Global Programme "Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons"

UNCCT-2018-02-79

Independent Mid-term Evaluation

Final Evaluation Report

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This publication has not been professionally edited.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CERN	The European Organization for Nuclear Research / *Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire*
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECU	Evaluation and Compliance Unit
EPS	External Partnership Section
GE	Gender equality
HR	Human rights
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICSANT	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
IED	Improvised explosive device
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JAF	Jordan Armed Forces
LNOB	Leave No One Behind
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
NCSCM	National Centre for Security and Crisis Management
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SPRF	Strategic Plan and Results Framework
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTX	Table-top exercise
UN	United Nations
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
GCTS	United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN SDGs	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
US DOS	United States Department of State
UAS	Unmanned aircraft systems
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VNSAs	Violent non-state actors
WG ETCIP	Global Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection
WG BMLE	Global Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Management Response

Introduction

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and its United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre wishes to thank the independent evaluators for their rigorous and diligent evaluation of the Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons — a core component of the UNOCT capacity-building mandate. The evaluation offers a valuable assessment of the Programme's impact, highlighting the considerable success achieved since its inception. This evaluation also identifies gaps and challenges that warrant further attention, particularly around monitoring and evaluation, and includes recommendations that will inform the continued development of UNOCT support to Member States on countering terrorist acquisition and use of weapons-related issues. The findings will also help guide the formulation of an updated Programme.

UNOCT broadly concurs with the recommendations and has already begun implementing a number of them. As outlined in this management response, additional recommendations will be addressed in the foreseeable future, including as resources become available.

UNOCT is also grateful to the many funding partners who have made the success of the Programme possible. These include Canada, the European Union, Finland, France, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Evaluation Recommendation #1: Weapons Programme Design - The programme document should be updated at this mid-term period to reflect changes in scope and activities
Explanation: The Programme document should be updated to reflect the change in scope to also include SALW/IED/UAS. This update should include: 1. The inclusion of a comprehensive Theory of Change;   2. A strategic redesign which considers separate outputs in the programme design for WMD, CBRN, SALW, IED, and UAS;   3. Revision to the goal so that it is realistic and achievable based on the programme's activities;   4. Evidence of consultation process is included (including with duty-bearers, rights-holders, and CSOs);   5. Alignment with human rights obligations, GE standards, and UN SDGs;   6. A gender and human rights analysis and impact assessment;   Revision to the logical framework to ensure that: 7. Only S-M-A-R-T indicators are included, which include a baseline figure/rating and a target figure/rating (including annual targets where necessary);   8. Gender and other disaggregation (such as marginalisation, or country specific) of indicators and targets are included;   9. Specific GE, human rights and SDG indicators and targets should be included and adopt a human rights-based approach, including language around duty-bearers and rights-holders, include targets for including women experts or speakers at events.

Accepted? Yes ☒ Partial ☐ No ☐	Rationale (if Partially or No): The Programme Team agrees with this recommendation but would like to extend the target implementation date to longer term, July 2026, in order to update the new programme document in line with the new multi-year UNOCT Strategic Plan.

Evaluator Priority ☒ High	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual

Medium Low	Short-term (6 months)	July 2026	Programme Team, in consultation with PMU and HRGS as relevant

Key Actions	
1.1	A comprehensive theory of change will be developed according to guidance set out in the UNOCT SOP 2 on Programme and Project Management, in coordination with PMU, and submitted to the PRB along with the revised programme document.
1.2	A strategic redesign will consider separate outputs in the programme for conventional and non-conventional weapons including WMD, CBRNE, SALW, IED, and UAS, as recommended.
1.3	The Programme goal will be updated to be realistic and attainable, and in line with the latest guidance from SOP 2 on Programme and Project Management, and submitted to the PRB with the revised programme document.
1.4	Following the lead and with the support of the HRGS Unit, the Programme Team will work with duty-bearers, rights-holders, and CSOs for the revision of the programme document, where possible and relevant.
1.5	The Programme Team will effectively mainstream human rights and gender considerations throughout the new programme document, working in close collaboration with HRGS. Relevant SDG goals will also be referenced in the revised programme document, where relevant.
1.6	A gender and human rights analysis and impact assessment is a goal of the Programme, and will be included in the revised programme document, subject to the availability of funding.
1.7	The revised programme document and its logical framework will include S-M-A-R-T indicators, along with clearly defined and measurable outcomes and outputs, realistic targets with varying timelines (annual and end of Programme) and, where possible, baselines to establish a reference point for measuring progress over time.
1.8	It is already standard practice for the Programme Team to include gender disaggregated indicators and targets across all projects, with a current target minimum 10% female participation rate. The programme document revision will include these for programme activities as well. The Programme Team will work closely with HRGS to strengthen the formulation of these gender-related indicators and targets. Further disaggregation will be made to improve reporting by country and stakeholder group based on this recommendation.
1.9	While this recommendation is accepted, as stated in 1.8 above, it is already standard practice to include gender equality and human rights indicators and targets in project documents for all projects currently being implemented by the Unit. The Programme Team will also include additional language around duty-bearers and rights-holders, and targets for including women experts or speakers at events, in the programme document. SDG indicators and targets will also be developed and included in the revised programme document.

Evaluation Recommendation #2: Programme and Project Management and Reporting - The Programme team should revise its MEL approaches to better measure and monitor effectiveness and impact, particularly measurements of Member State capacities so that any improvements can be evaluated in the end term. Indicators with measurable targets should be established. The Programme and associated

projects should report against the Programme's logical framework indicators in a frequency that aligns with Office monitoring requirements and document what achievements had been made against planned targets.

The Programme and projects (which do not already do so) should:
1. Report (in a frequency that aligns with Office reporting requirements) in standalone progress reports which include the reporting of their results against their logical framework indicators and targets, activities undertaken, challenges encountered, and lessons learnt;
2. Develop a robust MEL system for monitoring the effectiveness and impact of activities following a review of the logical framework (see recommendation 1 above);
3. Develop and utilise a standardised approach for assessing 'Member States Capacity' both before and after trainings, to avoid incorrectly extrapolating from trainee data to assume Member States capacities have increased;
4. Include systems for follow-up information on how trainings have changed internal procedures or processes among national entities;
5. Collect data to demonstrate whether the objectives of the projects were achieved (currently data collected is more appropriate for activity/output reporting);
6. Include robust measurement approaches for Gender and Human Rights indicators;
7. Use learnings from the MEL system to inform course-corrections and redesigns.

Accepted?	Rationale (if Partially or No):
Yes ☒ Partial ☐ ☐	

Evaluator Priority	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
☒ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Long-term (12 months)	July 2026	Programme Team, in consultation with PMU, ECU, other M&E capacities within OCT

Key Actions	
2.1	The Programme Team will ensure that standalone progress reports are produced in line with and reporting on their logical framework indicators and targets, as relevant, noting that the Programme and all projects follow the reporting requirements set out by the Office reporting frequencies (quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports, and monthly activity level reporting into the UNOCT APP) and those of their respective donors.
2.2	The Programme Team, with guidance from PMU and ECU, will develop a MEL plan based on the reviewed programme logframe, in consultation with MEL good practices in the Office and in line with the requirements of the UNOCT SOP 2 on Programme and Project Management. The Programme Team will further refine the MEL Plan to ensure alignment with the new UNOCT results framework as needed.
2.3	The Programme Team will standardize its current approach to ensure improved data collection for end-term evaluations, noting that the majority of projects currently ongoing collect and analyze surveys to assess the change in knowledge of participants before and after the conduct of trainings. The Programme Team will utilize surveys for six months and/or one year after trainings to collect data on the trainings impact and collect examples of how participant's utilized the knowledge gained for their work.
2.4	The Programme Team already implements or has planned to implement post-facto surveys and questionnaires approximately six months after the end of trainings and projects, and will continue to do this to systemize its capture and assessment of results.

	This approach, however, may not be optimal for singular trainings that do not aim to change internal procedures or processes among national entities.
2.5	The Programme Team will ensure consistent reporting on the achievement of projects' objectives.
2.6	The Programme Team will work with HRGS to ensure the programme and project documents include robust measurement approaches for gender and human rights indicators. It is standard practice for the Programme Team to consult HRGS during the drafting of all concept notes and project documents. Human rights and gender mainstreaming language is included as standard practice in all logical frameworks, as per SOP 2, however greater efforts will be made to strengthen language used in the programme document around human rights and gender mainstreaming.
2.7	The Programme Team will utilize learnings from the MEL system to inform evidence-based adjustments to the Programme and, where necessary, redesign interventions to improve effectiveness and relevance.

Evaluation Recommendation #3: Enhance Technical Oversight and SME Collaboration for Quality Assurance - To improve the technical accuracy and educational effectiveness of training materials, the Programme Team should establish a WMD Scientific Workgroup/Community and implement formalised quality assurance processes.

The technical review identified inconsistencies with the instructional quality of training materials. Some materials lacked proper references, used incorrect measurement units, or failed to convey complex information effectively. Additionally, most training materials were produced by a restricted pool of content developers, which may have limited diversity in expertise. This can be improved by:

1. Establishing a structured technical advisory framework so that UNOCT can ensure better oversight, leverage external expertise, and maintain a high standard for training materials. This recommendation calls for creating
•   technical advisory groups (TAGs) for each CBRN threat area,
•   broadening SME engagement,
•   developing standardised training evaluation frameworks, and
•   diversifying contractors.
2. Strengthening partnerships with universities and research institutions will help UNOCT stay ahead of emerging threats.
NOTE: See Annex 11 for a more detailed list of technical observations and recommendations.

Accepted?

Yes ☒   Partial ☐   No ☐

Rationale (if Partially or No):

Evaluator Priority	**Evaluator Timeframe** (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	**Target** Implementation Date	**Responsible Individual**
☒ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Medium to long-term (6-9 months)	January - April 2026	Programme Team

Key Actions	
3.1	The Programme Team will establish a technical advisory group or working group to leverage external expertise, ensure quality assurance, and as recommended in Annex 11, to stay abreast of emerging trends and threats in the terrorist acquisition and use of weapons field and share best practices.

3.2	The Programme Team has collaborated with academic and research institutions in the past, including UNICRI, UNIDIR and the University of the Philippines, and it will continue to explore opportunities to deepen engagement with academic and research institutions that will enhance foresight on emerging threats, as recommended.

Evaluation Recommendation #4: Expand and Sustain Advanced Training - The Programme team should develop standardised course difficulty criteria, and supplement basic trainings with more intermediate and advanced-level training courses, including table-top exercises (TTXs) and practical skill-building components for more technical and sophisticated stakeholders.

1. Current training offerings are primarily at the basic level, with limited intermediate or advanced courses. Intermediated and advanced offerings should be expanded.
2. TTXs and practical simulations are cost-effective tools for reinforcing learning which should be utilised by the Programme more to improve effectiveness and sustainability.
3. The courses developed so far serve as a technically sound foundation that should be expanded using structured learning methodologies (e.g., Bloom's Taxonomy) to enhance cognitive progression.
4. Institutionalising a structured approach to both training development and threat analysis will enhance the program's long-term impact.
5. Utilising comprehensive and standardised TTT approaches would support sustainability.
6. Ideally, the regional threat assessments should be synthesised into any future trainings (irrespective of the training level) to help the audience better contextualize the threat environment that they are operating within.

NOTE: See Annex 11 for a more detailed list of technical observations and recommendations.

Accepted? Yes ☐ Partial ☒ No ☐	**Rationale** (if Partially or No): The Programme Team welcomes this recommendation to standardize its training courses and increase the TTX and practical skill-building components of its courses, however, it should be noted that each of the training courses under the Programme include break-out group sessions that are facilitated utilizing a TTX format. These have evolved since the evaluation timeframe and currently there is an increased emphasis on TTXs, where UNOCT develops exercises that include multiple phases of an incident (prevention, response, consequence management) and customizes it accordingly for the requirements of participants and the threat environment of the host country or region. The Programme Team has made modifications to the agendas and course modules over time, in response to participant feedback, and this included increasing the utilization and complexity of the TTXs. Additionally, the Programme Team welcomes the standardized approach to TTT for increased sustainability of trainings, however, the Programme Team disagrees that a TTT approach is appropriate for all trainings and target audiences. Also, in order to fully implement this recommendation, the Programme Team would need to conduct a multi-course training block to constitute a true TTT programme, which requires significant funds and would limit programme reach to a few countries. The Programme Team notes the short-term timeframe for this recommendation may prove challenging given the workload of activities the team is undertaking over the next six months and the funds that will need to be procured to undertake the standardizing of materials. Therefore, the Programme Team extended the target date to long-term to better reflect the feasibility of implementing this recommendation.

Evaluator Priority	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
☒ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Short-term (6 months)	June 2026	Programme Team

Key Actions	
4.1	The Programme Team will review its course material in line with this recommendation to standardize course complexity levels.
4.2	The Programme Team has already been implementing this recommendation and will continue to do so moving forward.
4.3	The Programme Team has already been implementing this recommendation, namely through the conduct of TTXs, practical exercises and case study discussions in each course, and will continue to do so moving forward.
4.4	The Programme Team has already been implementing this recommendation. It is currently common practice to include threat analyses from the regional threat assessments findings in the Programme Team's trainings and presentations, aligning with the recommendation from Annex 11.
4.5	The Programme Team has already been partially implementing this recommendation and will continue to further develop a standardized TTT approach, where applicable.
4.6	The Programme Team has already been implementing this recommendation and will continue to integrate the regional threat assessments in training modules, as applicable.

Evaluation Recommendation #5: Civil Society Engagement - The Programme Team in coordination with the relevant UNOCT work units should develop a roadmap for civil society inclusion in the Programme and projects

In line with the Secretary-General's call to action for human rights in 2020 for "broad and sustained" engagement with CSOs to support SDG progress, the UN's system-wide Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, the Secretary-General's "Our Common Agenda," Secretary-General's Call to Action for Human Rights, and the Guidance Note on the Protection and Promotion of Civic Space, and considering the Global Centre on Cooperative Security A Blueprint for Civil Society-Led Engagement in UN Counterterrorism and P/CVE Efforts , the Programme team should develop a roadmap, with support from the relevant UNOCT work units, to show how they intend to: Positively engage with interlocutors to promote and protect civic space; Respond to undue restrictions on civic space; Protect the space for different stakeholders to express their views; Ensure a broad diversity of CSOs from targeted Member States are engaged in project design and implementation (including groups representing women, youth, disabled people, marginalised or vulnerable communities and victims of terrorism); Coordinate engagement with the Global Compact working groups and members; Provide the necessary political and financial support for civil society to engage; and engage with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

Accepted? Yes ☐ Partial ☒ No ☐	**Rationale** (if Partially or No): Although the Programme Team accepts this recommendation, it should be noted that providing political and/or financial support to civil society is not possible, as the Trust Fund does not have grant-making authority.

Evaluator Priority ☐ High ☒ Medium ☐ Low	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
	Long-term (12 months)	July 2026	Programme Team

Key Actions	
5.1	In line with UNOCT policies and guidance, and with the support of working units and adequate funding, the Programme Team will strive to draft a roadmap for civil society inclusion.

Evaluation Recommendation #6: Gender Equality and Human Rights Inclusion - The Programme should incorporate a gender, HR, and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design

1. The Programme Team should incorporate a gender, HR, and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design.
2. The Programme Team should ensure dedicated HR/gender expertise to support the work of the Programme utilising the HRGS's network of experts on the intersection of human rights/gender and CT (including specific experts on the application to use of weapons by terrorists).
3. UNOCT should establish a framework agreement so that such experts can support project and programme teams quickly.
4. The Programme team should implement the UN HRDDP when providing support to non-UN security forces, under the guidance/in close cooperation with UNOCT HRGS.

Accepted? Yes ☒ Partial ☐ No ☐	Rationale (if Partially or No):

Evaluator Priority ☒ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
	Short-term (6 months)	January 2026	Programme Team, in collaboration with HRGS

Key Actions	
6.1	The Programme Team recognizes the importance of incorporating a gender, human rights and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design, and will strive to integrate these aspects, subject to availability of funding.
6.2	The Programme Team integrates dedicated human rights and gender expertise to support the Programme and its projects, most commonly by integrating sessions into trainings or awareness raising events led by HRGS colleagues, primarily due to resource constraints. However, the Programme Team will engage external human rights/gender experts from HRGS's network to further strengthen this work, subject to availability of funding and donor priorities.
6.3	The Programme would explore the engagement and contracting of external human rights and gender experts, subject to availability of funding.
6.4	This recommendation is already being implemented, and the Programme Team remains committed to continuing these efforts moving forward, in line with the new SOP on the

implementation of HRDDP to be issued in 2025, subject to the availability of funding and donor priorities.

Evaluation Recommendation #7: Address Staffing Shortage - The Programme team should ensure that any new programme and project documentation submitted to the PRB includes a clear staffing structure and associated resource requirements

Before presentation to the PRB, the Programme team should:
1. Design the Programme and projects taking into account the financial and capacity needs including an assessment of their staffing management plans and budgetary disbursement plans against planned activities, duration and number of Member States and implementing partners.
2. Assessments should also be made of plans submitted by implementing partners.

Accepted?	Rationale (if Partially or No):
Yes ⊠ Partial ☐ No ☐	While the Programme Team accepts the recommendation, it stresses that this will not fully address staffing shortages. The Programme Team considers that this relates to a broader issue connected to the UNOCT funding model where capacity building efforts are mostly 100% extra-budgetary and with a ceiling of 40% for staff costs. Additional regular budget staffing positions would not only decrease staff costs for projects thus increasing project budget for the implementation of project activities, but also allow for continued support for mandated non-project related activities.

Evaluator Priority	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/ Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
⊠ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Short-term (6 months)	December 2025	Programme Team

Key Actions	
7.1	The Programme Team has already been implementing this recommendation and will continue to design its programming through an assessment of financial and capacity needs, noting that the PRB and the USG have ultimate decision on budget allocation for staffing. The implementation is contingent on the availability of funding as well as the priorities and parameters set by UNOCT management and donors regarding funding allocations to staff positions.
7.2	Assessments will be made in an effort to ensure that sufficient funding is available for implementing partners, to the extent possible, subject to the availability of funds and donors' priorities.

Evaluation Recommendation #8: Dissemination Approach for Regional Threat Assessments - UNOCT Programme Team should develop a dissemination plan and revise the logical framework so that the effectiveness of the regional threat assessments can be assessed

The Programme Team should:
1. Develop a dissemination strategy, including timeline and target audiences, in collaboration with INTERPOL for the regional threat assessments.
2. Any remaining internal reviews and copy editing should be prioritised given that the reports are time sensitive.
3. The Logical Framework should be revised to include indicators that match the new dissemination strategy so that the effectiveness of these reports can be assessed and evaluated.
4. Indicators should also capture contributions of knowledge products produced by other projects under this Programme for this output.
5. Given the large scope of work, strategic importance of the reports, and their sensitivity, a project document should be developed for the regional threat assessments to document decisions that have

been made regarding the scope of work, respective activities for UNOCT and INTERPOL, and expected timeline.

6. The regional threat assessments should be updated on a routine basis, with a standardized threat study template to support national and regional threat assessments.

Accepted? Yes ☐ Partial ☒ No ☐	Rationale (if Partially or No): The Programme Team concurs with the recommendation in principle and recognizes the value of a structured dissemination plan and a revised logical framework to measure effectiveness. However, due to the inclusion of politically sensitive content in some regional threat assessments, their dissemination is subject to internal clearance processes. Regardless, the Programme Team remains committed to identifying appropriate and context-sensitive ways to share relevant findings, where feasible, while safeguarding the integrity and confidentiality of the assessments, and updating the logical framework accordingly. Additionally, as the regional threat assessments are complete, and both INTERPOL and UNOCT have finalized their respective contributions, the Programme Team considers that developing a project document retroactively would be unnecessary and an inefficient use of resources. Instead, a final meeting is scheduled for June 2025 with INTERPOL to formally discuss the closure of the initiative.

Evaluator Priority ☒ High ☐ Medium ☐ Low	Evaluator Timeframe (Short/Medium/Long-term)	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
	Short-term (3 months)	October 2025	Programme Team

Key Actions	
8.1	The Programme Team will devise a method for dissemination of the reports in accordance with the approval of the assessments' release. This would include timelines, target audiences, and INTERPOL would be consulted accordingly.
8.2	The Programme Team confirms that all four assessments have been finalized, therefore this recommendation has been completed.
8.3	The Programme Team will revise the Logical Framework to include indicators that match the new dissemination strategy in order to assess the assessments' effectiveness.
8.4	The Programme Team will devise indicators to capture contributions of other knowledge products of the Programme and projects under this output accordingly.
8.5	The Programme Team will ensure that a shared understanding is reached regarding the conclusion of this work.
8.6	The regional threat assessments will be updated on a routine basis, subject to the availability of funding.

Executive Summary

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) launched in September 2018 the Global Programme *"Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism"* (UNCCT-2018-02-79). The title of the Programme was later changed to the global Programme on "Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons" (herewith: "the Programme") as recommended by the UNOCT Programme Review Board (PRB) in October 2023 and approved by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Counter-Terrorism in November 2023. The first cycle of the Programme was originally approved for an initial 36 months, starting September 2018, and was designed to be extended to a second cycle as funding became available. It subsequently received four extensions totalling 94 months, as funds were raised by the Programme team, with a current end date of March 2028.

The Global Programme has an intended goal of contributing to making the world safer and more secure from terrorist acquisition and use of weapons through the implementation of the provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS), and it subsequent reviews, related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials, small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). It plans to achieve this by enhancing capacities of Member States, International Organisations and United Nations (UN) entities to prevent terrorists from accessing and using weapons, materials and/or components and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving such weapons or materials. The Programme aims to deliver on this goal with the following outputs: Output 1: Enhancing visibility of UNOCT activities on countering the terrorist use of weapons (including WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS); Output 2: Strengthening strategic partnerships with members of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and Member States related initiatives involved in prevention and response projects related to WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS; Output 3: Advancing knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk of terrorists acquiring and using WMD/CBRN materials/SALW/IED/UAS; Output 4: Improving the capacities of Member States in prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving WMD/CBRN materials/SALW/IED/UAS in line with international obligations, standards and best practices; and Output 5: Improving United Nations international interagency coordination on preventing and responding to terrorist attacks involving WMD/CBRN materials/SALW/IED/UAS.

The Global Programme, which has been designed as an umbrella programme, has supported seven pilot[1]projects, three regional studies on the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) terrorism, and a portfolio of 20 training courses[2] on countering WMD/CBRN terrorism (see Annex 7 for the list of training courses).[3] While the original focus of the Programme was countering WMD/CBRN terrorism, during the course of implementation, the Programme scope expanded to also include SALW and associated ammunition, IEDs and their components, and UAS and components, and was renamed as UNOCT's Global Programme on "Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons" when the USG approved the recommendations of the 65th meeting of the PRB. The expanded scope of the programme was considered by this evaluation.

This report summarises the findings from an independent mid-term evaluation conducted by Ms. Coralie Pring (Evaluation Expert) and Dr. Donell Harvin (WMD/CBRN Expert). The purpose of the evaluation was twofold: as a backward-looking assessment for accountability and learning purposes, and also a forward-looking study to generate lessons learnt and recommendations to inform future course corrections by the Programme team,

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[1] The 'pilot' projects were intended to serve as initial engagements to be further developed and refined into an integrated capacity building approach for Member States. These projects began between October 2018 and July 2021.

[2] This includes courses delivered from February 2021 to September 2022.

[3] Additional two capacity-building projects (bringing the total number of projects to 11) began after the evaluation began and therefore were outside the scope of this evaluation.

implementing partners and UNOCT management. The evaluation assessed the Programme against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. An additional criterion of human rights, gender equality and disability inclusion was also included, in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidance. The evaluation used both quantitative and qualitative methods, both primary and secondary data sources, and was sequenced across multiple phases. The approach was non-experimental given respondents and interviewees had all been engaged by the Programme in various capacities. The evaluation design was informed by the UNOCT Evaluation Handbook, OECD DAC Criteria and Guidelines, and UNEG Norms and Standards, including guidelines on the incorporation of gender equality (GE) and human rights (HR) within evaluations. Due to lack of budgetary resources for in-person data collection, all fieldwork was conducted remotely.

The methods employed by the evaluation team and number of stakeholders consulted were: (1) 37 semi-structured key informant interviews (18 male, 19 female) conducted online with UNOCT Programme and Project Managers, UNOCT staff, implementing/coordination partners, Member States/Duty Bearers, a civil society organisation (CSO) and a CSO Engagement Expert, and a donor; (2) two quantitative online surveys with 21 representatives from implementing partners and Coordination Partners (14 male, 7 female) and 81 duty-bearer beneficiaries of capacity building activities (60 male, 19 female, 1 non-binary/other, 1 prefer not to say); (3) a qualitative systematic review of 20 training courses and capacity building initiatives, reports and publications; (4) a desk review of Programme and Project documents and external relevant reports; and (5) secondary data analysis of project monitoring data. The evaluation assessed activities undertaken by the Programme up until July 2023, but due to an extension to the evaluation timeline, the evaluators have also taken into consideration information provided at a later stage while the evaluation report was being finalised in line with a user-focused evaluation approach.

The evaluation process began in December 2022. Initial data collection efforts were undertaken with internal stakeholders between March and June 2023. Following a contract amendment, including an increase to the evaluation budget and extension to the evaluation timeline, a pause in evaluation activities was necessary due to contracting issues with the Evaluation Expert. Further data collection resumed from November 2023 to February 2024 including interviews and surveys with external stakeholders. The evaluation report was finalised following several rounds of internal review by the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) and the inclusion of the technical review by the Substantive Expert. The report was finalised in May 2025.

Conclusions on Key Findings

Relevance: The Programme and projects had high relevance and alignment with the United Nations GCTS, the UNOCT Strategic Plan and Results Framework (SPRF), the strategic priorities of the implementing partners, and the needs of Member States. The Programme and projects are also relevant for the obligation of States, under international human rights law (IHRL) to respect and protect the right to life, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) particularly Goal 16, and to a lesser extent, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Projects were chosen to meet either the needs of Member States or to meet gaps identified by Global Compact Working Group members. In-depth consultations with duty-bearers or rights holders were not undertaken during the original design of the Programme, but several pilot projects did engage closely with duty-bearers for their design. At the time the Programme was designed, UNOCT did not have guidance on how to incorporate WPS agenda into the Programme design, but this has since been produced. The Programme document and some project documents should explicitly articulate how the activities are connected with human rights, gender equality and the UN SDGs. The Programme and projects were severely affected by Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which delayed the implementation of activities and interrupted planned approaches. In several cases, the team responded where possible with online delivery of meetings and trainings, which was welcomed as a way to allow continued support and was needed given the pandemic restrictions. The Programme

also responded in a timely manner to the increased expression of interest in biological threats by holding webinars and meetings on the relationship with the project theme. The Programme has a diverse portfolio of foundational projects and informative activities and reports and was able to address and respond to emerging threats appropriately. The potentially dated and unpublished regional threat assessments and a paucity of courses featuring advanced content present missed opportunities to remain relevant in the ever-shifting global counter-WMD landscape.

Coherence: The evaluation finds that coordination, addressing gaps, and responding to the needs of beneficiaries, was deeply embedded into the Programme design and implementation. Implementing partners reported positively about the value of the coordination efforts, the responsiveness, and support provided by the UNOCT Programme team. The UNOCT's collaborative approach to working directly with Member States to develop the objectives and materials for trainings improved their coherence. The Programme can improve on technical coherence due to inconsistencies in training standardisation, SME collaboration, and technical oversight.

Effectiveness: The Programme has so far at the mid-term stage, demonstrated success in improving the visibility of UNOCT on WMD/CBRN/SALW/IEDs/UAS (Output 1), achieving the planned numbers of partnerships (Output 2), and has achieved its planned contributions to international interagency coordination via seed grants for pilot projects (Output 5). The Programme placed a high emphasis on visibility, and there are several instances of successful fundraising through improved visibility via events. The Programme has had substantial effectiveness so far in directly contributing to Member States having improved capacities (Output 4). The Programme has produced three high quality regional threat assessments to promote risk knowledge/understanding through a partnership with International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and additional reports through other pilot projects. Based on learnings gained during the production of the regional threat assessments with INTERPOL, the dissemination approach for the reports has been revised, and restricted versions with sensitive law enforcement related information have been distributed by INTERPOL through their restricted channels for law enforcement. The logical framework should be updated to reflect the new approach and include measurable indicators for effectiveness. The Programme and several project Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) systems have several challenges for evaluating effectiveness at the mid-term, which should be rectified to support an end-term evaluation. The Programme Document does not specify how the five outputs are interrelated via expected pathways for change; however, the different activities have contributed to improved visibility, awareness, funding, coordination, cooperation and improved capacities to varying extents and are interlinked with one another. Technically, the effectiveness of the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme hinges on its Subject Matter Expert (SME) staff and the quantity and quality of the reports and training that it produces for Member States. The Programme's ability to align training, threat assessments, and SME engagement with evolving security challenges will ensure the Programme remains responsive, effective, and impactful.

Efficiency: The budget management system used by the Programme has complexities which made it challenging to comprehensively assess efficiency as part of this evaluation, however, information available indicates the Programme/project results justify the costs incurred. The programme took a conservative approach in budget planning that reduced the risks of funding gap vis-a-vis planned results. Projects were operated with lean funding, but time, staffing, and resources (including for evaluations) were often insufficient for the high levels of ambition of the Programme and projects. The COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to bottlenecks and delays. The UNOCT Programme team is very small considering their wide remit (both geographical and in terms of types of weapons) and would benefit from additional technical and administrative support. Several partners also reported high workloads for the staffing resources that were planned. MEL was not sufficiently budgeted for. The technical efficiency of the Programme is hindered by gaps in quality control, the absence of standardised training frameworks, lack of diversification in content development, and a poorly resourced and structured review process for reports and training materials.

Sustainability: The Programme activities were not developed with an explicit sustainability plan embedded in the design, although several projects were intended to support potential future collaboration between UNOCT and the implementing partners. Several elements of the Programme demonstrate positive indications of sustainability, including the partnerships that have been established. Tangible deliverables such as reports, and project outputs have potential sustainability but may require updates and further dissemination. Insights from beneficiaries indicate positively that the learnings are continuing to be used, however, some stakeholders from Member States reported that factors such as a lack of protection and detection equipment/materials (which were not within the scope of the projects and the Programme to provide), or embedded train-the-trainer approaches may hinder their ability to implement the learnings from the capacity building activities in the medium and long term. Such factors should be considered during the needs assessment stage. Practical interventions and advisory groups offer greater sustainability potential by providing reusable, adaptable resources for ongoing professional development. However, regional relevance, national ownership, and integration into existing security structures are critical to ensuring lasting impact. Trainings that lack specificity or rely heavily on external trainers risk diminished effectiveness over time unless transferred to local institutions. Stakeholders from Iraq and Jordan indicated continued national progression on the issues identified by the capacity building support from UNOCT, but they would both welcome continued support.

Human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion: The evaluation finds that there was limited incorporation of   gender equality and human rights considerations into the Programme design and for most projects (based on the Programme/project documents). The Programme and projects would benefit from a gender and human rights analysis. During implementation, efforts were made to encourage women's participation, but in some project locations there is low/no representation of women in key national agencies of relevance. The Programme did, however, promote the visibility of women as speakers during trainings and workshops and some projects promoted human rights obligations during presentations. At the time of the evaluation, the UNOCT did not have guidance on how to implement the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in the context of support provided to non-UN security forces, which is a risk which should be urgently addressed given the contexts in which the Programme is operating. Risk assessments and conflict sensitivity analysis were not undertaken periodically to identify potential human rights risks with the activities and to put relevant mitigation measures in place. However, some implementing partners such as Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) reported that the activities did include a human rights-based approach, such as by assessing compliance with international human rights norms and standards during gap analyses and making specific recommendations on policy improvements, although these were not detailed in the project documents. The Jordan project raised the awareness of national entities of the need for gender-sensitive approaches to decontamination in the case of a terrorist incident. The technical review found opportunities for the Programme to strengthen its commitment to human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the principle of leave no one behind (LNOB) by embedding these considerations from the design and conceptualisation stage. There were low capacities in UNOCT regarding gender equality and human rights at the start of the Programme. Support available has increased since the establishment of the Human Rights and Gender Section (HRGS), although staffing resources are still limited. Despite willingness and efforts made by the Programme Team to request input from the Section, greater support from the Section would be beneficial and advanced notice from the Section regarding the time required for their input would help collaborative efforts.

Key recommendations:
1. **Weapons Programme Design:** The programme document should be updated at this mid-term period to reflect changes in scope and activities and to specify the relevance to human rights considerations, gender equality, and the UN SDGs. The goal should be revised so that it is realistic and achievable based on the Programme's activities.
2. **Programme and Project Management and Reporting:** The Programme team should revise its MEL approaches to better measure and monitor effectiveness and impact, particularly measurements of

Member State capacities so that any improvements can be evaluated in the end-term. Indicators with measurable targets, should be established. The Programme and associated projects should report against the logical framework indicators in a frequency that aligns with Office monitoring and reporting requirements and document what achievements had been made against planned targets.

3. **Enhance Technical Oversight and SME Collaboration for Quality Assurance:** To improve the technical accuracy and educational effectiveness of training materials, the Programme team should establish a WMD Scientific Workgroup/Community and implement formalised quality assurance processes. To accomplish this, the Programme can leverage the existing UNOCT infrastructure to create a Formal WMD SME collaboration platform (such as the Global Vulnerable Targets Network's use of the UNOCT Connect & Learn Platform), and recruit and engage with SME from across the globe.

4. **Expand and Sustain Advanced Training:** While providing clear standardisation of the competency and proficiency levels for training curricula offered at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels, the Programme should continue to develop a suite of complementary and progressively intense intermediate and advanced-level training courses, including more comprehensive table-top exercises (TTXs) and practical skill-building components. Comprehensive train the trainer (TTT) approaches should also be incorporated into the training curricula to support sustainability.

5. **Civil Society Engagement:** The Programme team should incorporate engagement with civil society into their programming, in coordination with UNOCT thematic sections tasked with mainstreaming functions, such as HRGS, and the UNOCT External Partnerships Section.

6. **Gender Equality and Human Rights Inclusion**: The Programme team should incorporate a gender, human rights and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design, which should be periodically reviewed to identify risks and mitigation measures. The Programme team should implement the UN HRDDP when providing support to non-UN security forces, under the guidance/in close cooperation with UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section.

7. **Address Staffing Shortage:** The Programme team should ensure that any new project and Programme documentation which are submitted to the PRB provide sufficient staffing (both for UNOCT and implementing partners).

8. **Dissemination Approach for the Regional Threat Assessments:** The Programme team should revise the logical framework and develop a dissemination plan in collaboration with INTERPOL for the regional threat assessments, to reflect the revised planned approach for dissemination of the findings from the reports. Additionally, the reports should be updated on a routine basis, with a standardised Threat Study Template to support national and regional threat assessments. The revised logical framework indicators for this Output area should also include knowledge contributions from other projects developed and disseminated under the Programme.

Introduction

In September 2018, UNOCT launched the Global Programme *"Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism"* to enhance capacities of Member States, International Organisations and UN entities to prevent terrorist Organisations from accessing and using WMD and/or CBRN materials and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving such weapons or materials. While originally the focus of the Programme was WMD/CBRN terrorism, during the course of implementation, the Programme scope expanded to also include SALW, IEDs and UAS. The Programme was later renamed to the Global Programme on "Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons" (herewith: "the Programme") as recommended by the UNOCT PRB in October 2023 and approved by the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism in November 2023. The first cycle of the Programme was originally approved for an initial period of 36 months, starting September 2018, and was designed to be extended to a second cycle as funding became available. It subsequently received four extensions totalling 94 months, as funds were raised by the Programme team, with a current end date of March 2028.

The Global Programme[4] originally had an intended goal of contributing to making the world safer and more secure from WMD/CBRN terrorism through the implementation of the WMD/CBRN provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS), and its subsequent biennial reviews. It planned to achieve this by enhancing capacities of Member States, International Organisations and UN entities to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving WMD/CBRN materials. The Programme aimed to deliver on this goal by:
1. Enhancing visibility of UNOCT WMD/CBRN activities.
2. Strengthening strategic partnerships with WMD/CBRN related members of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and Member States related initiatives
3. Advancing knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk of WMD/CBRN terrorism
4. Implementing capacity building projects to support Member States
5. Supporting international interagency coordination through engagement with the UN Interagency Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks (later renamed Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection).[5]

The Global Programme, which has been designed as an umbrella programme, has supported (during the period being evaluated, 2018-2023) seven pilot projects (see table below), three regional threat assessments on the threat of CBRNE terrorism and a portfolio of twenty training courses on countering WMD/CBRN terrorism (see Annex 7 for the list of training courses). While the first cycle of the Programme was intended to be a pilot phase including the implementation of pilot projects, the second phase was intended to roll out a consolidated methodology of the programme, including implementation of core training and exercises. However, the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the Office's ability to deliver activities as envisioned and generated a delay in implementation of many pilot projects. Consequently, the first and second cycle merged, and the Programme continued to implement both pilot activities and the consolidated methodology concurrently.

Table 1. Summary Table to show Projects under Outcome 4 and Outcome 5

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[4] The scope of the Programme expanded during implementation from an original focus on WMD/CBRN terrorism, to also include SALW, IEDs and UAS. The Programme document had not been updated at the time of the evaluation to include the additional types of weapons. The following text refers to the original scope as outlined in the Programme document.

[5] The scope of the Programme expanded during implementation to involve the UN Interagency Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement Relating to Counter-Terrorism.

