



**PROVISION FOR POST-PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS  
DEMOCRACY FUND  
Contract NO.PD:C0110/10**

**EVALUATION REPORT**



**UDF-GLO-08-213: Assessing Democracy Assistance**

**Date: 30 May 2012**

### **Acknowledgements**

The evaluator would like to thank all those who made themselves available for interview. Special thanks go to FRIDE staff who assembled a comprehensive annotated binder of project materials for the evaluator.

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluator. They do not represent those of UNDEF nor of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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## I. Executive Summary

### *i. Project data*

The project "Assessing Democracy Assistance" was implemented by Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2011. The total UNDEF grant was US\$ 220,000, of which the project budget was US\$ 198,000, and US\$ 22,000 was reserved by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation.

The project's goals according to the Project Document were "to provide the first comprehensive assessment of global democracy assistance efforts based on the views and perceptions of local stakeholders" and "to ensure, through systematic dissemination and consultation among policy makers, opinion leaders, media and local stakeholders, the findings' impact on future policy design."

### *ii. Evaluation findings*

The project was clearly consistent with UNDEF's mandate and was **relevant** to needs of the direct beneficiary, which was the international democracy assistance community itself. It grew out concrete discussions at the World Movement for Democracy assembly in Kyiv in 2008 and was embedded in a broader international initiative coordinated by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). By financing part of the first systematic canvassing of views of democracy aid recipients, UNDEF contributed to improving the quality of democracy assistance worldwide, a highly relevant activity. It may safely be said that the activity was more relevant in some of the 19 countries where field work was carried out than in others, but this was to be expected.

As documented in the project final narrative report and confirmed by this evaluation, the project was highly **effective**. Despite logistical challenges, FRIDE was able to produce and disseminate 19 high-quality case studies on time. These were rigorously peer-reviewed and, in ten countries, were the subject of in-country consultations. Synthesis Report findings were presented at the WMD assembly in Jakarta in 2010, and high-level dissemination seminars were held in New York and Brussels. Taking advantage of the high degree of flexibility in UNDEF projects, FRIDE was able to work with the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies to organize a high profile democracy event six months following the Egyptian Revolution. This event, well covered by the media, was a milestone in that it was the first major public discussion by democracy experts and activists of the fragility, some would say betrayal, of democratic reforms in Egypt.

The project was **efficient** in that it delivered excellent value for money. It strengthened UNDEF ties with major international players as well as with the democracy communities in the 19 countries covered, all for a relatively low price. UNDEF's backing lent credibility that made it possible for FRIDE to attract additional support.

Assessing the **impact** of the project is not easy, but the project has made a contribution to progress. The intended direct beneficiaries were members of the international democracy assistance community, of which UNDEF is a member. There were concrete benefits for UNDEF, some of them described above. Whether the project succeeded in strengthening international commitment to democracy assistance and strengthening the quality of development assistance by improving the alignment between the supply and demand sides is difficult to judge, especially for a small, short-term intervention. However, evidence has been found that project results were broadly disseminated and cited among academics and practitioners worldwide. While the project did not provide capacity building and institution

strengthening in the traditional sense, this was never one of the project's goals. By promoting activities of a number of relatively young researchers via the project, UNDEF contributed to rejuvenating and strengthening the democracy community.

The **sustainability** aspect of the project, as traditionally defined, is of little interest as it was not designed to embed or replicate itself over time.

### *iii. Conclusions*

- Based on our findings regarding relevance and impact, this positive project evaluation confirms that **well-designed research projects of the “state of the art” assessment variety are a sound investment of resources**.
- Based largely on our finding related to effectiveness, but also on findings related to relevance and impact, the success of this project can in large part be attributed to the **high quality and status of the grantee, the implementing partners, and the members of the network mobilised by the grantee**.
- The project benefitted from the attention given to the in-country group review and discussions. **This project is to be saluted for having taken participatory assessment seriously**. This conclusion is based mostly on our findings related to relevance and, to some extent, effectiveness.
- **All funders in the development assistance field, whether government agencies or private foundations, have shied away from funding research**. The result was a cleavage between research as it would more traditionally be considered in the social, political and (more recent and largely Anglo-American) policy sciences, and program design and implementation. This has had **negative consequences for the relevance of program design** (since goals have not been queried and intended beneficiaries insufficiently consulted) **and for impact** (few irrelevant projects have impact; if they do, it is usually unintended and negative). **The project attempted to rectify this**.
- Anti-democratic forces are not intellectually, financially, or politically weak. By including both civil society and government representatives, the research design has addressed this problem to significant extent, however, the **question remains whether anti-democratic forces themselves are not worthy of more attention if such projects are not to preach to the converted, who are in church already**. This conclusion derives essentially from our analysis of relevance and impact, as well as from the finding that emerged from the study that a primary concern of democracy activists is the lack of political support from abroad.
- Based on all the findings above, the project highlights the **benefit to UNDEF from working with first-class partners who can produce first-class outputs on schedule**. There is a role for field-based, local NGO implemented projects, often in very challenging circumstances, but there is a role, as well, for global projects implemented in partnership with known global players: This project was a sound investment of the international taxpayer's money. That said, this observation must be conditioned on the fact that the **project strategy was sound, the research design was appropriate, and the researchers chosen to implement it were of excellent quality**.

