UDF-KEN-09-296 / Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region

Date: 29 November 2013
Acknowledgements
The evaluators would like to thank everyone who took the time to provide their expertise and insight on the issues of civic participation and the electoral process in Kenya, and on the implementation of the project Strengthening Governance and Democratization Practices in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region. In particular, the Institute for Educational Democracy (IED) and its partners for their support to the evaluation team during the field work.

All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

Authors
This report was written by Sue Nelson and Wangeci Chege. Landis McKellar, the Evaluation Team Leader, provided editorial and methodological advice. Ms. Aurélie Ferreira provided quality control. Mr. Eric Tourres Project Director at Transtec.
# Table of Contents

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................... 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT .......................... 4

   (i) The project and evaluation objectives ...................................... 4

II. PROJECT STRATEGY ................................................................ 7

   (i) Project approach and strategy .................................................. 7

   (ii) Logical framework ................................................................. 9

III. EVALUATION FINDINGS ......................................................... 10

   (i) Relevance ........................................................................... 10

   (ii) Effectiveness ....................................................................... 12

   (iii) Efficiency ........................................................................... 15

   (iv) Impact ............................................................................... 16

   (v) Sustainability ....................................................................... 18

IV. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................... 20

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 21

V. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND CLOSING THOUGHTS ................... 22

VIII. ANNEXES .......................................................................... 23

    ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS: ........................................ 23

    ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED: ......................................... 24

    ANNEX 3: PERSONS INTERVIEWED ........................................... 25

    ANNEX 4: ACRONYMS ............................................................... 27
I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

The *Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region* project sought to strengthen the capacity of governance and grassroots organizations and enhance the participation of citizens to promote a democratic culture in Kenya and East and Central Africa. Its intended outcomes were to: 1) improve the management and execution of the mandate of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (RPP); 2) increase the participation of youth, women, persons with disabilities (PWD) and the illiterate in governance and electoral processes; 3) increase access and the utility of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE) in the East and Central Africa region; and, 4) enhance the capacity of civil society, community/faith-based organizations in electoral monitoring, observation and reporting.

This was a two-year USD 275,000 project (1 March 2011 - 31 May 2013 including a three-month no-cost time extension). It was implemented by the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), a Kenyan Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) based in Nairobi. Its main intended activities were to:

- Undertake three guided study tours for the RPP to Ghana, Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) for RPP personnel;
- Develop voter forums and a voter education documentary delivered by a mobile theater and four audio messages to reach one million voters in Kenya;
- Translate parts of the ACE knowledge website from its original language (English) into Swahili1 for use in eastern and central Africa; and,
- Train at least 40 Kenyan grassroots organizations in electoral observation, monitoring and reporting.

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives were directly relevant to the needs to strengthen the electoral process and to support the knowledgeable participation of voters in Kenya in anticipation of the general elections expected in 2012 (and eventually held in March 2013). Kenya had a new Constitution, electoral system and electoral management bodies (EMBs) which included the RPP. There was also a need to avoid the irregularities and violence of the 2007 elections by educating the public and strengthening local observation efforts by civil society. Targeting marginalized citizens for voter education and individuals from community and faith based organizations (CBOs and FBOs) for observation training was appropriate. The RPP study tours were relevant to the needs of a new organization, but would have been more relevant if done at the start of the project and included followed up with the institutions afterwards. The relevance of translating ACE into Swahili was not evident during the evaluation.

Project implementation delivered most of the anticipated outputs, but the activity-driven nature of the project limited its effectiveness to the output level. The three study tours were done with the RPP, with Mexico replacing the planned trip to the UK. That trip also included an officer from the Law Reform Commission which was a good addition. The participants felt the tours happened at a formative stage and helped to inform their decisions, policies and in the development of related legislation. However, others interviewed felt that the lessons and

1 In Kenya, the language is referred to as Kiswahili rather than Swahili which is used to refer to the people using the language. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary has Swahili listed as a meaning for both the Bantu speaking people and the language. As ACE labelled the translation site as the “Swahili” version of ACE, that term is also used in this report for consistency.
recommendations from the tours had yet to be put into practice. IED produced a substantive
documentary for its voter education component that it showed in 10 counties through a
mobile theater company. This was generally felt to be effective although no data was
available to corroborate this or IED’s assertion that its voter education efforts reached one
million persons. Portions of five ACE topic areas were translated into Swahili and uploaded
onto the ACE website.\(^2\) However, there was no assessment done to determine actual need
for the translations and they were not publicized after published. Use statistics are low and
none of the Kenyans interviewed outside of IED knew the translations existed. The Kenyans
interviewed said they relied on English technical material because Swahili is still a
developing language and does not have the technical vocabulary such as found in ACE. IED
also undertook 12 workshops in different counties to train individuals from CBO/FBOs on
election observation. This two-day training seemed to be effective and participants thought it
was useful, especially since the elections were nearing. All said they had shared the
information with their organizations and networks following the training.

The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of the activities but not with the intended
outcomes. That would have required follow-up for the activities. The main constraints to an
efficient implementation of the project were IED’s over commitment of its staff which drew
them off the project at different times, and the late decision making on some of the specific
elements of the electoral process that were needed for voter education and training content.
This resulted in delays in the delivery for some activities/outputs (such as the study tour
publication), more generic documentary and initial training content, and a seven month slip in
the elections date respectively. IED undertook an open and rigorous selection process for its
training participants. This helped ensure they represented a mix of CBOs and were well
qualified. The use of a well-established website and encyclopedia to develop a Swahili
electoral knowledge resource would seem to be an efficient use of resources, but only if
there was a demonstrated need for this resource in Swahili and if the targeted beneficiaries
knew the site and translations existed. IED was unaware of the other UNDEF-funded project
working in Kenya at the time (and vice versa) so there were no links between them even
though they both worked on the same topics in some of the same areas of the country.
Synergies between the projects could have benefited both as they ran parallel activities.