Project Code	Project Title	Status	TOTAL Budget (US$)	Dates	Substantive and Implementing Partner(s)	Donor	Regional/ Country focus
UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq	Enhancing national capabilities to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorist attacks in Iraq	Complete	2,359,408.00	15 November 2019 - 31 March 2022	United States Department of State (US DOS) Additional partners: CRDF Global, US Sandia National Laboratories	US Department of State and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Iraq
UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan	Enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to a CBRN terrorist attack in Jordan	Complete	798,282.77	1 October 2018 – 30 September 2022	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Additional partners: Jordan Armed Forces (JAF), National Centre for Security and Crisis Management (NCSCM)	NATO and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Jordan
UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism	Promoting universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)	Complete	1,687,701.30	1 January 2019 – 30 June 2023	Joint Implementation with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	European Union	Global
UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security	Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat WMD terrorism	Complete	133,000.00	21 March 2019 to 31 July 2021	Main Partner: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)	UNICRI and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Global
UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability	Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks - Phase III (Implementation)	Complete	190,400.00	1July 2021 – 30 June 2023	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Agency self-funded activities	Global
UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW	Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of SALW and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia (Phase I)	Complete	1,165,382.	1 January 2020 – to 31 December 2021	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), UNODC – Firearms Trafficking Section, and UNODA	Russian Federation contribution & Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW	Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia (Phase II)	Complete	4,285,116.14	1 January 2022 – 31 December 2025	UNODC – Firearms Trafficking Section, Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking Branch, Division for Treaty Affairs, CTED, UNODA	Canadian CTCBP/ACCBP contribution and & Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370	Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the	Complete	147,465.00	15 April 2020 March 2020 – 31 March 2023	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR),	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Global with a particular focus on Europe, CARICOM

implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring SALW, IED components and UAS and components				CTED, The project was implemented under the umbrella of CT Global Compact	and Sahel/ Maghreb regions)

UNOCT was established in June 2017 by General Assembly resolution A/Res/71/291. UNOCT, headed by Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov, has five main functions:

1. Provide leadership on the General Assembly counter-terrorism mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General from across the United Nations system
2. Enhance coordination and coherence across the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities to ensure the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
3. Strengthen the delivery of United Nations counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance to Member States
4. Improve visibility, advocacy, and resource mobilization for United Nations counter-terrorism efforts
5. Ensure that due priority is given to counterterrorism across the United Nations system and that the important work on preventing violent extremism is firmly rooted in the Strategy

The establishment of UNOCT subsumed the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). CTITF, established in 2005, which consisted of 38 international entities and had a mandate to enhance coordination and coherence of counter-terrorism efforts of the UN. UNCCT was established in 2011 through a voluntary contribution of the Government of Saudi Arabia, with the aim to promote international cooperation on counter-terrorism and support Member States in the implementation of GCTS. The work of the Centre was guided by a five-year programme (2016-2020 – later extended to 2021). In 2018/2019, the Centre added an additional output to the five-year programme on WMD/CBRN terrorism.

The priorities of UNOCT are established via the UN General Assembly through the resolutions of the biennial Review of the GCTS. UNOCT developed and launched its new SPRF for the period of 2022-2025, to operationalise the mandate given to the Office by General Assembly resolution 71/951 and the GCTS. The SPRF specifies the UNOCT's Strategic Goals for this period which are:
- Strategic Goal 1. Foster further unity and collaboration within the United Nations against terrorism.
- Strategic Goal 2. Create resilience against violent extremism conducive to terrorism.
- Strategic Goal 3. Reinforce responses to terrorist threats and attacks.
- Strategic Goal 4. Mitigate the risks and impact of terrorism.
- Strategic Goal 5. Promote human-rights compliant and gender responsive Counter Terrorism (CT)/Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) efforts.

Its mission is operationalized through the main pathways of leadership, coordination and coherence, capacity building, and visibility, advocacy, and resource mobilization. Despite the approval and launch of the SPRF coming after the conceptualisation and implementation of projects and activities under the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme, a harmonisation exercise was undertaken in 2022 to strategically align the Programme and projects to the GCTS pillars and the SPRF Strategic Goals.

Through the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, UNOCT facilitates one of the largest cross-pillar coordination frameworks within the United Nations system, bringing together as of March 2024, 47 United

Nations entities, as well as INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), to leverage multidimensional expertise and mandates across the United Nations system, while reducing duplications and ensuring synergies to align Counter Terrorism (CT)/PCVE efforts with Member States' strategic priorities and technical assistance needs, including those identified by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the analysis and recommendations from the UN human rights mechanisms, bodies and entities. The overarching priorities/objectives of the CT Compact are to A) Enhance coordination and coherence; B) Strengthen engagement with Member States; C) Promote and integrate human rights, gender, and the rule of law; D) Coordinate joint resource mobilization and programme evaluation; E) Strengthen partnerships and regional cooperation; engage with CSOs, academia, private sector.[6]

The prospect of non-state actors, including terrorists and their supporters, gaining access to, and using WMD and materials is a serious threat to international peace and security recognized by several resolutions and strategies of the United Nations.[7] Groups have tested new ways and means to source and use more dangerous weapons to maximize damage, including weapons incorporating CBRN materials. With advancements being made in technology and the expansion of illegal and legal commercial channels, including on the dark web, some of these weapons have become increasingly accessible. From June 2014 to December 2017, the use of chemical weapons on civilians in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[8] as well as their attempts to weaponize biological agents and the seizure of 40 kg of low enriched uranium by ISIL in Mosul university demonstrated that the threat of terrorist attacks involving CBRN materials is real.[9]

In addition, SALW continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. In 2021, the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Small arms and light weapons (S/2021/839) noted that, in the past decade, terrorists have used SALW to carry out as many as 85,148 terrorist attacks. In 2018, the Secretary-General indicated in his Report on Countering the threat posed by IEDs (A/73/156), that during the period 2011–2018, over 150,000 casualties were reported in connection with IEDs, over 80% of which were civilians. In the subsequent report (A/75/175) of 2020, the Secretary-General highlighted that incidents involving IEDs have been recorded in the context of conflict, crime, political unrest and terrorism in all regions of the world. In addition, he emphasized that some terrorist groups have learned to deploy IEDs using off-the-shelf UAS and acquired the ability to manufacture improvised fixed-wing UAS as IEDs against military and political targets.

There is an array of organisations both within the UN system and other international bodies who are actively working to prevent terrorist acquisition of these materials. It has been recognised that improved co-ordination between the Global Compact entities would improve coherence and effectiveness of their respective activities in delivering across all four pillars (A/RES/77/298).

The Global Programme has engaged with a range of stakeholders since implementation began in 2018. UN entities and bodies (such as Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate - CTED, UNIDIR, UNICRI, UNODC, UNODA), international organisations (such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and INTERPOL) and Member State bodies (such as United States Department of State (US DOS) were engaged as implementing partners for joint initiatives and pilot projects. The Programme also sought the services of private consulting firms and individual expert consultants to support the delivery of certain aspects of the Programme work (see Table 1 above for the list of implementing partners).

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[6]   UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (2023) "The largest counter-terrorism framework explained." https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/230917_global_compact_brochure_web.pdf
[7] UN SCR 1373 (2001); UN SCR 1540 (2004); UN SCR 2325 (2016); UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) from 2006 and its biennial reviews.
[8] UN (2023) "UN investigative team outlines findings around ISIL chemical weapons use." https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137492
[9] Letter dated 8 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 8 July 2014, S/2014/481. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/774604?ln=en&v=pdf

The Programme also supported and engaged with Member States/duty-bearers across all regions globally as recipients of trainings and capacity building support. These duty-bearers are listed here by project/activity:

- **CBRN prevention response in Iraq** (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq): National authorities, academia, and industry and first responders in Iraq.
- **CBRN prevention response in Jordan** (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan): JAF, the General Intelligence Directorate, the NCSCM, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, first responders namely fire services, law enforcement and emergency medical services.
- **Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)** (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism): This project had activities at the global, regional, and national levels.[10]
- **Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of SALW and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia** (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) (herein SALW Central Asia project): Border control, criminal justice, customs, judiciary prosecutors, police authorities and legislators in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
- **Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017)** (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) (herein SCR2370 technical guidelines): experts coming from national entities that are responsible for counter-terrorism, law enforcement, arms control, intelligence, and other types of authorities dealing with countering terrorist acquisition of SALW, IEDs and UAS in Europe, the Sahel/Maghreb; and in the Caribbean.[11]
- **Portfolio of 20 WMD/CBRN Training Courses**: 1,223 training participants from, *inter alia,* law enforcement, military, first responders, health personnel, industry and intelligence services from Australia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand, the Philippines, Tunisia, Türkiye.

With the exception of the project 'CBRN prevention response in Iraq' (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq) which engaged with some university students in Iraq, none of the projects or Programme activities engaged with rights-holders nor were specific vulnerable, marginalized individuals or groups, including people with disabilities, engaged. There was also no planned or actual engagement by the Programme or the pilot projects with CSOs either at the global, regional or national levels.

As part of this Programme, the Counter-Terrorism Global Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats, and Critical Infrastructure Protection (WG ETCIP) has been engaged for the project 'Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security) to combat WMD terrorism' and the project 'Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks - Phase III (Implementation).' The Global Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement (WG BMLE) has also been engaged on the project 'Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring SALW, IED components and UAS and components' (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370). The Programme engaged with the working

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[10] Duty-bearers engaged in regional and global activities include, law enforcement authorities, ministry for foreign affairs, ministry of justice, regulatory authorities, members of parliaments, from Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Austria, Australia, Bahrein, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Thailand, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia. National: Albania, Israel, Tajikistan, the Philippines and Togo.

[11] Duty-bearers in Europe from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Türkiye and United Kingdom; the Sahel/Maghreb from Algeria, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia; and the Caribbean region from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname.

group Chairs: INTERPOL (WG ETCIP) and CTED (WG BMLE); Co-Chair WCO (WG BMLE); Vice-Chairs: UNODA, UNICRI, OPCW (WG ETCIP) and INTERPOL (WG BMLE). Working Group members were engaged during the implementation of activities and/or were implementing partners who delivered key activities.

The Programme has an overarching logical framework which encompasses a goal statement, two intended outcomes, and five outputs. The Programme developed and implemented seven pilot projects, plus additional capacity building trainings were developed and implemented via a series of 20 courses portfolio. The projects and capacity building trainings are linked to the overall Programme framework. The projects also have their own results frameworks, indicators, and targets. The full Programme results framework and reconstructed Theory of Change can be found in Annexes 9 and 3 respectively.

Chart 1. Graphic to summarize Programme Results Framework as per the Programme Document.

Goal: Contribute to making the world safer and more secure from WMD/CBRN terrorism through the implementation of the WMD/CBRN provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. More specifically, the Programme seeks to support Member States, International Organisations and UN entities to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving WMD/CBRN materials.

Outcome 1. Member States implement enhanced policies, practices, procedures for the prevention, preparedness, and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism and operate with improved awareness, knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk.

Outcome 2. International Organisations and UN entities support Member States in the prevention, preparedness, and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism in a more informed and coordinated manner, reflecting the "All-of-UN" approach.

Output 1. Visibility
Member States, International Organisations and UN entities have greater awareness of UNOCT WMD/CBRN activities, thereby facilitating potential cooperation with and mobilisation of resources for UNOCT.

Output 2. Partnerships
UNOCT has strengthened strategic partnerships with relevant WMD/CBRN-related members of the UN Global Compact and Member States' International Initiatives, enabling the development of joint, complementary & mutually reinforcing projects.

Output 3. Threat/ risk analysis
Member States, International Organisations and UN entities have advanced knowledge and understanding of the risk and level of the threat of terrorist groups accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials.

Output 4. Capacity-building.
Member States have improved capacities in prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving WMD/CBRN materials in line with international obligations, standards, and best practices.

Output 5. International interagency coordination The UN System, through the UN Interagency WMD Working Group, has improved international interagency coordination on preventing and responding to WMD/CBRN terrorist attacks.

Evaluation Purpose and Scope

As informed by the evaluation Terms of Reference (TOR), the evaluation team understood the purpose of this assessment to be twofold: as a backward-looking assessment for accountability and learning purposes, and also forward-looking study to generate lessons learnt and recommendations to inform future course corrections. Given that this evaluation comes at the mid-term period, operational and process related issues were examined so that strengths and weaknesses can be ascertained to improve programme delivery in the latter half of the implementation period. Activities and outputs (such as reports and training guides) were also reviewed to examine their quality, usefulness and contribution thus far to the achievement of intended results, including capacity building efforts to Member States. A key element of the Programme was to establish new working partnerships with various UN Entities and International Organisations. Working mechanisms of these partnerships were also assessed to inform effective collaboration.

In line with the Evaluation TOR, and with contribution during the inception phase by the Reference Group the following were considered to be the main objectives for this evaluation:

1. A systematic assessment of the Programme's design, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability.
2. An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses within the Programme design and implementation. Recommend improvements for future scale-up efforts.
3. An assessment of the Programme's effectiveness in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues of gender and human rights into project activities, including an assessment of the extent to which stakeholders (women, men, marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities) have participated in the various capacity building activities in an active and meaningful manner.
4. An assessment of how the Programme has contributed to increasing the level of preparedness and capacity to respond to WMD/CBRN terrorism by the target groups.
5. Identification of lessons learned, conclusions, recommendations. Capture promising practices for the remainder of the Programme implementation period including the effects of the no-cost extension that has been provided.
6. Provision of evidence of programmatic accountability to beneficiaries involved in capacity development, donors, and Member States by determining the extent of how programme objectives promote international law norms and standards (including as contained in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions), as well as facilitate the implementation of national strategies, priorities, and needs.
7. Establishment of what is working/worked for successful partnerships and management, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and provide recommendations for future joint programming.
8. Recommendations on the alignment of programme objectives and outcomes including, as necessary, revised language for goals, outcomes, outputs, and indicators to the new SPRF and to incorporate gender and human rights for the remainder of the Programme.

The evaluation questions (see Table 2 below) were informed by the questions included in the TOR, a review of the UNOCT draft evaluation Handbook (which had not been produced at the time of the drafting of the TOR) and input from the UNOCT HRGS. It should be read in conjunction with the Evaluation Matrix (see Annex 2) which provides further details including full lists of sub-questions and modes of data collection. The Evaluation Questions were cleared together with the inception report.

The scope of the evaluation covered the period of Programme implementation from September 2018 through to July 2023 and examined all outputs and outcomes of activities implemented by the Programme team during that time period, including seven pilot projects, three regional studies on the threat of CBRNE terrorism and the 20 training courses. Projects which began implementation after the inception phase had begun were not included within the scope of the evaluation.

The evaluation began in December 2022. Following initial internal interviews between March and June 2023, there was a stoppage in evaluation activities due to a contract issue with the Evaluation Expert. The evaluation timeline was increased, and the evaluation budget was increased to reflect the wide scope and number of activities which were to be reviewed. Evaluation fieldwork subsequently resumed with further interviews and surveys completed between November 2023 and February 2024. The evaluation report was finalised by April 2025 following several rounds of review by internal stakeholders and the ERG and the substantive technical inclusions from the Substantive Expert. This evaluation report takes note of more recent Programme developments, although limited the scope of activities which were assessed to only those completed by the Programme team by July 2023. Projects which started after the inception phase of the evaluation began are not included in the evaluation.

During the inception phase, a number of revisions to the Evaluation TOR were discussed with the Reference Group and agreed to by the Evaluation Consultants. The scope of the evaluation was amended to also include gender equality, human rights, leave no one behind (LNOB), and disability inclusion, as an additional 'evaluation criterion' which was not included in the original TOR. The number of days allocated for this evaluation were also extended following an assessment of the level of effort required for delivering the scope of the evaluation by the evaluation team. The evaluation timeline was also extended.

The evaluation was supported by an ERG comprising of individuals from Programme Management Team, Evaluation and Compliance Unit and the HRGS.

Table 2. Approved Evaluation Criteria and Questions

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation Question
Relevance	To what extent is the intervention relevant to the pillars of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and the Strategic Goals of the Strategic Plan and Results Framework (SPRF)?
	To what extent do the programme/project's objectives and design respond to the needs, policies, and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders (including global, country, and partner/institution) including international human rights obligations of Member States, including on gender equality, as well as Women, Peace, Security agenda?
	To what extent has the intervention been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc., changes including changes in the conditions, needs or problems to which it is intended to respond?
	To what extent were the perspectives of rights holders and duty-bearers considered during the design process?
Coherence	To what extent were partnerships with different actors in the programme/project and UN agencies utilised successfully and interventions planned and delivered to be harmonised to promote synergies, create strategic partnerships, avoid gaps and duplications including coordination with Member States?
	What aspects of the programme/project helped or hindered successful partnerships and management, coordination, monitoring, and oversight?
Effectiveness	What has been the contribution of the intervention to the pillars of the GCTS and the Strategic Goals of the SPRF?
	To what extent did the programme/project achieve its intended goal, outcomes and outputs and what are the implications of the results? Sub-Question: Have there been any unexpected or negative results?
	To what extent were the linkages between inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes clear and logical? Sub Question: Did the activities designed under the programme provide clear linkages and complement each other regarding the project strategies and project components of intervention?
	What internal and external factors have helped and hindered implementation and achievement of results, and to what extent were mitigation measures effective?
Efficiency	To what extent has the implementation strategy and execution been efficient and cost-effective? Sub-Question: Did the results obtained justify the costs incurred?
	To what extent were intervention staffing, activities and outputs planned, sequenced and delivered in a timely and efficient manner? Sub-Question: If not, what changes can be made to improve them?

Sustainability	To what extent are the benefits of the programme/project likely to continue after it ends? Sub-Question: Assess what contributions the programme has made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the programme outcomes.
	To what extent was a strategy for sustainability of achievement clearly defined at the design stage of the programme/project?
Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind	To what extent has the programme/project design, implementation and monitoring fully considered human rights, gender equality as well as marginalised or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities? This includes the development of relevant human rights and gender analysis and responses (such as specific human rights and gender analysis, human rights and gender quality indicators, etc.)
	What challenges and/or opportunities, if any, influenced the way in which considerations related to human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities were incorporated in the programme design, implementation and monitoring?
	To what extent were women, persons with disabilities, and/or Organisations working on these issues consulted and meaningfully involved in programme planning and implementation?
	To what extent has the programme promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women?
	To what extent have unintended effects emerged for women, men, or vulnerable groups?

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation used both quantitative and qualitative methods, and both primary and secondary data sources, to answer evaluation questions and to ascertain the efficacy of programme interventions. Due to lack of budgetary resources for in-person data collection, all fieldwork was conducted remotely. For the desk review, the Evaluators reviewed all relevant programme and project reports and monitoring data including the Programme and project documents, progress reports.

The evaluation was sequenced across multiple phases, with each phase informing the subsequent phase in an iterative approach to theory development. The evaluation incorporated participatory approaches to ensure the findings represent beneficiary and stakeholder views and are inclusive of the range of opinions and experiences. The approach utilised contribution analysis by mapping achieved results and findings to expected logical chain. Deviations from expected results were explored, along with unintended positive and negative consequences. Contextual factors including socio, economic, political contexts in which the interventions were operating in were explored. The approach was iterative allowing for theory development to evolve throughout the course of the evaluation data collection phase. The approach was non-experimental given the evaluation involved respondents and interviewees who had all been engaged by the Programme in various capacities.

The evaluation assessed the Programme against the (OECD DAC) criteria of Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. The evaluation also assessed the Programme's efforts to adopt a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA), mainstream gender as well as LNOB principles. Elements of the Programme's design and implementation were examined throughout to establish lessons learned and inform recommendations for the scale-up of activities. The evaluation design was also informed by the UNOCT Evaluation Handbook and UNEG Guidelines, including on the incorporation human rights and gender equality within evaluations. The evaluation design was tailored based on the available budget for this evaluation, which is lower than the amount recommended in the UNOCT Evaluation Handbook. The budget informed the scope, coverage, and approaches.

Data collection methods

A. Qualitative in-depth interviews:

Semi-structured in-depth Key Informant Interviews were conducted online with UNOCT Programme and Project Managers, UNOCT staff, Implementing/Coordination Partners, Member States/Duty Bearers, a CSO, and a donor.

In total 37 interviews (18 male, 19 female) were conducted from 22 March 2023 until 7 December 2023 (see Annex 5 for the details on stakeholders consulted).[12] Where internet connectivity allowed, interviews were conducted using video interviewing, to better replicate face-to-face interviewing and to allow the evaluators to capture non-verbal communication during the interview process. Interviewees were assured of confidentiality and anonymity, and that their responses would be anonymised, and transcripts kept secure and only accessible to the evaluation team and would be destroyed after the completion of the evaluation. That said, some interviewees did note that given their organisation was the only one involved in certain aspects of implementation, that they would potentially be identifiable. In some cases that affected their responses to certain questions.

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[12] UNOCT Programme and Project Managers (7), UNOCT staff (stakeholders) (7), implementing/coordination Partners: UN Entities. International Organisations (IOs), Duty-bearers (10), Beneficiaries: Member States/ Duty Bearers (9), NGOs/CSOs and CSO Engagement Expert (2), and Donors (2).

The discussion guides were semi-structured in order to gather findings on the evaluation criteria/questions while also offering interviewees the opportunity to provide unprompted insights on related subjects of relevance to this evaluation. Interviews were conducted in English as no budget was available for translation.

Sampling: Purposive sampling was used to select in-depth interview subjects based on the list of programme/project beneficiaries and stakeholders provided. Purposive sampling for the in-depth interviews was used to allow the evaluators to gather insights from people engaged in specific aspects of the Programme/project and offering specific insights on certain aspects of the Programme. Consideration for gender balance was also given. The external CSO expert was selected purposively based on a desk review of relevant expert CSOs working on the topic of gender and human rights inclusion in CT and an additional CSO inclusion expert was also interviewed from a UN Entity, as the Programme does not engage directly with CSOs.[13]

Analysis: The evaluator used computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software to assist with the analysis of the transcripts. Findings from internal staff interviews were triangulated with feedback gathered from external stakeholders including implementation partners and beneficiaries.

B. **Quantitative Surveys – Implementing/Coordination Partners & Member States (Duty-bearers)**: Two online quantitative surveys were distributed by the evaluators via email to two sets of stakeholders:

Survey Instrument	Total Sample	Respondents' Gender[14]	Mode
Implementing partners and coordination partners – Programme and Projects & Member States (beneficiaries)/ duty-bearers who coordinated trainings/capacity building support	21	14 M / 7 F / 0 NB / 0 Other	Online
Member States (beneficiaries)/ duty-bearers who received trainings/capacity building support[15]	81	60 M / 19 F / 1 NB / 1 Other	Online

The survey for the implementing/coordinating partners was conducted from 18 November 2023 to 6 December 2023 and the survey to beneficiaries from Member States was conducted from 17 January to 8 February 2024. The surveys consisted of close-ended questions to collect statistical insights for assessing the evaluation criteria. The survey for implementing/coordinating partners included questions to gather insights from programme level activities and individual modules for each pilot project to assess outcomes from the project level activities. Demographic data were captured to allow for disaggregation of results by key criteria so that this evaluation can better assess varied impacts by sub-groups.

The questionnaire was programmed using Survey Monkey and was fully tested prior to dissemination. The questionnaire was administered in English. Up to three reminders were sent to boost response rates. All responses were kept on a password protected computer with two-factor authentication. Only the two evaluators had access to the raw findings. The aggregated anonymised data is provided to UNOCT along with the final evaluation report.

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[13] A research institute was a partner for the production of an ICSANT report and a research institute was involved in a bio-webinar, however, grassroots, non-profit campaigns or advocacy organisations, representing community interests, and professional associations were not engaged by the Programme team directly.

[14] Legend: M Male; F Female; NB Non-binary

[15] 25 respondents had taken 1 UNOCT training course on countering the terrorist use of weapons, 32 had taken 2-3 courses, 14 had taken 4-5 and 6 had taken 6 or more. 4 respondents answered that they didn't know. Responses were received from trainees based in 17 Member States: Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Moldova, Turkey, and Uganda.

Sampling: No sampling was applied with the survey questionnaires disseminated to the full universe of implementing partners or beneficiaries who were involved in the previously specified aspects of the Programme/projects. The approach is appropriate as an online survey means the total population can feasibly be covered during the timeline for the project without sampling being required. 45% of implementing/coordinating partners who received the survey link completed the survey, and 7% of beneficiaries who received the survey link completed the survey. Given the low response rates (particularly for the beneficiaries survey) the findings should be considered indicative but not necessarily representative.

Analysis: The survey findings were analysed using Excel and SPSS.

C. Qualitative systematic review: The Substantive WMD/CBRN Expert, who is part of the evaluation team, undertook a qualitative systematic review of the key outputs from the Programme.

Training courses and capacity building initiatives: The 20 capacity-building training courses aiming to increase the capabilities of Member States in targeted CBRN areas were assessed, in addition to: "Countering the Threat Posed by Non-traditional Chemical and Biological Laboratories in Iraq "Virtual reality training;" "Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of SALW and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia" assessments; "Enhancing Capabilities to Prepare for and Respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorist Attack in Jordan" Self-Assessment Workshop.

The course review entailed assessing the effectiveness of each selected Programmes/projects to determine (1) if the stated learning objectives were met, (2) if the content technically accurate (3) if the course delivery was effective. This was accomplished via:
- Review of scientific and technical accuracy of the course, as well as whether it includes and accurately reproduces international law norms and standards, including IHRL
- Analysis of consistency with similar international training
- Review of project design and implementation
- Analysis of alignment with the GCTS, and the SPRF
- Analysis of gender and human rights mainstreaming into training content
- Recommendations for current or future programme

Reports and Publications – the (WMD)/CBRN Expert also reviewed the following documents for technical accuracy, relevance and sustainability: Threat Assessment: Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; Threat Assessment: VNSAs in State Actors in Sub-Saharan Africa and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; Threat Assessment: VNSAs in State Actors in Southeast Asia and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; and UNICRI – UNOCT Report on Science, Technology and Innovation: Understanding Advancements from the Perspective of Countering (WMD) and associated Risk Scenarios.

The criterion for the qualitative systematic review was approved during the inception phase and is provided in Annex 8. The full detailed micro assessments from the qualitative systematic review have been provided additionally to the programme team to support learning and refinement of future training courses, capacity building initiatives, reports, and publications.

D. Secondary data analysis and additional desk-top literature review

The evaluation team conducted further analysis of project/programme literature, monitoring data and budgetary information when evidence gaps are noted, and additional documents supplied. Secondary quantitative data analysis was conducted on some quantitative monitoring data collected by the Programme/project team. As noted in the limitations section below, the Programme and projects have varying levels of monitoring data

available, there is no MEL data collection plan in place for the Programme, and data is not consistently collected to report against programme logical framework indicators.

Human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion

A HRBA, gender equality, and LNOB considerations, including considerations for people with disabilities were incorporated throughout all phases of the evaluation design, data collection and analysis and are included in the final report, in line with the UNOCT Evaluation Policy and recommendations from the UNEG Handbook 'Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation - Towards UNEG Guidance.'[16] The evaluation was led by the UNEG HRGE principles of inclusion, participation and fair power dynamics. HR, GE, LNOB as well as intersectionality, youth, and the inclusion of people with disabilities were considered cross-cutting themes throughout the evaluation process. In accordance with the UNEG HRGE handbook, the Programme was assessed in the inception phase by the evaluation team as having low potential evaluability for HRGE due to lack of inclusion of gender and human rights considerations in the design of the Programme and most projects, lack of quality monitoring data including disaggregated data and no/few gender or human rights targeted indicators in the logical frameworks (for more information, see the findings section of this report). The Programme and almost all projects did not plan to engage with rights-holders or CSOs working at any level, targeting instead CT agencies. Based on this evaluability assessment the Evaluators developed an appropriate evaluation approach guided by UNEG guidelines.

In accordance with UNEG HRGE guidelines, the evaluators used mixed-method research approach to collect quantitative data from a diverse range of stakeholders. In accordance with UN Guidelines on integrating disability inclusion,[17] data collection tools were kept short and concise. Online interviewing software allowed for transcription if needed, and online survey software allowed for completion at the respondents desired speed. Qualitative interviews were conducted with a diverse range of stakeholder organisations, with duty-bearers involved with the implementation of activities from a range of country contexts (although these interviews are limited in number due to lack of available budget) and an NGO working at the nexus of CT and gender/human rights who has not directly participated in the Programme but who provided recommendations for better incorporation of human rights and gender equality into this programme of work in future. Another external CT CSO expert from a UN Entity was also consulted.

Data collection tools included relevant questions to assess the incorporation of a HRBA as well as gender equality and LNOB considerations in the Programme Design, and implementation phases (including results framework and monitoring), and assessed any positive or negative impacts on different stakeholder groups. Recommendations were also be gathered for how human rights, gender equality and LNOB considerations can be better integrated in any future interventions. See Evaluation Matrix (Annex 2) and Evaluation Questions for the full list of questions to be assessed as part of this evaluation – which were recommended by the UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section. The findings from the evaluation were disaggregated by age, gender, Organisation type, and whether human rights and gender equality are a strategic priority for the organization. For duty-bearers, key findings were disaggregated by country context. A gender-responsive and human rights-sensitive analysis approach, whereby potential barriers to inclusion such as political, financial, structural, and social barriers, was explored and reported on where relevant.

Ethical considerations and safeguards

The evaluation applied the following ethical considerations and safeguards:
1. Informed consent to participate in the study.

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[16] UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Handbook 'Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation - Towards UNEG Guidance. http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/980
[17] UNEG (2022) Guidance on Integrating Disability Inclusion in Evaluations and Reporting on the UNDIS Entity Accountability Framework Evaluation Indicator. https://unevaluation.org/document/detail/3050

2. Informed consent to use an audio recording device.
3. Informed consent gained from participants that they be listed in the annex of this report as someone who participated in the evaluation.
4. Privacy, anonymity and confidentiality in terms of the information given - the findings have been presented in a way in which individuals are not identifiable.
5. Data accuracy in terms of the results presented in this report.

The UNEG Ethical Principles for Evaluators were followed, and the signed Ethical Pledge is found in Annex 10.

Methodological limitations and mitigation strategies

∉ *Gender equality and human rights considerations were only incorporated in a limited way into the programme/project design and not in a manner consistent with UNEG guidelines:* therefore, this evaluation focused on why it was not fully implemented and gives recommendations on how this can be improved upon.

∉ *Lack of budget for translation support:* Only English-speaking stakeholders were interviewed and surveyed as part of this study. This prevented access to and the inclusion of beneficiaries who did not speak English. While findings were triangulated with (limited) available monitoring data, this is a limitation on the comprehensiveness of this evaluation.

∉ *Lack of budget for country visits:* This limits the comprehensiveness of some project assessments and meant there were no opportunities for engagement with rights-holders. While findings were triangulated with (limited) available monitoring data, this is a limitation on the comprehensiveness of this evaluation.

∉ *Length of time since programme began:* The Programme has been implemented since 2018 with some projects completed significantly prior to the evaluation starting. This limited accessibility to some interviewees and undermines accuracy of recall of interviewees.

∉ *No theory of change:* The Programme and most projects lack a clear theory of change.[18] This was recreated for this evaluation which is used for the evaluation's analysis.

∉ *Logical framework out of date:* The Programme's logical framework is out of date and contains indicators which are not measurable, lack clear target values, and for which the Programme team has not been collecting monitoring data for. This provided insufficient information to support a complete analysis of individual projects and contributed to incomplete documentation of Programme and project results and learnings. While the evaluation did attempt to collect partial data to report on logical framework indicators, this is a sub-optimal approach and poses a major evaluability challenge which was noted in the inception phase. Recommendations have been made in this evaluation report to improve programmatic and project reporting requirements internally at UNOCT.

∉ *Extended time of the evaluation:* Due to initial delays in the delivery of programme documents and a lengthy review of the inception report, the fieldwork was delayed for the evaluation. Due to contractual issues for the evaluation team, the fieldwork period was greatly extended and staggered with most staff interviews taking place in March 2023, stakeholder interviews (and two remaining staff interviews) in October-December 2023 and external interviews and the surveys completed from November 2023 to January 2024. This resulted in the evaluation adapting the evaluation fieldwork end date from February 2023 to February 2024.[19] Because the staff interviews were conducted approximately a year before the drafting of the evaluation report and there were no remaining resources available to repeat the staff interviews, during the review of the draft evaluation report, the Programme team reviewers were instructed to provide any additional information and documents where findings were out-of-date. The substantive technical inputs from the Substantive Expert were also provided after the report had been drafted. These issues contributed to an extended evaluation period, which created inefficiencies and was sub-optimal.

∉ *Limited internal reporting information available during inception phase:* The Programme and several projects do not report periodically on their progress in a standalone programme or project specific reports (instead some key information is aggregated into the organisational annual reporting process in line with UNOCT policy for the specific donor who funded these specific activities). Recommendations have been made in this evaluation report to improve programmatic and project reporting requirements.

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[18] Programme managers have been guided previously by UN RBM frameworks that focused on a results framework, not a Theory of Change.
[19] While the evaluation end date was postponed, the evaluation scope did not expand to include two projects which started implementation after the beginning of evaluation, nor some additional activities incorporated under the Programme after the start date of the evaluation.

- *Rights-holders lack of willingness to participate:* Only one project engaged with rights-holders. Despite several attempts to request participation in this study, there was no response. This is a limitation of this evaluation.
- *Lack of participation by some stakeholders:* Some key stakeholders did not respond or were not able to participate in the evaluation. Several requests were made and where possible a substitute was sought.
- *Technical review:* The technical review consisted of a desk review of documents produced for training and reports, and the substantive expert did not interview or correspond with the originator of those documents. The technical reviewer did not attend the interviews, or construct the surveys, and these data collection methods did not include specific technical questions to inform the technical review.

Evaluation Findings

Relevance

To what extent is the intervention relevant to the pillars of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and the Strategic Goals of the Strategic Plan and Results Framework (SPRF)?

The Programme team undertook a harmonisation exercise in December 2022 to align the Programme and projects with the pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288). The Programme and projects were found during this harmonisation exercise to conform with pillar 2 of the GCTS by providing 'Measures to prevent and combat terrorism' and pillar 3 of the GCTS 'Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in the global counterterrorism enterprise.' Both the CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq) and CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan) projects were assessed to contribute to Pillar 2. The ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism), Interoperability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability), SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) and SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) projects were all assessed to contribute to pillar 2 and partially to pillar 3.

While Outputs 2 and 3 of the Programme were not individually rated during the harmonisation exercise, the partnerships formed, the regional threat assessments, and other reports and guidelines produced by some pilot projects, are directly relevant to the aspect of pillar 3 of the GCTS which encourages *"the United Nations to work with Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional Organisations to identify and share best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets. We invite the International Criminal Police Organization to work with the Secretary General so that he can submit proposals to this effect. We also recognize the importance of developing public-private partnerships in this area"* Paragraph 13 and pillar 2: *"To intensify cooperation, as appropriate, in exchanging timely and accurate information concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism."* The pilot project UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security (herein: the Technology and Security guidelines) was also unrated but these pillars would also apply. The 20 training courses were also unrated but are most closely aligned with pillar 2.

The GCTS pillar 4 is not referenced during the harmonisation exercise for either the Programme as a whole or any projects, despite the GCTS (A/RES/60/288) saying the *"promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing, and stressing the need to promote and protect the rights of victims of terrorism."* An integration and mainstreaming of human rights considerations across all assessed pillars within the harmonisation process and guidelines would therefore beneficial.

The UNOCT SPRF[20] covers the period 2022-2025. While this was not in place at the time of the Programme and many projects design stage, the team undertook a harmonisation exercise to strategically align with the new framework.[21] The Programme overall was assessed to primarily contribute to Strategic Goal 3 (outcome 3.1 3.2 3.3. 3.4) and to secondarily contribute to Strategic Goal 1 (outcome 1.1 through 1.6). Both the CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq) and Jordan projects were assessed to contribute to Strategic Goal 3, the ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism), SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) and SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) projects was assessed to contribute to Strategic Goal 3 and to contribute secondarily to Strategic Goal 1. The Interoperability project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability) contributes to Strategic Goal 1.

Output 2 and Output 3 were not rated in this harmonisation exercise, but it would contribute to both Strategic Goal 1, particularly 1.5 ("Fostered multilateral and multisectoral collaboration and cooperation against terrorism") and Strategic Goal 3, outcome 3.3 *("Enhanced inter-agency coordination/cooperation and exchange of counter-terrorism information and good practices")*. The Technology and Security guidelines were not rated as the project had already finished but they would most appropriately contribute to Strategic Goal 3, principally Outcome 3.4 (*"Effective response developed and implemented addressing the counter-terrorism challenges and opportunities as related to new technologies, including information and communications technologies, in accordance with the rule of law, and human rights obligations, and gender equality standards"*). The evaluation finds relevant contributions from the Programme and projects to Strategic Goal 5 as elaborated in the section on 'Human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion' in this report, but these contributions have not been included in the harmonisation assessment.

The subject-matter expert found that the majority of projects implemented by the Programme had strong relevance to UN Security Council resolutions and UNOCT strategic priorities. This ensured that the projects contributed directly to international efforts to combat terrorism, arms trafficking, and CBRN threats.

To what extent do the programme/project's objectives and design respond to the needs, policies, and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders (including global, country, and partner/institution) including international human rights obligations of Member States, including on gender equality, as well as Women, Peace, Security (WPS) agenda?

The Programme and projects were reported during interviews as being highly relevant for duty-bearers. The alignment between the Programme and project activities and the needs of Member States also reflects the alignment of the Programme with the GCTS, in which Member States participate in the review of the strategy every two years. This review process allows Member States to ensure the strategy is aligned with their priorities and any new or emerging threats. Several of the projects also incorporated risk assessments or capacity consultations into their design in order to ensure activities were aligned with Member States' needs. These were the three regional threat assessments, the CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq), CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan), SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) project, and the Security and Technology (risk scenarios) projects. The 20 training courses also include vulnerability and risk assessment methodology.

The conceptualisation of both the CBRN prevention response in Iraq and CBRN prevention response in Jordan projects were informed by a deep analysis of the country contexts and their national strategies. In the case of

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[20] https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/unoct_strategic_plan_results_framework_2022-25.pdf

[21] The Framework has five Strategic Goals: Strategic Goal 1: Foster further unity and collaboration within the United Nations against terrorism; Strategic Goal 2: Create resilience against violent extremism conducive to terrorism; Strategic Goal 3: Reinforce responses to terrorist threats and attacks; Strategic Goal 4: Mitigate the risks and impact of terrorism; Strategic Goal 5: Promote human rights compliant and gender responsive CT/PCVE efforts.

Iraq (as per the project document), in 2016, CTED developed 16 priority capacity building projects with UNOCT/UNCCT to lead on five of these. The project was aligned with Iraq's national strategy and the National Action Plan which also seeks to improve effective cooperation of state agencies. The project team responded to a direct request in 2021 from the Iraqi government for more direct capacity-building support and adjusted the project to meet this identified need.

In the case of Jordan, NATO undertook an advisory support team visit in 2015 to assess gaps. One of the gaps was the lack of a national plan which NATO did not focus on at the time but saw as an opportunity for partnership. Jordan lacked an overarching strategical plan on how the different national agencies would respond in a coordinated way. UNOCT and NATO undertook a joint fact-finding mission to Jordan at the start of the project to consult with national stakeholders (Civil Defence Directorate, Ministry of Interior, JAF, Ministry of Defence, NCSCM, Crisis Management Centre, Ministry of Health and Public Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior) on the project design and workplan. From a technical perspective, the project was strongly aligned with both the GCTS and UNOCT SPRF and directly addresses or is linked to strategic priorities/metrics. The project also aligns with UN and UNOCT Programme mission and is novel in its approach. This was assessed by the Substantive Expert as a particularly strong project in terms of its ability to provide accurate and detailed information, consistent with international standards. Moreover, this engagement(s) provided a novel offering in this space, and the research undertaken by the evaluation team was unable to find any similar project of this nature.