#### *iv. Recommendations*

##### **For UNDEF**

- **Continue to fund global research projects where there is a need to improve the evidence base and the potential for impact on aid quality has been demonstrated.** Based on Conclusions (i), (ii) and (iv), UNDEF should take advantage of its flexibility and broad remit to fill research gaps where they are identified. In doing so, it fills a need that is not easily filled by other donors. The advantages of working through high-quality partners, as well as the support given to younger researchers through such activities, more than counterbalance the fact that such projects contribute little to capacity building and institution strengthening. We make a concrete suggestion that **thematic state-of-the-art reviews, perhaps taking “cluster” evaluations from the current series as background, might be a good idea.**
- **Continue to place emphasis on partnerships with world-class institutions.** Based on Conclusions (ii) and (vi), the success of the project was due to two main factors. The first was the institutional depth of the grantee, FRIDE, which enabled it to mobilize an excellent network of researchers and design and implement a sound research design on time. The second was the fact that the project was embedded in a broader initiative bringing together most major players in the democracy assistance field. The fact that the impetus for the project came from WMD was another factor promoting success. **The project would have been strengthened if two missing key players in the “democracy family” – the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been represented.** Involving these two organizations in future work will be great benefit both the UNDEF and FRIDE.
- **Stress reflexivity, be bold in dialogue, and innovate.** To state, today, that democracy lies in ideologically and culturally contested terrain is to assert a commonplace. UNDEF's governance structure obviously imposes limits and responsibilities. Yet, engaging with forces regarded as hostile to democracy is a crucial step at the present caesura in global democratic development, however defined. With its small footprint, its ability to work in difficult environments, and its low-flying approach, UNDEF is situated to innovate and take risks. It is appreciated that UNDEF is, to use the economists' term of art, a project taker, not a project maker. However, this project clearly emerged from consultations within the UNDEF network. . Based on Conclusions (v) and (vi) **UNDEF should not under-estimate its potential contribution to shape the direction of international democracy assistance; should not be reluctant to solicit projects from high-quality potential grantees and, within governance constraints, should be bold in dialogue and willing to innovate.**

##### **For FRIDE**

- **Consider a follow-up study.** Based on all of the conclusions above, it would be of value to consider how the project has changed perceptions of democracy assistance over a time frame of, say, two years from project end. The mailing list generated from the field work is a valuable resource and could, together with the names of contact persons from the 30 donors profiled, form the basis for a study carried out via questionnaire and selected telephone interviews. Such a study would be economical to implement and would solidify FRIDE's reputation as an applied think tank with special expertise in development assistance.
- **Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of book or journal special issue publication.** With hindsight (the papers are somewhat outdated now), the collection of

papers produced would have had no difficulty in attracting publication by a leading academic press. The great bulk of contributions were by FRIDE staffers and network members, so uniformity, quality, and timeliness were to a large extent under control. Web-based reporting and working papers are effective tools of dissemination, but the prestige factor and contribution to professional careers of a book should not be underestimated. That said, such an option is only worth pursuing if the press or the journal is a leading one.

#### **v. *Concluding comment***

The essential purpose of the project was to elicit views, right or wrong, of democracy assistance recipients regarding the aid on offer. While not strictly called for by the Terms of Reference, the evaluation report concludes with a brief consideration of how the results that emerged from this important research exercise and summarized in the project Synthesis Report might be applied to UNDEF.

An overall assessment might be that, as a small, flexible, mostly demand-driven donor, UNDEF is responding well to beneficiary needs. Unlike a few donors such as Soros, it has limited ability to finance NGOs that are in open breach with governments, but it has succeeded in supporting democratic activists in a few very adverse countries (e.g., Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia). It is less overtly political than the major bilateral donors, which are often instrumentalized for political purposes. UNDEF's weakest point may be its lack of field presence and limited resources for project selection and monitoring, themes that emerge not from this evaluation but from others in the series. This makes it acutely dependent on the capacity and quality of its grantees and implementing partners.

## II. Introduction and development context

### **(i) The project and evaluation objectives**

This report evaluates the project “Assessing Democracy Assistance” implemented by Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2011. The total UNDEF grant was US\$ 220,000, of which the project budget was US\$ 198,000, and US\$ 22,000 was reserved by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation. The project’s goals, according to the Project Document, were “to provide the first comprehensive assessment of global democracy assistance efforts based on the views and perceptions of local stakeholders” and “to ensure, through systematic dissemination and consultation among policy makers, opinion leaders, media and local stakeholders, the findings’ impact on future policy design.” In this way, the project aimed to improve the quality of democracy assistance and make it conform more closely to local needs worldwide.

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed on a framework governing the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. According to the manual, the objective of the evaluation is to *“undertake in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project, which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”*.

The series of evaluations have so far included country-projects, regional projects, and (on going) thematic cluster evaluations in media and youth. This is the second global-level project evaluated. The first global-level project evaluated was on civil society strengthening through local and regional platforms (Coordination Sud: “Pour une Démocratie Non Gouvernementale”<sup>1</sup>).

### **(ii) Evaluation methodology**

The methodology for this evaluation, agreed upon by Transtec and UNDEF, was detailed in a *Launch Note (43-UDF-GLO-08-213)*. This evaluation was a desk exercise informed by one visit to the grantee in February 2012 and follow-up telephone interviews, essentially to confirm and cross-check impressions gained from document review and the FRIDE visit. Out of 19 countries involved (see project description below), six were selected for review: China, Nigeria, Egypt, Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia. Nigeria and China were selected because field studies in these countries were financed by UNDEF. The other four were selected, in consultation with the grantee, because in addition to country case studies, there were local stakeholder focus group discussions in these countries to review case study drafts.

The evaluation was organized around a series of Evaluation Questions (Annex 1) which cover the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability, plus the criterion of UNDEF value added. In addition, UNDEF requested that three additional issues be addressed:

- Was the UNDEF grant instrumental in generating matching funds of US\$ 200,000 from other donors (National Endowment for Democracy or NED, Arab Democracy Fund, Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, Department for International Development or DfID and the Smith Richardson Foundation).

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<sup>1</sup> « Pour une Diplomatie Non-Gouvernementale », Luisa AGUILAR, Evaluation available on line : [http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/Post%20project%20evaluations/UDF-GLO-08-214\\_ER\\_Pour%20une%20Diplomatie%20Non%20Gouvernementale%20\(Global\).pdf](http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/Post%20project%20evaluations/UDF-GLO-08-214_ER_Pour%20une%20Diplomatie%20Non%20Gouvernementale%20(Global).pdf)

- How effective was the dissemination of the papers generated by this project to the development assistance community, the democracy support community, academics and local activists, and what impacts can be identified?
- In what ways did the Arab Spring affect the project, and was the project able to leverage its impact in light of unfolding events?

