POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND

EVALUATION REPORT

UDF-RAS-13-550 – Emerging Leaders of the Arab Region

Date: 13 November 2017
Table of Contents

I. OVERALL ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................ 1
II. PROJECT CONTEXT ........................................................................................................ 2
   (i) Development Context .................................................................................................. 2
   (ii) Organizational background .................................................................................... 3
   (iii) Project Objective and Intervention Rationale ......................................................... 4
III. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 6
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 7
   (i) Relevance .................................................................................................................. 7
   (ii) Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 10
   (iii) Efficiency ................................................................................................................ 14
   (iv) Impact ...................................................................................................................... 16
   (v) Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 18
   (vi) UNDEF Added Value ................................................................................................ 19
V. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 20
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 21
VII. LESSONS LEARNED ....................................................................................................... 22
VIII. ANNEXES ..................................................................................................................... 24
   ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND DETAILED FINDINGS ......................... 24
   ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ............................................................................. 26
   ANNEX 3: PERSONS INTERVIEWED ............................................................................. 27
   ANNEX 4: ACRONYMS .................................................................................................... 28

Acknowledgements
The evaluator wishes to thank the former and current staff of World Youth Alliance – Middle East as well as all of the individuals who made themselves available for interviews.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluator. They do not represent those of UNDEF or any of the institutions referred to in the report.

Author
This report was written by Marina El Khoury.
I. Overall Assessment

This report is an evaluation of the “Emerging Leaders of the Arab Region” project implemented by the World Youth Alliance – Middle East (WYA-ME) from 1 November 2014 to 31 October 2016. Through this project, WYA-ME sought to empower young leaders in five countries in the Arab region to play a larger role in civil and democratic life. The five selected countries were Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. WYA-ME received an UNDEF grant of USD 200,000 to carry out activities under this project, outlined in more detail in Section II.

The project’s overall development goal was to “increase the civic and democratic participation of young people in the Arab region”. The specific objective was to “empower young leaders in the Arab region to play a bigger role in civic and democratic life”.

According to WYA-ME, the “Emerging Leaders of the Arab Region” project succeeded in training 20 Arab youth in four countries to become trainers, and those trainers in turn trained 565 additional youth on topics including human rights and dignity. These 585 individuals then volunteered at least 12,000 hours in various civic engagements and organizations. In addition, a further 75 “community awareness activities” were held by the trainees during the course of the project. Project launching and closing ceremonies were also organized, as were two “Arab Emerging Leaders Forums”. Finally, an “Emerging Leaders Guide” was drafted and published, and an online platform for communication was meant to have been established.

As discussed in more detail below, WYA-ME was generally unable to produce documentation verifying these claims. Documents that were produced were insufficient or contradictory. For example, while their final report states that 565 individuals participated in training workshops, documentation provided to the evaluator showed a total of only 274 trainees. It is unclear that the project was able to achieve its stated outcomes and goals.

To prevent similar results with future grants, UNDEF must better assess the capacities and values of potential grantees – especially those who propose to implement multi-country projects\(^1\). In addition, UNDEF should request and allocate additional resources to financial and narrative verification during milestone, mid-term, and final reporting periods. WYA, the parent organization of WYA-ME, should review financial management and accountability mechanisms and consider developing the skills of their local staff.

\(^1\) Following the submission of the first draft of this document, UNDEF clarified that since this project, UNDEF has enhanced its due diligence process and added additional areas for assessors to review before long listing a project.
II. Project Context

(i) Development Context
Youth between the ages of 15 - 24 form more than 30% of the population in the Arab region. Since 2011, the region has experienced major political, economic, and social changes. The “Arab Spring” swept youth into larger movements, with mixed results in different countries. While youth were able to play a key role in these movements to express their hopes and aspirations, they still face a number of obstacles in playing more significant roles in civic, political, and socioeconomic life in Arab countries.

Across the region, youth face many obstacles including
- a challenging security environment with a surge in terrorism and narratives supporting the clamping down of civil society as a defensive mechanism against potential attacks;
- a non-conducive political and economic environment in which nepotism and clientelism thrives;
- an institutional environment rife with corruption and an absence of transparency and accountability; and
- oppressive social norms where youth continue to be perceived by the rest of society as reactive and naïve, and are given very limited opportunities to increase their role in social processes.

According to the project document, youth in the Arab region tend to feel powerless and defenseless in the face of these challenges. It should be noted that the project document lacked description of the context in each country of implementation.

In Jordan, while some demonstrations took place in 2011 in support of other youth-led movements across the region, the level of public participation of youth remained extremely low. The lack of interest of youth can be due to the difficult geographical context: a refugee crisis in the country, war on the northern border with Syria, and constant tensions in the neighboring Israel-Palestine conflict. Generations of Jordanians have withdrawn from further involvement to what they perceive are issues where they have little or no input.

In Lebanon, the Syrian refugee crisis also dominated the public sphere during the course of the project. While several civil society initiatives have attempted to break through the status quo (such as Beirut Madinati), the disconnect with younger generations has yet to be bridged to form more successful interventions. With most of the development-oriented engagement making way for more humanitarian-type projects, youth were engaged as part of larger relief efforts for vulnerable refugees across the country.

As for Morocco, protests that took place in 2016 and 2017 in the Rif were watched with caution by youth in other parts of the country, as demonstrations were controlled, and activists arrested. In the lead-up to these events during the period between 2014 and 2016, youth in the
Kingdom of Morocco were positively engaged in public participation. However, most youth continue to struggle in a difficult socio-economic environment and perceive limited results in engagement on larger issues.

Tunisia presented an ideal landscape for youth engagement, following the most successful experience of change in the region. By 2014, Tunisian youth had just started to understand the scope of the opportunities at hand in the public sphere. Youth-led and grassroots initiatives emerged across the country and support from like-minded institutions provided the space for youth to experiment further with their newly-discovered freedoms. In fact, the main challenge for youth engagement between 2014 and 2016 could mostly be attributed to general fatigue from both donors and beneficiaries as the political process stalled and truth and reconciliation mechanisms failed to be fully engaged.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) consists of a loose federation of absolute monarchies in which the ruling families have generally had no interest in democratization. Nonetheless, youth engagement in the UAE has increased for several years, with dozens of UAE youth participating in international youth engagement opportunities and UN initiatives such as the Alliance of Civilizations. The UAE has an official youth empowerment strategy, a newly-appointed 23-year-old young woman serving as Minister of State for Youth Affairs, youth municipal councils, and a government-organized Emirates Youth Council that organizes regular “Youth Circles” activities across the country.

