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EVALUATION REPORT



TRANSTEC
PROJECT
MANAGEMENT

**UDF-DRC-07-141 / Formation des citoyens au droit et au dialogue avec les
institutions, République démocratique du Congo**

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All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. Executive Summary

(i) The project

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled “Formation des citoyens au droit et au dialogue avec les institutions” (Training citizens on law and on institutional dialogue), implemented by Réseau Citoyen – Citizens Network Justice & Démocratie (RCN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1 October 2008 to 30 September 2010. The project had three different target audiences:

- The population of two municipalities in suburban Kinshasa, as well as families of military and police personnel housed in camps in the area.
- A group of trained NGO resource people.
- Police officers, prosecutors and judges in the target areas.

(ii) Conclusions

- The project was based on a sound strategy, which identified explicitly the institutional weaknesses that were to be addressed, and proposed realistic steps to address them. The terminology confusion, which resulted in results/outcomes to be substituted to the global objective in the original project formulation, did not hamper the project implementation.
- The project was generally implemented to a high standard. Two activities can be considered to be illustrative of good practice, in the sense that they were both innovative in their field, and carried out with appropriate levels of skills and monitoring: the training sessions for NGO resource people and the seminars bringing together civil society, police and members of the judiciary.
- Training for civil society resource persons was strategically very important and a key reason underlying the effectiveness of the project as a whole.
- RCN’s long-term engagement with the police and the judiciary contributed to the project’s success, by helping it to overcome resistance to activities such as human rights awareness raising campaigns in police and military camps, and the organization of “open days” in courts.
- RCN’s track record in the DRC, its years of contacts.
- with senior levels of the police and judiciary, as well as with internationally supported police reform institutions in the DRC, helped ensure that the project was consistent with the internationally supported SSR agenda, endorsed officially by the Government of the DRC.
- A high proportion of the project budget was devoted to the production of leaflets and broadcasts, without a fully explicit view of how these activities would be followed up to help foster durable attitudinal change.

- The restriction of the geographical scope of the province to the municipality of Kinshasa made sense in the 2008-2010 phase, because it helped the project's efficiency and established a precedent about joint work with civil society organizations, police and judiciary. However, it also raises issues of opportunities missed.
- The project's aim to address the "demand" side for human rights protection, by raising awareness, was sound. However the impact of this set of activities was relatively uncertain. A more deliberate attitude change strategy, drawing on social research and lessons from other countries, might yield a more measurable impact.
- While the project fell squarely within UNDEF's mandate and usefully complemented UN interventions in DRC, the scope and duration of this project remain too restricted to establish UNDEF's comparative advantage in the DRC.

(iii) Recommendations

- The project was relevant and well implemented, but follow-up is essential to consolidate the results. Discontinuing some activities (such as supporting NGOs in the target suburbs and reducing engagement with the police and judiciary) would send a negative message. It is therefore recommended that RCN should seek support for a continuation of this project.
- It is recommended that any new project phase should widen its scope to an additional province of the DRC, while continuing work in Kinshasa suburbs. Widening to Bas-Congo seems to be a good initial step, for reasons set out in detail in the main body of the report.
- Although the broadcasts and leaflet production activities were implemented as planned, the evaluation found that their impact was the least clear of all activities. While this is partly because of the wide target audience, this concern points to the need carefully to review techniques used to raise awareness of rights and to consider alternatives, either in terms of media or of contents.
- UNDEF should consider a policy that allows continuing funding for projects, provided that the new phase widens or otherwise builds on the achievements of the previous one. This would help UNDEF establish a track record, based on its comparative advantage as a UN institution.

II. Introduction and development context

(i) Project and evaluation objective

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled “*Formation des citoyens au droit et au dialogue avec les institutions*” (training citizens on law and on institutional dialogue), implemented by Réseau Citoyens – Citizens Network Justice & Démocratie (RCN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1 October 2008 to 30 September 2010. The project had a total budget of US\$325,000.



Banner announcing an open day in a police station. Photo : RCN

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed a framework governing the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. According to the manual, the objective of the evaluation is to ‘undertake in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine

whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipate project outputs have been achieved’.

(ii) Evaluation methodology

Two experts, one international and one national, carried out the evaluation under a framework agreement between UNDEF and Transtec. The methodology of the evaluation is set out in the Operational Manual governing this framework agreement, with brief additions in the evaluation Launch Note. In accordance with the agreed process, a set of project documents was provided to the evaluators in November 2010 (see list of all documents consulted in Annex 2). On that basis, they prepared the Launch Note (UDF-DRC-07-141) setting out issues to be considered during the field visit, which took place from 6 to 10 December 2010. During their visit to Kinshasa, the evaluators conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders (see list of people met in Annex 3x), including:

- Personnel from RCN and partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
- Participants in training sessions;
- Journalists at the relevant media partners (radio and TV);
- Police officers, as well as judges and prosecutors;

- Members of grassroots community organizations.

The evaluators also took account of available contextual information about the progress of security sector reform (SSR) in the DRC, and in particular about the reform of the police force, which is an important stakeholder in the RCN project. At the end of their visit, the evaluators held a debriefing session with RCN representatives.

(iii) Development context

A relevant case in Ndjili – rape

During their visit to Lifded, one of the NGO partners in the project, the evaluators were told about a recent case of rape. A mother had visited the NGO's office with her nine year-old daughter, indicating that her daughter had been raped the previous evening by three young men as she was returning home from a rehearsal for a local festival. Representatives of the NGO accompanied the mother and her daughter to the local police station, where they were issued with an official requisition ensuring that the daughter will receive medical/sanitary care at a local health facility. The director of the NGO explained that the police rarely act on rape complaints (though they sometime seek money from perpetrators if they are known, and give some of the funds to the family of the victim). However, being accompanied by NGO representatives, the girl and her mother stood a better chance of receiving the requisition document, which would at least ensure that initial medical help was provided. According to the NGO, similar cases occur several times each month in the local area, a suburb of Kinshasa. These cases illustrate the challenges faced by citizens in accessing justice.