The impact of this project is difficult to assess as it did not collect outcome information, and
the one-off nature of the activities makes it doubtful that it made a significant difference
beyond the individual participant level. From the anecdotal information gathered, it is likely
that this project contributed to an increased sense of empowerment for training participants
or those who viewed the documentary. This is more likely at the grassroots level where
substantive information was more limited. It also reached beyond the primary participants as
each participant interviewed seemed to have transmitted the information to at least 60 other
people. Some of the participants created local observation efforts which was the objective for
this training. The study tours did seem to have raised the awareness of their participants, in
particular for what needed to be done in the Kenyan electoral framework, for the
management and financing of parties, and for the areas where the IEBC, RPP and Law
Reform Office needed to build their capacity. But the tours’ lessons still remain to be
implemented. There was no impact visible from the ACE translations. Kenyans interviewed
were not aware of its existence and user data shows that most users from the region still
access ACE in English, with only about 10 percent of those that do find the Swahili site
returning to it. The average visit duration has been a little more than a minute (3-8/13).

IED included some sustainability elements in its project design and implementation despite
the lack of follow-up which could have helped to improve the sustainability of its results. It

\(^2\) The original English version has 13 topic areas.
selected its participants for observation trainings from locally-based CBOs/FBOs to ensure the knowledge remained within the area and institution; it used the UNDEF-funded documentary as a pilot effort to obtain a large (USD 600,000) grant from UNDP to update it and continue its dissemination before the March 2013 elections; did the translations for a well-established electoral knowledge network that could ensure its continued maintenance independent of IED; and, documented and disseminated the lessons learned and recommendations made from the study tours that can serve as a continuing resource for the participants, policymakers and advocates. IED also selected activities that fit into its own institution vision and is still working on these issues and using some of the trained participants in these activities.

(iii) Conclusions
The project’s purpose was mission driven, but the project itself was activity driven. The series of separate activities raised IED’s visibility but needed more programmatic linkages to be effective beyond achieving activities. Study tours for new offices are useful for raising awareness of participants, but need to be integrated into a broader program of capacity building and systems development to be effective beyond that level. Translating ACE into Swahili did not increase the access and utility of ACE in the region which was the purpose for the activity. The need for it was not clear and once done it was not publicized.

There was a lack of adequate staffing for project activities as project staff were also tasked with other responsibilities that pulled them off the project at different times. Coordination between UNDEF grantees in Kenya was needed and could have strengthened both projects as each had strengths and resources that could have benefited the other. This project might have had more significant results than was visible to the evaluators, but this is unknown as it did not have a performance monitoring plan that tracked its performance or measured results beyond the collection of output data.

(iv) Recommendations
For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that the grantees concentrate efforts on achieving project outcomes and develop a ‘development’ program instead of an activity plan, and ensure the follow-up needed to make a more meaningful difference in the areas assisted. Use study tours as part of a larger capacity building/advocacy effort and ensure study tour lessons and recommendations are followed up and implemented after return. Ensure the promotion of any materials developed under the project and advocate for their use and/or implementation of their recommendations.

Ensure adequate staffing for the project throughout its timeline through strategic planning at the design phase so that staff do not end up pulled between project work and other institutional needs. If funding is a constraint, consider alternative approaches such as cascade training and/or small sub-grants to partner CBOs, which could also help strengthen CBOs at the grassroots. Do topical needs assessments before designing capacity building, training or material development activities. Link UNDEF-funded projects in a country especially when they work in the same sector and on the same topics. At a minimum, projects should share information and explore synergies between them. Adopt appropriate indicators to be used throughout the project that can measure project results as well as its outputs.
II. Introduction and development context

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region (UDF-KEN-09-296) was a two-year USD 275,000 project implemented by the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED). USD 25,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project ran from 1 March 2011 to 31 May 2013 including a three-month no-cost time extension. Its main objective was to strengthen the capacity of governance and grassroots organizations, and enhance the participation of citizens to promote a democratic culture in Kenya and in eastern and central Africa. It intended to do this through: 1) increasing the exposure of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties to other systems of party regulation through international study tours; 2) increasing voter awareness on the voter registration and electoral processes; 3) increasing the access and utility of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network website for the region by translating some of its sections into Swahili; and 4) ensuring better coverage of elections by domestic observers through training CBO/FBO members on observation and reporting.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Round 2 and 3 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to “contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”. 3

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took place in September - October 2013 with field work done in Kenya from 23 September - 4 October, 2013. This field time was shared with the evaluation of another UNDEF project in Kenya (UDF-KEN-09-297) that worked to support the same electoral processes as this project. Some of the interviews were arranged to cover questions for both projects. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Wangeci Chege, experts in electoral processes and democratic governance. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the voter registration and electoral processes done in Kenya from 2011 through to the elections held in March 2013 (Annex 2).

In Kenya, the team met with IED, the RPP, IEBC, electoral assistance providers, other NGOs working in the sector, local officials, and project participants. This work was done in Nairobi and Coast Provinces, two of the locations where the project was implemented. In addition, the team contacted the ACE Secretariat in Stockholm and some of the ACE partner focal points by e-mail to get their views on the translation and use of the ACE Swahili version, as well as those of the ACE partner staff working in Kenya. Although the project title and objectives indicated a regional focus, all of the project activities were conducted in Kenya except for the international study tours. To determine the use of the ACE translations in the region, the evaluators obtained the user statistics from the ACE webmaster, and were also able to pose a question to the head of the electoral commission of Tanzania about the use of ACE in its work at a subsequent global conference. There they were also able to follow up

---

3 Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.
with the ACE secretariat and ACE partners. The list of persons interviewed in provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up on during their interviews. These included:

- **Project design** and the effectiveness of the approach that undertook four separate activities for different stakeholder groups for different parts of the process;
- **Study tour** value as the permanent RPP Registrar had not yet been appointed;
- **Translation of ACE** and the extent of its use and value for users;
- **Assessing impact** as the project’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was based on outputs.

In addition, the team assessed the issues raised by UNDEF:

- **Lack of a final financial report** and assessing if there were any major deviations from the budget in the Project Document;
- **Budget shortfalls that limited the ACE translations** and the logic between using project savings to undertake two additional workshops rather than completing the translations;
- **Strategy for media outreach** for the ACE on-line products and website;
- **Impact of CBO capacity building** and how IED was able to monitor the impact of this effort which they reported as successful;
- **Extent of the media coverage** of project activities beyond IED’s own website which was the only media coverage noted in project reporting.