For the SALW Central Asia project, CTED had also previously visited all five countries involved, and had identified legislative gaps, lack of a proper implementation mechanism or interagency mechanisms for sharing information. Soon after the start of the project, bordering country Afghanistan saw major political and security changes with the de facto Taliban authorities. This resulted in a growing concern of the risk of weapons being trafficked over the border, as the region had previously been a transit area for illicit weapons smuggling. The project was also considered highly needed given a lack of information or research on the region and the risk of small arms, and countries had been infrequently reporting to UNODA on their programme of action.

In addition, the SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) have relevance to Member States as CTED had previously noted gaps in Member States implementation of this during their assessments and were receiving frequent requests for technical assistance on how to implement the resolution. Member States who participated in the 20 training courses were able to select from the list which trainings they felt were most appropriate and the training courses were tailored to the specific country context, which supported their relevance.

The assessment reports and guidelines produced under this programme were also informed by Member States' needs and priorities. The INTERPOL regional threat assessments will have very high relevance for Member States given they include both regional threats and specific threats for certain countries. The reports were found by the Substantive Expert to be technically sound and well-researched projects. They align well with UNOCT programme mission and represent a novel resource for Member States to contextualise the CBRN threat from a regional perspective. Summarised conclusions of main threats, and intelligence and information gaps that need more research are also identified in the INTERPOL reports, further highlighting their relevance and usefulness. The Technology and Security report is also informed by Member States' needs as it is intended to address concerns that have been raised in UN Security Council resolutions 1624, 2129, 2178, as well as reports and statements of the UN Secretary-General, regarding new and emerging threats and security challenges from technology. Six Member States were also engaged in the development of the report and the risk scenarios. The purpose of the ICSANT project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism) which is to support universalisation and effective implementation of the convention, is also aligned with Member States' needs as not all have adhered to ICSANT yet and its effectiveness relies on international cooperation as without universalisation, the relevance and strength of the convention is undermined.

Among beneficiaries from national authorities, the overwhelming majority (84%) reported that the capacity building activities were very relevant to the needs of their organisation or for their work personally, while a further 11% reported that they were somewhat relevant. Just 1% reported that the capacity building activities were not very relevant. Additionally, all 5 of the national coordination partners who took the evaluation survey confirmed the high degree of relevance of the capacity building activities for the needs of the participating organisation. The beneficiaries also confirmed high degrees of importance of activities for preventing terrorism involving CBRN materials, WMD and IED components for their organisational needs (see Chart 2 below). Addressing gender considerations and incorporating human rights considerations as well as considerations related to marginalised and vulnerable groups were the thematic issues which were less likely to be rated as 'very important' by the surveyed respondents for the strategic priorities of the national authorities participating in the trainings. That said, still the majority of respondents rated them as being important and the results for these three issues were similar between both male and female survey respondents.

Chart 2. Thinking about your organization's strategic priorities and goals, how important, if at all, are the following types of intervention for your organizational needs? Base: 81 Trainees

All of the implementing partners interviewed as part of this evaluation reported a strong alignment between the strategic goals of their organisations and the activities which they implemented under this Programme. This should be viewed in the context that the partners were the source or joint-source (along with UNOCT and other implementing/coordinating partners) of the conceptualisation of the project ideas initially. For example, OPCW and UNOCT, within the framework of the UN Global Compact Working Group on ETCIP, have previously completed two phases of the interoperability project, in cooperation with the Working Group members. OPCW and UNOCT co-designed and implemented the third phase together with key partners of the Working Group, including INTERPOL, UNODA, UNICRI, and WHO. The project closely aligns with OPCW's mandate as the custodian of the Chemical Weapons Convention and is aligned with another similar project they planned to implement in parallel on OPCW Biological Emergency response initiative. In the case of the 'Technology and

Security guidelines' (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security) and SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) projects, these were conceived during meetings of the Working Group, reflecting alignment and prioritisation by participating organisations for these initiatives. UNODC has been working on promoting universalisation of ICSANT for many years and considers its activities under the project as highly aligned with their mandate. In the case of Jordan, NATO had previously identified and sought the support of UNOCT as a joint implementing partner for the initiative and is interested in interagency partnerships where possible. INTERPOL considers the regional threat assessments as very relevant for their work, given they are unique, and an in-depth study has never been done before in such a way. The design/co-design approach used by the Programme therefore is found to have strongly supported its strategic relevance to the goals of the implementing/coordinating partners.

While not explicitly outlined in the Programme document, the activities of the Programme do have strong relevance to the human rights obligations of Member States with regards to the protection of human rights by suppressing terrorism, which threatens the right to life and physical integrity.[22] Human Rights Council resolution 19/19 on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism states that States must take necessary measures to fulfil their duty to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism while upholding human rights and the rule of the law through due process.[23] Activities that ensure terrorists' criminal acts are properly designated as such in law, could in turn support victims/survivors' rights of access to justice and recognition. This can also be supported by activities working with the police and security forces so that evidence is properly and safely collected. The interoperability project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase) sought to improve coordination by different agencies in the case of an attack, which could strengthen direct and immediate support to victims of terrorism when followed through by concrete assistance in that field. In some cases, projects also explicitly discussed human rights obligations within counterterrorism responses (see section on 'human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion' for details). The programme document and (when not currently included) project documents, should therefore be updated to more clearly communicate how the designs are relevant to human rights and support for victims and survivors of terrorism.

The technical review of the capacity building trainings by the Programme found that with regards to LNOB, none of the trainings mentioned humanitarian response explicitly, nor were targeted at that type of emergency response personnel. The trainings also did not cover consequence management (medical assessment, medical countermeasures/treatment, environmental health, WASH, etc.) that would be required to fulfil the humanitarian response mission, strictly speaking. In short, this aspect could be better reflected in the Programme.

UNOCT adopted a strategic approach for mainstreaming the WPS agenda internally across all programmes and projects in 2022, contained within its Gender Mainstreaming Policy and Action Plan. During the design stage for the Programme, this strategy was not in place and the gender unit was not established at the time.[24] The WPS agenda does have some limited relevance for the Programme and projects via the Programme's encouragement of women's participation in meetings and training events on prevention, detection, and response to terrorist threats, and the inclusion of women experts as speakers during trainings. The Programme did not plan to work with women human rights defenders and women peacebuilders, however, which is a limitation of the relevance of the Programme for the WPS agenda (see section on 'human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion' for details). The programme document and some project documents should therefore be updated to more clearly communicate how the designs are relevant to gender equality and the WPS agenda.

The evaluation found that the programme document, logical framework, and the project documents do not refer to a strategic alignment with the UNSDG agenda. However, staff and implementing partners reported during

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[22] United Nations, Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31, "The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant" (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 8).
[23] UNODC (2021) Counter-Terrorism in the International Law Context
[24] The UNOCT had a gender advisor since 2019 to provide guidance to programmes and projects.

interviews a relevance with SDG16 '*Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.*'[25] Target 16.a "*Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime*" most explicitly relates to the Programme activities. Other interviewees at the national level expressed the projects and Programme as having potentially a wider relevance to the SDG agenda. For example, there is a link to Goal 6 on Water and Sanitation (as well as other environmental targets) due to the contamination risk from terrorist attacks, and Goal 9 on building resilient infrastructure, which the Programme directly seeks to strengthen critical infrastructure from attack. Terrorism also undermines Member States efforts to make progress on reducing poverty (Goal 1), efforts to reduce inequality (Goal 10), provide for good health and well-being (Goal 3), access to quality education (Goal 4), and to promote decent work and economic growth (Goal 8). The Programme document and (when not currently included) project documents, should therefore be updated to more clearly communicate how the designs are relevant to the UNSDGs.

To what extent has the intervention been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc., changes including changes in the conditions, needs or problems to which it is intended to respond?

The Programme overall remained responsive to the needs of Member States including changes in the needs and terrorist threats over the course of implementation. This was most notably seen by the expansion of the Programme from working on WMD/CBRN terrorism to also include SALW, IED components and UAS. These threats were raised by Member States during biennial reviews of the GCTS by the General Assembly.

All projects were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, with all requiring no-cost extensions due to delays caused by the pandemic. In-person meetings were either cancelled or moved online or postponed to a later date. Several implementing partners and staff members reported challenges holding meetings online, reporting the interaction was lower than would be expected in an in-person context. Online meetings for the SALW Central Asia project were particularly challenging at the initiation of the project when relationships with the national partners were first being established and country assessments, which are typically done via a country visit, but were instead undertaken online with a translator or interpreter, which was not optimal and had varying levels of success depending on the country. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, UNICRI had to cancel one expert workshop on technology options and practical recommendations for Member States, and moved the three remaining workshops online, with an adjusted approach given the challenges of interacting in online fora. For the SCR2370 guidelines, regional workshops with Member States to validate the guidelines had to be moved to the end of the project due to the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and were instead used to review and socialise the guidelines with Member States. In some cases, the activities adapted quickly to demonstrate strategic alignment between the projects' objectives and Member States needs particular to the COVID-19 pandemic context. For example, a virtual meeting with Jordanian national authorities was held to exchange lessons learned on the COVID-19 response (April 2020) and how to prepare for possible future high impact emergencies of similar scale and complexity. UNOCT and UNICRI also organised a webinar on COVID-19 and the spectre of bioterrorism with a focus on biotechnology, attended by more than 190 representatives.

While the findings of the report produced under the UNICRI/UNOCT Technology and Security project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security) had originally been planned to be widely disseminated and publicised, in order to prevent the findings being used by terrorist to inform their strategies, dissemination was moved to direct sharing with Member States upon request with visibility given via a presentation by UNOCT at a side event during Second Counter-Terrorism Week (June 2022) at the United Nations. This is in line with a Do No Harm approach.

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[25] https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16

See subsequent Effectiveness and Efficiency sections for further examples of modifications and adaptations made.

To what extent were the perspectives of rights holders and duty bearers considered during the design process?

The evaluation did not find any evidence of consultations with rights-holders (or CSOs representing diverse rights-holders) during the design of the Programme and pilot projects.[26] The Programme and project documents do not include evidence of the utilisation of secondary sources of information of rights-holders' perspectives being considered during the design phase. The perspectives of duty-bearers were considered during the design of the Programme in so far as the intended goal and outputs aligned with the GCTS. However, there is no evidence that there was specific consultation undertaken by the Programme team with duty-bearers specifically as part of the initial design process for the Programme. As noted above, several of the pilot projects were designed in light of specific capacity assessments undertaken by implementing partners (such as for engagements in Iraq and Jordan). National stakeholders were also consulted in both Iraq and Jordan during the design of both projects, and UNOCT interacted with their Permanent Missions in New York. However, one interviewee from a national authority involved in the implementation of a project reported said that they felt their organisation was not included sufficiently in the initial consultation on the design. The interviewee felt this impacted on the relevance of the initiative for their own needs. For the SALW Central Asia project, UNOCT interacted with the Permanent Missions in New York representing the Member States as requested by the Member States to promote internal coordination. Prior CTED assessments, which had been approved by the Member States, identified the needs and informed the activities. OPCW's design of the project on interoperability was reportedly informed via its interactions with Member States and requests for improvements in interoperability, although data/evidence of this is not included in the project document. Duty-bearers who took part in trainings under the 20 courses were asked which of the trainings they would like to take part in (rather than the course being imposed by UNOCT). The topics themselves were originally chosen after an internal discussion among the UNOCT programme team and refined with the contracted WMD/CBRN Consultant and UNOCT, considering how to avoid duplicating existing trainings already on offer. However, a deep consultation with duty-bearers during the design of the courses was not evident due to capacity constraints.

> Key Findings: The Programme and pilot projects align with/have relevance for the GCTS, SPRF, human rights obligations, the UN SDGs, and the strategic priorities of the implementing partners. Projects were chosen to meet either the needs of Member States or to meet gaps identified by Global Compact Working Group members. Some projects utilised novel approaches. Deep consultations with duty-bearers as beneficiaries for the design of the Programme and rights holders at any stage were not found to have occurred. Relevance to the WPS Agenda was limited although this is understandable as UNOCT programme teams lacked strategic guidance at the design stage on gender as the Gender Unit was not in existence at the time. There are opportunities for the capacity building trainings to have greater relevance to support the humanitarian responsiveness of Member States and to help them comply with their human rights obligations while preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism.

Coherence

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[26] This was explained by the Programme team because the focus of the Programme was capacity building to officials of Member States and no right-holders are involved as end beneficiaries.

To what extent were partnerships with different actors in the programme/project and UN agencies utilised successfully and interventions planned and delivered to be harmonised to promote synergies, create strategic partnerships, avoid gaps and duplications including coordination with Member States?

As described in more detail under 'Relevance' and 'Effectiveness', several partnerships were developed, and coherence was central to the Programme's design. The Programme engaged with a range of stakeholders including the UN entities and bodies CTED, UNIDIR, UNICRI, UNODC, UNODA, international organisations, and Member State bodies such as US DOS as implementing partners for joint initiatives and pilot projects. The Programme also sought the services of private consulting firms and individual expert consultants to support the delivery of certain aspects of the Programme work. Key successes include, a first joint UN-NATO project, a key partnership developed with INTERPOL, and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Global Coordination Compact Working Groups projects which engaged with working group members and were implemented in close collaboration with the implementing partners on areas of mutual strategic importance.

Partners reported positively about the relevance and effectiveness of the elements of the Programme designed to support coherence. Furthermore, in the evaluation survey of implementing/coordinating partners, 38% felt that the Programme has helped their organisation a great deal in achieving its own priorities, and a further 44% reported a fair amount. One in eight (13%) however, felt that the programme hasn't helped them very much to achieve their goals (see 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' sections for further elaboration on coherence challenges).

Chart 8. To what extent has your engagement(s) with UNOCT under this programme helped your organisation achieve its own priorities? Base: 16 implementing and coordinating partners

What aspects of the programme/project helped or hindered successful partnerships and management, coordination, monitoring, and oversight?

Refer to issues reported under relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

Key Findings: The evaluation finds that coordination was deeply embedded into the Programme design and implementation. Implementing partners reported positively about the value of the coordination efforts and the responsiveness and support provided by the UNOCT Programme team and the Programme has resulted in several important partnerships being established. Several hindering factors were identified related to the COVID-19 pandemic, dispersing of funds, contracting and administration issues, time and staffing resource constraints. Despite the challenges, the partnerships and coordination were perceived well by almost all partners.

Effectiveness

What has been the contribution of the intervention to the pillars of the GCTS and the Strategic Goals of the SPRF?

During the inception phase, the evaluation team noted several evaluability issues with the Programme and several projects which hinder the ability of this evaluation to make a comprehensive assessment of effectiveness at this mid-term stage.[27] For some key indicators, the evaluation integrated these into the evaluation data collection tools, however, this presents partial information given not all people involved in the Programme's delivery took part in the evaluation. The following section presents the learnings that have emerged from the evaluation, however, in future a systematic gathering of data via a comprehensive results-based monitoring system should be used. It is critical that the issues are addressed as soon as possible so that the Programme's results can be comprehensively assessed at the end of the Programme implementation period.

Based on a review of the collected monitoring data and primary data gathered over the course of the evaluation, the Programme and its subsidiary projects have been found to contribute results to pillar 2 of the GCTS by supporting 'measures to prevent and combat terrorism' and pillar 3 of the GCTS 'Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in the global counterterrorism enterprise.' The Programme and projects contribute results to Strategic Goal 3 'Reinforce responses to terrorist threats and attacks,' and Strategic Goal 1 'Foster further unity and collaboration within the UN against terrorism.' These results are presented in further detail in the following sub-section.

To what extent did the programme/project achieve its intended goal, outcomes, and outputs and what are the implications of the results? Do achieved results align with the expected theory of change for the interventions?

The following section presents an assessment of results achieved by the Programme at the mid-term stage against the indicators for the Programme goal, two outcomes, and five outputs. At the time of the evaluation, the Programme has developed and implemented seven projects,[28] 20 training courses, drafting three regional threat assessments and issuing one set of technical guidelines. The Programme has worked with 92 Duty-Bearing Member States, five International Organisations - The European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, INTERPOL, NATO, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and WCO, and 11 UN entities particularly (CTED), UNIDIR, UNICRI, UNODA, two divisions within UNODC, and OPCW), as well as the World Health Organization (WHO) on activities which directly relate to the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy for the purpose of improving the prevention, preparedness and response to a WMD/CBRN terrorist attack. Where possible, indicators from the logical framework were used as the basis for the assessment. Where these were not measurable or data was unavailable, information was gathered by the evaluation team.

Programme Goal: to contribute to making the world safer and more secure from WMD/CBRN terrorism through the implementation of the WMD/CBRN provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. More specifically, the programme seeks to support Member States, International Organisations and UN entities to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving WMD/CBRN materials.

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[27] The evaluability issues include an out-of-date logical framework for the Programme; logical framework indicators which are not being measured and assessed in a systematic manner; results not reported against the logical framework format due to lack of donor or organizational requirement for such reporting; quantitative or measurable targets or baseline values not having been set for each indicator at the Programme level; unclear/unmeasurable indicators; a long time period which is being assessed by the evaluation with no project mid-term reviews or end of project evaluations completed. These issues were largely explained as a result of the lack of support units (such as PMU and the ECU) in place within UNOCT when the Programme began. There is also a lack of programme-specific and also, in some cases, project-specific annual reports summarising key activities, adaptations and learnings, and some projects lack end-of-project reports. Activities are being reported on in UNOCT Quarterly and Annual Organizational reports, but these are in narrative format and do not report against the logical framework indictors and are aggregated along with all programmatic activities which is inefficient for the evaluation team to analyse. The Programme lacks a Theory of Change - while this was recreated by the evaluation team during inception phase for the purposes of this evaluation, had this been developed, tested and revised during the last 5 years of implementation, more specific learnings could have been incorporated and tested during this evaluation.

[28] Two additional projects have been developed but implementation began after the evaluation inception phase.

The goal of the Programme is highly ambitious and unrealistic given the size of the Programme. World safety from WMD/CBRN terrorism is not a measurable or quantifiable indicator which is being tracked by the Programme and is contributed to by a range of factors which are outside of the control of the Programme. Assessing the effectiveness of the Programme at the goal level is not feasible, particularly at the mid-term. In terms of the perceived effectiveness of the Programme in contributing to its intended goal, the evaluation survey found that only 29% of the surveyed implementing and coordinating partners felt that the Programme had been very effective at improving world safety (see Chart 3 below). A further 57% reported that the Programme had been fairly effective. The logical framework does not specify how the current goal level indicators would be measured (Decrease in the threat of WMD/CBRN terrorism, increase in global security) and the evaluation finds that more evidence is needed to demonstrate that terrorist groups have actually been prevented from accessing and using WMD materials via the Programme directly. The programmatic logical framework goal indicator should be revised to describe a realistic and feasible long-term contribution that the Programme can make on prevention, detection, and response to terrorist use of weapons, using language that adheres to Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound (S-M-A-R-T) indicator phrasing.

Chart 3: For each of the following, please say how effective, if at all, you think the UNOCT programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons (including WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS) has been in contributing to the following ambitions since 2018? Base. 21 implementing and coordinating partners.

Outcome 1: Member States implement enhanced policies, practices, procedures for the prevention, preparedness and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism and operate with improved awareness, knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk.

The evaluation finds that to date the Programme has made several contributions towards the achievement of this outcome, with examples of results from activities demonstrating improved awareness, knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk, and reports from beneficiaries that trainings resulted in changes in policy, practice and procedures. Measurable outcome targets to assess the achievements and outcome from underlying activities should be set for the end term so achievement can be objectively assessed.

The evaluation survey (see chart 3 above) of implementing and coordinating partners found that a half (52%) reported that the Programme had been very effective at contributing to Member States operating with improved capacities, awareness, knowledge and understanding of the threats (33% reported the Programme was fairly effective). A third of these respondents (33%) also felt that the Programme has been very effective at contributing to Member States implementing enhanced policies with a further 48% rating the Programme as fairly effective.

A large majority of beneficiaries who took part in the evaluation survey confirmed that they had made changes or reforms to approaches and infrastructure related to prevention and response to terrorist acquisition and use of weapons, materials, and components (WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS), due to the support they had received from UNOCT and its partner implementing organisations. Three quarters (73%) reported that changes had been made, while 11% reported that no changes had occurred and a further 16% reported that they didn't know. The survey also found just over two in five (44%) of beneficiaries who took part in the evaluation survey confirmed that the UNOCT's support under this programme had contributed to improving their readiness *a great deal*. A further 47% of beneficiaries reported that their national authority's readiness had improved *a little* (only 6% reported that there had been no change). National coordinating partners were slightly less optimistic about their national readiness as a result of the training with only one out of five saying that their country's readiness had improved a great deal, while 3 out of 5 reported that it had improved just a little (1 said don't know).

Specification is needed in future as what level of 'contribution' is expected by the Programme and a rigorous method to assess Member States' capacities to prevent, prepare and respond. Based on the quality, quantity and comprehensiveness (in terms of subject matter) of the projects delivered by the Programme, it has objectively succeeded in attainment of this goal based on a review by the SME via this evaluation. However, quantification of success particularly for reporting and comparative purposes (against projects within and without the Programme) cannot be achieved without measurable metrics for success. The logical framework does not specify how many Member States the Programme sought to target to improve their prevention, preparedness and response. In some cases (see section below Output 4), the initiatives have resulted in improved knowledge and awareness but have yet to result in changes to operations. Monitoring systems have not been created to gather follow-up information after activities have ended to collect evidence of changes to operations, policies, practices, or procedures from all beneficiaries, which is needed to conclusively demonstrate the extent of the effectiveness of the Programme at achieving this outcome. Given these elements are currently lacking, the evaluation is not able to assess the likelihood that outcome will be achieved by the end of the Programme.

Outcome 2: International Organisations and UN entities support Member States in the prevention, preparedness and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism in a more informed and coordinated manner, reflecting the "All-of-UN" approach.

The evaluation finds that to date the Programme has made several contributions towards the achievement of this outcome, with several examples of activities contributing evidence of coordination between UNOCT, International Organisations and other UN entities to support Member States in the prevention, preparedness, and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism (albeit with a fairly limited geographical reach). Measurable outcome targets should be set for the end term so achievement can be objectively assessed.

This includes the first joint project between UNOCT and NATO in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan), and the interagency SALW Central Asia project (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW). Three pilot projects were undertaken which were informed by the Global Compact Working Group member requests and supported a response to Member State needs. Unfortunately, the first of its kind joint UNOCT-INTERPOL regional threat assessments have not been published yet. However, restricted/law enforcement sensitive versions of these reports have been disseminated through partnership with INTERPOL. Ostensibly, while limited in distribution, these reports are supporting key law enforcement agencies tasked with counterterrorism and countering WMDs within Member States, although to a lesser extent than had they been published. In the case of the ICSANT project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism), UNOCT and UNODC engaged

with one another during the design and implementation of their respective activities. Additionally, during the final stages of the project, UNOCT and UNODC established a coordination mechanism to jointly design the second phase of the project, particularly looking at issues related to budgets and overlapping mandates.

As shown in chart 3 above, just over three in five of the surveyed implementing and coordinating partners felt that the Programme had been very effective at seeing international organisations and UN entities operating in a more coordinated manner. The remaining 38% of respondents answered that the Programme had been fairly effective. Almost a half (48%) also thought that the Programme had been very effective in ensuring better interagency coordination supported Member States (43% reported the Programme had been fairly effective at this). The beneficiaries who took part in the evaluation survey, confirmed positive perceptions about the coordination of support to their national entity by international organisations and UN Entities. Two in five (39%) reported that the support was very well coordinated while 51% reported that the support was fairly well coordinated. Similar results were found with the national coordinating partners, where one out of five reported that support was very well coordinated, while three reported the support was fairly well coordinated (1 said don't know).

Some improvements in coordination, efficiency and partnerships are needed for UNOCT to better realise and maintain the relationships it is establishing. A monitoring system is also needed to track perceptions of Member States to the level and quality of interagency coordination.

Output 1: Visibility. Member States, International Organisations and UN entities have greater awareness of UNOCT WMD/CBRN activities, thereby facilitating potential cooperation with and mobilisation of resources for UNOCT.

The evaluation finds that the Programme has substantially improved the visibility of UNOCT WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS activities. The workplan (which covered activities up until 2022), expected UNOCT programme team to participate in approximately 37 different events as well as to organise visibility and promotional events at UN Headquarters. The Programme team collects the information on such events, both through an internal tracker document, as well as through the UNOCT App. While not every event has been recorded, the data collected indicates participation in over 150 visibility events, demonstrating that the target was far exceeded already at the mid-term stage.

As shown in chart 4 below, 48% of implementing and coordinating partners reported that the Programme had been very effective at improving UNOCT's visibility on countering terrorist use of weapons (output 1), while a further 48% reported the Programme had been fairly effective. The evaluation survey results also found the large majority (67%) of implementing and coordinating partners are now much more aware than they had been in 2018 of UNOCT activities on countering terrorist use of weapons (including WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS), while a further one third (33%) of implementing partners say that they are now a little more aware.

Chart 4: And how effective, if at all, do you think the UNOCT programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons has been at achieving each of the following ambitions since 2018? Base. 21 implementing and coordinating partners

Output 1	48%	48%	5%
Output 2	43%	57%	
Output 3	52%	38%	5% 5%
Output 4	29%	62%	5% 5%
Output 5	48%	43%	5% 5%

■ Very effective ■ Fairly effective ■ Not very effective ■ Not at all effective ■ Don't know

The Programme did place a heavy emphasis on visibility and attending events and while this did contribute to improved awareness of UNOCT activities, potential *cooperation* was only evidenced for the Working Group meetings attended. However, record keeping under this output area is inconsistent and there were an extensive variety of other meetings/events to which the Programme team have attended (including those organised under the output 4 projects) which have contributed to improve cooperation but were not planned to be counted as such in the original workplan. The Programme team reported that involvement in certain meetings played a role in securing resource mobilisation for UNOCT. The meetings did also contribute to improved *coordination* (which was not specified in the programme document), which should be incorporated into the logical framework and theory of change in future.

Output 2: Partnerships. UNOCT has strengthened strategic partnerships with relevant WMD/CBRN-related members of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and Member States' International Initiatives, enabling the development of joint, complementary and mutually reinforcing projects.

The evaluation finds that the Programme has achieved the total planned number of partnerships. The workplan (which covers up until 2022) planned to result in five exchange of letters and five Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) being agreed. At the time of the evaluation, instead the Programme has resulted in two exchange of letters and eight MOUs /Agreements with different entities. Key successes from the Programme include the first joint UN-NATO project ever (implemented in Jordan), and a first of its kind partnership between UNOCT and INTERPOL on the production and joint publication of regional threat assessments. The pilot projects were all considered strategically relevant, complementary, and mutually reinforcing by the implementing partners interviewed as part of this evaluation. As shown in chart 4 above, almost half (43%) of the implementing and coordinating partners surveyed considered the Programme to have been very effective at strengthening strategic partnerships, with 57% reporting it has been fairly effective. Challenges during implementation of some projects have caused frustrations for a few of the partnerships and have undermined somewhat the value that these joint initiatives could have brought (see effectiveness and efficiency hindering factors below).

Output 3: Threat/risk analysis. Member States, International Organisations and UN entities have advanced knowledge and understanding of the risk and level of the threat of terrorist groups accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials.

The evaluation finds that, when measured using the current logical framework indicators, the Programme has not been as effective for this output. The Programme planned to achieve this via production of an "academic

study" on the global threat and risk of terrorist groups accessing and using WMD and CBRN materials, focusing in particular on capabilities, vulnerabilities, impact, and the relevance of new technologies. This area of work evolved and adapted, with the first ever partnership of this kind between UNOCT and INTERPOL on the production of three regional threat assessments (which INTERPOL would have responsibility for conducting the analysis due to its access to classified information received from its members). A fourth report was under production at the time of writing.

During production and the review stage for the reports, the plans for dissemination adapted and revised, in part due to the sensitivity of the findings and in response to the UNOCT internal review process have not yet been approved for publication. To date no reports have yet been published by UNOCT.[29] According to the indicators in the logical framework, the achievement of this output area would be measured by the number of recipients of the report, number of positive feedback to the report received, and number of citations, and would include a record of the distribution list as evidence. It is therefore not possible at the mid-term stage to evaluate the effectiveness of the Programme for these outputs. The reports are very likely, when disseminated, to contribute to enhancing knowledge and understanding of the risks, given they are unique reports and contain country specific risks and identify gaps in evidence. It is vital that they are published in a timely manner by UNOCT so that the reports continue to be seen as up to date and useful by recipients, as the findings the reports contain are time sensitive and will require regular updates to remain accurate and useful. Some preliminary findings have been disseminated in presentations and meetings by both INTERPOL and UNOCT, and attendees were reportedly appreciative of the findings. Redacted versions of the reports were distributed by INTERPOL to its Member States under agreement of this programme. Since UNOCT does not have access to the INTERPOL versions of these reports, nor did the office control that distribution process, nor have access to any feedback, monitoring and evaluation data, it is not possible to determine effectiveness. The logical framework should be adapted as soon as possible to allow for evaluation at the end-term of the regional threat assessments, and to also include indicators to track and measure contribution from knowledge-products produced by some pilot projects.

Output 4: Capacity-building. Member States have improved capacities in prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving WMD/CBRN materials in line with international obligations, standards and best practices.

The evaluation finds that the Programme has had substantial effectiveness at directly contributing to Member States having improved capacities in prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving WMD/CBRN materials in line with international obligations, standards, and best practices. The programmatic workplan (up until 2022) foresaw six capacity building projects being developed, although it did not include a target number of Member States nor a robust method to assess improved capacity. These were intended as pilot projects which would be scaled up in future.

The Programme has resulted in four[30] pilot projects plus the 20 training course portfolio being developed under the output 4 (although some of which are more closely aligned to improving capacities of Member States than others). The key results from each of these initiatives based on a review of documents provided during the inception and fieldwork phase of the evaluation is summarised in the table below. The table includes a summary of the technical review undertaken by the CBRN Expert on a sample of key outputs and deliverables from the Programme:

Table 3: Summary Table of Key Results by Activity/Pilot Project

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[29] INTERPOL published first report for Middle East and North Africa internally as a classified version to their National Crime Bureaus in 2021, but it has not been approved for wider release by UNOCT yet.
[30] Two additional projects have also been developed and implemented, but as these began after the evaluation inception phase, they are outside the scope of this evaluation.

Project	Planned Results	Achieved Results (to date)
CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq)	Output 1.1 Increased awareness and knowledge among academia, industry, and law enforcement in Iraq to recognize and disrupt efforts by non-State actors to build mobile chemical and biological weapons laboratories	Antalya meeting in February 2020 focused on Countering Clandestine Chemical and Biological Threats for 42 participants (42 M / 0 F). There was no available data at the time of data collection on this training. Contained virtual reality training.
	Output 1.2 Enhanced national capacities to counter CBRN terrorism through trainings	The project delivered the following five courses: - A three-day training course on Chemical Countermeasures and a two-day Chemical Incident Table-Top exercise (TTX) 17-21 October 2021 for 20 participants (15 M / 5 F) from Iraqi national security agencies, law enforcement and military sector in Istanbul, Türkiye. - A joint 5-day training course on Introduction to WMD Science in Istanbul, Türkiye for 15 representatives (15 M / 0 F) from Iraqi national authorities (policy makers, government authorities, industry representatives and law enforcement officials) from 14-18 November 2021. -- Training courses on Intermediate Biological Threats (5-9 December 2021) 16 government officials (15 M / 1 F) and Advanced Bioterrorism and in-person training course on Intermediate Radiological and Nuclear Threats for Iraqi national officials in Istanbul Türkiye, 9-13 January 2022 including one TTX, 19 representatives (17 M / 2 F), which was shortened as participants contracted COVID-19. **TECHNICAL REVIEW FINDINGS**: The trainings in this project are technically accurate and have no inconsistencies with established science and practice. The project also aligns with international standards of practice in terms of scientific and technical material and concepts presented. The TTX was found to be a particularly strong aspect of the project in terms of its ability to provide accurate and detailed information, consistent with international standards. Moreover, this training provided a novel offering, and an advanced forum for learning and collaboration. From a technical perspective, the trainings in the project lacked either a national or regional context and relied heavily on US-centric experiences and materials (for example, the scenarios used in the TTX take place in the USA and are not easy to imagine in the MENA region).
	Output 1.3 Strengthened safety and security culture among chemical and biological researchers within the Iraqi academic community	- A Chemical and Bio risk Management Awareness Raising Conference was held in Istanbul, Türkiye from 8-12 December 2019, with 24 Iraqi participants (21 M / 3 F) The purpose of the conference was to instil foundational chemical and biological security concepts to ensure that WMD-applicable materials present in bioscience institutions in Iraq cannot be diverted and weaponized by nefarious actors.
	Output 1.4 Improved multi-sectoral coordination among national authorities to prevent, detect and respond to biological terrorism. All the activities related to this output will be implemented by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)	- A finalization meeting on Multi-Sectorial Coordination on Biological Terrorism Response in Iraq from 21-23 March 2022 in Istanbul, Türkiye (informed by three inception meetings and two technical meetings held from September 2021 to December 2021). 21 Iraqi participants agreed on the content of the three action plans of the National Strategy, and in particular roles and responsibilities, as well as the timeline towards the finalized document. SNL and UNCCT continued the efforts until the submission of the strategy for official approval by the end of 2022. No feedback survey results were provided. - Drafting of an Iraq National Strategy and Action Plan to Improve Multi-Sectoral Coordination for Bioterrorism Response. There was no available data at the time of data collection.
	Output 1.5 Increased readiness of emergency personnel to respond to biological terrorism	- A training course for emergency personnel focusing on biosafety and biosecurity education, medical. response skill sets, command and control principals, and exercises to test capabilities entitled 'Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness for Crisis Responders took place from 12-16 December 2021 for 18 government officials (15 M / 3 F). 100% of participants planned to apply the knowledge gained during the training for both improving personal performance and teaching others.
For CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan)	Output 1 Increased awareness of the capability gaps in the areas of resilience, preparedness, and consequence management in response to a CBRN terrorist attack	In addition to Jordanian participation in NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre consequence management field exercise, the project signing ceremony and original fact-finding mission, this output resulted in the development of: - A tailored self-assessment methodology and the organising of a first self-assessment workshop from 19-21 August 2019 in Amman Jordan with 16 participants (19 M / 1 F) from national CBRN stakeholders and also attended by UNODA, the Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence for Middle East, INTERPOL, UNICRI and UNODC. Feedback from the workshop was positive as nine out of 14 respondents answered that they very strongly agreed that "the workshop improved my understanding of the state of the CBRN resilience and preparedness in Jordan, as well as my capacity to perform my duties." More time was requested and to expand the scope. Positive responses from national stakeholders were also received via email. - A 2nd Self-Assessment Workshop of Jordan's CBRN Resilience Preparedness and Consequence Management on 9 December 2019, to review the key findings

		and strategic recommendations of the First Self-Assessment Workshop, with 31 participants (28 M / 3 F). - Senior Leaders Workshop CBRN Training Centre of Excellence, Zarqa 10 December 2019. Positive feedback received in feedback survey (23 M / 2 F), with 11 agreeing and 13 strongly agreeing that "the workshop improved my understanding of the state of the CBRN resilience and preparedness in Jordan, as well as my capacity to perform my duties." More practical elements requested as well as hearing from other Member States with experience.
	Output 2 Greater knowledge and understanding of theoretical and practical aspects of responding to a CBRN terrorist attack	The project organised: - A virtual meeting on 8 April 2020 with exchange of lessons learned on the COVID-19 with 22 participants (gender breakdown unknown) including the Jordan Armed Forces, National Security and Crisis Management Center, Ministry of Health, Civil Defence Directorate, Ministry of Interior, Public Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior. - A virtual workshop on desk-review findings towards a National Crisis Plan in response to a CBRN terrorist attack, from 28-29 September 2021, with eight participants, all male. - An in-person workshop on National Crisis Plan in response to a CBRN Terrorist Attack in Zarqa, Jordan from 16-17 January 2022, with 25 participants, all male. - An in-person training course for 20 participants (15 M / 5 F) for Jordanian First Responders to CBRN Incidents (informed by a NATO course) 'Introduction to the International CBRN Training Curriculum for Trainers of First Responders to CBRN Incidents' held at the NATO Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov from 23-25 May 2022. The event also included a practical demonstration and training at the Fire Protection and Training Centre in Brno from 26-27 May 2022. This was originally planned for 2020 and was postponed due to COVID-19.
	Output 3 Improved capacity to address existing gaps in the areas of preparedness and response to a CBRN terrorist attack	The project organised: - An initial planning conference from 1-2 March 2022 as a scoping meeting for the CBRN field exercise with a virtual reality component, attended by 20 participants (19 M / 1 F). - A main planning conference from 11-12 May 2022 to prepare for a CBRN field exercise attended by 40 participants (40 M / 1 F). - A final planning conference in 20-21 July 2022 attended by 34 participants (31 M / 3 F). A main exercise, Jordan, from 18-22 September 2022 was attended by 2,500 participants from 35 national entities (gender breakdown unknown) which aimed to test the national crisis action plan. A post project feedback survey of 10 participants found 50% very satisfied and 40% satisfied with the project. - A high-level meeting to present the results of the project was conducted from 10-12 September 2022. According to participants survey, over 90% of project participants expressed satisfaction with the project and noted that Jordan's abilities to respond to, plan and train for CBRN incidents has increased because of the project.
ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism)	Outcome 1: The number of Parties to ICSANT is increased and there is heightened awareness of ICSANT among beneficiaries (national policy and decision makers, including Parliamentarians) and in international fora	Key highlights include: - Advocacy events in Albania (26 national participants, 16 M / 8 F), the Philippines (70 national participants, 35 M / 35 F), Tajikistan (21 national participants, 19 M / 2 F) and Togo (30 national participants, 20 M / 10 F) Both Albania and Tajikistan have since ratified ICSANT. - A high-level event was held with the EU in New York on reinforcing the global nuclear security architecture on the margins of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for 230 participants (130 M / 100 F). - Awareness was also raised via a launch event, a briefing to Permanent Missions of the Member States to the United Nations in New York, a high-level side event on the margins of the UNOCT Counter-Terrorism Week in New York, and participation by UNOCT in 43 visibility events organised by international partners. Press releases and social media posts were released to raise awareness of these events. - Regular meetings were also held with Oman, who has since also ratified the convention. - Internal monitoring data reported on at the end of project report, says that there was positive feedback from 80 Member States. Seven Member States reported improving knowledge and understanding of the importance of adhering to ICSANT, as seen through consultations and communications with the respective countries. - A study on reasons Member States have not ratified was being finalized in collaboration with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and is awaiting publication.
	Outcome 2: The capacity of Member States to detect and respond to the threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials is strengthened	The project organised: - Six capacity-building events on Border Security and Management as well a virtual case study: A "Snow Leopard" tabletop exercise and workshop on legal frameworks and nuclear forensics in Dushanbe, from 30 May - 1 June 2023, for 60 participants (47 M / 13 F) from 13 national agencies in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

		- "Lutetia" Tabletop Exercise and Workshop on Radiological/Nuclear detection and links to traditional national security for 70 participants (61 M / 9 F) from 25 national agencies in the Sahel and other international organisations. - "Med Trident" Tabletop Exercise and workshop on nuclear detection and forensics for 78 participants (60 M / 18 F) from 20 countries in the Mediterranean Basin as well as South East and Eastern Europe. - Virtual workshop on strengthening cooperation in nuclear security detection and response for the Horn of Africa for 42 participants from nine countries (33 M / 9 F). - Virtual Workshop on Strengthening cooperation in nuclear security detection and response in South East Asia for 114 participants from 10 countries (67 M / 47 F). - Virtual Case Study on the Detection of R/N material and International Exchanges of Information for 204 participants from 29 countries (136 M / 68 F). - Nuclear Detection at Blue and Green Borders Workshop and Table-top Exercise for 86 participants from 31 countries (70 M / 16 F). According to reported survey results, 93% of national authorities that completed a post-event survey reported that the exercises increased their capacities in terms of detecting and responding to nuclear terrorism. From the Med Trident and the Lutetia surveys, 17 participants indicated they were likely or very likely to work on plans and related strategic documents that refer to radiological/nuclear terrorism, with a further 14 confirming that they have worked on plans and related strategic documents.
SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW)	1110: Increased knowledge of SALW normative and institutional frameworks, regulatory measures and the respective gaps in national legislation by targeted national judicial and law enforcement agencies as well as national institutions in Central Asia	According to latest annual report provided, the project is on track to reach its target. Four out of the planned five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) reported enhanced use and improvement of SALW normative, institutional and regulatory frameworks in line with international instruments and in respect of human rights. Four countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) have accepted over 75% of the proposed recommendations following the legislative workshops, which exceeds the targeted number of three out of five. **TECHNICAL REVIEW:** The project is technically accurate and has no inconsistencies with established international scientific knowledge and practice. The project was a particularly strong project in terms of its ability to provide accurate and detailed information, consistent with international standards. Moreover, this engagement(s) provided a novel offering in this space, and the research was unable to find any similar project of this nature. The series of roadmap evaluations conducted for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan focus on strengthening national capabilities to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW and their supply to terrorist Organisations, were technically sound. Overall, this suite of activities was well conceived and crafted, and filled a needed gap in the Programme's offerings that cater to the most common threat faced in this region. It is also a novel concept and extremely well developed, based on the review of available documents.
	1210: Increased awareness of effective cooperation and information sharing to detect, investigate and prosecute complex cases involving the terrorism-SALW-organized crime nexus among judicial and law enforcement agencies at regional and international levels, in Central Asia	According to latest annual report provided, the project is on track to reach its targets. Two out of a planned three regional meetings have been attended by all five Central Asian countries. Also 95% (74% high confidence and 21% moderate confidence) reported confidence to use cooperation and information sharing in addressing firearms trafficking cases and associated offences, exceeding the target.
	1310: Increased knowledge of targeted law enforcement agencies in Central Asia to conduct intelligence analysis, monitoring, and mapping of firearms trafficking, especially in the context of terrorism	This will be calculated at the end of the project period. No monitoring data provided.
	1410: Enhanced knowledge of judicial and law enforcement agencies in Central Asia* to detect, interdict, investigate and prosecute terrorism activities involving illicitly manufactured, trafficked, or diverted SALW by criminal groups, taking into account gender and human rights considerations in all relevant cases	This will be calculated at the end of the project period. No monitoring data provided, although preliminary survey data for the underlying immediate outcomes suggest the project is on track to increase awareness and knowledge of participants. Gender disaggregated data for the effectiveness of the trainings is not provided. Unfortunately, the target only specifies the % of survey respondents that are female rather than monitoring gender variation in the effectiveness of the trainings.
20 Courses	No project document as they are intended as a consolidated training programme under output 4, however, are included in this table to summarise their contribution to the Programme Output 4	Based, on the internal post training feedback survey results from 505 trainees (385 M / 120 F): - 70% of trainees said that they found the content of the virtual training and the good practices relevant to their work (71 % M / 64% F) - 97% of trainees rated the quality of the capacity building support received, including good practices and tools presented, good or very good (97 % M / 98% F)

	- 65% of trainees said the knowledge and skills acquired have improved their understanding of the topics discussed and will be useful in the performance of their duties (67 % M / 58% F). See Annex 11 for the technical review of these trainings.

