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EVALUATION REPORT



TRANSTEC
PROJECT
MANAGEMENT

UDF-COL-07-203- "PROYECTO ARTICULO 40" (Colombia)

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
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MOE: Project geographical coverage in Columbia

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

“Proyecto Artículo 40” (“Project Article 40”) was a two-year initiative implemented by Misión Observación Electoral (MOE). The project was active from 1 October, 2008 to 31 January, 2011, including a four-month extension. This was a USD 1.4M project, supported by an UNDEF grant of USD 350,000 with additional financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Ford Foundation, the British Embassy in Bogota, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the District Institute for Communal Action in Co-financing. The project goal was to strengthen the quality of civic participation and public accountability by creating spaces for non-partisan dialogue between civil society actors and political leaders. It engaged the country through 22 implementing partners, including university platforms, civil society organizations (CSOs), research centers, and social organizations at national and local levels. Overall the project involved 403 civil society organizations in 343 municipalities and 27 departments.

The project strategy was framed around seven intended outcomes: (i) establishment of a network of local observatories on democracy, analyzing political and electoral information at regional, national and local scales; (ii) implementation of public opinion surveys focused on issues on the political agenda; (iii) monitoring of the regional and national print media with respect to topics on the political agenda; (iv) a communications campaign centered on political rights; (v) production of training and informational materials about political rights for citizens; (vi) round table discussions, workshops, and forums about electoral issues, geared toward making proposals at the local level; and (vii) election monitoring.

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives and activities were **relevant** given the Colombian electoral context, within which government efforts have failed to reduce interference in electoral processes by illegal armed actors, information remains limited, and voter turnout is very low. Throughout the country, apathy on the part of civil society is indicative of a profound political malaise. The project was initiated significantly ahead of parliamentary elections, planned for March 2010, and presidential elections in May-June of the same year, so as to focus on broader issues affecting the quality of elections, including security threats, handling of complaints and transparency in campaign financing. The selection of implementing partners from among a range of civil society sectors and backgrounds, based at both local and national levels, made it relevant, moreover, to addressing inequities in access to information among the citizenry.

The project employed an **effective** strategy of drawing on multiple sources of information from previous elections and on current electoral practices, in order to produce analyses that captured political and electoral realities and encouraged a civil society dynamic. Electoral risk maps highlighted areas of the country with abnormally high and low voter turnout, which can be compared with maps of guerrilla and paramilitary activity. These new approaches to data-gathering, visualization and analysis demonstrated the often weak accountability for use of public resources, the lack of *de facto* independence of judicial institutions, and the lack of accountability and transparency among political parties that continue to facilitate criminal infiltration of elected authorities. Such factors were a focus of reform proposals during round table discussions and the development of electoral

observation material and trainings. More partners were involved and more activities completed than anticipated. The provision to the public of easily understandable aggregate data appears to have raised awareness and led to constructive dialogue, which did not exist before the project, with public officials and electoral authorities.

Project management was highly **efficient**. The project benefited from the MOE network at national and local levels, and from the specific skills of each partner. The validity and internal consistency of methodological approaches were clearly established and based on the characteristics and requirements of specific activities.

The project has had a direct **impact** in its contribution to the historical traceability of electoral impediments. It added value by bringing together different sectors of civil society, thus increasing the quality of civic participation. It also contributed to a shift in attitudes among government officials, toward a greater consideration for the concerns of civil society. The Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with security forces and the Army, is now developing its own map of electoral risks. The public prosecutor's office, through its Immediate Reaction Unit (URIEL), collaborates with MOE to investigate claims of electoral irregularities. The MOE baseline study of electoral risks has also inspired several academic doctoral dissertations and a book, "Y refundaron la patria." The nomination of MOE to be a member of the executive secretariat for the Lima Agreement (i.e., Acuerdo de Lima), a network of civic movements in Latin America and the Caribbean committed to the strengthening of democracy, has enhanced MOE visibility. In this respect, this project derived significant added value from UNDEF funding, which, for the first time, allowed for the development of adequate materials to foster civil society voices. Many interviewed partners felt that funding from a UN agency gave MOE and their own organizations more credibility and visibility with government officials.

While the project has had immediate impact, the **sustainability** of its results is debatable. The 41 candidates killed in the run-up to the 2011 local elections are evidence that electoral violence still exists. Challenges remain, and MOE recommendations have yet to be implemented: electoral maps issued by the Ministry of the Interior are not made public, needed structural changes for justice and political reform have not yet been adopted, and it remains unclear precisely what happens when complaints are passed on to the institutions responsible for addressing them, such as URIEL. In particular, it is unclear whether this information is updated at regular intervals, so as to document progress in following up on the original complaints.

(iii) Conclusions

- ***The project's focus and activities as designed and developed were relevant and important given Colombia's democratic and electoral context.*** The project was based on sound strategy, which explicitly identified critical electoral challenges and proposed realistic steps to address them. There was a clear identification of target audiences—including authorities, the media and civil society—and of their different needs. The project laid the ground for reform of electoral organizations, focusing on critical issues that hamper the implementation of genuine elections and identifying problems that lead to electoral apathy. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), and (iii).

- ***The ad hoc creation and the use of different sectors of civil society - based at national and local-levels and selected among partners from different backgrounds – to implement the activities was an effective approach as it leveraged the different strengths of each partners,*** however, the extent of interactions

between actors from different backgrounds is unknown. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (iv), and (v).

- ***The project was generally implemented to a high standard.*** It brought a unique and innovative approach to elections, with results contributing to increased access to information and demand for governmental accountability, political transparency, and judicial reforms related to election processes. However, the project did little to concretely change the political culture of beneficiaries, especially at the local level; This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii).

- ***Improved knowledge on electoral risks turned out to be of great strategic importance, and is a key result underscoring the relevance and effectiveness of the project as a whole.*** However, more comparisons with electoral local practices which are not typically recorded in statistics would be useful. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

- ***The project focused on the accessibility of public information to improve civic participation and public accountability. It established a precedent*** with respect to data analysis and raised civic awareness, working with CSO networks and university platforms across the country. It definitely opens a window for future electoral observations. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

- ***The project has had a direct impact but its contribution to sustainable changes is more debatable.*** The project primarily tracked activities and outcomes, which is insufficient to determine how has the governmental accountability improved on elections organization and more generally on democracy issues. This conclusion follows from findings (vi).