(iii) **Development context**

Kenya has had a multiparty democracy since 1991 holding regular elections for national offices. However, widespread violence followed the 2007 elections triggered by a lack of public confidence in the election results. This conflict took on ethnic overtones and resulted in more than 1,000 deaths. A national dialogue process led to a coalition government and structural reforms. This included the ratification of a new Constitution in 2010, the creation of a new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to manage the elections, and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties to regulate parties and ensure compliance with the Political Parties Act. The Registrar position itself has been filled by an IEBC employee since it was created in 2007. Parliament has yet to select the permanent registrar.

Political parties were widely criticized for their role in the 2007-2008 problems. The Political Parties Act of 2011 tried to improve party management and strengthen their internal party democracy and rules, as well as the legal framework governing political activity. That Act provides for the RPP, a political party fund, a political parties dispute tribunal and a political party liaison committee. The Act also restricts party hopping, prohibits political violence as well as organizing parties along ethnic or regional lines. It also provides for some public funding for political parties for internal party democracy. There is an election campaign financing bill in Parliament that will regulate campaign financing, but this is yet to be adopted.

Forty-six parties registered under the Political Parties Act. According to the Electoral Observation Group (ELOG), the verification process, done by the RPP was cumbersome and parties took advantage to fraudulently register party members, while frequent hopping of members between parties made it difficult to maintain accurate party registers. These had to

---

be presented at different parts of the process, such as to confirm party membership for candidate nominations.\(^5\) The nomination process within parties has also led to intraparty violence. As this determines who wins the elections in safe districts, it is “literally cut-throat.”\(^6\) Monitoring reports raised questions about the extent to which the IEBC and RPP enforced the law after the nomination process for the 2012 by-elections in Kajiado North ended up in court. They also felt that “the current institutional set up where the Acting Registrar fills duties from IEBC as a Director is neither effective nor adequate for disciplining political parties. The registrar of political parties does not have the wherewithal to detect and enforce effective implementation of the Political Parties Act.”\(^7\) The Law Reform Commission is now faced with the challenges of reviewing the newly developed laws.

The 2013 elections were the first general elections held under the new Constitution and managed by the new EMBs. It was a very politicized process, and the overriding priority was to hold peaceful and credible elections. There were concerns about voter apathy and their constructive participation in the process. The changes in the new Constitution included the establishment of a bicameral Parliament, a devolved system of government to the county level and six offices to be elected in one general election instead of two.\(^8\) There was also a national redistricting done of the electoral boundaries and a re-registration of voters. The elections themselves were initially expected in August 2012, but a late Supreme Court ruling and IEBC decision making pushed them into March 2013. All of this information needed to be conveyed to the voters and observers.

This project also worked with ACE, the Electoral Knowledge Network. This is an online knowledge site that provides information and advice on the electoral processes. This was started in 1998 as the ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections) Project by International IDEA, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). It changed its title to the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network in 2006 and is now a collaborative effort between IDEA, the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), Elections Canada, the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico (IFE), IFES, UNDESA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD). The European Commission is an ex-officio member.

The ACE website is managed by an interim ACE Secretariat hosted by International IDEA. The ACE encyclopaedia has more than 10,000 pages and covers 12 in depth topics that cover the key parts of the electoral cycle. These include electoral integrity, electoral systems, electoral management, voting operations, legal framework and voter registration. It is a technical resource geared towards electoral practitioners, in particular EMBs. Parts of the ACE site have been translated into Spanish, Russian, Arabic and French. The Spanish version of ACE is the most active language version after English, managed in large part by IFE.

ACE also set up a number of regional centers to collect and upload electoral material and data for their areas. One of these was IED that covered Eastern Africa. The regional center concept was discontinued following recommendations from an external evaluation of ACE done in 2010-2011. However, IED still retained its associate partner status with ACE.

---

\(^7\) South Consulting, Op Cit
\(^8\) President, Senator, Members of Parliament, Women’s Representatives, Governor and County Assembly Representatives
II. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

With this project, the Institute for Education in Democracy intended to assist several functional areas in the electoral process that it felt needed strengthening to be able to more effectively fill their mandates and potential. These were:

- **The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties.** This Office was established in 2007 to manage the administration and management of political parties in Kenya and was to administer the campaign finance law once adopted. As it was established within the IEBC and was new, the IED felt it needed to strengthen its independence and develop the systems needed to effectively fulfill its role of overseeing the political parties, enforcing regulations and arbitrating their disputes.

- **Civic and voter education** to address the widespread voter apathy demonstrated by post-2007 surveys and by-election observation reports, and in particular by vulnerable and marginalized groups. IED thought that civic/voter education could help to educate these persons on their civic roles and responsibilities and equip them with the knowledge and skills needed to participate more effectively in the electoral processes.

- **ACE, the Electoral Knowledge Network** website, which was originally written in English, and had some sections translated into French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic. IED felt that translating some of these sections into Swahili and having them available on the internet would increase the utility and accessibility of the ACE information for the electoral practitioners and citizens within the East and Central Africa region.

- **Domestic observation and reporting** which IED felt was needed at the grassroots level following the problems of the 2007 elections. With the new constitution and devolved system of government, which included elections at the local level, IED felt it was important to ensure there were grassroots organizations that were capable of impartially and authoritatively providing an independent and objective judgment on the processes.

By supporting these areas, IED felt that the project would strengthen the democratic and governance practices in Kenya and in eastern and central Africa. It intended to do a main activity within each of these areas to enhance the capacity of the institutions of governance and strengthen civil society’s capacity to participate effectively in these processes.

In particular, IED intended to:

- **Strengthen the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties through study tours** to Ghana, Canada and Britain. The objective of these three guided tours was to sensitize RPP personnel on model systems, structures and best practices on managing political party regulation. Two senior persons from the RPP and one IED staff member were to participate in each tour. This was intended to benefit the RPP directly, and the political parties, electorate and IEBC indirectly.