The evaluation feedback received from beneficiaries, showed that the majority of trainees surveyed confirmed that the capacity building activity(ies) they took part in were very effective (67%) at increasing their knowledge and skills on the topic with a further 28% reporting that they were fairly effective. Initial feedback documented in the programme's monitoring data following the 20 courses capacity building exercises found that 65% of trainees said the knowledge and skills acquired have improved their understanding of the topics discussed and will be useful in the performance of their duties (see Table 2 above). Differences in results may be due to question wording differences, or the fact that more satisfied attendees were willing to engage with this mid-term evaluation. An end-term evaluation should be supported by the Programme team to reach a larger cohort of participants in the capacity building activities.

Also positively, this mid-term evaluation survey found that a majority of beneficiaries (52%) report having put into practice often the knowledge gained through the training workshop or capacity building exercise while a further two-fifths of trainees (38%) report having put the knowledge into practice once or twice. Only 6% of trainees reported never having implemented the learnings. Attendees most appreciated the experience and knowledge of the trainers, to which almost two thirds (64%) reported as being very good, followed by the quality of the training materials (rated as very good by 51%). Areas for improvement include the incorporation of the cross-cutting issues of human rights and gender equality which only 36% said was very well incorporated into the trainings (this was also seen as an area for improvement by the training coordinators). In terms of encouraging national ownership, only 33% of trainees felt this had been done very well via the trainings however, the training coordinators disagreed, feeling that this was well incorporated into the trainings. Further investigation is needed as to the extent to which trainings are encouraging national ownership of the outcomes and how this can be further improved going forward.

Chart 5. On a scale from very good to very bad, how would you rate the UNOCT training/workshop/capacity building exercise you participated in, on each of the following aspects... Base. 78 Trainees

Aspect	Very good	Good	Neither good nor bad	Bad	Very bad	Don't know
Experience and knowledge of the trainers	64%	35%	1%			
Quality of the training materials (such as videos, handbooks, notes)	51%	45%	4%			
Relevance of the topic to the terrorist issues your country is facing	49%	44%	6%	1%		
Improving coordination between your organization and the UNOCT	48%	31%	12%	4%	5%	
Establishing a new partnership between your organization and the UNOCT	44%	34%	16%	1%	6%	
Addressing knowledge gaps of the national entity you work with on specific aspects of terrorism	41%	50%	9%			
The training's alignment with the policies, needs and priorities of your country/institution	40%	54%	5%	1%		
Building the capacity of your agency to respond to the threat of terrorism	38%	50%	8%	3%	1%	
Delivering quality outputs in a timely manner	37%	51%	9%			3%
Consideration of cross cutting issues of human rights and gender equality in the training and materials delivered	36%	44%	15%			5%
Encouraging ownership of the training outcomes by your country/institution	33%	53%	9%			5%

The evaluation feedback from trainees aligned with several qualitative and technical factors observed in the Programme's technical review undertaken by the Substantive Expert. Well-developed curricula and SME-led instruction contributed significantly to knowledge retention and skill acquisition. The high effectiveness rating (67%) can be attributed to the practical relevance of the training content, hands-on learning methodologies such as TTXs, and engagement with real-world case studies, which enabled trainees to apply theoretical knowledge to operational contexts. The alignment of training content with international norms and best practices further enhanced its credibility and applicability and made the learning experience more impactful for participants. From a technical standpoint, the sample of trainings reviewed by the substantive expert demonstrated the attributes and requirements of similar global initiatives aimed at improving prevention, preparedness, and response capabilities for CBRN threats. The projects assessed were in strong alignment with international scientific and technical norms, and presented well-structured, evidence-based frameworks. These are essential traits for promulgating technical and scientific information to an international audience, tasked with utilising the knowledge gained during a crisis situation.

Capacity-building initiative coordinators and partners during the evaluation interviews, while reporting very positively about the engagement and support from UNOCT, also reported several challenges which tempered improvements in the capacities of the participating agencies. These include: challenges of the online modality for providing trainings (necessary, however, due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions); online modes offering fewer opportunities for participation/interactive engagement; training courses provided at a more basic level, while for capacities to be built, more specific, nationally tuned in-person trainings – especially for more experienced staff - would be appreciated; more opportunities requested for TTXs or practices with the testing of equipment (which were made challenging due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions); in-person visits requested once pandemic

restrictions were lifted to critical infrastructure for in-country assessments; challenges gathering the right people for the trainings. In some Member States, too few people were reported as having been trained for 'national and institutional capacities' to be conclusively strengthened; and a lack of a comprehensive TTT approach in some Member States was missing which would have ensured learnings are shared more widely.[31]

Challenges to effectiveness noted by the Substantive Expert during the technical review of the courses, highlighted that from a scientific and technical accuracy perspective, during the review of training courses, it was found in several cases that the content was generalised and not tailored specifically to national or regional contexts. Specifically, several Member States received identical trainings, with no variation for regional context and were developed for a US-centric audience. While maintaining core training standards and materials is critical to sustainability and quality control, some minor variation in content is recommended when the same trainings are provided in different countries and regions.

The evaluation noted that online training modes, while necessary due to the pandemic, offered fewer engagement opportunities, reinforcing technical findings that emphasised the need for more hands-on and more advanced-level training, practical applications, and real-time scenario-based exercises (TTX),[32] based on the needs and capabilities of the Member State. In-person trainings which have been delivered by the programme team since pandemic restrictions were lifted, as well as for the Iraq project, can be more engaging for participants although this warrants further assessment by the end-term evaluation. While a more comprehensive use of TTXs as a method for bringing all relevant participants to discuss a scenario, response plans, and identify strengths and weaknesses of their plans, policies, or procedures should be incorporated into the Programme's training modalities. While the provision of practical trainings with equipment testing for improving national response capabilities was not envisioned within the Programme's original design, the inclusion of such practical elements would support future efforts by the Programme Team to improve trainees' ability to translate knowledge into operational readiness to respond to threats of terrorism. While the Programme was not constituted to provide equipment and hands-on training, established adult learning principles indicate that the adult learner retains very little of what is heard (20%) and seen (30%) in classroom/presentation style trainings, but has significant memory recall (90%) from physical activities performed during trainings.[33] The incorporation of hands-on training elements for threats, countermeasures, and response training courses by the Programme Team would support the Programme's effectiveness and sustainability. The technical review noted the utility and cost-effectiveness of the Programme's ability to rapidly pivot to providing online and virtual training as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These offerings, if modified, can be used as a means of increasing impact and sustainability of the Programme.

Overall, there was appreciation for the trainings given and several national stakeholders interviewed and in the open-ended questions in the survey welcomed and requested continued support, including more substantial and comprehensive support in the future if possible, recognising the importance of improving capacities to respond to threats of terrorism. Of the national implementing/coordinating partners who took part in the survey, four out of five said that they were very likely to recommend the UNOCT training(s)/ workshop/ capacity building exercises in future to other relevant stakeholders, while one reported that they would be fairly likely to recommend it. Of the trainees themselves, 87% said that they were very likely to recommend it while 11% reported that they were fairly likely to recommend it.

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[31] While the Programme team does share materials with participants who complete the trainings, train-the-trainer approaches are tailored trainings to targeted audiences, specifically selected and instructed in how to provide follow-on trainings to other members of their organisations.

[32] While many of the Programme's trainings referenced case studies and scenarios for group discussion, a robust use of TTX would include a discussion-based exercise intended to develop, validate and/or revise an existing plan, with an 'After Action Review' produced at the conclusion of the training. See here for further information: https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Homeland-Security-Exercise-and-Evaluation-Program-Doctrine-2020-Revision-2-2-25.pdf

[33] Source: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA130532.pdf

Output 5: International interagency coordination. The UN System, through the UN Interagency WMD Working Group, has improved international interagency coordination on preventing and responding to WMD/CBRN terrorist attacks.

The Programme has achieved its planned contributions to improving international interagency coordination on preventing and responding to WMD/CBRN terrorist attacks. The targeted number of three initiatives supported was achieved. One was the interoperability project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability) in the case of a chemical terrorist attack. The second was SCR2370 technical guidelines project (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370), which brought together 44 UN and non-UN entities to review and promote the document, and the third is the technology and security project (the specific results from these initiatives are presented in Table 2 above). The UNOCT programme team participated in 59 Working Group meetings during the assessed time period up until July 2023 and in the case of several projects UNOCT supported improved coordination for the development of the projects, encouraging participation by other working group members and supporting the gathering during the review of reports. The Programme team did provide technical expertise and guidance as planned, although precise ways to measure this were not conceived at the start of the Programme. The Global Compact WG BMLE met four times in 2021 and held two virtual meetings in 2022. The Global Compact Working Group on ETCIP held four quarterly meetings and two thematic briefings in 2021, and met four times in 2023.[19]

Table 4: Summary Table of Key Results by Activity/Pilot Project

Project	Planned Results	Achieved Results (to date)
Technology and Security guidelines (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security)	Outcome 1: Member States and the members of the UN Interagency WMD WG have advanced knowledge about new and emerging WMD terrorist threats and innovative technology solutions capable of helping mitigate WMD terrorism, as well as a set of strategic recommendations and concrete follow-up actions for capacity-building - Output 1.1: Report detailing background on WMD-terrorism relevant advances in science and technology, risk scenarios (describing CBRN terrorist threats and evolving terrorist tactics that could exploit advances in science and technology to gain access to and/or deploy WMD), technology-based countermeasures matched to the identified risk scenarios, and a set of strategic recommendations and follow-up actions for capacity-building (phase two)	UNICRI involved more than 80 experts from Member States, academia, research centres and industry to discuss risks scenarios and possible technology-based solutions during three workshops. A fourth expert workshop on technology options and practical recommendations was cancelled. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Global Coordination Compact – WG ET&CIP, INTERPOL, UNODA, OPCW, IAEA, CTED, FAO, WHO and the experts from the 1540 UNSCR offered several inputs and feedback on the risks and technology-based ideas to combat WMD terrorism. The final report was peer-reviewed by the WG ET&CIP as well as reviewed by the participants of the three virtual workshops. The final report offers an overview of risks and benefits associated with WMD-relevant advances in science and technology, describes fictional scenarios on the misuse of four different technologies (drones, AI, synthetic biology and additive manufacturing), analyses of a set of innovative technology-based ideas to prevent and combat WMD terrorism, and lastly a set of strategic recommendations and follow-up actions for capacity-building. UNICRI and UNOCT/UNCCT distributed the final report to Member States that requested it (due to sensitivity of information the report was not widely circulated or placed online). UNICRI and UNOCT/UNCCT organized a final webinar to share main findings with Member States, as part of the Second United Terrorism Counter-Terrorism Week. The event gathered more than 250 representatives from Member States, international and regional Organisations, academia and the private sector. **TECHNICAL REVIEW:** The UNICRI WMD Report on Science, Technology, and Innovation is a well-researched and methodologically sound document that is particularly strong in its technical rigor and coverage of fields like AI, synthetic biology, and blockchain. The report could be improved by integrating human rights considerations, gender analysis, and practical implementation strategies. Expanding discussions on cross-border cooperation, digital forensics, and cybersecurity threats would further enhance its utility. Overall, it is a valuable contribution that could benefit from periodic updates to maintain relevance and impact.
For review Interope	- Outcome 1.1 Agencies will be better prepared to respond with other agencies to a crisis - Outcome 1.2 The capacity of agencies to respond with other agencies during a crisis, upon	The project document specifies that the means for measuring achievement for both outcomes one and two is "Total number of products and services realized as designed." The same indicator is specified for all outcome indicators, and was an inappropriate choice given the outcomes. Key areas

rability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability	receiving a State Party's request for assistance, will be improved - Outcome 2: The interactions between agencies during Phase III, particularly between agencies across the humanitarian, health, and security sectors, will help agencies improve their understanding of the mandates and operations of other agencies	of success include the establishment of a network of Functional Focal Points and agreement on its Terms of Reference; a report on Inter-agency Workshop on Information Exchange and Compendium of agencies' response resources; an inter-agency report on areas of cooperation between Emergency Response Centres and Draft Programme of Work Emergency Response Centres; the development of a non-mandatory checklist for deployment; the drafting of a summary of agencies' views on three Key Recommendations; and progress in establishing bi- or multi-lateral agreements as well as OPCW participating in conferences and events related to the Biological Weapons Convention. There has been some progress in the signing of MoUs with partner agencies. MoUs are in place between OPCW and OCHA, OPCW and UNDSS and OPCW and WCO; an OPCW and INTERPOL MoU is expected to be signed in 2024; and exploratory discussions for a joint MoU have taken place between OPCW and WHO. Project funds were not allocated for the development of the training course for inter-agency cooperative training on hazards of biological and chemical weapons, however, WHO and OPCW did discuss this during meetings and will develop this when funds are available. A proposal for a sustainable mechanism to facilitate training delivery will be developed once those funds are available.
SCR2370 Technical Guidelines UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370	- Increase awareness and knowledge on implementation of measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons and improve capacity of Member States in this area. - Contribute to the enhancement of Member States national legislative, strategic and operational capacities to prevent and respond to terrorist acquisition and use of small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and unmanned aircraft systems, - Contributes to a higher level of cooperation and cohesion in addressing terrorist acquisition and use of weapons	- Three expert workshops were conducted, but rather than for the purposes of informing the development, they were undertaken to sensitise and get feedback on the developed Technical Guidelines, which is a live document. The reason why this was changed was the pandemic, that did not allow for in person meetings to collect feedback for the development of the guidelines. Instead, CTED, UNIDIR and UNCCT decided to postpone the workshop to a time when travel could resume. This was approved by PRB of UNCCT. - Regional workshop for Europe (27-29 April 2022, Brussels, Belgium): 28 participants (25 M / 3 F). 97% of respondents to the internal feedback survey said the content and the good practices presented were relevant to their work. - Regional workshop for the Sahel and Maghreb regions (31 January – 2 February 2023, Madrid, Spain): 28 participants (25 M / 3 F). 100% of the five respondents to the feedback survey said the content and the good practices presented were relevant to their work. - Regional workshop for the Caribbean regions (7-9 March 2023, online): 18 participants (15 M / 3 F). 83% of respondents to the internal feedback survey said the content and the good practices presented were relevant to their work. - Guidelines to enhance and facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) were developed and promoted. They are available here: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/cted_guidelines_2370.pdf - Online launch event held on 18 March 2022: 109 participants (65 M / 44 F).

The Working Group projects have been effective at contributing to improved knowledge, understanding and awareness of the risks but their results are not incorporated under the assessment of Output 3. Two of the Working Group projects have the potential to also contribute to Output 4 by supporting improvements in the capacity of the Member States so that they are able to act and respond in line with international obligations, standards, and best practices, if these projects also incorporate and implement follow-up initiatives. The technology and security guidelines and Security Council resolution (SCR) 2370 technical guidelines very appropriately focus on improving knowledge and awareness which is an important first step in changing policy and practice. A theory of change for the activities and the Programme as a whole would clarify that improved knowledge and awareness is an important result and would identify gaps in the expected pathways for change between the projects that were funded and the expectation of the Programme.

Have there been any unexpected or negative results?

The evaluation did not identify any unexpected results. The Programme is operating in some contexts where there is a real and high risk of human rights violations, and conducting human rights due diligence, including implementing the UN HRDDP in cases of support to non-UN security forces, is necessary to identify such risks

and to implement relevant measures to prevent, mitigate and address any impact that the Programme's and projects' activities may have on human rights. In addition, the Programme and projects should adopt a human rights-based approach in their design and implementation would help prevent negative results in the future.

The technical review did not assess negative impact, nor was the substantive expert provided with any data or documents that indicated such. That said, based on the outcomes of the qualitative and technical review, there are a number of *potential* negative impacts – or constraints due in part to the remit of UNOCT, which may limit impact - including:

1. Without institutionalization and incorporation of UNOCT projects at the country-level, trained personnel may leave without passing on their skills, causing a revolving-door effect where knowledge retention is poor.
2. Without fully harmonised and integrated response systems (with training, policies, plans, procedures, and equipment) Member States' capabilities will remain fragmented internally, and varied regionally. This could result in inefficiencies in detecting and responding to transnational CBRN threats.
3. The lack of interoperability between national and regional counter-terrorism frameworks was noted, particularly in areas such as cyber intelligence-sharing, border control, and counter-financing measures. This could produce significant gaps in preparedness and resilience against these threats and pose a vulnerability for Member States to emerging threats. If counter-terrorism efforts fail to adopt gender-responsive, human rights compliant and all-of-society approaches, they may overlook critical elements that may reduce the efficacy of counter-terrorism measures and result in harms. For decades, terrorist groups have been exploiting inequalities, vulnerable individuals and/or groups, so by incorporating LNOB principles, engaging women, victims and survivors of terrorism, and vulnerable individuals and groups, the Programme may help strengthen the ability of its beneficiaries to detect, prevent and address use of weapons by terrorists.

It is important to note that these are all *hypothetical* scenarios, and the assessment of potential untoward outcomes falls outside of the scope of the technical review and requires more in-depth investigation.

What internal and external factors have helped and hindered implementation and achievement of results, and to what extent were mitigation measures effective?

The main internal factors (those within the Programme's control) and external factors (those outside of the Programme's control) which *helped* the effectiveness of the activities based on data collected through interviews and desk review include:

- Strong commitment and engagement from Programme team and stakeholders, including Working Group Chairs, Co-Chairs, and members, and Member States
- Expertise via the presence of highly experienced subject matter experts, trainers, and analysts and the use of expert consultant reviewers and technical experts.
- UNOCT's reputation and responsiveness, with UNOCT recognised for being committed, well-regarded, and provided strong coordination and support throughout.
- High-quality reports and deliverables, including the production of reports, guidelines, and well-organised workshops, with technical accuracy and standardised, consistent, content.
- Strategic alignment and complementary goals with implementing partners' missions and priorities, and complementarity between initiatives.
- Effective coordination and collaboration, with cross-agency collaboration and an all-of-UN approach.
- Inclusive and consultative approach, which undertook consultation with Member States
- Adaptability and flexibility in the Programme's approach which included a pivot to virtual meetings and projects due to COVID-19 and the use of tools like TTXs as flexible training methods.

- Regional focus, demonstrated with the shift from global to regional threat assessments for targeted impact, and regional engagements in Central Asia and for the 2370 Guidelines.
- Resource support and funding, including budget provision by UNOCT and staff allocation by partners

The main internal factors (those within the Programme's control) and external factors (those outside of the Programme's control) which *hindered* the effectiveness of the activities based on data collected through interviews and desk review include:

- COVID-19 disruptions resulting in delays to implementation, and a shift to online meetings with an associated reduced effectiveness of virtual formats, which hindered engagement, consultation, and capacity-building efforts.
- Coordination and participation issues, such as limited participation or engagement by some partners or Member States, challenges in coordinating among implementing partners with differing contracts and responsibilities, and delays in responses and difficulty gathering suitable participants. Differences in expectations, goals, and roles among partners, and occasional duplication of effort in terms of participation were also found.
- Lack of quality assurance and feedback mechanisms, such as an absence of formal quality assurance/peer review processes, and no mechanisms to monitor changes or improvements post-training.
- Gender imbalance and inclusion gaps, resulting in low participation of women in meetings.
- Administrative and process delays, such as delays in report production, payments, and project documentation, and late submissions of amendment requests by partners.
- Technical and operational gaps, such as lack of equipment reported by some Member States to implement skills learned, limited engagement with the tech/industry community in the Technology and Security Project, and varying national needs for SCR 2370 guideline implementation, requiring better tailoring.

Key Findings: The Programme successfully improved the visibility of UNOCT on WMD/ CBRN/ SALW/ IES/ UAS (output 1), achieved the planned numbers of partnerships (output 2), and achieved its planned contributions to international interagency coordination (output 5). The Programme had substantial effectiveness at directly contributing to Member States having improved capacities (output 4). Adaptations to plans for releasing regional threat assessments means output 3 is not evaluable according to logical framework indicators, despite activities resulting in high quality reports. The technical review identified several aspects of the Programme's work that were novel, with several high quality and robust outputs and trainings delivered. The Programme MEL system has several significant weaknesses, and, while aligned with RBM guidance at the time, the Programme goal is overly ambitious and not measurable at this stage. The technical review identified opportunities to improve quality assurance of training course materials by formalizing categorisations of levels of difficulty (basic, intermediate, advanced) and providing more intermediate and advanced level trainings.

Efficiency

To what extent has the implementation strategy and execution been efficient and cost-effective? Sub-Question: Did the results obtained justify the costs incurred?

Limited budgetary information was available for review by the evaluation team. The Programme budget and financial reporting format is complex and simple budget information is not quickly available to the evaluators. The outputs are also not in the standard financial report format, with incurred costs reported relative to planned expenditures for different expenditure types. The current budget process therefore not only makes an evaluation

of efficiency challenging but also creates inefficiencies for a small team to undertake robust project budget management and oversight.

With the information available and testimonies from the team, the programmatic implementation strategy and execution has been planned in an efficient way to deliver high levels of results with lean funding inputs. Hard-earmarked funded projects resulted in workplans informed by donor expectations. Unearmarked funds were used for certain UNOCT programme staff positions to deliver the programme work, which allowed project donor funding to be directed to outputs, activities and travel as needed. Project budgets were supplemented with in-kind support in some cases from implementing partner organisations, and staffing support from colleagues who were not budgeted for. The move to online meetings during COVID-19 pandemic resulted in travel cost savings and allowed the team to participate in numerous meetings and events in a more efficient manner. For some projects, the move to online did impact effectiveness of the meetings, so the return to in-person events (despite budgetary and time implications) was appreciated and welcomed. Inflation also put pressure on budgets.

Table 4: Summary table of key activities/projects key budgetary information

Project	Status	TOTAL Budget (US$)	Donor
Regional Threat Assessments	Ongoing	Phase 1 cost 107, 833, Phase 2/3 cost 196, 248	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Phase I, II, III)
CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq)	Complete	2,359,408- total from US DOS and UNOCT 659,408 – UNOCT portion	US Department of State and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan)	Complete	798,282.77 - total both NATO and UNOCT 399,149 – UNOCT portion	NATO and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism)	Complete	1,687,701	European Union
Technology and Security guidelines (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security)	Complete	133,000 113,044 – UNOCT portion	UNICRI and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Interoperability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability)	Complete	190,400 169,500 – UNOCT portion	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Agency self-funded activities
SALW Central Asia – Phase I (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW)	Complete	1,165,382	Russian Federation contribution and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
SALW Central Asia – Phase II (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW)	Ongoing	4,285,116.	Canadian CTCBP/ACCBP and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370)	Complete	169,000	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Training portfolio of 20 Courses	Ongoing	(unknown)	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
		11,092,3714[34]	

To what extent were intervention staffing, activities and outputs planned, sequenced, and delivered in a timely and efficient manner? Sub-Question: If not, what changes can be made to improve them?

UNOCT programme staff were initially funded from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funds which allowed the Programme Team to use funding from other sources for activities. Since then, the Programme team successfully fundraised so that it no longer required Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funding. This aided to smooth running of the Programme when funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ended.

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[34] Total is based on total project budgets including contributions from other donors. Figure of UNOCT contributions only is USD 8,952,381.17. Two additional new projects (2370 Africa and ICSANT II) have additional projects budgets of 498,372 and 1,746,721 respectively, bringing the UNOCT contribution total to USD 11,197,474.17.

The pandemic contributed to a bottle-neck with new projects beginning before old projects (delayed due to COVID-19) had finished. In future, projects must be carefully planned in cooperation with senior management and donors, with realistic estimates of the staffing levels required including junior administrative roles and senior managerial staff members, technical and project managers, and time required for monitoring and learning built into the project budget breakdowns and workplans. Staff turnover/staff leave affected smooth operations given resources were already low for the planned results. There were reports of heavy workloads from some team members which presents a potential health and safety risk.

The Programme had one P4 (Head of Unit), four P3 (Programme Managers), one P2 (Junior Professional Officer), two G6 (Programme Management Assistants) and was supported by several consultants. However, a number of staff and partners reported staffing levels for the projects were insufficient for the needs, reflecting the wide scope of work of the programme, number of implementing partners and initiatives, large number of events and travel requirements, and the number of Member States supported. Given the high number of events which have been organized by the Programme and projects, sufficient administrative support is vital to ensure senior and expert staff are able to focus their time and attention on strategic and content work, rather than administrative tasks.

In a number of cases, the resources required for project delivery were not sufficiently estimated, and expectations for what could be achieved in terms of time, staffing and funding overly ambitious. The Programme team attributed delays to COVID-19 pandemic, however, other factors including internal review processes and administrative delays also factor into the experienced bottlenecks. Additionally, unexpected tasks created extra workload for the team. In some cases, projects relied on partner organisations providing staffing in-kind. While partners identified that these weaknesses in the original designs were jointly the responsibility of both parties, UNOCT in future should more carefully review and jointly design projects with careful consideration given to staffing, timelines required (including any approval and review timelines, fund disbursement, etc.) and time required for engaging with partners for input, and delivery.

Across all projects and for the Programme as a whole, a lack of financial resource allocation for evaluations has been found. It has been reported than in some cases donors do not agree to allocate a percentage of the project budget for monitoring and evaluation. The UNOCT has only recently developed an Evaluation Handbook, however, this provides an estimate of a *minimum* of US$270,000 for evaluations of programmes with budgets over US$5million. This should provide for the costs of one internal evaluation and one-externally-conducted evaluation. The budget for this evaluation was far below this estimated cost, which impacts on the depth and comprehensiveness that could be provided. There has also been a lack of internal evaluations conducted by the Programme team for the individual projects, which not only would have informed improvements in the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and inclusivity of gender/human rights considerations into the projects and Programme but also would have supported a more effective and efficient mid-term Programme evaluation. Based on a review of the project documents, a planned evaluation of the Iraq, Jordan and ICSANT projects by the monitoring and evaluation Officer did not happen. There was no dedicated monitoring and evaluation Officer within the Programme team to undertake these assessments. The team does now have a team member with monitoring and evaluation expertise, although they are not completely dedicated to such tasks. Given the number of projects implemented by the Programme, ensuring sufficient allocation of staff time resources for monitoring and evaluation will be crucial to allow sufficient data gathering for an end of Programme evaluation. There was no monitoring or evaluation for SALW Central Asia Phase I (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) specified in the project document (despite a substantial project budget). SALW Central Asia Phase II planned for an evaluation in cooperation with the UNODC Independent Evaluation Section (IES) although this had reportedly not been conducted yet as the project has been extended. The Technology and Security Project Monitoring and Evaluation Management Approach developed by UNICRI provides excellent documentation of project activities via quarterly progress reporting.

What factors (both internal and external) affected efficient delivery of the interventions?

In addition to the factors already mentioned, specific project challenges to efficient project implementation have been identified as:

- **Output 3 regional threat assessments:** The report production process was delayed due to far more time needed to do the analysis than originally expected by the implementing partner. The timeline for review of the reports by UNOCT's Programme team also took longer than expected and contributed to the reports' delays. The original scope for the reports provided by the implementing partner was broad (and later considered infeasible) and the size of regions covered by the regional reports is very large and required further time to produce than had been expected. There was insufficient staffing for analysis and report production given the scope of the assessments. Additional time was needed for production and fact-checking as the reports were intended to be unclassified (INTERPOL's collected information from members is classified) which caused additional delays in finding non-classified sources. There was no budget allocation for professional copy editing for the first report. This was corrected for subsequent reports according to the Programme team.
- **CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan)**: Translation issues were experienced during inception and implementation phases which caused delays. Some efficiency savings were made by moving to online meetings (due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions) but that made building relationships with national stakeholders more challenging. The project was extended by one year (no-cost extension). There were several changes in staffing for project management at UNOCT which contributed to some impacts on implementation due to re-establishing relationships.
- **CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq)**: All trainings were held in Türkiye rather than Iraq, which meant all national Member State beneficiaries needed to travel for activities, which resulted in high costs for travel, but this was a necessary requirement for US DOS staff who are not allowed to travel/conduct activities in Iraq, and therefore a reasonable decision.
- **Technology and Security guidelines (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security)**: There was a small underspend of the overall budget for this project. However, more funding was needed for engagement with technology private sector for travel to meetings at the headquarters of the technology firms. Follow-up initiatives were not budgeted for within the extremely lean seed-funding budget (as planned by the Global Compact) which would have supported greater effectiveness and contributed to the Member States capacity building intended outcomes of the Programme.
- **Interoperability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability)**: A requested final no-cost extension for the production of a synthesis knowledge product wasn't granted as the request was sent too late for PRB authorisation and amendment of the agreement and it was deemed over costly by senior UNOCT management. This was unfortunate as a knowledge product could have contributed to improved effectiveness, impact and sustainability at no additional cost. There was a large delay to the initial payment for the project due to an internal financial issue. Timelines needed to be adjusted significantly due to initial delays in the project plan by the implementing partner and delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This was further exacerbated by changes in staffing and roles at OPCW. The project was in some areas overly ambitious and, for example, wanted also to have a training course on hazards of biological chemical weapons without applying any additional funding. The allocated budget was applied just for holding workshops so OPCW could not hire assistance for the project which would have been beneficial to aid smooth implementation. There was lower involvement by other implementing partners than originally planned (i.e. OCHA) and lower engagement by other stakeholders, although UNOCT made additional efforts to improve engagement and buy-in.
- **SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370):** The time required for the production of the guidelines was more intensive than originally expected. The budget was also

impacted by an unexpected increase in workshop costs after the COVID-19 pandemic. Preparations and planning for workshops were impacted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with previously planned workshops to collect feedback from Member States instead delivered after the Guidelines were developed in order to review, socialise and disseminate them.

- **SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW):** Member States did not provide feedback in a timely manner. In response UNOCT-UNCCT requested support from the authorities of beneficiary countries during high-level meetings and sent additional letters with project objectives and timelines.   UNOCT-UNCCT and UNODC worked with Permanent Missions in New York and in Vienna as a temporary measure. The project had insufficient donor funds available at start of project meaning the project was divided into two phases due to initial lack of funding. Overall, the budget for phase 1 and phase 2 (prior to the recent extension being granted) was very low considering the large number of countries involved (five) and number of implementing partners. The staggered funding approach caused delays and inefficiencies due to additional approval processes required as well as a high number of amendment requests during the course of implementation. UNODC faced process challenges when receiving funds from UNOCT. A stakeholder consulted during this evaluation expressed that there was insufficient budget for a key staffing position and a reliance by UNOCT on consultant support. The project was supported by a regional UNOCT and UNODC staff presence which has helped smooth delivery and reduces travel costs. Scope for greater flexibility in budget allocations to allow for deeper follow-on support which is country-specific would be appreciated by some stakeholders, noting that the programme team had made attempts so far to meet requests using existing resources.
- **ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism):** Two no-cost extensions were requested due to the COVID-19 pandemic because some activities couldn't be done online, which was a reasonable and necessary adaptation.

Key Findings: The Programme's budget and financial reporting system is highly complex, making it challenging to comprehensively assess efficiency as part of this evaluation. However, information available indicates the Programme/project results justify the costs incurred. The Programme used a conservative approach in budget planning that reduced the risks of funding gap vis-a-vis planned results. Projects were operated mostly with extremely lean funds. Estimated time, staffing, and resources to deliver activities were often insufficient to achieve the planned results within the expected timeframe. The COVID-19 pandemic also further impacted on delivery and resulted in bottlenecks, as did staff leave, unexpected tasks, internal reviews and administrative procedures. UNOCT Programme team is very small considering their wide remit and lacks sufficient administrative support. The Programme should ensure that sufficient budget is allocated for programmatic as well as project level evaluations in line with the UNOCT Evaluation Handbook. The technical efficiency of the Programme is hindered by gaps in quality control and would be strengthened with the use of standardised training frameworks, diversification in content development, and a well-resourced and structured review process for reports and training materials.

Sustainability

To what extent are the benefits of the programme/project likely to continue after it ends? Are there any differences in likely sustainability between the different interventions and activities?

Some elements of the Programme and pilot projects show strong indications of potential sustainability, such as the development of partnerships, increased awareness and visibility of UNOCT, and the research reports, guidelines and knowledge products (which have expanded the knowledge base and can be used to drive evidence-based interventions in the future). Almost all implementing or coordinating partners responded in the survey that their respective projects had either a very likely or fairly likely chance that the benefits would last into the medium or long-term. Only one respondent out of 21 reported an unlikely chance that the results would last.,. Improvements in national capacities have the potential to endure, although in-country stakeholders pointed to several extraneous factors which may hamper their ability to implement the learnings in the medium- and long-

term. At the mid-term point, the Programme and projects should develop a sustainability strategy, incorporating plans for follow-up initiatives, and make adaptations where possible to support the longevity of the results. Clarity on how improved national capabilities is understood by the Programme and measured, would support an end-term evaluation of programme successes.

The partnerships that were made under the Programme's activities are expected to continue if they continue to be nurtured. Several partners did note that as a wider contextual challenges, they find that it can be difficult to obtain donor funding for counter-terrorism projects and programmes, due in part to the changing priorities of donor Member States related to the financial slow down post-COVID-19 pandemic and resources being diverted towards the war in Ukraine. Several of the partnerships were established with UNOCT providing the funding support for the initiative. UNOCT should assess its strategic value added in multi-partnership projects.

The outputs produced under the Programme and projects have potential high sustainability, however, require further follow-up/further communication to ensure they remain visible and key stakeholders are aware. The regional threat assessments have strong potential to be sustainable resources, with high potential value into the medium term, although may require some updates, depending on new emerging threats and changes to specific individuals/organisations named in the reports to remain up to date and accurate. However, unless they are published soon, take-up and interest in the reports is likely to wane as it will be challenging to generate interest in reports based on analysis from several years prior.

