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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data
This report is the evaluation of the project “Enhancing the Functional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia” implemented from October 2009 to September 2011 by the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), an intergovernmental institution based in Rome, Italy, in partnership with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC). The UNDEF grant amount was US$400,000, with USD 25,000 retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project aimed at developing the EHRC into “a functional institution able to protect and enforce human rights in line with Ethiopian laws and international norms and standards”.

The project strategy was to enhance the EHRC’s technical capacity and subsequently to train EHRC staff in substantive work areas. Other technical advisory activities were also proposed, including guidance on how to advise government and training of trainers enabling acquired skills to be passed on to others. The design of the project was modified at the start of the implementation phase, to take account of activities carried out under another program of support to the EHRC, implemented by UNDP. The project management approach was also modified because IDLO did not receive permission to establish a permanent office in Addis Ababa.

(ii) Evaluation Findings
The project was relevant in that it correctly identified the weak institutional capacity and skills shortage of the EHRC and because it met needs expressed by the EHRC itself. The context at the time of the design of the project also helped its relevance. The project did not only focus on the development of human rights protection skills, but prioritized in its initial phase the development of the EHRC’s operational management capacity. This component was widely seen as addressing a key need, as the EHRC was a relatively young institution where management systems were under-developed. The project was also designed to address capacity gaps in various fields of the Commission’s competence.

The relevance of the project was harmed by weak risk assessment and mitigation, because the original design failed to take fully into account the risk that IDLO would not be able to set up an office in Addis. It was also difficult for the project to address the challenging political environment in which the EHRC operated.

There is evidence of the effective implementation of many of the planned activities, particularly those related to training. The quality of the training provided by IDLO representatives (or consultants hired by IDLO) was good. Participants also noted that the training materials developed by the various trainers were comprehensive, well written and up-to-date.

However the overall effectiveness of the project – in terms of progress towards the achievement of its objective – was weakened in particular by the lack of follow-up of training activities, such as on-going coaching and support, and integration of lessons into EHRC management processes. Effectiveness suffered from the fact that the activities were largely implemented one at a time, with different people in charge of different activities and little in-depth coordination among them.
The project was **efficient** in the sense that activities were implemented within budget and, bar some initial delays, within the planned timeframe. However there were significant concerns with project management, which hampered the achievement of project outcomes and of its objective. Project management could have been improved by hiring all the trainers early in the project, consulting them regularly during implementation and ensuring that their feedback was systematically shared with other trainers.

The project has had an immediate **impact** on the professional skills of its direct beneficiaries, who broadly report satisfaction with the learning they derived from IDLO support. It is also likely that the project had a positive impact on the operational capacity of the EHRC, partly because it contributed to the establishment of effective procedures, for example in relation to management processes for the individual complaints caseload. It is also likely that the IDLO project has enhanced the capacity of the EHRC to provide appropriate human rights advice to the government in relation to draft legislation.

However it is premature to speak of impact in that respect at present, because the Ethiopian authorities have not yet (publicly) sought such EHRC advice. Indeed, the main reason why the project’s impact to date lacks clarity is that the political environment in which the EHRC operates has not changed — that is, the government has yet to display any willingness to engage in a policy debate on human rights.

**Sustainability** has arguably been built into the design of the project, in that operational capacity and professional training were meant to ensure that the EHRC makes a qualitative leap forward in its ability to discharge its mandate. There is evidence that the project is likely to continue to have beneficial effects. The project has provided for sustainability by combining professional training and the development of handbooks, manuals and operational guidelines. The latter should remain in force, even if staff turnover means that those who underwent training eventually leave the EHRC.

The project has vindicated a strategy of engagement with the EHRC, which UNDEF was well-placed to support thanks to its international nature. More broadly, the project suggests that UNDEF is in a good position to support national human rights institutions, many of which operate in sensitive political contexts, comparable to the situation in Ethiopia.

### (iii) Conclusions

The conclusions presented here are based on the findings set out in the previous section and on the contextual information presented in section II.

- The project responded to a clear need and addressed it with appropriate activities. However its relevance was hampered by a loss of coherence related to the need to avoid overlap with activities implemented under the Democratic Institutions Programme (DIP) managed by UNDP. This conclusion follows from chapter III and IV (i).

- The relevance of the project also suffered from insufficient risk analysis and mitigation in the original design, particularly in relation to the political environment in which the EHRC was operating. See chapter IV (i).

- The capacity building activities were effectively implemented, despite difficult conditions. However some activities (training of trainers) were not adequately
followed up, while others were reported to have been insufficiently planned (study tours). See chapter IV (ii).

- Training was generally excellent, particularly where combined with technical assistance on specific Commission tasks. These activities resulted in genuine added value. See chapter IV (ii) and (iv).

- Project management was more remote than anticipated due to the impossibility of setting up a permanent IDLO presence in Addis. However the failure to involve the consultant trainers closely in the management of the project led to a loss of effectiveness and impact. See chapter IV (iii).

- The project achieved a positive impact on the professional skills of staff and on the development of appropriate internal management mechanisms and guidelines. However, impact could have been enhanced through closer relationships between project managers and the EHRC and by harnessing the skills and knowledge of the trainers. See chapter IV (iii) and (iv).

- The project’s sustainability is difficult to assess, primarily because the future evolution of the EHRC depends on factors largely outside its own control. However there is a clear continuing need for capacity development support, which IDLO and its trainers would be well placed to deliver.

- The project has demonstrated UNDEF’s added value in terms of support to a national human rights institution operating in a sensitive political environment. There is scope for similar support to be developed in other countries. See chapter IV (v) and (vi).

(iv) Recommendations

To IDLO:

- **Consider further support to the EHRC.** IDLO has acquired in-depth knowledge of the EHRC, through the interactions of its staff and consultants with the Commission. It has also developed credibility with the Commission and acquired the trust of its managers. These factors, in addition to IDLO’s expertise on human rights promotion and protection, make it an appropriate partner to accompany the EHRC in its future development. See conclusions (i), (iv) and (vi).

- **Sharpen risk analysis and mitigation.** Future project design should envision scenarios related to each identified risk, and develop mitigation approaches to ensure that core objectives can be met. Advocacy and awareness raising should be considered as part of the mitigation planning. See conclusion (ii).