- **Provide voter/civic education through 20 public forums that screened a documentary and four audio messages.** IED intended to develop one civic/voter education documentary and four messages to be provided through a mobile theatre
to create awareness on voter registration and the elections and to educate citizens on their rights, roles and responsibilities. These forums were to be held in ten counties: Mombasa, Gurissa, Isiolo, Nyandarua, Uasin Gishu, Baringo, Kajiado, Busai, Migori and Nyamira. These counties were selected on the basis of the problems encountered after the 2007 elections and literacy levels. They intended to target youth, women, PWD, illiterate persons and marginalized areas within these counties. IED intended to partner with the Film Cooperation of Kenya to develop and deliver the film.

- **Translate and post portions of the ACE knowledge website in Swahili.** IED intended to cooperate with International IDEA, which was hosting the ACE Secretariat, to develop a Swahili version of the ACE website and to translate some of its knowledge products. It also intended to translate other materials into Swahili for uploading along with other materials written in Swahili. This material was intended to directly benefit the electorate and practitioners in the region, and indirectly to benefit the regional institutions of governance. IED was a regional center of ACE for East Africa at the time.

- **Provide capacity building workshops for grassroots CBOs** to strengthen their capacity to undertake electoral observation, monitoring and reporting. IED intended to do one workshop in each of the ten targeted counties to train representatives from 40 CBOs. The curriculum was to be based on BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy Governance and Elections) modules. The targeted counties were: Kwale, Marsabit, Kiambu, Transnzoia, Nakuru, Kakamega, Kisii, Kisumu, Meru and Nandi.

The main project assumptions for these activities were that: the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties would be provided the functional independence needed to effectively execute its mandate; that all stakeholders would be willing to engage in project activities; and that the social and political environment would be conducive for project implementation.

IED also identified some risks for the project. These included delays in adopting the legislation needed to implement the new Constitution which could lead to political hostilities and tensions among citizens which could harm the atmosphere for voter education; and the lack of political will and support for the RPP to operate effectively. IED intended to mitigate these risks by maintaining a neutral and impartial position with citizens, and a principled and professional engagement with the RPP based on mutual understanding.

The intended outcomes for this project were:

- Improved management and execution of the mandate of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties;
- Increased participation of youth, women, people with disabilities, and illiterate persons in governance and electoral processes;
- Increased access and utility of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network in the East and Central Africa Region;
- Enhanced capacity of civil society, community/faith-based organizations in electoral monitoring, observation and reporting.

IED based this project on its five-year strategic plan (2009-2013). It was also intended to contribute towards the reform process underway in Kenya and the region to promote democratic governance and elections. IED intended to ensure local ownership of the project by aligning the activities with the plans of its partner institutions so that they would continue the activities beyond the end of the project. It also intended to have a 50:50 gender balance in all of its activities, ensure its materials were suitable for its targeted
groups, and use affirmative action methods to ensure participation of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups.

**(ii) Logical framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project activities</th>
<th>Intended outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term impacts</th>
<th>Long-term development objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved management and execution of the mandate of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 3 Study Tours (Ghana, Canada, Britain)</td>
<td>• Strengthened capacity and expertise of the RPP</td>
<td>Increased independence of the RP and more effective fulfilment of its mandate</td>
<td>More level playing field and strengthened accountability for political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Report on best practices observed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased participation of youth, women, people with disabilities and the illiterate in governance and electoral processes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop 1 documentary and 4 audio messages</td>
<td>• 1 million voters reached with civic and voter education</td>
<td>Increased voter awareness and reduced levels of voter apathy</td>
<td>Increased voter participation in electoral processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hold 20 public forums in 10 counties using mobile film</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased accountability of elected leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased access and utility of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network in East and Central Africa region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Select sections of ACE to translate into Swahili</td>
<td>• Increase access and utility of electoral information in region</td>
<td>More aware and knowledgeable electoral practitioners and citizens</td>
<td>Improved electoral processes and practices in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Translate sections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Launch Swahili site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhanced capacity of civil society, CBO/FBO in electoral monitoring, observation and reporting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 10 workshops in 10 counties for CBOs on observation, monitoring and reporting</td>
<td>• 40 CBOs trained on electoral observation, monitoring and reporting</td>
<td>Strengthened capacity of CBOs for observation and improved reporting</td>
<td>Increased integrity and credibility of the electoral processes in Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Evaluation findings

(ii) Relevance

The project was directly relevant to the mandate of the grantee, IED, which had been working on election related education and observation since 1993. The project activities fit into IED’s institutional vision and mission which was to empower citizens and institutions engaged in democratic elections. IED was an appropriate organization to provide observer training as it was one of the founding members of the Electoral Observation Group (ELOG) of domestic observers in Kenya. IED was also a regional center of ACE at the time and was the appropriate organization to do work with ACE. It knew the ACE knowledge products, uploaded electoral materials and information from the region onto the ACE site for them, and had a good working relationship with the ACE Secretariat and International IDEA.

The project design was composed of four separate and distinct activities. Two were done as outreach to citizens and CSOs (mobile theater and observation training), one was done internationally as study tours (RPP) and one was a desk product intended for regional use (ACE translations). Most of the project activities themselves were directly relevant to the objectives of the project and in line with the needs to strengthen the electoral processes in Kenya. Kenya had a new Constitution, electoral system and EMBs. There was a need for more objective domestic observation and better informed citizens in order to avoid the violence and irregularities that plagued the 2007 elections. However, most of the activities were designed as a series of one-time efforts. This scattered nature and the lack of follow-up reduced their relevance, effectiveness and potential impact.

The RPP, as a new institution, needed to set up its systems and structures to regulate political parties and their public funding. Campaign finance legislation was also expected to be passed during the life of the project that the RPP would have to administer and enforce. The study tours were expected to expose them to comparative international practices that they could then use in the development of their own systems and regulations.

For the observer training, the individuals selected were relevant to the purpose of the training. They were from grassroots CBOs and FBOs with networks that could extend the reach of the project to the marginalized groups who were the intended beneficiaries of the voter education aspects of the project, as well as capable of organizing local election observation efforts of their own.
The Registrar was an appropriate choice for the tours even though she was only acting as she managed the RPP through the entire 2013 electoral cycle. The addition of a lawyer from the State Law Office was also a good idea, especially for the trip to Mexico which provided a good example for political party regulation, financing and also use of the media. The selection of a human resource (HR) manager seemed questionable, but the RPP stated that she was fully engaged in the substance of its establishment because of understaffing, which would justify the choice. The rational for including an IED board member on a study tour instead of an IED program person or another IEBC or RPP person is unclear beyond raising IED’s visibility, although IED said its board members engaged in advocacy work on electoral issues, and as such the trip would have also expanded their knowledge and awareness of key issues.