### ***(iii) Development context***

The project grew out of the Fifth Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) held in Kyiv in April 2008. The feeling arose at that meeting that, while the volume and range of democracy assistance had increased dramatically over the last two decades, there was need for reflection and assessment. A number of participants expressed the view that democracy assistance was failing to meet priority needs; to use the jargon, that it was increasingly supply-driven rather than demand-driven. The issue of the legitimacy of democracy assistance and the challenges posed by autocratic regimes were raised. There was also realisation that there was no systematic assessment of what types of democracy programs and approaches work best.

In conversations among the organisers of the assembly (David Lowe of NED and Art Kaufman of the WMD), Roland Rich of UNDEF, and Larry Diamond of the Center for Democratic Development and the Rule of Law or CDDRL at Stanford University), the feeling emerged that the time was ripe for an independent, comprehensive state of the art review of democracy assistance. The concept for the study and selection of case study countries took place at a workshop held at CDRLL. UNDEF's major contribution to project design appears to have been the large role given to in-country consultations in the form of focus group discussions.

### III. Project strategy

#### (i) Project approach and strategy

**The grantee / implementing partners.** The project was implemented by FRIDE, the direct UNDEF grantee. Implementing partners were WMD and CDDRL. The role of the former was largely as a facilitator of project results; that of the latter as a contributor to project conceptualisation in the early stages.

FRIDE, a self-described “think tank” located in Madrid, is a leading player in global democracy studies. It is, *inter alia*, a major implementer of European Union (EU) Directorate General (DG) Research projects in the area of democracy and human rights. WMD is the international umbrella organisation for academics, policy makers, and civil society representatives active in democracy assistance. CDDRL, as the name implies, is a university research center. FRIDE oversaw the project as a whole and had management responsibility.

**Financing.** In addition to the UNDEF grant, the project received financing from the National Endowment for Democracy, the Arab Democracy Fund, the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy, DfID, the Taiwan Fund for Democracy, the Foundation for the Future, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. Most funding came in June and July 2009 while UNDEF finance did not start to flow until September of that year. However, project staff interviewed were all of the opinion that the UNDEF “brand” conferred when the project was conceptualised contributed significantly to encouraging other donors to come on board. This answers, in the affirmative, one of the questions of interest to UNDEF officials.

**Targeted beneficiaries.** The project’s targeted direct beneficiaries were civil society organisations, government agencies, and donors who are involved in democracy assistance and stakeholders in the democratic reform process. In effect, the direct beneficiaries were members of the global democracy community, especially those involved in the design and implementation of democracy assistance programs. Indirect beneficiaries were all those who benefit from such programs when they are successful and fail to benefit when they are not.

**Project strategy.** The project was designed to operate in tightly sequenced steps. The first step consisted of field work financed by the donors in fourteen countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Belarus, Bosnia, Georgia, Ukraine, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, China, Indonesia, and Venezuela), out of which UNDEF financed two (China and Nigeria). The main purpose of the case studies was to solicit the views of local stakeholders on what types of interventions had worked best and worst, what types of assistance were needed, and what lessons had been learned over time. Production of the reports was coordinated by FRIDE, which mobilized as authors staff members and, where this was not possible, members of its research network. It was explicitly recognized that the outputs of this activity would be local stakeholder (mostly local beneficiary) views and an editorial synthesis thereof; it would not be a global assessment including the views of major donors, Western civil and political society, etc. In this sense “Assessment” was a term mildly off-base as used in the project title, but the Project Document was transparent on the limited remit of the study and made a good case for its relevance and, especially, its timeliness..

It was also envisaged in the first step to produce, at FRIDE, a comprehensive inventory or mapping of global democracy assistance. The purpose of the mapping was to answer basic questions about funding for democracy assistance: Who was providing it? What were their priorities? How much was being provided and through what modalities? In effect, the mapping exercise was the production of approximately 30 “data sheets” on donors.

The second step consisted of the dissemination and discussion of the country case studies. First, the draft reports were circulated to selected members of the group of 40-60 national stakeholders who had been interviewed in each country during the field visit. Following revision, the country case studies were distributed for peer review, typically by one in-country expert, one out-of-country expert, and one academic.

In a sub-set of case study countries, the peer-reviewed and revised report then served as the background document for an in-country consultation in the form of a focus group discussion. A minor criticism of strategy is that the term “focus group discussion” was, as has become common, used in a way that would be foreign to experts in qualitative research methodology. Such in-country dissemination and consultation “events,” to speak more accurately, were planned in Indonesia, Morocco, Egypt, Bosnia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Kenya, and Turkey. In some cases, at the time of the event, the case studies were at the stage of an advanced draft; in other cases they had been effectively finished. Some events were public and others closed, while in some countries (e.g., Belarus and China), events were unpublicised to protect participants from reprisals. In the case of Venezuela, the danger of violence or intimidation was felt to be so acute that the in-country consultation was cancelled altogether. The Indonesia case study event was scheduled to coincide with the April 2010 WMD assembly in Jakarta, at which the synthesis paper was presented. In addition there was a seminar discussing results at UNDEF headquarters in New York.


The project document acknowledged that there were a wealth of “democracy perception” surveys and studies available, but identified the unique features of the proposed activity as its policy orientation and potential for affecting the nature of democracy assistance, specifically, to make it match beneficiary needs more closely by exploring and broadly disseminating them.

More generally, this was a research project, the tools being field-work based country case studies and consultations. The basic assumption was that, properly disseminated and discussed, high-quality research findings related to democracy assistance interventions could improve the quality of those interventions. This sounds like an obvious proposition, but development assistance and academic research often operate on separate tracks or, as in donor institutions, are compartmentalized into project-oriented operational departments and policy-oriented Institutes often operating with very different institutional cultures.