- **Review project management.** Should a future project with EHRC be developed, a project management should be established that includes IDLO staff and consultant trainers. There should be regular project management review meetings with senior EHRC representatives, to take stock of activities and ensure follow-up. See conclusions (iii) and (v).

- **Ensure greater integration of activities.** A future project design should build on the achievements of the present project and of the DIP to design an integrated program of activities. This should ensure, for example, that more cross-departmental
training takes place and that lessons learned from implementation are taken into account in the design of subsequent activities. The project should also contribute to the implementation of the EHRC’s forthcoming strategic development plans. See conclusions (iii), (iv) and (vi).

- **Develop on-going support strategies** Any future project should include support for networking between the EHRC and other actors, including Ethiopian civil society and other national human rights institutions, to complement linkages with relevant UN agencies implemented under the DIP. See conclusions (vi) and (vii).

**To UNDEF:**

- **UNDEF should provide further support in Ethiopia.** The EHRC needs further capacity development support, and the human rights situation in Ethiopia remains a source of concern. As part of the UN family, UNDEF has appropriate credential to provide support on relevant projects. It should encourage applicants to submit proposals, including based on partnerships between domestic and international civil society organizations. See chapter III and conclusion (viii).

- **Consider a program of support to national human rights institutions.** The institutional and professional capacity challenges faced by the EHRC are similar to those confronting many national human rights institutions in Africa and elsewhere. UNDEF is well placed to support these institutions and should consider encouraging the submission of projects providing support to relevant national institutions. It should also consider encouraging international organizations such as IDLO to develop multi-country programs of support to national institutions. See conclusions (vii) and (viii).
II. Introduction and development context

(i) Project and evaluation objectives
This report is the evaluation of the project “Enhancing the Functional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia” implemented from October 2009 to September 2011 by the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), an intergovernmental institution based in Rome, Italy, in partnership with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC). The UNDEF grant amount was US$400,000, with USD 25,000 retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project aimed at developing the EHRC into “a functional institution able to protect and enforce human rights in line with Ethiopian laws and international norms and standards”.

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed a framework governing the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. According to the manual, the objective of the evaluation is to ‘undertake in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipate project outputs have been achieved’.

(ii) Evaluation methodology
Two experts carried out the evaluation. Its methodology is set out in the Operational Manual governing the UNDEF-Transtec framework agreement, with brief additions in the evaluation Launch Note. In accordance with the agreed process, a set of project documents was provided to the evaluators in September 2011 (see list of documents consulted in Annex 2). On that basis, they prepared the Launch Note ETH-08-227 setting out issues to be considered during the evaluation.

This evaluation did not present any particular methodological challenge, and the evaluators were able to follow the standard methodology without problems. The standard project information was available: project document setting out the original design, mid-term evaluation and final report. A monitoring and reporting handbook produced during the project was also provided. IDLO staff conducted at mid-term review from February to April 2011 – that is, about 16 months after the formal start of the project, several months after its actual halfway point. That report was extremely thorough and detailed, going significantly beyond the mid-term reporting required by UNDEF. The present evaluation draws on information compiled in that report.¹

The evaluation also drew on the following sources:

- Information provided by other donors, in particular the multi-donor Democratic Institutions Programme (DIP) administered by UNDP, which includes a significant element of support to the EHRC;
- Ethiopia’s report to the UN Human Rights Council under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism, together with UN Member States recommendations, input by civil society organizations and the Ethiopian government response;
- Reports on Ethiopia by international human rights NGOs;

¹ See ETH-08-227 Mid-Term Review, May 2011, by Manuela Marin, IDLO Monitoring and Evaluation Unit.
• The 1993 Principles Relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions (Paris Principles);
• Key informants, including:
  o Staff and managers of the EHRC, including staff who underwent training as part of the IDLO project;
  o IDLO staff and consultant involved in the project;
  o Representatives of donor institutions and NGOs supporting the capacity building of the EHRC, including as part of the DIP;
  o Ethiopian NGO and academic observers of the work of the EHRC.

The evaluators were mindful of the fact that the political context in Ethiopia was not conducive to open discussions of human rights-related issues. Ethiopia is a one-party state in which the activities of civil society organizations and the exercise of public freedoms are strictly curtailed (see section iii below). The EHRC does not meet the international standards of independence set in the Paris Principles for national human rights institutions. It was therefore clear that some informants were constrained in what they could tell the evaluators. Nevertheless, the evaluators believe that they compiled sufficient information to build a fair and evidence-based report.

(iii) Development context

Political and legal background to the EHRC
Ethiopia is Africa’s most populous country after Nigeria with a total population of more than 80 million², of whom over 80% lives in rural areas. It is a nation of more than 70 ethnic groups who speak more than 80 languages. The economy is based on agriculture, which contributes 42% of GDP and more than 80% of exports, and employs 80% of the population.³ Ethiopia has recorded some of the highest economic growth rates worldwide over the last 6-8 years as well as impressive progress towards many of the MDGs.

However, the country still remains one of the least developed countries in the world, ranking 157th out of 169 countries in the 2010 UNDP Human Development Index.

Ethiopia's centralized imperial government was replaced by a socialist oriented military dictatorship after a popular uprising in 1974. A coalition of rebel forces under the name Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overturned this government in May 1991 and has essentially ruled the country since then.

The Constitution, promulgated in 1995, provides for a federal government and a parliamentary democracy. In addition to the Federal Government and two federal city administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa4), nine Regional States enjoy significant powers to establish their own legislative, executive and judicial branches.5

The federal legislature includes the Council of People's Representatives (HPR) elected for five-year terms in single-seat constituencies and the Council of the Federation designated by the regional councils. The majority party or coalition in the HPR following legislative elections designates the Prime Minister. The president, holding a non-political position as the head of state, is nominated by the HPR and appointed by a two-thirds majority of both chambers of the legislature.6 The Constitution also guarantees judicial independence.7

The 1995 elections for the federal parliament and regional legislatures, which most opposition parties chose to boycott,8 gave the EPRDF a landslide victory. The 2000 general elections also confirmed EPRDF as a ruling party. In 2005, the third general elections under the 1995 Constitution were held with a record 90% voter turnout, but were characterized by claims and counter-claims of vote rigging, intimidation, and fraud. The elections also resulted in unrest, which claimed the lives of more than 200 citizens, but their final results gave the EPRDF coalition a sufficient majority to form the government again. The most recent national and regional elections, in 2010, gave the EPRDF and affiliated political parties practically total control of the Federal Parliament and regional councils, with only one opposition candidate currently sitting in the Federal Parliament.

