

**UNDEF**



The United Nations  
Democracy Fund

**PROVISION FOR POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS  
DEMOCRACY FUND  
Contract NO.PD:C0110/10**

**EVALUATION REPORT**



**UDF-GLO-09-281: Opening the Doors of Policy Making in Central Asia and  
South Caucasus**

**Date: 4 April 2013**

**Acknowledgements**

The evaluators would like to thank all of those who took the time to provide their expertise and insight on the implementation of the *Opening Doors* project.

All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

**Authors**

This report was written by Landis MacKellar and Pierre-Paul Antheunissens. Michel Leblanc and Aurélie Ferreira, evaluation manager,, provided editorial and methodological advice and quality assurance.

Mr. Eric Tourres was Project Director at Transtec.

# Table of Contents

- I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..... 1**
- II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT..... 5**
  - (i) The project and evaluation objectives..... 5
  - (ii) Evaluation methodology..... 5
  - (iii) Development context ..... 6
- III. PROJECT STRATEGY ..... 8**
  - (i) Project approach and strategy..... 8
  - (ii) Logical framework ..... 11
- IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS ..... 12**
  - (i) Relevance..... 12
  - (ii) Effectiveness..... 12
  - (iii) Efficiency..... 14
  - (iv) Impact ..... 15
  - (v) Sustainability..... 18
  - (vi) UNDEF value added ..... 19
- V. CONCLUSIONS ..... 20**
- VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 22**
  
- VII. ANNEXES ..... 23**
  - ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS:..... 23**
  - ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ..... 24**
  - ANNEX 3: PERSONS INTERVIEWED ..... 25**
  - ANNEX 4 : ACRONYMS ..... 26**

## I. Executive Summary

### *(i) Project Data*

According to the project document, the “Opening the Doors of Policy-Making: Central Asia and South Caucasus” (UDF-GLO-09-281) project sought to strengthen policy processes in eight countries -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – by improving the capability of independent CSOs to engage in policy debates. Activities included two training workshops, two regional networking conferences, and supervised research during the course of which eight policy fellows produced research papers.

This US\$ 325,000 project was implemented by the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) located in Prague and ran from 1 August 2010 – 30 July 2012. Policy fellows received distance supervision from, and had three-week research residencies in, a number of European think tanks, mostly in formerly socialist countries.

### *(ii) Evaluation Findings*

The project was **relevant** given the need to strengthen CSOs’ ability to participate in public policy dialogue in the target countries and was closely aligned with UNDEF’s goal of serving as a catalyst for democratic development. The regional dimension was appropriate because it promoted sharing of experiences among CSOs operating in often isolated and difficult settings. The project also allowed NGOs to benefit from the experience of NGOs in countries such as the Baltics and countries in Eastern Europe where CSOs were a positive force for democratic development. Training needs assessment was rigorously done.

The project Final Narrative Report details the various changes that were made in response to practical difficulties as they arose. The South Caucasus and Central Asia region is an inherently challenging area of the world in which to work, so the changes were not unusual and the responses were good. In this sense, the project was **effective** in delivering results. Some of the objectives in the Prodoc were mere puff, but deflating these to reasonable proportions based on what the project actually did, reasonable results were achieved. The two trainings and regional networking conferences were held, the anticipated distance mentoring and research residencies took place, and the planned policy research papers were produced and disseminated. Capacity was built, institutions were strengthened, and progress was made towards improving policy making in target countries. The combination of training with networking activities leveraged the training. Training events were of high quality and the project observed strict bilingualism throughout.

Staff and personnel expenses were reasonable. Project management and reporting were highly competent and no issues were raised in interviews with project staff. The strategic choice of the project was to focus resources on a relatively select group of beneficiaries (project fellows) and there is no reason to judge that, given the extended and intensive training that these received, the project was any less **efficient** than one which would have given more shallow support to a larger number of persons.

**Impact** can be judged both at the level of individual project beneficiaries and at the level of the policy dialogue in their home countries. The impact of the study residency on the fellow’s capacity to do high-level policy research was greater, the less time he/she was trying to come to grips with an unfamiliar problem. A key aspect of success was using host country experience to illuminate the policy problem being worked on, so selection of a host country

was important. All policy papers were translated so as to be available both in English and Russian and published on the internet and in a bilingual hard-copy volume that was assigned an ISBN number. Clearly not all papers had discernible real-world impacts on policy discussions, although a few may have come close. A number dealt with politically loaded issues while others dealt with more practical issues. Most explicitly cited the experience of European countries, usually the host country, to the class of problems at hand. The quality of papers was naturally variable. Some papers gave good evidence of the progress that has been made over the years, and some of that may be attributed to the training and supervision received in this project. One impact reported by project fellows was that, as a result of the project, they ceased to regard themselves as pro- or anti-government, but as independent voices. The project also had impacts on the host institution and PASOS ends, as well. It strengthened the capacity of host institutions to deliver training and bolstered credibility. The project allowed PASOS to strengthen its ties in countries where it has done relatively little work before and identify a set of potential new member institutions.

From the institutional point of view, one of the strongest **sustainability** aspects is that new think tanks have been integrated, informally if not yet formally via certification, into a long-established existing think tank network. The project benefited from, a strong internet dissemination strategy. There is no reason to believe that leakage of fellow into the private or international sector will be any worse in this project than others. However, emerging factors will be a challenge to sustainability. It is entirely possible that, as in Russia and Ukraine, the future years will see increasing government intolerance of independent civil society. There is no sign that progress is being made against the fundamental dependence of civil society on foreign resources.

**UNDEF added value** (i) by being able to work in countries where other programs, such as European Commission / Council of Europe Joint Programmes, would have been unable to work, (ii) by its ability to work with CSOs, and (iii) by its ability to operate in an atmosphere where bilateral agencies and international NGOs closely associated with them are increasingly regarded as foreign meddlers.

### ***(iii) Conclusions***

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

- ***Given the difficult context in which it worked, the project was effective and had reasonable impact.*** The project has to be judged against the difficult atmosphere for civil society and independent policy participation in decision making in the countries targeted. PASOS is to be complimented for having successfully identified institutions with which to work and good people with whom to work, and having delivered significant capacity building under these circumstances. Progress has been made towards improving the quality of policy discussions in target countries.