Women and minorities have different rights across all these countries, but general trends and social norms are broadly similar. Tunisia is at the forefront of the struggle for gender equality, with the most advanced legislation in favor of women’s rights. By contrast, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco retain discriminatory legislation with disastrous impact, especially for vulnerable girls and women. Of the five targeted countries for this project, the UAE has perhaps the most restrictive views of women’s rights. While efforts are being made to increase the participation of women in the workforce in the UAE, women still be subject to discriminatory legislation in other areas. For example, female victims of rape are often prosecuted for violating laws on public morality. Across the region, early marriages, domestic violence, sexual harassment, laws allowing rapists to marry their victims to avoid prosecution, the failure to criminalize marital rape, and other issues are daily threats to girls and young women. Political and economic rights are also lagging in the region, which has the world’s lowest participation rate for women in government. Across the region, other types of minorities face severe marginalization and legislative criminalization, including non-recognized ethnic minorities, stateless persons, and LGBT people.

(ii) Organizational background
The WYA was established after its founder participated in the 1999 Conference on Population and Development and objected to its emphasis on the reproductive rights of girls and women. According to WYA’s website, the founder of the organization distributed “pink flyers” during
the conference denouncing the meeting and its stated aims. As stated in the “pink flyer”: “We implore parents to exercise their prior rights and responsibilities to direct the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions and not relinquish these rights to governments and to UN agencies”. This statement, among others, forms the basis of WYA’s understanding of human rights and human dignity as well as its core training programs, “Track A Training” and the “Certified Training Program” (or “CTP”). WYA’s Middle East office was established in 2012 in Beirut, Lebanon.

(iii) Project Objective and Intervention Rationale
The “Emerging Leaders of the Arab Region” project’s overall development goal was to “increase the civic and democratic participation of young people in the Arab region”. The specific objective was to “empower young leaders in the Arab region to play a bigger role in civic and democratic life.

The project had three expected outcomes:
- Capacities of selected youth leaders on freedom, democracy, human rights, civic activism and leadership increased;
- Negative perceptions of youth working in democracy and activism diminished; and
- Youth access to knowledge resources and networks is increased.

The project benefited from an UNDEF grant amounting USD 200,000 to carry out the following activities:
- Selecting and training 20 opinion shapers from 5 countries;
- Training 600 youth leaders at national level through 4 rounds of 150 selected participants trained per round
- 12,000 volunteering hours by 600 youth leaders (20 hours per participant);
- 80 community awareness activities at a rate of 4 activities per country through 4 rounds by teams of youth leaders;
- Organizing launching and closing ceremonies to maximize project exposure within communities;
- Organizing two Arab Emerging Leaders Forums;
- Publishing the emerging leaders’ guide;
- Creating an online platform for the emerging leaders participating in the project.

The project approach was based on the observation that while youth played a key role in the Arab uprisings, they continued to find themselves with limited empowerment or support to take control of their lives and futures. While this intervention rationale is broadly accurate, the project document did not include substantive contextual background for each targeted country.

According to WYA-ME, the post-Arab uprising period is demonstrating that democracy is not a simple change in political systems and representation, but a long and difficult process that requires a change in the political culture. The core problem, and what the project aimed to
change, was identified as “limited opportunities to empower young leaders in the Arab region to play a bigger role in civic and democratic life”.

Through this project, WYA-ME sought to empower young leaders in five countries of the Arab region to play a larger role in civil and democratic life. This was to be achieved by building the capacities of young opinion-shapers and offering them the necessary resources to connect with other young leaders in their countries. Through volunteer work and community awareness activities, the emerging leaders of tomorrow would start constructively working together to make their communities a better place. These community-based actions would positively influence the perceptions that societies in the region have towards youth in democracy.

The project strategy intended to have a long-term and sustainable impact through adopting the following approaches:

- targeting young opinion-shapers,
- empowering these young people through capacity building,
- smart networking through information and communications technology, influencing through action, and
- bottom-up activity planning and implementation.

A communication strategy was also developed with a focus on social media, especially paid advertisements on Facebook.

All the lessons learned would be compiled into a guide that would support this new network of 620 “Emerging Leaders of the Arab Region”.

The direct participants and beneficiaries of this project were youth leaders between the ages of 15 and 29. Indirect beneficiaries included an unspecified number of civil society organizations in the five targeted countries benefitting from the volunteer work, and 2,400 individuals from rural and urban communities benefitting from community awareness activities.

The initial project document and intervention rationale did not include any mention of implementing partners. However, the final report mentions 105 partnership agreements across the four countries in which activities were implemented.
III. Methodology

UNDEF’s 2017 operational manual for post-project evaluations was the initial reference document to develop the methodology. Basic criteria of constructive process, focus on lessons learned, forward-looking, and comprehensive view of the project’s results were respected. Information was collected, analyzed, and is presented in this report according to the OECD – DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. An additional criterion was included aimed at analyzing UNDEF’s added-value. The post-project evaluation also aimed at linking evidence-based findings to recommendations.

An international expert designated to conduct the evaluation prepared a preliminary planning note (Launch Note) in August 2017. The Note was based on a review of the following project documentation:
- Project document;
- Mid-term progress and final narrative and financial reports;
- Milestone verification reports;
- UNDEF Programme Officer mission note; and
- Email correspondence between UNDEF Programme Officer and the grantee.

The evaluator and the grantee then proceeded to hold introductory Skype conversations to develop a schedule of interviews that would take place during a field mission to Lebanon from 10 to 15 September 2017. During the field mission, the evaluator interviewed the grantee’s current and former staff, external accountant, participants in the project activities, partner organizations, and UNDP representatives. The evaluator also spent time reviewing the organization’s presence on social media and public Facebook albums of the UNDEF-funded activities. As the project was regional, Skype calls were conducted in lieu of physical or regular phone meetings with stakeholders from Morocco and Tunisia. The full list of people interviewed is presented in Annex 3.