In the project document, FRIDE identified the main risk as being insufficient breadth and depth of the field studies. One might observe, in a spirit of praise, that this rather narrow vision of risk reflected the tightly focused and highly targeted objectives of the project. This proposed enterprise did not promise the moon, the sun, and the stars; to switch metaphors, it promised a brick in the wall, not the wall itself. UNDEF support was requested for two of the most ambitious studies, both in terms of size of countries and complexity of the democracy equation, as well as for the democracy donor data sheets, production of the synthesis reports, and the ten in-country consultation events. Other donors financed the remaining 12 events (as it turned out, 17 as the number of donors grew).

## (ii) Logical framework

An approximation of the project logical framework, drawn from the project document, is given below. The figure maps the logical path from activities/outputs through intended outcomes/objectives to anticipated impacts. The mapping of activities and intended outcomes to medium and long-term impacts is not one-to-one: an individual intended outcome may give rise to various impacts through the influence of particular activities, and multiple intended outcomes are likely to have similar impacts. As can be judged from the discussion above, the logical frame proposed in the project document was of high quality.



## IV. Evaluation findings

### *(i) Relevance*

Relevance has to do primarily with the appropriateness of project objectives to beneficiary needs, as well as to some extent with the appropriateness of implementation approaches to context and circumstance. The main direct beneficiary of this project was the international democracy assistance community, of which UNDEF itself is a member. The project design emerged from a real need identified at the 2008 assembly of the WMD in Kyiv, namely for a state-of-the-art review to promote closer conformity between democracy programs and beneficiary needs. As members of the democracy community are either statutorily or informally bound to promote democratic development and are answerable to governance bodies strongly committed to democracy, filling this gap was relevant to their needs and, in order to make progress in achieving that, it was necessary to identify beneficiary attitudes, perceptions, and desires. The approach adopted, extensive interviews in a broad range of countries (40-60 interviews per country followed by focus group consultations in ten countries) and a synthesis of country findings, was appropriate to eliciting local views.

In this sense, the project was relevant, as well to the broader community of indirect stakeholders, namely the citizens and residents of countries aspiring to develop democratically. The potential objection that civil society represents only its adherents was tempered by the fact that government agencies, as well, were included in the exercise. The human capital-intensive research design, combining in-depth field work, intensely peer-reviewed case studies, and a high-level synthesis report, was highly appropriate.

The relevance (and impact) of the project was enhanced by the fact that it was embedded in a broader initiative coordinated by NED. Other components of this broad initiative were a survey conducted by NED, a trans-Atlantic dialogue conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and a dialogue with regional organizations conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

A limitation of the project must also be registered. Target beneficiaries were all groups committed, whatever their differences, to promoting democracy. Groups opposing democracy were by definition, not targeted by the project, and it is such groups that are often the real barrier to democratic development. Also, some groups identified with democracy have a policy of not accepting donor funding or are increasingly wary of it. Groups not receiving international democracy assistance, whether because they do not want it or donor agencies will not provide it, did not figure in this project.

Relevance, like effectiveness and impact, not surprisingly varied from country to country. Some countries (e.g., Egypt and Morocco) have historically suffered from an over-supply of democracy assistance; Jordan, as well, is such a “donor darling.” Yet, in such countries, relevance (as well as effectiveness and impact) was not necessarily impaired, because one of the results of the project was to promote donor discussion and coordination in a setting too often more characterised by competition than cooperation. Donor feedback on country case studies was a means of increasing communication between donor agencies.

Flexibility is an important aspect of relevance, as conditions change over the course of a project’s life. In the case of this project, the Arab Spring intervened. This event, and the travails that began to appear for Arab democracy movements as military and religious forces began to flex their political muscles, increased the profile and importance of the project to the democracy assistance community. Perceiving that a case-study focus group event of the

type implemented in other countries would be out of place given events in the streets, the conference transformed the planned Cairo event into a July 2011 conference on Egypt's democratic transformation. The national partner selected for this activity was the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and the report is available on, in addition to the FRIDE website, the UNDEF website: <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/News/NFTF04Aug11.html>. This observation on flexibility answers one of the donor's queries noted above.

### ***(ii) Effectiveness***

There were no significant issues regarding the production of high-quality outputs – the donor data sheets, the country case studies, the synthesis paper, the focus group discussions, and the dissemination activities. The fourteen planned case studies were completed on time, and sufficient resources were left over to finance five additional case studies. The planned focus group discussion in Venezuela was cancelled, as mentioned above, because it was feared that participants would be at risk of intimidation, arrest, or violence. This prudent decision is not a negative mark for effectiveness. The dissemination of project results at the 2010 WMD assembly in Jakarta was an adroit feature from multiple standpoints: relevance, effectiveness, and impact. The main panel discussion "Assessing Democracy and Democracy Assistance" was organized by NED and presented study results; following this, there were five focused workshops, in the first of which UNDEF provided a panellist. The Assembly report is available online at [http://www.wmd.org/sites/default/files/FINALREPORT\\_smaller\\_2.pdf](http://www.wmd.org/sites/default/files/FINALREPORT_smaller_2.pdf)

The six country case studies reviewed by the evaluator are of high substantive quality, are presented in a readable and visually attractive manner, and are posted on a smoothly functioning website. The high intellectual level of the country case study authors is evident, and the synthesis report is of the quality that would be expected from a leading academic. Focus group discussions – subject to the caution that the term was very loosely used by UNDEF (FRIDE itself preferred the more neutral and accurate "round table" descriptor) were well documented. Presumably for reasons of confidentiality, these were not posted on the web.

Of interest for impact as well as effectiveness,

- A seminar on study results was organized at UN headquarters. Participating were Dr. Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Dr. Joel Barkan, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Dr Richard Youngs from FRIDE. The report and video were posted at:  
<http://www.un.org/democracyfund/News/NFU17May11.html> and  
<http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/05/press-conference-organized-by-undef.html>
- A seminar presenting the Synthesis Report was organized by FRIDE in Brussels, with attendance by top policy makers and NGO practitioners. The European Commission (EC) was well represented, and a staffer of the European Parliament attended, as well.



Participants in a workshop following the presentation of Democracy Assessment results, World Movement for Democracy Assembly, Jakarta, April 11-14, 2010.