- ***The success of the project was in large part due to its regional nature and the stature and experience of PASOS.*** Regional sharing of experiences and the transmission of experience from European think tanks in countries where they had served as a force for democratic policy debate played an important role. It is also clear that PASOS' credibility and experiences in transition countries was a major factor in project success. Special credit should be given to the Project Manager, who clearly commanded respect among beneficiaries, as well as to the PASOS support staff, who handled the project's challenging logistical aspects. This is based on findings related to relevance, effectiveness, and impact.

- The quality of the project was enhanced by **linking training to networking and linking training to an extended research project**. Needs assessment identified skills gaps and considerable care was used in screening applicants for fellowships. By combining training with networking events, the project ensured that beneficiaries were immediately drawn into an international network of persons dealing with the same class of problems. The policy research papers produced by fellows gave the training an “on the job” aspect and guaranteed that at least one significant output would be produced as a result of the training. This is based on findings related to effectiveness and impact.

- The quality of policy papers was varied and demonstrated **the still-strong hold of Soviet-style thinking**, with its emphasis on engineering and legal solutions to problems that are inherently social and political. The project made some contribution to improving the quality of policy analysis, but the challenge is enormous. This is based on the finding related to **impact**.

- **The Achilles’ heel of the project is the uncertain political future for NGOs in the region and continuing NGO dependence on foreign finance**. The prospects for successful democratic transition in the target countries is more challenging than it ever was in the now-European former Soviet states and Eastern Europe. The lack of domestic financial support will make independent NGOs vulnerable to nationalist criticisms. While it has formed capacity, strengthened institutions, and introduced CSOs into an international network, it is difficult to imagine any of the target NGOs successfully mobilizing substantial international support. This is based on the finding related to **sustainability**.

- There was **no evidence that the project sought to build bridges with academia or the international private sector**. University researchers represent an untapped source of expertise in the target countries, yet this project appears to have done little to improve this situation. Similarly, there was no evident engagement with international firms. Especially in the natural resource sector in many of the target countries, these have a corporate social responsibility to engage with civil society and often have a need for independent analysis of the social impacts of their activities. Independent think tanks can serve this function and, most important, diversify their funding as a result. This is based on findings related to **impact** and **sustainability**.

#### ***(iv) Recommendations***

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

- **PASOS should continue to exploit its comparative advantage in countries in political transition while considering global diversification**. PASOS has already provided some training in the Arab world and, despite setbacks, support for democratic transition in this part of the world is by no means at an end. Continued efforts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia can also be foreseen. This follows from Conclusions (i) and (ii).

- There is clearly **need for continuing engagement of PASOS with think tanks in South Caucasus and Central Asia**. The quality of papers produced, as reported, was variable and there remains a clear quality gap between think-tank analysis emerging from the target countries and that in European think tanks. PASOS could consider similar projects which built on its technical expertise and access to expertise by focusing on one aspect of democratic development, say migration policy or anti-corruption. While it would find

itself in competition against specialised institutes, its reputation and efficient cost structure would make it an attractive implementing agency, especially for EC-financed projects. If it has not already done so, PASOS should actively cultivate ties with “emerging” bilateral aid agencies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. This follows from Conclusion (i) and (ii)..

- Based on the success of its research residencies, PASOS could consider organizing a **policy analyst in residence program** in which a policy analyst from a country with relatively weak think-tank capacity could spend nine months or a year working in a network member NGO on a project, with funds allocated for regular travel back to home base to gather needed evidence and meet with stakeholders. This is based on Conclusions (iii) and (iv).

- PASOS should actively pursue **links with academia and the private sector** in all the countries where it works, but especially in countries where independent civil society faces the most serious barriers. This is based on Conclusions (vi).

- **There are some obvious opportunities for innovative future work.** A project component that was notably successful was bringing together think tank representatives and administration officials in a simulation exercise where each took on the role of the other. A range of similar innovative workshop structures are possible and described in the main text.

## II. Introduction and development context

### **(i) The project and evaluation objectives**

The project Opening the Doors of Policy-Making: Central Asia and South Caucasus (UDF-GLO-09-281) was implemented from 1 August 2010 – 30 July 2012, a 24-month span. The project was implemented by the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) located in Prague and was aimed principally at building capacity in civil society organizations (CSOs) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The total budget was USD 325,000; of which USD 300,000 was received by the grantee (\$25,000 being withheld for evaluation). All save some \$7,000 was expended.

The goal of the project was to fill a gap in the South Caucasus and Central Asia: the lack of competent independent policy centers or “think tanks.” Whereas these flourished in the West and emerged as strong forces for democratization during transitions in Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, and the Balkans, they were largely absent from the scene in the target countries. When present, their voice was weak, leaving policy analysis to government entities and universities. The latter, in research style if not always in political outlook, were *ancien regime*. The project aimed to strengthen the capacity of CSOs to serve as think tanks through an intense mix of training, research residencies in European think tanks, networking activities, and policy analysis projects.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved.<sup>1</sup>

### **(ii) Evaluation methodology**

The evaluation took place in November 2012 when the two international experts were able to participate in the PASOS conference event “Open Democracy, Deeper Democracy,” organized on 9 November in Skopje, Macedonia in collaboration with the Macedonian Center for Research and Policy Making . This conference, which brought together a number of project participants from many of the target countries, was held in conjunction with the annual meeting of think tanks affiliated with PASOS. The evaluation was conducted by Landis MacKellar and Pierre-Paul Antheunissens, both experts in democratic governance and development projects. Mr. Antheunissens is, in addition, an experienced Central Asia expert and is fluent in Russian, a necessary skill since a number of participants did not speak English.

The UNDEF-Transtec evaluations are more qualitative than quantitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This is to allow meta-analysis for cluster evaluations at a later stage. This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project (Annex 2). Interviews were held with PASOS staff, project beneficiaries (i.e., researchers at participating institutions in target countries) and researchers at the European institutions that were partnered with beneficiary think tanks. (Annex 3).

---

<sup>1</sup> Operations Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 3.