Collecting data from the grantee was a difficult process, indicating some disorganization and a lack of proper hand-over to new staff on the part of the grantee. For example, an Excel spreadsheet provided to the evaluator only accounted for 274 trainees, whereas the final narrative report stated that 394 participants successfully completed the national workshops. The evaluator also had to disaggregate the spreadsheet data by gender, country, and training rounds because the grantee did not. Data related to the community awareness activities and the volunteering component was also missing and never provided to the evaluator. The evaluator was unable to accurately measure whether targets were achieved or conclusively confirm beneficiary numbers indicated in the final report. Similarly, the evaluator was never provided with a consolidated document summarizing or listing the activities that were conducted in any of the countries, nor was there any list or report of any kind reporting back on the volunteering component of the project. There was difficulty in finding any type of UNDEF-related training materials, for either the Training of Trainers or the national workshops. There also appear to be
discrepancies between the final report and the collected data for certain components, such as the number of printed guides.

The financial review also posed significant challenges. Nearly all of the financial documentation requested by the evaluator was not provided. The Director of Operations, who was supposed to be the project’s accountant, did not perform the basic functions of recordkeeping, as described below. In addition, the individual who prepared financial reports on behalf of WYA-ME also acted as their “external auditor”, a clear conflict of interest. The cash ledger and supporting documents were in his possession, despite the fact that the evaluation took place nine months after project completion, and WYA-ME had no copies. When asked to provide supporting documents and given time to send copies via emails, WYA-ME and the accountant failed to do so. Basic rules of bookkeeping were also neglected, with an absence of essential documentation such as invoices from translators, receipts from hotels, or even descriptions or summaries of activities for each transfer of funds to trainers.

Finally, a number of incidents took place that prevented the evaluator from conducting a complete review. Meetings and Skype calls were cancelled without prior notice, and group interviews were not set-up despite an agreement to do so. Many of the meetings that WYA-ME did organize for the evaluator involved individuals that had limited or no involvement in the course of the project, disrupting the course of the evaluation and indicating that hand-over documents to new staff were either inaccurate or missing.

IV. Evaluation Findings

(i) Relevance
Youth engagement has been a topic of interest for UN agencies and local civil society organizations (CSOs) across the region in the last two decades. Since 2002, the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s “Arab Human Development Report” has persistently analyzed the situation of an increasing number of Arab youth, from being deprived of basic rights to challenges in the livelihoods sector. The 2016 report “Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality” examines the situation of youth following the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and provides strategic guidance on how to involve youth in shaping the future of the region.

Problem and context analysis
In this context, the objectives of the project as outlined in the project document were generally relevant. The project as described did relate to UNDEF’s aims and objectives. However, the project’s design lacked specific context analysis for each selected country. There also did not seem to be any involvement from project stakeholders and beneficiaries in the formulation and design of the project. The understanding of the context being limited, the project’s intervention
rationale and the process for implementation was also lacking essential elements relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries at the local and national levels.

**Partnerships and WYA-ME positioning in the region**
Consequently, the absence of a partnership strategy was not only detrimental to the relevance of the project, but also to all the other components of this evaluation. WYA-ME has been operating out of Lebanon since 2012, a mere two years before receiving this grant, and has heavily relied on social media for outreach. However, the Arab region already has a substantial number of national and regional CSOs and actors with a long-term presence and experience sharing mechanisms do exist. WYA-ME developed a simple strategy without mapping other actors nor identifying potential synergies with already-existing programmes on youth engagement. In addition to the difficult positioning of the organization in the development landscape in Lebanon (an NGO professional explained: “although it was an international NGO, it didn’t feel like one when working with them”), WYA-ME was unable to tailor the objectives of the project to the local development landscape in other countries. With no in-house expertise on engaging with youth in any of the implementation countries, the project had a difficult start.

**Withdrawing the UAE from project implementation**
WYA-ME decided to withdraw the UAE from the project early in its implementation. The main reasons that were shared with the evaluator were the risks associated with the lack of previous outreach, and time-consuming efforts that may lead to neglecting the other four countries. According to the former regional director, some unsuccessful outreach towards a single university was attempted, and no significant strategy was put in place to attempt further outreach.

**Activity and output consistency with intended outcomes**
Activities and outputs were only partially consistent with intended impact and effects. Their scope was too broad, with no clear frameworks for the volunteering hours and community activities.

The Training of Trainers (ToT) seemed to be a replica of WYA-ME’s core “Track A” training programme and was perceived by all interviewed participants as being too dense and theoretical. According to the former project coordinator, the content of the training was not tailored to suit the needs of the region. Many also felt that it did not provide them with the skills they needed to deliver their national workshops, especially because several of these trainers had already been certified through WYA-ME’s “Track A” or “CTP” training. Several trainers explained that they had to translate some materials themselves and find tailored approaches for their different groups, even in the same country. In addition, only trainers with personal relationships shared their experiences and provided support to each other; there was no institutional mechanism for doing so.
The absence of comprehensive data, listing all volunteering activities by country and round, and listing all community awareness activities, was a large obstacle in evaluating the relevance of these activities towards the objectives of this project.

**Other project activities**

In addition to outputs linked to the grassroots participants, other activities were not properly fleshed out or implemented. For example, the proposed information exchange platform ended up being nothing more than Facebook groups, and did not have the effect intended in the project document.

Apart from Facebook photo albums, data about the Arab Emerging Leaders Forums, and the opening and closing ceremonies was scarce. The evaluator was unable to verify the number of participants, the content of sessions and discussions, the names of speakers, nor even the name of the documentary film that WYA-ME claimed was screened during the second Forum.

**Risks and assumptions**

Risks and assumptions were not clearly identified in the project document and the case-by-case approach to mitigate these risks limited the relevance of the project. A certain number of risks, such as the commitment of participants, finding venues, and developing platforms for the activities, could have been solved by a strategic decision to find and engage formally with appropriate local partners.

Leaving the trainers to find participants and invite them to register online carried significant risks. One potential participant perceived this solicitation as unprofessional and disconnected from the local civil society landscape, indicating that activities may not have been fully consistent with the intended impact.