**Democracy and Human Rights Situation**

The Constitution devotes a full Chapter to “basic freedoms and rights” and recognizes a wide range of fundamental rights and freedoms. Ethiopia is a party to most major international and regional human rights instruments. According to Article 9/4 of the Constitution these instruments are part of the law of the land. Despite this constitutional and legal framework, Ethiopia has faced serious challenges in protecting human rights and building a democratic system. According to various international and domestic observers and human rights organizations, the democratization process and human rights situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated in recent years, particularly after the disputed 2005 elections. Serious doubts and concerns on the government's commitment to democracy and the rule of law have been raised. Human rights reports on Ethiopia in the last two decades show a continued pattern of gross violation of human rights and mounting political repression.

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4 The status of Dire Dawa as a federal city administration is not confirmed in the Constitution.
5 Article 50 of the Constitution
6 FDRE Constitution, Article 70
7 The president and vice president of the Federal Supreme Court are recommended by the prime minister and appointed by the House of People’s Representatives; for other federal judges, the prime minister submits candidates selected by the Federal Judicial Administrative Council to the House of People's Representatives for appointment.
8 International and non-governmental observers concluded that opposition parties would have been able to participate had they chosen to do so.
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission

The EHRC is a national human rights institution established in accordance with Article 55(14) of the Constitution through Proclamation No 210/2000 of July 2000. The establishing law gives the EHRC extensive mandates to promote, protect and work towards the realization of human rights in Ethiopia. The EHRC’s objectives include: educating the public to be aware of and claim its rights; seeing to it that the human rights are protected, respected and fully enforced; investigating complaints of human rights violations; and recommending remedial measures to violations.\(^9\)

The Commission’s tasks\(^{10}\) include: ensuring that laws and policies respect human rights; making recommendations for the revision of existing laws, enactment of new laws and formulation of policies; providing consultancy services on matters of human rights; and forwarding opinions on human rights reports to be submitted to international organs.

Although the EHRC was formally established in 2000, it remained inactive until 2005, when the Chief Commissioner and other Commissioners were appointed and the institution became operational. Since then the EHRC has focused on building its own organizational capacity and trying to determine its role within the Ethiopian human rights system. It is only in the past few years that the Commission turned its attention to exercising to some degree its substantive mandates. The EHRC faces serious institutional constraints, including a lack of adequate and skilled human resources.

According to Ethiopian and international human rights experts, the EHRC has so far not been as proactive as it should be in the exercise of its mandate to promote and protect human rights. Its investigations of human rights violations have avoided challenging legislation or the action of government. The EHRC has not begun to exercise its mandate to review the consistency of laws and policies with Ethiopia’s human rights commitments. Representatives of donors and civil society organisations have expressed concern at the Commission’s failure to comment on the 2009 Charities and Societies law, which restricts the capacity of civil society organizations to work on human rights (see box below). A similar EHRC silence greeted the 2009 anti-terrorism legislation, which restricts freedom of expression and association, as well as fair trial safeguards. Experts and observers met by the evaluators have described the lack of EHRC reaction to these laws as a clear indicator of the Commission’s inability to implement its core mandate.

Impact of legislation on human rights

The EHRC has failed to comment on the 2009 Anti-Terrorism law, which defines terrorism in a way that encompasses peaceful criticism and political activities. The law also reduces legal safeguards for those accused of terrorism. Similarly, there has been no comment by the EHRC on the 2009 law on Charities and Societies. The law defines as “foreign NGOs” those receiving more than 10% of their funding from international sources, and bars such NGOs from carrying out most activities related to human rights. The law establishes an agency that may deny registration to “foreign NGOs” without the possibility of appeal to a court. The law also provides for severe penalties (fines or imprisonment) for minor administrative offences by NGO managers. As a result of the law, many NGOs have been deregistered or ceased working on human rights and several civil society leaders have gone into exile.

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\(^9\) See Article 5 of Proclamation 210/2000.
\(^{10}\) See Article 6 of Proclamation 210/2000.
**Other initiatives**
The IDLO project was launched a few months after the formal start of the large, multi-donor, UNDP-managed, Democratic Institutions Program. The 5-year DIP (2008-2012) sought to develop the capacity of seven Ethiopian institutions including the EHRC (other beneficiaries included the Electoral Board, the Ombudsman, the anti-corruption commission, etc.). DIP expenditures have varied each year; in 2010 – the last year for which public figures were available – they amounted to US$9.77m, of which US$1.47m was allocated to the EHRC. The DIP included the following EHRC-related outputs:

- Enhancing the management and coordination capacity of the EHRC:
  - Enhancing outreach and access to citizens;
  - Improving human rights for indigent people.
- Enhancing human rights protection in Ethiopia:
  - Increasing human rights monitoring and reporting;
  - Raise awareness about human rights challenges in Ethiopia;
  - Promote the right to political participation.
- Build the EHRC’s capacity to promote awareness of human rights;
- Enhance knowledge of human rights in Ethiopia;
- Report under international human rights treaties ratified by Ethiopia.

This program, which started about a year before the IDLO project, covered similar ground to the original IDLO project document. IDLO had not learned of the DIP at the time it submitted its application to UNDEF, but became aware of it after the UNDEF application was approved. This is why IDLO subsequently redesigned its project to avoid activities that reproduced those already planned under the DIP (the redesign was carried out jointly by IDLO and EHRC).

In 2009, the US-based organization Freedom House also started a capacity building project on human rights monitoring and documentation and reporting skills development. The project aimed at addressing the needs of both the EHRC and of prominent human rights organization EHRCO (Ethiopian Human Rights Council). One of the activities initiated with the EHRC was the development of a handbook on human rights monitoring and reporting. The project came to a premature end when its funder, USAID, withdrew as a result of an internal policy review. The Monitoring and Reporting Handbook (MRH) was subsequently completed as part of the IDLO project.