During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several specific issues which they followed up on during the field work. The project offered a good opportunity to concentrate on outcomes, including the following questions:

- *How viable were the networks established?*
- *How realistically did the project increase access of participating CSOs / think tanks to financial resources?*
- *What was the quality and contribution to policy processes of policy analyses produced?*
- *What was the role of academic researchers in target countries?*
- *Has the project empowered participating CSOs / think tanks to compete (and engage) more effectively with GONGOs?*
- *Did the project help to build bridges between independent CSOs / think tanks and local and national governments?*
- *Did the project contribute to a tangible increase in civil society contribution to policy dialogue with local and national governments?*
- *How has the project contributed to positioning CSOs / think tanks against what can (in light of the Arab Winter and events in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia) probably be foreseen as a chilling of relations between national government and independent CSOs?*

### ***(iii) Development context***

The general development context in the target countries of South Caucasus and Central Asia is well known and does not require extended description here. Most are natural-resource intensive economies and, in a few cases, are endowed with globally significant energy resources. None is currently competitive in global trade outside the primary sector. Remittances, especially from workers in Russia, are a significant resource in many. All share a political culture in which power is highly centralized in the ruling party, with consequent weakness of the legislative and judicial branches of government. In some countries, power has remained since independence with ruling parties headed by former Soviet officials; in others, power has alternated between different political factions, but all within the context of strongman rule.

As stated above, in other countries experiencing political transition, independent civil society organizations were a catalyst for democratic development in the 1980s and 1990s. In the European countries of the ex-Soviet Union (Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltics, and with the exception of Belarus), the first ten years of independence saw rapid development of independent CSOs and their growing involvement in policy processes. Despite these initial positive trends, the situation in more recent years has become increasingly difficult. In countries such as Russia and the Ukraine, there has been a rise in reported cases of harassment, particularly directed towards CSOs campaigning for electoral reform, involved in monitoring of government activities, protection of human, civic and political rights etc. More broadly, with no private domestic funding base to turn to, and given often strained relations with governments, the major problem faced by NGOs is that they are dependent on international support, which in turn makes it difficult for them to develop their own agenda. In a word, they must follow the money. This opens them to the accusation of representing foreign interests to the detriment of national ones. In extreme cases, this may lead to onerous registration requirements, eviction from premises, frivolous audits and other administrative actions, and even criminal charges.

Another factor of importance is the widespread appearance of Government-sponsored (or at least encouraged) NGOs or so-called GoNGOs. In some cases, GoNGOs are innocuous in that they are simply NGOs openly friendly to Government policies and, for that reason, able to obtain access to government funding. In too many other cases, however, GoNGOs' funding and constituency are opaque and they serve not only as cheerleaders for ruling party policies but as a fig leaf for the suppression of genuine civil society.

The situation of CSOs in the Caucasus and in Central Asia differs from one country to another and calls for country-specific approaches. In a nutshell, however, all of the problems mentioned above have been present since independence in these countries. These include:

- Restrictions on fundamental rights, more specifically freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, including free media, representing major obstacles to the development of independent civil society actors;
- Low capacity to engage in policy dialogue despite some training and information activities undertaken at local level. Many civil society actors are still isolated, or their potential contribution to a sector reform/policy dialogue at national level is underused;
- Lack of human resources, often leaving only two or three people to accomplish all tasks ranging from administrative tasks to research, coordination, and management. CSOs often lack a clear vision on how to manage volunteers and to engage them in their activities in the long term by organizing trainings and capacity building activities for them;
- Lack of a common voice and shared vision for CSOs, leading to conflict and competition within the CSO community (for resources, for legitimacy, for constituency). Dependence on foreign finance has made independent agenda-setting difficult;
- Reluctance to engage constructively with ruling forces and their representatives even where common ground can be found, the result of long-running enmity.

To summarize, in all the target countries, the potential of independent civil society to serve as a source of expertise for local and national government policy making is greatly under-developed and under-utilized.

### III. Project strategy

#### ***(i) Project approach and strategy***

The goal of the project was to strengthen capacity for policy research and promote policy dialogue involving CSOs. PASOS, founded in 2004 and based in 2004 and headquartered in Prague, is an independent network of non-university, non-government policy studies institutes. In addition to classic network node functions, it engages in training, capacity building, and certification activities. Originally dependent on Soros funding, PASOS is in the process of diversifying its financial base,

Quoting the Project Document, the overall objective was stated as to empower civil society and enhance public participation and accountability in the eight target countries, in particular by strengthening capacity of civil society actors, fostering regional networking, and establishing dialogue with policymakers.

Specifically, the project aimed to

- Increase civil society actors' policy expertise and sustainability, mentor and train in key policy analysis and advocacy.
- Attract new / young policy analysts to the existing pool of policy experts with the aim to diversify the expertise and enrich the policy discussion and its quality in the countries.
- Foster regional cooperation leading to transfer of good practice and development of innovative cross-border policy projects.
- Foster a more inclusive, open, and consistent dialogue on policymaking process and specific policies between civil society actors and public institutions at the level of local and national authorities through providing a shared set of analytical tools to policymakers and analysts in both realms.

Each of these objectives was backed up, in the Project Document, by a summary needs assessment presenting baseline data, as well as proposed criteria for success. The latter were (shortening and paraphrasing liberally):

Overall objective:

Civil society actors with strengthened think-tank capacity develop policy initiatives that effectively and professionally engage in public debate in the public policy development process and influence decision making of national and local authorities.

Specific objectives:

- 1) Preparation by participants of reports on organizational needs followed by training
- 2) Improved understanding of European policy making, partnerships and networking between European and participant target-country think-tanks
- 3) Closer ties between European think tanks and participant CSOs, closer integration of participant CSOs in international networks
- 4) Advocacy initiatives launched by participant policy institutes / CSOs, improved policy dialogue between CSOs and local and national governments, emergence of public consultation processes.

Without listing all proposed activities, these fell into the following broad groups:

Specific objective (1): Needs assessments in the eight countries of CSO / think tank capacity development needs, followed by training

Specific objective (2) Project-long fellowships for eight fellows identified, one in each country, consisting of online work with a European mentor throughout the project and three weeks in residence at a European think tank, the production of eight policy papers to be disseminated by PASOS with a prize awarded for the best.

Specific objective (3): Two regional networking conferences in Istanbul and Almaty (as originally planned, in the event the second RNC was held in Bishkek), each 2 days in length and involving 60 participants.

Specific objective (4) Needs assessments in the eight countries of public authority capacity for policy dialogue and identification of policy dialogue priorities.