(iv) Recommendations

- The project was relevant and well implemented during the electoral period, but ***follow-up is essential to consolidate results after elections are finished.*** Especially because they are, by their nature, intermittent, ***continuous democratic monitoring and lobbying activities on electoral reforms*** would enhance project' results. It is therefore recommended that MOE seek post-election support to sustain civic motivation and to track progress in terms not only of elections but also of democratic principles. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (iii), (v), and (vii).

- ***It is recommended that MOE consolidate and seek local partners for enhanced synergies in its activities.*** For such a project, the UNDEF grant recipient should consolidate partners and implementers within one integrated program, producing joint products and branding the project to provide a unifying focus for civil society voices and agents of change. For example, research activities such as the production of electoral risk maps by academics could benefit from the experience of social organizations and vice versa. This type of approach could be valuable in local areas, as it would reduce the gaps between elites and citizens and provide tangible evidence of their participation. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), and (iii).

- ***Data with a greater focus on local electoral practices and the capacities of beneficiaries would be required to change political culture.*** Data from electoral risk maps would need to be analytically compared with local realities and practices which are not systematically reported in official statistical data. Data and methodology should be updated at regular intervals, including after elections, so as to document progress in following up on electoral processes and original complaints. This recommendation follows from conclusion (iii) and (iv).

- ***MOE should widen the electoral scope of the project. It is recommended that the project widen its focus to include local elections, while continuing its work at the national level.*** Civic action to mitigate local electoral risks in 2011 could have made a real difference in breaking the cycle of conflict and corruption in which many municipalities are trapped. Close domestic and international scrutiny could have been crucial in generating confidence in results and preventing electoral violence. Observers should particularly have been deployed in municipalities at high risk of political violence and/or electoral fraud. This recommendation follows from conclusion (v).

- ***Use a results-based performance monitoring plan to track progress with respect to electoral reforms.*** This could measure changes in media access to information or the performance of governmental initiatives in the field in relation to identified electoral risks. Such a plan should be also used to track legal and institutional changes related to issues affecting the quality of elections, including security threats, handling of complaints, and transparency in campaign financing. This recommendation follows from conclusions (vi) and (vii).

- ***During the project, build a long-term vision for work in the electoral sector, linking with civil society partners. A post-project strategic action plan should be in place with partners to provide direction in continuing work.*** This would help sustain gains and maintain momentum generated by the project, especially at the local level. This recommendation follows from conclusion (ii) (iii) and (vii).

II. Introduction and development context

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

“Proyecto Artículo 40” (“Project Article 40”) was a two-year initiative implemented by Misión Observación Electoral (MOE). The project was active from 1 October, 2008 to 31 January, 2011, including a four-month extension. This was a USD 1.4M project, supported by an UNDEF grant of USD 350,000 (of which USD 25,000 was used by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation), with additional financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Ford Foundation, the British Embassy in Bogota, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the District Institute for Communal Action in Co-financing. The project goal was to strengthen the quality of civic participation and public accountability by creating spaces for non-partisan dialogue between civil society actors and political leaders. It engaged the country through 22 implementing partners, including university platforms, civil society organizations (CSOs), research centers, and social organizations at national and local levels.

The project strategy was framed around seven intended outcomes: (i) establishment of a network of local observatories on democracy, analyzing political and electoral information at regional, national and local scales; (ii) implementation of public opinion surveys focused on issues on the political agenda; (iii) monitoring of the regional and national print media with respect to topics on the political agenda; (iv) a communications campaign centered on political rights; (v) production of training and informational materials about political rights for citizens; (vi) round table discussions, workshops, and forums about electoral issues, geared toward making proposals at the local level; and (vii) election monitoring.

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed on a framework to govern the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. Accordingly, the objective of the evaluation is to “undertake in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved.”¹

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took place in June 2012, with fieldwork in **Bogota** and **Medellin** completed from 4-11 June, 2012. UNDEF evaluations are qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, and value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the issue of equitable services in Bogota (Annex 2). Interviews were held with MOE, its main partners, electoral observers, government interlocutors, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in this sector. The evaluators interviewed those respondents in Bogota and Medellin in person and the remainder by phone, Skype, and/or e-mail (Annex 3).

¹ Operations Manual for UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 3.

(iii) Development context

The design of the project was grounded within the Colombian electoral and political context. For over 60 years, Colombia has experienced social and armed conflict, which has affected the lives of all Colombians and had enormous significance for social movements and democracy in the country. This conflict has been marked by extraordinary levels of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), with civilians constituting by far the principal victims. According to Amnesty International,² over the past 20 years, 70,000 Colombian civilians were killed and 20,000 taken hostage (either by paramilitaries or by rebel groups) as a result of the conflict, 15-30,000 remain missing, and between 3 and 4 million have been displaced from their homes, making them refugees within their own country. All parties to the conflict—guerrilla groups, security forces and paramilitaries—have been responsible for widespread and frequently systematic human rights abuses and violations of IHL—most often, but not exclusively, committed against civilians. Connections between criminal and political actors have been a major obstacle to conflict resolution in Colombia. Illegal armed groups have consolidated and expanded their hold over parliament and local governments.

Formally, Colombia is a parliamentary democracy with relatively free elections, but in reality, the country's political process is marred by conflict and by armed, violent groups, calling into question the credibility of elections and rendering civic participation extremely difficult. The high number of prospective candidates for the 2010-11 election that were killed suggests that electoral violence still exists.

Impunity is decreasing at the national level, as judicial investigations into links between politicians and paramilitaries have resulted in the conviction of several dozen members of Congress, yet extremely large challenges remain at the local level. It is widely recognized that clientelism continues to weigh on local politics, while links between criminals and politicians are frequently difficult to expose. Weak local institutions are also an important obstacle to local and regional “parapolitics” investigations.

Citizens are aware that illegal armed groups and criminal actors look to redefine their relationships vis-à-vis national and local politics at each election. In this context, the government has proposed a series of measures to impose sanctions on political parties that have connections with illegal armed actors. However, a Gallup poll commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) shortly after the March 2010 Congressional elections found that 20% of the electorate had been promised goods, money, or work in return for votes.³

Another impediment to Colombian democracy is the partiality of the Colombian media. Though the press is ostensibly free, in reality this freedom is severely restricted through both violence and more subtle methods. Journalists who report on corruption, expose links between paramilitaries and political figures, or uncover human rights violations have been particularly targeted. As a result, self-censorship is widely practiced and the ability of citizens to make informed political choices is severely limited, especially at the local level. Furthermore, the country's main national newspaper, TV and radio stations are owned by political dynasties, a situation which does not bode well for freedom of the press.