- The Cairo conference (see accompanying text box) represented an especially effective activity, and demonstrated UNDEF's flexibility, as it represented the only major deviation from the project document, and one greatly to be recommended. A film of the conference, commissioned by UNDEF from project funds reserved for evaluation, was shown at the UNDEF function for the International Day of Democracy on 15 September 2011 and posted at:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9KOUnbRnSM>).



UNDEF Seminar “Perceptions of Democracy Assistance” presenting results of the democracy assistance recipients’ views, UN Headquarters, New York, 9 May, 2011.

### ***(iii) Efficiency***

There was a reasonable relationship between budget allocated by UNDEF and results achieved. This is true not only for the UNDEF-financed outputs listed above, but for the project as a whole. By pooling its resources with those of other donors, UNDEF was able to leverage its contribution, resulting in the only comprehensive assessment of democracy assistance done to date.

While conceptually straightforward, this project was logically and administratively complicated to implement, and FRIDE deserves a great deal of credit:19 case studies involving 19 field missions plus ten in-country consultation events made for heavy logistic work. Arranging in-country review by selected experts (persons who had been interviewed during field studies) plus external peer reviews added to the workload. This can only be compared to implementing a major academic research project with a large matrix of authors and reviewers and multiple drafting milestones. All of this work was completed on time, to a high level of quality.

- Financial management was also complicated. By the end of the project, seven donors (each with their own reporting mechanism and each with its contribution earmarked for specific activities) were involved. FRIDE reporting and bookkeeping were exemplary. At the end of the project, some USD 7,000 was returned to UNDEF, a reasonable implementation rate.

#### **(iv) Impact**

The second specific query of the donor agency highlighted assessing impact, and this has presented some difficulty. Impact of this project can be assessed along several dimensions:

- (i) a strengthened commitment by the international donor community to democracy assistance,
- (ii) perceptible shifts in program design in order to better conform to beneficiary needs and priorities,
- (iii) a strengthened intellectual foundation for democracy assistance.

#### ***The Cairo Conference: “Ways to Strengthen the Democratic Transformation in Egypt”***

As dramatically evidenced by the prosecution of leading national and international democracy NGOs in early 2012 and the banning of 11 presidential candidates in the spring, democratic transformation in Egypt is under threat. A perfect storm is brewing, as the military and Mubarak-era forces fight to maintain their traditional privileges and impunity, Islamist parties attack the legitimacy of secular democracy, obtaining overwhelming support outside urban elites; and internationally-supported democracy NGOs are broadly perceived to be foreign implantations. The results of the May 2012 first round of elections, which will lead to a runoff between the Muslim Brotherhood candidates and a candidate close to the old regime, have been characterized as the worst possible outcome for progressive forces.

In view of the dramatic Arab Spring events of early 2011, UNDEF and FRIDE concluded that a “regular” focus group discussing Mubarak-era democracy assistance would be absurd. Instead, a new partner, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies or CIHRS – was brought into the picture and it was decided to implement a major international conference on the promise and perils of the Egyptian revolution. 85 persons participated (unfortunately only 19 of them female, but this is unsurprising in the Arab world). Participants of special note included representatives from the United States Agency for International Development (US AID), the Muslim Brotherhood, American University in Cairo, Cairo University, and diplomats and staffers from the embassies of Japan, Singapore, Australia, and the Netherlands. Press representation included, in addition to many Egyptian journalists, representatives of Reuters, Associated Press, Al Jazeera and the Christian Science Monitor. In all, 40 accredited journalists attended and there was significant, albeit not overwhelming, media coverage of the event.

Following opening remarks, working sessions were held on “Evaluating the Transition Period,” “Islamist Movements and the Transitional Period,” and “Have the Former Regime’s Institutions Changed?” On the second day, additional working sessions were held on “What Constitution for the Future Egypt?” and “The Dilemma of Pluralism in the Future Egypt,” [...].

This was not the only conference on democracy held in Egypt after the events of January 2011, but it was one of the largest, one of the broadest in terms of participation, and one of the most media-reported. It generated significant publicity for UNDEF, solidified UNDEF’s credibility as a major international actor in democracy assistance, and provided national activists with an opportunity to form links and promulgate their views.

The main theme that emerged from the conference, not surprising with the hindsight of one year, was that the strategic alliance of the military, former regime forces, and Islamist political parties was squelching left-liberal hopes for a secular, social democratic order, save perhaps in the very long term. Subsequent events in Egypt have confirmed and deepened these fears. This reinforces a principle finding of the project (see next box), that democracy assistance without political will to back it up is of limited impact.

**Source: Conference narrative report**

None of these is easily assessed.

- (i) Some contribution to the first could be indicated by, e.g., increased commitments to democracy assistance, but so many other forces are at work, especially in the

current volatile economic environment, that mechanical accounting exercises are of little interest. Moreover, commitment is essentially political in nature and cannot reasonably be expected to have responded to a two-year project involving a few hundred thousands of dollars.

- (ii) The second is perhaps more easily assessed but aid programs, like large warships, do not turn on a dime. The UNDEF-financed project had its genesis in the conviction of the donor community (and other stakeholders) that change was needed in approaches to democracy assistance. In this sense, the project was preaching to the already converted. As highlighted in the accompanying box, the changes called for by beneficiaries are not only strategic and tactical, but political. This poses an existential dilemma for international democracy assistance donor community: How effectively can it promote democracy when the “ultimate political fact” is that it cannot always rely on donor agency governments to provide needed political support?

With the third, we are on firmer ground. The potential impact of making available to donors a solid intellectual basis on which to engage with their governance structures and pay masters is large. “We know from solid research that ...” is a powerful argument in the hands of a donor agency seeking support for its proposed program. By focusing on concrete issues of programmatic design to improve aid quality, this project increased its potential impact. For example, the documentable findings (see box) that political support is now more valued than dollars and that the traditional package of training, capacity building, and institution building is of declining relevance in many settings are important ones for program design. They might, for example, have implications for the design of media projects, where beneficiaries in some countries have reason to argue that they are more technologically advanced than their benefactors. Or, they might suggest that in settings where the political environment is hostile and the donors’ political will to engage forcefully with power structures is low, aid resources may be better be allocated thematically or geographically elsewhere.