In the case of the Technology and Security Guidelines (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security), it is a forward-looking report and therefore has future relevance but with new developments in technology, the report may need updating. Further activities are needed to engage with technology industry and further monitoring of up-take of the recommendations by government, academic or industry (unfortunately direct capacity building support during a phase II was dropped from the workplan for the project which would have supported sustainability). The SCR2370 technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370) require integration into agencies assessments (such as CTED's country assessments) and capacity building support (such as the project in Central Asia), and further development of the technical guidelines is needed so that they are suitable for Member States who lack capacities/technical expertise on SALW/IEDs/UAS as currently they are complex and advanced guidelines. Further workshops at the national and regional levels would be welcome to provide tailored advice to the integration of the guidelines, and online pre-recorded trainings or videos to explain the basics are needed to support dissemination. While the guidelines have relevance in the medium term, they may require periodic updates based on updates to technology (such as ghost guns, dark web, etc).

The interoperability project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability) supported the establishment of a new network of focal points across agencies, who are functional focal points that were involved in the project. This is expected to gather momentum to overcome the structural restrictions which hinder interoperability. OPCW has reported back to a group of states parties who are looking at interoperability issues which were raised via this project. The project would have benefited from the utilisation of resources for the production of knowledge products to support sustainability, however, this was not included in the project plan,

The qualitative technical review suggests benefits of the UNOCT Programme are likely to continue beyond its immediate implementation, but the extent of sustainability depends on several key factors. The Programme's effectiveness in building capacity among participants, enhancing technical expertise, and establishing structured training frameworks contributes to its long-term impact. The incorporation of more comprehensive TTXs and the development of standardized training materials and support of TTT programmes can provide lasting benefits by allowing Member States to continue using these resources independently. Additionally, if UNOCT strengthens its technical advisory groups and SME networks, these expert collaborations could sustain knowledge-sharing and ensure that evolving WMD threats are continuously addressed. However, challenges such as the lack of national

ownership and limited integration of cross-cutting issues like human rights and gender equality may hinder the long-term sustainability of some interventions' direct involvement.

The sustainability of different programme interventions varies depending on their structure and implementation. Capacity-building activities with strong hands-on components, such as TTXs and advanced technical courses, are more likely to have lasting effects, as they equip participants with practical skills that can be applied in real-world scenarios. Conversely, trainings that lack regional specificity, rely on generic content, or do not provide comprehensive instructional resources for future use are less likely to be sustained by participants post-programme.

Based on the technical review, the following projects and training activities undertaken by the Programme are more likely to be sustainable due to their structured learning methodologies, practical application, and potential for long-term use by Member States:

1. **TTXs** – These activities provide a cost-effective and interactive training method that allows participants to simulate real-world decision-making scenarios. Since TTXs can be adapted and reused by national agencies, they are more likely to be sustained beyond the programme's direct involvement.
2. **Clandestine Lab Virtual Reality (VR) Training** – This virtual reality-based training has the potential for continued use as a digital learning tool. If properly integrated into national training programmes and enhanced with hands-on practical components, it can provide long-term benefits.
3. **Virtual Training Course on CBRN Countermeasures and Response** – As a digital training module, if modified for self-paced learning, this course can be continuously accessed and updated, making it more sustainable compared to in-person-only training sessions. If national agencies incorporate it into their official training curricula, its impact can extend beyond the initial UNOCT implementation.
4. **Intermediate Biological Threats Course** – While the current version of this course lacks regional specificity and depth, a revised and contextually adapted version could serve as a sustainable training resource for national security agencies and health officials dealing with biological threats.
5. **Regional Threat Assessments** – Although these studies are currently outdated, they are superbly crafted and hold long-term strategic value for policymakers and security agencies. If UNOCT commits to a routine production cycle and develops a Threat Study Template for national use, the RTS could become a lasting resource for governments.

Assess what contributions the programme has made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the programme outcomes.

The evaluation at the mid-term found several examples of sustainable results in national capacities and knowledge as a result of the Programme's interventions. However, some interviewees pointed to national contextual factors which may limit implementation of learnings in the medium and long-term, and support would benefit from embedded sustainable training approaches.

In Iraq, an in-country interviewee reported that following the completion of the project and based on the learnings gained, the country has established the new Secretariat to support national coordination and have included additional relevant departments in ongoing meetings. There are also plans to draft a five-year plan to enhance the early detection and early response system, preparing annual national reports, and to establish a new database system and also set out new regulations on monitoring private sector and customs clearance on borders. Challenges which may hinder sustainability include the in-country need for an upgrade early detection system, new software and hardware needs, advanced training needs for detection and crisis management, management of radioactive locations, and capacity support for drafting and review of the national strategy. These issues were not part of the project design and should be considered in the design (or attempts made to mitigate against these risks) for any future engagements to support lasting impact from the engagement.

In Jordan, testimonies provided indicated very strong national buy-in for strengthening capacities in line with the project's objective and the country has continued independently to progress the work. Reportedly, agencies have made amendments to an SOP based on learnings from the training, and it has been clarified who will be in charge in the case of an attack and making updates to the national contingency plans. However, factors which prevent sustainability include a lack of coordination with another on-going initiative (US multinational initiative) and, while outside of the scope of what the project can provide, stakeholders reported a lack of operational equipment at the local level, and medicines to treat victims which may hinder their ability to implement the learnings from this project in the case of an attack. Stakeholders report being ready to respond in case of a small event, but for a larger scale attack further joint practical field exercise (at T3 level) on a national scale event would be beneficial. New staff members require training indicating a lack of train-the-trainer approaches or training plans into the original design.

The SALW Central Asia project (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW) has been successful at establishing important connections at the national level and for raising awareness of the importance of SALW. CTED is now conducting follow-up assessments on what has been done to ensure they are not duplicating and can build on the existing work, and to check whether the recommendations were enacted. All participating countries are invited to the Counter Terrorism Committee to report on their progress on implementing the recommendations which supports accountability within a year of each assessment and sustainability. Senior Management in UNOCT and Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General had discussions with Central Asian countries about these issues during their visit to Central Asia and during high-level international conference on regional cooperation of Central Asian countries within the framework of the Joint Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, held in Tashkent on 3-4 March 2022. Linking the project to high-level meetings is important to sustain national buy-in and interest. The roadmap approach utilised by the project is a best practice approach because it has different pillars which are sequential from legislative, institutional, to operational, and supports sustainable capacity improvements. The approach is relevant for other themes such as WMD/CBRN/IED/UAS and could be applied to other areas not just SALW. As a further indication of sustainability of the outputs from this project, UNODA has incorporated the assessment, roadmap and guidelines from this project into the design of a new upcoming project. UNODC has been able to provide recommendations to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mission (which received the mandate from the Security Council to work within the region to address the risk of proliferation of weapons out of Afghanistan) with contacts in Central Asia. The mission was reportedly positively impressed that the issue already had a level of awareness in the region however, there is a lack of evidence gathering about cases and whether any have been brought to justice, which is needed to demonstrate whether the activities have led to any sustainable changes.

The 20 training courses show indications of sustainability. In the evaluation survey of beneficiaries three quarters (74%) think that the benefits are very likely to last into the future. The survey with national training coordinating partners, found three out of five reporting that the benefits are very likely to last into the medium or long term, while two reported that the benefits were fairly likely to continue.

The long-term sustainability of the UNOCT Programme depends on its ability to enhance technical expertise and establish structured training frameworks that Member States can utilize beyond direct UNOCT support. Practical interventions such as TTXs, virtual training modules, and train-the-trainer projects offer greater sustainability potential by providing reusable, adaptable resources for ongoing professional development. However, regional relevance, national ownership, and integration into existing security structures are critical to ensuring lasting impact. Trainings that lack specificity or rely heavily on external trainers risk diminished effectiveness over time unless transferred to local institutions.

Chart 6: How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the benefits from the UNOCT training(s)/workshop/capacity building exercise will last into the medium and long-term? Base: 70 Trainees

However, it should be noted that some Member States that received training also lack robust legislation to be able to ensure the benefits of the trainings will continue. One in nine (11%) reported that their legislation was fairly weak (a further 49% reported that there were some gaps). The survey with national training coordinating partners, found three out of four reporting that their policies and regulatory frameworks, mechanisms and procedures are robust to support implementation of the learnings from the trainings, while one reported that the frameworks are fairly weak. During interviews, national stakeholders reported that the lack of national resources for equipment (protection or detection) to be able to implement the learnings in a real-time situation, and others suggested that UNOCT should work to embed the training courses within the national training curriculum to ensure that new recruits are trained.

Chart 7. To what extent are policies and regulatory frameworks, and other mechanisms and procedures, in place that will support the continuation of benefits from the UNOCT training(s)/workshop/capacity building exercise? Base. 70.

To what extent was a strategy for sustainability of achievement clearly defined at the design stage of the programme/project?

The Programme was foreseen in phases, with an initial piloting phase before more comprehensive roll-out. This has not materialised due to delays in completion of the first phase due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and now both phases having been rolled-out concurrently. However, this sequenced approach was not comprehensively

designed and described in the programme document about how this would work in practice and how this has informed some elements of the Programme activities (such as project selection).

The pilot projects, which were devised to address an urgent need while the Programme was being consolidated. As the Programme is in the mid-term phase, the Programme and projects would benefit from a sustainability strategy, and elements such as the regional threat assessments and 20 courses would benefit from additional documentation on planning, design, and implementation decisions made.

> **Key Findings:** Several elements of the Programme demonstrate positive indications of sustainability, including the partnerships that have been established. Tangible reports and outputs have potential sustainability but may require updates and further dissemination. Insights from trainees indicate positively that the learnings are continuing to be used. The technical review identified TTXs and hands-on trainings to offer a higher likelihood of sustainability. However, generic trainings which lack regional specificity, or which are not at an intermediate or advanced level are less likely to have sustainable results. Additionally, some Member States reported that their lack of equipment may hinder their ability to implement learnings and would welcome an embedded train-the-trainer approach.

Human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion

To what extent has the programme/project design, implementation and monitoring fully considered human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities? This includes the development of relevant human rights and gender analysis and responses (such as specific human rights and gender analysis, human rights and gender quality indicators, etc.)

UNOCT established the HRGS in January 2022, which was after the start of the Programme. Since 2019, there was a gender and human rights dedicated staff members within the organisation, however given the size of the organisation and their role, their contributions to programme/project design was understandably limited. The Programme was developed, and implementation began, before the establishment of UNOCT specific guides and resources,[35] and prior to the increased capacity that UNOCT now has on human rights and gender mainstreaming. While some interviewees felt that the Programme could have incorporated gender equality and human rights more strongly into the design prior to the establishment of the section, the evaluation concludes this would have been challenging given the small size of the Programme team, high workload, and that this would require specific Gender Equality and Human Rights experience and knowledge which the team was lacking at the time.

Table 5: Summary Table of human rights and gender equality Inclusion

	GENDER EQUALITY		HUMAN RIGHTS
	Gender Marker Score - Design	Implementation and Monitoring	Human Rights inclusion
WMD/CBRN Programme	Gender marker 0	Some efforts have been made to collect gender-disaggregated data during its implementation	No evidence that human rights were integrated in activities design and implementation. No engagement with CSOs. No human rights analysis undertaken. No human rights due diligence conducted.
Regional Threat Assessments		Reported use of gender analysis by the analyst during the production of the reports. INTERPOL gender mainstreaming guidance applied.	Careful use of language. There are potential human rights risks once reports are published as they name specific individuals and refer to certain groups as terrorist groups.
CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-	Gender marker 0	Some efforts have been made to collect gender-disaggregated data during its	No evidence that human rights were integrated in activities design and implementation. No

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[35] The Gender Marker and Gender Mainstreaming guidelines were finalised in 2020.

79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq)		implementation however, monitoring of participants' genders was in some cases missing. Low levels of participation by women in trainings and events. No engagement with women's civil society groups or female activists. No gender analysis undertaken.	engagement with CSOs. No human rights analysis undertaken. US Leahy vetting for the participants was applied.
CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan)	Gender marker 0	Some efforts have been made to collect gender-disaggregated data during its implementation, as well as encourage women's participation, however, monitoring of participants' genders was in some cases missing. Low levels of participation by women in trainings and events. No engagement with women's civil society groups or female activists. No gender analysis undertaken.	No evidence that human rights were integrated in activities design and implementation. No engagement with CSOs. No human rights analysis undertaken. No human rights due diligence conducted.
ICSANT (UNCCT-2019-02-79-C_Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism)	Gender marker 0	Encouragement of women's participation in project activities. Collection of gender disaggregated monitoring data. No direct engagement with women's civil society groups or female activists. No gender analysis undertaken. Of the 654 participants in capacity building activities organised by UNOCT/UNCCT, 27.5% were female. For the outreach and advocacy activities organised by UNOCT/UNCCT, 41.3% of the 713 were female. Many events and activities achieved close to gender parity, however, in some country locations or specific activities, fewer women participated.	UNOCT highlighted the importance of respecting human rights and due processes, referring to, for example, Article 12 of ICSANT during events. This Article makes specific reference to a fair treatment guarantee for a person taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken, or proceedings are carried out pursuant to ICSANT, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international law of human rights. A joint high-level event which both UNODC and UNOCT participated in included a discussion on human rights.
SALW Central Asia (UNCCT-2020-Pillar II-SALW)	Gender marker 1	Encouragement of women's participation in project activities. Some gender disaggregated monitoring data collected. Low levels of participation by women in trainings and events. No engagement with women's civil society groups or women activists. No gender analysis undertaken. 10% female inclusion target likely to be missed. CTED assessment visits include gender officer - they ask whether there are female officers within forces and special campaigns to encourage females to join the forces. A gender study is being produced by UNODC as part of the project activities. UNODA mentioned the incorporation of WPS agenda into their activities. According to internal monitoring data from April 2022 – February 2023 follow-up discussions around the importance of including female public servants in national response institutions found participants verbally affirming their increased awareness of this inclusion. The project team participated in an advocacy campaign on gender mainstreaming and addressing gender-based violence in Uzbekistan organized by the Uzbek Civil Society Organization 'Istiqbolli Avlod' and attended a working group meeting organized by the Academy of the General Prosecutor's Office in Uzbekistan to discuss data collection and reporting on SDG Indicator 5 among judiciary and law enforcement.	Some evidence that human rights were integrated in activities design and implementation however, limited documentation provided to the evaluator team due to sensitivity. Implementing partners report assessing compliance with international human rights norms and standards during the gap analysis and making specific recommendations on policy improvements (such as data protection). CTED has a human rights officer in their assessment visits and includes a section in their assessments on human rights. CTED use UN human rights mechanisms reports, analysis, and recommendations, and will incorporate any specific issues that needs to be addressed into their assessments. However, there was no engagement with CSOs during the project. The project will include in the latest cycle of trainings a human rights component. According to internal monitoring data from April 2022 – February 2023 training test data found 100% of participants nearly doubled their awareness on human rights considerations during the investigation and prosecution stages.

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20 Courses		The technical review found that these trainings lacked gender-sensitive approaches and none incorporated equity-focused interventions or addressed the disproportionate impact of security threats on vulnerable populations. See Annex 11 for the technical review of these trainings	There was the lack of emphasis on (IHRL HRBA incorporated into the trainings. While some projects acknowledged human security risks, none incorporated IHRL or HRBA into the project. See Annex 11 for the technical review of these trainings
Interoperability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability)	Gender marker 0	This was not foreseen by the project, although efforts have been made to collect gender-disaggregated data during its implementation.	The objective of this project is highly relevant to human rights, leave no one behind, and do-no-harm approaches, although this is not as explicitly referenced in the project document. The project established a network of focal points so that *"agencies across the humanitarian, health, and security sectors, improve their inter- agency preparedness for, and response to, a State Party's request for assistance, relief operations, and victim support. Specifically, when this assistance is needed as a result of a chemical and/or biological weapons attack."* The network of focal points established includes international organisations including, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), UN OCHA, and the WHO. Under this project, a workshop was held in 2023 which had an objective of understanding "the potential humanitarian and human rights considerations of sharing information about a developing crisis." The project has also resulted in a draft Programme of Work Emergency Response Centres.
SCR2370 Technical guidelines (UNCCT-2020-seedfund_Implementation of SCR2370)	Gender marker 1	Encouragement of women's participation in project activities. Gender disaggregated monitoring data collected. Some workshops had low participation of women.	Consideration to human rights obligations incorporated into the Technical guidelines and workshops content.
Technology and Security guidelines (UNCCT-2019-02-79-D_WMD WG_WMD Technology and Security)	Not assessed	Encouragement of women's participation in project activities. Gender disaggregated monitoring data was planned to be collected but has not been provided to this evaluation team (the team notes this was due to holding meetings virtually). UNOCT/UNICRI included gender perspectives in the assessment of the risks and opportunities related to technology development by: emphasizing the importance of including a gender perspective to the situational analysis of the problem to better understand the different implications of WMDs on both men and women, physically and psychologically, including the different responsibilities, roles, risks and vulnerabilities that the two groups are entitled/subjected to; discussing how crucial it is to design counterterrorism strategies and plans that would promote gender equality and ensure the inclusion of women as active stakeholders and decision makers in combating WMD terrorism;	Due diligence applied in the decision not to publish the report as it contains highly sensitive information on how technology could be used by terrorists, and therefore publication and wide dissemination might threaten lives. UNOCT/UNICRI made sure to promote the important connection and interdependency between the concepts of human rights and human security, emphasizing that any proliferation of WMD would drastically impact on and undermine both. In addition, UNOCT/UNICRI advocated for the importance of including HR perspectives in their assessment of the risks associated with the malicious use of technology to develop WMDs, asserting that any response strategies or solutions should holistically prioritize the protection and safety of Member States' military, police and civilian populations and the right to equality before the law and safety for all suspects. UNOCT/UNICRI also considered the potential that technology can be misused by governments.

		raising the awareness of different agencies and participants during the expert workshop on the importance of including female perspectives, ideas, concerns, information and interests to the quality and outcome of the nuclear and national security discourses surrounding the issue of WMD terrorism.	

The evaluation did not find evidence that human rights and gender analysis was conducted at the start of the Programme nor for the development of the projects (with the exception of Central Asia, where human rights were incorporated into the assessment undertaken by CTED). Further guidance and trainings are needed for the Programme team on how to conduct a human rights and gender analysis, and external consultancy support utilised when necessary, given the small size of the Programme team. The project and programme document templates should also be revised to avoid confusion that the sub-section 'Gender and Human Rights' is not/should not contain this analysis. These sections are intended rather to summarise how gender/human rights aspects of contextual analysis have informed the design.

Some project logical frameworks do include gender disaggregated targets and gender related indicators, however, these tend to be at the level of tracking participation at events, rather than including indicators to measure tangible impacts on gender equality as part of the project design. Several 'List of Participant' sheets for events do not collect gender. For human rights and the inclusion of marginalised, disadvantaged groups, such as youth or those with disabilities, no such indicators are included in the logical frameworks.

Over the course of the evaluation, a gender focal point was identified in the team and a WMD/CBRN Unit Gender Workplan was developed to cover the period of 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023. The plan specified how the team intend to integrate gender into the programme and projects. The roll-out of the plan was affected by staff turnover/leave. Delays to this evaluation, which was intended to inform the gender workplan, also impacted on the roll-out of the workplan. There is no similar workplan for human rights integration in programmes/projects in UNOCT. These elements should be assessed during the end-term evaluation.

During implementation, implementing/coordination partners and duty-bearers confirmed that there was an emphasis placed on encouraging women's participation in events, trainings, and meetings. Despite strong encouragement, for some country/regional locations there was low or no participation of women (outside of the Programme/implementing team). Some Member States have low numbers of women in national agencies of particular relevance for the trainings. UNOCT encourages and requests women's participation in events, however, for several projects just a single woman or a small number of women attended, some of whom are in administrative or a non-related field, and therefore the extent to which they could participate fully and meaningfully was limited. This will remain a major challenge for the Programme team especially when delivering trainings on CBRNE CT as this is driven by military, law enforcement and intelligence agencies which tend to be male-dominated professions and UNOCT will not be able to significantly change without standalone projects to support the recruitment of women into such professions. UNOCT may also be able to influence the future hiring of women to key roles, as evidenced in the CBRN prevention response in Jordan (UNCCT-2018-02-79-B_CBRN prevention response in Jordan) project. For UNOCT to achieve sustainability and effectiveness for such trainings, and for these trainings to contribute to improved preparedness against attacks, it is critical that UNOCT ensures national agencies and staff members actively working on CT attend the trainings.

Activities and trainings which seek to support emergency response and preparedness in the case of an attack will likely offer more opportunities to directly benefit women who work in relevant fields. Such activities and trainings should seek the perspectives of women's groups to ensure victims of all genders benefit and be informed by the perspectives of victims and survivors of terrorism, thereby making them victim-centric.

Incorporating more women into counter-terrorism discussions through training and programmatic offerings may break barriers into these professions, which would benefit from their perspectives and contributions. All genders can be victims, perpetrators, sympathizers, supporters, recruiters, and facilitators of violence and terrorism, and including more women in detection and prevention operations may support identification of female terrorists/facilitators of terrorism. A strategic prioritisation of gender equality by the Programme team would be needed and projects to be specifically designed in a way which embeds gender equality considerations, to move beyond women's participation in events and trainings to embed gender considerations throughout all aspects of the design and implementation.[36]

Additionally, the programme team should consider whether off-site workshops and events in other countries is a barrier to women's participation. Cultural or practical reasons may prevent a woman being able to travel abroad without family accompaniment, or practical reasons due to family commitments may make this more challenging for women than men. Online events, or at places of work may offer opportunities for increased participation. A gender analysis at the start of the project/programmes would identify lack of women in key targeted national entities as a major risk, have aided the setting of appropriate gender targets in monitoring data collection, and potentially supported the identification of specific sub-divisions/units with higher numbers of women (for example, female police units[37], or border force units) who could have been specific targets for training. A variety of training options could also have been developed to target not just senior decision makers but also to support junior staff members develop skills and knowledge and advance their careers in this field.

Neither the programme nor the projects have adopted a human rights-based approach in their design and implementation. The language of duty-bearers and rights-holders is not used in the Programme/Project Documents. There were no consultations with vulnerable, marginalised individuals or groups during the design phase design and no such groups were envisioned to be the direct beneficiaries of the interventions. Indicators in the programme logical framework and project logical frameworks do not measure contributions to the realisation of human rights obligations, such as rights-holders actively realising their rights or duty-bearers increasingly respecting, protecting, promoting, and fulfilling the HRs of rights-holders. A human rights risk analysis is not included in the programme/project documents. At the time of the evaluation, UNOCT does not have specific internal guidance for the implementation of the UN HRDDP. This is despite the HRDDP stating that UN entities which are intending to support non-UN security forces must develop an implementation framework for HRDDP and "general operational guidance." This was reiterated again in January 2019 by the Secretary General's Executive Committee. While the HRDDP could have been applied by the programme without the internal guidelines, with advice sought from the human rights officer, the evaluator concludes this is unlikely and challenging given the small size of the programme team and would require human rights expertise and prior knowledge.

What challenges and/or opportunities, if any, influenced the way in which considerations related to human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities were incorporated in the programme design, implementation and monitoring?

Opportunities:
- Partners with strong processes and approaches to ensuring gender and human rights considerations are embedded in project design and implementation

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[36] For example, UNODC has developed a specific Women's Professional Development Programme to provide an opportunity for emerging border control leaders in Eastern and Southern Africa. UNODC reported that after having worked consistently with border security agencies to prioritise gender, they have seen an increase in the number of female staff. See: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2022/July/empowering-women-leaders-in-border-control-in-eastern-and-southern-africa.html
[37] For such examples see: Uzbekistan https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2016/06/16/feature-02, Kazakhstan https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-to-increase-number-of-female-police-officers/, and Niger https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/westandcentralafrica/stories/2022/communication-day-at-the-gendarmerie-school-of-niger-gathers-95-young-women.html?testme

- The HRGS who can be more closely cooperated with to receive guidance during planning and implementation
- Donor requirements to incorporate human rights and gender equality
- Assessments of the integration and mainstreaming of human rights and gender equality by the Programme Review Board, with the support of the Human Rights and Gender Section. However, opportunities exist to strengthen the review process to enable the PRB to delay approvals of new projects until human rights and gender equality integration has been completed satisfactorily
- The role of the Gender Focal Points System which has recently been established

Challenges:
- Lack of transparent Human Rights indicators and Disability marker system used by UNOCT for programme and project assessments
- Limited staffing in the HRGS given the size of the organisation and the scope of support that is needed
- Lack of internal capacities within programme team about human rights, and how to integrate this properly into programme/project design in a meaningful way
- UNOCT's gender and human rights guidance documents are not tailored sufficiently to provide practical support for busy teams working on specific aspects of CT such as WMD/CBRN
- No human rights focal point system established
- UNOCT does not have a designated civil society unit
- Interoperability (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability) - OPCW wanted the special rapporteur for human rights in counter-terrorism to be more involved in the project however this was foreseen late in implementation, so this did not materialize. Gender equality was not foreseen as part of the project

Additionally, several projects' activities faced challenges in achieving gender parity during trainings or events organised, as there were often found to be few or no women in national agencies engaged with under the project in roles which have relevance for the activities. Comprehensive statistics detailing the percentage of men versus women employed in counter-terrorism roles internationally are not readily available. However, it is widely recognized that the field of CT has been predominantly male-dominated, particularly as counter-terrorism capabilities often reside within a country's law enforcement and military organisations, the latter of which may have legal restrictions in female representation. Similarly, global statistics detailing the gender distribution within CBRN response roles are not readily available. However, existing studies and reports indicate a significant underrepresentation of women in this field. The response and consequence management to a CBRN event often falls to fire/rescue/hazardous materials teams, civil defence and military units. In many parts for the world, women are excluded from these occupations. The technical review of the Programme's projects did not include research into this aspect of countering CBRN, and it was not analysed as part of this report. It is recommended that a full in-depth analysis of gender-related issues in this area be produced as an annex in future reports, or as a standalone report due to the significance of this topic, and the value with which the UN places on it.

To what extent were women, persons with disabilities, and/or Organisations working on these issues consulted and meaningfully involved in programme planning and implementation?

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, there was no engagement with CSOs during the project or programme design or implementation, despite formal recognition in the GCTS of the value of civil society engagement A/RES/75/291. UNOCT did not have internal guidance on civil society engagement while the Programme was being designed, which explains the lack of prioritisation given to such consultations at that stage. There was extremely low engagement with rights-holders directly (with the exception of the CBRN prevention response in Iraq (UNCCT-2018-02-79-A_CBRN prevention response in Iraq) which engaged some university students are part of the training courses). While the focus of this Programme is on countering terrorist use of weapons and

therefore a level of technical knowledge on types of weapons may be required in some instances for effective contribution, CSOs do still have important insights offer the Programme team at various stages of development and implementation, including with regard to the potential impact of the Programme and project on human rights. There are still several CSOs who work on related topics to this Programme such as the Center for Civilians in Conflict, the Global Center on Cooperative Security, the Strong Cities Network, as well as large numbers involved in humanitarian and emergency support who could share expertise relevant when UNOCT supports national entities develop strategies to respond to an attack. There are also several research institutes with relevant expertise in CT strategies who can also offer advice to the design of programme activities. The UNODC Civil Society Unit has been implementing projects related to Counter Terrorism and maintains a database of relevant CSOs who it has worked with. Engagement with Rights Holders is relevant to understand their concerns related to CT operations and to understand any impacts (positive or negative) on human rights of the activities UNOCT may been implementing. Engagement and discussion with other programme teams internally at UNOCT may identify opportunities for cross-organisation learning on CSO and Rights Holder engagement.

An example of good practice was the inclusion of OCHA in the consultation and implementation phases for the Interoperability project (UNCCT-2019-02-79-E_ETCIP WG_Phase III Interoperability). Reportedly, the project team from UNOCT played a critical role in encouraging OCHA's continued participation in the project. OPCW had hoped to engage with the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism part of the project also, however, this was too late in implementation so didn't occur.

To what extent has the programme promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women?

An example found by this evaluation is from Jordan, whereby the Chemical Support Unit of JAF reportedly has hired women, recognising that there were too few, and they are using a TTT approach to train more women. Then national agencies recognised the prioritisation by both NATO and UNOCT on women's inclusion. While the project didn't achieve gender balance, they did get a key senior woman to attend (i.e. the person in charge of handling Emergency Management response for CBRN in the Public Security Directorate). During the gap assessment it was identified that there was a gap in the ability to deal with the decontamination and handling women in a suburban incident. So, the project stakeholders made a deliberate effort to send more women to the course to be trained (achieving approximately 20-25% women in that training). UNOCT/NATO also emphasised the need for gender considerations during the decontamination scenario. A real risk was identified that if there are fewer women to do decontamination if an incident occurred, men would get treated much quicker than women. This was also recognised by the national stakeholders, but further research is needed to assess current level of preparedness in the case of such an incident

More broadly, the evaluation survey of beneficiaries who took part in capacity building activities under the programme found that women reported positively about the relevance of the trainings for the work of their organisation. All 19 women trainees reported that it was very relevant. Just over three in five (63%) of the women trainees reported that the sessions were very effective at increasing their knowledge and skills on the topic, with a further 32% reporting that it was fairly effective. Women trainees were also more likely than men surveyed to report that they had put into practice the knowledge gained often (see Chart 9 below). The survey findings indicate that the activities have brought some benefits to the women engaged, but improved monitoring data would aid a more comprehensive assessment by the end of the programme.

Chart 9. Have you put into practice any of the knowledge gained from the UNOCT training/workshop/capacity building activity?

To what extent have unintended effects emerge for women, men, or vulnerable groups?

No unintended effects have been identified by the evaluation; however, the Programme and projects should implement the UN HRDDP, given the Programme and projects provide capacity building support to non-UN security forces and given the country contexts where the programme and projects are operating in. Periodic conflict sensitivity assessments and risk assessments which incorporate potential negative unintended effects on human rights should be undertaken to allow for the identification of potential risks, and the development of mitigation measures. The Programme should also implement a follow-up process to assess what specific changes to policy or practice may have occurred as a result of the activities which would allow for an identification of negative effects on women, men, or vulnerable groups. The Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights can offer support, technical assistance, and expertise to UNOCT so that activities do not have adverse impact on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Key Findings: The evaluation finds that there was extremely limited explicit incorporation of human rights considerations and gender equality into the design of the Programme and most projects. The Programme and many projects did not adopt a human rights-based approach in their design and implementation, however, the Interoperability, ICSANT and Central Asia projects were able to do this to varying degrees. During implementation, efforts were made to encourage female participation, but in a number of project locations there is low/no representation of women in key national agencies of relevance. The UN HRDDP was not applied but UNOCT lacked internal guidance on how to apply the policy, which should be urgently addressed. Periodic conflict sensitivity assessments and risk assessments (which include potential adverse consequences on human rights) are needed to ensure risks and mitigation measures are identified and addressed quickly.

Conclusions

The main conclusions from the mid-term evaluation, organised by evaluation criteria are:

Relevance
1. The Programme and pilot projects align with the GCTS, particularly pillar 2 of the GCTS by providing 'Measures to prevent and combat terrorism' and pillar 3 of the GCTS 'Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in the global counterterrorism enterprise.' The Programme and pilot projects align with the SPRF Strategic Goal 3 'Reinforce responses to terrorist threats and attacks and Strategic Goal 1 'Foster further unity and collaboration within the United Nations against terrorism.'
2. The Programme and projects have high relevance for the needs of Member States supported via the alignment with the GCTS, as well as gap analysis assessments and capacity consultations with Member States for the development of several projects including those undertaken by implementing partners. Deep consultations with duty-bearers were not evidenced in the design of the Programme. There was no consultation with rights holders, including marginalised and discriminated groups, or civil society groups.
3. There is high relevance of the Programme and activities for the strategic priorities of the implementing partners. Many projects were originally designed by the partners or co-designed together with UNOCT, based on their strategic priorities or assessments of needs or to meet gaps identified by Global Compact Working Group members.
4. There is high implicit relevance of the Programme to support Member States in complying with their human rights obligations under international law, in particular their duty to protect human rights by suppressing terrorism, which threatens the right to life and physical integrity, although this was not explicitly described in the Programme or project documents. There is also relevance for the UN SDGs, particularly SDG16. Relevance to the WPS agenda was limited, although efforts to include women as beneficiaries and as speakers at events were made throughout. UNOCT did not have strategic guidance on the incorporation of WPS agenda into programmes at the time the Programme was being designed. The Programme and project documents should be revised to make explicit their relevance for human rights, GE, and the UN SDGs.
5. The Programme and projects were severely affected by COVID-19, which delayed the start to some project activities or interrupted planned approaches. In several cases, the team responded with online delivery of meetings and trainings, which was necessary due to the pandemic restrictions. Some projects also responded to the increased interest in biological threats by holding webinars and meetings on the relationship with the project theme.
6. The relevance of the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme stems from its diverse portfolio of foundational projects and informative activities and reports. A strength of the Programme is its ability to address current and emerging threats while meeting the specific needs of Member States. However, the dated and unpublished regional threat assessments and a paucity of advanced courses limit present missed opportunities to remain relevant in the ever-shifting global counter-WMD landscape.

Coherence
1. The evaluation finds that coordination was deeply embedded into the programme design and implementation. Implementing partners reported positively about the value of the coordination efforts and the responsiveness and support provided by the UNOCT programme team.
2. Several hindering factors were identified such as the distribution of funds, administrative/contracting issues, staff turnover, lack of staffing, and lack of invitation by some implementing partners for UNOCT to participate in their events.
3. The technical review reveals that the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme demonstrates strong international engagement but can improve on technical coherence due to inconsistencies in training

standardization, SME collaboration, and technical oversight. The absence of a structured quality assurance process and dated threat assessments weakens its effectiveness. The Programme's inability to publish the completed threat assessments and integrate them into training curricula highlights missed opportunities and issues with adaptability.

Effectiveness

1. The Programme MEL system (including logical framework) has several significant weaknesses which, as identified in the inception phase, undermines the evaluability of the results. Keeping these limitations in mind, the evaluation team concludes that the Programme goal is overly ambitious and contribution by the Programme is not measurable at the mid-term stage. Outcomes 1 and 2 were found to have so far achieved positive contribution of results from the Programme/project activities, although both outcomes require quantified targets. Currently the Programme lacks a standardised way to assess Member State capacities, and therefore the mid-term evaluation is not able to assess the likelihood that the Programme will meet its targets by the end.

2. The Programme successfully improved the visibility of UNOCT on WMD/ CBRN/ SALW/ IEDs/ UAS (output 1), achieved the planned numbers of partnerships (output 2), and achieved its planned contributions to international interagency coordination (output 5). The Programme placed a high emphasis on visibility, which the Programme team reports contributed to resource generation. Visibility also likely contributed (unplanned) to improved coordination.

3. The Programme had substantial effectiveness at directly contributing to Member States having improved capacities through several pilot projects and the 20 training courses developed by the Programme (output 4), although the Working Group seed funding projects do not contribute to capacity building of Member States (such as the interoperability project, Technology and Security project, and the SCR2370 technical guidelines), have the potential to via follow up activities. The Programme revised the dissemination approach for the regional threat assessments produced by INTERPOL (output 3) but the indicators in the logical framework have not been revised, and therefore the effectiveness of this output is not evaluable at the mid-term stage.

4. Beneficiaries supported by the Programme activities were appreciative and generally very positive about the quality and delivery of the capacity building activities. To support improved effectiveness of the capacity building activities, beneficiaries reported interest in more advanced trainings, TTX trainings, in-person trainings, refresher trainings, expanding the training to more participants, and addressing their lack of equipment/ protective materials.

5. The effectiveness of the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme hinges on its SME staff and the quantity and quality of the reports and training that it produces for Member States. The Programme's ability to align training, threat assessments, and SME engagement with evolving security challenges will ensure the Programme remains responsive, effective, and impactful.

6. Targets and indicators should be updated to reflect the Programme's extension and new end date, and to reflect levels of ambition for the end of the implementation period given several targets have already been achieved.

Efficiency

1. The budget management system at UNOCT is complex making it challenging to comprehensively assess efficiency as the budget outputs generated from the system are not in the standard project budget/resource reporting formats. However, the information available indicates the Programme/project results justify the costs incurred.

2. Some projects were operated with extremely lean funds. Delivery was supported by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funding, which allowed other contributions to be spent on activities. The team successfully fundraised, no longer requiring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funding, which was fortuitous when funding from that donor was exhausted.

3. During implementation the COVID-19 pandemic, staff leave, and unexpected tasks (among other issues), impacted on the expected time, staffing, and resources needed for delivery resulting in delays. Several

partners reported high workloads for the staffing resources that were planned. MEL was not properly budgeted within the programme and project budgets.

4. The UNOCT Programme team is very small considering their wide global remit and expanded scope to cover WMD, CBRN, SALW, IED and UAS. The team would benefit from additional technical and administrative support.

5. The technical efficiency of the Programme is hindered by gaps in quality control and the need for further standardisation of training frameworks. There is a need for improved or deeper tailoring of course content to national and regional contexts, and more resources and structure for review processes for reports and training materials.

Sustainability

1. Several elements of the programme demonstrate positive indications of sustainability, including the partnerships that have been established, which partners indicated they are interested in continuing as well as a network of focal points created by the interoperability project.

2. Tangible outputs such as the regional threat assessments, SCR2370 technical guidelines and the Technology and Security report have potential sustainability but may require updates and further dissemination to remain useful. In the case of the SCR2370 Technical Guidelines, further adaptations for Member States with low capacities, national workshops and sub-regional workshops are needed to support improved capacities.

3. Insights from beneficiaries indicate positively that the learnings are continuing to be used, however, there are some in-country contextual factors which may hinder sustainability including a lack of protective or testing equipment, embedded train-the-trainer approaches or incorporating the courses into national training curricula. Considerations should be given in the design stage so that sustainability is better supported. Both Iraq and Jordan indicated continued national progression as a result of the support provided by the Programme but would welcome continued support. As part of its needs assessment process, the Programme should assess Member States' ability to utilise and implement the training deployed, based on existing CBRN response infrastructure, including policies, procedures, personnel and equipment. These are aspects required to successfully employ the training delivered.

4. The long-term sustainability of the UNOCT Programme also depends on its ability to build capacity, enhance technical expertise, and establish structured training frameworks that Member States can utilise beyond direct UNOCT support. Practical interventions and advisory groups offer greater sustainability potential by providing reusable, adaptable resources for ongoing professional development. However, regional relevance, national ownership, and integration into existing security structures are critical to ensuring lasting impact. Trainings that lack specificity or rely heavily on external trainers risk diminished effectiveness over time unless transferred to local institutions.

Human rights, gender equality, leave no one behind, and disability inclusion

1. There was limited incorporation of human rights and gender equality into the Programme design and for most projects. Neither the Programme nor most projects adopted a HRBA in their design or implementation. Gender, human rights impact/risk assessments, and conflict sensitivity analysis were not undertaken. However, some implementing partners reported incorporating human rights analysis into the activities.

2. The UN HRDDP was not implemented in the context of support provided to non-UN security forces, as the UNOCT currently lacks guidance for programmes on how to implement the policy. Risk assessments and conflict sensitivity analysis was not undertaken periodically to identify potential human rights risks with the activities. However, some implementing partners such as CTED and UNODC reported that they do include these considerations in the activities and US Leahy vetting was applied for activities under one project.

3. There were low capacities in UNOCT regarding gender and human rights at the start of the programme. Support available has since increased since the establishment of the HRGS, although staffing resources are still low, and several guidelines have now been produced. The Programme team had a gender focal point, but this person has now (at the time of writing) left the team and this function is mainstreamed

across the team. A workplan for 2023 was developed for incorporating gender equality into the Programme activities. The HRGS's guidance documents are in some cases quite generalised and lack practical elements to support extremely busy teams, and more specific support for the applicability of human rights and gender equality in the context of weapons use by terrorists is needed. There are currently no human rights and disability indicators or marker scores system.

4. There was some collection of gender disaggregated monitoring data, such as pre- and post- training surveys. During implementation, efforts were made to encourage women's participation in workshops and events, and include women as speakers during events, but in a number of project locations there is low/no representation of women in key national agencies of relevance. A gender analysis at the start of the projects would have identified this as a risk and informed appropriate mitigation strategies. The Jordan project raised the awareness of national entities of the need for gender considerations in decontamination in the case of a terrorist incident.

5. Rights-holders, including victims and survivors of terrorism, CSOs or people representing marginalised or vulnerable groups, and people with disabilities were not consulted nor engaged in the design or delivery of activities.

6. The technical review found opportunities for the Programme to strengthen its commitment to human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the principle of leaving no one behind by embedding these considerations into all aspects of training and report development. A deliberate integration of gender perspectives and human rights frameworks into threat assessments and training curricula will foster a more comprehensive, ethical, and sustainable approach to counter-WMD efforts.

Lessons Learned

1. **Programme and Project Management and Reporting:** The programme document and some project documents are not maintained as living documents (it is understood that the internal management approval process would be needed for any revision to these documents, which may prevent managers from making updates in real-time). The Programme's logical framework contained in the UNOCT standard template has several critical issues in terms of its content and it does not appear to have undergone a quality check by someone with MEL expertise. Programmes and projects using Kingdom of Saudia Arabia funds do not report results against the indicators in the logical framework nor in detailed narrative form about activities, the workplan and challenges encountered. Limited and partial information is instead gathered in UNCCT reports; however, these are not sufficient to properly record programme and project achievements (as per the pre-determined indicators contained in the logical framework) and learnings.

2. **MEL System:** The Programme and projects lacked a comprehensive MEL system to collect data to report against logical framework indicators (to support a true results-based management system) and also to gather learning and reflections from the Programme team/implementing team about successes, challenges, and indications of wider impact. The Programme lacks a standardised approach to rate/assess Member States capacities or measuring the threat of terrorism (as per the goal of the Programme).

3. **Theory of Change:** A theory of change detailing the expected pathways for change, preconditions for changes to occur and risks would have supported programme learnings during implementation. Two Working Group seed-funded projects – SCR2370 Technical Guidelines and the Technology and Security Project, contribute to Output 5 but have the potential to contribute to Output 4 with further follow up initiatives. Knowledge products produced by several pilot projects under Output 4 and 5, can also contribute to Output 3.

4. **Budgetary management system:** The budget management system is time consuming for managers to use to extract information on budgeted expenditures against planned budget lines. Extracted information is not displayed in a standard financial expenditure spreadsheet. This makes budget management and oversight challenging, including for assessments of efficiency for evaluations such as this.

5. **Lack of administrative support:** The Programme team lacked sufficient administrative support staff. Given the large amount of travel, events and meetings that have been organised under the Programme, additional support staff at this level would allow the team members to spend their time on strategic and content work.

6. **Limited staffing:** The evaluation noted a high workload for a lean team given their wide remit and scope of work. Staff turnover and leave also affected the team, and this was felt more acutely due to limited staffing originally. This limits efficient operations and timely delivery of activities. It also poses a health and safety risk due to potential burn-out.

7. **Human rights due diligence:** The UN HRDDP in cases of support to non-UN security forces was not applied, nor was conflict sensitivity analysis or a periodic risk assessment incorporating assessment of risks of negative impacts on human rights. The Programme also did not apply a HRBA in its design and implementation. The Programme is operating in some contexts where there is a real and high risk of human rights violations, and conducting human rights due diligence, including implementing the UN HRDDP in cases of support to non-UN security forces, would be necessary to identify such risks and to implement relevant measures to prevent, mitigate and address any impact that the Programme's and project activities may have on human rights. The UNOCT currently lacks guidance for programmes on how to operationalise the UN HRDDP.

8. **Gender and Human Rights Analysis:** Further guidance and training is needed for the Programme team on how to undertake a gender and human rights analysis. Guidance should be added to that programme and project document template to explain what should be contained in section 9 'Gender and Human Rights' and to direct staff members to resources for how to undertake a gender/human rights analysis.[38] The HRGS

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[38] Newly revised templates do reportedly include further guidance; however, these were not in place at the time of the evaluation.

guidance documents should be updated to provide practical support for busy Programme teams, including direction to external sources of data and indicators, and provide suggested indicators. The Programme team should reach out to the Section for the identification of suitable consultants among its network, to provide expert support when necessary.

9. **Structured and Contextually Relevant Training**: The qualitative technical review found the necessity of structuring training programs around established educational frameworks such as Bloom's Taxonomy and ensuring regional and contextual relevance. Several training courses, while technically accurate, lacked practical application and alignment with the operational realities of Member States, reducing their effectiveness. The use of U.S.-centric case studies and the absence of localized content in some courses demonstrated the need for customised training materials that reflect the unique challenges and threats faced by each region. Future capacity-building initiatives must incorporate scenario-based learning and case studies that are specific to the target audience to maximise real-world applicability.

10. **Formal (Documented) Quality Assurance and Peer-Review Process**: The evaluation revealed inconsistencies in technical accuracy, instructional quality, and materials developed for trainings, highlighting the lack of a robust quality assurance and peer-review framework. Some training materials contained outdated references, insufficient source citations, and low-quality images, while others failed to comprehensively address key objectives. Without a standardized technical review and evaluation process, critical errors may occur in courses. Establishing a formalised scientific review process, engaging external SMEs, and implementing standardised training rubrics would significantly improve content quality and instructional effectiveness.

11. **Virtual Training:** Virtual training presents an unrealised opportunity for sustainability but must incorporate modern learning techniques to be effective. The Programme's transition to virtual training - prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic - was a necessary adaptation, but the evaluation revealed that these offerings lacked engagement strategies that are critical for technical learning. The review identified that many virtual courses did not leverage modern educational techniques such as interactive assessments, gamification, scenario-based learning, or adaptive learning tools. This failure to differentiate virtual training from in-person instruction has potentially reduced the effectiveness and retention of course material. To improve learning outcomes, UNOCT should invest in a standardised virtual training framework that incorporates best practices from online learning, including microlearning, interactive simulations, and artificial intelligence-driven adaptive content. Without these enhancements, virtual courses may fail to meet the technical and instructional standards required for CBRN training.

12. **Expanding Training Levels and Addressing Emerging Threats**: The technical evaluation also highlights a mismatch between course difficulty levels and the intended audience, with some introductory courses being too technical, while some intermediate/advanced courses lacked technical depth. This gap suggests a need for clearer training level definitions vis-à-vis a metric/rubric that codifies what constitutes a basic, intermediate, and advanced-level training. Thereafter, the development of more advanced learning opportunities based on identified needs and gaps of stakeholders. Additionally, the current training catalogue does not sufficiently address emerging WMD threats, such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, quantum computing, and dual-use technology. As non-state actors increasingly exploit technological advancements for malicious purposes, UNOCT must proactively integrate these evolving threats into its training portfolio. Establishing collaborations with leading academic institutions and research bodies will also enhance the Programme's ability to stay ahead of emerging security risks.

13. **Train the trainer (TTT) approaches:** While training materials are provided to participants after completing the courses, a more comprehensive TTT approach is needed to ensure that appropriate national stakeholders are provided with the appropriate skills and knowledge to roll-out further trainings within their own national entity.

14. **Lack of equipment and protective gear:** While not part of the design of the Programme or projects, several Member States reported that they lack equipment and/or protective gear to be able to necessarily implement some of the learnings in practice. Awareness of national resource constraints should be built into preliminary assessments when providing trainings.

Recommendations

Weapons Programme Design

[1] The programme document should be updated at this mid-term period to reflect changes in scope and activities

Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness & HRGE	Priority Level: high
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 6 months

Explanation: The Programme document should be updated to reflect the change in scope to also include SALW/IED/UAS. This update should include:
1. The inclusion of a comprehensive Theory of Change;
2. A strategic redesign which considers separate outputs in the programme design for WMD, CBRN, SALW, IED, and UAS;
3. Revision to the goal so that it is realistic and achievable based on the programme's activities;
4. Evidence of consultation process is included (including with duty-bearers, rights-holders, and CSOs);
5. Alignment with human rights obligations, GE, and UN SDGs;
6. A Gender and human rights analysis and impact assessment;
Revision to the logical framework to ensure that:
7. Only S-M-A-R-T indicators are included, which include a baseline figure/rating and a target figure/rating (including annual targets where necessary;
8. Gender and other disaggregation (such as marginalisation, or country specific) of indicators and targets are included;
9. Specific GE, human rights and SDG indicators and targets should be included and adopt a human rights-based approach, including language around duty-bearers and rights-holders, include targets for including women experts or speakers at events.

Programme and Project Management and Reporting

[2] The Programme team should revise its MEL approaches to better measure and monitor effectiveness and impact, particularly measurements of Member State capacities so that any improvements can be evaluated in the end term. Indicators with measurable targets should be established. The Programme and associated projects should report against the Programme's logical framework indicators in a frequency that aligns with Office monitoring requirements and document what achievements had been made against planned targets.

Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness	Priority Level: high
Responsibility Programme Team with Support from PMU, ECU, HRGS	Timeframe for Implementation: 1 year

Explanation: The Programme and projects (which do not already do so) should:
1. Report (in a frequency that aligns with Office reporting requirements) in standalone progress reports which include the reporting of their results against their logical framework indicators and targets, activities undertaken, challenges encountered, and lessons learnt;
2. Develop a robust MEL system for monitoring the effectiveness and impact of activities following a review of the logical framework (see recommendation 1 above);
3. Develop and utilise a standardised approach for assessing 'Member States Capacity' both before and after trainings, to avoid incorrectly extrapolating from trainee data to assume Member States capacities have increased;
4. Include systems for follow-up information on how trainings have changed internal procedures or processes among national entities;
5. Collect data to demonstrate whether the objectives of the projects were achieved (currently data collected is more appropriate for activity/output reporting);
6. Include robust measurement approaches for Gender and Human Rights indicators;
7. Use learnings from the MEL system to inform course-corrections and redesigns.

Enhance Technical Oversight and SME Collaboration for Quality Assurance

[3] To improve the technical accuracy and educational effectiveness of training materials, the Programme Team should establish a WMD Scientific Workgroup/Community and implement formalised quality assurance processes.	
Relevant Conclusion: Efficiency and Effectiveness	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 6-9 months
Explanation: The technical review identified inconsistencies with the instructional quality of training materials. Some materials lacked proper references, used incorrect measurement units, or failed to convey complex information effectively. Additionally, most training materials were produced by a restricted pool of content developers, which may have limited diversity in expertise. This can be improved by: 1. Establishing a structured technical advisory framework so that UNOCT can ensure better oversight, leverage external expertise, and maintain a high standard for training materials. This recommendation calls for creating • technical advisory groups (TAGs) for each CBRN threat area, • broadening SME engagement, • developing standardised training evaluation frameworks, and • diversifying contractors. 2. Strengthening partnerships with universities and research institutions will help UNOCT stay ahead of emerging threats. NOTE: See Annex 11 for a more detailed list of technical observations and recommendations.	

Expand and Sustain Advanced Training	
[4] The Programme team should develop standardised course difficulty criteria, and supplement basic trainings with more intermediate and advanced-level training courses, including table-top exercises (TTXs) and practical skill-building components for more technical and sophisticated stakeholders.	
Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness and Sustainability	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 6 months
Explanation: 1. Current training offerings are primarily at the basic level, with limited intermediate or advanced courses. Intermediated and advanced offerings should be expanded. 2. TTXs and practical simulations are cost-effective tools for reinforcing learning which should be utilised by the Programme more to improve effectiveness and sustainability. 3. The courses developed so far serve as a technically sound foundation that should be expanded using structured learning methodologies (e.g., Bloom's Taxonomy) to enhance cognitive progression. 4. Institutionalising a structured approach to both training development and threat analysis will enhance the program's long-term impact. 5. Utilising comprehensive and standardised TTT approaches would support sustainability. 6. Ideally, the regional threat assessments should be synthesised into any future trainings (irrespective of the training level) to help the audience better contextualize the threat environment that they are operating within. NOTE: See Annex 11 for a more detailed list of technical observations and recommendations.	

Civil Society Engagement	
[5] The Programme Team in coordination with relevant the UNOCT work units should develop a roadmap for civil society inclusion in the Programme and projects	
Relevant Conclusion: HRGE	Priority Level: Medium
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 1 year
Explanation: In line with the Secretary-General's call to action for human rights in 2020[39] for "broad and sustained" engagement with CSOs to support SDG progress, the UN's system-wide Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, the Secretary-General's "Our Common Agenda," Secretary-General's Call to Action for Human Rights, and the Guidance Note on the Protection and Promotion of Civic Space, and considering the Global Centre on Cooperative Security A Blueprint for Civil Society-Led Engagement in UN Counterterrorism and P/CVE Efforts[40], the Programme team should develop a roadmap, with support from the relevant UNOCT work units, to show	

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[39] https://www.rightsandsecurity.org/assets/downloads/Project_Description_Scoping_Study_for_Independent_CSO-UN_Engagement_Mechanism_FINAL.pdf
[40] https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Blueprint_for_Civil_Society-Led_Engagement_Web.pdf

how they intend to: Positively engage with interlocutors to promote and protect civic space; Respond to undue restrictions on civic space; Protect the space for different stakeholders to express their views; Ensure a broad diversity of CSOs from targeted Member States are engaged in project design and implementation (including groups representing women, youth, disabled people, marginalised or vulnerable communities and victims of terrorism); Coordinate engagement with the Global Compact working groups and members; Provide the necessary political and financial support for civil society to engage; and engage with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

Gender Equality and Human Rights Inclusion

[6] The Programme should incorporate a gender, HR, and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design

Relevant Conclusion: HRGE	Priority Level: high
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team and HRGS	Timeframe for Implementation: 6 months

Explanation:
1. The Programme Team should incorporate a gender, HR, and conflict sensitivity analysis into the Programme design.
2. The Programme Team should ensure dedicated HR/gender expertise to support the work of the Programme utilising the HRGS's network of experts on the intersection of human rights or gender and CT (including specific experts on the application to use of weapons by terrorists).
3. UNOCT should establish a framework agreement so that such experts can support project and programme teams quickly.
4. The Programme team should implement the UN HRDDP when providing support to non-UN security forces, under the guidance/in close cooperation with UNOCT HRGS.

Address Staffing Shortage

[7] The Programme team should ensure that any new programme and project documentation submitted to the PRB includes a clear staffing structure and associated resource requirements

Relevant Conclusion: Efficiency	Priority Level: high
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 6 months

Explanation: Before presentation to the PRB, the Programme team should
1. design the Programme and projects taking into account the financial and capacity needs including an assessment of their staffing management plans and budgetary disbursement plans against planned activities, duration and number of Member States and implementing partners.
2. Assessments should also be made of plans submitted by implementing partners.

Dissemination Approach for Regional Threat Assessments

[8] UNOCT Programme Team should develop a dissemination plan and revise the logical framework so that the effectiveness of the regional threat assessments can be assessed

Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness & HRGE	Priority Level: high
Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team	Timeframe for Implementation: 3 months

Explanation: The Programme team should
1. develop a dissemination strategy, including timeline and target audiences, in collaboration with INTERPOL for the regional threat assessments.
2. Any remaining internal reviews and copy editing should be prioritised give the reports are time sensitive.
3. The Logical Framework should be revised to include indicators that match the new dissemination strategy so that the effectiveness of these reports can be assessed and evaluated.
4. Indicators should also capture contributions of knowledge products produced by other projects under this Programme for this output.
5. Given the large scope of work, strategic importance of the reports, and their sensitivity, a project document should be developed for the regional threat assessments to document decisions that have been made regarding the scope of work, respective activities for UNOCT and INTERPOL, and expected timeline.
6. The regional threat assessments should be updated on a routine basis, with a standardized threat study template to support national and regional threat assessments.

Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for Process and Outcome Evaluation of
Programme: Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Minimum 10 Years' Experience

1. Context and Purpose

1.1. Context

The UNOCT initiated the programme - Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism to enhance capacities of Member States, International Organizations and United Nations (UN) entities to prevent terrorist organizations from accessing and using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving such weapons or materials.

The objectives of the programme are being achieved by enhancing visibility of UNOCT WMD/CBRN activities; strengthening strategic partnerships with WMD/CBRN related members of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact; advancing knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk of WMD/CBRN terrorism; implementing capacity building projects to support Member States; and supporting the UN Interagency Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks.

The programme which was launched in 2018 as a multi-year programme has developed seven pilot projects, one global study on the threat of CBRN terrorism and twenty training courses.

1.2. Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation will be mostly to draw valuable lessons to inform the next cycle of the programme while accounting for achievements that have been realized since the beginning of programme implementation in in 2018. This evaluation is being conducted part way through the programme and therefore will focus on operational and process related issues, and oriented towards identifying strengths and shortcomings to derive corrective actions that can be taken to strengthen outcomes and impact of the remainder of the programme implementation period and inform the next cycle of the programme. In addition, since the programme has been under implementation for over three years, the evaluation will also assess the quality and relevance of the outputs produced to the beneficiaries and their emerging benefit in terms of outcomes. The results and lessons of the evaluation will be used to inform the implementation of the remaining period of the programme and the drafting of the upcoming cycle through among others, the review of implementation strategies. The information from the evaluation will also inform improvements in the working mechanisms with the partners to ensure effective collaboration in the delivery of results.

2.1. Scope

The scope of the evaluation will cover the period 2018 to date and will examine all outputs and outcomes of activities implemented so far in the seven pilot projects, one global study on the threat of CBRN terrorism and twenty training courses. The evaluation will also assess the extent of utilisation of the global study on the threat of CBRN terrorism by beneficiaries including the impact of the training on the beneficiaries. The evaluation will also focus on the implementation process and determine how successfully the programme followed/is following the strategy laid out in the logic framework. The evaluation will make use of both primary and secondary data sources to answer evaluation questions and to ascertain the efficacy of programme interventions. For the desk review, the evaluation consultant(s) should refer to all relevant information including the programme design, progress reports, and any other related documents. The evaluation does not foresee the undertaking of any field visits. Engagements to collect data from programme staff, programme partners, programme beneficiaries and other key stakeholders should be conducted remotely.

2.2. Overall Objectives

The overall objective of the evaluation is to produce a forward-looking evaluation report that will assess the current status and performance of the WMD/CRBN programme including by undertaking an assessment of the progress made towards the attainment of programme outcomes and provide information that will guide the future orientation WMD/CRBN programme including through alignment with the new Strategic Programme Framework. The evaluation will be process-oriented aimed at collecting, reviewing, and using data to find the right adjustments needed to improve the current programme performance and increase alignment of the upcoming cycle to programme objectives.

The following tasks are also to be included in the evaluation:

i. A systematic assessment on the programme's design, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability.
ii. An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses within the programme design and implementation and recommend improvements for future scale-up efforts
iii. An assessment of the programme's effectiveness in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues of gender and human rights into project activities, including an assessment of the extent to which stakeholders (both women and men) have participated in the various capacity building activities in an active and meaningful manner
iv. An assessment of how the programme has contributed to increasing the level of preparedness and capacity to respond to WMD/CBRN terrorism by the target groups
v. Identification of lessons learned, conclusions, recommendations and capture promising practices for the remainder of the programme implementation period including the effects of the non- cost extension that has been provided
vi. Provision of evidence programmatic accountability to beneficiaries involved in capacity development, donors, and Member States by determining the extent of how programme objectives comply with Resolutions, national strategies, priorities, and needs.
vii. Establishment of what is working/worked for successful partnerships and management,

coordination, monitoring, and oversight and provide recommendations for future joint programming.

viii. Recommendations on the alignment of programme objectives and outcomes including indicators to the new Strategic Programme Framework.

3. Methodological Approach of the Assessment

The evaluation will be based on a mixed methods approach, utilizing qualitative and quantitative methods. The evaluation will use appropriate criteria from the standard approaches and methodologies used to review and assess interventions by OECD-DAC and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). The following are the suggested criteria that the evaluation should address.

3.1. Relevance

- o Has the programme met needs that its beneficiaries expressed and agreed to? And to what extent?
- o Has the programme continued to be responsive regarding the conditions, needs or problems to which it is intended to respond?
- o Has the programme been implemented in alignment with the priorities and policies of the host governments?

3.2. Effectiveness

- o Examine the delivery process of outputs in terms of timeliness and how realistic were the critical assumptions?
- o Assess whether the project is achieving its intended purpose, outputs and objectives, to what extent and what are the implications of the results?
- o Assess whether the linkages between inputs, activities, outputs, and objectives were clear and logical. Did the activities designed under the programme provide clear linkages and complement each other regarding the project strategies and project components of intervention?
- o Assess and account for any changes in the behaviour and capacities of people trained including changes in institutional operations

3.3. Efficiency

- o Assess the efficiency of the programme through a comparison of the allocated resources with results obtained. In general, did the results obtained justify the costs incurred?
- o Examine delivery of project outputs in terms of quality and quantity, were they delivered in a timely manner? To what extent are factors outside the control of project design and management affecting project implementation and attainment of objectives?
- o How are factors outside of the control of the programme affecting implementation and programme objectives and what mitigation measures have been put in place?
- o Is the time frame for programme implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic? If not, what changes can be made to improve them?

3.4. Sustainability

- Assess the positive outcomes of the project and their likelihood to continue beyond the horizon of the programme and practical steps that are being taken to ensure sustainability (including, commitment, and technical and financial capacity)
- Was the strategy for sustainability of achievement clearly defined at the design stage of the programme?
- Assess what contributions the programme has made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the programme outcomes.

3.5. Coherence

- Assess the extent to which partnerships with different actors in the programme and UN agencies have been successful and interventions were harmonized to promote synergies, create strategic partnerships, avoid gaps and duplications including coordination with member states.
- Establish what is working/worked for successful partnerships and management, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and provide recommendations for future joint programming.

4. Expected Deliverables

The consultant will be supported with a CBRN expert for 25 days and will deliver the following.
- Inception report with the proposed methodological approach and work plan (3-5 pages without annexes).
- An initial "bullet point" style report with main findings in English.
- Final draft report (about 25-30 pages without annexes), including a draft executive summary, methodology, clearly identified findings, the results-assessment form (part of the reporting requirement), conclusions and recommendations and annexes.
- Final report (25-30 pages without annexes), including the final executive summary, overall context, methodology and the results-assessment form (part of the reporting requirement) including actionable recommendations. The report should be sent as one complete document and the file size should not exceed 5 megabytes. Photos, if appropriate to be included, should be inserted using lower resolution to keep file size low.
- The document will be prepared and delivered in English.
- The copyright of the report will rest exclusively with UNOCT. Use of the data for publication and other presentation can only be made with the written agreement of UNOCT.
- The evaluation report will only be deemed completed upon clearance by the Chief of Office of USG, the Office of the Deputy USG and validated by the programme manager and the monitoring and evaluation officer.

5. Timelines and Resources

DUTY STATION: Home-based

The evaluation will be conducted for a maximum of 55 days over the period of four months. The Consultant will provide the detailed budget breakdown based on the below deliverables.

Table 1: Estimated timeframe and deliverables for the evaluator	
Activity	Indicative timeframe
Deliverable 1: Desk review	7 days

Identification and provision of documents required to support assessment and outline of the Methodological plan	
Deliverable 2: Inception report	12 days
Inception report with the proposed methodological approach and workplan	
Deliverable 3: First draft report	22 days
First draft report including a draft executive summary, methodology, clearly identified findings, the results-assessment form (part of the reporting requirement), Conclusions and recommendations and Annexes	
Deliverable 4: Final report	14 days
Final report (25-30 pages without annexes), including the final executive summary, overall context, methodology and the results-assessment form (part of the reporting requirement) including actionable recommendations	
Total	55 days

Deliverables breakdown

6. Management Arrangements

The Consultant will be supported with a CBRN expert for 25 days. The Consultant will coordinate assignments of the evaluation and will undertake frequent interaction with Programme Managers in the Preventing and Responding to WMD/CBRN Terrorism Unit, and the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer will provide support and technical advice on evaluations including through the review of evaluation products. The Project Manager with support from the M&E Officer will manage the evaluation process. An internal technical group will be created for the evaluation comprising the monitoring and evaluation officers and subject matter experts. The technical group will support the work of the Consultant through quality assurance and review of evaluation products to ensure that the products are informative, of the highest quality and submitted in a timely manner, according to agreed deadlines and schedule of work.

7. Final Report Submission Procedure

- The consultant will submit a draft report to UNOCT through the Project manager and the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
- UNOCT will forward a copy to key stakeholders for comments on factual issues and for clarifications
- UNOCT will consolidate the comments and send to the consultant by date agreed between UNOCT and the consultant or as soon as the comments are received from stakeholders.

- The final report is submitted to UNOCT who will then officially forward it to stakeholders, including the donor.

8. Mandatory Requirements for Selection of Consultant

Individual must have adequate and appropriate logistic capabilities, and personnel available to perform the job as subcontracted; and individual must have documented experience.

9. Education, Professional Experience and Competencies

9.1 Education and Professional requirements

A. Evaluation Consultant:
- Master's (or higher) degree in evaluations, economics, political or social sciences, project management or a related field. A first-level university degree in combination with two or more years of qualifying experience may be accepted in lieu of the advance university degree.
- Ten years or more of progressive experience in conducting project or programme evaluations, or related area is required.
- Proven experience in supporting process evaluations of complex programmes in conflict and counter-terrorism settings.
- In-depth knowledge of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and data analysis is required.
- Knowledge of UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation, the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation is required.
- Deep knowledge and proven experience in working with entities of the United Nations and other international organisation.
- Experience in multi-disciplinary evaluation methodologies is highly desirable.
- Experience working on counter-terrorism or the prevention of violent extremism programmes is an added advantage.

9.2. Competencies

Professionalism: Knowledge and understanding of theories of change conceptual analytical and evaluative skills to conduct independent research and analysis, including familiarity with and experience in the use of various research sources- electronic sources on the internet, intranet and other databases, research orientation, intellectually curious, and problem solving skills, self- starter and hardworking, successfully worked as part of a research team, ability to communicate well, strong methodology skills, thorough, detail orientation, ethical, mature and able to respond productively to constructive criticism and relates well with agency/program staff and gains their confidence, awareness of political realities and needs, analytical approach to issues, clear, concise, persuasive writer, conversant with concepts and approaches relevant to counter- terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Ability to identify issues, analyze and participate in the resolution of issues/problems. Ability to apply judgment in the context of assignments given, plan own work and manage conflicting priorities. Shows pride in work and in achievements; demonstrates professional competence and mastery of subject matter; is conscientious and efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines, and achieving results; is motivated by professional rather than personal concerns; shows persistence when faced

with difficult problems or challenges; remains calm in stressful situations. Takes responsibility for incorporating gender, human rights and ethical perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work.

- Planning & Organizing: Develops clear goals that are consistent with agreed strategies; identifies priority activities and assignments; adjusts priorities as required; allocates appropriate amount of time and resources for completing work; foresees risks and allows for contingencies when planning; monitors and adjusts plans and actions as necessary; uses time efficiently.
- Teamwork: Works collaboratively with colleagues to achieve organizational goals; solicits input by genuinely valuing others' ideas and expertise; is willing to learn from others; places team agenda before personal agenda; supports and acts in accordance with final group decision, even when such decisions may not entirely reflect own position; shares credit for team accomplishments and accepts joint responsibility for team shortcomings.
- Communication: Speaks and writes clearly and effectively, including the ability to produce written reports in a clear and concise style and to deliver presentations to external audiences with language, tone, style and format tailored to match the audience. Maintains timely and consistent flow of information with relevant colleagues as necessary. Demonstrates openness in sharing information and keeping people informed and ability to build and maintain effective partnerships.
- Technology Awareness: Excellent computer skills.

9. Application Process

For candidate that are interested in applying for this assignment please submit the following:
Proposal explaining proposed methodology and approach.
A detailed work plan, time-frame, outputs and detailed budget.
CV and profile

No Fee

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Annex 2. Evaluation Matrix

Criterion: Relevance				
Evaluation Question: To what extent is the Programme relevant to the pillars of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and the Strategic Goals of the Strategic Plan and Programme Framework (SPPF)?				
Sub-question: How are the interventions aligned with the GCTS and SPPF?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme as a whole and all pilot projects and activities are aligned with at least one aspect of the GCTS and SPPF	The goal, outcomes and outputs of the programme and pilot projects align clearly with at least one pillar of the GCTS and Strategic Goals of the SPRF	N/A	Programme documents, project documents, GCTS and SPPF documents UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit and Senior Management	Desk Review KIIs
Key Findings: The programme and pilot projects align with Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy pillar 2 of the GCTS by providing 'Measures to prevent and combat terrorism' and pillar 3 of the GCTS 'Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in the global counterterrorism enterprise.' Some contribution found to GCTS Pillar 4. UNOCT Strategic Plan and Results Framework (SPRF) contribute to Strategic Goal 3 and Strategic Goal 1. There is some contribution to Strategic Goal 5.				
Sub-question: To what extent are elements/projects of the Programme aligned with the GCTS and SPPF?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The pilot projects and activities are aligned with at least one aspect of the GCTS and SPPF	Identified aspects of the goal, outcomes and outputs of the programme and pilot projects which do not align clearly with any pillars of the GCTS and Strategic Goals of the SPPD	N/A	Programme documents, project documents, GCTS and SPPF documents UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit and Senior Management	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings:
There is strong alignment to both the GCTS and SPRF

Evaluation Question: To what extent does the programme'/projects objectives and design respond to the needs, policies, and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders (including global, country, and partner/institution) including international human rights obligations of the Member States, as well as gender-related frameworks, such as Women, Peace, Security agenda?

Sub-question: What were the existing needs that beneficiaries expressed?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The interventions were developed based on expressed needs from beneficiaries and in alignment with the strategic priorities, and policies and recommendations of other UN bodies, international organisations and Member States.	The expressed needs of beneficiaries at the start of the programme period.	N/A	Programme documents, project documents, context/risk analysis UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff Implementing Partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States)	Desk Review KIIs Survey

Key Findings:
Implementing Partners, coordination partners and trainees confirm relevance of the objectives of the programme and their organisational priorities. Between 67% and 96% rated the individual elements of the programme as either very or fairly important for their organisational needs.
The programme's objectives align with human rights obligations related to state obligations to protect human rights by diligently suppressing terrorism, support justice and rule of law, and a strengthened humanitarian response.
The G/WPS does have relevance for the programme/ projects via encouraging women's participation in meetings and training events on prevention, detection and response to terrorist threats.

Sub-question: Do the interventions align with the strategic priorities and policies of the host governments and key stakeholders (including UN Agencies and International Organizations) including international human rights obligations as well as Women, Peace, Security agenda?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The interventions were developed based on expressed needs from beneficiaries and in alignment with the strategic priorities, and policies and recommendations of other UN	Host governments and key stakeholders confirm the interventions align with their human rights obligations and WPS framework. Documents show alignment between strategic priorities/policies/needs of host	N/A	Programme documents, project documents, context/risk analysis Strategic plans and policies of host governments and key stakeholders Implementing Partners	Desk Review KIIs Survey

			Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States)	
bodies, international organisations and Member States.	governments/key stakeholders and the design of the interventions.			

Key Findings:
Implementing Partners, coordination partners and trainees confirm relevance of the objectives of the programme and their organisational priorities. Between 67% and 96% rated the individual elements of the programme as either very or fairly important for their organisational needs.
Interviewees confirmed high relevance of the projects to their objectives.

Sub-question: Are there any aspects of the interventions which do not align with strategic priorities and needs, human rights obligations and WPS?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The interventions were developed based on expressed needs from beneficiaries and in alignment with the strategic priorities, and policies and recommendations of other UN bodies, international organisations and Member States.	Host governments and key stakeholders confirm that there are no aspects of the interventions which do not align with their strategic priorities and policies Documents show full alignment between strategic priorities/policies of host governments/key stakeholders and the design of the interventions.	N/A	Programme documents, project documents, context/risk analysis Strategic plans and policies of host governments and key stakeholders Implementing Partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States)	Desk Review KIIs Survey

Key Findings:
There was no engagement with women human rights defenders or peacebuilders as part of the WPS. The UNOCT lacks a strategic approach for G/WPS.
The programme/projects do not appear to directly support the rights of victims, to ensure remedies for victims of terrorism.

Evaluation Question: To what extent has the intervention been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc., changes including changes in the conditions, needs or problems to which it is intended to respond?

Sub-question: What changes have occurred in terms of CT conditions, needs, problems, or political, legal, economic, institutional, context since 2018, including the COVID-19 pandemic, and how did they affect the project?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The intervention was impacted by various changes to the context which impacted programme delivery.	Programme and project progress reports detailing contextual changes and impacts on delivery	N/A	Progress reports UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit	Desk Review KIIs

| | Staff member and implementing partner reports of context changes and impacts on delivery | | Implementing Partners
Donor
If needed, external validation by beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders) | |

Key Findings:

The expansion of the programme from working on WMD/CBRN terrorism to also include SALW, IED components and UAS was due to these threats were raised during GCTS biennial reviewed by member states

All projects were affected by COVID-19 causing delays to implementation

The move to online so that work could continue was appreciated but may have undermined effectiveness.

Two events were held linking project activities to the COVID-19 pandemic strategically.

Funds were returned to the Russian Federation following the receipt of donor funding from the Canadian Government

The Central Asia project was redesigned from focusing on Africa to focus on Central Asia due to available funding, which was appropriate due to closeness to Afghanistan

Sub-question: What changes, if any, were made in response to the changing circumstances?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Appropriate course corrections were made as necessary.	Programme and project progress reports detailing contextual changes and impacts on delivery Staff member and implementing partner reports of context changes and impacts on delivery	N/A	Progress reports UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit Implementing Partners Donor If needed, external validation by beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings: Changes made include: Strategic redesign to include SALW, IED components and UAS, Move to meetings held online, Reduction in travel, and Increasing participation in visibility events held online

Sub-question: How appropriate were these changes?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection

Appropriate course corrections were made as necessary.	Staff members report appropriate changes were made in response to the changing circumstances Implementing partners and donors confirm changes made were appropriate and necessary	N/A	Progress reports UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit Implementing Partners Donor If needed, external validation by beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings:
Changes made were appropriate based on the available information and COVID-19 pandemic.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were the perspectives of rights holders and duty-bearers considered during the design process?				
Sub-question: How comprehensive was any stakeholder and context analysis undertaken during planning for the programme? (Did the analysis include human rights and gender considerations)?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Comprehensive stakeholder and context analysis was undertaken during planning which considered the perspectives of various groups including rights holders and duty bearers.	Existence of context and stakeholder analysis undertaken prior to implementation and updated version of analysis at key milestones Assessment of alignment and quality of context and stakeholder analysis with international best practice by evaluators Assessment of comprehensiveness of context/stakeholder analysis by UNOCT staff and implementing partners	N/A	Stakeholder/context analysis documents International best practice examples of stakeholder/context analysis UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff Implementing Partners	Desk Review KIIs Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:
The evaluation did not find any evidence of consultations with rights-holders (or civil society organisations representing diverse rights-holders) during the design of the programme and pilot projects. The programme and project documents do not include evidence of the utilisation of secondary sources of information of rights-holders perspectives being considered during the design phase. The perspectives of duty-bearers were considered during the design of the programme in so far as the intended goal and outputs align with the GCTS however, there is no evidence that there was specific consultation undertake by the programme team with duty-bearers specifically as part of the initial design process.
Some comprehensive analysis was done by implementing partners prior to project conceptualisation and a number of projects incorporated risk assessments and gap analysis into their design.

Sub-question: Did this analysis consider the perspectives of rights holders (of different genders, ages, ethnic, religious, etc backgrounds, marginalized/ vulnerable individuals or groups, persons with disabilities, civil society, etc) and duty-bearers?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Diverse rights holders and duty bearers were consulted and their views considered in the analysis	Assessment of sources of information used for context/stakeholder analysis and data collection methods UNOCT staff and implementing partners confirmation of sources of information used for analysis	N/A	Stakeholder/context analysis UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff Implementing Partners	Desk Review KIIs
Key Findings: No consideration for rights-holders given. The needs of duty-bearers was considered as mentioned above.				

Criterion: Effectiveness

Evaluation Question: What has been the contribution of the intervention to the pillars of the GCTS and the Strategic Goals of the SPPF?

Sub-question: How effective has the programme been at delivering results in accordance with the GCTS and SPPF?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme reports clear results, which can be clearly attributed to the work of the programme, which align with the GCTS and SPPF.	Logframe indicators for the programme and projects show targets were achieved for all indicators which map to the GCTS and SPPF	N/A	Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal monitoring data collection for logical framework reporting UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit and Senior Management If needed, external validation by implementing partners, beneficiaries and donors	Desk Review KIIs
Key Findings: The programme and projects have been effective at achieving results against the GCTS Pillar 2 (via the technology and security, SCR2370 Guidelines, and ICSANT projects) and 3 (capacity building initiatives in Iraq, Jordan, Central Asia, 20 training courses, and via improved partnerships and collaboration) and SPRF Strategic Goal 1 (capacity building initiatives in Iraq, Jordan, Central Asia, 20 training courses, ICSANT, SCR2370 Guidelines and via improved partnerships and collaboration) and 3 (Output 5 WG meetings, Interoperability, Iraq, Jordan, Central Asia, 20 training courses, ICSANT, SCR2370 Guidelines and via improved partnerships and collaboration)				

Evaluation Question: To what extent did the programme/project achieve its intended goal, outcomes and outputs and what are the implications of the results?

Sub-question: How effective has the programme/project been at achieving planned results (according to the programme/project Logical framework and defined indicators)?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Clear results are reported for logical framework indicators for most output and outcome indicators. Indicators which have not yet been achieved either show indications of progress or due to factors outside of the control of the programme/project. The programme/project was designed and delivered with clear linkages between each component which helped improve effectiveness.	Logical framework indicators for the programme and projects show targets were achieved for all indicators Quality assessment of outputs	N/A	Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal data collection for logical framework reporting UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit and Senior Management Implementing partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders) Donors	Desk Review KII Surveys Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:
Programme Goal - Partially effective
Outcome 1 - Partially effective
Outcome 2 - Partially effective
Output 1 - substantially improved visibility of UNOCT WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS activities. the large majority of implementing and coordinating partners confirm that they are now much more aware (67%) of UNOCT activities on countering terrorist use of weapons (including WMD/CBRN/SALW/IED/UAS) compared with their awareness in 2018, while a further one third of implementing partners say that they are now a little more awareness (33%).
Output 2 - the programme has exceeded the number of partnerships that it had originally envisioned (5 MOUs). Partnerships were established with NATO, INTERPOL, CTED, UNODC, UNODA, UNICRI, UNIDIR, OPCW, and US DOS.
Output 3 - not effective, as the reports produced by INTERPOL have not been published by UNOCT
Output 4 - substantial effectiveness, with more than the planned number of projects undertaken. The project generally has been effective in achieving their planned results. However, direct contribution to improved capacities of member states is not in all cases evident.
Output 5 - effective achievement achieved its planned contributions improving international interagency coordination on preventing and responding to WMD/CBRN terrorist attacks

Sub-question: Have there been any unexpected or negative results?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection

			Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal data collection for logical framework reporting	
No unexpected or negative results were found as a result of the intervention	Progress and annual reports of unintended/negative consequences UNOCT and external sources verification of existence/non-existence of negative or unintended consequences	N/A	UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit and Senior Management Implementing partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders) Donors	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings:
No unexpected results. Negative results potentially may occur if the regional threat/risk reports are not published. Overlapping mandates with UNODC on ICSANT, and risks related to member states' expectations being raised for future support. Lack of human rights due diligence or monitoring of impact of the capacity building support on rights-holders.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were the linkages between inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes clear and logical?

Sub-question: Did the activities designed under the programme/project provide clear linkages and complement each other regarding the project strategies and project components of intervention?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme/project's reported changes align with the expected theory and logical chains.	UNOCT staff confirm clear linkages in line with theory Process tracing and contribution analysis by evaluators	N/A	Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal monitoring data collection for logical framework reporting UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Programme Management Unit Implementing Partners for joint projects	Desk Review KIIs Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:

Sub-question: Do achieved results align with the expected theory of change for the interventions?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme/project's reported changes align with the expected theory.	UNOCT staff confirm clear linkages in line with theory Process tracing and contribution analysis by evaluators	N/A	Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal data collection for logical framework reporting External sources on theory of change for advocacy interventions UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff Implementing Partners for joint projects	Desk Review KIIs Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:

No theory of change for the programme. The visibility events identified for output 1 did not clearly contribute to the expected improved cooperation or resource generation for initiatives (however, likely other meetings contribute to these ambitions). They did likely support improved coordination which was not previously identified.

Unfortunately the activities were not sequenced so that the regional threat/risk reports inform which countries receive capacity building support.

Due to sequencing of activities, the SCR2370 Guidelines were not completed in time to inform SALW Central Asia project.

Several projects under output 4 are at the knowledge/awareness raising level rather than capacity building level.

A way to assess member state capacity has not been established by the programme and so it is not demonstrable that the trainings provided have moved beyond building the capacity of individuals to improving the capacity of the member state. Lack of equipment and materials was mentioned as a limitation to implementing the training given, as well as trainings being at a more basic level with more advanced training being needed.

Evaluation Question: What internal and external factors have helped and hindered implementation and achievement of results, and to what extent were mitigation measures effective?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Both internal and external factors affected programme delivery	Survey question on internal and external factors Internal document referenced factors UNOCT staff members reported factors Implementing partners, beneficiaries and donor reported factors	N/A	Annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal data collection for logical framework reporting UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff and Senior Management Implementing Partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	Desk Review KIIs Survey Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:

Several factors helped implementation and achievement including experienced, knowledgeable implementing partners, committed member states, and a responsive UNOCT team
Several factors hindered implementation and achievement including moves to online modalities due to COVID, inefficiencies in fund disbursement, insufficient funding, staffing or time required for the initiatives, lack of funding for follow up activities.
Sub-question: What mitigation measures were put in place and how effectively were they activated during the programme/project?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme/project team identified all critical risks during planning and devised appropriate strategies to mitigate these risks. When activated, these mitigation measures were effective.	Internal document referenced mitigation measures UNOCT staff members reported mitigation measures	N/A	Project documents & concept notes, annual reports, progress reports, end of project reports and internal data collection for logical framework reporting UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff If needed, external validation by Implementing Partners ~~and Beneficiaries~~	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings:
Some mitigation measures were put in place, but many hindering factors remained to impact project delivery.

Criterion: Efficiency
Evaluation Question: To what extent has the implementation strategy and execution been efficient and cost-effective?
Sub-question: Did the results obtained justify the costs incurred?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Allocated resources were utilised in line with expectations and delivered to budget. Budgets were utilised in a cost-effective manner.	Budget utilisation compared with planned expenditure at each level of the results chain Comparison of costs for all elements of the programme and pilot projects, and assessment of deviations % of budgets assigned to staffing % of budget underspent/overspent Staff and stakeholders report budgets were sufficient and justified	N/A	Budget and expenditure annual and closing reports for programme and pilot projects UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Project Management Unit Implementing Partners Donor	Desk Review KIIs Survey

Key Findings:
The UNOCT has a complex internal system for project/programme budget management which means that simple budget information is not quickly available in a transparent way to the team. However, the lean project budgets do seem to justify the results, relying on core UNOCT funding for staffing roles so project budgets could be directed to outputs and activities and a reliance on in-kind implementing partner staff. Savings were made due to moving activities online due to COVID-19 however some costs increased due to inflation.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were intervention staffing, activities and outputs planned, sequenced and delivered in a timely and efficient manner?

Sub-question: How realistic and appropriate was the staffing and time allocations for the interventions? If not, what changes can be made to improve them?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The planned staffing and timeframe needed was appropriate and realistic to deliver quality interventions.	Comparison of staffing and time allocations for all elements of the programme and pilot projects, and assessment of deviations % of budgets assigned to staffing % of budget underspent/overspent Staff and stakeholders staffing and time allocations were efficient Process tracing and contribution analysis by evaluation team	N/A	Programme and pilot project progress reports and closing reports UNOCT Programme Staff, Project Staff, Project Management Unit Implementing Partners Beneficiaries (Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders) Donor	Desk Review KIIs Survey Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:
The reliance on core funding for staffing roles and in-kind contributions from implementing partners with staff positions unfunded for some projects resulted in staffing resources being underestimated. Heavy workloads which present a health and safety risk. UNOCT has very limited staffing considering the wide scope and remit of the programme. The programme manager is also responsible for several project indicating lack of staffing. There are no junior staff members in the team or administrative staff positions. UNOCT consultancy rates were mentioned as being lower than the market rates for experts on CT and WMD/CBRN/SALW, which makes it challenging to hire experienced consultancy support. MEL was not budgeted for in appropriate levels based on UNOCT Evaluation Guidelines (2023).

Sub-question: What factors (both internal and external) affected efficient delivery of the interventions?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection

The planned staffing and timeframe needed was appropriate and realistic to deliver quality interventions.	Staff members and implementing partner reported factors Process tracing and contribution analysis by evaluation team	N/A	UNOCT Staff Implementing Partners If needed, external validation with donor and beneficiaries (Member States/Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	Desk Review KIIs

Key findings:
Several factors affected efficient delivery including pressures due to the COVID-19 pandemic, limited budgets for the activities, delays to UNOCT approval process and challenges in the disbursement of funds to implementing partners.

Criterion: Sustainability

Evaluation Question: To what extent are the benefits of the programme/project likely to continue after it ends?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Interventions developed based on strong partnerships with IOs and UN entities, Member State partners who showed strong political will, who have a strategic interest in reducing terrorism, with stable governments, strong good governance regimes, and who had senior change makers engaged are more likely to show sustainable results.	Comparative analysis - likelihood of sustainability disaggregated by programme activity, pilot project, and recipient of capacity building support (duty bearer and rights holder)		UNOCT staff programme staff, project staff Implementing partners Beneficiaries (Member States/Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	KIIs Survey Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:
High likelihood of sustainability: Almost all implementing or coordinating partners responded in the survey that their respective projects had either a very likely or fairly likely chance that the benefits would last into the medium or long-term. Only one respondent out of 21 reported an unlikely chance that the results would not last, however, they were the only descendant voice.
Partnerships with international organisations, UN Entities, National Authorities and networks of focal point show high likelihood of sustainability
The threat/risk reports' sustainability prospects will be hindered if publication is delayed much longer

Sub-question: What contributions has the programme/project made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the programme outcomes.

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection

			Needs assessments Monitoring data	
Under certain contextual conditions, capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders was strengthened	Comparison of needs assessments and delivered capacity support provided National stakeholders reported level of capacity and knowledge National stakeholders reported level of ownership over the programme outcomes		UNOCT staff programme staff, project staff Implementing partners Beneficiaries (Member States/Duty Bearers/Member States and Rights-holders)	Desk Review KIIs Survey Qualitative Systematic Review

Key Findings:
In the evaluation survey of trainees, three quarters (74%) think that the benefits are very likely to last into the future.
The survey with national training coordinating partners, found 3 out of 5 reporting that the benefits are very likely to last into the medium or long term, while 2 reported that the benefits were fairly likely to continue
In Iraq and Jordan national authorities have indicated continued action following the end of the support although would welcome further capacity building support. In Central Asia, the activities have been focused on the knowledge building/awareness raising levels, with more tailored national support needed to build capacities.

Evaluation Question: To what extent was a strategy for sustainability of achievement clearly defined at the design stage of the programme/project?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
A sustainability strategy was identified at the start of the programme, and it is in line with international best practice	Existence of a sustainability strategy for the programme and pilots Assessment of the sustainability strategy compared with international best practice UNOCT staff members and implementation partners reported gaps		Programme and project documents UNOCT staff programme staff, project staff Implementing partners	Desk Review KIIs

Key Findings:
The programme was foreseen in phases, with an initial piloting phase before more comprehensive roll-out. This has not materialised due to delays in the first phase, and now both phases have been rolled-out concurrently.
The pilot projects lack a sustainability strategy. Indeed, some elements of the programme such as the threat/risk reports or 20 training courses lack a project document specifying a theory of change or documenting design decisions. Further elaboration is needed on how UNOCT plans to roll-out the training courses so that they are effective for building capacity of member states, and address lack of equipment.

Criterion: Coherence

Evaluation Question: To what extent were partnerships with different actors in the programme and UN agencies utilised successfully and interventions planned and delivered to be harmonized to promote synergies, create strategic partnerships, avoid gaps and duplications including coordination with member states?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection

	Number of organizations with whom new partnerships were established over the course of the programme All new partnerships were made with organizations with a strategic priority to counter terrorism Number and quality assessment of synergies established		Programme and project progress reports Monitoring data UNOCT staff programme staff, project staff, and Senior Management Implementing Partners	Desk Review KIIs Survey
The programme established a number of clear and valuable new strategic partnerships.				

Key Findings:

Evaluation Question: What aspects of the programme/project helped or hindered successful partnerships and management, coordination, monitoring, and oversight?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The programme/project includes a number of examples of best practice in utilising partnerships.	UNOCT staff reported factors UNOCT staff reported examples of effective utilisation of partnerships, verified by progress reports or relevant partner		Progress reports UNOCT programme staff, project staff, Project Management Unit, Senior Management Implementing partners	Desk review KIIs

Key Findings:

Criterion: Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind

Evaluation Question: To what extent has the programme/project design, implementation and monitoring fully considered human rights, gender equality as well as marginalised or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities? This includes the development of relevant human rights and gender analysis and responses (such as specific human rights and gender analysis, human rights and gender quality indicators, etc.)

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Gender, human rights and marginalised or vulnerable individuals or groups were not considered during the programme/project design	Evidence that international human rights norms and standards, and the needs of all genders, excluded groups and the most marginalised or vulnerable including those with disabilities as well as youth, were incorporated into programme and project design and planning Programme and Project Gender Markers		Internal documents and outputs UNOCT programme staff, project staff UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section International best practice and international guidance on HRBA and LNOB	Desk Review KIIs

	Comparative assessment to international best practice and international guidance on HRBA, Gender Mainstreaming and LNOB by evaluators			

Key Findings:

The evaluation did not find evidence that human rights and gender analysis was conducted at the start of the programme nor for the development of the projects.

Some project logical frameworks do include gender disaggregated targets and gender related indicators however, these tend to be at the level of tracking participation at events, rather than including indicators to measure tangible impacts on gender equity as part of the project design. Several 'List of Participant' sheets for events do not collect gender. For Human Rights and the inclusion of marginalised, disadvantaged groups, such as youth or those with disabilities, no such indicators are included in the logical frameworks.

A gender focal point was identified in the team and a WMD/CBRN Unit Gender Workplan was developed to cover the period of 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023.

During implementation, implementing/coordination partners and duty-bearers confirmed that there was an emphasis placed on encouraging female participation in events, trainings, and meetings. Despite strong encouragement, for some country/regional locations there was low or no participation by women (outside of the programme/implementing team).

A HRBA was not applied to the programme nor project designs. The language of Duty-bearers and Rights-holders is not used in the Programme/Project Documents. There were no consultations with vulnerable, marginalized individuals or groups during the design phase design and no such groups were envisioned to be the direct beneficiaries of the interventions.

Evaluation Question: What challenges and/or opportunities, if any, influenced the way in which considerations related to human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities were incorporated in the programme design, implementation and monitoring?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Human rights and gender analysis and responses were included in a limited way by the programme/project	Existence of human rights analysis (including marginalised or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities; and youth) and gender analysis. Existence of indicators related to human rights, gender equality as well as outcomes related to marginalised/vulnerable individuals or groups in programme and project logframes. Quality assessment of analysis and indicators undertaken by Evaluators. Examples of human rights and gender responses included during programme implementation		Internal documents and outputs. UNOCT Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines. International best practice and international guidance on HRBA and LNOB. Monitoring data. Progress reports and end of project reports. UNOCT programme staff, project staff. UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section. As needed, external validation with implementing partners, beneficiaries (Member States, duty-bearers and rights-holders)	Desk review. KIIs. Qualitative Systematic Review
Key Findings:				

Opportunities include: Implementing partners with strong consideration to gender and human rights considerations, donor requirements to incorporate this, the establishment of the gender focal points, and the starting of a relationship with the High Commissioner for HR.
Challenges include: Lack of transparent Human Rights and Disability marker system used by UNOCT for programme and project assessments, limited staffing at UNOCT GE and HR Unit, lack of internal understanding within teams about GE and HR, and guidance documents which are not tailored sufficiently for CT in WMD/CBRN, lack of integration of G/WPS and no/few women working in national entities of relevance for projects.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were women, persons with disabilities, and/or organizations working on these issues consulted and meaningfully involved in programme planning and implementation?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
There are a number of challenges to the incorporation of these considerations into all stages of the programme/project.	Reported challenges and opportunities		Internal documents and outputs Monitoring data Progress reports and end of project reports UNOCT programme staff, project staff, and Senior Management UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section As needed, external validation with implementing partners, beneficiaries (Member States, duty-bearers and rights-holders)	Desk review KIIs

Key Findings:
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, there was no engagement with Civil Society as part of the project or programme despite formal recognition in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the value of civil society engagement A/RES/75/291.
The UNOCT has established a Civil Society Unit, however, so far their engagement with programme teams seems very limited. There was extremely low engagement with rights-holders directly (with the exception of the Iraq project which engaged some university students are part of the training courses).

Evaluation Question: To what extent has the programme/project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Several lessons learnt were noted during implementation and course corrections made.	Documented examples which can be clearly attributed to the programme/projects, verified by external sources Reported examples by UNOCT staff, implementing partners or beneficiaries which can be clearly attributed to the		Internal documents and outputs Progress reports and end of project reports UNOCT programme staff, project staff UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section	Desk review KIIs Survey

| | programme/projects, verified by external sources if necessary | | Implementing partners
Beneficiaries (Member States, duty-bearers and rights-holders) | |

Key Findings:
Women trained under the project also reported positively about the relevance of the trainings for the work of their organisation. All 19 female trainees reported that it was very relevant. Just over three in five (63%) of the female trainees reported that the sessions were very effective at increasing their knowledge and skills on the topic, with a further 32% reporting that it was fairly effective. Female trainees were also more likely than males surveyed to report that they had put into practice the knowledge gained often (see chart 13 below).
Sustainable impact in Jordan whereby gender specific gap in emergency response was identified, and the national authority has specifically sought to hire more women as a result of the project identifying lack of female experts as a gap.

Evaluation Question: To what extent have unintended effects emerged for women, men, or vulnerable/ marginalized individuals/ groups, civil society organizations?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Several lessons learnt were noted during implementation and course corrections made.	Documented examples which can be clearly attributed to the programme/projects, verified by external sources Reported examples by UNOCT staff, implementing partners or beneficiaries which can be clearly attributed to the programme/projects, verified by external sources if necessary		Internal documents and outputs Progress reports and end of project reports UNOCT programme staff, project staff UNOCT Human Rights and Gender Section Implementing partners Beneficiaries (Member States, duty-bearers and rights-holders)	Desk review KIIs

Key Findings:
No unintended effects have been identified by the evaluation; however, the programmes and projects require a more comprehensive due-diligence approach and follow up process to assess what specific changes to policy or practice as a result of the activities.

Annex 3. Theory of Change and/or Logical Framework

UNOCT Programme on Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons Reconstructed Theory of Change (Source: Evaluation Team, for evaluation use only)

The following summarises the reconstructed Theory of Change which the evaluation team proposes to guide the mid-term evaluation of the programme. The Theory of Change (TOC) is used to explain how the interventions which were implemented under the programme were originally expected (at the time of the programme's design) to contribute to the intended outcomes and goal as stated in the programme logical framework. This Theory of Change is retrospective and refers to the understanding of the programme team at the time when the programme was first designed.

This Theory of Change is preliminary and will be refined following the interviews with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) programme staff. The evaluation will investigate (using process tracing and contribution analysis) whether the expected changes occurred in line with the expected pathways for change and what contextual factors impacted on the changes seen. The evaluation will investigate what changes should be made to the TOC based on the experiences of the programme team during implementation.

Given the programme was developed before UNOCT had gender and human rights guidelines, this document marks elements related to gender mainstreaming, the human rights-based approach and Leave no one behind (LNOB) considerations in red. These guidelines were not specified in the Programme Document and are therefore preliminary suggestions by the evaluation team which will be explored and refined during the evaluation fieldwork.

Context to the Programme:

UNOCT was established in June 2017 by the General Assembly resolution (A/Res/71/291), subsuming the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). The UNOCT is the custodian of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and is mandated to support duty-bearers/Member States to implement it.

The prospect of non-state actors, including terrorist groups and their supporters, gaining access to and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials is a serious threat to international peace and security. Terrorist and violent non-state actor (VNSA) groups are developing new ways and means to acquire and use more dangerous weapons to maximise damage, including those incorporating CBRN materials. New technology advancements (including on the dark web) are allowing weapons to be more easily trafficked and accessible.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy provides a framework for preventing and responding to WMD/CBRN terrorism. There are existing endeavours of a number of UN entities and various International Organizations on aspects of WMD/CBRN terrorism. However, there is no specific comprehensive programme dedicated to the issue within the UN system and there is a need for a more programmatic and complete approach to preventing, preparing for and responding to the threat of WMD/CBRN terrorism.

Terrorist and violent non-state actor groups exploit and manipulate gender inequalities, norms and roles, including violent masculinities, to radicalise and recruit new members, and leverage biases of State security actors for strategic and tactical purposes. Violations of human rights, including those perpetrated in a counter-terrorism context are recognized among the conditions conducive to radicalization to violence. Poor governance, lack of the rule of law, corruption, and a culture of impunity for unlawful behaviour by the State or its agents have been shown to facilitate the recruitment efforts of terrorist and violent extremist groups. Inequality, including gender inequality, marginalisation, and discrimination have successfully been exploited by these groups to gain recruits.

The baseline problem (which the programme has been designed to respond to, taken from the programme logical framework):

- WMD/CBRN provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy are implemented in an ad hoc manner, with Member States, International Organizations and UN entities having limited capacities for the prevention, preparedness and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism.
- National authorities in Member States have limited capacities for the prevention, preparedness and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism and awareness, knowledge and understanding of the real threat and risk is low.
- Several International Organizations and UN entities are active in the area of WMD/CBRN terrorism and provide support Member States, although often in an uncoordinated manner.
- The role and relevance of UNOCT in the WMD/CBRN community is not well established and UNOCT is often overlooked by Member States, International Organizations, UN entities and related international initiatives by stakeholders as a partner for WMD/CBRN activities.
- The members of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact have committed to enhancing coordination to ensure the balanced implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
- The partners of Member States' International Initiatives have committed to enhancing coordination and cooperation.
- There exist very little analysis of the global threat and risk of WMD/CBRN terrorism. Some reports on WMD/CBRN terrorism exists, although they are fundamental in nature and lack insights on capabilities, vulnerabilities, impact and the relevance of new technologies, predominantly.
- National authorities in Member States have limited capacities to prevent, prepare for and respond to WMD/CBRN terrorist attacks.
- The UN system currently coordinates WMD/CBRN terrorism issues through the UN Interagency WMD Working Group, although it has a limited capacity and technical expertise. There is a lack of evidence/knowledge on the specific relationship between gender mainstreaming, Leave no one behind, and terrorist access to weapons and materials. In many instances, IOs fail to adopt a human rights-based approach in their counter-terrorism programming and Member States do not comply with their international human rights obligations when countering terrorism.
- Currently, the views and alternative perspectives of different genders, youth, marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities, as well as civil society are not incorporated into the design and implementation of approaches to counter terrorist access to weapons and materials.

Programme Vision:

- Member States/Duty-bearers, International Organizations and UN entities are able to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials.
- Member States, International Organizations and UN entities are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving WMD/CBRN materials.
- IOs, UN Entities and Member States/Duty-bearers have a joined-up approach, share information/knowledge quickly and easily between one another, and undertake partnerships which utilising each-others areas of strengths, to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials.
- Efforts to prevent terrorists accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials will be informed by new research and evidence generation.
- Evidence generation should include a range of perspectives including from different genders, age groups, marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities. Information will be presented and published in a transparent way in accordance with the Human Rights-based Approach.
- Collectively, UNOCT, IOs and UN entities will support MS/Duty-bearers to reform and revise policies and practices to better prevent terrorist groups accessing WMD/CBRN materials in compliance with international human rights norms and standards.
- Member States' new policies and practices will be effective at reducing terrorist access to WMD/CBRN materials and will support gender responsive and human rights compliant, incorporating leave no one behind considerations.

Pathways for Change:

STRATEGY

Coordination and collaboration with other IOs and UN entities with shared beliefs, to influence changes in policy and practice, informed by research and information exchange, in line with the provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and international law, including international human rights law, and to support the development of the capacities of duty-bearers to meet their human rights obligations, including on gender equality.

Raising visibility of UNOCT

Partnerships with key stakeholders

Threat and risk analysis

Piloting – then Full roll-out of capacity building

Interagency cooperation

OUTCOMES

Shift in social norms and beliefs of duty-bearers on approaches to preventing terrorist access to WMD/CBRN materials, and their human rights obligations, including on gender equality

Strengthened base of support

Strengthened alliances and coordination

Member States/Duty-bearers have improved awareness, knowledge and understanding of the threat and risk of WMD/CBRN terrorism and show increased political will to revised policies and practices and meet their human rights obligations, including on gender equality

Duty-bearers/Member States implement enhanced policies, practices and procedures for the prevention, preparedness and response to WMD/CBRN terrorism in line with international human rights law norms and standards.

Reduction in terrorist access to weapons and materials and responses to terrorist attacks are more effective. The world is more safe and secure from WMD/CBRN terrorism. This is experienced by all rights-holders including women, men, girls & boys as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities.

Key Assumptions:

- There are a number of reputable and experienced IOs and UN Entities who also share the belief and strategic priority of preventing terrorist access to weapons and materials.
- UNOCT will maintain an excellent reputation with other stakeholders so that it can play an important and active role in partnerships
- Partnerships between UNOCT, IOs and UN entities will be held together by agreement over core beliefs about policies.
- Despite a diversity of organisations whom UNOCT is partnering and collaborating with, these partnerships and collaborations can operate effectively and efficiently due to shared core beliefs.
- After receiving information, research, evidence and trainings, duty-bearers/Member States will be motivated and committed to making necessary changes to policy and practice.
- Member States/Duty-bearers policies and practices related to the prevention of terrorist access to WMD/CBRN materials will be unlikely to change unless key change-makers within the country (or hierarchically superior jurisdiction) have changed perceptions.
- The risk assessment research for the global study will result in a high quality, informative and engaging report(s) which responds directly to the needs of partners.
- The pilot projects will establish clear evidence on 'what works' when building capacities of member states/duty-bearers
- Concepts, processes and approaches related to Gender Mainstreaming, Leave no one behind and a Human Rights-Based Approach are fully understood and incorporated into the programme design and implementation at all stages by UNOCT programme staff.
- Duty-bearers/Member States will understand the value and importance of human rights, gender mainstreaming and Leave no one behind considerations for effectively reducing terrorist access to WMD/CBRN materials. They will ensure that their policies and practices to respond to terrorist access to weapons and materials integrate and comply with relevant international norms and standards, as well as gender-related frameworks, such as Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

- The prevention of terrorist access to weapons or materials will continue to be of high international interest with various actors and stakeholders internationally engaged and willing to fund activities

Main Contextual Factors enabling or hindering the programme:

- Level of perceived threat from terrorists accessing and using WMD/CBRN materials (globally, regionally, nationally or locally)
- Strategic priorities of, and staffing capacities, within partner IOs and UN entities
- Political settlement within the participating Member States/Duty-bearers and frequency of political change
- Internal capacity (including staffing, financial, and technological) of participating duty-bearers
- Gender inequalities, norms and roles within partner IOs, UN entities, and MS/duty-bearers
- Respect for and protection of human rights/ rule of law/ good governance by MS/duty-bearers

Annex 4. List of Documents Reviewed

- UNOCT Strategic Plan and Programme Framework
- UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and its review resolutions
- Secretary-General's reports on "Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy" (A/77/718 ; A/75/729 and A/74/677)
- UNOCT Office Structure
- Programme document
- WMD CBRN List of Projects
- Pilot Project Preventing and Responding project document, progress reports, monitoring data, budget
- UNCCT – US DOS Iraq project document, progress reports, mission reports, monitoring data, budget
- UNCCT-NATO Jordan project document, progress reports, mission reports, monitoring data, budget
- ICSANT project document, progress reports, mission reports, monitoring data, budget
- SALW_Updated project document, progress reports, mission reports, monitoring data, budget
- Technology and Security project document, Power Point, progress reports, monitoring data, budget
- WG Phase III project document, progress reports, mission reports, monitoring data, budget
- WG BMLE 2370 Technical Guidelines project document, progress reports, monitoring data, budget
- Summary document of trainings and courses
- TOR WMD CBRN Expert
- TOR WMD CBRN Evaluator
- UN Treaty Collection - ICSANT Treaty Ratification Status

UNOCT/UNEG Evaluation Documents -

- UNOCT Evaluation Handbook, quality assurance checklist and templates (2022)
- UNOCT Evaluation Policy (2021)
- Gender Mainstreaming Policy (2022)
- UNOCT Gender Marker Information Note
- Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for UNOCT Projects
- UN Learn Better, Together: Independent Meta-Synthesis Under the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2021)
- UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2017)
- UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation (2020)
- UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation (2014)
- UNEG Guidance on Integrating Disability Inclusion in Evaluations (2022)
- OECD DAC Criteria
- OECD DAC Evaluation Guidance documents
- Maria J. Grant, Andrew Booth A typology of reviews: an analysis of 14 review types and associated methodologies Health Information & Libraries Journal Volume 26, Issue 2
- Poorvu Center, Yale, Formative and Summative Assessments UN SDG Operationalizing Leave No One Behind

Annex 5. List of Stakeholders Consulted

Interviewees' Key Demographics

Stakeholder group	Total number Interviewees	Interviewees' Gender	Location
UNOCT Programme and Project Managers	7	1 M / 6 F	Online
UNOCT staff (stakeholders)	7	3 M / 4 F	Online
Implementing/Coordination Partners:[41] UN Entities. International Organizations (IOs), Duty-bearers	10	6 M / 4 F	Online
Beneficiaries:[42] Member States/ Duty Bearers	9	7 M / 2 F	Online
NGOs/CSOs and CSO Engagement Expert	2	0 M / 2 F	Online
Donors	2	1 M / 1 F	Online
TOTAL	36	18 M / 18 F	Online

Survey Respondents' Key Demographics:

	Implementing/Coordinating Partners	Trainees
18 - 34	2	8
35 - 54	9	60
55+	10	10
Prefer not to say	0	3

Please state which UNOCT Programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons capacity building activity or activities you have participated in?

Answer Choices	Responses

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[41] Including: Counter-Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN), CRDF Global, INTERPOL, OPCW, CTED, the European Union, UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), UNICRI, UNODC, UNIDIR, and UNODA

[42] Including stakeholders from: Albania, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Philippines, and Tajikistan

Basic Microbiology and Biological Threats	17%	14
Basic radiological and nuclear threats	23%	19
Biological Countermeasures Training	33%	27
Bioterrorism Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX)	22%	18
CBRN Countermeasures	37%	30
CBRN countermeasures and response	32%	26
CBRN critical infrastructure and key resources protection	12%	10
CBRN Critical Infrastructure Protection	14%	11
Chemical Countermeasures	15%	12
Chemical Table-Top Exercise (TTX)	20%	16
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Protection Activities	0%	0
Countering Nuclear Terrorism	16%	13
Intermediate Biological Threats	6%	5
Intermediate Radiological and Nuclear Threats	4%	3
Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction	19%	15
Outbreak containment for law enforcement	17%	14
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures	9%	7
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)	2%	2
UNCCT and UNODA Joint Biological Preparedness and Response Training	16%	13
WHO UNCCT Combatting Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism	9%	7
Other (please specify)	12%	10
Don't know	1%	1
	Answered	81

Was/were the capacity building initiative(s) you attended held online (virtual) or in person?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Online (virtual)	41,98%	34
In person	19,75%	16
Both	38,27%	31
Don't know	0,00%	0

Annex 6. Evaluation Team Member Biographies

Evaluation Expert Ms. Coralie Pring, MRes (www.coraliepringresearch.org)

Coralie Pring brings over 16 years of experience in formative monitoring, evaluation and learning research with a specialism in counter-terrorism, good-governance, anti-corruption, and gender. Since the start of her career, Coralie has undertaken a number of strategic monitoring, evaluation and learning projects including for multilateral organisations, bilateral organisations, civil society, foundations and political parties including UNODC, UNDP, UN Women, the Gates Foundation, Open Society Foundations, GIZ, the US Department of Defense, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNCAC Coalition, Transparency International, Farm Radio International, the British Council, Plan UK, Comic Relief and the British Red Cross, among many others

Ms. Pring previously led the world-renowned global corruption measurement tools for Transparency International Secretariat - the Global Corruption Barometer and the Corruption Perceptions Index. She currently is Team Leader for a multi-partner consortium providing research to the Somalia Stability Fund III. She is also Team Leader for a multi-country end of programme evaluation for Hivos's We Lead Programme on sexual and reproductive health and rights, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this she was the team leader for a global mid-term evaluation of Sida's core funding to the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). She previously undertook evaluations and research in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel on defence, security, counter-terrorism, and state building. Her expertise includes mixed-method, quasi-experimental, participatory and gender sensitive evaluation approaches.

Coralie has a Master of Research with Distinction in Politics from Birkbeck, the University of London where she specialised in qualitative and quantitative research methods. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and Philosophy from the University of Sheffield.

Substantive Expert, Donell Harvin, DrPH, MPH, MPA

Donell Harvin is an international expert in homeland security and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), based in Washington, DC. He regularly provides expert analysis to MSNBC/NBC News, CNN, Politico, INTERPOL, and RAND. Dr. Harvin serves as a Visiting Scientist at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, where he leads the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) research and training program. He also teaches courses on terrorism, homeland security, and counter-WMD operations at several schools within Georgetown University.

Dr. Harvin's public safety and homeland security career spans over 30 years, including senior leadership roles in fire/EMS, law enforcement, forensics, public health, and intelligence. He began as a first responder on a specialized CBRNE unit and went on to serve as Chief Research Scientist for the NYC Department of Health's Bureau of Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response. There, he led the city's Radiation Response Unit and directed major projects such as New York City's BioWatch program and its Radiological Response and Mitigation Plans. He later established forensic CBRNE capabilities for both New York City and Washington, DC, as an agency executive before being named as the DC's Chief of Homeland Security and Intelligence.

Most recently, Dr. Harvin developed and delivered CBRNE response training for emergency and medical professionals in Ukraine, deploying multiple times during the ongoing conflict to support capacity-building under wartime conditions.

He holds an undergraduate degree in Fire and Emergency Services Management, and graduate degrees in Emergency Management (MPA), Terrorism Studies (MAcert), and Environmental Science (MPH) focusing on health physics and radiation emergency response. He earned his Doctor of Public Health (DrPH) with a focus on environmental epidemiology and biological threats. His dissertation, conducted at Cornell University School of Medicine, used shotgun DNA sequencing to study the presence of pathogens in emergency vehicles, aiming to better understand first responders' biological exposure risks.

Annex 7. WMD CBRN 20 Training Courses Overview

Training	Participants	Male	Female	Unknown	Member State	Language
20 WMD/CBRN Courses portfolio						
2022						
Training on CBRN critical infrastructure and key resources protection for **Tunisia** (26-29 Sept 2022)	37	34	3	0	Tunisia	Material translated into French
WHO UNCCT Combatting Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, **Türkiye** (27 June-1 July 2022)	30	24	6	0	Türkiye	Material translated into Turkish
Biological Countermeasures Training for **Jordan** (25-27 January 2022)	36	26	10	0	Jordan	Material translated into Arabic
TOTAL COURSES 2022	**103**	**84**	**19**	**0**	**3**	
20 WMD/CBRN Courses portfolio						
2021						
UNCCT and UNODA Joint Biological Preparedness and Response Training for **Nigeria** (14-16 December 2021)	85	59	26	0	Nigeria	Delivered in English
CBRN Countermeasures course for **Australia and New Zealand** (30 November - 3 December 2021)	48	30	18	0	Australia, New Zealand	Delivered in English
Training on CBRN Countermeasures for **Malaysia** (9-12 November 2021)	48	39	9	0	Malaysia	Delivered in English
Chemical Countermeasures Course for **Jordan** (26-28 October 2021)	33	26	7	0	Jordan	Material translated into Arabic
Training on CBRN Countermeasures for **Kenya** (12-15 October 2021)	48	38	10	0	Kenya	Delivered in English
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Virtual Course' for **Malaysia (**14-16 September 2021)	66	51	7	0	Malaysia	Delivered in English
Basic radiological and nuclear threats virtual course for **Malaysia (**7-10 September 2021)	75	66	11	0	Malaysia	Delivered in English
Training **Jordanian** officials on WMD/CBRN (4 days) - Basic Microbiology and Biological Threats (23-26 August 2021)	24	19	5	0	Jordan	Material translated into Arabic

Training **Iraq** officials on WMD/CBRN (3 days) - third training - Biological Countermeasures Course (17-19 August 2021)	44	33	11	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
Training **Kenya** officials on WMD/CBRN - Intermediate Biological Threats course (10-13 August 2021)	43	32	11	0	Kenya	Delivered in English
Training **Nigeria** officials on WMD/CBRN (3 days) - third training - Biological Countermeasures Course (27-29 July 2021)	46	29	17	0	Nigeria	Delivered in English
Virtual training course on CBRN countermeasures and response for the **Philippines** (13-16 July 2021)	58	36	22	0	Philippines	Delivered in English
Virtual training course on Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Protection Activities for **Jordan** (28 June - 1 July 2021)	23	18	5	0	Jordan	Material translated into Arabic
Virtual training on outbreak containment for law enforcement – **Kenya** (21-24 June 2021)	50	35	15	0	Kenya	Delivered in English
Bioterrorism Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX) for **Iraq** (2-3 June 2021)	40	35	5	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
CBRN Critical Infrastructure Protection course for the **Philippines** (25-28 May 2021)	53	36	17	0	Philippines	Delivered in English
Bioterrorism Incident Table-Top Exercise (TTX) for **Nigeria** (20-21 May 2021)	58	39	19	0	Nigeria	Delivered in English
Virtual training on outbreak containment for law enforcement – **Iraq** (5-8 April 2021)	41	37	4	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
Virtual training on outbreak containment for law enforcement – **Nigeria** (16-19 March 2021)	73	48	25	0	Nigeria	Delivered in English
Virtual Training on Outbreak Containment for Law Enforcement, The **Philippines** (22-24 and 26 February 2021)	54	35	19	0	Philippines	Delivered in English
TOTAL COURSES 2021	**1010**	**741**	**263**	**0**	**8**	
Iraq project WMD/CBRN courses - Output 1.2						
2021 and 2022						
Intermediate Radiological and Nuclear Threats (9-13 January, 1 February 2022 - virtual)	21	19	2	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic

In-person training on intermediate Biological Threats Course for Iraq (5-9 December 2021)	16	15	1	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction Course (14-18 November 2021)	15	13	2	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
In-person Training on Chemical Countermeasures for Iraq (17-19 October 2021)	21	16	5	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
In-person Chemical TTX for Iraq (20-21 October)	21	16	5	0	Iraq	Material translated into Arabic
TOTAL	94	79	15	0		

Annex 8. Rubric Systematic Qualitative Review Preliminary Approach

Criterion	Lacking	Poor	Average	Desired	Points
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	
Project Alignment and Distinctiveness					
Alignment with UN and UNOCT Program Mission	Project is not aligned with UN GCTS and UNOCT SPPF and does not contribute to strategic priorities/metrics.	Project is only consistent with UN GCTS or UNOCT SPPF but does not contribute to strategic priorities/metrics.	Project is consistent with UNOCT mission or marginally so but contributes to strategic priorities/metrics.	Project is strongly aligned with both the GCTS and UNOCT SPPF and directly addresses or is linked to strategic priorities/metrics.	
Alignment with International Human Rights Law (IHRL), including gender equality standards.	Project is contradictory with IHRL concepts and/or purveys inaccurate information.	Project lacks information on IHRL.	Project is consistent with and includes IHRL concepts but does not explicitly include information on IHRL.	Project is strongly aligned with and accurately includes IHRL concepts.	
Alignment with Human Rights-based Approach (HRBA), Gender Equality and Leave No One Behind (LNOB)	Project is contradictory with HRBA and LNOB concepts and/or purveys inaccurate information.	Project lacks information on HRBA and LNOB.	Project is consistent with and includes HRBA and LNOB concepts but does not explicitly include information on these considerations.	Project is strongly aligned with and accurately includes HRBA and LNOB concepts.	
Objective/Goals	The goals/objectives of the training or document are not provided.	The premise of the training or document is not clear and/or disconnected from the assertions made throughout the training or document.	The premise of the training or document is clear, however not fully supported throughout.	The premise is well-defined and supported throughout the training or document.	

| **Project Utility/Need** | Project is irrelevant, not timely and/or does not demonstrate demand or utility. | Project is redundant to other projects within UNOCT or the other UN programs. Need/utility is not evident. | Program is traditional in design/delivery and shows elements of overlap with other programs at UNOCT or within UN. | Project is noteworthy in design/delivery, and timeliness or novelty, both within and outside of the UN. Brings distinction and credibility to the UNOCT. | |

Project Scientific and Technical Review					
Student Learning Objectives (SLO) ***For Trainings only**	No SLO are provided	SLOs do not align with project mission and goals and are not clearly and concisely outlined.	SLOs moderately reflect project mission and goals - OR- are not clearly and concisely outlined but are present.	SLOs reflect project mission and goals. SLOs clearly and concisely describe what students will know and be able to do after course completion.	
Organization/Clarity	Information and ideas are not organized and lack clarity.	Information and ideas are poorly sequenced and difficult to follow.	Information and ideas are presented in an order that not is not logical, but one can follow with minimum difficulty.	Information and ideas are presented in a logical sequence which flows naturally throughout the training or document	
Process/Methods	The methodology used to deliver or present the project is critically flawed, and there is no value in the content offered.	The methodology used to deliver or present the project is unproven or dubious. The transfer of knowledge is marginal.	The methodology used to deliver or present the project is convoluted, yet the content transfer yields value.	Data and evidence is synthesized using a well-described logical methodology, which yields in the transfer of valuable content.	
Scientific and Technical Accuracy	The sources or accuracy of data and information are inaccurate.	The sources or accuracy of data and information are, flawed, unreliable, cannot be verified, or are contradictory.	The quality of the data or information is weak, the sources are convoluted or not well-cited.	Data and information is logical, technically accurate, and obtained from credible and transparent sources.	