There were questions raised in some of the interviews about the tours’ timing. There was a general perception that the RPP was passive and absent at critical points in the process. It is difficult to determine after the fact if the UNDEF-funded tours conflicted with the needs of the electoral cycle as there were also tours organized by others. According to the Project Document timeline, the tours were intended to be done between March and May 2011 which would have been early in the cycle. However, the trips were done later (Ghana: 28 August - 1 September 2011, Mexico: 11-18 September 2011, and Canada: 21-26 October 2012). The last trip was done after the September 2012 by-elections but at a time when many issues, such as party nominations and the party financing bill, were still being discussed. The RPP and the State Law Office participants felt the trips were extremely relevant as they said they were able to use the information to help inform their work and identify areas that needed change.

The relevance of translating ACE into Swahili is questionable. Although ACE is a technical resource targeted at electoral practitioners, IED felt the translations would be useful, especially for CSOs in the region doing voter education. It did not do a needs assessment to determine the actual level of need for the translations or assess the use of the ACE materials that it intended to translate. The ACE user statistics would have been available to IED as a regional ACE center. These would have shown a high bounce rate and rather limited use. In addition, a 2010 survey, done as part of the global evaluation of ACE, found that most EMBs, experts and CSOs accessed electoral information through internet search engines rather than through ACE. Expert panels also used for that evaluation to assess ACE content found the encyclopedia a valuable resource, but static with many topic areas in need of updating. That information would have been shared by ACE with IED shortly after project signing and should have been used to reassess the need for translations and address issues such as how the translations would be updated.

For this evaluation of the Swahili version, the team found that the IFE, which manages the Spanish version of ACE, thought their Spanish language version was extremely useful for its region, and that any translation of ACE into local languages was relevant as it would be easier for nationals to use. However, all of the Kenyans interviewed said they thought in English and would rather access technical information in English because Swahili did not have the technical vocabulary needed. They also noted that the working language of the IEBC was English. They felt that Swahili was most useful for documents geared towards the general public but that this material would need to be more straightforward and simpler than the technical natured ACE. There was a general feeling however, that the Swahili translations of ACE would have more relevance in Tanzania where the election commission reportedly worked more in Swahili and where they are about to undertake a constitutional referendum.
(ii) Effectiveness

Project implementation delivered most of the anticipated outputs, but the one-off nature of the activities limited its ability to contribute towards achieving the intended project outcomes.

The three study tours were completed although not completely as planned. The trip to the UK was replaced by a visit to Mexico as the UK had already been visited, and as noted all of the trips were done well after the anticipated timeframe of March - May 2011. The Registrar of Political Parties went on most trips along with the RPP HR Manager. They were accompanied by different IED staff and board members. The Deputy Chief Parliamentary Counsel of the State Law Office also attended the Mexican tour.

The participants appreciated the study tours, although one noted it was a lot to learn in a short period of time. They felt this increased their awareness of how EMBs interacted with and regulated political parties, and how parties in other countries operated. This helped them to understand issues better such as party financing, reporting and oversight; party registration and internal party democracy. All of the tours were done after the updating of the Political Party Act (August 2011) but before the campaign finance bill went to Parliament (and which has yet to be adopted). Doing the study tours earlier would have been more effective as this would have given them the opportunity to incorporate some of the best practices observed into the updating of the Party Act. It also would have allowed for more follow up by IED or others to help them to implement the lessons learned. Most of those interviewed thought the recommendations from the tours had not yet been implemented.

IED did write up a rather comprehensive Activity Report for the study tours with information on the different systems encountered along with some specific recommendation for the Kenyan situation. This had a public launch with 300 copies distributed to different stakeholders but this was done after the elections were over.

For its voter education activity, IED developed and produced a documentary in collaboration with the IEBC and the Film Corporation of Kenya. The 30 minute film explained the changes to the electoral system, the voting process and the importance of a peaceful election and knowledgeable voter participation. It also contained messages to Kenyans from the IEBC Chairman taped specifically for this documentary and from national politicians taped from a live national event held to promote peaceful elections. The documentary was substantive and informative and was shown in 10 counties through the mobile theaters. Most of those interviewed felt this was an effective way to reach marginalized persons and to disseminate voter information. The Film Corporation had trucks that followed a regular route and showed feature films. This drew the crowds who would see the voter education messages which were shown first. IED’s reporting
says it held 30 public forums and reached 1 million people. There is no data available that would corroborate the number of persons reached through these theaters or that assessed the effectiveness of this delivery mechanism.

IED contracted a language professor to do the **ACE translations**. The sections to be translated were not identified in the Project Document, but the thematic topics translated were: *voter education*, *voter registration*, *electoral systems*, *legal framework*, *boundary delimitations* and *voting from abroad*. IED apparently wanted to translate more sections as it states in its reporting that the funding was not adequate to translate all of the sections intended. In doing this work, IED said it received guidance by the ACE Secretariat and from International IDEA which hosted the Secretariat.

The Swahili site was launched by ACE in February 2013. Some materials were available before this time but only on a test basis, so statistics for its use are only available for the period following the launch. As noted in Figure 3, ACE in Swahili received about 2,000 visitors from February - August 2013. Most of these were one-time visitors. Almost half of the persons accessing the site did so from a mobile device. This does not allow for tracking for the country of origin for the visit, but from the remainder of the data, most of the visitors to the Swahili versions were from Kenya, followed by Tanzania (Figure 4). Most of the visits from these countries are however still to the English versions (Figure 5). Users that accessed the Swahili pages also moved onto to the English pages. It should be noted that the English version covers 13 topics, the French version 12 and the Swahili version 5.

IED did not publicize the Swahili versions beyond its own launch which was done before the translations were started. This is likely to account for the low level of recognition found during the evaluation among electoral practitioners in the region. None of the electoral experts or practitioners interviewed for this evaluation in Kenya beyond IED knew the Swahili translations existed, including those from UNDP and IFES (who are ACE partners). Most of the nationals interviewed did not know what ACE itself, including the commissioner from Tanzania.