The essence of the project was a rather complicated series of workshops and conference events which were held jointly. A table will help to keep major milestones in mind:

	Capacity development	Networking	Other
<b>August 2010- May 2011</b>	National needs assessment methodology development ; needs assessment consultant selection; needs assessment finalisation (Nov 2010-April 2011) Call for participants in Istanbul training, selection of participants, selection of trainers, curriculum development. (December 2010-May 2011)	Formation of Regional Networking Conference Steering Committee, agenda setting (Feb 2011-May 2011)	
<b>June 2011</b>	Training in Policy Making Skills Development (TPMSD), Istanbul (24 participants, 3 from each target country). Call for Project Fellowships	Regional Networking Conference, Istanbul	
<b>October 2011- May 2012</b>	Selection of fellows, distance supervision of project development, research residencies, policy paper preparation. (October 2011-May 2012) Preparation of Training of Future Trainers in Policy Making Skills or TFTPMS (selection of trainers, curriculum development) (January-May 2012).	Preparation of final Regional Networking Conference, Bishkek (Jan-May 2012)	Preparation of Workshop for Public Administration Officials (WPAO) Issyk-kul (Jan-May 2012)
<b>June 2012</b>	TFTPMS workshop in Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan (9 diplomas awarded).	Regional Networking Conference, Bishkek (45 participants)	Workshop for Public Administration Officials (WPAO), Issyk-kul

Target groups for training and networking were:

- Existing CSOs (policy research units at universities, independent think-tanks, advocacy, watch-dog and development-promoting CSOs)
- Local non-registered public groups and non-governmental initiatives
- Individuals (experts, recent graduates of international universities returning to home countries) -Public officials on local and national levels
- Donors and international organizations

By far most effort was given, however, to the first set of target groups.

Some of the major points of the strategy were:

- The initial Istanbul training lasted five days and was conducted in Russian and English. The trainers were international and had experience in civil society and policy analysis. The content covered policy analysis skills (see below) and, for English language sessions, think-tank management and strategic planning.
- The strategy stressed the pairing of training and networking activities, with RNCs immediately following training workshops. In this way, the impact of training could be leveraged.
- Initial training in Istanbul was linked to the possibility of being selected as a Project Fellow, which meant receiving distance mentoring and benefitting from a three-week research residency at a Western think tank, all in the context of producing a policy paper on a selected subject. The box in the table above corresponding to October 2011-May 2012, not surprising, could be filled in much more detail, as there were delays in recruiting some fellows, dropouts, challenges in making arrangements with host institutions etc. In the end, as reported in full detail in the project Final Narrative Report, these difficulties were surmounted and the originally foreseen eight policy papers were completed.
- In order to promote interaction between trainees, and in particular project fellows, and decision makers, a concurrent workshop for public administration officials was held in Issyk-kul. The TFTPMS and WPAO were held in parallel, so there was only informal interaction among participants. However, a simulation exercise permitted participants to switch roles, with think tank participants taking the role of officials and officials taking the role of independent policy analysts. In addition, two project fellows presented their policy papers to the administration officials.
- If the strategy was that all 8 project fellows would participate in the Issyk-kul and Bishkek activities, this was frustrated by events because only three of the nine diplomas awarded in Issyk-Kul went to Istanbul participants (one fellow had to cancel due to personal reasons but was able to arrive in time for the RNC, one fellow decided not to travel due to security concerns, and one fellow was requested by his government to take part in the WPAO event as an interpreter). All think-tank participants took part in the following RNC, as did some public officials from the WPAO.




**Regional Networking Conference participants, Istanbul**

Risks identified in the project document included the thinness of civil society in the beneficiary countries (i.e., the low number of organizations with any realistic potential for policy dialogue to choose from), the difficulty of matching fellows with host institutes, visa problems, failure to secure engagement with governments at senior level, and political risk.

**(ii) Logical framework**

The logical structure of the project, somewhat extrapolated from the version in the Prodoc given above, is illustrated in the graphic below.



## IV. Evaluation findings

### **(i) Relevance**

The need to strengthen CSOs' ability to participate in public policy dialogue in the target countries was strong, so the project's goal was relevant. The project was closely aligned with UNDEF's goal of serving as a catalyst for democratic development. The regional dimension was appropriate for two reasons. First, the ability of CSO beneficiaries, often situated in isolated settings, to interact with persons in similar positions led to valuable exchanges of experiences. The sense of belonging to an internationally respected network was repeatedly stressed by beneficiaries who were interviewed in Skopje. Also of importance was what might be called the inter-regional dimension, that is, the fact that fledgling CSOs in countries where they face difficult conditions were paired, in many albeit not all cases, with CSOs in European countries where similar conditions once prevailed. The "big brother" aspect of the project played an important role in guaranteeing its success. It was evident from interviews with mentors and host institutions that there was a sense of commitment and responsibility on the part of PASOS members who hosted fellows.

Contributing to relevance was the fact that training needs assessment which served as input to the Istanbul and Issyk-kul workshops was rigorously carried out using a standardized methodology devised by Dr. Linda Austere of Providus in Latvia under a contract financed by the project. The emphasis was not along "gaps in training" lines but rather "gaps in skills," which helped to increase the relevance (and effectiveness) of training. The needs assessment methodology paper was prepared in English and Russian and disseminated to national needs assessment consultants in the eight target countries, who then worked via desk research and CSO interviews. The results of the national needs assessments were published in the form of a Needs Assessment Summary Report for 8 countries in April 2011. In general, the project used monitoring and evaluation results to inform future activities (e.g., participants' evaluations of the Istanbul initial event) were fed into future planning. Mid-term reporting to UNDEF was used properly as an instrument for assessing progress, deriving lessons, and making course adjustments.