Finally, there seemed to be limited effort from WYA-ME to engage with governments or local authorities. Initiatives linked to local governments may have taken place on a personal level by participants.

**Taking gender and minorities into account**

Although there was no substantive work on the matter, gender balance seemed to be achieved naturally, albeit with a minor male predominance (53% as seen in table below). There was no strategy beyond the regular gender balance for project participants, for instance in providing any material linked to women empowerment or women’s rights. While the proposal mentions the inclusion of sections on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW), the evaluator was unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion as data provided on training content was scarce.
Some activities were, however, somewhat relevant in the global movement for gender equality, such as a debate in Morocco, and a training with “She Fighter” in Jordan, an organization promoting girls and women’s self-defense skills.

(ii) Effectiveness
As mentioned in the methodology section, data collection and documentation was unsatisfactory. The evaluator was unable to verify precise numbers related to targets and indicators set forth in the project document. As a result, the evaluator found it challenging to assess the full extent of the project’s effectiveness, and relied on triangulating and cross-checking information through qualitative accounts by interviewed stakeholders.

Preparing 20 opinion shapers to become national trainers
Participants had to apply for the ToT, and interviews followed up through Skype. The evaluator was unable ascertain how many interviews were conducted and whether clear guidelines for selection were followed. It seemed that previous WYA-certified trainers were selected almost immediately, while others were selected for some prior engagement in civic activities.

According to multiple trainers, the materials for the ToT were no different than the WYA “CTP” training, which constitutes the core programming of the organization. At least four participants were already certified through the initial programme, and were therefore more familiar than others to the subjects. This created some imbalance as new participants had difficulties catching up with concepts.

The training itself was not contextualized to fit the needs of the countries, and was only effective for seasoned participants who had significant experience conducting trainings themselves.

In the absence of the “ELAR project guidebook”, which was not provided by WYA-ME, the evaluator reviewed the “Track A” or “CTP” training. WYA-ME staff confirmed that most elements were similar. The evaluator found that some elements could be perceived as controversial and in contradiction with core UN values. Although WYA states that it is a firm believer in the equal dignity of all human beings without exception and firmly prohibits any gender discrimination, it does advocate against certain universal reproductive rights or any enshrinement of the rights of children in opposition to ”parental rights” in international law.

Training 600 youth leaders at national level
After the ToT, trainers returned to their respective countries to work on their first assignment: setting up and delivering national workshops. This turned out to be a particularly difficult task and trainers quickly felt overwhelmed with the tasks at hand: gathering participants, securing venues without much funding, adapting the training materials to their audience, and organizing all other logistical details. In addition, trainers also had to verify that volunteering
hours were completed. They were also in charge of supervising the community awareness activities. Without any local partner or support, many trainers were unable to pull off the organizing of these national workshops. The fact that trainers were volunteers did not help in keeping a consistent level of motivation and dedication throughout the project. Even the most committed trainers were unable to implement the four rounds as described in the project document.

The selection of participants also seemed somewhat weak. Sponsored advertisements on Facebook did bring in large numbers of applicants, but only a few made their way to the actual activity. It was more constructive for trainers to reach out on a personal level to their family members and friends at their schools or universities. One model included partnering with a large foundation and attracting its volunteers through a poster campaign (see right). Some trainers also mentioned their lack of experience at first and the challenges in delivering a national workshop from a practical standpoint, but nearly all were positive about their learning process.

Some of the information in the final report turned out to be inaccurate through triangulation of data and interviewing stakeholders. For example, the final report mentions 565 youth leaders trained at a national level, however only 394 passed the certification exam that would allow them to pursue the volunteering and community activities. There are discrepancies between numbers mentioned in the final report and the only available sheet reflecting participant data, showing a total of 274 participants as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Round</th>
<th>Round 1</th>
<th>Round 2</th>
<th>Round 3</th>
<th>Round 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaggregation by country, round, and gender was calculated by the evaluator. The document did not include any information about the fourth round in three countries.

12,000 volunteering hours by 600 youth leaders
It is highly unlikely that 12,000 hours of volunteering took place in the course of this project. As mentioned, only participants having passed the exam would continue further with the
subsequent activities. While the mid-term evaluation sought to bring in partnerships to enhance this component, the implementation seemed challenging. On instances of verified volunteering, the charity framework had taken over the civic engagement scope, and volunteering took place in humanitarian relief organizations. While it could be argued that charity could in fact account for a form of civic engagement, it remained unclear how democratic engagement was achieved.

In Lebanon, only one interviewed NGO with staff and volunteers as participants was able to verify that some level of volunteering took place (more in the form of capacity development opportunities for their own staff and volunteers), whereas three other NGOs contacted admitted not having had any formal or informal collaboration with WYA-ME at any point in the last two years. The volunteering may have happened in the form of other pre-existing arrangements such as internships where WYA-ME was not directly involved.

The organization did not track any records or certificates from associations or NGOs that confirmed that volunteering took place, and staff were unable to produce these documents when requested. However, a few trainers did keep some documentation that was helpful to the evaluation in clarifying this component.

80 community awareness activities
The final report mentions 75 completed activities, however the documentation provided was insufficient for verifying this number. The evaluator was unable to track the number of workshops organized by each trainer, and there was extremely limited reporting over subsequent activities. Documentation was sparse and there did not seem to be specific guidelines over the organization and execution of these activities.

There was no clear or available data around the number of trainers that committed to supervising these activities, and it seems that activities were not distributed evenly among the trainers. It also seems unlikely that activities took place in locations outside of capital cities; for example, all Jordan-based activities appear to have taken place in Amman. With different degrees of motivation, some trainers never reached the implementation of this component, whereas other took the lead for several activities. To enhance the final number of activities, WYA-ME interns were tasked with executing actions to be accounted for in this project.