Together, these elements have resulted in a profound crisis of credibility for the democratic system and challenge to civic participation, especially during the last decade.

² Amnesty International. ‘Leave us in peace!’: Targeting civilians in Colombia's internal armed conflict, 2008.

³ See <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/8540-20-of-colombian-electorate-promised-gifts-for-votes.html>. Also see <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/interviews/9815-are-you-here-to-buy-my-vote-election-observers-in-colombia.html>

Although the Constitution of Colombia, in Article 40, defines the right of citizens to participate in the exercise and control of power, the high rate of abstention⁴ in national and local elections is evidence of widespread political malaise.


“Any citizen has the right to participate in the establishment, exercise, and control of political power”

Article 40, Constitution of Colombia

In 2008, the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) surveyed Colombian citizens, finding low levels of trust in political parties (90%) and in democratic institutions such as the Congress (86%).

Analysis by the project suggested that a key factor in guaranteeing basic voter rights is ensuring that citizens understand electoral challenges. Civic participation is also closely related to access to clear and neutral information and to citizens’ understanding of civil rights, especially in regions where electoral violence is a real discouraging factor. The 2007 final report by MOE highlighted deficits in civic participation.

Project analysis also suggested that the articulation of coherent and pluralistic civil society strategies aimed at increasing political power and strengthening civic participation fundamentally requires the facilitation of dialogues between various sectors of civil society and networking at national and local levels. Although Colombian CSOs are perceived as key players in politics and important potential agents of reform, networks connecting various sectors of civil society at national and local levels are needed.



Press conference invitation for Electoral risk maps presentation, MOE

⁴ <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=48>

III. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

The objective of the Article 40 project was to strengthen the collective action and voice of civil society in Colombia by: 1) making public information on sensitive issues more accessible through a new approach to the analysis of electoral information, carried out by five university-based political observatories of democracy; 2) monitoring mass media coverage of electoral topics; 3) sharing information to encourage debate and capacity-building among civic actors through a series of round table workshops and forum discussions; and 4) monitoring and observing election processes.


MOE has been observing elections since 2006 and is well-connected with various sectors of civil society. The project strategy was designed to raise awareness among citizens, improve their ability to participate in elections, and increase their control of political power. Project activities covered the Caribbean, Occidental, Central-North Oriental, South Oriental, and South Pacific zones.

The project aimed to present information in new ways, highlighting electoral problems in the project area in order to encourage civic participation and advocacy with public authorities. To this end, it carried out a series of research activities which were presented and disseminated throughout the project area:

- A set of monographs mapping electoral risks and drawing on statistical data about previous elections was produced by five political observatories of democracy, which involved universities and members of social organizations in 31 of 32 departments (excluding San Andres and Providencia);
- National and local print, radio and TV media were monitored to analyze the extent to which citizens had equal and unhindered access to information. This effort focused on: (i) justice reform; (ii) political reform; (iii) congressional elections; (iv) two rounds of presidential elections; (v) local and regional media.

In parallel, MOE, in collaboration with universities, research centers and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), conducted two polls, about issues on the political agenda as perceived by elites and about the perceptions of Colombian voters with respect to political and electoral issues.

All polls and information were published in mass media and presented to regional and national authorities to increase public awareness and mitigate the risk that electoral



Electoral risk for Parliamentary election in the Valle department, MOE

processes might be hijacked by illegal groups. These actions were intended to foster the quality of civic participation, monitoring, networking, and influence and control over policy.

To further the process of empowerment, project data and analysis were also used as a foundation for citizens' empowerment, in local round table discussions on needs for structural electoral change, and to develop materials for electoral observer trainings. Thematic round tables and debate forums were held with CSOs, social organizations, local authorities, politicians, political and private sector leaders, media directors, journalists, etc.

The project operated on multiple levels, engaging 12 national and 90 regional civil society and academic organizations as direct partners and implementers. Locally, it emphasized consciousness-raising, round tables and forum discussions. At the state level, it focused on information monitoring and analysis and public advocacy. This project worked with civil society actors from various sectors and backgrounds—including social organizations, universities, research centers, and NGOs—in order to embrace diverse and pluralistic perspectives. In using them as implementers, the project aimed to strengthen their ability to participate in and monitor elections. Each partner was assigned a specific task, while MOE supervised overall progress and disseminated information to the mass media and authorities. National technical teams were created within MOE to ensure the uniformity of overall methodological approaches, as well as the matrix applied to track research activities, supervision of electoral observers, monitoring of mass media, polls, and organization of round tables.

The project focused on the direct engagement of targeted partners, establishing 34 department-based coordination teams to provide organizational and logistical support. It was implemented in a decentralized manner, with programmatic and methodological details agreed upon by MOE in collaboration with its various partners—a deliberate approach adopted to increase local ownership of the project. At project conclusion, evaluation workshops were held to analyze results from the observation missions and to propose some methodological changes for future electoral cycles.

(ii) Logical framework

The table below illustrates the logic of project interventions, framed around seven intended outcomes:

Project activities	Intended Outcomes	Medium-term Impacts	Long-term Development Objective
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1 Data methodologies carried out by local and national research teams • 1.2. Data-gathering and processing. Analysis and production of research documents • 1.3. Validation of data with national and regional experts • 1.4. Public policy recommendations generated that promote collaboration with authorities thus minimizing risk of capture of public institutions by illegal armed groups • 1.5. Publication, dissemination, and national and regional presentation of results and recommendations • 2.1. Methodological and thematic characterization of first poll • 2.2. Implementation of first poll • 2.3. Analysis and publication of results of first poll • 2.4. National and regional debate forums on results of first poll • 2.5. Methodological characterization of second (contrast) poll • 2.6. Implementation of second (contrast) poll • 2.7. Analysis and publication of results of contrast poll • 2.8. National and regional debate forums on results of contrast poll • 3.1. Consultation among national and regional organizations involved in media monitoring • 3.2. Methodological clarification of media monitoring process given lessons learned and previous experience • 3.3. Data gathering and processing • 3.4. Consolidation of results and analysis • 3.5. Engagement with journalists, media directors, CSOs, and political and private sector leaders to debate and evaluate results • 4.1. Consolidation and implementation of media strategies for communications and lobbying • 4.2. Development of lobbying strategy on public policy issues • 4.3. Design , printing and distribution of three pamphlets on political responsibilities of citizens • 4.4. Design , production and diffusion of two radio spots on political responsibilities of citizens • 5.1. Writing and design of three booklets • 5.2. Printing of 15,000 copies of booklets (5000 each) • 5.3. Distribution of 5,000 copies of each booklet to regional coordinators • 5.4. Implementation of 20 regional workshops for local trainers emphasizing instruction on political rights • 6.1. Selection of subjects and production of documents based on discussions • 6.2. Invitation of subjects and performance of round tables • 6.3. Ethnographic registration of records from each round table • 6.4. Consolidation of proposals and presentation to authorities • 6.5. Follow-up and evaluation of results • 7.1. Platform consultation held at CSO responsible for each monitoring campaign • 7.2. Definition of the scope of electoral monitoring and data gathering elements • 7.3. Open calls for observers and training and credentialing • 7.4. Election monitoring • 7.5. Data analysis and presentation of reports and recommendations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1. A network of local political and electoral observatories of democracy established to generate and analyze regional, national and local data • 2. Two polls conducted among academic, private sector, and political and social leaders about issues on the political agenda • 3. Two campaigns to monitor written national and regional media with respect to topics on the political agenda completed, evaluated, and printed • 4. Communications campaign about political rights completed • 5. Booklets to capacitate civic formation and provide information about political rights produced and circulating • 6. Six roundtables, establishing regional influence through proposals and complementary activities leading to political control, completed in six regions • 7. Three electoral monitoring campaigns carried out 	<p>1. By August 2010, at least 15 Colombian civil society and academic organizations have participated in the production and socialization of a minimum of 5 studies on diverse subjects relevant to the adequate exercise of democracy</p> <p>2. The number of organizations participating in training sessions and workshops about alternative ways to exercise and control political power in Colombia has increased. Such organizations have participated in round table discussions and have implemented specific electoral monitoring processes</p>	<p>The quality of Colombian citizenry improved through increased civic participation and accountability, as a result of greater accessibility to information on democratic issues</p>

IV. Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance

The project objective—i.e., to generate data and create spaces for dialogue among citizens—was entirely **consistent with the Colombian political and electoral context**, within which government efforts have failed to reduce interference in elections by illegal armed actors, information remains limited and self-censored, and voter turnout has not exceeded 50% for decades. Project scheduling was favorable, since parliamentary elections were planned for March 2010 and presidential elections for May-June of the same year. **The project was initiated significantly ahead of the date of voting**, so as to focus on broader issues affecting the quality of elections, including security threats, handling of complaints and transparency in campaign financing.

The project drew on **multiple sources of information from previous elections and on current electoral practices**, highlighting risks for interference and/or impediments. This strategy was considered highly relevant and innovative by all partners and beneficiaries in terms of controlling the exercise of power and restoring, to some degree, voter confidence.

The strategy of strengthening local interactions between civil society actors—selected from among beneficiaries with different backgrounds—made the project relevant, moreover, from a democratic perspective. The unequal distribution of resources in Colombia often implies unequal access to information. In identifying and working directly with local civil society partners, project activities were brought closer to implementers, making them more directly relevant during national and local elections. For instance, it was reported that youth involvement with observatories of democracy influenced their electoral participation.

The development and design of project activities was both relevant and innovative. Beginning with research and data-gathering allowed the project to characterize different political and electoral realities, to identify the main electoral issues, and to foster discussion on electoral approaches. This tailored mechanism encouraged flexibility and new methods to enable civil society actors to exert political control and to prepare them to discuss electoral issues in round tables and electoral observation trainings. This was an important first step in facilitating a common understanding of national electoral challenges,



Round table on political reform in Bogota, MOE

thus creating a space for the engagement of civil society. A high level of interest in the project was expressed by most interviewees. Several participants attributed this to a need for alternative ways to discuss elections.

Addressing electoral issues from multiple perspectives, including academic research, public opinion surveys, and monitoring of the media, **reinforced the credibility of the project**, allowing it to engage with authorities and influence the exercise of power. This attracted national and local media, which recognized the importance of MOE

messages. By providing free publication of information and surveys and free coverage of events for the public information campaign, the media created opportunities for raising public awareness of the main electoral challenges.

(ii) Effectiveness

MOE brought most of its intended outcomes, as laid out in the project document, to fruition. As should be expected given the above discussion on relevance, the project was generally very effective.

The broad array of project activities— involving many partners as key actors— fostered a civil society dynamic.

Partners provided data, training and awareness-raising with respect to electoral issues. This increased the willingness and capacity of civil society to participate in electoral processes as voters, observers, and democratic watchdogs, and to interact with authorities. Adding to an extremely high level of domestic participation, MOE, for the first time, invited a group of around 30 international observers to enhance scrutiny of electoral rules and threats to the quality of elections. This group included participants from Venezuela, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, the United States, Panama, Ecuador and Brazil. The collaboration between international and domestic observers fostered the perception of impartiality.

“159 municipalities are at risk for electoral anomalies or irregularities, both for the House of Representatives and for the Senate.” MOE

“The FARC don’t allow people to go out and vote, while emerging armed groups intimidate people, resulting in abnormally high voter turnout in other areas,” Vidart said.

MOE, presentation of electoral risk maps (2010)



Most of the data collected were compiled and made publicly available by MOE, and analyses produced with a view toward ease of understanding. The clarity and instructional methodology of materials produced for the project merit particular mention. All data analysis products—including risk maps, results of media monitoring, and polls—were scientifically valid, and together represent an alternative way to visualize and evaluate elections.

This resulted mainly from the

strong guidance provided by MOE in collaboration with its partners. Electoral risk indicators used in monographs were based on election statistics for 1998, 2002 and 2006, and included atypical levels of participation, handling of spoiled and unmarked ballots, atypical ratings for candidates or lists, formal irregularities, and the relationship between risk and electoral crime allegations. One example of the use of such indicators was the production of risk maps highlighting areas of the country with abnormally high and low voter turnout, which can be compared with maps of guerrilla and paramilitary activity. Selected media monitoring

“159 municipios presentan riesgos por anomalías o irregularidades electorales tanto para Cámara como para Senado: MOE.”