### Figure 2: Use of ACE in Swahili 2/13 - 8/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Visits</td>
<td>2,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounce rate</td>
<td>76.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages per visit</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% new visitors</td>
<td>89.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique visitors</td>
<td>1,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average duration</td>
<td>2:38 min 2/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessed from mobile device</td>
<td>Almost half</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 3: ACE Swahili total page views and Number of visitors by country of origin (2/13 - 8/13)

9 There is a discrepancy with the sections provided in the Final Narrative Report which lists "voting operations" rather than "voting abroad" which is what is posted on the ACE website.
According to ACE user statistics, the most accessed section from the region in all languages is voter education. This corresponds with IED’s assumption that the voter education section could benefit CSOs. But, the limited time spent on the Swahili pages and the technical nature of the resource raises questions about the value of translating the ACE topic areas as the means to provide this type of information.

**Figure 4**
**Most popular ACE web pages accessed from Kenya and Tanzania**
*Number of page views (2/13 - 8/13)*

IED also trained individuals in elections observation from grassroots CBOs in 12 counties through the holding of one workshop per county. This was two more than anticipated in the Project Document. The extra workshops were held through savings made in the meeting line item. Kiambu County was replaced with Tharaka-Nithi. The two counties added were Murang’a and Hamabay (Figure 1). As a result, IED reporting says it reached an additional 31 CBOs for a total of 71 CBOs.

From the interviews, training seemed to be effective. Participates ranged across the socio-economic and educational spectrum but all seemed to have benefited and appreciated the trainings. IED’s plan to target individuals working in CBOs and FBOs to ensure a multiplier effect appears to have happened. Each of the participants interviewed said they had shared the information with their friends and colleagues.

Although IED was a member of ELOG, the training for these individuals was intended to create local observation efforts as ELOG already had a large database of trained observers from previous elections. IED says that its participants created at least 12 observation groups following the workshops that observed parts of the process and were incorporated into the IEBC’s mapping of domestic observation groups for 2013. The evaluators were only able to corroborate one of these efforts (Figure 9) but it is likely that others were created, especially on an informal basis.

IED also used UNDEF funding to develop a *Handbook on Governance and Devolution* that it published in March 2013. It says the handbook was developed because of citizen concerns on understanding the new Constitution and issues of devolution. This activity is not mentioned in the Project Document. Although a document of this nature is likely useful for those working on devolution and citizen participation issues it was another isolated activity. The time and resources could have been used instead to follow up some of the existing
activities which could have helped to increase their effectiveness and impact.

(iii) Efficiency

The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of its outputs, but not with the project’s intended outcomes. To achieve those, follow-up efforts would have been needed in all four activity areas. IED had substantial levels of experience in the activity areas and a good relationship with the EMBs which eased the development of the documentary, observation training material and study tours. The fact that IED had been an ACE regional center and was still an ACE associate member would have also facilitated the arrangements for the study tours with IFE in Mexico and Elections Canada, both of which are ACE partners, as well as for the development of the translations for ACE with the ACE Secretariat.

The primary constraints to an efficient implementation of the project seemed to be IED’s over-commitment of its staff during the project period\(^\text{10}\) and the delays in decisions on specific aspects of the process which were needed for the education and training components, and the slip of the electoral date from August 2012 to March 2013. All of these contributed to IED’s request for a three-month no cost time extension to complete the project activities. IED also noted that it was unrealistic to engage stakeholders such as the RPP and IEBC immediately before a general election. However, these types of issues should have already been factored into the design by either increasing the number of trainers hired for the project or holding the activities earlier in the electoral cycle. IED, as a founding member of ELOG, should have also had a good idea of the level of effort that ELOG would require from it during the lead up to these elections, and had the elections date not slipped, the timeline for the UNDEF-funded activities would have been substantially shorter.

Although not specifically stated in the Project Document, all of the activities, with the exception of ACE, would have contributed to the up-coming elections in Kenya, anticipated originally for August 2012. Although it seems clear that the Project Document timeline expected elections to be within a year of the project start date as few activities were planned for its fourth quarter, it still showed implementation of some of the major activities, such as election observation training and the mobile theatre, continuing well past that date and to the end of the project. This raises questions of efficiency, as the project itself appeared designed to have started in late 2010 and for the purpose for doing some of these pre-election activities after the elections were over.

IED’s narrative reporting to UNDEF was timely, but the final financial report had not yet been submitted by the time of evaluation reporting, five months after the end of the project. According to the estimated budget, almost 40 percent of the funds were to be used for IED staff, their internal travel and office expenses (Figure 6). The training for election observation accounted for almost a third of the project funds (31 percent), primarily due to the two-day nature of the training that required transport, room and board for the

---

\(^{10}\) IED noted in the Final Report that its obligations as part of ELOG “limited IED’s capacity to complete the remaining activities by the end of the project.”
participants. This was followed by the study tours (14 percent), mobile theater (nine percent) and ACE translations (six percent). Only one percent of the project budget was spend on publicity, specifically a launch event to announce that IED would do the ACE translations and another for the study tour publication.

The use of an existing global knowledge website, such as ACE, to provide electoral material in a regional language would seem to be an efficient use of resources. But before investing in this effort, a needs assessment should have been done to see if the lack of ACE-type material in Swahili was a major constraint to the achievement of the project’s intended outcomes and to determine which topics, if any, should be translated. It also did not adapt its concept after the ACE global evaluation which raised the issues of its limited use in other languages and the need to keep the material current.

There were existing materials for voter education and on other aspects of the process in the region in Swahili that could have served as an alternative. These could have been uploaded to ACE with minimal cost and effort and, according to interviews, this would have been more useful for the CSO voter education and observation work which seemed to be IED’s main targets for this effort. It was also not efficient to translate material and establish a Swahili site and not publicize it so that the targeted groups and others in the region knew it existed.

IED ensured qualified individuals were selected for its observation training through a competitive recruitment process. The selection process was time consuming according to IED, but seems to have been effective in selecting persons who are still with their CBOs and are available in the counties for future activities. IED however, did all of the training itself going out from its base in Nairobi rather than adopting a trainer-of-trainers type of approach which might have been more efficient, especially as the IED staff was stretched with its ELOG duties.