Human rights violations remain on a massive scale in the DRC. Reports by organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues and Human Rights Watch, among others, document a wide range of human rights violations, as well as abuses perpetrated by non-government entities.¹ The United Nations (UN) system, through the human rights component of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) peacekeeping operation, renamed Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in 2010, has also documented widespread violations, as have specialised UN agencies. While much of the reporting has historically focused on the most conflict-affected East of the country, violations are widespread, including in the capital Kinshasa. Reports of human rights violations not particularly connected to the armed conflict include:

- Torture and ill-treatment at the hands of police or military forces;
- Arbitrary detention, sometimes motivated by attempts to extort money;
- Rape and other forms of sexual violence.

Victims have little effective remedy, partly because they often do not know their rights, partly because the judicial system does not

function effectively. There is also a widespread perception that the police and judiciary are corrupt, and that therefore attempts to seek redress for human rights violations are futile. Impunity for those responsible for human rights violations is all the more entrenched because

¹See for example the DRC entry in Amnesty International's 2010 annual report. Other relevant reports are listed in Appendix 1.

the police and judiciary lack training and the means to carry out their duties. While middle- to senior-ranking police officers often have a reasonable level of education, the same cannot be said of rank-and-file police agents, many of whom were formerly members of armed political groups, incorporated into the national police without screening or training. Judicial officials (judges, prosecutors) have a better standard of training on average, but this is not the case of the great majority of other personnel, such as court clerks. In all cases irregular pay is a major concern and an underlying cause for corruption.

As institutions, the police and judiciary remain largely dysfunctional, partly because the legal frameworks governing them are obsolete or disregarded. For example, the status of the *Officiers de police judiciaire* (OPJ) is hybrid: as a police officer, an OPJ is responsible to the



Reading leaflets at a campaign event on sexual violence in Lufungula police camp, April 2009. Photo : RCN

police hierarchy headed by the *Inspecteur Général* and ultimately by the Minister of Interior. However, as an investigator of crime, the OPJ is nominally under the authority of an investigating magistrate, thus responsible to the criminal prosecution hierarchy. The same nominally applies to rank-and-file *Agents de police judiciaire* (APJ). In practice, however, judicial control over the police is non-existent and there is little interaction between police and judiciary. This issue was highlighted, and partly addressed, by the *ateliers-rencontres* carried out by the project.

Target population

The project took place mainly in suburbs of Kinshasa – though the radio and TV broadcasts had a nationwide audience. Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC, is administratively both a city and a province. Its population was estimated by the DRC National Statistics institute at about 8m in 2004, and about 8.5m today. Most of the population live in the eastern part of Kinshasa, in large, often informal slum areas taking up most of the Tshangu district, which includes the two towns on which the project has focused on, Masina and Ndjili.

There are no reliable statistics about the population of these communes, but Tshangu district is estimated by police as being home to about one third of Kinshasa's population. The population is very poor and it is believed to be made up in significant part of migrants from other provinces. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an international

humanitarian NGO², the population of Tshangu district may have unmet humanitarian needs on a scale that is not very different from that of war-torn North Kivu at the other end of the country (population: about 4m). North Kivu is one of the provinces in which large amounts of humanitarian aid are delivered, and where NGOs have a significant presence, particularly in urban areas. By contrast few humanitarian NGOs are active in Tshangu district, despite its proximity to the political centre of the country.

Other relevant initiatives

To the evaluators' knowledge there is no systematic mapping of NGO projects in the DRC related to the promotion and protection of human rights. This is in contrast to the humanitarian assistance field, for example, where the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are able to monitor an estimated 80% (by value) of humanitarian assistance projects through the coordination mechanism they administer³. There is no such coordination mechanism in the field of human rights and democracy, but there are some pointers to government and international community strategies in the DRC in relation to reforming the security and judicial system:

- High-level planning by the DRC government and the international community. Since the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was issued in 2006, a number of national plans of actions including state- and peace-building have been developed, including the *Programme d'actions prioritaires* (PAP), the current version of which runs until end-2010. A five-year plan was, due to follow up the PAP to cover 2011-15, according to a statement by the Minister of Planning in mid-2010, but no plan has yet been published officially. The PAP officially prioritises such human rights-related issues as the fight against sexual violence and the reconstruction of the court system.⁴
- Plans focusing on peace- and state-building in Eastern DRC. A series of such plans in recent years has included STAREC (*Programme de stabilisation et de reconstruction des zones sortant de conflits armés*), a US\$1.2bn 3-year plan (2008-10) which included US\$100m for the establishment of *Tribunaux de paix* (civil courts) and the provision of judicial and prison administration personnel.⁵

The government plans, however, are not seen as effective. In 2009 the Ministry of Planning commissioned an independent evaluation of the PAP, which concluded that only 12% of planned PAP activities for 2008 had been implemented in full, due to insufficient administrative capacity and inadequate programme design.⁶

A number of donors, as well as MONUSCO itself, support projects related to human rights and democracy. They include the European Commission (EC) and bilateral donors. They support projects such as training and awareness raising on human rights and the monitoring of police and the judiciary by civil society organizations. However, it seems (in the basis of

² See <http://www.theirc.org/special-reports/congo-forgotten-crisis>

³ See www.ochaonline.un.org/drc

⁴ See *Ministère du Plan, Programme d'actions prioritaires 2009-2010*, May 2009. On the forthcoming five-year plan, see www.lobservateur.cd.

⁵ See synthesis of the STAREC plan under www.ipisresearch.be.

⁶ See *Dialogue international sur la consolidation de la paix et le renforcement de l'Etat, Consultation Nationale, Contribution de la RDC*, www.oecd.org, March 2010.

information available on the websites of MONUSCO, the European Union Delegation in the DRC and other bilateral donors) that most of these projects are implemented in Eastern DRC. Also, the RCN project uses some techniques such as joint workshops with police, judiciary and civil society representatives, and “open days” in courts, which are not commonly used by others – and are indeed quite unique, as highlighted below.