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III. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

Initial design
The initial project design was based on an assessment of the human rights situation in Ethiopia at the time (2007-08), which made clear that IDLO was aware of the dire state of human rights in Ethiopia. Its proposed strategy was therefore to enhance the EHRC’s technical capacity – a relatively non-controversial area – including budgeting, work planning, procurement and recruitment. In a second step, it proposed to train EHRC staff in substantive work areas, using staff from peer human rights institutions in other countries. Again, that approach was based on the implicit assumption that training offered by staff working at other national institutions was likely to be politically acceptable to the EHRC. Other technical advisory activities were also proposed: guidance on how to advise government, training of trainers enabling acquired skills to be passed on to others, etc.

Some proposed activities were more controversial in the Ethiopian political context. They included a multi-stakeholder round-table on the production of reports to human rights treaty bodies; workshops with NGOs on specific areas of human rights violations; and the publication of newspaper articles and documentation on human rights safeguards.

The project thus envisioned a gradual strategy, starting with the least controversial issues and moving towards more sensitive ones. The strategy made sense, though it was arguably over-optimistic when the EHRC’s past record was considered: as the project document itself acknowledged, the EHRC, established in 2000, was “only now [2008] becoming active”. The project’s relative optimism may in part be explained by the situation at the time. Having declared victory after the disputed and violent the 2005 parliamentary elections, the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was under pressure as a result of international criticism of its human rights record. There was therefore a possibility that the EHRC would be in a position to start fulfilling its mandate. The project aimed at providing the Commission with the organizational capacity and technical skills to do so.

Changes at initial stage
The above project strategy was modified early in the implementation phase, from October 2009, for the following main reasons:

- Some of the activities planned under the project overlapped with those planned under the DIP. The project was therefore initially refocused on enhancing the EHRC’s organizational capacity so as not to overlap with the DIP objective of reaching out to citizens.
- Similarly, the public awareness-raising elements of the project were left to implementation by DIP while the IDLO project focused on training on monitoring and investigation. In the event the DIP never implemented the awareness raising activities originally planned by IDLO.

IDLO’s strategy
When the project was designed in 2007-08, IDLO assumed that it would be able to establish a permanent presence in Addis Ababa, as it had done previously and since in other countries. IDLO’s vision was to use that office not just as a provider of training and other capacity building to the EHRC, but also as a resource base for on-going interaction with the Commission.
That plan had to change when it became clear that the Ethiopian authorities would not grant IDLO permission to establish an office in Addis. Instead, the project was managed from IDLO’s headquarters in Rome, involving repeated short visits to Addis by IDLO representatives and consultants. Alternative project management approaches were not considered, according to IDLO documents.

(ii) Logical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Project activities*</th>
<th>Project outputs*</th>
<th>Project objective</th>
<th>Intended outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coaching and mentoring to all technical staff on operational management tools and work processes</td>
<td>Strengthened EHRC operational management capacity</td>
<td>To build the capacity of EHRC to effectively monitor and protect the rights of Ethiopian residents, especially women and vulnerable groups.</td>
<td>EHRC is protecting and enforcing human rights in line with Ethiopian laws, international human rights norms and standards.</td>
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<td>Training of trainers session for selected staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workshop on the Monitoring and Reporting Handbook</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity of the EHRC to effectively investigate human rights abuses and solve human rights disputes through amicable settlement</td>
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<td>Training on use of MRH and on dispute resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical assistance to develop and publish a set of guidelines on legal drafting</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity of the EHRC to advise the Government of Ethiopia on drafting legislation to comply with human rights standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training on the use and interpretation of the guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training on report writing</td>
<td>Strengthened capacity of the EHRC to produce reports on human rights**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical assistance on preparing the first Status Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manual on report writing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Follow-up training on above outputs</td>
<td>Enhanced impact and sustainability of the project***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations to EHRC on project sustainability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* This table provides a summary of the project logic, including changes that occurred in the course of implementation. Some project outputs and activities were changed or reformulated during implementation. The present table presents the project as it was eventually implemented. Apart from some reformulation, the key changes are summarised in the two notes below.
** The original project document included an output entitled “Strengthened collaboration between the EHRC and Ethiopian human rights NGOs to monitor and address human rights violations”. This output was deleted because it was considered premature. It was replaced with this output on reporting capacity building.
*** This output was also added to the project design after approval of the original proposal, in order to build in follow-up initiatives.
IV. Evaluation findings

The following findings stem from the evidence gathered by the evaluators.

(i) Relevance
The project correctly identified the weak institutional capacity and skills shortage of the EHRC, and described accurately the context of weak human rights safeguards and widespread human rights violations in Ethiopia. This context was appropriately seen as lending urgency to building EHRC capacity. Another element contributing to the relevance of the project was that it responded to needs expressed by the EHRC itself: the project was designed after consultations with the Commission, including its then chairperson in late 2007, and was clearly informed by the organizational development and substantive skills needs expressed its managers.

The context at the time of the design of the project also helped its relevance. Following the 2005 controversial elections, pressure grew on the Government of Ethiopia to engage in more depth with the international community and to address human rights concerns. The pressure was compounded by the views of civil society organizations in Ethiopia, which had played a key role in highlighting the violence and fraud surrounding the elections.

One way in which the project was most relevant was that it did not only focus on the development of human rights protection skills, but prioritized in its initial phase the development of the EHRC’s operational management capacity. This component was widely seen as addressing a key need, as the EHRC was a relatively young institution where management systems were under-developed and (where they existed) were copied on the processes used in other Ethiopian administrations. There was a clear capacity gap, both in terms of the expertise of EHRC staff in the various fields of the Commission’s competence, and in terms of organizational processes and systems. These included processes for monitoring legislation, managing the Commission’s caseload, setting up investigation teams, following up queries to relevant authorities, etc.

The project design was appropriate and rational, in that it started with developing organizational capacity and moved to addressing specific areas of expertise – investigation, report writing, etc. The project was ambitious, in the sense that it sought to help turn the EHRC into an effective organization within two years – this very ambition contributed to its relevance, partly because it galvanized the interest of key staff and managers within the Commission – although excessive ambitiousness in the event impaired the project’s impact, as discussed below.