To speak of “potential impact” is, however, to dodge the question of how much impact the project has actually had. Papers generated in the course of this project have been widely disseminated and used by academics, donor agencies, and NGOs. The large number of national participants involved, the high level and profile of the researchers involved, and the high quality of dissemination events speak favourably for impact. Web dissemination and good use of information and communications

#### ***Assessing Democracy Assistance: a Synthesis of the Synthesis***

Richard Youngs, author of the country case study synthesis, was asked to distil what he thought were the most salient points to emerge.

First, he replied, beneficiary civil society organizations (CSOs) are of the view that themes and priorities are still being largely set in Western capitals, not in aid recipient countries. While there is active consultation with and inclusion of local beneficiaries, this is within the broad confines of programmatic directions set elsewhere.

Second, and potentially more troubling for donors, the greatest concern is not now obtaining more funding. It is, rather, obtaining more reliable external political support. Forces of democracy are threatened or impaired in their operation. Intimidation, harassment, threats, legal prosecution, and violence are features of daily life for pro-democracy activists in some countries. Project money, is welcome, even under such circumstances, but political support would be even more welcome.

Asked what sorts of projects they most value, the strong sense that emerged from beneficiaries was “Projects that build bridges”: between CSOs, between CSOs and Government / public agencies, or between CSOs and “political society” (essentially, political parties). Notably absent from this list of beneficiary priorities is training, capacity building, and institution strengthening as it has been traditionally delivered (scholarships, seminars, computers, study visits, etc.).

**Source: Interview with Richard Youngs,**

technology (ICT) as described above enhanced this. The dissemination through the World Movement for Democracy Assembly in Jakarta and seminars in New York and Brussels was exemplary.

Finally, the project's positive impact on the careers of a number of younger researchers (most of those involved) should not be forgotten.

The UNDEF Project Officer identified a number of further impacts, mostly benefits that the project delivered to UNDEF:

- A strengthened working relationship with NED, NDI, FRIDE, and IDEA.
- Enhanced UNDEF reputation.
- Extended UNDEF relations with national experts in the field.

#### **(v) Sustainability**

The sustainability aspect, conventionally defined, of the project is not of particular interest. Results were well disseminated, the professional advancement of researchers was ensured, the path of international development assistance may, to some extent, have been affected. The project was not designed to institutionalize itself or give rise to on going activities.

## **V. Conclusions**

The conclusions presented here represent a synthesis of the answers to the Evaluation Questions presented in the previous section.

**(i)** Based on our findings regarding **relevance** and **impact**, this positive project evaluation confirms that **well-designed research projects of the “state of the art” assessment variety are a sound investment of resources**. The impact of the project should be understood largely as impact on the democracy assistance community and, especially on the large number of persons who participated in the project.

**(ii)** Based largely on our finding related to **effectiveness**, but also on findings related to **relevance** and **impact**, the success of this project can in large part be attributed to the **high quality and status of the grantee, the implementing partners, and the members of the network mobilised by the grantee**. That the donor agency, grantee, and implementing partners were peers comes through at every point as a factor contributing to the success of the project. That the **project strictly defined was embedded in a broader global examination of the role of democracy assistance also contributed to success**. There was no capacity building or institution-building; some would regard that as a negative aspect, but the project was not designed to deliver this. However, it **did help a number of younger researchers** (most of those involved) to implement field visits and interviews that are very difficult for early-career professionals to arrange on their own. It **involved numerous national experts in a major international assessment**. In sum, the project **contributed positively to the social reproduction of the democracy assistance community**.

**(iii)** The project benefitted from the attention given to the in-country group review and discussions. Yet, “focus group” is sometimes casually used to apply to any interview in which more than two persons are present. Qualitative research, a field in which focus group discussions are an important tool, has a methodological apparatus as formidable as quantitative research. ***This project is to be saluted for having taken participatory assessment seriously***, yet, based on documents consulted, a liberal stretch of imagination is needed to consider these consultations as “focus groups.” This conclusion is based mostly on our findings related to **relevance** and, to some extent, **effectiveness**.

**(iv)** “Community” is a phrase often used, as in “the democracy community.” “Family,” as in “the democracy family” is also commonplace. These words have a comforting, soothing feel to them. Yet, democracy is a concept lying in ideologically and culturally contested terrain. ***Is there really only one democracy “community” or “family”?*** Anti-democratic forces, or forces with radically opposed interpretations of democracy, are not intellectually, financially, or politically weak. ***By including both civil society and government representatives, the research design has addressed this problem to significant extent***, however, the nagging question remains whether those outside the “community” are not deserving of some engagement if democracy assistance is not to preach to the converted, who are in church already. This conclusion derives essentially from our analysis of **relevance**, perhaps to some extent from findings on **impact**, as well as from the finding that emerged from the study that a primary concern of democracy activists is the lack of political support from abroad. Indeed, the beneficiary message that democracy assistance can merely add a fig leaf or, worse, increase the credibility and efficiency of an essentially anti-democratic system is a stern warning for the democracy assistance donor “community” (in which case, the term is probably correct). Identifying and transmitting that signal was, perhaps, the most important result of this project. We shall see what impact it has.

**(v)** Based on **all the findings** above, the project highlights ***the benefit to UNDEF from working with first-class partners who can produce first-class outputs on schedule***. The project strategy was sound, the research design was appropriate, and the researchers chosen to implement it were of **excellent quality**. There is a role for field-based, NGO implemented projects, often in very challenging circumstances, but there is a role, as well, for global projects implemented in partnership with international players: This project, due to its well-articulated strategy, sound research design, and excellent implementation, was a sound investment of the international taxpayer’s money.

## VI. Recommendations

### **For UNDEF**

*i. Continue to fund global research projects where there is a need to improve the evidence base and the potential for impact on aid quality has been demonstrated.* Based on Conclusions (i), (ii), (iv) and (v), UNDEF should take advantage of its flexibility and broad remit to fill research gaps where they are identified. In doing so, it fills a need that is not easily filled by other donors. The advantages of working through high-quality partners, as well as the support given to younger researchers through such activities, more than counterbalance the fact that such projects contribute little to capacity building and institution strengthening. A specific idea would be to **encourage participatory state-of-the-art assessments in selected thematic sectors, perhaps taking as background documents the “cluster evaluations” being done in this series of evaluations.**

*ii. Continue to place emphasis on partnerships with world-class institutions.* Based on Conclusions (ii) and (v), the success of the project was due to two main factors. The first was the institutional depth of the grantee, FRIDE, which enabled it to mobilize an excellent network of researchers and design and implement a sound research design on time. The second was the fact that the project was embedded in a broader initiative bringing together most major players in the democracy assistance field. The fact that the impetus for the project came from WMD was another factor promoting success. While the “democracy family” was broadly represented, two key international players were absent: the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, or, more precisely, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR in Warsaw). Yet, these organizations have been responsible for major democracy projects in case study countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. Both organizations provide election observers and, through the Venice Commission, the CoE is a unique source of constitutional advice to countries undertaking democratic reforms (including, now, selected non-CoE member states in North Africa and Central Asia). **Involving the CoE and ODIHR in future work will be great benefit both for the UNDEF and FRIDE.**

*iii. Stress reflexivity, be bold in dialogue, and innovate.* To state, today, that democracy lies in ideologically contested terrain is to assert a commonplace. UNDEF’s governance structure obviously imposes limits and responsibilities. Yet, engaging with forces regarded as hostile to democracy is a crucial step at the present caesura in global democratic development ... however defined. With its small footprint, its ability to work in difficult environments, and its low-flying approach, UNDEF is situated to innovate and take risks. It is appreciated that UNDEF is, to use the economists’ term of art, a project taker, not a project maker. However, this project clearly emerged from consultations within the UNDEF network. Based on Conclusions (v) and (vi) **UNDEF should not under-estimate its potential contribution to shape the direction of international democracy assistance; it should not be reluctant to solicit projects from high-quality potential grantees and, within governance constraints, it should be bold in dialogue and willing to innovate.**

### **For FRIDE**

*iv. Consider a follow-up study.* Based on all of the conclusions above, it would be of value to consider how the project has changed perceptions of democracy

assistance over a time frame of, say, two years from project end. This would allow a true assessment of impact, something that has not really been possible with much credibility in this evaluation exercise. The mailing list generated from the field work is a valuable resource and could, together with the names of contact persons from the 30 donors profiled, form the basis for a study carried out via questionnaire and selected telephone interviews. Such a study would be economical to implement and would solidify FRIDE's reputation as an applied think tank with special expertise in development assistance (perhaps making it easier to diversify from EU DG Research funding, if such diversification is a strategic goal).

**v. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of book or special journal issue publication.** With hindsight (the papers are somewhat outdated now), the collection of papers produced would have had no difficulty in attracting publication by a leading academic press, particularly since the peer review process was so well designed and thorough. The dilemma with making this choice *ex ante* is typically that one fears that the quality and timeliness of contributions will be uneven, in which case there may be an immoderate demand on in-house time and nerves first to cajole, then harass, then threaten; then edit and revise if not re-write. In the case of this project, however, the great bulk of contributions were by FRIDE staffers and network members, so uniformity, quality, and timeliness were to a large extent under control. The professional advancement aspect for younger researchers strengthened the carrot factor and reduced the likely need for the stick. That said, such an option is only worth pursuing if the press is a leading one. Journal special issue publication is an obvious alternative, and one more attractive in some senses if the journal is a good one. The practice of academic presses and journals demanding financial subsidy, of course, has to be factored in.

## VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

There is no need to synthesize major points from the project evaluation per se. Of some interest, however, may be the evaluator's impressions of what insights UNDEF might want to draw from the Synthesis Report. In the following paragraphs, major points are extracted from the report (semi-verbatim and given in italic font) and a brief statement is made of how this might apply to UNDEF.

### Programming issues

*NGOs call for more small, flexible grants distributed directly by embassies.* UNDEF procedures fit well with this desire.

*NGOs want greater flexibility not to have to publicize the support they receive from international organizations.* UNDEF's position on this issue may need to be clarified. While it is almost certainly less insistent on visibility than bilateral donors, it is not known how it compares with, e.g., EIDHR.

*The need for donors to focus more assertively on the lack of internal democracy within the NGOs they support.* There is no evidence that UNDEF deals with this issue. Hierarchical and personalized governance structures may prevail in some of the NGOs that UNDEF finances. Reflexivity on the nature of civil society is called for, as is transparency on what organizations are considered to be within the tent and what are considered to be outside it.

*NGOs often have to “invent” projects that do not conform to their normal day to day functioning and core business.* UNDEF is blameless to the extent that it responds to grantee proposals under a broad democracy umbrella. It has steered clear of identifying narrow priority areas. The fact that NGOs propose and implement projects simply to finance their operations has to do with the lack of a sustainable financial base, something UNDEF should try to address as much as it can through its projects. That said, UNDEF has limited power to have an impact on this issue, as it reflects a structural fact in beneficiary countries. Lest this be considered a criticism, civil society in Western Europe (Continental) is essentially a post-1968 development and private support is small.

*Donors are still operating on the model of the central and Eastern European democratization process, leading in particular to over-emphasis on training.* UNDEF needs to consider the role of training, capacity building, and institution strengthening – which have become little more than terms of art in development assistance proposals, reporting, and evaluation -- in its projects. When these are stressed in project proposals, there should be a burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate precisely why training, capacity building, and institution strengthening will contribute to meeting project goals.

*Over-reliance on Western NGOs.* UNDEF has shifted to local NGOs over time. However, capacity and depth of experience of the grantee has been identified as a major determinant of project quality.