In conclusion it can be said that the RCN project, to the extent it contributes to enhancing the accountability of the police and judiciary to the citizens, and to an increased demand for the



*Participants at an open day in a police station, April 2009.
Photo: RCN*

protection of rights by the population, is consistent with the human rights protection and SSR strategy espoused by official DRC and international plans, particularly in relation to enhancing the accountability of the police and the judiciary, and access to justice. The project is not redundant with other projects or programmes implemented by NGOs, largely because the areas it covers is not a priority for many NGOs, which tend to focus on Eastern DRC.

III. Project objectives, strategy, and implementation

(i) Logical framework

The table below summarises the project's logical chain from activities to results contributing to the ultimate development objective. The table is based on the results framework of the original project document. However it differs slightly from the project document. The first two results are presented separately (the project document merges Results 1 and 2). In the evaluators' view the separation of the two results and related activities makes the project logic clearer.

Activities*	Results/effects**	Development objective***
Legal training for grassroots NGO resource people	Result 1 Improved legal knowledge and sense of responsibility on the part of civil society actors Beneficiaries: 60 resource people	To enhance the legitimacy of the judicial system as part of the reinforcement of democratic processes.
Focus groups, before and after training sessions		
Five-day campaigns on sexual violence for families of military and police personnel, and about official harassment for the local population (including theatre play)	Result 2 Raised awareness of human rights among citizens Beneficiaries: Thousands (local population in target areas, police/military camps) TV/radio audiences (nationwide): hundreds of thousands?	
Production and dissemination of leaflets in Lingala and French on rights-related issues		
Radio and TV broadcasts on rights (based on play)		
TV and radio broadcasts on justice, rights and democracy		
Joint workshops with police, military and civilian prosecutors, civil society	Result 3 Increased trust between citizens and judicial institutions, better liaison between judicial actors and civil society Beneficiaries (direct): participants in workshops, organisers and hosts of open days (dozens of police and judicial officers and personnel, NGO activists)	
Open days in local courts, district police offices		

Notes:

- * The activities are described in more detail in project documents and in the Launch Note.
- ** The results are described in the results framework table in the project document.
- *** The development objective is a summary of different formulations used in project documents.

(ii) Audience and project approach

The table shows that the project sought to operate with three different target audiences:

- The population of the target areas in general. This included the general public in the municipalities of Ndjili and Masina, as well as families of military and police personnel housed in camps in the area. While the public activities in Masina and Ndjili were designed to reach thousands of people (a small percentage of the entire population), the activities in the military and police camps reached a greater proportion of the camp dwellers. The TV and radio broadcasts reached a separate nationwide audience, whose size cannot be reliably estimated.
- A group of trained NGO resource persons. That group of about 60 people was to be given training in human rights and legal issues, which could subsequently disseminate among other NGO activists. The resource persons were also expected to provide support to members of the public seeking to exercise their rights.
- The workshops and open days involved the participation of the local population (open days) and NGO resource persons (workshops), but they deliberately focused on involving police officers, prosecutors and judges in dialogues with civil society and among themselves.

The project document notes that this approach seeks to address both the “supply” and “demand” sides of human rights protection by raising citizens’ awareness on their rights and widening police and judicial officials’ understanding of their duties. To that end, the NGO resource persons play a crucial role because: while they appear as beneficiaries under the first project result (legal training and focus groups) they are key multipliers of influence, because they are among those who take part in workshops with police and judiciary and who influence the population at large. They are also expected to use their own initiative to follow up on the training received (for example by training others).

This outline makes clear that the broader the audience, the more diluted the impact – which is only to be expected. However, it also demonstrates the importance to the evaluation of assessing the impact of the project activities on the NGO resource persons and on the police and judicial officials.

(iii) Strategic aspects

The project strategy is sound. It is based on an appropriate overview of the situation of the target groups and demonstrates an understanding of the political and social concerns underlying the human rights and access to justice situation in the DRC. The project document also makes clear that the planned activities were derived from techniques previously developed and tested by RCN. The partnerships with the main stakeholders were themselves largely pre-existing. This increased the project’s chances of success.

The project document suggested that the three anticipated results were of similar strategic importance. It is striking, however, that the allocation of funds to activities under the three results was sharply unbalanced: of a project budget of US\$300,000 (excluding evaluation costs), about 21% was devoted to Result 1, 68% to Result 2 and 9% to Result 3 (the rest,

under 2%, went to activities on deriving learnt and disseminating these to the authorities). The imbalance of resources across the three expected results can be explained by practical factors: the production of leaflets, TV and radio broadcasts implies important costs to be paid to contractors, whereas most of the costs under Results 1 and 3 concerned seminars and public meetings, which are relatively cheap to implement.

In the event, however, the strategic value of the three sets of activities, as perceived by stakeholders, was much more evident in relation to Results 1 and 3 than in relation to the production of leaflets and broadcasts (the lion's share of the costs under Result 2). This is in part because it is always much easier for stakeholders to assess the value to themselves of activities they have directly taken part in, such as training sessions and seminars. By contrast it is inevitably harder to assess the value to the general public of



Children watching the campaign event in Lufungula police camp, April 2009. Photo : RCN

publication and broadcasts, particularly in a country like the DRC where audience research is not developed. It is also, in the view of the evaluators, because the activities under Results 1 and 3 were more innovative and provided more strategic added value than the production of leaflets and broadcasts, however useful these may have been as background information to the public.



Campaign on sexual violence in Lufungula police camp, April 2009. Photo : RCN

IV. Evaluation Question answers / findings

The evaluation is based on a set of evaluation questions or EQs, designed to cover the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability; plus the issue of UNDEF value added. The Evaluation Questions and related sub-questions are presented in Annex 1.

(i) Relevance

It is obvious that the project **responded to needs** for human rights protection – on the “supply” and “demand” sides, according to the metaphor in the project document. The population of the target areas of Kinshasa (and the general population targeted by the broadcasts) suffers from poverty and lack of education, which leads to widespread ignorance about rights and vulnerability to human rights violations. On the “supply” side, the Government of the DRC is not fulfilling its most basic obligations to its citizens in terms of human rights – both because of a lack of capacity and of failing political will. In addition, widespread corruption and a culture of impunity for officials have a negative impact on citizens’ expectations and on officials’ sense of responsibility.