The other outputs in the project, as well as DIP’s support, were designed to address the substantive expertise issues, but the IDLO organizational capacity development output was a shrewd and innovative approach, liable to ensure that capacity gains achieved through the other outputs were effectively mainstreamed by the EHRC. The plan was also politically astute because organizational capacity development was likely to be politically more neutral than other outputs in the project – it therefore made sense to start with this aspect.
Some factors hampered the relevance of the project. They included:

- **Weak risk assessment and mitigation.** The project design failed to identify, or to develop adequate mitigation strategies, for two areas of risk in particular:
  
  o **Risk related to project implementation arrangements.** The design of the project was predicated on IDLO establishing a permanent presence in Addis Ababa, which would provide an on-going interface with the EHRC and respond to needs on a case-by-case basis. The office would also be able to propose changes to the planned activities, on the basis of feedback from experience.

  IDLO was aware of the risk that the Ethiopian authorities might not allow the establishment of such an office. Many international NGOs (including some accredited as observers with the African Union, headquartered in Addis), which had previously attempted to open representative offices in Ethiopia, had seen their requests denied by the government. IDLO knew about this pattern of refusals but did not derive from it the conclusion that its own attempt at setting up an office would likely be denied.\(^\text{12}\)

  In the event, IDLO made up for the absence of a permanent presence in Addis by sending Rome-based staff to Addis on short missions. However this on-and-off interaction could not offer the depth of relationship, or generate the trust, that a permanent presence could.

  o **Strategic risk.** IDLO knew, as a result of its contacts with stakeholders during the design phase, that the EHRC had not been able to develop into an effective organization since its establishment. IDLO’s strategy to build organizational capacity and expertise therefore ran the risk of being rendered pointless, should the authorities continue to prevent the EHRC from implementing its mandate.

    IDLO’s project was based on the assumption that, with improved capacity, the EHRC would address more concerns related to Ethiopia’s human rights record. However, the project design did not consider in detail the risk that the EHRC would not develop a greater willingness to address human rights concerns, or that it would face government hurdles to do so.

- **Overlap with the UNDP’s DIP.** Although the DIP addressed other institutions as well as the EHRC, its approaches concerning the EHRC were similar to those of the IDLO project. The chronology of the two projects suggests that both were designed at the same time, and that the EHRC made similar requests for capacity building to both UNDP and IDLO, hence the overlapping proposals.

  In the event, IDLO and UNDP worked together to share tasks in relation to the EHRC. Their agreement helped avoiding overlaps, but it took away much of the IDLO’s project programmatic coherence, because the project ended up, in effect, plugging gaps not covered by the DIP.

\(^{12}\) IDLO was to some extent justified in expecting to be treated differently from NGOs, because it is formally an inter-governmental organisation whose board is mostly made up of ambassadors. However, this special status did not in the event make it easier for IDLO to set up an office in Addis.
(ii) Effectiveness

There is evidence of the effective implementation of many of the planned activities, particularly those related to training. However it is not clear that the implementation of specific activities led to the overall project’s effective achievement of its planned outcome – an issue discussed at the end of this section.

The quality of the training provided by IDLO representatives (or consultants hired by IDLO) was good – some EHRC staff had specific, high praise for training sessions on monitoring and reporting, and for the report writing training and support given by IDLO. It was also noted by participants – and confirmed by the evaluators – that the training materials developed by the various trainers were excellent: they were comprehensive, well written and up-to-date.

Here is an overview of effectiveness for each area of activity listed in the summary logical framework of Chapter III:

- The training on operational management tools and processes was thorough and high-level. Participants also noted that it was appropriately tailored to the needs of the EHRC. However they raised two concerns:
  - It was planned that the training sessions would be followed up with mentoring and coaching sessions with IDLO experts. Some follow-up visits to Addis were conducted by IDLO, partly as a result of recommendations contained in the mid-term review. However these visits covered all project outputs and were not specifically designed to enhance the effectiveness of the initial training on operational management. The follow-up implemented by IDLO was itself a series of one-off events, which were not conducive to effective coaching and mentoring of staff – actions that require on-going dialogue and intervention.

  At the time the original project was designed, providing for mentoring and coaching, it was expected that IDLO would have a permanent representative based in Addis. One of the representative’s tasks would have been to act as an ongoing interlocutor to the EHRC, including on operational management issues. The representative

  Training and handbook for monitoring department

  In order to strengthen the capacity of the EHRC to produce reports, IDLO implemented training sessions aimed primarily but not solely at staff from the EHRC’s Monitoring and Reporting Department.

  The training, in September 2010, covered issues such as identification of human rights violations and of applicable legislation and international standards. The session was followed up in November with training on report writing. This was in practice turned into a hands-on coaching session on the preparation of the first National Status Report (on the implementation of international standards ratified by Ethiopia).

  In addition to the Status Report, a significant legacy of the intervention was the Monitoring and Reporting Handbook, a 100-page set of guidelines on procedures, based on good practices developed by other national human rights institutions and the OHCHR.
could have drawn on IDLO experts in Rome to respond to specific requests for support. In the absence of a permanent office in Addis, IDLO representatives who made short visits to Addis took over this function to a limited extent, but this approach did not fully meet the EHRC’s expectations and needs.

The impact of this shortcoming on the rest of the project was significant, according to EHRC staff. The operational capacity development resulting from the project was not as substantial as staff expected; this early weakness of the project may also have influenced the way staff viewed other IDLO activities. Above all, staff and managers reported that they lacked the support needed to implement some of the good practices they learned about in the initial training sessions.¹³

- Although some mid-level managers underwent a training of trainers (ToT) session on operational capacity building, they did not actually implement any further training sessions themselves. According to EHRC staff, the expectation that they should implement future training courses was conveyed by IDLO to the participants in the training of trainers course, but was not taken on board by the management of the EHRC.

The failure of the EHRC to use the skills learned by participants in the ToT session was illustrative of a broader challenge to the effectiveness of the project, which also affected its impact. The EHRC did not pro-actively seek to build on the skills base developed through the IDLO project.

- The workshops on monitoring, reporting and investigation were considered excellent, and to have fully met participants’ expectations and EHRC requirements (see box and photographs). Factors that contributed to this positive assessment included the deliberately practical approach taken by the trainers. For example, they worked with participants to develop a Monitoring and Reporting Handbook that helped guide their own future work.¹⁴ Similarly, the training on report writing was considered a success, partly because it focused on drafting a report on the status of implementation of international human rights standards in Ethiopia – a task directly within the scope of work of training participants.

- A training session was conducted on mediation, aimed at helping the EHRC fulfill its mandate on settlement of rights-related complaints without recourse to lawsuits. This training session was perceived as less effective than others because the trainer, a senior staff member at another African human rights institution, reportedly lacked familiarity with Ethiopia’s code-based legal system.

Beyond the legal aspect, however, lay the fact that mediation activities were less developed at the EHRC than anticipated in its mandate. According to staff in the Commission’s investigation department, mediation work to date has primarily

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¹³ It should be noted, however, that other factors than the lack of IDLO follow-up or coaching also probably led to operational capacity development being weaker than planned. For example, administrative and management systems at the EHRC, mirrored on those of the Ethiopian civil service, are not necessarily conducive to the pro-active engagement with human rights issues implicit in the EHRC’s mandate. Some of the criticism levelled at the IDLO project by EHRC staff may have been motivated by considerations other than the IDLO’s own performance.

¹⁴ Work on the Handbook had been initiated under a USAID-funded Freedom House project of support to the EHRC (see above, section II (iii)).
concerned conflicts within families, such as allegations of domestic violence. By
counter, other national human rights institutions include in their mediation
activities a broader range of issues, such as addressing complaints about
conditions in detention facilities, human trafficking, juveniles in conflict with the law,
violations of international humanitarian law in conflict contexts, etc.¹⁵

This discrepancy between the broad scope of the EHRC’s mandate and its actual
range of activities has adversely affected the effectiveness of the project because
it has made it difficult for staff to integrate newly acquired knowledge into their
daily practice.

- EHRC participants gave a nuanced assessment of the two study visits organized
as part of the project – to India for a delegation of Monitoring and Reporting
Division staff; to Uganda for Investigation Division staff. Most staff were
appreciative of the opportunity given to them to observe the functioning of
counterpart institutions in fields relevant to their own work. The visit to India
appears in particular to have impressed the Monitoring and Reporting staff.
However they stated that the visits were poorly organized: they were too short for
in-depth exchanges to take place, and some meetings could not take place
because the relevant host human rights commission representatives were
unavailable. The assessment by participants was consistent with the evaluators’
experience, which suggests that, to be effective, study tours should meet a range
of conditions, including the following:
  o They should be planned sufficiently long in advance to cover the range of
issues of interest to the participants;
  o They should be part of a reform process, under which the beneficiary
institutions is open to revising its work methods in accordance with lessons
learned from the visit;
  o They should include senior representatives of the beneficiary institutions,
who can facilitate the mainstreaming of future change.

Although the participants in the two study tours included senior EHRC staff, the
two other conditions were not met: the visits were planned at short notice and
there was little or no action taken to integrate the practices of the host institutions
into the EHRC’s own policies and practices.

Despite the effectiveness of the training activities, the overall effectiveness of the project –
in terms of progress towards the achievement of its objective – was weakened in
particular by the lack of follow-up of training activities, such as on-going coaching and
support, and integration of lessons into EHRC management processes. Two factors in
particular explain these weaknesses – both are discussed further in the section on
efficiency:

- The absence of the planned permanent IDLO office deprived the project of its on-
going support dimension, and more generally of some of its reactivity. This issue is
discussed further in the efficiency section.

- Independently of this, the effectiveness of the project suffered from the fact that
the activities were largely implemented one at a time, with different people in
charge of different activities and little in-depth coordination among them. As a

¹⁵ Examples drawn from the work of the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, where the IDLO
trainer had previously worked as a Commissioner.
result, some trainers had only a diffuse understanding of work done by other trainers – a pattern reinforced by the fact that the trainers were mostly consultants, not based at IDLO headquarters and working from different locations.

(iii) Efficiency

The project was efficient in the sense that activities were implemented within budget and, bar some initial delays, within the planned timeframe. However there were significant concerns with project management, which hampered the achievement of project outcomes and of its objective.

Initially, the long delay between project design and start of implementation contributed to some of the challenges faced by IDLO. The delay (seven months between project signature in September 2009 and launch in April 2010) was primarily due to staff change within IDLO, and to the need to reconfirm activities with the EHRC as a result of the implementation of the DIP by UNDP. The delay in operational start was further lengthened by IDLO’s unsuccessful attempt at establishing an office in Addis.

When the original plan for Addis-based project management turned out to be impractical, IDLO decided to place project management responsibilities in the hands of a senior staff member based at its Rome Headquarters. That staff member subsequently travelled on several occasions to Addis to initiate activities and take regular stock of the project with EHRC senior representatives and other stakeholders such as DIP managers. However, there were several changes in staff responsible within IDLO, following the departure from the organization of managers who had been involved in the original project design.

Trainers were recruited to design and implement specific capacity building activities. Recruitments were spread over time, with experts involved solely in specific tasks under the overall project design. Recruitments were implemented as summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Date recruited*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miles Young</td>
<td>Manager, Field Operations Unit</td>
<td>Till mid-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumit Bisarya</td>
<td>Project Manager, Rome-based</td>
<td>From mid-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsukasa Hiraoka</td>
<td>Project Officer, Rome-based</td>
<td>December 2009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenz Metzner</td>
<td>Trainer, operational management</td>
<td>January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lylal Sunga</td>
<td>Trainer, Reporting Department</td>
<td>May 2010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veronica Eragu Bichitero</td>
<td>Trainer, Investigations Department</td>
<td>August 2010****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Nyaundi</td>
<td>Trainer, Monitoring Department</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first three people are permanent IDLO staff. The dates given refer to their in-depth involvement in the project, not to their joining IDLO.
** Some tasks of Tsukasa Hiraoka were taken over by Sumit Bisarya, IDLO Field Operations Legal Officer, starting in mid-2010, though she remained on staff.
*** Lylal Sunga implemented training activities in late 2010 as well as in May. He remained connected to the project through to its end, by following up on training activities and contacts with EHRC staff.
**** Veronica Eragu Bichitero was hired again in November 2011, following the August 2011 mid-term review, to help enhance project impact and sustainability.

As a result of this pattern of recruitment, project implementation by consultants was substantially separated from Rome-based project management. The knowledge and understanding of the EHRC acquired by trainers was only partially fed back to IDLO, and IDLO in turn lacked the capacity to follow-up on each consultant’s activities.