MOE, presentation of electoral risk maps (2010)

indicators pertaining to justice, political reform, congressional and presidential elections, and local and regional media were used to track the quality of information on issues affecting the validity of elections.

The broad array of activities—involving many actors at local and national scales—gave MOE a solid basis for awareness-raising and discussions with national and local officials. The results of data analyses in combination with round table recommendations were used to focus specifically on actions that could have been taken before the polls and to address structural issues in more detail. The latter included the often weak accountability for use of public resources, the lack of *de facto* independence of judicial institutions, and the lack of accountability and transparency among political parties—these factors continue to facilitate criminal infiltration of elected authorities. Interviews suggested that the project had made a significant contribution to ongoing discussions on policy reform in Colombia, leading to constructive civic participation and dialogue with public officials and electoral authorities. To increase the accountability of

VII. ACCIONES QUE ATENTAN CONTRA LA LIBERTAD DEL VOTO

Gráfico 12: Percepción vs experiencia personal - nacional



Second poll, Colombian Voters perceptions, MOE

workshops, 24,000 electoral booklets disseminated), communicated by mass media, proved very effective in achieving results at local and national scales;

- More observations during parliamentary and presidential elections were undertaken than planned—MOE observers covered 27 departments;
- More civil society and academic organizations than expected participated in project implementation. In particular, 12 national and 90 regional and academic organizations from across Colombia were involved at various stages. Moreover, 403 CSOs, spread across 343 municipalities and 27 departments, participated in workshops and training sessions. Several international donors—such as UNDP—and various international embassies took part in round table discussions.

participating institutions, MOE made public information on the status of received complaints. This helped develop relationships with government officials where none existed prior to the project. For example, close relationships appear to have been developed with the prosecutor's office.

All planned activities were implemented to a high standard, delivering better-than-expected results.

- More awareness-raising forums and round table discussions were held, and more sensitization materials produced than anticipated. The various means of raising awareness (25 local round tables in 15 regions, 104 regional

Activities planned	Activities delivered	MOE dissemination policy after each activity
A network of electoral observatories that generate national, regional, and local information	Electoral risk maps and monographs in 31 out of 32 departments	14 departmental meetings to validate risk maps 11 regional and 3 national events to publicize risk maps
Two polls on political agenda	2010 Agenda: A strategic Colombian view of elites Influenced voter perceptions of elections	1 st poll published in El Tiempo editorial house and national and regional debate forums 2 nd poll disseminated to 34 regional coordinating organizations involved in electoral observation and national and regional debate forums 7 presentations and debates held about the results of media monitoring
Two media monitoring campaigns published, focusing on national and regional press	9 media monitoring initiatives undertaken 11 media monitoring reports published, focusing on: - Justice reform - Media monitoring - Political reform - Congressional elections - Two rounds of presidential elections - Local and regional media 6 media monitoring initiatives focused on national and regional media undertaken by universities	
Communication campaign about political rights	57 key messages identified Virtual bulleting sent via e-mail to 2,500 persons 7 articles produced for communications media on civic responsibility, election safeguards, mechanisms for civic participation, and political and justice reforms	8 press conferences held on electoral risk maps
Information and training for citizens on political and electoral topics	24,000 booklets on the ABC's of political and electoral topics printed and disseminated (6,000 copies of each booklet)	15 inter-institutional meetings with political parties and authorities
Printing of 15,000 copies of booklets	Distribution of 6,000 copies of each booklet to regional coordinators	
Distribution of 5,000 copies of each booklet to regional coordinators	104 trainings/workshops held, including 30 awareness-raising meetings with platforms and 74 electoral observer trainings; held in 27 departments, with 2,564 participants involving 403 organizations	
20 regional workshops		
Six round tables held in six regions to define an electoral political control strategy on behalf of civil society Three electoral monitoring campaigns carried out	25 round tables held in 15 regions involving 350 organizations 28 documents produced Observers monitored 13 elections 3,909 observers during legislative elections 2,231 accredited observers during 1 st round of presidential elections and 1,594 during 2 nd round	Media strategy for presidential elections, including public statements from MOE

(iii) Efficiency

Although the project was delayed for four months due to internal political dynamics in Colombia, its efficiency and cost-benefit ratio, given a modest and reasonable UNDEF budget, were highly satisfactory. MOE carried out a range of activities relevant to civic electoral needs, covering a highly diverse profile of voters.

The quality of the relationship between MOE and implementing partner organizations and other factors contributed to the project's efficiency:

Project management was very efficient. All methodological approaches by MOE and its partners were designed and planned in detail. Requisite methodologies, measures to assure internal consistency, and the distribution of responsibilities were clearly established and based on the characteristics and requirements of specific activities. The project benefited from the MOE network at national and local scales, and from the skills and expertise of each partner. The choice of partner organizations was also judicious, with implementation of specific activities matched to skills and competencies. For instance, two public opinion surveys were undertaken in collaboration with universities, research centers and LAPOP, the latter of which is well-recognized for its professional expertise in polling methodologies. Electoral risk maps were produced by five political observatories of democracy staffed by universities and members of social organizations; these used scientific approaches to define and aggregate various indicators that have a systematic impact on electoral processes. Media monitoring was performed by universities, directly involving groups of students to track specific media on a daily basis over 6-month periods, and thus allowing for quantitative and qualitative measurement and evaluation.

	Activities	Dollars	%
1	Network of observatories of democracy	48,700	15
2	Two polls	38,000	12
3	9 media monitoring initiatives	38,200	12
4	Communication campaign	47,500	15
5	Training and civil society information	81,800	25
6	Local round tables	35,800	11
7	13 election observations	35,000	11
	Total	325,000	101

The employment of well-qualified staff, who remained involved throughout the life of the project, enhanced its credibility with both national and local authorities and civil society partners. That 34 regional coordination teams were based in various departments was also strategically appropriate and efficient.

The administrative and financial management of the project and **close supervision of activities from Bogota** also played a significant positive role. Documents made available to the evaluators indicated that each activity was given specific methodological attention.

(iv) Impact

In view of Colombia's electoral context, the project made an important contribution to the historical traceability of electoral impediments, while demonstrating the need for new approaches to providing space for civil society and organizations involved with electoral processes.

The project also demonstrated **the added value of bringing together various sectors of civil society** to manage the exercise of power at national and regional scales. In particular, it enabled civil society actors to give voice to concerns about electoral issues and political power at all levels. It has had a direct and positive impact on the quality of civic participation, increasing information and knowledge among all partners and stakeholders.

As well, it contributed to a **shift in attitudes among government officials, toward a greater consideration for the concerns of civil society**. The Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with security forces and the Army, is now developing its own map of electoral risks. The public prosecutor's office has taken such maps very seriously, and collaborates with MOE—in particular through its Immediate Reaction Unit (URIEL)—to investigate claims of electoral irregularities. Such collaboration has been enhanced since MOE has become known in civil society for allowing citizens to bypass little-trusted institutions. URIEL, as a one-stop shop for the formal reporting of electoral offenses, is a temporary platform that brings together officials from institutions with competence in the investigation of different aspects of electoral rule infractions. URIEL considers MOE a useful partner in mitigating the pervasive information problem faced by mid-level institutions when monitoring elections.

The project has also had multiplier effects, which have reinforced MOE visibility and recognition in Colombia and across Latin America:

- The departmental monographs inspired several academic works. For example, they served as the baseline for “Y refundaron la patria,” a book disseminated widely in Colombia and Latin America. Each book contains a CV listing departmental monographs. Moreover, three students from Rosario University involved in this project have apparently started PhD programs addressing electoral themes.
- Many partners used MOE analyses to initiate further activities within their own organizations after project completion. For example, the Press Foundation for Freedom (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa) (FLIP) conducted numerous trainings and awareness-raising sessions with local journalists in various regions. Other stakeholders such as UNDP are using the mapping results to advocate for political reforms.
- MOE was nominated to be a member of the executive secretariat for the Lima agreement (i.e., Acuerdo de Lima), a network of civic movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, established on September 15, 2000 in Peru by a group of CSOs from regional countries. All are committed to the strengthening of democracy, having agreed to partner in promoting the exchange of experiences, providing a mutual support system in reference to the political and technical aspects of election monitoring, and developing joint activities and projects. Thanks to its innovative approach to data analysis, MOE was able to disseminate its methodologies, including a matrix to identify electoral risks, risk maps, and media monitoring protocols.

The elimination of preferential voting, the implementation of biometric identification in all electoral processes, real-time monitoring of election campaign financing, effective sanctions on those who foster electoral fraud and the creation of a Specialized Crimes Unit in the General Prosecutor's Office are, in the opinion of MOE, five major issues on which Congress must take substantive decisions to move towards freer elections and transparency. **MOE, presentation of electoral risk maps (2010)**

(v) Sustainability

The project had immediate impact, but the question of sustainability is problematic. Aware

that it could not ensure the continuity of activities once UNDEF funds expired, MOE proposed a series of national measures to mitigate passive and active electoral risks, as well as structural changes.

However, these recommendations have not yet been implemented by authorities. The lack of adequate data on significant electoral changes makes it difficult to identify or measure the extent to which results are sustainable or to what extent MOE recommendations, in particular, have led to sustainable improvements. It is important to keep in mind that, less than nine months after project conclusion, 41 candidates were killed in the run-up to local elections held in October 2011.

Electoral maps issued by the Ministry of the Interior are not made public and needed structural changes for justice and political reform, as advocated by MOE round tables and international donors such as SIDA and UNDP, have not yet been adopted. Challenges also remain in terms of collaboration with URIEL. It is unclear precisely what happens when complaints are passed on to the institutions responsible for addressing them. Information on the status of complaints is not yet made public in a way that is easy to access and understand.

The ownership and empowerment of partners and civil society actors are also difficult to assess, in particular after elections are finished. Moreover, the extent of relationships and interactions among different civil society actors are unclear. In Medellin, the regional coordinator declared that more local support was needed after elections to empower civic actors to change the political culture. Most electoral observers are committed only during elections, and consider the job complete once results are in. Platforms aimed at empowering civil society to participate continuously in the monitoring of democracy require greater effort before, during, and after elections.

Most interviewees also pointed out that risks are mainly identified at regional levels but most MOE recommendations are aimed toward national authorities.

The project has certainly laid the foundation for real change, but needs to be bolstered by post-election follow-up activities, or benefits may be lost.

Security, governance, and the quality of civic participation are interconnected elements of democratic consolidation. Sustainable progress will depend in large part on the effective commitment of governmental resources to provide efficient mechanisms for rapid response in all of those areas. Much will depend on the government's capacity to guarantee free and fair elections through the presence of strong institutions (e.g., military, police, judges, and prosecutors) at national and local scales and on citizens' participation in governance.

(vi) UNDEF added value

It was widely recognized that UNDEF added value to this project. MOE and the main partners felt that UNDEF funding allowed MOE, for the first time, to develop its qualitative activities through the development of innovative, informative approaches to assuring democratic functioning.

Gathering and analyzing political facts with electoral risk maps and media monitoring during the electoral period is a sensitive issue in Colombia, and all partners felt that UNDEF support enhanced MOE credibility not only with government officials, but also with partners from different backgrounds.

V. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

- **The project's focus and activities as designed and developed were relevant and important given Colombia's democratic and electoral context.** The project was based on sound strategy, which explicitly identified critical electoral challenges and proposed realistic steps to address them. There was a clear identification of target audiences—including authorities, the media and civil society—and of their different needs. Subsequent actions adequately factored in how and why identified challenges affected the quality of civic participation. The project laid the ground for reform of electoral organizations, focusing on critical issues that hamper the implementation of genuine elections and identifying problems that lead to electoral apathy. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), and (iii).

- **The engagement of multiple sectors of civil society—at national and local scales and selected from among partners with different backgrounds—to implement activities was effective because it leveraged the different strengths of each partner; however, the extent of interactions between actors from different backgrounds is unknown.** Partners and implementers were assigned specific tasks, and the project did little to enhance cross-interactions among media, academics and social organizations. Given the wide disparities existing in Colombia with respect to democracy, as well as varying degrees of civic participation and access to electoral information, better planning for joint implementation of activities among national academics and social organizations could have strengthened partners' capacities and enhanced project results. Evaluations of electoral risk by academics could have benefited from the practical electoral experience of social organizations and vice versa. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (iv), and (v).

- **The project was generally implemented to a high standard. It brought a unique and innovative approach to elections, with results contributing to increased access to information and demand for governmental accountability, political transparency, and judicial reforms related to election processes. However, the project did little to concretely change the political culture of beneficiaries, especially at the local level;**

- **Improved knowledge on electoral risks turned out to be of great strategic importance, and is a key result underscoring the relevance and effectiveness of the project as a whole. However, more comparisons with electoral practices which are not typically recorded in statistics would be useful.** The new methods for organizing and presenting electoral information espoused by the project, in tandem with observation of elections and the recommendations of social organizations, created an unprecedented civil society dynamic for denouncing electoral violations. However, the scientific and statistical information gathered by the project was not measured against local electoral practices. More in-depth consideration of political and governance-related practical constraints on the implementation of technical electoral improvements would be an important aspect of more detailed recommendations.

- **Scope for broadening election observation missions.** The project focused on the accessibility of public information to improve civic participation and public accountability. It established a precedent with respect to data analysis and raised civic awareness, working with CSO networks and university platforms across the country. However, local elections held in 2011 highlighted some missed opportunities.

- **The project has had an impact on MOE's credibility and visibility with authorities, the public, partners and domestic and international observers.** The project's impact is visible mainly in the fact that results were taken seriously by government and international agencies and widely publicized by national and international media.

- **However, its contribution to sustainable changes in electoral processes and the quality of the citizenry in terms of political culture is debatable. The project made a difference** but the extent to which MOE recommendations were taken into consideration by authorities was limited. The project primarily tracked activities and outcomes which do not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether or how governmental accountability has improved with respect to issues of elections or democracy. Although positive impacts were seen—for example, the Ministry of the Interior is now emulating MOE methodology in developing its own risk maps and there is now a formal collaboration between MOE and URIEL—there is no evidence that the government has taken necessary measures to mitigate electoral risks. No governmental information was made public for local elections held in 2011—nine months after project completion. The status of complaints should be made public in a way that is easy to understand. It remains unclear what precisely happens to complaints once passed to the institutions responsible for addressing them. Furthermore, it is not clear whether such information is updated at regular intervals, including after elections, so as to document progress in following up on the original complaints.

VI. Recommendations

- **MOE should continue to foster civic participation and address electoral advocacy more firmly in the context of democratic governance.** The project was relevant and well implemented during the electoral period, but follow-up is essential to consolidate results after elections are finished. Given that elections are, by their nature, intermittent, continuous democratic monitoring and lobbying activities on electoral reforms would send a stronger message. It is therefore recommended that MOE seek post-election support to sustain civic motivation and to track progress in terms not only of elections but also of democratic principles. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (iii), (v), and (vii).

- **Continue to build civil society networks within an integrated framework that allows for more cohesive and synergistic interconnections among partners, with efforts to address attitudinal changes in political culture at the local**

level. There is scope for the MOE project to continue and even to be deepened with respect to social organizations at the local level, particularly if these can provide additional evidence on risks or electoral violations. For such a project, the UNDEF grant recipient should consolidate partners and implementers within one integrated program, producing joint products and branding the project to provide a unifying focus for civil society voices and agents of change. For example, research activities such as the production of electoral risk maps by academics could benefit from the experience of social organizations and vice versa. This type of approach could be valuable in local areas, as it would reduce the gaps between elites and citizens and provide tangible evidence of their participation. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), and (iii).

- ***Data with a greater focus on local electoral practices and the capacities of beneficiaries would be required to change political culture.*** Data from electoral risk maps would need to be analytically compared with local realities and practices which are not systematically reported in official statistical data. A deeper and updated analysis could better capture electoral interference and propose specific recommendations to mitigate electoral risks. This approach has the potential to yield a complete and comprehensive catalogue of electoral impediments, taking into account those practices which are not captured in standard statistics. This recommendation follows from conclusions (iii) and (iv).

- ***Data and methodology should be updated at regular intervals, including after elections, so as to document progress in following up on electoral processes and original complaints.*** This recommendation follows from conclusion (iv).

- ***MOE should widen the electoral scope of the project.*** It is recommended that the project widen its focus to include local elections, while continuing its work at the national level. As outlined in the section above on the Colombian political context, there is an urgent need to develop means whereby local politics can be included in nation- and peace-building. Civic action to mitigate local electoral risks in 2011 could have made a real difference in breaking the cycle of conflict and corruption in which many municipalities are trapped. Replication of project methodologies with the same partners could have provided added value. Given the realities of local Colombian politics—40 candidates were killed in the run-up to local elections in 2011—close domestic and international scrutiny could have been crucial in generating confidence in results and preventing electoral violence. Observers should particularly have been deployed in municipalities at high risk of political violence and/or electoral fraud. This recommendation follows from conclusion (v).

- ***Use a results-based performance monitoring plan to track progress with respect to electoral outcomes.*** This could measure changes in media access to information or the performance of governmental initiatives in the field in relation to identified electoral risks. Such a plan should also be used to track legal and institutional changes related to issues affecting the quality of elections, including security threats, handling of complaints, and transparency in campaign financing. This recommendation follows from conclusions (vi) and (vii).

- ***During the project, build a long-term vision for work in the electoral sector, linking with civil society partners.*** A post-project strategic action plan

should be in place with partners to provide direction in continuing work. This would help sustain gains and maintain momentum generated by the project, especially at the local level. This recommendation follows from conclusion (ii) (iii) and (vii).

VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

The evaluators were able to reach only a limited number of community beneficiaries who participated in local activities. Nevertheless, the information gathered from different sources and all the documents provided by MOE and partners helped validate evaluation findings.