In this context the project is appropriately designed to address some key needs of the target audiences outlined in the previous section. These needs are set out in the project document:

- The population at large needs information about its rights, both in general terms (how to make a complaint?) and in relation to specific concerns such as sexual violence, police harassment (*tracasseries*), land rights, etc.
- NGO activists are often well educated and willing to help, but lack the specialist knowledge about law and human rights that can make a qualitative difference in their support to citizens: by improving the quality of their advice to citizens and by enhancing their credibility with officials.
- Police and judicial officials, when they do not deliberately engage in human rights violations, often fail to have an appropriate understanding of the justice system as a whole and of the concerns of the population at large.

These needs were addressed by the project activities. The **design of the project** was generally sound. Strictly speaking, the project document reflected some confusion in the use of project management terminology (what it referred to as “objectives” were effectively intended results, and the overall objective was not stated explicitly). However the project had a sound evidence base, clearly benefitting from RCN’s previous experience in the DRC; it also had an appropriate intervention logic linking activities to results, and building in synergies among activities (such as having trained NGO resource people attend subsequent workshops with police and judicial officers).

Gender issues were widely mainstreamed into the project:

- The NGO resource people selected for training were evenly divided between men and women.
- Many of those targeted by the campaign activities in military and police camps were women.
- The issue of gender-based violence was addressed throughout the project: activities under each of the three results included coverage of sexual violence.

Training for NGO staff – addressing a key need

Sixty NGO resource persons were trained in basic human rights defence during the project. RCN selected NGO activists from organizations actually active in the target suburbs. As a result of this vetting process, the participants (26 women, 34 men) underwent a 30-day training conducted by a facilitator assisted by legal experts. The participants’ work was monitored after the training and they were invited to join other project activities, including open days and workshops with police officers and members of the judiciary.

The only concerns about gender in the project were about official participants and trainers: a scan of the names of participants in workshops from the police and the judiciary (including military prosecutors) indicated that the great majority of civil servant participants were men. All the specialist trainers involved in the activities (such as legal experts) were also men, though some workshops included women facilitators.

The project had appropriate **geographical coverage** in view of its size. As suggested in the “development

context” section above, its focus on two of Kinshasa’s suburban municipalities was appropriate in that it covered a large population (almost comparable in size to a province like South Kivu in Eastern DRC) living in very harsh conditions and drastically underserved by public services and NGOs. The geographical focus on a restricted area also reduced implementation costs. Close monitoring was also facilitated, the two communes being at easy commuting distance from the RCN offices. Note however, that while geographical coverage was positive for relevance, we express some doubts below about its effect on impact.

The project was clearly relevant to **UNDEF’s priorities**. The project falls under the “rule of law and human rights” area of UNDEF focus. Within this, it covers issues raised in the September 2009 Guidance Note of the Secretary General on Democracy, in particular some of the areas of UN focus and comparative advantage noted under Section IV of the Guidance Note: “advance transparency and accountability arrangements”; “promote the rule of law”; “encourage responsive and inclusive governance” and “support a strong and vibrant civil society”. The project’s implementation modalities are also consistent with the guiding principles for effective assistance set out in Section III of the note, including in particular by broadening “domestic engagement and participation” and addressing “explicitly the effects of discrimination against women”.

As a result of these factors, the project was relevant in its strategic approach and implementation, addressing clear needs and helping build a response capacity.

(ii) Effectiveness

The project was generally very effective. All the **planned activities** were carried out, some elements were delivered beyond expectations: more leaflets, more TV and radio broadcasts than originally foreseen. The activities were delivered to a good, sometimes a very good standard. For example the training provided to NGO resource people was exemplary, as a result of the following factors:

- The training was unusually long (30 days), which allowed topics to be addressed in depth, and participants were appropriately selected, taking gender balance and skills into account.
- Project documents and internal RCN reports demonstrate that the training was planned in detail in advance, using highly qualified facilitators (all of whom except one had themselves been trained as trainers by RCN) and techniques previously developed and refined by RCN.
- Participants who met with the evaluators highlighted the quality of the training and the relevance to their work of the issues raised. Speaking to the evaluators more than a year after undergoing the training, the participants appeared conversant with its contents and were able to comment on it on request. The director of Lifded, one of the partner NGOs whose representatives attended the training, expressed satisfaction with the outcome, stating that the staff returning from the training had visibly improved skills in relation to the defence of human rights.

Other factors contributing to the project's effectiveness included the following:

- The quality of the **relationship between RCN and partner organizations** (TV and radio station, theatre group, local NGOs in Ndjili and Masina). RCN documents show that

Joint workshops with NGOs, police and judiciary – networking and accountability

RSN organized 4 workshops bringing these stakeholders together. They discussed issues such as police harassment and arbitrary detention. The objective was to address tensions between these stakeholders, particularly in relation to the perceived failure of commanding officers to impose discipline on their subordinates. Participants involved in the joint workshops between civil society, police and judiciary unanimously praised the way these meetings helped enhance (or create) links between them and provided a forum in which mutual trust could be developed. Much of the credit for this result belongs to the RCN staff and facilitators: they laid the groundwork for the workshops by developing long-term relationships with the stakeholders, and ensured that the workshops themselves were held in a constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere.

most of the partnerships pre-date the project. In the same way, the project benefitted from the goodwill that RCN developed over the years with senior police officers and members of the judiciary.

- The use of well-qualified **project staff** who remained involved throughout the duration of the project has enhanced its credibility with the police and judicial officials. The fact that senior police officers and judges were effectively co-opted as trainers or advisors to the project was also strategically appropriate, and effective in enhancing the visibility of the project to these official constituencies.
- Hands-on **project management** and the close supervision of activities and personnel also played a role. Project files seen by the evaluators show that each activity has been the object of a specific report written to a standard format by the person in charge. When consultants were hired, contracts clearly set out their tasks. Similarly, agreements with partner organizations provided for an explicit division of responsibilities.

It is notable that the only changes to planned activities during the life of the project have been increases in outputs, not cancellations. This is fairly unusual in the DRC context, where many projects end up realising fewer activities than planned, often as a result of logistical challenges or difficulties with controlling costs. This was not the case with this project, which exceeded planned outputs in relation to Results 2 and 3: the project produced more leaflets and more broadcasts than expected, and additional awareness raising material were produced as a result of lower-than-expected leaflet printing costs. In addition, the 8 “open days” held in courts and police stations were each implemented over two days instead of one (16 days in all) to accommodate more people.

Although the project responded well to the lower cost of the leaflet printing activity, this new situation might have provided an opportunity to rebalance the allocation of funds among the three results. According to project staff there was no attempt to do so. The saving from the

leaflet printing, though large enough to help produce other material, was not sufficient to implement altogether new activities.

(iii) Efficiency

The project has been run efficiently. Some costs may have been overestimated in the original proposal – particularly the production of leaflets, which turned out to be cheaper than anticipated both because of a favourable evolution of the dollar exchange rate and because of a lower cost per leaflet than originally budgeted. However the project management was excellent, as demonstrated by the detailed paper trail concerning each activity provided to the evaluators and by the quality and effectiveness of the staff and management interviewed. Risk management was effective: RCN has clear ideas of the political and practical risks entailed by the project's implementation, and was able to mitigate these risks, in particular through sustained engagement with the institutional stakeholders.

The activities carried out involved reasonable costs. In contrast to projects implemented in more rural parts of the DRC, logistical costs were reasonable thanks to the closeness of the target municipalities to Kinshasa's centre. Meeting costs were kept reasonable for the same reason.

In hindsight, it is possible to question the wisdom of devoting half of the project budget to the production of leaflets – particularly in view of the fact that some of the most effective and impactful activities were the training sessions (Result 1) and the workshops (Result 3), each of which cost less than a tenth of the leaflet production budget. Devoting more money to these activities could, in theory, have entrenched their benefits further, while the reduction in the production of leaflets would perhaps not have had a major impact on the project's effectiveness. In the March 2010 internal evaluation exercise, some participants also noted that other ways to outreach to local citizens could have been envisioned and achieved greater impact at similar cost, such as large meetings in sports stadiums.

These alternative ways of managing the projects should be considered in the context of the design of a future phase. However, they do not mean that the project as it was conducted was inefficient: activities were conducted as planned, and costs were tightly contained.

(iv) Impact

Notwithstanding the attribution difficulties that are seen in all project evaluations, the project appears set to have a positive and possibly lasting impact on the target audiences of Results 1 and 3: NGO resource persons and members of the police, military and civilian justice systems. It is clear that many of the individuals in these categories who have been involved in activities have derived benefits and have experienced attitude change: NGO resource persons have had their skills enhanced and were exposed to new ways of addressing human rights protection, while police and judicial officials have gained a better understanding of their duties in relation to human rights, and of the constraints under which the other stakeholders operate. However the project did not directly enhance NGOs' capacity to implement projects or the capacity of the police to address human rights issues. Some NGOs, by their own account, have developed their capacities as a result of their partnership with RCN: however it is difficult to attribute this evolution to the project itself (though the project may have contributed to it).

In the case of the police, the impact has been diffuse but identifiable: the fact that OPJs have been exposed to workshops and seminars and that weekly professional development sessions continue to take place within the jurisdiction of the Kinshasa Provincial Inspectorate, can be ascribed to RCN, though not exclusively to this project – since RCN was working with the police before the project started. The work of RCN, and the project, has not led to institutional change in the police: this was neither possible nor expected. However the project has contributed to police attitudes' evolving towards a greater understanding of accountability requirements, which is consistent with the approach taken in the broader, internationally supported SSR agenda in the DRC.

Several OPJs targeted by the project noted, however, that impact on police had been limited to the level of the OPJs, and did not include the rank-and-file APJs. This is a crucial remark, because APJs are those that are most directly in contact with the population, and those with the least training. They are also much more numerous than OPJ (several thousands, as against a total of 600 OPJs in Kinshasa). To achieve a lasting impact, any project related to the police should include the rank-and-file in its target. The project did not do so, and its impact is limited by that choice.

However, the key concern on impact was related to the production of leaflets (and other campaign awareness-raising materials) and the TV and radio broadcasts. Although activities were carried out as planned – indeed, as we have said, more was done than originally planned – it is almost impossible to know the extent to which these elements led to a greater awareness of human rights among the general population they targeted. However there was continuing demand for the leaflets on the part of partner NGOs and other civil society organizations active at local level – which suggests at least that groups involved in advocacy and human rights protection found value in them. It was harder to identify similar signs of interest in relation to the TV and radio broadcasts. The editor and programme producer at the TV station partner of RCN could point to questions and messages received from members of the audience: however it is difficult to know how representative these messages were. Also, the station did not systematically record these messages, or compile statistics about them, which makes it impossible to form a general view of the public's reaction to the broadcasts. As indicated above, media research is in its infancy in the DRC, there is no reliable independent organization able to compile information about the audience of a particular programme, still less about viewers' opinions or attitudes.

The impact on the general population in the DRC (through the broadcasts) is not measurable as such. However, as noted above in relation to sustainability, the project has contributed to the broader social and media momentum towards increased demand for human rights protection. The picture is more positive in the municipalities of Ndjili and Masina: according to NGO resource persons, the police in these municipalities have gained a degree of understanding of their duties towards the population, and some NGOs discern a reduction in the amount of harassment suffered by citizens. The latter view may be over-optimistic, but there are anecdotal suggestions that the police and judicial officials know better, as a result of their interactions with NGOs, what the expectations of the population are. This is an incremental change, which may be reversed in future, but which NGO people active within these poor neighbourhoods have mentioned to the evaluators and highlighted in RCN's own internal evaluation of the project.⁷

⁷ See *Atelier d'évaluation des activités FNUD*, mars 2010 (internal RCN report).