The mid-term review of the project, conducted by IDLO's own evaluation experts, concluded that this arrangement threatened the project’s impact and sustainability, and
recommended that remedial action be taken, primarily by re-hiring one of the consultants to ensure a degree of follow-up on previous activities. However it is clear that this action could not by itself compensate for the fact that project management had been excessively remote for most of the project period and that feedback from trainers had not been adequately sought or followed up.

In the evaluators’ view this weakness in project management stemmed in part from adverse events (Ethiopia’s refusal to allow IDLO to set up an office in Addis) but was mostly related to a failure to anticipate project-related risks, political and institutional. A more realistic risk assessment and mitigation strategy at project design stage could have made clear the need to ensure close coordination between the IDLO project managers and the trainers. This could have been achieved by hiring all the trainers early in the project (irrespective of the timing of their input) consulting them regularly during implementation and ensuring that their feedback was systematically shared with other trainers.

Together, the trainers – some of whom developed an in-depth understanding of the dynamics underpinning the work of the EHRC – constituted a highly knowledgeable and resourceful pool of experts, who could have exercised greater influence on the EHRC as a group than they did as individuals. Together with IDLO’s expertise and credibility, they had the credentials to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of the project. Unfortunately the project failed fully to harness this resource.

(iv) Impact

The project has had some immediate impact on the professional skills of its direct beneficiaries, who broadly report satisfaction with the learning they derived from IDLO support. It has certainly also had some positive impact on EHRC’s capacity to conduct investigations and draw up reports concerning human rights issues. In that sense the project had a positive impact on the credibility of the EHRC. This was evidenced by two project-related activities: the report on the implementation of international human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia, and the one on conditions in Ethiopian detention facilities. These two reports were completed with some technical support from IDLO trainers. Although they have not been published, EHRC staff indicated that the reports were shared and discussed in confidential sessions with representatives of relevant ministries. Action has reportedly been taken to improve prison conditions. It remains unclear to date whether the reports will be made public.

It is also likely that the project had a positive impact on the operational capacity of the EHRC, partly because it contributed to the establishment of some effective procedures, for example in relation to management processes for the individual complaints caseload. It is also likely that the IDLO project has enhanced the capacity of the EHRC to provide appropriate human rights advice to the government in relation to draft legislation. However it is premature to speak of impact in that respect at present, because the Ethiopian authorities have not yet (publicly) sought such EHRC advice.

Indeed, the main reason why the project’s impact to date lacks clarity is that the political environment in which the EHRC operates has not changed – that is, the government has yet to display any willingness to engage in a policy debate on human rights. For its part, the EHRC lacks the ability to be assertive because assertiveness would threaten its access to the government, and possibly its own existence.
Informally, some stakeholders and outside observers have described the project as a means to advance a long-term agenda, summarized as follows: by building up the professional capacity of key EHRC staff and the operational capacity of the EHRC as a whole, the project helped create a structure that may be able, if and when allowed, to investigate human rights violations and report about them effectively and competently. In the current context, it is almost impossible to know whether this informal goal has been achieved. But the fact that it was suggested as a possibility is itself a positive sign.

Clearly, the EHRC is not in a position to influence decisively the advancement of a human rights agenda in Ethiopia. Civil society’s work on human rights has largely been snuffed out by legislation described in chapter II above.

Seen in this light, it may be concluded that the project has achieved as much as possible given the political environment in Ethiopia, namely improvement in the professionalism of EHRC staff. It is possible, but by no means certain, that a project management strategy involving a closer collaboration between IDLO and the trainers could have enhanced both the “explicit” and the “implicit” impact of the project.

To the extent the project has impacted EHRC management systems and procedures, its impact should be lasting. However the main impact has been on individual staff members, through training. Like all training-based projects, follow-up is key to the conservation of impact. This is why it would be essential that a project be designed, to build onto the IDLO one and reinforce its gains.

(v) **Sustainability**

Sustainability has arguably been built into the design of the project, in that operational capacity and professional training were meant to ensure that the EHRC makes a qualitative leap forward in its ability to discharge its mandate. Although implementation has been less effective than foreseen, and project management more challenging, impact has been achieved as summarized above. The status report mentioned above, and the report on prison conditions – both drafted with the support of IDLO trainers – were evidence of the EHRC’s acquisition of new professional skills. There is evidence that the project is likely to continue to have beneficial effects:

- The project has provided for sustainability by combining professional training and the development of handbooks, manuals and operational guidelines. The latter should remain in force, even if staff turnover means that those who underwent training eventually leave the EHRC.

- The two reports mentioned above have reportedly been discussed behind closed doors with relevant ministries, thus enhancing the EHRC’s credibility with the authorities. This in itself should contribute to future impact.

- It is possible, but by no means certain, that some linkages established as a result of the project (for example with counterpart commissions in Uganda and India, but also with the academic institutions where some of the trainers are based) will be maintained, either by the EHRC staff themselves, or by the institutions. The linkages, if followed up, could help entrench some of the positive changes initiated by the IDLO project.

However, as mentioned above, the EHRC continues to face a challenging political environment. The risk that the Commission might become a victim of its own success (i.e.
that the authorities could seek to silence it, precisely because it has started to produce results) cannot be discounted, though it should also not be overstated. Until the political environment improves, the maintenance of a support network for the Commission, including through further capacity building projects, would be an appropriate way to mitigate the political risk. Future projects should help enhance strategic planning at EHRC, including its planned development of a network of regional offices.

(vi) **UNDEF added value**

One result of the challenging political environment in which the EHRC operates is that few donors are ready and able to support capacity building projects. USAID, for example, cut short one project (implemented by Freedom House), for reasons that reportedly included dissatisfaction with the EHRC and with government policy on human rights.

In this sensitive context, both UNDEF and IDLO turned out to be effective at addressing the EHRC capacity building challenge:

- IDLO, being an intergovernmental organization with a record of support for human rights protection and promotion, had an appropriate profile, which probably helped it open doors to an extent that an international NGO would have found difficult to match.

- UNDEF’s membership of the UN family probably also contributed to the EHRC buying into the project, and to the Government of Ethiopian apparently not objecting to it.

Despite the challenges and weaknesses highlighted in this report, the project has vindicated a strategy of engagement, which UNDEF was better placed to support than most other donors, thanks to its international nature. More broadly, the project suggests that UNDEF is in a good position to support national human rights institutions, many of which operate in sensitive political contexts, comparable to the situation in Ethiopia.
V. Conclusions

The conclusions presented here are based on the findings set out in the previous section and on the contextual information presented in section II.

(i) The project responded to a clear need and addressed it with appropriate activities. However its relevance was hampered by a loss of coherence related to the need to avoid overlap with activities implemented under the DIP. This conclusion follows from chapter III and IV (i).

(ii) The relevance of the project also suffered from insufficient risk analysis and mitigation in the original design, particularly in relation to the political environment in which the EHRC was operating. See chapter IV (i).

(iii) The capacity building activities were effectively implemented, despite difficult conditions. However some activities (training of trainers) were not adequately followed up, while others were reported to have been insufficiently planned (study tours). See chapter IV (ii).

(iv) Training was generally excellent, particularly where combined with technical assistance on specific Commission tasks. These activities resulted in genuine added value. See chapter IV (ii) and (iv).

(v) Project management was more remote than anticipated due to the impossibility of setting up a permanent IDLO presence in Addis. However the failure to involve the consultant trainers closely in the management of the project led to a loss of effectiveness and impact. See chapter IV (iii).

(vi) The project achieved a positive impact on the professional skills of staff and on the development of appropriate internal management mechanisms and guidelines. However, impact could have been enhanced through closer relationships between project managers and the EHRC and by harnessing the skills and knowledge of the trainers. See chapter IV (iii) and (iv).

(vii) The project’s sustainability is difficult to assess, primarily because the future evolution of the EHRC depends on factors largely outside its own control. However there is a clear continuing need for capacity development support, which IDLO and its trainers would be well placed to deliver.

(viii) The project has demonstrated UNDEF’s added value in terms of support to a national human rights institution operating in a sensitive political environment. There is scope for similar support to be developed in other countries. See chapter IV (v) and (vi).
VI. Recommendations

In this section, recommendations (i) to (v) are addressed to IDLO and the last two to UNDEF. The recommendations are based on the findings and conclusions set out above.

Recommendation to IDLO

(i) **Consider further support to the EHRC.** IDLO has acquired in-depth knowledge of the EHRC, through the interactions of its staff and consultants with the Commission. It has also developed credibility with the Commission and acquired the trust of its managers. These factors, in addition to IDLO’s expertise on human rights promotion and protection, make it an appropriate partner to accompany the EHRC in its future development. This recommendation is based on conclusions (i), (iv) and (vi).

(ii) **Sharpen risk analysis and mitigation.** Future project design should envision scenarios related to each identified risk, and develop mitigation approaches to ensure that core objectives can be met. Advocacy and awareness raising should be considered as part of the mitigation planning. This recommendation is based on conclusion (ii).

(iii) **Review project management.** Should a future project with EHRC be developed, a project management should be established that includes IDLO staff and consultant trainers. There should be regular project management review meetings with senior EHRC representatives, to take stock of activities and ensure follow-up. This recommendation is based on conclusions (ii) and (v).

(iv) **Ensure greater integration of activities.** A future project design should build on the achievements of the present project and of the DIP to design an integrated program of activities. This should ensure, for example, that more cross-departmental training takes place and that lessons learned from implementation are taken into account in the design of subsequent activities. The project should also contribute to the implementation of the EHRC’s forthcoming strategic development plans. This recommendation is based on conclusions (iii), (iv) and (vi).

(v) **Develop on-going support strategies** Any future project should include support for networking between the EHRC and other actors, including Ethiopian civil society and other national human rights institutions, to complement linkages with relevant UN agencies implemented under the DIP. This recommendation is based on conclusions (vi) and (vii).

Recommendations to UNDEF

(vi) **Despite the difficult context, UNDEF should provide further support in Ethiopia.** The EHRC needs further capacity development support, and the human rights
situation in Ethiopia remains a source of concern. As part of the UN family, UNDEF has appropriate credentials to provide support on relevant projects. It should encourage applicants to submit proposals, including based on partnerships between domestic and international civil society organizations. This recommendation is based on chapter III and conclusion (viii).

(vii) **Consider a program of support to national human rights institutions.** The institutional and professional capacity challenges faced by the EHRC are similar to those confronting many national human rights institutions in Africa and elsewhere. UNDEF is well placed to support these institutions and should consider encouraging the submission of projects providing support to relevant national institutions. It should also consider encouraging international organizations such as IDLO to develop multi-country programs of support to national institutions. See conclusions (vii) and (viii).
### VII. ANNEXES

#### Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Relevance     | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | ▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | ▪ To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?  
▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?  
▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? |
| Efficiency    | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | ▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?  
▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives? |
| Impact        | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | ▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?  
▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples? |
| Sustainability| To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | ▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)? |
| UNDEF value added | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | ▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).  
▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

UN documents

OHCHR documents on Ethiopia UPR, 2009
United Nations Human Rights Council, UPR, Submission of Jubilee Campaign, April 2009
EHRC Monitoring and Reporting Handbook

Project documents
UDF-ETH-08-227 Project proposal, mid-term evaluation report, final report

### Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position &amp; Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amira Abdella</td>
<td>Junior Legal Expert, Investigations Department, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonas Assfaw</td>
<td>Investigator, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumit Bisraya</td>
<td>Project Manager, IDLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erin Connors</td>
<td>Project Manager, Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faris Esete</td>
<td>Monitoring Department, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Hussein</td>
<td>Monitoring Officer, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed A. Kediro</td>
<td>Monitoring Officer, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Omozuafoh</td>
<td>Manager, DIP, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aster Seyum</td>
<td>Human Rights Researcher, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Lyal Sunga</td>
<td>IDLO Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tara</td>
<td>Investigator, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abneh R. Tesfaye</td>
<td>Monitoring Directorate, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girma Wolde</td>
<td>Investigator, EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonas Zerihun</td>
<td>Investigator, EHRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 4: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Council of People’s Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIP</td>
<td>Democratic Institutions Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>Ethiopian Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRCO</td>
<td>Ethiopian Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDLO</td>
<td>International Development Law Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRH</td>
<td>Monitoring and Reporting Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>Universal Periodic Review</td>
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