### **(ii) Effectiveness**

Effectiveness has to do with whether the project delivered promised activities and achieved expected results, whatever their impact. As has already been discussed, the project Final Narrative Report details the various changes that were made in response to practical difficulties as they arose. The South Caucasus and Central Asia region is an inherently challenging area of the world in which to work, so the changes were not unusual and the responses were good. The project experienced slight delays at the beginning due to difficulties in recruiting national needs assessment experts and various difficulties arose during the project due to resignations, competing professional engagements, visa difficulties, etc. Due to recruitment delays, the Project Fellows from Azerbaijan and Tajikistan had shorter fellowships than others and one project fellow had to participate anonymously due to security concerns. In general, though, the project responded nimbly to setbacks when they occurred and can be considered to have functioned effectively in a challenging atmosphere. Of more interest is whether the project achieved expected results. Some of the objectives in the Prodoc were mere puff, but deflating these to reasonable proportions based on what the project actually did, reasonable results were achieved. The two trainings and regional networking conferences were held, the anticipated distance mentoring and research residencies, took place, and the planned policy research papers were produced and disseminated. Capacity was built, institutions were strengthened, and progress was made towards improving policy making in target countries. In Istanbul and Issyk-kul / Bishkek, the

project combined training with networking, an arrangement that made for both effectiveness and efficiency while contributing to sustainability as the relationships formed reinforced capacity built. The first RNC offered the opportunity for policy paper mentors to meet and for the head of the mentoring team to present a report on project goals. This made for some standardization of the supervision process. The paired Istanbul events also served a screening function, as selection of project fellows was based in part on their performance as participants.



**Regional networking conference, Istanbul**

Training events were of high quality as a result of careful planning. In addition to reflecting the skills development needs assessment carried out at the beginning of the project, program preparation was based on a pre-training questionnaire to selected applicants that covered experience, fields of interest, and expectations. All participants received a package of required reading material prior to the workshop so that they arrived well prepared. The Istanbul curriculum covered ethics in policy analysis, general policy research training, methods, research design, data access, business / strategic planning (in the English language track only), how to develop meaningful recommendations, the importance of local context, and the regional political and security context. Emphasis was placed on evidence-based recommendations meant to inform improved decision making by government. The workshop highlighted speaking skills and sought to encourage presenters to present themselves as representatives of institutions, not as individuals. All of these points contributed to project effectiveness and relevance.

That practical management was taught only in the English-language track was because no properly qualified Russian-language trainer could be identified. There was an admitted quality divide between the Russian and English workshops, but bilingualism was the price of openness and coverage, and it was a price worth paying. The commitment to bilingualism was a project feature that enhanced effectiveness, relevance, impact, and sustainability, with little negative impact on efficiency. In all, the project was a good example of the importance of accommodating language differences among participants in multi-country projects.



Another project feature that was a positive factor for effectiveness, as well as impact and sustainability, was that the project delivered intensive skills development over an extended period of time to a small group of carefully selected individuals. Due to good publicity, admission to the fellowship program was competitive. In response to the call for Istanbul training workshop participants, there were over 40 applications, of which 24 (3 per country) were selected. Local institutions advised, but did not make actual selection, enhancing quality control. The Call for Project Fellows was launched in June 2011 after the Istanbul event. Applications consisted of a letter of interest, a research or policy advocacy project proposal, and a CV. As stated above, project staff and mentors had already been able to identify some promising potential fellows during the course of the meeting.



**Training session on presentation skills, Istanbul**

### **(iii) Efficiency**

Out of the \$300,000 received by the grantee, the project budget called for approximately \$60,000 to finance staff and personnel expenses, \$40,000 to finance needs assessment and training consultancies, and the remainder to finance workshops, travel, fellowships, dissemination, etc. Consultants were nationals of transition countries, trainings and workshops were held in relatively low-cost settings, and there were significant in-kind contribution of European partner think tanks in the form of offices, mentors' time spent in supervision, etc.

Project management and reporting were highly competent and no issues were raised in interviews with project staff.

An issue which always arises in training is the number of persons trained per dollar spent. In general, the calculation is meaningless because it leaves out some of the most important questions: (i) was the training needed? (ii) what was the quality of the training, (iii) what were the sustainable impacts? And so on. This project was targeted at a relatively small group of people which received capacity building over a relatively long period of time (without leaving

their posts) and were, in combination with their training, integrated into an elite network of policy researchers. It would be difficult to find fault with the approach taken from an efficiency point of view.

### **Addressing Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Trans boundary Water Issues: Policy Recommendations**

River basins do not respect national borders, giving rise to one of the classic problems of public goods management. Tajikistan's decision to build the Rogun super-dam has provoked outrage in Tajikistan for two reasons: (i) the dam's height may place it, and anyone else downstream, at risk in case of earthquakes and (ii) filling the dam to the required height may deplete the water basin of the Amu Darya river. Yet, the positive experience of Hungary and Slovakia in dividing the waters of the Danube provides an example of constructive engagement which defused political pressures while protecting the environment. Based on this example, the policy paper arrived at seven concrete recommendations:

- 1- An independent panel of experts from the two nations should be constituted to review the project from a technical point of view.
- 2- The Tajik-Uzbek dispute should be taken to the International Court of Justice.
- 3- The legal status of the affected rivers should be assessed using the applicable regulations of the Helsinki Convention of 1992.
- 4- The recommendation of the bilateral expert commission regarding the maximum safe height of the Rogun dam should be followed.
- 5- A permanent and transparent mechanism for monitoring the Amu Darya river basin should be put in place. For this purpose, hydrologic monitoring systems in use in Slovakia should be adopted.
- 6- Uzbekistan, a user of the river basin, should create research capacity to study means of improving water efficiency.

The paper represented an objective, carefully documented, science-based discussion of a problem that has inflamed passions and led to speculative claims and accusations on both sides.

#### ***(iv) Impact***

One fact that emerged was the importance to review, early in the process, what policy problem policy fellows would be dealing with. It was especially important that the fellow have a good grip prior to the research residency in order to enhance its effectiveness and the potential impact of the final product. The most successful projects were those where the participant already had a good foundation but the project was able to give practical experience, a space to develop ideas, and exposure to how things work internationally. To put it differently, the impact of the study residency on the fellow's capacity to do high-level policy research was greater, the less time he/she was trying to come to grips with an unfamiliar problem.

A key aspect of success was using host country experience to illuminate the policy problem being worked on, so selection of a host country was important. The fellow responsible for the Uzbekistan water project, for example, was in residence at an institute in Slovakia, with long-experience of dealing with cross-border water issues. In some cases, practical difficulties also made residencies more ad hoc than would have been ideal. Also critical was promulgating clear guidelines for host institutions. In hindsight, the length of the country visits was probably too short, but this limitation was imposed by financial constraints.