(v) Sustainability

Considering the three sets of audiences addressed by the project (outlined in Section III above) the key advances in sustainability were made in relation to the NGO resource persons, whose capacity was durably built as a result of the training. In addition, the training afforded participants with networking opportunities and provided an impetus for grassroots-level initiatives, some of which received support from RCN. The 60 NGO resource persons all coming from local NGOs, were therefore in a position to act as multiplier agents in relation to “demand” for human rights safeguards. They have also begun acting as go-between with the police and judiciary on behalf of the population, also with advice and support from RCN. This contributes to ensuring that project results last beyond the lifetime of the project itself.

Another element of sustainability comes from the relationship between RCN and the police and judiciary, particularly the former. Senior police officers at the Kinshasa provincial police inspectorate have both supported RCN and benefitted from its work. One outcome of RCN’s long-term cultivation of links with the police is that, partly as a result of the workshop held within the project, weekly staff development training sessions take place in Kinshasa, targeted at OPJs. The impetus for these sessions came, according to police officers, from RCN, which has also been providing some of the trainers. However there is scope for this initiative to continue and even to be broadened to other provincial inspectorate, particularly if institutions involved in police reform across the DRC support the idea.⁸

Sustainability is more difficult to assess in relation to the awareness-raising activities targeting the general population. The awareness raising campaigns (mainly focused on sexual violence) conducted in police and military camps were successful according to RCN’s reports, but actions such as these need repeating to have lasting effects – partly because of personnel turnover, partly because existing command and control structures and camp management systems are not able to take an effective lead in protecting the rights of camp dwellers.

The sustainability of the leaflet production and TV/radio broadcasts is difficult to document. The effect of producing and distributing leaflets is, by definition, fairly short term: an individual’s exposure to a given leaflet may be transient. The same is true of exposure to the broadcasts. However, a comprehensive overview of sustainability, in terms of the awareness raising result of these activities, should also take account of the “residual” knowledge that people exposed to these activities may have acquired, which may contribute to attitudinal change.⁹

In that sense, the project’s activities included two elements of sustainability:

⁸ The *Comité de suivi de la réforme de la police* (CSRP), a donor-funded institution attached to the Ministry of Interior and to the Inspectorate-General of the police, is aware of RCN’s track record of work with the police. RCN has been in contact with the CSRP. There is scope in theory for the CSRP to provide a channel (and technical/financial support) to broaden the weekly training approach initiated by RCN to other police provincial inspectorates.

⁹ Psychologists (and advertisers) have attempted to model attitude change. One theory (Elaboration Likelihood Model, ELM) suggests that a person may be “persuaded” to change an attitude through a central route (being given information, which the person can assess and follow, or not) and peripheral routes (essentially social cues picked up by the person). Leaflets and broadcasts on rights are, at least initially, part of the “central route” because they impart information. They become elements of the “peripheral routes” by being repeatedly brought to people’s attention, even in a passive way (eg, when a leaflet is posted on the wall of an NGO office). On the ELM theory, see for example: *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 2001.

- Repetition. The TV and radio broadcasts were produced on a regular basis for an extended period of time. They were also repeated, in some cases, and potentially still could be, at least in the case of those programmes that have been recorded and copied onto CDs. Repetition is a key engine of attitude change.
- Reproduction of the model. RCN noted that, when its funding for the broadcasts ended, the partner TV station actually wished to continue the series of programmes. The same happened with Radio Okapi, a nationwide radio station supported by the international community, which had collaborated earlier with RCN. The fact that these media sought to copy the model used in RCN's broadcasts may be taken as a sign that the broadcasts were seen as fulfilling a legitimate function responding to a demand.

Despite these elements of sustainability, it remains clear that sustainability is always weak in human rights projects, particularly in the unstable DRC context. The repetition of activities is necessary to reinforce changes. The project has certainly laid the ground for sustainable change to be effected, but this needs to be supported by follow-up activities, otherwise the benefits may be lost.

(vi) UNDEF value added

As indicated in the relevance section, the project fell squarely within the mandate of UNDEF, and contributed to the implementation of some of the approaches highlighted in the Secretary General's Guidance Note of 2009. Whether the project was illustrative of UNDEF's unique comparative advantage is less clear.

The mandate of UNDEF in DRC complemented the agenda of MONUSCO and contributed to the UN's engagement on broader peace- and state building. As mentioned above, the project contributed to advancing accountability arrangements, promoting the rule of law and supporting a strong civil society, which are among the areas of UN focus and comparative advantage highlighted in the Guidance Note. However it cannot be said that it did so as a result of the unique position of the UN or UNDEF: RCN is a well-established organization receiving financial support from a number of other donors, and it would in all likelihood have been able to support this project through other donors if UNDEF had not provided the grant.

V. Conclusions

The conclusions presented here represent a synthesis of the answers to Evaluation Questions given in the previous section.

(i) Good project strategy

The project was based on a sound strategy, which identified explicitly the institutional weaknesses that were to be addressed, and proposed realistic steps to address them. The terminology confusion, which resulted in results/outcomes to be substituted to the global objective in the original project formulation, did not hamper the project implementation. The following elements contributed to the quality of the strategy:

- Good evidence base, drawn from the NGO's experience.
- Good understanding of the capacities of the NGO itself and of its partners.
- Good assessment of police and judiciary needs resulting from long-term engagement.
- Clear identification of target audiences, and of their different needs.
- Focus on developing the capacity of grassroots NGO resource people.
- Sound project management: qualified staff, tight supervision and detailed reporting.

(ii) Project illustrative of good practices

The project was generally implemented to a high standard. The two activities described in text boxes in the previous section can be considered to be illustrative of good practice, in the sense that they were both innovative in their field, and carried out with appropriate levels of skills and monitoring: the training sessions for NGO resource people and the seminars bringing together civil society, police and members of the judiciary.

(iii) Successful capacity building of NGO resource people

Result 1 of the project (Improve legal knowledge, focused on persons associated with the NGO at the grassroots level)) turned out to be strategically very important and a key cause reason underlying the effectiveness of the project as a whole. The resources devoted to this result were important: the project went out of its way to identify qualified trainers and to ensure that participants were able to devote 30 days to the training. However, we concluded that the project did little to improve capacity of the NGO to implement projects.

(iv) Effective liaison with police and judicial authorities

RCN's long-term engagement with the police and the judiciary contributed to the project's success, by helping it to overcome resistance to activities such as human rights awareness raising campaigns in police and military camps, and the organization of "open days" in courts. By effectively co-opting police officers in the project, RCN was able to use them as advocates for its views within the police.

However the project did not reach police rank-and-file officers, only the more senior OPJs. Although OPJs should play a crucial role in training and supervising police officers, they make up only a fraction of police forces. Rank-and-file APJs represent over 90% of forces. They are much less educated and trained than OPJ, and are in direct contact with the population. To achieve a lasting impact in terms of human rights protection, APJ should be targeted as well as OPJs. We found, above, that the project did not successfully raise the capacity of the police to address human rights issues, especially at the APJ level.

(v) Effective engagement with the broader SSR agenda

RCN's track record in the DRC, its years of contacts with senior levels of the police and judiciary, as well as with internationally supported bodies such as the CSRP, helped ensure that the project was consistent with the internationally supported SSR agenda, endorsed officially by the Government of the DRC.

(vi) Over-emphasis on production of leaflets and broadcasts

The proportion of the project budget devoted to the production of leaflets and broadcasts reduced the scope for implementing more activities under Results 1 and 2. Although apparently balanced between its three areas of results, the project in practice devoted much of its resources to these activities, without a fully explicit view of how these activities would be followed up to help foster durable attitudinal change. These activities involved the cooperation of partners outside RCN; in particular, a media company to produce the broadcasts and NGOs to distribute the leaflets. Although legal contracts were drawn up on the production of the broadcasts, it is clear that RCN could not exercise the same degree of quality control on these as it does on the work of its own staff. The use of the leaflets by NGOs was clearly not subject to any follow-up obligation, meaning that RCN had no control of it.

(vii) Scope for broadening the geographical coverage

The restriction of the geographical scope of the province to the municipality of Kinshasa made sense in the 2008-2010 phase, because it helped the project's efficiency and established a precedent about joint work with civil society organizations, police and judiciary. However, it also raised issues of opportunities missed.

(viii) Scope for addressing attitudinal change

The project's aim to address the "demand" side for human rights protection, by raising awareness, was sound. However the impact of this set of activities (Result 2) was relatively uncertain, partly because of lack of evidence about the size and attitudes of the audience of the TV and radio broadcasts (the short-term impact of the campaigns in police and military camps was clearer, though long-term changes probably need reiteration of the activities). A more deliberate attitude change strategy, drawing on social research and lessons from other countries, might yield a more measurable impact.

(ix) The added value of UNDEF is not yet established

While the project fell squarely within UNDEF's mandate and usefully complemented UN interventions in DRC, the scope and duration of this project remain too restricted to establish UNDEF's comparative advantage in the DRC. For its footprint to emerge, UNDEF will need to develop a track record in the country based on a portfolio of projects. In this regard, UNDEF should consider its exit strategy from projects it funds. The current policy of not renewing funding for projects may have the harmful side-effect of hampering the achievement of impact.

VI. Recommendations

These recommendations stem from the conclusions of the evaluation. All but the last are directed at RCN. The first three are proposed as initial steps, the other two being medium-term.

(i) RCN should continue the project

(Based on Conclusions i to v). The project was relevant and well implemented, but follow-up is essential to consolidate the results. Discontinuing some activities (such as supporting NGOs in the target suburbs and reducing engagement with the police and judiciary) would send a negative message. It is therefore recommended that RCN should seek support for a continuation of this project.

(ii) RCN should widen the geographic scope of the project

(See conclusion vii). It is recommended that any new project phase should widen its scope to an additional province of the DRC, while continuing work in Kinshasa suburbs. Widening to Bas-Congo seems to be a good initial step, for a number of reasons:

- Bas-Congo is populated, and largely underserved by NGOs and humanitarian assistance (similar in that sense to suburban Kinshasa).
- Bas-Congo is close to Kinshasa, reducing the logistical difficulties of project implementation.
- Bas-Congo is one of the three pilot provinces (with Kasai-Occidental and Nord-Kivu) selected by the Ministry of Interior and the UK Department for International Development to pilot a comprehensive police reform and accountability programme, the 2009-2013 Security Sector Reform and Accountability Programme). This programme is addressing issues of police accountability, including capacity building activities consistent with the RCN approach.

(iii) A future project should target rank-and-file police too

(See Conclusion iv). Rank-and-file police officers (APJs) are less trained and educated than more senior OPJs, and are responsible for committing most of the harassment and abuses that citizens complain about. It is essential for any future project to address the APJ level in addition to the OPJs, with a view to raise awareness about the duties of APJs and enhance their accountability, both internally to senior officers, and externally to civil society.

(iv) RCN should review how it raises awareness of rights among the general public

(See Conclusions vi and viii). Although the broadcasts and leaflet production activities were implemented as planned, the evaluation found that their impact was the least clear of all activities. While this is partly because of the wide target audience, this concern points to the need carefully to review techniques used to raise awareness of rights and to consider alternatives, either in terms of media or of contents.

(v) UNDEF should review its policy on continuing funding

(See Conclusion ix). UNDEF should consider a policy that allows continuing funding for projects, provided that the new phase widens or otherwise builds on the achievements of the previous one. This would help UNDEF establish a track record, based on its comparative advantage as a UN institution.

VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

(i) The project was a remarkable achievement

While many projects in the field of human rights protection and promotion tend to lack a sound strategic outlook and to accumulate activities without an overall vision, the RCN project was based on sound strategies, narrowed down to achievable results, which were achieved beyond expectations. In that sense it is a very good project, which could serve as a model for other countries where SSR and post-conflict peace and state building are high on the international agenda. Both in terms of local achievements and the production of insights and approaches that can be applied elsewhere, the project was a sound investment of UNDEF resources.

(ii) The project built on a long track record and sound management

The project clearly benefitted from work done by RCN over the years, and from the skills and experience of its programme coordination and project implementation teams. It also benefitted from the quality of the partnerships developed by RCN prior to the project with key civil society and institutional stakeholders.

(iii) The NGO was not a “start up”

The obverse of the points made above is that the project was relatively low-risk, precisely because of the implementer’s track record. It can therefore not be said on this occasion that UNDEF helped the emergence of a new actor – although it did help RCN support enhanced NGO coverage of underserved areas.

(iv) This evaluation had little criticism to express: unusual

On a more personal note, the evaluators note that this evaluation is unusually positive. This is explained in part by the constructive critique approach agreed with UNDEF, but is mostly down to the fact that the performance of RCN in delivering the programme was significantly above average (meaning on this occasion the aggregate experience of the evaluators in DRC).

VIII. Limitations, constraints and caveats

(i) Difficulty of building a baseline

As mentioned in the introduction, it was not possible for the evaluators to ascertain whether the perception by some NGO activists in Njili and Masina, that the police were more respectful of human rights than before the project started, was objectively true. This is because there are no reliable statistics or surveys that can back up this impression. The absence of a baseline is cause for concern about all the results and impacts addressed in this report. The evaluators had to rely on the views of the stakeholders, moderated by their own empirical knowledge and experience.

(ii) Lack of information about social attitudes

One of the reasons for the uncertainty expressed by the evaluators about the impact of the TV and radio broadcasts and the leaflets is the absence of data on public attitudes on human rights and access to justice, and on exposure to the media. Conventional wisdom has it that the DRC is an oral culture where electronic media exercise significant influence. This may be the case in principle, but there are reasons to doubt the effectiveness of that influence:

- The amount of advice available on some radio channels (less so on TV) in the DRC is such that listeners could be forgiven for “switching off”. The evaluators have on occasion heard radio programmes made up virtually entirely of a succession of what in other countries would be called “public interest announcements”. These make for cheap programming, but it is unclear that listeners pay much attention. The low production values of TV broadcasts, including those related to the project, also give rise to doubts about the degree of interest viewers will feel.
- There were interesting, unexpected comments by NGO activists about the production of leaflets in Lingala and other African languages. Some remarked that, while the majority of the target population cannot read French, documents in French may have more credibility than ones in local languages. Again the evaluators were unable to confirm this judgement, because of the lack of reliable surveys.

The evaluators attempted to mitigate these limitations by confronting the views of different stakeholders on similar issues and by using their own experience. However these limitations remain, and need to be borne in mind by users of this report.

Annex 1: Evaluation Questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</i> ▪ <i>Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</i> ▪ <i>Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</i>
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</i> ▪ <i>To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</i> ▪ <i>Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</i> ▪ <i>What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</i>
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</i> ▪ <i>Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</i> ▪ <i>Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</i>
Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</i> ▪ <i>Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</i> ▪ <i>To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and</i>

		<p><i>unforeseen, on democratization?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</i>
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</i> ▪ <i>Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</i>
UNDEF value added	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</i> ▪ <i>Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</i>

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

Project-related documents

Compilation by RCN of newspaper articles on project activities

Rapport sur la formation aux notions élémentaires de droit, Kinshasa, Octobre-Novembre 2009

Rapport sur les journées de campagnes de sensibilisation et de lutte contre les violences sexuelles dans les camps militaires et de police, 2009

Atelier évaluation activités FNUD, mars 2010

Rapport sur les journées portes ouvertes, mai et juillet 2009

Rapport sur l'atelier mixte Magistrats militaires et OPJ, août 2009

FNUD – rapport intermédiaire d'exécution

Document de projet RCN 18 août 2008

The evaluators also consulted files at RCN offices holding documents such as partnership agreements with other organizations, attendance lists for activities, training modules, etc.

Documents on human rights

Amnesty International Report 2010, DRC entry

"Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone – Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the DRC", Human Rights Watch, July 2009

"République démocratique du Congo : la derive autoritaire du regime", *Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme*, July 2009

Documents on development

La RDC en reconstruction : programme d'actions prioritaires 2009 – 2010, Ministry of Planning, Kinshasa, May 2009

Dialogue international sur la consolidation de la paix et le renforcement de l'Etat, Consultation Nationale, Contribution de la RDC, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, March 2010

Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

RCN, Kinshasa

Bernard Philips, Coordinator RCN

Joseph Mango, Project Manager

Gabriel Katshioko, Project Officer

Marie Sadzot, Administrative, Finance and Logistics Manager

Marabout Theatre

Arthur Nzey, Actor, Organization and Marketing

Séraphin Kalamasi, Martin Makitakow, Actors

RTGA TV and Radio Station

Henri Kiovwe, Director of Programming

Dieunit Kanyinda, Deputy Editor

Partner NGO representatives

Alex Bwanga-Mawesi, AIDDH

Fifi Kababi, AMK

Vital Kimoko-Samba, AJPP St Martin

Narcisse Ladiabata, CPDIE

Grace Lula, Director, Lifded

Guylain Musakala, UPT

Dady Pangawu, APROTTU

Judicial officials

Mr Elamej, Judge, Tribunal of the Peace, Ndjili Commune

Ludovic Nshingadi-Tshitenge, Prosecuting Magistrate, Ndjili High Court

Police officials

Richard Mbambi, Colonel

Sylvain Lofimbo, Commissaire Principal

Tardy Masiala, Commissaire Principal

Others

Luc Moens, Director, Security Sector Reform and Accountability Programme

Georges Kapiemba, Executive Director, ASADHO (human rights NGO)

Annex 4: List of acronyms

APJ	Agent de police judiciaire
CSRP	Comité de suivi de la réforme de la police
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ELM	Elaboration Likelihood Model
EQ	Evaluation question
IRC	International Rescue Committee
Lifded	Ligue des femmes pour le développement et l'éducation à la démocratie
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
OPJ	Officier de police judiciaire
PAP	Programme d'Actions Prioritaires
RCN	Réseau Citoyens – Citizens Network Justice & Démocracy
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STAREC	Programme de stabilisation et de reconstruction des zones sortant de conflits armés
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme