of the 9 states (civic education; civic engagement; advocacy strategies; media and stakeholder engagement)</p>	<p><b>237 CSO members from 90 CSOs are trained as trainers (180 planned)</b></p> <p><b>19 advocacy visits (intended =9) by CSOs to the three functions of governments</b></p>	<p><b>Civil society organizations acquire the capacity to prepare the marginalized groups to enter the political arena and occupy more political space</b></p> <p><b>Participation of marginalized groups in the political process is increased by at least 40%.</b></p>	<p><i>a) To build the capacity of civil society organizations and other non-state actors in the Niger Delta working with politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups; and,</i></p> <p><i>b) To build the</i></p>

<p>Advocacy meetings organized, bringing trained CSO representatives together with relevant government officials.</p>	<p>and interacted with 89 members of the governments in 9 states on local government issues (in practice, this was more effective in some states than others)</p>		<p><i>capacity of politically marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups in the Niger Delta to acquire means of political expression and thus participate in the political/democratic process without resorting to violence; and,</i></p>
<p>“Engagement Seminars” organized for representatives of women’s and youth groups</p>	<p>185 women and youth group members trained through nine engagement seminars (originally intended = 135)</p> <p>Marginalized groups acquire knowledge of the workings of democracy</p> <p>Women who are trained acquire skills and knowledge on how to monitor budgets, elections, and policy implementation</p>	<p>Capacity of marginalized and disadvantaged groups is built, which has significantly improved their knowledge of civic and political rights and the democratization process</p>	<p><i>c) Encouraging Political Pluralism</i></p>
<p>Radio program, “Democracy Round Table” is produced and broadcast in the 9 Niger Delta states</p> <p>Production and distribution of “special awareness” materials</p>	<p>Local citizens are better-informed on the ideas and workings of democracy</p>		
<p>Engagement by CSOs and marginalized group representatives and Project Implementation Team with government officials in 9 states; on-going policy dialogue</p>	<p>Government and legislative officials engage with advocates and introduce initiatives and mechanisms to respond to marginalized group exclusion (effort at engagement with judiciary was unsuccessful)</p> <p>Openness of government and legislative officials to engage with CSOs and marginalized group representatives</p>	<p>The 3 branches of government are engaged in providing significant support to participation in the political process by marginalized and vulnerable groups</p>	

## IV. Evaluation findings

This evaluation is based on a set of Evaluation Questions or EQs, designed to cover the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, and value added by UNDEF. The Evaluation Questions and related sub-questions are presented in Annex 1.

### *i. Relevance*

Drawing on its previous work with local communities in the Niger Delta, KWDRC was able to demonstrate a firm understanding of the circumstances of vulnerable and marginalized groups in the region. In addition, the Baseline Study provided the foundation for a more focused analysis of the background, experience and level of previous civic and political engagement of the groups to be supported through the project.

The Study was based on the analysis of data derived from questionnaires delivered to two groups: firstly, CSOs working on the issues of marginalized people, and, secondly, a small sample of marginalized people and vulnerable groups. The Study will be discussed in more detail in the following section of the report. For now, it will suffice to note that, by utilizing its findings, KWDRC was in a better position to structure and determine the content of the curriculum for the workshops provided. The Study also informed the decision on the selection of the trainees to be included in the project.

As discussed earlier in the section on Development Context, there is a strong sense among the people of the Niger Delta that major decisions are made by the government and the oil companies with little regard to their needs and livelihood. This view goes along with low levels of political participation. Most of the studies of the Delta cited in this report emphasize the need for a departure from the ineffective and corruption-prone, top-down model of development characteristic of the approach adopted by the government, in favor of a community-centred approach to economic and social development. This would allow for recognition of the social and cultural complexity of the region, and the differing circumstances of the local communities within it.

A key ingredient in a community-driven model of development is the need for local leadership and the engagement of local populations in decision-making. The aims of the UNDEF-funded project were very much in line with the need to strengthen locally-based organizations, while also building the confidence of representatives of beneficiary groups that they can take action to bring their concerns to the attention of the government. Hence, the objectives of the project were in line with democratic development priorities for the Niger Delta.

In considering the appropriateness of the project strategy as a means to achieve the specified objectives of the project, the Evaluators have noted some limitations in its design, which had an impact on the achievement of results. In particular, these relate to the consequences of the geographic scope of activities undertaken.

A decision was made by KWDRC for the project to operate in all nine states of the region. As a consequence, in the view of the Evaluators, there were insufficient resources to enable the project to reach its potential in each location where operations took place. The link between the two training workshops and the advocacy activities which followed were not as strong as might have been the case. Further, following up on training by providing



modest support and guidance to both CSOs and representatives of beneficiary groups in applying what had been learned in their communities would have assisted greatly in building for sustainability. A more focused project, limiting activities to, perhaps, three states would have provided a more effective basis for testing and refining the methodology, and building the foundation for more ambitious efforts in the future.



**Young Women Participants with Trainer at a Workshop in Owerri, Imo State**

**Risk:** Drawing on the experience obtained through its long engagement with the political life of the region, the grantee was able to ensure that the project was equipped with a firm appreciation of the risks which might be encountered. The strategies adopted to deal with the identified risks were appropriate, given limitations of time and budget.

## **ii. Effectiveness**

The project completed all activities as planned. However, in certain states, the advocacy activities did not take place as envisaged, as a result of non-cooperation, or limited cooperation, on the part of governing authorities at state level.

As noted earlier, the content of the project's training materials was informed by the findings of **the Baseline Study**, which also served as a needs assessment for potential project participants. Although it does not seem to have had a detrimental effect on the project, a limitation of the survey, on which the Study was based, should be noted.

The questionnaire for the survey was well-designed and the questions included were relevant and appropriate, given its purpose.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the Study report was well-written and presented, and the analysis of data was handled professionally. However, there was an issue with the survey methodology. For each of the two groups surveyed – CSO representatives and members of beneficiary groups – ten questionnaires were administered in each of the nine states. For CSOs, this would seem to provide an adequate and reasonably representative basis for analysis, given the purpose served. However, given the need to ensure coverage of three major beneficiary groups -women, youth and the

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<sup>13</sup> Data collection was handled by the Local Coordinators, working with consultants, in each state

physically challenged – the total of 10 questionnaires per state does not allow for adequate numbers for each group to permit objective analysis, This is particularly problematic where results are broken down by state, and sub-group, as is done in the Baseline Study Report.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the fact that in project documents both the CSOs and the marginalized groups are taken as project beneficiaries, it is apparent that, in practice, it was the CSOs which represented the primary target group. The baseline data appears to have been very helpful in providing a profile of those to be trained, as well as in identifying some critical capacity gaps to be addressed. For example, the Study determined that only 28 per cent of CSOs had engaged in policy advocacy activities directly with government authorities on issues of priority for their communities.

Leaving aside the methodological limitations noted above, the Baseline Study was a factor contributing to project effectiveness. The recruitment of the nine Local Coordinators was a further source of strength. Given the considerable distances, and difficulties of travel between project sites, their role in managing local relationships, as well as logistics, was of some importance.

**Training:** Overall, the project experienced some success in achieving, or at least contributing to, its anticipated results. The training itself, the core part of the project, seems to have been well-gearred to the learning needs of participants, and many of those trained were able to put their new skills to work.

The project's training materials were developed by the members of the Project Implementation Team and the resource persons who would deliver the workshops. There were two key documents: the Training Manual on Civic and Political Education and the Marginalized Groups Participation Handbook (which introduced the Marginalized Groups Participation Index – the MGPI) while these outputs were not specified in the original project document.

The Training Manual included the following components: *Human Rights; Understanding Democracy; Government Budgeting, the Budget Cycle and Budget Monitoring; Community-Based Election Monitoring; Introducing Gender; and Citizen Participation*. Other topics covered were engagement with stakeholders and mass media. The findings of the Baseline Study were also used extensively in both sets of training workshops.

The Marginalized Groups Participation Index (MGPI), featured in the Handbook of the same name, was viewed by KWDRRC as the principal innovation of the project. The Index was intended as a tool “to measure the inclusion and participation of hitherto marginalized groups and individuals in society in the political and democratic processes of the country” (Handbook, page 3). Participants in the training workshops learned how to use the Index, collecting, compiling and interpreting data, in their work with local communities. The Project Team also used the Index to assess and compare participation levels in selected communities across the nine states.

The first training workshop focused on the materials included in the Training Manual. The second, the “Engagement Seminar” did not follow a set text, but the content was based in part on the findings of the Baseline Study. The Engagement Seminars were aimed at Women and Youth, rather than the CSOs.

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<sup>14</sup> In practice, as indicated in the Baseline Study Report, 87 of the 90 responses for beneficiaries were taken as valid and usable. In the case of CSOs, 108 questionnaires, not the 90 expected, were distributed, and 91 of those completed were accepted as valid.

Responses to the training provided were extremely positive, as confirmed in the post-training surveys conducted by the training teams, as well as through the limited number of interviews and focus group discussions conducted for the Evaluation. Trainers were drawn from those who had worked before with KWDRC. They included NGO leaders, media specialists and lawyers with experience in development-related and human rights issues. The trainers were also evaluated positively by participants. A keen interest was expressed in receiving further training, with some participants commenting on the limits of what could be learned in a 2- or 3-day workshop.

Some 237 CSO activists were trained in Civic and Political Education, exceeding the target of 180. Similarly, 185 women and young people were trained through the Engagement Seminars, also exceeding the target of 135.

In its own review, KWDRC concluded that the sessions on the MGPI and on media engagement were the most successful, in that they provided entirely new and practical knowledge, which trainees could apply readily. There was also a very strongly positive response from trainees to the module on democracy monitoring.

The third element of the project's engagement with trainees focused on the **Advocacy Visits** to government officials. The effectiveness of these visits depended, in large part, on the attitude and openness of the respective state governments, and of particular departments or agencies, to meeting with civil society groups.

According to the Executive Director of KWDRC: "The objective of the advocacy component of the project was to promote the engagement of government functionaries (with civil society groups), in order to encourage political pluralism. Participation in governance translates to engagement with public officials and their processes of decision making and implementation of government policies and programs. Advocacy visits/meetings were to establish the relation and the understanding that groups working with marginalized populations need to regularly engage in the processes of governance to ensure the concerns and interests of marginalized populations are met and addressed."

More specifically, the Executive Director noted, the purpose of the advocacy meetings was to promote the involvement of CSOs and marginalized groups in decision making and community development plans.

**THE WIDE RANGE OF LESSONS LEARNED BY PARTICIPANTS THROUGH TRAINING  
(Selected Statements Taken From Post-Training Surveys)**

- How to calculate index change and percentage change in the MGPI template;
- During the training, participants learned that civic education should be embedded, starting from grass roots levels. Also “all hands should be on deck” to monitor our democracy;
- Democracy is a system of government where the people have a say on what is to be done, marginalization is a vital issue that should be considered seriously;
- The Physically Challenged should be mobilized during voter registration, and should be provided with adequate security;
- New ways of how you can make your report something to be read by everyone, and not only your sponsor;
- We learned that democracy is our government, that everybody has the right to vote and to participate in governance;
- Using the Marginalized Group Index to measure levels of participation of marginalized groups in governance and electoral processes;
- I am empowered with skills to monitor the democratic process. I learned how to apply a new innovation tool called MGPI;
- I am now able to differentiate between civic education and voters’ education;
- When embarking on writing a proposal or implementing a project, you draw out the problem tree and objective tree - it will help in enhancing a better result;
- A press release should not be more than a page to be effective;
- A press release is for announcing, inauguration and activities of organization to create awareness, and your language should be as simple as possible for easy understanding;
- An improved understanding of stakeholders' engagement and how to draw up advocacy objectives;
- Advocacy is a continuous process and not a one-off activity;
- The importance of the baseline survey was clarified, and I have now understood that I have to include our project beneficiaries in project design and implementation;
- I understand that CSOs can influence policies at all levels if they use the right advocacy strategies;
- I now understand that advocacy is participation in governance;
- Now I can effectively write proposals;
- I have learned processes of interacting with government officials;
- I have acquired capacity on how to write a press statement;
- How to regularly work with the media;
- I have learnt new facilitating skills and knowledge on advocacy strategies.

The practice of the project in organizing for this activity was to bring together a small group to meet with government officials. The group consisted of representatives of CSOs and beneficiary groups, along with one or two members of the project Team. Normally, a project Team member facilitated the meeting. Altogether some 50 of these visits took place across the nine states (see text box on Advocacy Meetings, below, for a listing of some of the meetings held). These meetings featured the participation of 89 government officials.

The advocacy component of the project was a useful follow-up to the training provided. However, in many cases, the meetings seemed to merely provide an initial opening for a presentation of concerns by the project group, with government providing information on its current activities. This did not constitute engagement.

There were exceptions, where more was accomplished, but it is apparent that what was critical was that the meetings actually took place. In other words, they represented the initial

step, the opening, to what was expected to be a long-term dialogue. For this expectation to be realized, far more support and advice will be required, over a period of years, rather than months. A commitment of this order will be required, if levels of engagement are to be maintained, and if project participants are to develop the skills and working relations with their own communities, as well as officials, in order for the process to achieve results.

Judging from anecdotal information obtained from the small number of participants with whom the National Consultant met, along with post-training interviews conducted by the project - as well as documentation of subsequent activities of participants – the confidence of CSO trainees was much enhanced. In Imo State, participants from CSOs with a focus on the physically challenged, women’s issues and youth, all indicated that they had been energized by the training and experience and that their skills had been strengthened. Those from the Women and Youth Groups also explained that they had been active in delivering “step-down” training for others in their networks, using the training materials provided by the project.

In assessing results more broadly, it is unfortunate that the baseline study could not be used to assess “before” and “after” levels of public participation in relevant communities. However, to be realistic, and as KWDRC has observed, it will only be appropriate to make such an assessment in a year or two. Despite this, it is apparent that levels of CSO activity in engaging in dialogue with government are increasing. There is also evidence that more CSOs are now active in monitoring budgets and public procurement processes. Beneficiary groups would also seem to be more active than before.

On this basis, it may be concluded that, despite some weaknesses in design and overall strategy, the project has *contributed to* the achievement of the two capacity development objectives specified. For the third, “Encouraging Political Pluralism” by strengthening the voice of civil society in government decision-making, it is not yet clear whether the beneficiaries supported by the project will sustain their level of engagement, and some still seem reluctant to take a pro-active approach in following up on the openings which the project has provided.

#### Examples of Advocacy Meetings Held with Government Officials

- In Cross River State, meetings were held at the Ministry of Information; Ministry of Youths, Sports and Development; Ministry of Budget, Monitoring & Evaluation; a meeting was also held with the Senior Special Adviser to the Governor on NGO Matters.
- In Rivers state, advocacy visits were paid to the Rivers State Coordinator in the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the Commissioner for Women Affairs, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Women’s affairs.
- In Ondo State, meetings were held with: the Commissioner for Women’s Affairs; 2 Legislators, who are members of the House Committee on Women’s Affairs; the Commissioner for Youth Development; and, the Ministry of Multilateral Organizations.
- In Abia State, meetings were held with the Director and the Deputy Director for Women’s Affairs, a Director from the Ministry of Health and the Director of the National Orientation Agency.
- In Bayelsa State, advocacy meetings were held with the Senior Special Assistant (SSA) to the Governor on Women Affairs in Ogbia Local Government Area (LGA); the SSA to the Governor on Women’s Development in Sagbama LGA, and the Director for Public Health.

### **iii. Efficiency**

A review of the project budget indicates that, overall, costs do not seem out-of-balance with the activities completed and results achieved. However, there are a number of issues which are worthy of more attention within a general picture which appears to be satisfactory. One particularly positive, and extremely unusual, feature of the project was the decision by the grantee not to charge for the costs of core staff members. This was described as an in-kind contribution. Institutional arrangements, including the role of the Project Implementation Committee and the recruitment of local coordinators, appear to have been sound.

One of the difficulties experienced by the Evaluation Team in reviewing the budget concerns the manner in which costs are presented. The costs of all field activities are presented in the same way, with costs calculated at \$275 per participant, whether the activity is training or advocacy visits. No breakdown is provided of what cost items are included in the figure, nor is any explanation provided for using a standard formula. This does not provide a basis for assessing whether or not costs are reasonable.



**Training Workshop in Akwa Ibom State**

In the case of advocacy visits, as with training, it is indicated that costs are based on 20 participants, whereas, in practice, smaller numbers were normally involved. Further, the total cost given for each advocacy activity is the same as that given for each training event. Given that advocacy meetings were of short duration, while training activities took place over two or three days, this is puzzling.

Given the scale of activities in the project as a whole, it seems probable that, overall, the grantee provided value for money in its utilization of the project budget, particularly in view of the in-kind contribution, noted above. However, its method of presenting its budget, combined with the absence of supporting information, makes it difficult to be sure of this. In order to prevent this kind of issue arising in the future, it would be advisable for UNDEF to provide more specific guidelines on budget presentation and on supporting information (i.e. cost breakdowns and justifications for using standard costing formulas) in project documents.

Most project activities fitted well with the overall plan and strategy adopted. However, as noted in the preceding discussion of Effectiveness, the concern of KWDRRC to support project sites in all states was at odds with the need to ensure adequate resources to secure the capacity development gains achieved. A greater concentration of resources in fewer sites would have made for a stronger project. In particular, the Advocacy component clearly required additional resources and a more prolonged interaction between participants, on the one hand, and the Local Coordinator and the Project Team, on the other, for it to provide a solid basis for on-going engagement in governance processes.

There is also one project component which does not fit well with the overall strategy and which, in the view of the Evaluation Team, represents a poor use of limited funds. A radio program, based on a Democracy Roundtable, was produced and broadcast in four states.

While the topic was relevant to the project, no matter how well-produced, a “one-off” radio broadcast will have done little to support project objectives.

Properly planned, with programming produced with local communities on a continuing basis, and with links to community development activities, development broadcasting can be a very effective tool. This single program does not meet the criteria to qualify as an effective intervention. The cost of \$45,300, which included contracts with radio stations and fees for panellists for the Democracy Roundtable, constituted 16 per cent of project funds, and was a poor use of limited resources. If radio programming is selected as a core project activity, it must be well-integrated with other activities and be employed throughout the project. The project tried to cover too much ground and take on too many activities. Under such conditions, even a professionally-executed initiative (which this broadcast may well have been), when it stands alone, will make little difference to project results.

#### ***iv. Impact***

The project contributed to the three parts of the Development Objective specified. The first two concerned: (i) capacity development for CSOs to take an active and effective role in representing the needs of the marginalized and vulnerable groups, and (ii) enhancing the capacity of the beneficiary groups to take part in the political process. Its contribution to the third part of the Objective, political pluralism and opening up the political process to a wider range of voices, was less direct.

The project had some success in supporting the engagement of beneficiary groups in advocacy with government. However, it is clear that much more remains to be done to enhance the motivation, self-confidence and capability of members of these groups to enable them to maintain and build their involvement with the political process. The difficulty of making progress in this regard should not be underestimated, given the understandable lack of trust of the people of the Niger Delta in those who hold power, and, thus, in the efficacy of the political process.

The project contributed to strengthening the knowledge base of CSO activists, and this seems likely to have increased the probability that they will take an active role in governance in the region. At the same time, the commitment of the CSOs to entering into and maintaining dialogue with government still seems hesitant and uneven, while the government response is cautious, and further support will be necessary to build on the UNDEF project and secure broader impact.

#### ***v. Sustainability***

As is so often the case, sustainability of results achieved will depend, in large part, on the continuing flow of external funds. For all this, through the project, a number of valuable tools for capacity development work with local CSOs and beneficiary groups were designed and tested. A number of those who were trained acted to “step down” the training to other activists and members of their wider networks. With additional support in the future, these innovations will contribute to further strengthening civil society networks in the Niger Delta and reinforcing their presence as an actor in governance processes.

In addition, KWDRRC took on an important role in facilitating initial forays by CSOs into meetings with government officials for advocacy purposes. As yet, institutionalization of advocacy is far from established, and this project may be viewed as merely a beginning in

working towards the sustained engagement of civil society organizations with government concerning decision-making.

**Modest Beginnings: Advocacy at Work, a First Meeting with the Deputy Director, Ministry of Youth and Sports Development, Ondo State.**

Mrs. Williams (the project's local facilitator) took a letter of invitation to the Commissioner of Youths informing him about the project and proposed that an interactive session be held. Mrs. Williams and a small group visited the Commissioner and discussed the need for more involvement of NGOs in the activities of the Ministry. The NGOs complained that the interests of their beneficiaries are not addressed in the activities of the Ministry. The Deputy Director, 5 Youth Development Officers, and four members of the National Youths Council participated in the Interactive session. Discussion during the session was focused on youth empowerment activities, especially in rural communities, the involvement of youths and NGOs in such activities and how the activities were being monitored. Explanations about the provision of motor-bikes and wheel-barrows as income-generating support to marginalized youths were given. It was also explained that the Ministry has a policy of integrating female youths into projects and activities. Issues discussed were relevant to me as, the Deputy Director, Youth and sports development. It was decided that NGOs should be asking for information from the Ministry from time to time to keep abreast of the events of the Ministry and also to get involved in Ministry's activities.

**(Source: Based on Interview with the Deputy Director by Mrs Williams).**

***vi. UNDEF Added Value***

The project's explicit emphasis on democratization and enhancing political participation by marginalized communities was an easy fit with UNDEF's mandate. For this reason, the grantee was able to address its priority issues directly, without adjusting project objectives to fit the particular requirements which many other donors bring forward. This, along with the two-year funding commitment, was the main value added by UNDEF's support.



## V. Conclusions

*All conclusions are derived from the findings of the Evaluation, presented above.*

*i.* The grantee, KWDRC demonstrated a strong, practical knowledge of how to work effectively with the communities of the Niger Delta. The project's focus on strengthening the organizations and community leadership, through which mobilization of members of marginalized and vulnerable groups to engage in political life might take place, was directly relevant to the goal of broadening the base of participation, and, hence, enhancing local democracy. The project's strategy was sound in its approach to working with local communities throughout the Niger Delta. However, the ambition to hold project operations in all nine states in the region was realized at the cost of depth of involvement and continuity of support to project participants. A more focused project, restricted to perhaps three states, would have been more effective. The project completed all activities as planned. However, the limited willingness to cooperate, demonstrated by the government in some states, limited the scope and value of the Advocacy component. This conclusion is derived from findings on relevance and effectiveness.

*ii.* The Baseline Study was a positive factor in project effectiveness. It was conducted well and used as a means for identifying capacity gaps to be addressed through training. In addition, it was used imaginatively as a training tool. This conclusion is also based on findings on relevance and effectiveness.

*iii.* The Advocacy Visits by project participants to meetings with government officials, accompanied and facilitated by members of the Project Team, represented a worthwhile beginning to a process of engagement by participants. However, the visits were an opening only, and, in many cases, though not all, participants seemed hesitant to build on the experience. Overall, it is apparent that the project contributed to building both the practical skills and knowledge of participants and their self-confidence. In a number of cases, those supported by the project were motivated to take further action. Most often, this involved "stepping down" the training to other members of their networks. In other cases, CSOs and beneficiary groups became more active in advocacy on priority issues. This conclusion is derived from findings on impact and sustainability.

*iv.* In general, the grantee seems to have managed the budget well and made effective use of it in working towards objectives. At the same time, the way the budget was presented, along with the lack of supporting information, makes it difficult to know if the costs of all activities were reasonable. This conclusion is derived from the finding on efficiency.

*v.* The project contributed to the broader objectives of strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to support local communities in becoming engaged in the political process, and in enhancing the skills of beneficiary groups in the Niger Delta to engage effectively with government. While long-term progress will depend on continuing external assistance, the project made a number of contributions which will facilitate further positive developments in building the demand for good and responsive governance, thus

challenging the top-down political process in the Niger Delta, where the priorities of the poor and marginalized receive little attention. This conclusion is based on findings related to impact and sustainability.

## VI. Recommendations

### ***It is recommended that:***

*i.* UNDEF gives careful consideration to amending the guidelines on the presentation of the budget in project proposals to ensure that the costing basis, along with any funding formulas adopted, for particular budget lines, are explained and justified in a note to accompany the budget tables. In addition, it is recommended that a section is added to the Final Report, documenting how the budget has been used, and explaining on a line-by-line basis any departure from the initial plan. This recommendation is based on the Conclusion.vi. Similarly, it is recommended that KWDRC gives careful thought to its practice in presenting budgets, since current approaches, as exemplified in this project, do not provide enough information to enable a funding agency to determine whether resources have been used appropriately.

*ii.* For future projects, it is recommended that KWDRC focuses its resources to ensure that all project components receive the support required to achieve results and work towards sustainability. This recommendation is based on Conclusions i, iii, and v.

*iii.* On the basis of its proven expertise in undertaking and leading advocacy efforts, it is recommended that KWDRC take as a priority the building of an effective platform for supporting the continuing engagement of marginalized communities and vulnerable groups in advocacy activities and dialogue with government authorities. This is based on Conclusions I, iii and v.



**Training Workshop in Akwa Ibom State**

## VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

*The Civil Society Support Initiative on Political Marginalization* made a credible effort to provide support to building political participation among the most vulnerable and also most alienated groups in a region plagued by weak and corrupt governance. Operating under difficult conditions, the project devised an imaginative approach to strengthening the organizational and substantive knowledge of local CSOs, while also providing practical skills on advocacy to beneficiary groups representing Women, Youth and the Physically Challenged. It was over-ambitious, and some initiatives did not fit well with the broader strategy adopted. Nevertheless, its efforts yielded some valuable results.

It was able to develop an effective training program, planned and conducted in a very professional way, and which also addressed the learning needs of trainees. While the project represented the beginning to a long-term process to build a base to sustain political participation by marginalized and vulnerable groups, short-term objectives were achieved, with many of those trained proving that they had the ability to put newly-learned skills to work.

KWDRC demonstrated that it knew how to get things done in the Niger Delta environment. It showed that it possessed sound organizational capacities, as well as the knowledge and commitment to make a difference for those supported by its work, in a region where it is not easy for development projects to make solid progress.

## VIII. ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Evaluation questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish through the project that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.).</li> <li>▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

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## Annex 3: Persons Interviewed and Field Mission Schedule

<b>March 17, Sunday</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Consultant travels to Abuja from Port Harcourt (International Consultant arrived on March 15, Friday);</li> <li>• Briefing and Planning Meeting, International and National Consultant, Abuja.</li> </ul>
<b>March 18, Monday</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Consultant returns to Port Harcourt;</li> <li>• Initial meeting of National Consultant with Members of Project Team and Project Implementation Committee at KWDRC: Ifeanyi Ajagbo, Project Coordinator and Youth Now; Iheabacho Kingsley, KWDRC; Constance Meju, KWDRC; Juliana Nwamochiere, Gender and Development Action; James Q Nornubari, Youth Now.</li> </ul>
<b>March 19, Tuesday</b>
<p>Field Visit to Owerri, Imo State by National Consultant; return the same day</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting with 21 project participants and Local Coordinator.</li> </ul>
<b>March 21, Thursday</b>
<p>Field Visit to Uyo, Akwa Ibom State by National Consultant; return the same day</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting with 18 Project participants and 2 government officials.</li> </ul>
<b>March 22, Friday</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Follow-up Meeting for National Consultant with KWDRC in Port Harcourt.</li> </ul>
<b>March 23-24, Saturday/Sunday</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Consultant travels to Abuja (returns on Sunday, March 26);</li> <li>• Debriefing and Report Planning Meeting In Abuja, International and National Consultant;</li> <li>• International Consultant departs from Nigeria en route to Ghana.</li> </ul>
<b>March 27, Wednesday</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting with Ms. Emem John Okon Executive Director, KWDRC, by National Consultant to fill in gaps in data collection as identified in Abuja Meeting on March 23.</li> </ul>

## Annex 4: Acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EQ	Evaluation Question
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Gender Equality
HDI	Human Development Index
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
KWDRC	Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre
LGA	Local Government Area
MGPI	Marginalized Groups Participation Index
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NOREF	Norwegian Peace-Building Research Centre
PLHIVs	People Living with HIV/AIDS
SSA	Senior Special Assistant
ToT	Training-of-Trainers
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institute of Peace