VIII. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Evaluation questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.). Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

- Project programming and management documents:
 - Project Document;
 - Mid-term Report
 - Final report;
- Publications produced within the framework of the project
 - MOE, Mapas y Factores de Riesgo Electoral 2011;
 - MOE, Cartilla A, Sistema electoral , Elecciones generales, January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla C, Irregularidades y delitos electorales , January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla D, Dia Electoral guia para observadores, January 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla F, Formularios electorales, MOE, March 2010;
 - MOE, Cartilla G, Financiamiento Electoral en Colombia , March 2010;
 - MoE, Kit de analysis , elecciones presidenciales y legislativas 2010;
 - MoE, percepcion electoral de los votantes colombianos, January 2011;
 - MOE, Cuadro de observaciones ley estatutaria 1475 de 2011 reforma Politica-Resisada por Corte Constitucional C-490/11, 2011;
 - MOE, Electionnes Autoridades Locales , Colombia, 2011;
 - Agenda Political 2010, Una vision desde elites estrategicas de columbia, Octubre 2009;
 - MOE, Justice reform media monitoring;
 - MOE, Political reform media monitoring;
 - MOE, Congressional election media monitoring;
 - MOE, 2 rounds of presidencial elections media monitoring;
 - MOE, local and regional medias monitoring on Risaralda, Santander and valle del Cauca
 - Pontificia Universidad Javeriana cali University, media monitoring;
 - Universidad Central media monitoring;
 - Universidad Tadeo media monitoring;
 - Universidad de Antioquia media monitoring;
 - Universidad Autonoma de Bucaramanga media monitoring;
 - Universidad Tcnologica de Pereira media monitoring;
 - MOE, La reforma à la justicia: inconveniente e irresponsable, Caja de Herramientas, October 2008;
 - MOE, la eleccion de la nueva Corte Constitutcional: responsabilidad de todos, Caja de Herramientas, October 2008;
 - MOE, La reforma politica ...Reforma la politica? El Tiempo, December 2008;
 - MOE, Que esconde la reforma politica? , Caja de Herramientas, May 2009;
 - MOE, Todo contra la reforma politica, Caja de Herramientas, May 2009;
 - MOE, Mapa de riesgo consolidado por variables electorales, March 2010;
 - MOE, Commo cuidar elecciones en Colombia, el tiempo, 2010;
 - MOE,
- Others documents
 - MOE, Claudia Lopez Hernandez , Y refundaron la ^patria.. de como mafiosos y politicos reconfiguraron el Estado colombiano, 2010;
 - Amnesty International 'Leave us in Peace", targeting civilians in Columbia's internal armed conflict, 2008; <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/023/2008/en>
 - International Crisis Group, Cutting the links between crime and local politics,Columbia 's 2011 elections;
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ICG_CuttingtheLinksbetweenCrimeandLocalPolitics_Colombias2011Elections.pdf
 - Latin America Report N°37 – 25 July 2011;
 - Hannah Stone, Cleaning Up Colombia's Vote: The Government Response, 24 October 2011;
<http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-local-elections-2011/cleaning-up-colombias-vote-the-government-response>
 - Human Rights Watch, World Report Chapter Colombia- [World Report 2012: Colombia](#)

Annex 3: Interviewed persons

4 June (Bogota)	
Alejandra Barrios	Electoral observation mission director (MOE)
Andrea del Pilar Lopera	Administrative and financial coordinator (MOE)
Adriana Peña	Media monitoring project manager (MOE)
Felipe Jiménez	Democratic observatories coordinator (MOE)
Carlos Santana	Election observation mission coordinator (MOE)
Fabián Hernandez	Communication and media monitoring coordinator (MOE)
Andrés de la Cuadra	Communication project assistant (MOE)
Camilo Mancera	Legal assistant (MOE)
Juan Gabriel Navarrete	Legal affairs coordinator (MOE)
5 June (Bogota)	
Ariel Ávila	Armed conflicts observatory coordinator (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris)
Luis Eduardo Celis	Political adviser and coordinator (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris)
Beatriz Franco.	Political sciences department director (Universidad del Rosario)
Pedro Santana.	President (Viva la Ciudadanía)
Gabriel Bustamante	Member (Viva la Ciudadanía)
Felipe Botero	Political sciences department associate professor (Universidad de los Andes)
6 June (Bogota)	
Guillermo Cuellar	Director (Brújula Comunicaciones)
Diana Sanchez	Director (Asociación para la Promoción Social Alternativa Minga)
Angela Hernandez	Electoral matters prosecutor (Office of the Procurator General) (Procuraduría General de la Nación)
Jose Maria Sarmiento	Electoral matters prosecutor, adviser (Office of the Procurator General) (Procuraduría General de la Nación)
Gabriel Nieto	Coordinator (URIEL) (Office of the Procurator General) (Procuraduría General de la Nación)
Alejandro Rodriguez	Media monitoring coordinator, professor (Universidad Central, Facultad de comunicación social)
Raúl Acosta	Media monitoring coordinator, professor (Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Facultad de comunicación social)
Johana Zúñiga	Media monitoring coordinator, professor (Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Periodismo)
7 June (Bogota)	
Blanca Cardona	Coordinator (UNDP)
Felipe Cardona	Democratic strengthening coordinator (UNDP)
Andrés Morales	Director (FLIP)
Edilberto Peña	Electoral management director (National Registry of Civil Status) (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil)
Antonio Gómez Merlano	Delegated prosecutor for electoral matters (Procuraduría General de la Nación)
	Electoral observer
	Electoral observer
	Electoral observer
Alejandra Barrios	Electoral observation mission director (MOE)
Andrea del Pilar Lopera	Administrative and financial coordinator (MOE)
Adriana Peña	Media monitoring project assistant (MOE)
Felipe Jiménez	Democratic observatories coordinator (MOE)
Carlos Santana	Election observation mission coordinator (MOE)
Fabián Hernandez	Communication and media monitoring coordinator (MOE)
Andrés de la Cuadra	Communication project assistant (MOE)
Camilo Mancera	Legal assistant (MOE)
Juan Gabriel Navarrete	Legal affairs coordinator (MOE)
8 June (Bogota)	
Catalina Hoyos Mora	Program officer (Swedish International Development Agency) (SIDA)

20 June (Medellin)	
Patricia Fernández	Regional coordinator, Medellin (MOE - Antioquia) and Director (Corporación Viva La Ciudadanía - Antioquia)
Leslie Paz	Project assistant, Medellin (MOE - Antioquia) and Member (Corporación Viva La Ciudadanía - Antioquia)
Edwin Bermúdez	Municipal coordinator, Itagüí (MOE - Antioquia) and Member (Corporación Viva La Ciudadanía - Antioquia)
27 June (Bogota)	
Andrea del Pilar Lopera	Administrative and financial coordinator (MOE)

Annex 4: Abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organizations
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FLIP	Press Foundation for Freedom (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa)
HDI	Human Development Index
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MOE	Electoral Observation Mission (Misión Observación Electoral)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PD	Project Document
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
URIEL	Immediate Reaction Unit (Unidad de Reacción Inmediata)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency