FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

UDF-BDI-07-136 / Strengthening transitional justice processes in Burundi

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Acknowledgements

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All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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Executive Summary

(i) The project

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled “Strengthening transitional justice processes in Burundi”. It was implemented by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a US-based non-governmental organization (NGO), from September 2008 to November 2010, in partnership with two Burundian partner organizations. The UNDEF grant amount was US$225,000. The project was related to the establishment in Burundi of a National Consultation Steering Committee (NCSC, Comité de pilotage tripartite) made up of government, UN and civil society representatives and tasked with addressing issues of national reconciliation and accountability for past large-scale human rights violations. The overall goal of the project was “to help the NCSC to achieve its mandate and promote transitional justice”. The project included the following elements:

• Provision of technical support to the NCSC;
• Capacity development of Burundian civil society organizations dealing with transitional justice issues;
• Research on reconciliation, reparations and institutional reform;
• Study on the nexus between transitional justice and the peace building process;
• Advocacy for the effective implementation of transitional justice mechanisms.

The project built on the proven high-level expertise of ICTJ in relation to transitional justice. However the project strategy did not fully consider how ICTJ’s intervention would be received by government stakeholders. More broadly, the project strategy did not include a detailed overview of project risks and their possible mitigation.

(ii) Assessment of the project

Relevance

Many of the stakeholders who spoke to the evaluators could testify to the relevance of ICTJ’s long-standing involvement in Burundi. Most of the leading civil society, government and UN experts on TJ that were active in the country at the time of the evaluation visit had been trained by ICTJ.

The design of the project enhanced the relevance of ICTJ’s work in Burundi by prioritizing the implementation of the process leading to the establishment of a TRC. The project had a clear gender dimension, which enhanced its relevance. One of the implementing partners was a women’s rights organization, which worked actively with a network of community women’s groups to seek information from survivors and raise awareness about TJ processes.

Against this generally positive landscape, a number of design and implementation factors have contributed to reducing the practical relevance of the project. While the main project objective was to help build the capacity of transitional justice mechanisms, there was little analysis in the project document of the kind of capacity that needed building. The relationship
between ICTJ and the NCSC was overshadowed by communications difficulties between the NCSC chairperson and ICTJ.

Effectiveness

The project was generally effective. The planned results were largely attained. However some of the planned activities did not take place as foreseen. Civil society networks were not developed as foreseen, and publications that were produced differed from what had been anticipated. The effectiveness of the project was hampered by the lack of sufficiently clear operational arrangements between ICTJ, Dushirehamwe and ACAT-Burundi.

Efficiency

The project was not as cost-effective as it would have been with a permanent ICTJ presence in Burundi, as was foreseen in the original proposal. A large proportion of the budget was devoted to salaries and travel costs, and a relatively small one (partly unspent) to actual activities. The training seminars and capacity building workshops concerned less than 200 people in total. One factor outside the control of ICTJ and its partners, which reduced the efficiency of the project, was the government’s slowness in implementing TJ measures.

The project could most probably have been more efficient if it had been more closely managed by ICTJ’s office in South Africa. Its greater involvement would have enhanced the value of the project in the eyes of implementing partners and provided valuable assistance to the ICTJ staff working on Burundi.

Impact

The impact of the project has been impressive. There is a clear and continuing demand for ICTJ’s involvement, based on the track record and credibility it has achieved since 2005, including in the 2008-10 project period. Many of the professionals trained by ICTJ before and during the project period have subsequently taken an active part in TJ-related work. The project has helped to enhance the momentum for TJ work. Civil society in Burundi has benefited from the project in terms of capacity building and TJ expertise, and in terms of networking on the specific TJ concerns of victims. More broadly, TJ experts report a greater understanding of TJ issues among society at large.

Sustainability

The project helped create a critical mass of well-trained people, who in turn helped civil society, government and international organizations to increase their work on TJ in Burundi. Both ACAT-Burundi and Dushirehamwe continued working on TJ within their networks. Not only have they acquired new skills relevant to work on TJ: they have also honed strategic skills that will be useful if and when the TRC comes into being.

UNDEF value added

By funding this project, UNDEF provided added value as a flexible leader able to move quickly into a difficult area. The project’s focus on TJ was effectively aligned with broader UN priorities in Burundi. Despite some of the reservations on project strategy expressed above, UNDEF’s flexibility, user-friendly application procedures, and willingness to work in politically risky areas has paid off in terms of impact, and the project represented donor money well spent.
(iii) Conclusions

• The project was relevant and broadly effective
Work on transitional justice responded to a clear need, and the actions taken were largely consistent with those that were foreseen in the project document. The project built on the credibility and track record of ICTJ and effectively mainstreamed gender concerns by prioritizing the issue of women victims of politically motivated sexual violence.

• The project achieved a significant impact
A number of tangible elements indicate that the project added to the momentum towards the implementation of transitional justice measures in Burundi. A critical mass of experts was trained and the capacity of organizations was built, to address TJ issues and further raise awareness about it.

• There were weaknesses in project design
The project design would have benefited from a more detailed analysis of the baseline situation and feasibility of the proposed actions, which could have identified in particular how best to relate to government and other institutional stakeholders. In addition the project would have gained in effectiveness if it had been more rigorously designed, with a clearer intervention logic and linkage between objectives, results and activities. Staff and travel costs were high relative to the spending on activities.

• The project did not fully anticipate risks
Although it foresaw the possibility of politically motivated delays, the project had little in place in the way of mitigation. The strategy in relation to institutional stakeholders was not fully developed – for example there was no attempt to formalize and set an agreed framework for the project’s support and technical advice to the NCSC.

• Partnerships were not developed to the full
ICTJ worked effectively with Dushirehamwe and ACAT-Burundi, which had a strong track record in their respective fields. However the partnership between the three organizations was never formalized in a way that would have ensured a genuine and reciprocal commitment to reaching project objectives (as opposed merely to implementing specific activities). Although the local partners did much to implement all aspects of the project, they did not fully share in the overall management of the project.

• Some project activities were not fully implemented
Some of the civil society networks foreseen in the project document were not implemented, partly because they were made obsolete by other networks set up outside the project. Not all publications were produced. While these issues did not substantially diminish the impact of the project, they pointed to a lack of rigor in project design and partnership approach.

• ICTJ’s management of the project was insufficiently proactive
The project management was largely in the hands of the Country Lead, who had also been the main person in charge of designing the project. While the Country Lead reported to ICTJ’s office in Cape Town, ICTJ’s regional management did not exercise a close supervision of the project itself. While the expertise and commitment of the Country Lead ensured the project was implemented to an appropriate standard, the project would have
benefited from additional strategic and policy support, had ICTJ’s management exercised closer supervision.

• UNDEF’s funding acted as a catalyst for TJ projects
By funding ICTJ’s project in Burundi, UNDEF broke new ground, as no previous project in the country had focused solely on TJ processes. Thanks to this support, the project was able to build a momentum and a critical mass of TJ expertise, which subsequent projects and funders could support.

• There is a need for follow-up work on the TRC
As a result of the national consultations, the Government of Burundi has now committed itself to setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in early 2012. There is an immediate need for international support to prepare the establishment of the TRC, monitor its early steps and support commissioners and future staff.

(iv) Recommendations

• ICTJ should use more rigor in designing future projects
In particular, any future ICTJ project in Burundi should be based on a detailed feasibility study, in-depth consultations and joint design with partner NGOs, and should have an explicit intervention logic linking goals, results and activities. ICTJ’s regional management should contribute to project strategy and supervise implementation in conjunction with management at partner NGOs.

• A future ICTJ project should more clearly address government relations
The strategy, risk assessment and mitigation element of any future project, should draw lessons from this project in relation to engagement with government officials and institutions. In particular, proposed technical advice should be conditioned on obtaining a formal, prior agreement with the relevant institutional partners.

• ICTJ should formalize project implementation partnerships
Any future project should be designed and implemented on the basis of a formal partnership agreement, in which ICTJ and its partners commit to realizing project goals (as opposed to mere activities) and agree a realistic division of responsibilities that takes account of each partner’s institutional capacity.

• A future Burundi project should capitalize on achievements
In particular, a future project should make use of previously trained people and further harness the momentum achieved by spreading activities into provincial centers. It should also take into account civil society projects and networks established in recent months.

• ICTJ should consider implementing a TRC support project
In view of the momentum achieved by the national consultations and of the apparent commitment of the Government of Burundi to establish a TRC, there is an immediate need for advocacy, training and capacity building to precede and accompany the TRC’s establishment. ICTJ’s track record and credibility could add significant value to the expertise already available in Burundi, in particular by drawing on good practices developed in other countries.
I. Introduction and development context

(i) Project and evaluation objective
This report is the evaluation of the project “Strengthening transitional justice processes in Burundi” implemented by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a US-based non-governmental organization (NGO), from September 2008 to November 2010 in partnership with two Burundian partner organizations. The UNDEF grant amount was US$225,000. The project was related to the establishment in Burundi of a National Consultation Steering Committee (NCSC, known in Burundi as the Comité de pilotage tripartite) made up of government, UN and civil society representatives and tasked with addressing issues of national reconciliation and accountability for past large-scale human rights violations. The overall goal of the project was “to help the NCSC to achieve its mandate and promote transitional justice”. The project design included the following elements:

- Provision of technical support to the NCSC;
- Capacity development of Burundian civil society organizations dealing with transitional justice issues;
- Research on reconciliation, reparations and institutional reform;
- Study on the nexus between transitional justice and the peace building process;
- Advocacy for the effective implementation of transitional justice mechanisms.

UNDEF and Transtec have agreed a framework governing the evaluation process, set out in the Operational Manual. According to the manual, the objective of the evaluation is to ‘undertake in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipate project outputs have been achieved’. The present draft report is submitted to UNDEF and to ICTJ for comment. A final version will be produced, taking into account comments received.

(ii) Evaluation methodology
Two experts (one international and one national) carried out the evaluation. The methodology of the evaluation is set out in the Operational Manual governing the UNDEF-Transtec framework agreement, with brief additions in the evaluation Launch Note. In accordance with the agreed process, a set of project documents was provided to the evaluators in April and May 2011 (see list of documents consulted in Annex 2). On that basis, they prepared the Launch Note UDF-BDI-07-136 setting out issues to be considered during the visit to Bujumbura, which took place from 23 to 27 May 2011. During their visit, the evaluators conducted interviews with a range of stakeholders (see list of people met in Annex 3), including:
• A representative of *Ligue ITEKA*, a human rights NGO which the original project document indicated would be an implementing partner (the representative was also a civil society member of the NCSC);

• Representatives of *Action des chrétiens contre la torture-Burundi* (ACAT-Burundi), the NGO which replaced *Ligue ITEKA* as implementing partner;

• *Dushirehamwe*, a women’s rights NGO that was also an implementing partner;

• Representatives of a range of NGOs dealing with transitional justice (TJ) issues, including people who participated in training workshops organized by ICTJ as part of the project;

• A representative of the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in charge of TJ issues; and

• Former government officials dealing with TJ issues.

Representatives of donor agencies dealing with TJ were not available for meetings at the time of the visit, but information about their work was obtained from civil society organizations and the agencies’ websites.

ICTJ had no representatives in Burundi and all staff members involved in the project were outside the country when the evaluation took place. The evaluators therefore held a phone interview with the former Country Lead and discussed the draft evaluation report with ICTJ staff knowledgeable about the project.

(iii) Development context

When ICTJ designed the project in 2007 (activities started in September 2008) Burundi had a long record of holding TJ discussions and even of adopting legislation to frame TJ policies, but the security context and a marked lack of political will caused repeated delays in action being taken. This section gives a brief overview of the circumstances that led to the implementation of the ICTJ project.

The issue of transitional justice first arose in official documents in Burundi during the negotiation of the Arusha Accord, which was
signed on 28 August 2000 between the Government of Burundi and armed groups that had waged a civil war throughout the 1990s. The Accord provided for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to consider the conflicts that had taken place since between Burundi’s independence in 1962. Under the Accord the TRC was tasked with researching the facts and suggesting measures that the government could implement to promote reconciliation. The TRC was to be complemented by a Special Tribunal, set up within the judiciary of Burundi, to hear criminal cases against key perpetrators of human rights violations. The Accord did not envision consulting the people of Burundi on the terms of reference and composition of the TRC.

**Legal background**

The provisions of the Accord on the TRC were not implemented as such – instead they were largely transcribed into the text of the Transitional Constitution of Burundi, promulgated in 2001. Again, the constitutional provisions were left unimplemented. Slow, tentative steps towards implementation were taken in subsequent years:

- A 2004 law, never implemented, specified the TRC’s mandate, composition and operational modalities.
- In 2005 a UN-funded feasibility study (the “Kalomoh Report”) recommended that broad consultations on the mandate, composition and operation of the TRC should be carried out before it was established. It stated that failure to hold such consultations with a broad range of citizens and organizations would result in the TRC lacking credibility. A UN Security Council resolution that year endorsed that approach.
- The 2005 Constitution represented a step backwards, to the extent that it failed to refer to a TRC or any other TJ process (though it did refer in general terms to the Arusha Accord).
- In 2006, a “Government Delegation” tasked with negotiating with the United Nations the modalities for the establishment of a TRC issued two memoranda describing an operational model and recommending that three of its proposed seven members should be foreign nationals.
- Also in 2006, an agreement between the Government of Burundi and a rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, stated that the proposed TRC should be renamed “Truth, Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission”. In a similar vein a 2007 memorandum by the ruling CNDD-NDD party recommended that TRC should be able to grant an amnesty to those who testified before it and confessed crimes.
- One crucial step was taken in 2007: an agreement between the UN and the Government of Burundi established the National Consultations Steering Committee (NCSC), a tripartite committee of representatives of the government, the UN and civil society. The task of the NCSC was to lead the implementation of “national consultations on transitional justice” (NCTJ).
- The NCSC started work in 2008, with the assistance of a technical support unit chaired by a presidential advisor.
The National Consultations on Transitional Justice in Burundi

It became clear in the mid-2000s that a TRC established by government decree would lack credibility. The national consultations sought to boost the credibility of the process by seeking the views of a broad section of the population on the issues that the TRC should address and on the modalities of its operation.

More than 4,600 people were consulted, about half of them in community meetings, the others in focal groups or individual interviews. The sample reflected gender balance and the population’s ethnic and socio-economic diversity.

The sample addressed questions on topics including the following:

- Mandate of the TRC
- Operational modalities of the TRC
- Scope and functions of the Special Tribunal
- Modalities for compensation
- Institutional reform

The UN, civil society and the authorities expressed satisfaction that the consultations took place. Several stakeholders stated that the process may have helped to lift the “taboo” on discussions of past human rights violations. However civil society organisations were highly critical of methodological flaws in the consultation process, which led to some inconclusive or contradictory results. For example, participants were not able to choose between amnesties and trials for perpetrators of crimes: they were led by flawed questioning to agree to both.

It remains to be seen whether the TRC is established as promised in 2012 and follows international good practices.

National consultations

As the legal and legislative background makes clear, the implementation of transitional justice measures has been hesitant. Many stakeholders attributed the slow progress to political parties’ concern that the process would single out ruling party leaders for blame and potential criminal trials. A mixture of awareness raising and lobbying about TJ (together with pressure from the international community) gradually led to a degree of acceptance of the process on the part of the government. ICTJ had made a significant contribution to awareness raising since 2005, two years before developing its application to UNDEF for funding.

The national consultations on transitional justice constituted the first (and to date only) tangible step taken by the authorities towards implementing the TJ aspect of the Arusha Accord. The consultations, led by the tripartite NCSC, took place across Burundi from July to December 2009, with two additional sessions aimed at Burundi nationals living abroad (in Nairobi and Brussels) in March 2010. The NCSC produced a report on the consultations, which it submitted to the government in late 2010. The government officially acknowledged receipt of the report in April 2011. In May 2011, a government delegation visited the UN in Geneva and reportedly assured the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) that the TRC would be established in early 2012. There is no indication whether or when the Special Tribunal will be established and bring to justice the perpetrators of the largest-scale human rights violations.

Context of the project design

At the time ICTJ was developing its application to UNDEF, the situation regarding TJ in Burundi was the following:

- The existing commitment to TJ, enshrined in the Arusha Accord, had not been implemented.
• There was a clear record of hesitancy, if not active foot-dragging, on the part of the authorities about implementing TJ commitments. According to interlocutors in Burundi, this was mainly because the authorities were concerned that TJ activities would implicate current leaders in past human rights violations.

• There was also a large need for training and capacity building of civil society and government institutions concerning TJ. That need was already being addressed by ICTJ.

• Policy-makers and other political leaders were distrustful of the TJ process.

• The armed opposition group Palipehutu-FNL was still active, demonstrating its capacity to threaten the stabilization of Burundi.

In 2007 and 2008, ICTJ was conducting training workshops on TJ and security sector reform (SSR) in Burundi. In early 2008, it started a 12-month Police Census and Identification project, funded by the Government of the Netherlands via UNDP.

As a result of its long-standing monitoring of the TJ and security sector reform (SSR) situation and of its regular presence in Burundi through high-level experts, ICTJ had developed credibility, on which the project was designed to build.

**Target population**

The ICTJ project was essentially aimed at three target groups – although these were not explicitly listed in the project document: civil society, government officials dealing with TJ, and the staff of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (*Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi*, BINUB). The project was designed to support the tripartite NCSC and to build the capacity of civil society to monitor and influence the national consultations process. Part of the work with civil society aimed at ensuring better coordination among NGOs dealing with TJ, and greater involvement of community-level organizations, thus enhancing the “multiplier effect” of the capacity development.

Another important stakeholder was the international community as a whole, which was due to be targeted through publications, research project and advocacy directed at donors and UN institutions.

**Other relevant initiatives**

Since 2000 the UN and bilateral donors supported a wide range of projects in Burundi, related to conflict resolution and peace building – including SSR, disarmament and demobilization, police reform and other institutional reform. Of these, organizations such as Benevolencia (a Dutch NGO) and US-based Search for Common Ground were active in media development focused on peace building: as part of this they also implemented awareness raising activities on transitional justice.

Many of the projects related to peace building touched on TJ issues, for example by highlighting the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in other countries. However

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1 See for example the list of projects compiled in a report written by an ICTJ expert in Burundi: “La réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Burundi”, by Stéphane Mora, November 2008 (www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.org).
the UNDEF-funded ICTJ project was the first one to specifically focus on the reinforcement of TJ processes in Burundi. ICTJ developed its proposal partly by building on its Netherlands/UNDP-funded police census project, and partly on the basis of the training and awareness-raising workshops it had conducted in Burundi in 2007 and 2008 (and on other workshops it had organized in South Africa and Europe, attended by participants from Burundi).

Since then, other organizations have become involved in TJ issues:

- The South Africa-based Institute for Justice and Reconciliation has initiated research and training activities with partners in Burundi;
- Canada-based Impunity Watch set up an office in Burundi in 2010;
- The Swiss Development Corporation included support for TJ in its scope of intervention, working inter alia with the media;
- A range of civil society organizations (human rights NGOs, media development organizations, etc.) gradually included TJ in the scope of their interventions;
- The Forum des organisations de la société civile (FORSC), an umbrella group, started hosting a regular meeting of a Groupe de réflexion sur la justice de transition made up of NGOs and UN officials. The group monitors TJ developments and helps coordinate civil society activities in this field.

ICTJ’s work in Burundi since 2005 laid the groundwork for other organizations to support TJ activities. Until the above-named donors started implementing their projects in 2009 and 2010, the UNDEF-funded budget was the only major civil society project focusing on TJ.
II. **Project objectives, strategy and implementation**

(i) **Logical framework**

The table below summarizes the project’s logical chain from activities to results contributing to the ultimate development objective. The table is based on the results framework of the original project document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities*</th>
<th>Results/outcomes*</th>
<th>Development objective**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Help create civil society networks on truth seeking, prosecutions and SSR.</td>
<td>Result 1</td>
<td>Ensure that consultative democratic processes are inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor the consultation process and support stakeholders through expert visits.</td>
<td>Result 2</td>
<td>Strengthening transitional justice processes in Burundi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist in drafting the terms of reference for the national consultations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organise capacity building seminars on TJ for all stakeholders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy brief on nexus between TJ and peace consolidation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case studies on good practice on national consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Produce and disseminate TJ materials in French and Kirundi.</td>
<td>Result 3</td>
<td>Ensure the full inclusion of gender and victims’ concerns in all TJ mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support gender-sensitive SSR, building on police census project.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support open national dialogue on past human rights violations.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

* The activities and results/outcomes are described in the results framework table in the project document. Not all planned project activities are listed in this table.

** The development objective is based on the project title, since the project document does not specify a single overarching objective.
(ii) **Project approach**

As is clear from the above table, the project objective was primarily to be achieved through Result 2: support to the national consultations process. Most other activities and results were designed to support this aspect.

One can reasonably question the priority given to work on the national consultations: these were, after all, only one stage towards the actual establishment of a TRC. The project document justified this approach by the need to build trust and ensure the rule of law. The document also noted the relative weakness of most stakeholders’ understanding of TJ: civil society organizations, it suggested, largely lacked the skills to address TJ issues in detail and were therefore more likely to be side-lined in the design and implementation of the processes. Hence the need for capacity building.

(iii) **Strategic aspects**

The project document was articulated around a clear objective: to strengthen TJ processes in Burundi. The project also built on the proven high-level expertise of ICTJ in relation to transitional justice. However, a closer reading of the project document and implementation reports taking account of actual political conditions in Burundi in the 2008-10 period suggests that the project document did not fully analyze all aspects of the project’s feasibility. The following specific concerns can be identified:

- The project strategy did not fully consider how ICTJ’s intervention would be received by government stakeholders. ICTJ had built a positive record with civil society and BINUB based on earlier training and technical advice and on ICTJ’s international credibility. However ICTJ did not have a similar record with the government officials that were to lead the NCSC and its technical advisory team. The credibility that ICTJ built with the police through the implementation of the census project did not translate into an open door at the NCSC.
- More broadly, the project strategy did not include a detailed overview of project risks and their possible mitigation. The project document did say that political instability and delays presented risks to the project, but did not indicate how these risks could be mitigated. Had these risks been more explicitly identified and mitigation strategies developed in advance, some of the difficulties experienced in project implementation would probably have been reduced.

Overall, the project proposal included plans for many interesting and relevant activities, but was weakened by the lack of a solid overview of the project’s feasibility and implementation risks. This is reflected in the findings set out in the following chapter.
III. Evaluation Question answers / findings

The evaluation is based on a set of evaluation questions or EQs, designed to cover the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability; plus the issue of UNDEF value added. The evaluation questions and related sub-questions are presented in Annex 1.

(i) Relevance

It is clear that Burundi had (and still has) a need for transitional justice mechanisms. The country’s history of recurrent conflict, rooted in events since its 1962 independence (and patterns that arguably pre-dated independence), amply justifies interest in TJ. The inclusion of TJ in the Arusha Accords enhanced the relevance of work in this field. ICTJ had a long history of involvement in Burundi – indeed the organization was set up in part as a result of the cycle of conflicts that shook the Great Lakes region in the 1990s.

The project proposal referred to large-scale killings in 1972 and 1993 as specific examples of the patterns of ethnic and political violence in Burundi. The legacy of these events included the politicization of alleged ethnic divisions and the complicity of at least some political, military and other elites with the perpetrators of grave violations of human rights.

Many of the stakeholders who spoke to the evaluators could testify to the relevance of ICTJ’s long-standing involvement in Burundi. Most of the leading civil society, government and UN experts on TJ that were active in the country at the time of the evaluation visit had been trained by ICTJ, some of them on several occasions.

The design of the project enhanced the relevance of ICTJ’s work in Burundi by prioritizing the implementation of the process leading to the establishment of a TRC. Although TJ in principle includes several components beyond a TRC (see box in section II), ICTJ’s focus on helping a TRC get off the ground was sound and realistic. In particular, it was appropriate for ICTJ not to press for criminal trials to take place ahead of a TRC’s establishment, as this would likely have been counter-productive.

The project had a clear gender dimension, which enhanced its relevance. Women victims of politically motivated sexual violence were specifically addressed as stakeholders. One of the implementing partners was a women’s rights organization, which worked actively with a network of community women’s groups to seek information from survivors and raise awareness about TJ processes.

However, against this generally positive landscape, a number of design and implementation factors have contributed to reducing the practical relevance of the project. These were the following:

- Lack of rigor in project design. While the main project objective was to help build the capacity of transitional justice mechanisms, there was little analysis in the project document of the kind of capacity that needed building. The three project outcomes offered only general guidance on this point, prioritizing inclusiveness, gender sensitivity and victims’ concerns, but not explicitly translating these priorities into specific competencies or skills that needed developing at NCSC and other institutional levels. It is true that, since the project was designed before the NCSC came into existence, it was not possible to state in advance which issues would need...
to be focused on. However no study of the NCSC which could have answered this question was produced (or foreseen) during the project.

- Lack of clarity in the project’s operational strategy. The original project document envisioned ICTJ having a permanent presence in Burundi, a close working relationship with the two project implementation partners, and a sustained link with the NCSC. In practice, however, the project operated differently:
  - ICTJ decided not to open an office in Burundi. The original project document had anticipated that the UNDEF-funded project would benefit from an office set up as part of another ICTJ project (police census) funded separately. However the police census project did not lead to the establishment of an ICTJ office in Burundi, because the police census consultant hired by ICTJ worked out of non-ICTJ facilities. When this became clear, the UNDEF-funded project budget had already been approved, and there were no separate provisions for an office. For this reason in particular, ICTJ never established a permanent presence in Burundi, opting instead to send its Country Lead on missions from his base in South Africa.
  - The relationship between ICTJ and its implementing partners, though often constructive, was not as close as had been anticipated in the project document:
    - The relationship with Dushirehamwe was effective, according to representatives of both sides, but was confined to work on the gender aspects of the project. Dushirehamwe perceived itself more as a beneficiary of the project (in terms of capacity building and training) than as a project co-implementer.
    - The foreseen relationship with the other co-implementer, Ligue ITEKA, never developed, for reasons the evaluators were unable fully to clarify. Early in the project, ACAT-Burundi replaced ITEKA as project partner and played a significant strategic role in implementing activities. ACAT-Burundi’s input, although limited by the fact that it had not been part of the design phase, proved substantial, largely thanks to the expertise of its representatives.
  - The relationship between ICTJ and the NCSC was overshadowed by communications difficulties between the NCSC chairperson and ICTJ. One explanation for this was that the chairperson, reflecting government attitudes, was not pro-actively seeking a swift implementation of the NCSC’s mandate. This was out of the control of ICTJ, which eventually interacted with the NCSC primarily through its civil society and UN members. However, because this problem had not been anticipated, there was no explicit attempt to formalize ICTJ’s support to the NCSC, for example through a Memorandum of Understanding, leading to communication difficulties.2

In conclusion, the project was relevant because it addressed a clear need for implementation of TJ measures in Burundi and because ICTJ’s expertise and record enhanced the momentum for action by all stakeholders. However, a more clearly articulated project

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2 The NCSC was established under an agreement between the UN and the Government of Burundi. That agreement did not provide for a specific role for civil society organisations advising the NCSC. This constituted an added challenge to ICTJ to establish the legitimacy of their intervention.
strategy, based on a thorough feasibility analysis at project formulation stage, would have helped avoid some of the operational delays that were experienced.

(ii) Effectiveness

The project was generally effective. The three planned results were largely attained, as demonstrated by the implementation, contents and follow-up to the National Consultations:

- Through training of NCSC and advocacy directed at the various stakeholders, the project contributed to the consultations being reasonably inclusive along the dimensions of gender, socio-economic and ethnic background, as was recognized by civil society organizations observing the process. In addition, training conducted by ICTJ and its partners helped ensure a shared understanding of TJ among stakeholders, and advocacy contributed to build pressure on the government to move forward with the consultations.
- The training and informal advice provided by ICTJ and its partners helped build technical capacity among relevant stakeholders, including the government-led project team (Comité technique de suivi) implementing the national consultations under the leadership of the NCSC.
- Some aspects of the national consultations reflected a consideration of gender issues and of victims’ concerns. Women constituted roughly half of the sample of people consulted, and the sampling method was designed to cover a broad range of victims of past human rights violations.3

However, the project was not fully effective in the sense that some of the planned activities did not take place as foreseen. In particular:

- Civil society networks were not developed as foreseen. One such network was put in place, focusing on enforced disappearances – this network brings grassroots groups into contact with ACAT-Burundi, whose work covers this issue. The other networks were largely redundant because Burundi NGOs had set up a monitoring group on TJ (Groupe de réflexion sur la justice de transition), which is hosted by FORSC, an umbrella NGO, and meets fortnightly, often with UN staff present.
- Publications that were produced differed significantly from what was anticipated. For example there were no case studies specifically looking at good TJ practices in other countries with a view to informing the approach in Burundi. In addition, none of the research papers produced by ICTJ or with its support during the project period were

3 This does not mean that the national consultations were fully satisfactory in terms of contents and outcomes (on which the project had no effective control). An analysis of the consultations, carried out by a group of civil society organisations, highlighted some of the shortcomings of the process. These included:

- Inconclusive data on some issues (all TJ measures are favored, without prioritization);
- Some contradictory results (participants appear to want both a majority of women and a majority of men in the future Special Tribunal);
- Recommendations in the consultation report not consistent with the views of the sample consulted.

See: Analyse du rapport des consultations nationales, February 2011, issued by the Groupe de réflexion sur la justice de transition.
to be found on ICTJ’s website at the time of the evaluation. This reduced the international visibility of the project. UNDEF value-for-money would have been enhanced if ICTJ had more closely adhered to planned outputs.

The workshops and seminars implemented as part of the projects were considered by participants to be of good technical quality. However there was a lack of follow-up: there was no clear allocation of follow-up tasks among ICTJ and its two local partners.

The effectiveness of the project was hampered by the lack of clear operational arrangements between ICTJ, Dushirehamwe and ACAT-Burundi. There was no explicit commitment on the part of the partners to achieving the project’s objective and results (as opposed to implementing the activities), and no formal agreement on operational standards. A formal MoU between the three partners would have helped ensure more consistent implementation and follow-up of the activities. There is also no evidence that the local partners had any part in drafting any of the publications prepared as part of the project: a more integrated partnership would have ensure greater sharing, including on this aspect. In addition the project would have gained in effectiveness if it had been more rigorously designed, with a clearer intervention logic and linkage between objectives, results and activities.

(iii) Efficiency

The project was implemented within budget, but not as cost-effectively as originally foreseen. According to financial information submitted by ICTJ to UNDEF, the project costs totaled just over US$190,000, which was well within the project budget of US$202,500 (excluding evaluation costs). The travel budget was overspent due to the many trips undertaken by ICTJ staff and consultants based outside Burundi. The training budget was also overspent, but this was more than compensated by lower-than-anticipated spending on contractual services and advocacy/outreach.

While these headline figures are satisfactory, they cannot hide the fact that the project was not as cost-effective as it would have been with a permanent ICTJ presence in Burundi, because such an office would have helped enhance the visibility and nationwide reach of the project. Fewer advisory missions took place than planned, though other kinds of missions did take place: the cost of compensating for the lack of a permanent presence was high. On the whole, a large proportion of the budget was devoted to salaries and travel costs, and a relatively small one (partly unspent) to actual activities. This suggests that there was scope for a better balance of internal costs relative to project outputs.

ICTJ informed the evaluators that the website was being redesigned at the time of the evaluation, and indicated that the missing publications would be migrated to the new website. Among documents produced by ICTJ during the project period were:
- A leaflet in French explaining what TJ is;
- A review of TJ in Burundi by an ICTJ consultant: Le processus de justice de transition au Burundi: défis et perspectives, by Gérard Nduwayo, April 2011;

These documents were provided to the evaluators by ICTJ or found through internet searches, but they are not currently available on the websites of ICTJ and its Burundi partners. A paper on best practices on consultations, referred to in the final narrative report submitted by ICTJ to UNDEF, could not be found at the url indicated. The Kirundi version of the leaflet on TJ was also unavailable at the time of the evaluation.
It is also a matter of concern that the training seminars and capacity building workshops concerned less than 200 people in total. There is no specific evidence that the workshops held for civil society participants achieved a significant multiplier effect – for example through participants training others in their communities.\(^5\) Again, the lack of a permanent presence in Burundi reduced ICTJ’s capacity to monitor the follow-up to the training it provided.\(^6\)

One factor outside the control of ICTJ and its partners, which reduced the efficiency of the project, was the government’s slowness in implementing TJ measures. Although the original project document had anticipated the possibility that such delays would occur, it had not articulated an explicit mitigation strategy. This is the more regrettable since some project-related activities, not dependent on the authorities’ political will, could have taken place while “waiting” for official TJ measures to happen. For example, underspent project funds could have been used to hold local community consultations and TJ awareness-raising events.

The project could most probably have been more efficient if it had been more closely managed by ICTJ’s office in South Africa. The ICTJ staff member who designed and led the implementation of the project (referred to in ICTJ report as the Country Lead) was under the supervision of the Head of ICTJ’s office in Cape Town and received logistical and administrative support from staff in that office. However ICTJ’s management was not substantially involved in the project’s operational strategy – and had not taken a significant part in designing the original proposal. A closer involvement would probably have enhanced the value of the project in the eyes of implementing partners and provided valuable assistance to the ICTJ staff working on Burundi.\(^7\)

(iv) Impact

Despite the usual methodological caveats that must be taken into account with regards to attribution, the impact of the project has been impressive. Several elements signal that the project made a substantial contribution towards the implementation of TJ in Burundi:

- There is a clear and continuing demand for ICTJ’s involvement, based on the record and credibility it has achieved since 2005, including in the 2008-10 project period.
- Many of the professionals trained by ICTJ before and during the project period have subsequently taken an active part in TJ-related work in civil society, international organizations, the media and sometimes in state institutions. Many of the NGO and UN representatives working on TJ and met by the evaluators had been trained by ICTJ, and had used the skills they acquired to develop projects on behalf of their respective NGOs.
- The project has helped maintain (and enhance) the momentum for TJ work, by ensuring that pressure was kept on the authorities, based on authoritative research

\(^5\) Ligue ITEKA, originally planned to be a project implementation partner, had a nationwide network of community groups, which would presumably have been involved in the project. ACAT-Burundi, by contrast, did not.

\(^6\) Dushirehamwe and ACAT-Burundi were not specifically tasked with following up on activities other than those involving their own contacts and networks.

\(^7\) ICTJ’s Africa Programme managers visited Burundi in March 2009 to assess the organization’s activities in the country. According to their report, they found the management in Burundi to be “rather fragmented” due to the lack of integration between the TJ and the SSR interventions. However their assessment did not address the specific issue of the implementation challenges faced by the UNDEF-funded project.
and credible expertise, and by encouraging the UN and development partners to keep pressing for TJ steps to be taken.

- Civil society in Burundi has benefited from the project in terms of capacity building and TJ expertise, and in terms of networking on the specific TJ concerns of victims. Victim’s groups were established as a direct result of the project – for example groups of women who suffered from politically motivated sexual violence and survivors of the 1972 killings.
- More broadly, TJ experts report a greater understanding of TJ issues among society at large. According to journalists working on radio programs, feedback from listeners indicates that TJ is of growing concern to society at large and is not merely a tool of political battle between political factions.

It is clear that only decisive action on the part of the government can ensure that TJ benefits the population at large. However, it can be inferred from the above elements that the project has contributed to building the momentum towards the implementation of the steps foreseen in the Arusha Accord.

(v) Sustainability

The section on impact above also provides elements of evidence in relation to sustainability. The project (and ICTJ’s earlier involvement in Burundi) created a critical mass of well-trained people, who in turn helped civil society, government and international organizations to increase their work on TJ in Burundi. New projects were fostered (Impunity Watch, Search for Common Ground) and additional donor interest may have been created. While this did not enhance the sustainability of ICTJ’s project itself, it certainly did create conditions conducive to further work on TJ in the country.

More specifically, both ACAT-Burundi and Dushirehamwe are committed to continuing work on TJ within their networks (respectively: survivors of torture and enforced disappearances and women who suffered from politically motivated violence). Their current work is informed by their experience as partners on the ICTJ project. Not only have they acquired new skills relevant to work on TJ: they have also honed strategic skills that will be useful if and when the TRC comes into being, at which time they will be better able to support survivors testifying before the commission. The role these two organizations are now playing among the Groupe de réflexion sur la justice de transition is also testimony to the extent to which they have appropriated the strategic approach to TJ developed by ICTJ.

(vi) UNDEF value added

As noted in Chapter II above, this UNDEF-funded project was the first in Burundi focusing only on transitional justice. Other donors had previously funded a range of activities, including by ICTJ, ranging from SSR to media and human rights protection, which somehow touched on TJ. However none had specifically prioritised TJ in the way UNDEF did by supporting ICTJ’s project. In that sense UNDEF was a precursor and opened the way to other donors to take an interest – supporting civil society and/or BINUB’s TJ work itself. Despite some of the reservations on project strategy expressed above, UNDEF’s flexibility, user-friendly application procedures, and willingness to work in politically risky areas has paid off in terms of impact, and the project represented donor money well spent.
IV. Conclusions

The conclusions presented here represent a synthesis of the answers to Evaluation Questions given in the previous section.

(i) The project was relevant and broadly effective
Work on transitional justice responded to a clear need, and the actions taken were largely consistent with those that were foreseen in the project document. The project built on the credibility and record of ICTJ and effectively mainstreamed gender concerns by prioritising the issue of women victims of politically motivated sexual violence.

(ii) The project achieved a significant impact
A number of tangible elements indicate that the project added to the momentum towards the implementation of transitional justice measures in Burundi. A critical mass of experts was trained and the capacity of organizations to address TJ issues and further raise awareness was built.

(iii) There were weaknesses in project design
The project design would have benefited from a more detailed analysis of the baseline situation and feasibility of the proposed actions, which could have identified in particular how best to relate to government and other institutional stakeholders. In addition the project would have gained in effectiveness if it had been more rigorously designed, with a clearer intervention logic and linkage between objectives, results and activities. Staff and travel costs were high relative to the spending on activities.

(iv) The project did not fully anticipate risks
Although it foresaw the possibility of politically motivated delays, the project had little in place in the way of mitigation. The strategy in relation to institutional stakeholders was not fully developed – for example there was no attempt to formalize and set and an agreed framework for the project’s support and technical advice to the NCSC.

(v) Partnerships were not developed to the full
ICTJ worked effectively with Dushirehamwe and ACAT-Burundi, which had a strong record in their respective fields. However the partnership between the three organizations was never formalized in a way that would have ensured a genuine and reciprocal commitment to reaching project objectives (as opposed merely to implementing specific activities). Although the local partners did much to implement all aspects of the project, they did not fully share in the overall management of the project.

(vi) Some project activities were not fully implemented
Some of the civil society networks foreseen in the project document were not implemented, partly because they were made obsolete by other networks set up outside the project. Not all publications were produced, and those that were produced were very much the work of ICTJ, not really a joint effort with the partners. While these issues did not substantially diminish the impact of the project, they pointed to a lack of rigor in project design and partnership approach.

(vii) ICTJ’s management of the project was perfunctory
The project management was largely in the hands of the Country Lead, who had also been the main person in charge of designing the project. While the Country Lead reported to ICTJ’s office in Cape Town, ICTJ’s regional management did not exercise a close supervision of the project itself. While the expertise and commitment of the Country Lead ensured the project was implemented to an appropriate standard, the project would have
benefited from additional strategic and policy support, had ICTJ’s management exercised closer supervision.

**(viii) UNDEF’s funding acted as a catalyst for TJ projects**
By funding ICTJ’s project in Burundi, UNDEF broke new ground, as no previous project in the country had focused solely on TJ processes. Thanks to this support, the project was able to build a momentum and a critical mass of TJ expertise, which subsequent projects and funders could support. Measured against UNDEF’s stated aim to serve as a catalyst, this project must be judged a great success.

**(ix) There is a need for follow-up work on the TRC**
As a result of the national consultations, the Government of Burundi has now committed itself to setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in early 2012. There is an immediate need for international support to prepare the establishment of the TRC, monitor its early steps and support commissioners and future staff.

V. Recommendations
These recommendations stem from the conclusions of the evaluation. All are directed at ICTJ.

**(i) ICTJ should use more rigor in designing future projects**
(Based on conclusions iii and vii). In particular, any future ICTJ project in Burundi should be based on a detailed feasibility study, in-depth consultations and joint design with partner NGOs, and should have an explicit intervention logic linking goals, results and activities. ICTJ’s regional management should contribute to project strategy and supervise implementation in conjunction with management at partner NGOs.

**(ii) A future ICTJ project should more clearly address government relations**
(See conclusions iv). The strategy, risk assessment and mitigation element of any future project, should draw lessons from this project in relation to engagement with government officials and institutions. In particular, proposed technical advice should be conditioned on obtaining a formal, prior agreement with the relevant institutional partners.

**(iii) ICTJ should formalize project implementation partnerships**
(See conclusion v). Any future project should be designed and implemented on the basis of a formal partnership agreement, in which ICTJ and its partners commit to realizing project goals (as opposed to mere activities) and agree a realistic division of responsibilities that takes account of each partner’s institutional capacity. Future partnerships should also consider whether potential partners have a nationwide reach, or existing links to a nationwide network of community organizations.

**(iv) A future Burundi project should capitalize on achievements**
(See conclusions i and ii). In particular, a future project should make use of previously trained people and further harness the momentum achieved by spreading activities into provincial centers. It should also take into account civil society projects and networks established in recent months.
(v) **ICTJ should consider implementing a TRC support project**

(See conclusion ix). In view of the momentum achieved by the national consultations and of the apparent commitment of the Government of Burundi to establish a TRC, there is an immediate need for advocacy, training and capacity building to precede and accompany the TRC’s establishment. ICTJ’s track record and credibility could add significant value to the expertise already available in Burundi, in particular by drawing on good practices developed in other countries.

VI. **Overall assessment and closing thoughts**

(i) **ICTJ’s project helped move the agenda forward**

While the UNDEF-funded project had some design flaws and faced implementation challenges detailed in this report, it is undeniable that it helped move the national consultations forward. These consultations – though methodologically far from perfect, as highlighted above – have themselves increased the pressure on the authorities to act on their stated commitment to transitional justice.

(ii) **Transitional justice in Burundi: a moment of truth**

Despite the progress, many questions hang over the implementation of TJ in Burundi. The national consultations have not resulted in a clear mandate and modus operandi for the future TRC. Little is yet known about the way any future special tribunal would function. There is still a risk that these two institutions may be designed in such a way that they are effectively toothless. This makes it essential that support for, and monitoring of, the establishment of these institutions, should have a strong international civil society dimension. The legitimacy of this international dimension should be formally recognized by all stakeholders, including the relevant national institutions.

If successful, the TRC and special tribunal may help resolve conflicts that have simmered for generations in a region that has suffered devastating violence. The potential impact of effective transitional justice is therefore enormous.

VII. **Limitations, constraints, and caveats**

(i) **The project was part of broader ICTJ work in Burundi**

The project was implemented from 2008 to 2010, but ICTJ had had a regular presence in Burundi since 2005, dealing with TJ and SSR issues. Because stakeholders had been dealing with ICTJ long before the project started, it was not always clear whether their interactions with ICTJ were always project-related. In practice, the evaluators assumed that all ICTJ activities on TJ in Burundi between August 2008 and November 2010 were part of the project.

The Police Census activities undertaken by ICTJ were not taken into account in this evaluation.
### Annex 1: Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
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</table>
| Relevance     | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | • Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
• Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
• Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | • To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?  
• To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?  
• Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
• What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? |
| Efficiency    | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | • Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
• Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?  
• Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives? |
| Impact        | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | • To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
• Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?  
• To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
• Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples? |
| Sustainability| To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | • To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
• Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)? |
| UNDEF value added | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | • What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).  
• Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

*Analyse du rapport des consultations nationales sur la mise en plac des mécanismes de justice de transition au Burundi*, FORSC, April 2011

Burundi Case Study, ICTJ, May 2010

*Concepts fondamentaux de la justice transitionnelle*, ICTJ, 2010

*Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national, 2008-2013*, European Union

Gender, Peace and Security: the challenges facing transitional justice processes in Burundi, by Concilie Nibigira and Helen Scanlon, Initiative for Peace Building, August 2010

*Le processus de justice de transition au Burundi: défis et perspectives*, by Gérard Ndawayo, ICTJ, April 2011

Q&A for Burundi TV on Transitional Justice, ICTJ, undated draft

*La réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Burundi*, by Stéphane Mora, Initiative for Peace Building, November 2008

In addition the team reviewed the original project document, as well as the financial, mid-term and final reports to UNDEF. It also researched reports on human rights and conflict in Burundi, issued by major international NGOs, and some internal ICTJ memos provided by the organization.
## Annex 3: People Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Melchior WAGARA</td>
<td>PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE</td>
<td>Ancien Chef du Cabinet Civil du Président de la République du Burundi et Responsable du Projet Appui au Consultations Nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Procès BIGIRIMANA</td>
<td>1ère VICE PRESIDENCE</td>
<td>Chargé de Rédaction au sein du Projet Appui au Consultations Nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pie NTAKARUTIMANA</td>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Responsable de l’Unité Justice Transitionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Joseph NDAYIZEYE</td>
<td>LIGUE ITEKA</td>
<td>Président de la Ligue Iteka et Membre du Comite de Pilotage Tripartite (CPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Armel NIYONGERE</td>
<td>ACAT-BURUNDI</td>
<td>Président et Représentant Légal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Marius RUSOMO</td>
<td>ACAT-BURUNDI</td>
<td>Ancien Président de l’ACAT BURUNDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Christine MITURUMBWE</td>
<td>DUSHIREHAMWE</td>
<td>Coordinatrice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Goretti NDAYISABA</td>
<td>DUSHIREHAMWE</td>
<td>Chargé des Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tracy DEXTER</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL ALERT</td>
<td>Ancienne Représentante Consultante Peace Building and Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jeannine NAHIGOMBHEYE</td>
<td>GLOBAL RIGHTS</td>
<td>Responsable de Projet, Consultante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Johna DEFLANDER</td>
<td>BENEVOLECIJA</td>
<td>Chef de Mission</td>
</tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Aloys BATUNGWANAYO</td>
<td>BENEVOLECIJA</td>
<td>Journaliste Head of programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Floride AHITUNGIYE</td>
<td>SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND</td>
<td>Chargé de Programmes</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Isidore HAKIZIMANA</td>
<td>INTERFAITH ORGANISATION</td>
<td>Coordinateur</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tryphonie HABONIMANA</td>
<td>IMPUNITY WATCH</td>
<td>Chargé de programmes</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Thodleen DESSOURCES, Jerome HELLFT, Olivier KAMBALA</td>
<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>Program Officer for Burundi, Senior Associate, Evaluation Former Country Lead</td>
</tr>
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## Annex 4: List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAT</td>
<td>Action by Christians against Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>Integrated UN Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSC</td>
<td>Forum of Civil Society Organization in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>International Center for Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Consultations Steering Committee</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
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