Impact at the individual fellow level was increased by the fact that each participant was assigned a mentor who provided guidance by internet and telephone before the research residency. The extended nature of the engagement, which did not end until the wrap-up

Bishkek RNC event, made possible deeper impact than would be possible in a project that simply provided workshop training. The fact that the paper produced was identified with the individual had the same effect. Policy papers were assessed by a three-member award jury and two prizes were awarded (to participants from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). All policy papers were translated so as to be available both in English and Russian and published on the internet and in a bilingual hard-copy volume that was assigned an ISBN number.

Another impact on the individual level is that, in host countries, fellows were able to experience a free atmosphere in which more or less open and vigorous policy debate is open to CSOs.

Beyond the impact of the project on individuals, impacts at the institutional and political level can be identified. Clearly not all papers had discernible real-world impacts, although a few may have come close. In Kazakhstan, the project is reported to have contributed to opening detention centres to NGO inspection. The Uzbekistan paper on water rights and trans-boundary risk may have had the impact of stimulating dialogue and discussion by providing an independent assessment. These, and others, as well, have had the impact of improving the quality of policy discussions on selected subjects in the target countries.

The range of papers is impressive (see accompanying table). A number dealt with politically loaded issues – the Rogun dam issue in Uzbekistan, national security policy in Tajikistan, the role of women in the security sector in Georgia, and prevention of torture in Kazakhstan, for example. Others dealt with more practical issues, such as migration policy in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan and urban development issues in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. They differed in style, from legal analysis (torture in Kazakhstan) to scenario-based planning (impact of NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan on Tajikistan). Most explicitly cited the experience of European countries, usually the host country, to the class of problems at hand.

The quality of papers was naturally variable. A number still had the unmistakable Soviet characteristic of stressing engineering and legal solutions to social and political issues. Yet, some papers gave good evidence of the progress that has been made over the years, and some of that may be attributed to the training and supervision received in this project. The idea of assessing environmental risk, for example, was never accepted in Soviet ideology because all projects represented a pure improvement on the previous, non-engineered state of the world. Migration was not regarded as a multi-dimensional phenomenon requiring a wide range of responses, but simply as a behavior to be regulated by application of the legal rules. Questions of women in the work place were simply a matter of applying the labor code. A number of authors developed interesting analyses but then experienced difficulties in translating them into meaningful recommendations, some of which were rather trite. All in all, though, these problems were no more severe than would be encountered in a comparable set of policy papers coming from university professors in the same countries and the papers show that the project fellows are all equipped to enter into policy debates.. To the extent that GoNGOS play an important role in many of the target countries, the project has had the impact of levelling the playing field by strengthening independent civil society.

At the institutional level, as well as the individual level, it is important to be reasonable when assessing project impact. PASOS' rule of thumb is that think tanks need 5-7 years before they can have leave a significant imprint on policy. Since PASOS is a certifying institution (and the host institutions were all certified PASOS members), the project has helped to place new think-tanks in South Caucasus and Central Asia on the path to certification. While the evaluation has focused mostly on the training of think-tank representatives, the Workshop for Public Administration Officials (see accompanying box) also played an important role.

### Workshop for Public Administration Officials

13 public administration officials attended the 2.5 day WPAO, which was designed, in part, with input from project fellows. Presentations covered the role of CSOs in the policy process and gave concrete examples of cases where better policy decisions had resulted from including CSO input. Two project fellows presented papers dealing with migration in Kyrgyzstan and the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan dispute regarding the Rogun Dam. This gave them a chance to hone presentation skills and at the same time provided examples to public officials of the potential contribution of CSOs. For some public officials, this was their first interaction with civil society groups in the policy arena. However, as the Final Narrative Report noted, the two Kyrgyz public officials failed to show up, a disappointment that some blamed on hostility to the Kyrgyz CSOs represented at the workshop and the RNC.

One impact reported by project fellows was that, as a result of the project, they ceased to regard themselves as pro- or anti-government, but as independent voices. The program sought to build confidence so that participants see themselves as a necessary part of the policy process. Participants were trained to stop preaching; to put themselves in their interlocutor's shoes; to stress facts, not appeals to ideology. The simulation game event at the Workshop for Public Administration Officials was reported to have been an effective tool for breaking down barriers and building bridges.

The project also had impacts on the host institution and PASOS ends, as well. It strengthened the capacity of host institutions to deliver training and bolstered credibility. The project allowed PASOS to strengthen its ties in countries where it has done relatively

little work before and identify a set of potential new member institutions. As mentioned above, there was a clear sense of moral obligation on the part of European CSOs to provide support for fledgling CSOs surmounting difficult challenges, and while the supporting NGOs were all European, their socialist heritage still gave the project a South-South feel.

#### *Project Fellows, Home and Host Institutions, and Research Papers*

Name	Home Institution	Host Institution	Paper
<b>Astghik Injoyan</b>	International Center for Human Development, Yerevan, Armenia	PRAXIS Centre for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia	The role of private employment agencies in the process of regulation of labor migration in Armenia
<b>Fuad Jafarli</b>	Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy, Baku, Azerbaijan	Foundation for Urban Architecture, Technical University, Budapest, Hungary	Urban redevelopment policy framework for Azerbaijan
<b>Nino Khelaia</b>	Association Justice and Liberty, Tbilisi, Georgia	Foundation for International Relations and Dialogue (FRIDE), Madrid, Spain and Brussels, Belgium	Assessment of women's role in the security sector of Georgia
<b>Evgeniy Golendukhin</b>	Public Observer's Commission for the North-Kazakhstan Region, Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan	Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, Riga, Latvia	Some optimization questions on the National Preventive Mechanism in the Republic of Kazakhstan
<b>Ainura Umetova</b>	Independent expert, formerly of Center of Prospective Research,	Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, Poland	Approaches to the development of migration policy in Central Asia and

	Institute of Strategic Analysis and Assessment, Office of the President, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan		Europe
<b>Firuz T. Achilova</b>	Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation, Dushanbe, Tajikistan	Foundation for International Relations and Dialogue (FRIDE), Madrid, Spain and Brussels, Belgium	ISAF troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014: How should Tajikistan be prepared for that?
<b>K.B. Anelamova</b>	No affiliation given.	Association Hnutí Duha – Sunbow Movement , Brno, Czech Republic	Separate collection of municipal solid waste in Turkmenistan – the problem and solutions
<b>Shukhrat Ganiev</b>	Humanitarian Law Center, Bukhara, Uzbekistan	Slovak Foundation for Political Affairs (SFPA), Bratislava, Slovakia	Slovakia-Uzbekistan: How to approach trans-boundary water sources issues, similarities and differences.

### (v) *Sustainability*

There will likely be some leakage (if it has not occurred) of fellows into the private sector, into the international sector, and into international education. This is not a problem that can be addressed at the project level.

From the institutional point of view, one of the strongest sustainability aspects is that new

#### **Impact on Tajikistan of NATO Withdrawal from Afghanistan**

Scenario-based planning has been adopted by organizations as diverse as British Petroleum and the U.S. National Intelligence Council, the organization responsible for synthesizing the work of all U.S. government agencies engaged in gathering intelligence. This paper defined three scenarios -- stability and development in partnership between the present government and the Taliban forces, an outright Taliban takeover, and a continuing civil war with neither side in the ascendency. The author concludes:

- In each scenario, Tajikistan is challenged with the threats that already exist – drugs, weapons, radical extremism, refugees, disease.
- In the case of instability in Afghanistan, Tajikistan will lose economic opportunities, including opportunities for energy security and relief from transport isolation imposed by Uzbekistan.
- Because Tajikistan is unable to deal with these threats (drugs, weapons, radical extremism, refugees, disease) independently, it is rational to cooperate with other Central Asian states, who also suffer from these problems. The role of the neighbor countries is very important in the stabilization of Afghanistan, which could also benefit economically from cooperation.
- The analysis of the possible scenarios shows that, even if the Taliban come to power, the direct threat from them to the Central Asian states is less than generally supposed, as attacking and occupying neighboring countries has never been on the agenda of the Taliban. They have, instead, always sought recognition from their direct neighbors. However, the threat of the development and spread of extremist movements that could find shelter and support on Afghan soil still exists...
- The end of the game with so many players is difficult to predict and forecast. Too many interests of the big international actors are at stake in Afghanistan and while continuous instability is in favor of some of these, others are eager to achieve lasting stability.

think tanks have been integrated, informally if not yet formally via certification, into a long-established existing think tank network.

Sustainability was enhanced by the final project event, the 29-31 May, 2012 Training of Future Trainers in Policy Making Skills (ToFTPMS) held on Lake Issyk-kul in Kyrgyzstan and on 1 June, the Final Regional Networking Conference was held in Bishkek. The first promoted continuity of project results while the second, by putting project fellows in direct contact with policy makers, reinforced their standing and built confidence.

The project benefited from, a strong internet dissemination strategy that was gradually built up as it progressed. The Istanbul training workshop and first RNC were disseminated on a conference website (Policy-In-Istanbul). Following the Kyrgyzstan activities, the website, now renamed Opening Doors for Policy Making, was updated to contain all project-related material. Project material is still available on the PASOS website, and in the form of a YouTube video. Through PASOS web presence, participating think tanks were able to obtain visibility that would have been impossible in the absence of the project.

Some emerging factors will be a challenge to sustainability. It is entirely possible that, as in Russia and Ukraine, the future years will see increasing government intolerance of independent civil society. There is no sign that progress is being made against the fundamental dependence of civil society on foreign resources.

#### ***(vi) UNDEF value added***

When training in the formerly socialist block of countries is considered, the first thing that comes to mind is often a European Commission / Council of Europe Joint Programme, a modality which has delivered massive amounts of training in human rights, rule of law, democratization, and other fields. What did this project accomplish that a standard EC-CoE JP could not have delivered? For that matter, could not a bilateral agency have achieved similar results?

Fortunately, the answers are straightforward. First, the CoE does not work throughout the region. Among the countries participating here, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are not members. Therefore, UNDEF was able to bring wider coverage to bear.

Second, and perhaps more important, the CoE works much more closely with governments than CSOs. Strengthening civil society, while it is an emerging theme in Strasbourg, is not part of the CoE's traditional core mandate. It would be easy for the CoE to bring together government officials from multiple countries in a regional project, but very difficult indeed to bring together representatives of civil society (effectively bypassing government or at the very least compelling governments to participate with CSOs as equals).

More generally, the EC itself (which, after all, supports democracy projects not implemented by CoE and can cover all countries in the region) is also known for its tendency to work with governments rather than independent civil society. While thematic programs, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, are open to and eagerly pursued by civil society groups, the application process is notoriously complex and demanding. It can be stated with some confidence that the chances of any NGO benefitting from this project to secure EIDHR funding would be slim.

As to the role of bilateral agencies, there is no need to expand here on the point that increasingly, national aid agencies find themselves regarded by pro-government forces as

unwelcome foreign meddlers. Moreover, in the current project, a bilateral funder would have found it very difficult to assemble an international portfolio of host institutions. It is interesting to consider the potential, in the future, for emerging bilateral agencies (the Latvians, the Poles, the Czechs, etc.) to cooperate bilaterally with institutions in target countries, but this would entirely sacrifice the regional aspect of this project.

All in all, it is difficult to see how the project would have taken place in the absence of UNDEF.

## V. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

**(i) Given the difficult context in which it worked, the project was effective and had reasonable impact.** The project has to be judged against the difficult atmosphere for civil society and independent policy participation in decision making in the countries targeted. In some, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, for example, the fault lines between pro- and anti-government civil society are stark, predictably limiting the space for non-politicised, independent policy analysis. In the “-stans,” there is no tradition of free exchange of policy opinions and recommendations. PASOS is to be complimented for having successfully identified institutions with which to work and good people with whom to work, and having delivered significant capacity building under these circumstances. Progress has been made towards improving the quality of policy discussions in target countries.

**(ii) The success of the project was in large part due to its regional nature and the stature and experience of PASOS.** Presumably the project was global because the target countries belong to more than one UN region, but in practical terms, it was a regional project or, as described above, an inter-regional one when the European element is considered. A project targeting only one country would have had great difficulty in identifying enough high-quality participants from that country, and would have lost the regional sharing of experiences aspect, as well. It is also clear that PASOS’ credibility and experiences in transition countries was a major factor in project success. Special credit should be given to the Project Manager, who clearly commanded respect among beneficiaries, as well as to the PASOS support staff, who handled the project’s challenging logistical aspects. This is based on findings related to **relevance, effectiveness, and impact.**

**(iii)** The quality of the project was enhanced by **linking training to networking and linking training to an extended research project.** It is notorious that much training is wasted. In this case, needs assessment identified skills gaps and considerable care was used in screening applicants for fellowships. By combining training with networking events, the project ensured that beneficiaries were immediately drawn into an international network of persons dealing with the same class of problems. The policy research papers produced by fellows gave the training an “on the job” aspect and guaranteed that at least one significant output would be produced as a result of the training. This is based on findings related to **effectiveness and impact.**

(iv) The quality of policy papers was varied and demonstrated **the still-strong hold of Soviet-style thinking**, with its emphasis on engineering and legal solutions to problems that are inherently social and political. There is no simple answer, except time and the formation of a new generation of analysis, for this problem. The project made some contribution to improving the quality of policy analysis, but the challenge is enormous. The varied quality in part reflected good selection of beneficiaries, namely, those in need of capacity building. This is based on the finding related to **impact**.

(v) **The Achilles' heel of the project is the uncertain political future for NGOs in the region and continuing NGO dependence on foreign finance.** The prospects for successful democratic transition in the target countries is more challenging than it ever was in the now-European former Soviet states and Eastern Europe. Much of this is due to the centralized control of natural resource wealth (or, in non-resource intensive countries such as Armenia and Georgia, centralized control of essential business interests such as telecommunications). Not only does this discourage open dialogue, but it leads to polarization among CSOs and, resulting from that, politicization of policy research. The lack of domestic financial support will make independent NGOs vulnerable to nationalist criticisms. While it has formed capacity, strengthened institutions, and introduced CSOs into an international network, it is difficult to imagine any of the target NGOs successfully mobilizing substantial international support. This is based on the finding related to **sustainability**.

(vi) There was **no evidence that the project sought to build bridges with academia or the international private sector.** Academia in the target countries is somewhat paradoxical. Often, there are researchers with very high levels of competence, especially in engineering and the natural sciences, but virtually no skill to define a policy problem, mobilize data and methodology to analyze it, and derive and present policy-relevant conclusions. University researchers represent an untapped source of expertise in the target countries, yet this project appears to have done little to improve this situation. Similarly, there was no evident engagement with international firms. Especially in the natural resource sector in many of the target countries, these may represent a potential force for good. While they are naturally concerned about their economic interests and cannot be expected to aggressively antagonise ruling forces, they have a corporate social responsibility to engage with civil society and often have a need for independent analysis of the social impacts of their activities. Independent think tanks can serve this function and, most important, diversify their funding as a result. This is based on findings related to **impact** and **sustainability**.



## VI. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

- **PASOS should continue to exploit its comparative advantage in countries in political transition while considering global diversification.** PASOS has already provided some training in the Arab world and, despite setbacks, support for democratic transition in this part of the world is by no means at an end. Continued efforts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia can also be foreseen. This follows from Conclusions (i) and (ii).

- There is clearly **need for continuing engagement of PASOS with think tanks in South Caucasus and Central Asia.** The quality of papers produced, as reported, was variable and there remains a clear quality gap between think-tank analysis emerging from the target countries and that in European think tanks. PASOS could consider similar projects which built on its technical expertise and access to expertise by focusing on one aspect of democratic development, say migration policy or anti-corruption. While it would find itself in competition against specialised institutes, its reputation and efficient cost structure would make it an attractive implementing agency, especially for EC-financed projects. If it has not already done so, PASOS should actively cultivate ties with “emerging” bilateral aid agencies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. This follows from Conclusion (i) and (ii)..

- Based on the success of its research residencies, PASOS could consider organizing a **policy analyst in residence program** in which a policy analyst from a country with relatively weak think-tank capacity could spend nine months or a year working in a network member NGO on a project, with funds allocated for regular travel back to home base to gather needed evidence and meet with stakeholders. This is based on Conclusions (iii) and (iv).

- PASOS should actively pursue **links with academia and the private sector** in all the countries where it works, but especially those in countries where independent civil society faces the most serious barriers. This is based on Conclusions (vi).

- **There are some obvious opportunities for innovative future work.** A project component that was notably successful was bringing together think tank representatives and administration officials in a simulation exercise where each took on the role of the other. A range of similar innovative workshop structures are possible. In one, a joint team of administration officials and think tank representatives from Country A (say, Kazakhstan) could be asked to produce a written analysis of a specific policy problem (say, policies to deal with population ageing) in Country B (say, Kyrgyzstan) while a similar team from Country B commented on the same policy problem in Country A. Serious pre-workshop preparation of materials combined with intensive interaction, discussion, and revision of first drafts at the workshop would make for a highly stimulating and positive experience for all. Another idea would be to do joint training for administration officials and CSOs in an attempt to build bridges-

## VII. ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</li> <li>▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

### Project documentation:

Project Document, July 2010

Final narrative report, August 2012

Project policy papers: Opening the doors of policy making in Central Asia and South Caucasus, ed. Petr Pajas. Prague: PASOS (ISBN 978-80-905195-5-5 (see table above for paper authors and titles)

### Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

Name	Organisation
Linda Austere	Center for Public Policy PROVIDUS, Latvia
Alfredo Azula	PASOS
Gubad Bayramov	Economic Research Center, Azerbaijan
Vugar Bayramov	Center for Economic and Social Development, Azerbaijan
Astghik Injeyan	International Center for Human Development, Armenia
Piotr Kazmierliewicz	Institute of Public Affairs, Poland
Jeff Lovitt	PASOS
Kristina Mänd	PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies, Estonia
Petr Pajas	PASOS
Roland Rich	UNDEF
Armen Vardanyan	Social Policy and Development Centre, Armenia

## Annex 4 : Acronyms

CoE	Council of Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EC	European Commission
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
GoNGO	Government NGO
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PASOS	the Policy Association for an Open Society
RNC	Regional Networking Conference
TPMSGD	Training in Policy Making Skills Development
TFTPMS	Training of Future Trainers in Policy Making Skills
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WPAO	Workshop for Public Administration Officials