*The need for constancy and continuity rather than suddenly changing priorities.* UNDEF has maintained a broad umbrella approach since its inception and responds to applications rather than eliciting applications in narrowly defined thematic areas.

*The urgent need for better coordination between democracy promoters.* UNDEF is in a poor position to engage in classic Paris Declaration coordination due to its non-existent field presence and weak HQ staffing level. However, as a small donor, it is arguably less at fault than the majors.

### **How is the agenda for democracy support set and controlled?**

*CSOs and representatives of state institutions unite in calling for priorities to be set locally.* UNDEF, which maintains a broad umbrella approach and responds to local NGO applications, represents a force promoting this idea. It might reinforce this role by considering, in its selection process, whether a proposal is filling a gap created by major donor's focus on the theme of the day.

*CSOs criticize donors for funding organizations that they regard as unscrupulous.* Consider the source. Civil society organizations are notoriously sectarian. Given their lack of stable funding and often tenuous legitimacy, local NGOs compete for support. UNDEF has neither the field presence nor HQ strength to exercise due diligence over applicants apart than through the audit and evaluation processes.

*Recipients complain of overly bureaucratic procedures and lack of transparency in the allocation of donor funds.* All responses in the current series of UNDEF evaluations have been that UNDEF is among the most flexible and least bureaucratic of donor agencies. We have no information on how UNDEF's level of transparency is regarded.

### **Gaps between concrete needs and reform aims**

*CSOs most appreciate local-level projects that assist self-organization around issues of practical relevance to individual citizens.* This sets a clear point for consideration in UNDEF project selection. It may call for adding a section to the application form "How will this project respond to issues of practical relevance to individual citizens?" The Synthesis Report suggests that this may be most important in settings affected by governance pathologies (e.g., China, Venezuela, Hungary). The implications for UNDEF are made more important by the fact that it can hardly be considered an effective agency in financing social service delivery, a safe area of frequent local relevance. There may be need for an internal dialogue on how closely UNDEF's broad funding priorities, as translated into the portfolio of projects financed to date, has led to tangible improvements for the common man in beneficiary countries.

### **Struggling to temper fragmentation**

*Democracy aid often deepens polarization within civil society itself* This point arose particularly in the context of situations where younger, more confrontational CSOs were challenging older, more accommodating ones, sometimes in a context of regime change. As a UN organization, UNDEF by definition works with governments. At the same time, it is small, "under the radar," and does not have to work through UNDP, which is strictly bound to collaborate with government. A role in which UNDEF could add value, with the resources at its disposal, is in promoting dialogue between different civil society forces. It is recognized that UNDEF responds to applications, it does not design projects, but steps could be taken to ensure that projects contributing to such dialogue are encouraged.

## **Neutering by governments**

*The challenge today derives from governments' ability to neutralise the genuine reform potential of many democracy assistance initiatives.* In some countries (e.g., Zimbabwe, Myanmar), UNDEF has been able to have an impact despite the presence of highly autocratic regimes. However, in general, as a UN organization, UNDEF is ill-equipped to finance projects that adopt a belligerent stance towards governments. Some of UNDEF's most successful projects (e.g., support to civil society and local government in Ukraine and Moldova) have been premised on the need to promote cooperation rather than confrontation. Other projects, for example, those promoting elections, may have lent legitimacy to systems tainted by factors far beyond the ability of the project to address. One way of conceptualizing the process is to characterize UNDEF's strength as supporting the supply side of democracy ... the ability of civil society organizations to contribute. In settings where the demand is not there, or when grass roots demand is crushed by forces of oppression, UNDEF needs to consider carefully what it will be able to accomplish.

## **Lack of political backing**

*Much more valuable than slightly increased amounts of money, or slightly changed funding rules, would be more effective international pressure on regimes to loosen civil society and other laws.* UNDEF is not in a strong position to address this expressed need save through its dialogue with other donors. Despite a certain degree of independence, it must work within the broad UN context. Its power to exercise overt direct independent political pressure is nil.

*Many stakeholders feel they are not acutely in need of training on organising and communications techniques from the West.* UNDEF should adopt explicit criteria on when training is regarded as a sound investment. When there is a disconnect between project results and the political context, this should be taken into account in the project selection process.

## **Concluding comment**

An overall assessment might be that, as a small, flexible, mostly demand-driven donor, UNDEF is responding well to beneficiary needs. The project here evaluated, while supply-driven, responded to beneficiary needs and sought to communicate them better to the donor community. Unlike a few donors such as Soros, UNDEF has limited ability to finance NGOs that are in open breach with governments, but, as this evaluation series has shown, it has succeeded in supporting democratic activists in a few very adverse situations. It is less overtly political than the major bilateral donors, which are often instrumentalized for political policy purposes, including providing a democracy support fig leaf when the political stance is almost precisely the opposite. UNDEF's weakest point (not developed in this evaluation but clearly emerging from the series taken as a whole) may be its lack of field presence and limited resources for project selection and monitoring. This makes it acutely dependent on the capacity and quality of its grantees and implementing partners.

## VIII. Annexes

### Annex 1: Evaluation questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</li> <li>▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Documents reviewed

Project Document  
Final narrative report

Case study Nigeria  
Case study Ukraine  
Case study Georgia  
Case study China  
Case study Egypt  
Case Study Morocco

Conference report Egypt  
Focus Group report Ukraine  
Focus Group report Georgia  
Focus group report Morocco

## Annex 3: People interviewed

Name	Organization
Kerry Brown	Chatham House
Ana Echagüe	FRIDE
Kristina Kausch	FRIDE
Daniela Konietzko	FRIDE
Hélène Michou	FRIDE
Natalia Shapovalova	FRIDE
Richard Youngs	FRIDE

## Annex 4: Acronyms

CDDRL	Center for Democratic Development and Rule of Law
CIHRS	Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
CoE	Council of Europe
CSO	Community Service Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DfID	Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General
EU	European Union
FRIDE	Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund-
US AID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WMD	World Movement for Democracy