There was another UNDEF-funded project in Kenya at the same time as this one that also focused on supporting the electoral processes. It also targeted marginalized groups at the grassroots levels through CBOs in some of the same areas as this one. The two grantees were unaware of each other’s project and in some cases ran parallel activities. There were logical synergies that could have been developed between them which could have benefited both projects.

(iv) Impact
The impact of this project is hard to assess. Outcome data was not collected and the one-off nature of the activities makes it unlikely to have contributed substantially towards achieving it intended project outcomes. It is probable that the activities contributed to an increased awareness and knowledge for the individual participants, viewers of the documentary, or serious users of the Swahili version of ACE. But attributing results beyond this is not possible.
without more specific data. This project was one of many done in Kenya by national and international organizations to hold credible, peaceful elections in 2013 all of which contributed to the overall outcomes sought by the project.

However, from the anecdotal information gathered, it is likely that this project:

- **Provided an increased sense of empowerment for some participants** who attended the observation training, and perhaps for some of those who watched the documentary. This is more likely to have occurred at the grassroots level, although it was visible in all of the participants interviewed. They felt they had a better understanding of the electoral processes and wanted to share this with others.

- **Reached indirect beneficiaries.** The numbers are not known as this was not tracked, but each of the persons interviewed from the observation training said they had passed the information on both formally and informally through their CBOs, networks and friends. Each one said they had reached at least 60 or more persons.

- **Created some locally organized observation efforts for by-elections and the March 2013 elections.** Most of the participants trained in observation were not used by ELOG which already had its observer pool. However, IED reporting states that 12 local observation groups were created that observed the national or by-elections in their areas. The team had only one document to support this. This was a report by the Forum for Women in Development, Democracy and Justice in Kajjao North Constituency of its observation of the by-elections on 17 September 2012. Five Forum observers were accredited by the IEBC as long term observers and covered 25 polling stations (Figure 9). The report is qualitative in nature and includes recommendations for areas of improvement. It is notable that they obtained long-term accreditation status and provided a constructive report on the process and not just for election day.

- **Raised awareness of study tour participants on how other countries manage political party participation in the process.** Results of the international tours were primarily visible at the individual participant level. Most of those interviews felt the study tour recommendations had not been implemented and that the RPP and the framework for parties still needed considerable strengthening.

There was **no impact visible from the ACE Swahili site.** None of the persons interviewed in Kenya outside of IED knew the translations existed and most of the nationals working on elections interviewed did not know of ACE in general. User statistics from the region (Figure 8) show the vast majority of users from
the region still access ACE in English and only 10.7 percent of visitors to the Swahili pages returned to them, with visitors spending less than two minutes on pages on average. It is possible that one of the users was able to use the information found on the site to improve his/her work or processes, but there is no way to know this as ACE does not collect outcome information on its use.

(v) Sustainability

There were some elements of sustainability built into the project design and implementation despite the lack of follow up for activities. These included:

- **Selecting participants for observation training from CBOs so that the individuals and knowledge remained within the area and local institutions for future efforts.** The project training created a pool of informed individuals at the local levels in the 12 counties where training was done. The participants interviewed were still interested in electoral and civic affairs and shared the training information with their colleagues and some were being used by IED in subsequent activities. They also were provided with the skills to develop their own local observation efforts (Figure 9) after the end of IED’s training.

- **Use of the documentary as a pilot to interest other donors to continue the effort.** IED repacked the mobile theater concept and received a USD 600,000 grant from the UNDP Support to Electoral Reform (SERP) project through the IEBC. This allowed it to update and continue airing the documentary through the mobile theater. Along with support from IFES, the updated documentary reflected the specifics for the voter registration system adopted and was sent throughout northern Kenya with IEBC civic educators who addressed the crowds to increase the
effectiveness of the effort. The updated version included UNDEF branding.

- **Doing translations for a well-established electoral knowledge website supported by eight international institutions** that are commitment to its functioning and to ensuring its maintenance for the foreseeable future. This will assure the long-term maintenance of the Swahili site independent of IED. The Swahili materials are currently available on this site for anyone with internet access from anywhere in the world at any time (Figure 10).

- **Adopting activities that were part of IED’s mission of strengthening the electoral processes in Kenya** as IED continues to work in these areas through other donor funding. IED is likely to follow up on its publications from the project and is using the participant pool from CBO observer training in its subsequent activities. This included a voter education project in the north finance by AusAID and its current voter registry audit being done in collaboration with NDI.

- **Documenting and disseminating the recommendations from the study tour in a publication** that was provided to 300 persons working on the issues of party regulation, enforcement and financing. This will remain as a resource for input into the policy making processes for party regulation and enforcement as well as for advocacy efforts for needed change.
IV. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

(i) **The project purpose was mission driven, but the project itself was activity driven.** The series of separate activities raised IED’s institutional visibility in the sector, but lacked the programmatic links and followed up needed to be effective beyond the activity level. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

(ii) **Study tours for new EMB offices established, such as RPP, are useful for raising awareness of participants, but need to be integrated into a broader institutional capacity building efforts to be effective beyond that level.** The project did develop the recommendations from the study tours but provided no follow-up with the RPP to help ensure that these recommendations were implemented. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

(iii) **Translating ACE into Swahili did not increase access and utility of ACE in the region** which was the intended purpose for the translations. The need to translate a static and technical resource was not demonstrated. There was already more than a decade’s worth of good materials developed in the region in local languages that could have been collected and posted. In addition, the translations were not publicized so did not generate any new users to ACE, and almost 90 percent of those who found the translations on their own, did not return. This conclusion follows findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

(iv) **There was a lack of adequate staffing for project activities** as project staff were also tasked with other obligations that pulled them off the project at different times. This delayed some activities and a more coherent implementation of activities following the electoral cycle timeline. This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness and efficiency.