In an attempt to enhance the prospect of successful activities, some trainers agreed to work together on this component, such as in Jordan. However, interpersonal tensions hindered the effectiveness of this action. As relayed in the final report: “this specific problem was based on gender
differences, the male trainer refused to treat his female co-trainer equally...so we divided them into separate groups at the end”. This was confirmed by talking to the victim of this situation, the female trainer, as she recounted to the evaluator examples of the unprofessional and threatening situations she found herself in because of her male co-trainer. She concluded by saying that she never received an apology and there was no process related to accountability over this incident. It is particularly shocking that elements that could be described as verbal abuse took place against a participant in the project and were not met with any kind of punitive response, except an insignificant verbal reprimand, by WYA-ME’s senior management. The female trainer expressed her dismay to the evaluator that the male trainer continued to be part of WYA-ME after the incident, without having to apologize to his victim.

In addition to the abovementioned issues, one important issue raised by two trainers was the legality of their activities, as WYA-ME was not registered in any of the targeted implementation countries except Lebanon, complicating the task of convincing organizations to partner with them or to find appropriate venues².

As trainers were overwhelmed, the Project Officer was tasked with following up personally with as many participants as he could. This led to micromanagement without an understanding of a bigger picture for the project, neglecting other important elements of project management, and leading senior management to be as ineffective in maintaining comprehensive traction over the project’s overall effectiveness.

**Launching (right) and closing ceremony to maximize project exposure within communities**

The ceremonies took place in hotels at the heart of Beirut with limited exposure within communities. There was no data around the content of the speeches and materials that were shared. Photos and a video that were produced were shared on WYA-ME’s Facebook page. However, the video did not include parts of speeches or reflect on any opinions voiced, and was therefore inconclusive.

**Two Arab Emerging Leaders Forums**

There was no report or summary for either of the Forums, leaving the evaluator with limited documentation (pictures on Facebook albums) to properly assess the effectiveness of this output. The evaluator was left without information about the content of speeches, outcomes of the Forums, or even simple recollections about the events from participants. The Forums were not prioritized in the course of the project.

---

² Following submission of the first draft of this document, UNDEF clarified that revised procedures require that all applicants provide documentation to verify their legal registration.
Publishing the emerging leaders guide
Although the final report mentions 200 copies, the receipt found in the cashbook that is linked to the specific budget line only accounted for 100 copies. Facebook advertising was used to disseminate the guide. However, it seemed unlikely that this was effective, as even several participants and trainers had not seen it nor planned to use it in the future. The content of the guide is limited to the main achievements of the project and misses the chance to provide opportunities for adaptation and further usage.

Creating an online platform for the emerging leaders participating in the project
WYA-ME senior management decided early on to drop this component as it seemed like a time-consuming effort with limited results. While they may have been correct in this assumption, this core element of the project was neglected and did not provide trainers and participants with a sustainable platform beyond the scope of the project.

Although the final report states that each training group created a Facebook page (see right) to coordinate and continue communications, it appears that many training cadres did not create any such group. In addition, at the time of the evaluation, most of the groups that had been created were already inactive. Local groups on Facebook were closed and not linked to one another, limiting the possibilities for cross-sharing of experiences.

It would seem that the project’s objectives were partially achieved at best, and may only have partially empowered a specific group of young leaders in the Arab region to play a bigger role in civic life. It may have only empowered those who had more resources to invest, and strategic vision for their own personal development. A few of the interviewed trainers and participants are now residing in Western countries, and others were applying or were already working with much larger organizations, including some international organizations.

(iii) Efficiency
The budget for this project was not designed nor implemented in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives. The budget did not seem to reflect any thought process over the supervision of activities across five countries and travel was only allocated for activities taking place in Beirut. There was no reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs.

Financial management structure
The organization does not have an in-house finance officer and therefore relied on an external auditor to take charge of the accounting and bookkeeping of the project. As a result, the regional director of operations was in charge of basic cashbook management, but was inexperienced in financial project management. The external accountant, on the other hand, was only periodically present and was not responsible for actual finance management.

**Costs, Final Financial Utilization Report (FFUR), and supporting documents**

The external accountant was unable to produce a cashbook that accurately represented the expenses made in the project as per the submitted final financial utilization report (FFUR) to UNDEF. The FFUR signed on 17 December 2017 by the external accountant and the regional director accounted for USD 39,238 of remaining funds, whereas the detailed cashbook revealed USD 47,073 remaining funds. It is clear that accounting procedures and financial management were sub-standard.

Some costs seemed to be overestimated in the budget with translation costs of about USD 10,000 combined, which were almost all expended. However, the evaluator was unable to verify the veracity of these costs, as no invoices were produced, even when requested at multiple occasions, and there was no proof or access to any translated material except for the guide.

There were also discrepancies with some information. A non-exhaustive list includes: a videographer charge for the ToT accounting for USD 1,900 with no supporting documents and no video available, video and photo pricing for the closing ceremony being double that of the launching ceremony (also with an absence of an invoice in both cases), inaccurate reporting for hotel accommodations in Beirut (instead of 20, there were only 14 rooms reserved for the first event – 5 reserved to Lebanese project staff and Lebanese trainers, and between 11 and 14 rooms depending on the night for the second event), unclear per diems rates given to senior management on their trips, and no proof of payment or receipts to non-binding hotel reservations made online provided as supporting documentation. An education expert sitting at headquarters was also paid USD 2,000 for various review of materials, however no Terms of Reference existed and there is no record of which materials were reviewed and what the outcome of this support was.

In general, the costs for conferences and trainings accommodation and transportation accounted for more than a third of the project’s reported expenses in the FFUR (36%), leaving just 16% of effective costs for the actual youth-led activities.

**Project activities**

Activities were not tracked from a financial management standpoint, with a noted absence of payment orders, proofs of receipts and an absence of a summary or report of activity attached to wire transfer receipts.

For example, one of the first national workshops to be organized in Lebanon by two trainers in March 2015 had only 5 attendees, in addition to two visiting staff from WYA Global. The event,
supposed to take place over two days, was completed in less than a full day and may have cost up to USD 2,100 according to available data.

Several implementation planning issues that were brought up at different occasions in the course of the project (e.g. transportation costs, bank fees), negatively affected the project’s efficiency as this situation frustrated trainers and may have influenced the decrease of motivation over time. Other committed trainers mentioned that they paid out of pocket to cover for some expenses related to the project. The main issue with this assertion is that it is difficult to understand where the funds for activities went as there were no individual summaries or reports attached to the money wire receipts (nor were there payment orders for many of them).

Both trainers and participants complained about the lack of funds for their activities and commented that they were told that there was no money in the budget. However, there were no institutional arrangements to promote cost-effectiveness and accountability. The best example for this is the lack of partnership with local NGOs where only one bank transfer would have sufficed to not only reach targets, but also have a more meaningful impact. With weak monitoring, the project ran more risks in the ability of properly managing finances.

Available options and disbursement of tranches
On both occasions of milestone reviews, the milestone financial utilization reports indicated underspending at a rate of USD 19,796 in April 2015 and of USD 49,083 in January 2016. Nevertheless, the UNDEF instalments (USD 75,000 and USD 40,000 respectively) were still disbursed according to schedule based on available reports deemed satisfactory and a field visit conducted by UNDEF.

Although WYA-ME senior management was conscious of the budget imbalance, they were unaware of the type of options they had with UNDEF such as requesting a comprehensive project document revision with a more balanced budget in favor of the activities³. They also appeared to have been micromanaged by WYA-HQ toward other topics or simply thought that it would have been impossible to amend the project document.

(iv) Impact
Impact on the participants
The project had a positive impact on committed individual participants in enhancing their soft skills and leadership skills. Some youth clearly benefited from the project to help their community-based organizations’ visibility, to register a university club, and to enhance their work opportunities. Tangible individual impact included a boosted CV with increased chances of being selected for larger programmes in the country or even abroad, and a sense of

³ Further clarification from UNDEF following the submission of the first draft of this document: “UNDEF met with the grantee and explained all options. UNDEF subsequently agreed to budget deviations”.

16 | P a g e
understanding of critical thinking. All trainers and participants mentioned the interesting content of the training albeit having been too theoretical and difficult to fine-tune to the needs of others in their communities. Some participants mentioned that not everyone was convinced with the core messages relayed by WYA, but were still dedicated to implement local initiatives irrespective of this matter.

The main challenge throughout the implementation remained the ability for trainers to keep their participants engaged and motivated through the three components. This negatively impacted the engagement of other participants and trainers themselves, many of whom did not complete the four expected rounds. According to the UNDP observer, there was limited impact of the national workshop she monitored because of the limited attendance and the inexperienced trainers who would have benefited from more mentoring. According to a former staff member, there were struggles to understand what had really happened in a group, and the management had to make a choice of cancelling activities or going forward with the few participants left that were still motivated.

Some trainers did not feel ownership over the project. The evaluator sensed a level of frustration linked to the amount of logistical input they needed to provide and the limited funds available to support activities. Others attempted alternative solutions to enhance the motivation of participants, such as re-organizing components and inviting participants to go through the volunteering component before attending the national workshop. But even this was no guarantee for participants to continue through the third component.

A missed opportunity for increased impact was the absence of an experience sharing platform. The ToT provided the opportunity for trainers to meet and share their thoughts, however only trainers with personal connections continued to communicate throughout the period of the project. Some trainers felt left out and were unaware of project implementation in other cities and countries.

**Impact on communities**
The project may have created a temporary network of like-minded individuals, and may have “assisted massively in the creation of a cognitive environment of brainstorming” according to one participant, but the project is unlikely to have had a catalytic effect. The activities were mostly tactical and not strategic, with limited long-term effect. For example, a bike ride was organized in Jordan to raise awareness around freedom, but the ride was outside of town and did not attract enough visibility to reach the general public. It is therefore difficult to assess if there were any changes and effects, positive or negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization.

Participants were not introduced to the project’s objectives and processes and were therefore unable to link their activities to the rest of the project and its objectives. Activities were narrowly-focused with limited knowledge about other activities in other cities or countries as
part of the same project. Stakeholders were thus unable to grasp the full scope of the project. This may have been a missed opportunity for further engagement and increased impact.

The absence of a strategic framework and further details in the project document for the volunteering and for the community awareness activities indicated that the scope of the project was too broad and may have diluted the impact of the activities on communities.

While the project may have helped some youth in being more active in their civic life and opened career and personal paths, there were limited activities directly linked to democratic participation; examples of awareness activities were more likely to include charity-like components rather than a classic awareness raising model of activities.

**Impact of other project components**

The ceremonies, forums, the guide, and the online platform in the form of Facebook group, all had limited impact. The ceremonies and forums took place in Beirut and had weak coverage and visibility. The evaluator has been unable to retrieve the content of these events, but it would seem that there were no considerable outputs to these activities. The guide serves as a reminder of what was accomplished in the first year of the project (it was published in December 2015), thus limiting its potential outreach and not integrating all lessons learned from the experience. The evaluator was also unable to retrieve a hard copy of the guide for UNDEF’s records, as there were none available in the office. As for the Facebook groups, their membership is closed and all participants interviewed indicated that they were no longer active.

(v) **Sustainability**

**Relying on social media and volunteers**

Despite the dedication and commitment of most trainers that the evaluator interviewed, there were clear signals that expecting them to implement all the required tasks without appropriate human and financial support was not sustainable, and brought even the most dedicated trainers to some form of frustration. For example, three trainers mentioned out-of-pocket expenses to keep track of volunteers’ involvement, numerous field visits with no transportation allowance, and regular cell phone calls to follow-up.

When asked whether there were any other ideas to meet this challenge, the former staff for the project did not seem duly informed of options related to more comprehensive budget and project document revisions, relying instead on case-by-case solutions that were ad hoc.

There was no streamlining of processes related to the volunteering and community awareness activities. Some had great impact within the communities, while others seemed to be less linked to the actual empowerment of youth and civic and democratic values. In all cases, the lack of proper documentation clearly describing all volunteering and community activities was an obstacle to the evaluation in properly assessing the sustainability of these outputs. With an
absence of experience sharing platforms, trainers were left with bilateral support from a Project Officer that appeared to be underperforming, even according to both his former supervisors. Finally, the guide was shared through sponsored content on Facebook and it was difficult to properly assess the sustainability of this action. While some stakeholders were familiar with the guide, mentioning that it was a great record to track their achievements, many other direct stakeholders had not seen it and were unable to provide their thoughts.

**Organizational sustainability**

Although it appeared to be innovative, the project effectively seemed to be a continuation of WYA-ME core activities without particular added-value except the ability to expand their outreach to new countries.

The organization used the outputs of this project to set up national committees in each country. However, with the lack of resources to follow-up and the inability for the organization to diversify their sources of funding, national committees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia, did not seem to be functional. Three members from Jordan and two from Tunisia have since left their respective countries. The UNDEF-supported project remains the only grant provided to WYA’s Beirut regional office.

Participants and trainers were left to establish partnerships with organizations by themselves, with no formal or informal communication with WYA-ME. This had a negative impact on sustainability as the organization was unable to build institutional synergies that would continue beyond the scope of the project.

Finally, the organization is not registered within UNDP’s youth organizations network and thus may miss out on opportunities to network with other organizations in the country and in the region to gain more experience.

**(vi) UNDEF Added Value**

While stakeholders were not familiar with UNDEF as an agency, the presence of a UN logo seems to have greatly enhanced the image of the project, and encouraged more stakeholders to participate. According to one participant, a UN logo “gives it an automatic value”.

Unsurprisingly for the region, many participants mentioned their preference for UN-related funding rather than foreign governments’ such as the US, indicating that they would not have participated in the project had other donors, such as USAID, been involved.

Given that WYA-ME itself is not well-known in any of the implementation countries, including Lebanon, the UNDEF support was instrumental in ensuring some level of interest from other actors and subsequent partners. Promoting the project as being funded by the UN was considered by most interviewed trainers as a definite added-value in this regard as they were outreaching to find venues for the national workshops and conducting their activities.
V. Conclusions

(i) The project was not relevant. While the general field of youth engagement has been of great interest to civil society in the Arab region, the organization did not have sufficient geographic and managerial expertise to implement such a broad project across five countries, and keep focused on the outcomes. Even when one country was dropped, there were significant gaps between the project and its understanding of the local and national contexts. The project’s strategy and scope were too broad, did not reflect the needs of youth, and risks were not appropriately identified. When activities were successful and positive, they were not linked back to the project’s achievement of its overall expected outcomes. It seemed that the democratic scope was sidelined in favor of a more general civic scope. The lack of interest from government stemmed minimal attempts made by the organization to build relationships with policy makers.

(ii) The project’s effectiveness was compromised by the design of the project. The lack of local partners and the inexperience of the organization in the region impacted the effectiveness of the project. Instead of establishing agreements with youth organizations in each country, the organization instead heavily relied on their volunteer trainers (and Facebook sponsored content) to implement core activities. This may even have been harmful as the organization is not legally registered in any of the countries except Lebanon.

(iii) The effectiveness was also compromised by the lack of proper documentation. With hundreds of participants and dozens of activities, no proper documentation system was set-up to keep track of progress and analyze trends across the board. This led to case-by-case decision-making that was not streamlined and did not feed into a constructive cycle of activities.

(iv) The effectiveness of other components of the project was also limited. The ceremonies, forums, guide, and online platform, had limited effects on the achievement of the project’s objectives. On the one hand, the ceremonies and forums seemed to be prioritized from a logistical lens, but they did not lead to substantive steps and follow-ups, especially with the lack of information regarding the contents of these events. On the other, the guide and Facebook groups may serve for personal recollections but were not effective in contributing to the project’s goals.

(v) The project was not an efficient use of donor funds. The project’s financial management and bookkeeping procedures were below standard. Basic supporting documents such as proof of payments, invoices, and description of activities, were missing. The available funds were not appropriately allocated to project components. There seemed have been an emphasis on Beirut-based hotel-centered events, and not enough on resourcing core actions leading to the project’s expected achievements.
(vi) The project had a positive impact on some participants and, to a much lesser degree, their communities. The project had a positive impact on participants previously certified by WYA-ME and those with plans for further engagement extending beyond the project. However, the impact was limited as funds were inappropriately allocated, certain groups were demotivated, and there was a lack of clear guidelines for volunteering and community awareness activities. There was no way to assess further impact in the absence of comprehensive documentation and general tracking of trends. It is unlikely that the project had a catalytic effect as a result. Finally, it should be noted that the project had a negative impact on at least one participant due to an unresolved dispute with another participant. No appropriate action has been taken by the grantee organization with regard to this matter.

(vii) The project was not sustainable. The online platform and guide did not achieve the results intended in the project document. The guide was produced as an end in itself with limited long-term impact. The online platform that was supposed to achieve some sustainability was replaced by local and closed Facebook groups. Synergies across the networks were not built, and even the mechanisms for local groups are no longer functioning, indicating an absence of exit strategy of the project. Links between youth and policy makers at local and national levels were only assessed as positive in one instance, but this was a singular situation due to preexisting connection and not reflective of the rest of the project.

(viii) UNDEF’s support had limited added-value. While it was instrumental for successful activities to publicize the UN funding, UNDEF did not cover a gap in accessing resources for this type of project. WYA-ME already operates with core funds and through the UNDEF grant was able to conduct more of their original core activities. The organization did not use UNDEF to develop new partnerships or diversify their sources of funding, but did use UNDEF to increase its visibility and outreach as an organization.

VI. Recommendations

(i) WYA should develop its own staff skills and provide essential in-house financial management structures for their regional offices. WYA-ME staff are often inexperienced, with limited or no project cycle management understanding, no experience in financial management, limited understanding of local contexts in the region, and limited understanding of basic monitoring and documentation practices.

(ii) WYA should clarify its regional strategy and goals, and tailor its approach to the needs of the region. The engagement of organizations such as WYA, with no contacts or understanding of local contexts, can be negatively disruptive and potentially harmful to local civil society dynamics, especially with an absence of an exit strategy.
(iii) WYA should develop a code of conduct for their participants and provide support to victims of abuse in their projects, and UNDEF should request grantee’s codes of conduct at the proposal stage of the application process. Gender-based violence, albeit verbal, was witnessed and reported to the organization, but no concrete action was taken towards the aggressor.

(iv) UNDEF should better assess capacities and values of organizations to implement such large projects⁴. There were many issues related to the grantee’s capacities: lack of experience of staff in project management, absence of in-house financial management (and subsequent conflict of interest in having the accountant perform the audit), absence of a clear strategy per country, and lack of understanding of local contexts. This was detrimental to the project’s implementation. More importantly, UNDEF should ensure that potential grantees’ values are consistent with the global values and principles of the UN and subsidiary bodies and agencies.

(v) UNDEF should implement additional measures to verify further supporting documents during milestone, mid-term, and final reporting periods, especially financial for specific grants. Requesting a full break-down of project expenditure for complex and high-risk regional projects should be the norm, in addition to requesting more information on the modalities within each geographic area of implementation. If projects are deemed unsatisfactory by UNDEF, this information should be shared with other UN grant-making agencies and relevant entities to increase transparency and accountability of grantees within the UN system.

VII. Lessons Learned

Projects spanning over multiple countries should have detailed context analysis for each country of implementation. The number of countries should not exceed three countries, unless the strategy is realistic and appropriate. If the organization is not present in countries of implementation, it should be mandatory to present a partnership strategy. A solid mapping of potential partners, if not already-selected partners, should be presented in the project document, along with a partnership strategy that is continuous to the project, with comprehensive monitoring mechanisms. Steering committees for each country of implementation and a project steering committee should be established to ensure appropriate levels of communication among all stakeholders. Milestones should include activities from more than one country to provide better understanding of the implementation. When implementing the same model in multiple countries over different rounds, a review after the

⁴ Following the submission of the first draft of this report, UNDEF clarified that there have been enhanced risk mitigation policies put in place since the completion of this project.
first round is necessary to fine-tune the approach, instead of waiting for a mid-term review that may come in too late.

**Networking to gather participants in training sessions should be conducted after a clear mapping of local potential resources.** The reliance solely on social media and personal connections limits diversity, and the lack of involvement of the grantee also limits the credibility and legitimacy of trainers to attract participants.

**Volunteering as the basis of activities has many implementation challenges and less reliance on volunteer trainers would be preferable.** Instead of multiplying the number of rounds, and tapping into the potential of all volunteers, smaller numbers of rounds that are better organized and managed can have more impact. Regular visits of the project management team to all implementation sites should be mandatory, with clear documentation of analysis and next steps.

**Awareness raising activities should be strategic and not only tactical, for increased long-term effect.** Activities should aim at maximizing the number of people reached, and the message should be focused and applied locally. They should also include accurate indicators and means of verification in order to assess if there were any changes or impact, positive or negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization.

**Clarification around the perceived rigidity of the project document should be made as soon as possible.** The project document serves as a guiding tool, but grantees’ senior management should be aware of their options to modify activities and budgets to better fit the project’s goals.
### Annex 1: Evaluation Questions and Detailed Findings

The questions below were formulated by the evaluator and the project officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevance     | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | - Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
- How well did the project relate to UNDEF’s aims and objectives?  
- To what extent were project stakeholders including beneficiaries involved in the formulation and design of the project?  
- To what extent were decision makers (i.e. government and others) involved in the project and engaged with formal channels of engagement?  
- On the lack of interest from Governments. What could the project have done differently? How essential would this have been or not given the nature of the project?  
- Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
- Were risks appropriately identified by the project? How appropriate were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | - What has the project achieved? How do the results contribute to each of the outcome areas of the objectives?  
- To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached? Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
- Did key stakeholders fully participate in the project?  
- Did the right stakeholders benefit from the project; were there other important stakeholders not included?  
- On challenges for volunteers to be fully committed. Was the level of support and choice of volunteering modality adequate? |
| Efficiency    | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | - Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
- Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? Are there examples of leveraging other resources or partners in joint activity during the project?  
- Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?  
- Several implementation planning issues were brought up (e.g. transport costs, bank fees, planning event venues for better value). To what extent were these consequential in the project’s impact?  
- The project had several small project budget reallocations (mentioned in the MTR, FNR). To what extent were those reallocations done adding value for money to the project and why wasn’t there a formal budget revision made |
| Impact | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
- Did the targeted beneficiaries experience tangible impacts?  
- Which were positive; which were negative?  
- To what extent has the project cause changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
- Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?  
- What concrete illustrations of impact can be found in terms of the bigger role now played by youth (beyond the activities carried out through the project, like the community activities etc.)? |
| Sustainability | To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
- Are the involved parties (both youth participants and local partners) willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?  
- Was the project set to leave a sustainable legacy beyond networks of youth that are simply connected and informed? Was there something left behind in terms of setting up sustainable entry points for participation? |
| UNDEF value added | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.).  
- Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

Background documents

Project documentation - UDF-RAS-13-550
- Project document
- Reports: mid-term progress report, final narrative and financial reports
- Final financial report with break-down
- Milestone verification narrative and financial reports
- “Track A” or “CTP” training

Project outputs
- The “Emerging Leaders in the Arab Region” guide
- Facebook photo albums
- Summary of the 3rd and 4th rounds (incomplete)
- ToT evaluation forms (incomplete)
- Mid-term evaluation forms (incomplete)
- Templates of project documents: “the pitch”, “the game plan”, “the score”
## Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAY-ME staff</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Hallak</td>
<td>Former Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura El Khoury</td>
<td>Former Director of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Joe Alavalas</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Maalouf</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carmel Hilal</td>
<td>Participant/Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aseel Awwad</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mira Mkanna</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mira Fayyad</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hovig Markarian</td>
<td>Former WYA intern and participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jasmin Diab</td>
<td>Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsa Abi Khalil</td>
<td>Social entrepreneur, Unrelated to the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Ayoub</td>
<td>Executive Director, Nahnoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rami Chamma</td>
<td>Executive Director, DPNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi Abou Ismail</td>
<td>Executive Director, Al Khalil Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georges Ghali</td>
<td>Programs Manager, ALEF-Act for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Assaf</td>
<td>Dean of Literature Faculty, Universite Saint Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaelle Kibranian and Nada Sweidan</td>
<td>UNDP Country Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Kahi</td>
<td>Accountant of the project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Mehdi Hamrouche</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laila Sougri</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said Ousaka</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moustafa Laalaoui</td>
<td>Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostafa Essalai</td>
<td>Participant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hajer Tlijani</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hichem Ouertini</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imen El Handous</td>
<td>Participant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 4: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRMW</td>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and members of their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYA-ME</td>
<td>World Youth Alliance – Middle East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>