(v) **Coordination between the two UNDEF grantees in Kenya could have strengthened both programs and extended their reach.** Both grantees worked on the same electoral processes at the same time. IED had the experience and connections in the sector that the other grantee lacked and there were potentially strong synergies between their grassroots training efforts that could have strengthened the effectiveness and impact of both projects. This conclusion follows findings on effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

(vi) **The project might have had more significant results than was visible to the evaluators, but it is not possible to know as it did not have a performance monitoring plan** that tracked its performance and measured its results beyond the collection of output data. This conclusion follows findings on relevance and impact.
IV. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

(i) **Concentrate efforts on achieving project outcomes.** Before doing an activity plan, design a ‘development’ program where activities are mutually reinforcing and have the follow-on needed to make a meaningful difference in the areas assisted. This recommendation follows conclusions (i), (ii) and (iii).

(ii) **Ensure the promotion for materials developed** so that the intended beneficiaries and targeted institutions are aware of their existence and **advocate for their use and for their recommendations.** An active advocacy element should be part of any program that intends to build institutions and effect reform. This recommendation follows conclusions (i), (ii) and (iii).

(iii) **Use study tours as part of a larger program of capacity building and systems development for the institutions** so that the project is able to help the organization to benefit from the information learned and to apply the lessons both internally and within the broader framework within which they work. This recommendation follows from conclusion (ii).

(iv) **Undertake strategic planning at the design phase** that includes an assessment of organizational and project staff needs over the life of the project. The grantee should ensure that it has the staff needed to do its own work as well as implement the project without interruption. This could be addressed in planning through increasing the number of project staff, adopting a cascade training approach, and/or providing small subgrants to CBO partners which could also help to strengthen CBOs at the grassroots. This recommendation follows conclusions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

(v) **Do needs assessments in the planning stage** for all project activities, especially for institutional capacity building, trainings, development of materials and translations. These should inform the design and implementation of these project activities. This recommendation follows conclusions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

(vi) **Link UNDEF-funded grantees in a country especially when they work in the same sector and on the same topics.** At a minimum, the projects should share information but should also explore potential synergies that could strengthen their projects. The organization with the most experience in the sector could also be provided a small amount of additional funding to act as a mentor to the other grantee when needed. This recommendation follows conclusion (v).

(vii) **Adopt appropriate indicators that can measure results as well as outputs.** The M&E plan should be able to track the progress of the activities undertaken but
also measure the progress made towards achieving the higher level results anticipated in the project document. This recommendation follows conclusion (vi).

V. **Overall assessment and closing thoughts**

IED is an experienced institution on electoral issues that understands the electoral process and plans its activities according to the electoral timeline (or as it is known in the sector - the electoral cycle). However, the project itself had an event (activity) focus. If IED could undertake a more developmental approach to its projects they could easily become more than activities and could contribute more substantially towards IED’s strategic objectives of strengthening the electoral processes and institutions of governance.

UNDEF also funded two different projects in Kenya at the same time. Both of these projects worked to contribute to peaceful, credible elections in Kenya for 2013. There were natural synergies between these two efforts which targeted marginalized groups for their voter education efforts. The other grantee was a grassroots capacity building CSO with no previous electoral experience. IED was an experienced NGO in the electoral sector. IED could have provided mentoring and expertise and the connections within the sector that the other grantee lacked, while the latter could have provided IED with additional outreach channels through their grassroots networks that focused on reaching women, youth and the disabled in some of the same counties where IED did its activities. These were also the same target groups as IED’s. In the future, UNDEF should ensure that its grantees within a country are aware of each other and encourage synergies between like-projects, as that would help to strengthen the impact of the overall UNDEF-funded efforts within that country.
### VIII. ANNEXES

#### Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevance     | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | • Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
• Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
• Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | • To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?  
• To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?  
• Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
• What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? |
| Efficiency    | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | • Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
• Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?  
• Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives? |
| Impact        | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | • To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
• Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?  
• To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
• Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples? |
| Sustainability| To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | • To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
• Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)? |
| UNDEF value added | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | • What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).  
• Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

ACE Website, Swahili section, http://aceproject.org/ace-sw


Kenya Open DataSheets, https://www.opendata.go.ke/facet/counties


UDF-KEN-09-296, Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region, Project Extension Request Form, Undated

UDF-KEN-09-296, Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region, Mid-Term Progress Report, 4 April 2013

UDF-KEN-09-296, Strengthening Governance and Democratization Processes in Kenya and the East and Central Africa Region, Final Narrative Report, 30 June 2013


## Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 - 20 September</td>
<td>Virtual Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aledia Ferreyra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carlos Navaros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jose Luis Escutia Orta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Julia Almaraz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Wolf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naureen Tadros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 2013</td>
<td>Arrival international consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September 2013</td>
<td>Ezra Chiloba Simiyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carmina Sanchez-Ruecas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ann Nderitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joshua Changwony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carla Chianese, IED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 September 2013</td>
<td>Michael Yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Collins Odote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lisa McLean NDI, Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joshua Cangwony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September 2013</td>
<td>Travel to Coast Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Hassan Mwakulonda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Oyugi Jaramba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamisi Hassan Mwachengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September 2013</td>
<td>Halima Kulola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hadija Akumu Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return to Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 2013</td>
<td>Jane Ogot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 2013</td>
<td>Margie Cook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy Ndungu’u (Stour)</td>
<td>Director, Office of Registrar of Political Parties and study tour participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinah Liech</td>
<td>Human Resources Manager, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and study tour participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Njoroge</td>
<td>National Coordinator, Electoral Observation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3 October 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Aling’o, Former</td>
<td>Former Director for IED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucky Mwaka Mbaga</td>
<td>Project Associate, Mission for Community Initiative Development, Malinde, observation training participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Changwony</td>
<td>Acting Director, IED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla Chianese, IED</td>
<td>Civic/Voter Education Program Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4 October 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Departure of International Consultant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14 - 28 October 2013</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner (need to find name)</td>
<td>National Elections Commission of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Murila</td>
<td>State Law Reform Commission, participant in Mexico study tour (virtual)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 4: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>ACE, the Electoral Knowledge Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIDGE</td>
<td>Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute for Sustainability in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELOG</td>
<td>Electoral Observation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>Electoral Management Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEBC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Institute for Education in Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFE</td>
<td>Instituto Federal Electoral of Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Law Reform Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Registrar of Political Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEAD</td>
<td>United Nations Electoral Assistance Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>