Content/Completeness					
	The project fails to meet the objectives/goals that it sets out to, and the content lacks value	The project fails to meet the objectives/goals that it sets out to, however the content limited value	The project accomplishes most of the objectives/goals that it sets out to, but the content has value.	The project accomplishes the objectives/goals that it sets out to. The content is fully developed and is of the desired value.	
Technical Consistency	The project is contradictory with similar projects of international scope and does not advance knowledge or understanding of the subject matter.	The project is inconsistent with similar projects of international scope OR does not advance knowledge or understanding of the subject matter.	The project is marginally consistent with similar projects of international scope but contributes to knowledge or understanding of the subject matter.	The project is consistent with similar projects of international scope and contributes to the global knowledgebase.	
Project Effectiveness and Sustainability					
Project Outcomes	Outcomes or evaluation data are not available or inaccurate/flawed.	Outcomes are vague, illogical and or unsupported by the evaluation data.	Outcomes are inconsistent, vague or marginally supported by the evaluation data.	Outcomes are logical, well-documented and supported by the evaluation data.	
Capacity Building	The project failed to meet the needs that its beneficiaries expressed and has not been implemented by the host government.	The project marginally met the needs that its beneficiaries expressed but has not been implemented by the host government.	The project met the needs that its beneficiaries expressed but has not been implemented by the host government.	The project met the needs that its beneficiaries expressed and has been implemented in alignment with the priorities and policies of the host government	
Project Efficiency	The allocated resources for the project were inconsistent with the results obtained, and quality, quantity and timeliness goals were not achieved.	The allocated resources for the project were consistent with the results obtained, however quality, quantity and timeliness goals were not achieved.	The allocated resources for the project were inconsistent with the results obtained, however quality, quantity and timeliness goals were not affected.	The allocated resources for the project were consistent with the results obtained, in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness.	

Project Sustainability	The strategy for sustainability of achievement was not defined, and the project is not likely to continue beyond the horizon of the programme.	The strategy for sustainability of achievement was not defined, and the project is marginally likely to continue beyond the horizon of the programme.	The strategy for sustainability of achievement was ill-defined, however the project is likely to continue beyond the horizon of the programme.	The strategy for sustainability of achievement was clearly defined at the inception of the project and national stakeholders have or will be able to assume ownership of the programme.	

Annex 9. UNEG Pledge of Ethical Conduct

ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION

PLEDGE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT IN EVALUATION

UNEG
United Nations Evaluation Group

By signing this pledge, I hereby commit to discussing and applying the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation and to adopting the associated ethical behaviours.

INTEGRITY

I will actively adhere to the moral values and professional standards of evaluation practice as outlined in the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation and following the values of the United Nations. Specifically, I will be:

- **Honest and truthful** in my communication and actions.
- **Professional,** engaging in credible and trustworthy behaviour, alongside competence, commitment and ongoing reflective practice.
- **Independent, impartial and incorruptible.**

ACCOUNTABILITY

I will be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken and responsible for honouring commitments, without qualification or exception; I will report potential or actual harms observed. Specifically, I will be:

- **Transparent regarding evaluation** purpose and actions taken, establishing trust and increasing accountability for performance to the public, particularly those populations affected by the evaluation.
- **Responsive** as questions or events arise, adapting plans as required and referring to appropriate channels where corruption, fraud, sexual exploitation or abuse or other misconduct or waste of resources is identified.
- **Responsible** for meeting the evaluation purpose and for actions taken and for ensuring redress and recognition as needed.

RESPECT

I will engage with all stakeholders of an evaluation in a way that honours their dignity, well-being, personal agency and characteristics. Specifically, I will ensure:

- **Access to** the evaluation process and products by all relevant stakeholders – whether powerless or powerful – with due attention to factors that could impede access such as sex, gender, race, language, country of origin, LGBTQ status, age, background, religion, ethnicity and ability.
- **Meaningful participation and equitable treatment** of all relevant stakeholders in the evaluation processes, from design to dissemination. This includes engaging various stakeholders, particularly affected people, so they can actively inform the evaluation approach and products rather than being solely a subject of data collection.
- **Fair representation** of different voices and perspectives in evaluation products (reports, webinars, etc.).

BENEFICENCE

I will strive to do good for people and planet while minimizing harm arising from evaluation as an intervention. Specifically, I will ensure:

- **Explicit and ongoing consideration of risks and benefits** from evaluation processes.
- **Maximum benefits** at systemic (including environmental), organizational and programmatic levels.
- **No harm.** I will not proceed where harm cannot be mitigated.
- **Evaluation makes an overall positive contribution** to human and natural systems and the mission of the United Nations.

I commit to playing my part in ensuring that evaluations are conducted according to the Charter of the United Nations and the ethical requirements laid down above and contained within the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. When this is not possible, I will report the situation to my supervisor, designated focal points or channels and will actively seek an appropriate response.

Coralie L Pring

24 January 2023

_____ (Signature and Date)

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION
PLEDGE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT IN EVALUATION

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- **Responsive** as questions or events arise, adapting plans as required and referring to appropriate channels where corruption, fraud, sexual exploitation or abuse or other misconduct or waste of resources is identified.
- **Responsible** for meeting the evaluation purpose and for actions taken and for ensuring redress and recognition as needed.

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- **Meaningful participation and equitable treatment** of all relevant stakeholders in the evaluation processes, from design to dissemination. This includes engaging various stakeholders, particularly affected people, so they can actively inform the evaluation approach and products rather than being solely a subject of data collection.
- **Fair representation** of different voices and perspectives in evaluation products (reports, webinars, etc.).

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- **Evaluation makes an overall positive contribution** to human and natural systems and the mission of the United Nations.

I commit to playing my part in ensuring that evaluations are conducted according to the Charter of the United Nations and the ethical requirements laid down above and contained within the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. When this is not possible, I will report the situation to my supervisor, designated focal points or channels and will actively seek an appropriate response.

_____ Donell Harvin, DrPH _____ 12-March, 2023 _____ (Signature and Date)

Annex 10a. Evaluation Tool Discussion Guide Implementing Partners

KIIs - Implementing Partners

PLEASE NOTE THE INTERVIEWEES WILL BE ASKED TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY BEFORE TAKING PART IN THE INTERVIEW. THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WILL BE TAILORED TO THE ANSWERS GIVEN IN THE SURVEY AND FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS FOR ELABORATION.

Introduction

The Evaluation and Compliance Unit of United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT) is in the process of undertaking an Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNOCT Programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons. Under this programme, UNOCT implemented/jointly-implemented and/or currently implements the following projects which you were involved with: [LIST TO BE TAILORED BASED ON THE INTERVIEWEE]:

1. Enhancing national capabilities to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorist attacks in Iraq, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United States Department of State (Nov 2019 – Mar 2022)
2. Enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to a CBRN terrorist attack in Jordan, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Oct 2018 - Sep 2022)
3. Promoting universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Jan 2019 - Jun 2023)
4. Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia, jointly implemented by UNOCT with UNODC and in close cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (Jan 2020 - Jun 2025)
5. Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat WMD terrorism, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (Mar 2019 - Oct 2021)
6. Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Jul 2021 – Jun 2023)
7. Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive device (IED) components and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and components, jointly implemented by UNOCT, CTED and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (Mar 2020 – Mar 2023)

The programme also developed a portfolio of 20 training courses on Countering WMD/CBRN Terrorism.

The evaluation is undertaken in line with UNOCT Evaluation guidelines and UNEG norms and standards for evaluation.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how relevant, effective, efficient, sustainable, gender-responsive and grounded in a human rights-based approach the programme has been, and to identify any lessons which can be learnt to help improve future activities.

The evaluation is carried out by a team of external independent evaluators, consisting of an Evaluation Expert (Ms. Coralie Pring) and a WMD/CBRN Expert (Dr. Donell Harvin).

You have been selected to take part in the evaluation due to your involvement as either an **implementing partner** or a **relevant stakeholder** for either the aforementioned programme and/or projects.

Many thanks for kindly completing the pre-interview survey. We would like to have a focused in-depth interview with you now to allow you the opportunity to expand on your answers given. Your views will be crucial to help the evaluators assess the results of the programme of work and to contribute recommendations to improve future work by UNOCT.

Confidentiality: The interview is entirely confidential with all information received being aggregated and anonymized. No individual will be quoted nor will the organization they represent be identified.

The interview should take 30 minutes.

We very much appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions. **DEMOGRAPHICS ONLY ASKED IF NOT COMPLETED IN THE SURVEY**

1. Consent to take part in the study? Y/N
2. Consent to using an audio recording device? Y/N
3. Consent to naming your organization as one who was consulted as part of this evaluation at the end of the evaluation report? Y/N
4. Gender? M/F/Non-binary/Other/Prefer not to say
5. Position title
6. Type of Organization and Organization Name
7. Background information on their role and familiarity with the programme – Please state your role and experience with the project/programme

Relevance

8. Please can you expand on how the programme /project(s) [– tailored based on interviewee] respond and align to your organization's needs, policies, and priorities?
    a. Probe if not mentioned on Human Rights obligations, gender equality and the SDG agenda
9. Please can you expand on how the programme and project(s) [– tailored based on interviewee] responds and aligns to your Member States/National Authorities needs, policies, and priorities, as well as the needs of people (Rights-Holders) living in their country?
    a. Probe if not mentioned on Human Rights obligations, gender equality and the SDG agenda

Effectiveness

10. Please can you expand on which aspects of the programme and project(s) [– tailored based on interviewee] **worked best** at supporting its goal and objectives **worked least well** at supporting its goal and objectives, according to your experience with the programme/project? Please include positive or negative impacts on gender equality, human rights and on marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups including people with disabilities
11. Were there any unexpected or negative results from the programme or project(s)?
12. What internal and external factors have helped or hindered the achievement of results?

Efficiency

Thinking about the projects and activities which you were involved in, are you aware of any factors – either internal or external – which affected efficient delivery of the projects? By efficient we are referring to budget, allotted time and staffing

Sustainability

13. How likely are benefits expected to continue into the medium and long-term?
14. What could be done or could have been done to improve sustainability of the projects, activities and results?

Coherence

15. How effective was the partnership between your organization and UNOCT?
16. What aspects of the partnership between your organization and UNOCT worked particularly well and what can be improved upon in future?
17. Do you think this programme and projects are duplicating any other existing efforts by other organizations?

Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind

18. To what extent does your organization incorporate gender equality and gender considerations, a human rights-based approach or Leave No One behind considerations into its activities and strategic priorities?
19. To what extent has the programme/projects incorporated gender equality and gender considerations, a human rights-based approach or Leave No One Behind considerations into its design, implementation and monitoring/evaluation?
20. Were any opportunities harnessed or not harnessed related to gender equality and gender mainstreaming, a human-rights based approach and Leave no One Behind considerations, and if so, why?
21. Do you have any recommendations for how gender equality and gender considerations, a human-rights based approach and Leave no One Behind considerations can be better integrated into the programme and project design and implementation in future?

Closing Questions

22. What should UNOCT do differently to improve relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability in future?
23. Anything else you would like to add?

Thank you!

Annex 10b. Evaluation Tool Discussion Guide UNOCT Staff.

KIIs - Discussion Guides UNOCT Staff

[TO BE TAILORED BASED ON UNOCT STAFF MEMBER]

Introduction

The Evaluation Unit of United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT) is in the process of undertaking an Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNOCT Programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons.

The Goal of this programme is to contribute to making the world safer and more secure from terrorist acquisition and use of weapons through the implementation of the provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (and biennial reviews) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials, small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive devices (IEDS and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). More specifically, the programme seeks to support Member States, International Organizations and UN entities to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using weapons, materials or components and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving such weapons and materials.

Under this programme, UNOCT implemented, jointly-implemented and/or currently implements the following projects:

- Enhancing national capabilities to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorist attacks in Iraq, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United States Department of State (Nov 2019 – Mar 2022)
- Enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to a CBRN terrorist attack in Jordan, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Oct 2018 - Sep 2022)
- Promoting universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Jan 2019 - Jun 2023)
- Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia, jointly implemented by UNOCT with UNODC and in close cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (Jan 2020 - Jun 2025)
- Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat WMD terrorism, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (Mar 2019 - Oct 2021)
- Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Jul 2021 – Jun 2023)
- Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive device (IED) components and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and components, jointly implemented by UNOCT, CTED and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (Mar 2020 – Mar 2023)

The programme also developed a portfolio of 20 training courses on Countering WMD/CBRN Terrorism.

This Mid-Term Evaluation is undertaken in line with UNOCT Evaluation guidelines and UNEG norms and standards for evaluation. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how relevant, effective, efficient,

sustainable, gender-responsive and grounded in a human rights-based approach the programme has been and to identify any lessons which can be learnt to help improve future activities.

The evaluation is carried out by a team of external independent evaluators, consisting of an Evaluation Expert (Ms. Coralie Pring) and a WMD/CBRN Expert (Dr. Donell Harvin).

Your views will be very important in this process.

Confidentiality: The interview is entirely confidential with all information received being aggregated and anonymised. No individual will be quoted nor will the organization they represent be identified.

The interview should take around 1 hour to 1hr 15 minutes.

We very much appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions.

1. Consent to take part in the study? Y/N
2. Consent to using an audio recording device? Y/N
3. Consent to naming your job function as one who was consulted as part of this evaluation at the end of the evaluation report? Y/N
4. Gender? M/F/Non-binary/Other/Prefer not to say
5. Position title
6. Background information on their role

PROGRAMME MANAGER AND PROJECT MANAGER QUESTIONS

Relevance

7. How is the programme as a whole and the activities you are responsible for aligned with the GCTS and SPPF?
8. How, if at all, is the programme aligned with the UN SDGs?
9. How, if at all, is the programme aligned with the human rights obligations of the beneficiary states, including on gender equality, and gender-related frameworks, such as Women, Peace and Security Agenda,
10. [Programme Manager] To what extent does the programme's objectives and design respond to the needs, policies, and priorities of beneficiaries and? [Project Managers] To what extent does the project's objectives and design respond to the needs, policies, and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders?
    a. IF NOT MENTIONED PROBE: What assessments were made at the start of the programme to incorporate the perspectives of rights holders and duty-bearers into the design?
11. How was the programme [Programme Manager]/ Project [Project Managers] affected by any changes to the political, legal, economic, institutional, context and what ajustments were made in response to these changes?

Effectiveness

12. [Programme Manager] How effective has the programme been at delivering results in accordance with the GCTS and SPPF?
    a. [Programme Manager] How effective has the programme been at achieving planned results according to the Logframe? [Project Managers] How effective has the project been at achieving planned results according to the Logframe? PROGRAMME MANAGER IF NOT MENTIONED PROBE: According to the Programme Logframe and defined indicators, how effective has the programme been at achieving the intended results for the 5 output areas?
13. Have there been any unexpected or negative results?
14. Did the activities provide clear linkages and complement each other regarding the overall strategies and components?
15. What internal factors have helped or hindered the achievement of results for the Programme [Programme Manager]/ Project [Project Managers]?

16. What external factors have helped or hindered the achievement of results for the Programme [Programme Manager]/ Project [Project Managers]?
17. What mitigation measures were put in place during implementation and how effectively were they activated?

Efficiency

18. Did the results obtained justify the costs incurred?
19. How realistic and appropriate was the staffing and time allocations for the interventions and if not, what changes can be made to improve them?
20. What factors both internal and external affected efficient delivery of the interventions?

Sustainability

21. How likely are benefits from the programme/project [Programme Manager/ Project [Project Managers] expected to continue into the medium and long-term?
22. Are there any differences in likely sustainability between the different interventions and activities?
23. Programme Manager: What contributions has the programme made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the programme outcomes? Project Manager: What contributions has the project made or is making in strengthening the capacity and knowledge of national stakeholders and to encourage ownership of the project outcomes?
24. What gaps are there in the sustainability strategy for the programme [Programme Manager/ Project [Project Managers]?

Coherence

25. What partnerships and synergies were effectively established to date and how were any gaps addressed and duplications avoided?
26. Did the activities/you as the Project Manager coordinate appropriately with Member States?
27. What aspects of partnerships can be improved?

Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind

28. Programme Manager: To what extent were human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized groups, including people with disabilities considered during the programme design? Project Manager: To what extent were human rights, gender equality as well as marginalized groups, including people with disabilities considered during the project design?
29. Was a context specific human rights and gender analysis conducted and integrated into the programme/ projects?
30. Were there human rights and gender-sensitive indicators built into the interventions?
31. What challenges exist to further incorporation of a HRBA, GE and LNOB considerations in future?
32. Were any opportunities harnessed or not harnessed by the programme team?
33. Have there been consultations on issues related to human rights, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and leaving no one behind? If so, were issues raised in the consultations meaningfully incorporated? If not, what were the main strategic and operational challenges to incorporating them?
34. What examples are there of a positive impact on gender equality and empowerment of women via the programme/project?
35. Are there any examples of unintended negative effects on rights-holders, including women, men, vulnerable or marginalized individuals or groups including persons with disabilities?

Closing Questions

36. What should UNOCT do differently to improve relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability or gender-responsiveness /integrating a human rights-based approach / incorporating LNOB considerations in future?
37. Anything else you would like to add?

SENIOR MANAGEMENT

1. Please tell me about the strategic importance of the UNCCT Programme on Addressing the Terrorist Use of Weapons to UNOCT in general
2. What in your view are key results of the Programme (and its pilot projects)? Please include your perception on its contribution to improving visibility and partnerships brought about via the Programme and its projects
   - Have there been any unexpected or negative results?
3. What factors both internal and external helped or hindered the achievement of results for the Programme?
4. How realistic and appropriate was the staffing and time allocations for the interventions and if not, what changes can be made to improve them?
5. The programme expanded from WMD/CBRN to also include IED, SALW and UAS. How appropriate was this expansion of programme and how is this relevant for the GCTS, SPPF and UNOCT more generally?

Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind

6. How are a human rights-based approach, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and Leave No One Behind Considerations considered by Senior Management in their oversight of programmes and projects?

Closing Questions

7. What recommendations do you have for how the Programme can improve relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, gender-responsiveness /integrating a human rights-based approach in future?
8. Anything else you would like to add?

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER SECTION

1. What role does the Human Rights and Gender Section play in supporting programmes and projects at UNOCT?
2. To what extent/how the Human Rights and Gender Section has been involved/consulted on this particular programme/projects?
3. [Gender Expert] Please can you elaborate on why the Gender Marker Scores were given for the design of the programme and related projects?
4. [Human Rights Expert] Are you aware of any ways in which human rights as well as marginalized groups, including people with disabilities were considered during the programme/projects design?
5. Are you aware whether a context specific human rights and gender analysis was conducted and integrated into the programme and projects?
6. Are you aware whether human rights and gender-sensitive indicators were built into the interventions?
7. To what extent are you familiar with the implementation of the programme and projects? If familiar:
   a. Have there been consultations on issues related to human rights, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and leaving no one behind?

  b. Were issues raised meaningfully incorporated, and if not, what were the main strategic and operational challenges to incorporating them?

  c. What examples are there of a positive impact on gender equality and empowerment of women via the programme/project?

  d. Are there any examples of unintended negative effects on rights-holders, including women, men, vulnerable or marginalized groups including persons with disabilities?

8. Are you aware of any opportunities harnessed or not harnessed by the programme team? If so, which ones?

9. Have there been consultations on issues related to human rights, gender equality and leaving no one behind? If so, were issues raised in the consultations meaningfully incorporated?

10. What guidance can the Human Rights and Gender Section provide to the Programme Team to better include human rights, gender mainstreaming as well as marginalized or vulnerable individuals or groups, including people with disabilities into the design and implementation of the programme?

11. What should UNOCT Programme Team do differently to improve gender-responsiveness /integrating a human rights-based approach and incorporating LNOB considerations in future?

12. Anything else you would like to add?

Thank you!

Annex 10c. Evaluation Tool Discussion Guide Member States Duty Bearers Rights Holders

KIIs - Member States Duty Bearers Rights Holders

PLEASE NOTE THE Duty-Bearer INTERVIEWEES WILL BE ASKED TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY BEFORE TAKING PART IN THE INTERVIEW. THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WILL BE TAILORED TO THE ANSWERS GIVEN IN THE SURVEY AND FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS FOR ELABORATION.

Introduction

The Evaluation and Compliance Unit of United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT) is in the process of undertaking an Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNOCT Programme on Countering the Terrorist Use of Weapons. Under this programme, UNOCT implemented/jointly-implemented and/or currently implements the following projects which you were involved with: [LIST TO BE TAILORED BASED ON THE INTERVIEWEE]

8. Enhancing national capabilities to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorist attacks in Iraq, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United States Department of State (Nov 2019 – Mar 2022)
9. Enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to a CBRN terrorist attack in Jordan, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Oct 2018 - Sep 2022)
10. Promoting universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Jan 2019 - Jun 2023)
11. Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia, jointly implemented by UNOCT with UNODC and in close cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) (Jan 2020 - Jun 2025)
12. Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat WMD terrorism, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (Mar 2019 - Oct 2021)
13. Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks, jointly implemented by UNOCT and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Jul 2021 – Jun 2023)
14. Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive device (IED) components and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and components, jointly implemented by UNOCT, CTED and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (Mar 2020 – Mar 2023)

The programme also developed a portfolio of 20 training courses on Countering WMD/CBRN Terrorism.

The evaluation is undertaken in line with UNOCT Evaluation guidelines and UNEG norms and standards for evaluation.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how relevant, effective, efficient, sustainable, gender-responsive and grounded in a human rights-based approach the programme has been and to identify any lessons which can be learnt to help improve future activities.

The evaluation is carried out by a team of external independent evaluators, consisting of an Evaluation Expert (Ms. Coralie Pring) and a WMD/CBRN Expert (Dr. Donell Harvin).

You have been selected to take part in the evaluation due to your involvement in the aforementioned programme and/or projects.

[Member States/Duty Bearers] Many thanks for kindly completely the pre-interview survey. [ALL] We would like to have a focused in-depth interview with you now to allow you the opportunity to expand on your answers given. Your views will be crucial to help the evaluators assess the results of the programme of work and to contribute recommendations to improve future work by UNOCT.

Confidentiality: The interview is entirely confidential with all information received being aggregated and anonymised. No individual will be quoted nor will the organization they represent be identified.

The interview should take 30 minutes.

We very much appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions. **DEMOGRAPHICS ONLY ASKED IF NOT COMPLETED IN THE SURVEY**

24. Consent to take part in the study? Y/N
25. Consent to using an audio recording device? Y/N
26. Consent to naming your organization as one who was consulted as part of this evaluation at the end of the evaluation report? Y/N
27. Gender? M/F/Non-binary/Other/Prefer not to say
28. Position title
29. Type of Organization and Organization Name
30. Background information on their role and familiarity with the Programme/project

Relevance

31. Please can you expand on how the programme /project(s) [– tailored based on interviewee] respond and align to your organization's needs, policies, and priorities, including Human Rights obligations, gender equality and the SDG agenda
    a. [RIGHTS HOLDERS] Please can you expand on how project [– tailored based on interviewee] responds and aligns to the needs, policies, and priorities, in this country as well as the needs of people (Rights-Holders) living in their country?
32. Were you consulted at all in the design of the project?

Effectiveness

33. Which aspects of the programme and project(s) [– tailored based on interviewee] **worked best** and **least well** at supporting its goal and objectives?
34. Please can you expand on any examples of improved capacity within your country to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using weapons, materials or components and to ensure that they are better prepared for, and can more effectively respond to, a terrorist attack involving such weapons and materials, as a result of the Programme/project(s)?
35. Were there any unexpected or negative results from the programme or project(s)?

Efficiency

Thinking about the projects and activities which you were involved in, are you aware of any factors – either internal or external – which affected efficient delivery of the projects? By efficient we are referring to budget, allotted time and staffing

Sustainability

36. How likely are benefits expected to continue into the medium and long-term?
What could be done or could have been done to improve sustainability of the projects, activities and results?

Coherence

37. What aspects of the partnership between your organization and UNOCT worked particularly well and what can be improved upon in future?
38. [RIGHTS HOLDERS] What aspects of the support provided by UNOCT worked particularly well and what can be improved upon in future?
39. Do you think this programme and projects are duplicating any other existing efforts by other organizations?

Gender, Human Rights and Leave No One Behind

40. Were any opportunities harnessed or not harnessed related to gender equality, gender mainstreaming, a human-rights based approach and Leave no One Behind considerations, and if so, why?
41. Do you have any recommendations for how gender equality, gender mainstreaming, a human-rights based approach and Leave no One Behind considerations can be better integrated into the programme and project design and implementation in future?
42. Please can you expand on the examples you gave or positive or negative impacts on gender equality, human rights and on marginalized/vulnerable groups including people with disabilities?
43. [RIGHTS HOLDERS] Are there any examples of either a positive or negative impact on gender equality, human rights and on marginalized/vulnerable groups including people with disabilities from the engagement with UNOCT?

Closing Questions

44. What should UNOCT do differently to improve relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability in future?
45. Anything else you would like to add?

Thank you!

Annex 11. UNOCT Programme's Qualitative Systematic Review Observations and Recommendations

Introduction

The WMD/CBRN Expert, who is part of the evaluation team, undertook a qualitative systematic review of the key outputs from the Programme. This included training courses, capacity building initiatives[43] and reports and publications.[44]

The course review employed a Summative Evaluation, which entails assessing the effectiveness of each selected programmes/projects to determine (1) if stated learning objectives were met, (2) if the content was technically accurate, and (3) if the course delivery was effective This was accomplished via:

· Review of scientific and technical accuracy of the course, as well as whether it includes and accurately reproduces international law norms and standards, including international human rights law.

· Analysis of consistency with similar international training.

· Review of project design and implementation.

· Analysis of alignment with the GCTS, and the SPRPF.

· Analysis of gender and human rights mainstreaming into training content.

· Recommendations for current or future programme.

The criterion for the qualitative systematic review was approved during the inception phase and is provided in Annex 11, "Rubric Systematic Qualitative Review Preliminary Approach."

This document presents key recommendations aimed at enhancing the technical oversight and training capabilities of the Programme, ensuring the highest standards of accuracy, relevance, and instructional effectiveness. This technical review identified critical areas requiring improvement, including the need for a more structured engagement with subject matter experts (SMEs) and a more robust quality assurance framework for training materials.

Additionally, gaps in intermediate and advanced-level training offerings and outdated regional threat assessments highlight the need for a strategic (technical) approach to project development. The recommendations provided here are designed to address these challenges through structured SME collaboration, improved contractor selection, and the institutionalization of advanced training and routine threat assessments. By implementing these measures, UNOCT can reinforce its role as a global leader in counter-WMD initiatives while maximizing the impact of its project.

Methodology

The technical review was conducted by:

1. Creating a rubric by which to assess projects and trainings.
2. Reviewing each project in terms of technical and scientific accuracy, clarity and ability to meet the objective(s) established by the project.
3. Reviewing if the project or training incorporates international law norms and standards, including international human rights law.

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[43] 20 capacity-building training courses aiming to increase the capabilities of Member States in targeted CBRN areas were assessed; "Countering the Threat Posed by Non-traditional Chemical and Biological Laboratories in Iraq "Virtual reality training"; "Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist - in Central Asia" assessments; "Enhancing Capabilities to Prepare for and Respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorist Attack in Jordan" Self-Assessment Workshop.

[44] Threat Assessment: Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; Threat Assessment: VNSAs in State Actors in Sub-Saharan Africa and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; Threat Assessment: VNSAs in State Actors in Southeast Asia and Their Potential Use of CBRNE Materials; and UNICRI – UNOCT Report on Science, Technology and Innovation: Understanding Advancements from the Perspective of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and associated Risk Scenarios.

4. Analysis of consistency with similar international training and standards.
5. Conducting a technical review of each project or training based on the rubric, producing a scaled measurement or grade.
6. Documenting the findings of the review and grading in a technical review summary.

Observations and Recommendations

The following are observations of areas of improvement and recommendations that stemmed from the technical review of the Programme and its projects.

1. **Observation 1: There is a Need to Update and Publish the Regional Threat Assessments (RTA) and Determine a Routine Production Cycle**. These documents were originally produced between 2021 and 2022 and have not (as of the date of this evaluation) been publicly released in an unclassified format.
   - Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness and Sustainability
   - Priority Level: High
   - Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team
   - Timeframe for Implementation: Immediate

   Recommendations:
   1. **Update the Unclassified Regional Treat Assessments.** The three RTAs are outdated and will require a refresh before publication. The refresh should entail verification of prior cases studies as still accurate and relevant, addition of newer cases studies and data if publicly available. Additionally, regions such as Latin America should be included to provide a global perspective on the technical capabilities of transnational violent nonstate actors, particularly those that have established themselves in the Tri-Border Area of Latin America. Thereafter, these RTAs should be immediately released, and a feedback mechanism should be established for the WMD/CBRN scientific and operational community to provide comment for future iterations.
   2. **Commit to a regular production cycle:** These studies were of such high-quality, consumers (Member States) may base policies, procedures and doctrine on the contents of the studies. As such, the Programme should determine its desire for sustainability of this product and if warranted, publish these studies on a regular basis (such as one every or three to five years in conjunction with UN or UNOCT strategic doctrine).
   3. **Produce a Threat Study (TS) Template.** The Programme should templatize the RTA and create a training module that teaches member state how to use it so that they can develop a standardized TS for their nation, and collaboratively (geopolitics allowing) with their neighbouring states for a sub-regional TS. Alternatively, UNOCT could assist in collecting the national-level threat studies, and facilitating a sub-regional, and regional TS based on of the work of the Member States. This would also provide UNOCT with credible data from trusted sources, lending to the technical accuracy of the report.
   4. **Integration of RTAs into future trainings:** Observation 2 notes that many of the trainings lacked a local or regional relevancy or context. The RTAs should be incorporated directly into future trainings and projects to provide that contextualization for Member States. This will improve the sustainability for both the RTAs, driving demand for these products, and for the trainings, making them more realistic and relevant to the region.

2. **Observation 2: The Programme Should Improve and Formalize the Network of WMD SMEs it Collaborates with and Develop Comprehensive Training Resources.** The Programme is fortunate to have several SMEs in WMDs working in lead positions. However, these individuals are tasked with a myriad of responsibilities and activities that prohibits them from engaging in the rigorous process of scientific evaluation and research required to assure that all projects, activities, and materials distributed are accurate and properly sourced. The Programme stated that they have a process for their own SMEs to review projects for technical accuracy, however this process was not provided in writing, and it is unclear if there is a formal documented process or if it is a routine practice that is built into the contract of development of the project. That said, there were instances where there were issues with quality or technical accuracy that escaped the review that Programme SMEs conducted (see individual project reviews).

   Some of the materials lacked the academic rigor and scientific verification that is essential for the projects' credibility. Issues such as no references provided in materials, dubious sources for information or data, and

poorly synthesized scientific material were found. In some instances, the technical materials were accurate, but the method of instruction, and quality of the training materials reviewed were insufficient to purvey the information. For instance, in one radiation-related training the units of measurement used were RAD/REM (exclusive to the USA), however the country (Malysia) utilizes the international units (Sievert/Gray), which have different numbers. So while technically the information was accurate, it was inaccurate in the context of the mission. This should have been picked up in a quality assurance/quality control process that the Programme stated was done, but it was not.

In assessing and reviewing training materials, it was found that materials were often produced by small number of entities, with one contractor having produced the majority of trainings. While this in and of itself is not a negative aspect of the projects, the Programme may want to consider diversifying its development/contractor pool to assure that contractors with the best technical background, and ability to create effective educational content, are selected. While there are individuals and organizations that have unquestionable technical acumen, they are not always adept and creating educational content that effectively conveys their expertise.

Lastly, many of the trainings reviewed were offered virtually (nine in total). This is a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for social distancing. The Programme quickly pivoted and was able to continue to meet the needs of Member States by leveraging virtual learning. Virtual courses are difficult to successfully deliver, particularly when the subject matter is as technical as CBRN. There are virtual learning tools, activities and concepts that were not incorporated into the trainings, such as interactive assessments, gamification, and group work sessions. As such, these "virtual" trainings are not unique from similar in-person training offered by the Programme, and this could impact effectiveness and sustainability of the Programme's virtual offerings.

The following recommendations are low or no-cost solutions to remedy most of the technical and educational quality issues that the review observed.

- Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability
- Priority Level: High
- Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team
- Timeframe for Implementation: 6-12 Months

Recommendations:
1. **Create a UNOCT WMD Scientific Workgroup/Community**- much like the UNOCT Global Vulnerable Targets Network, create a community of interest that the Programme can engage to keep abreast of emerging trends and threats in the WMD field, and potential collaborators with relevant expertise. Ideally, academics/academic institutions, or educational delivery specialists should be invited into this group to synthesize the subject-matter with sound educational delivery methods. This will allow the Programme to have multiple touchpoints with leaders in academic and public sector to provide expertise and guidance when needed. This can be accomplished by:
    A. Identify and reach out to WMD SMEs from diverse sectors, including government agencies, academia, private industry, and international organizations.
    B. Host UNOCT-supported workshops and content relevant conferences, and symposia to build relationships and identify potential collaborators.
    C. Establish formal technical advisory groups (TAGs) of SME volunteers for each CBRN threat:
        a) Chemical TAG
        b) Biological TAG
        c) Radiological/Nuclear TAG
        d) SALW TAG
        e) Emerging Threats TAG (see Observation #4)

D. Leverage existing UNOCT infrastructure to create a Formal WMD SME collaboration platform (such as the Global Vulnerable Targets Network's use of the UNOCT Connect & Learn Platform)

E. Host an annual in-person workshop and regular online forums where WMD SMEs can share best practices, and emerging trends with the Programme.

F. This can be accomplished through UNOCT-supported workshops and/or TAGs.

2. **Develop Technical and Training (Education) Standards** – UNOCT WMD/CBRN staff and SMEs contracted to develop trainings, and educational activities require a systematic and standardized approach. Such regimes are widely utilized and could be accomplished by:

A. Creating and mandating the use of educational training development guidelines and rubrics for contractors and Programme staff tasked with developing training materials. Such a guidance document with institutionalize and assure that the [principles](#) of [adult education](#) and pedagogy adhered to, and scientific and technical information is properly incorporated and sourced.
NOTE: These types of tools may be currently utilized by the Programme, however they were not part of this review.

B. Integrating the RTAs into each project and training, to enhance the relevance of the project.

C. Creating a Technical Peer-evaluation process by independent evaluators.

D. Institutionalizing a formal scientific/technical "sign-off" process that is consistent with programmatic goals (the intent of the training), consistency across projects, and meets technical and academic standards.

E. Utilizing external experts from workgroups to assist with external review of materials.

3. **Invest in and Standardize Virtual Trainings -** The Programme should revise existing virtual training courses with more deliberate use of virtual learning concepts, and virtual learning tools, activities and concepts. To this end, the Programme should:

A. Invest in developing, cataloguing and maintaining an up-to-date curriculum of virtual training.

B. Revise existing virtual training to incorporate key concepts for virtual learning success such as:

a. Microlearning – Delivering content in small, focused chunks for better retention.

b. Scenario-Based Learning – Using real-world scenarios to enhance engagement and decision-making skills.

c. Gamification – Incorporating elements like leaderboards, badges, and rewards to motivate learners.

d. Adaptive Learning – Personalizing content based on learners' progress and needs.

e. Interactive Assessments – Using quizzes, polls, and knowledge checks to reinforce learning.

f. Social Learning – Encouraging peer interaction through forums, discussion boards, and group activities.

g. Virtual Reality (VR) & Augmented Reality (AR) – Immersive technologies for experiential learning.

h. Learning Analytics & AI – Tracking engagement, progress, and performance for data-driven improvements.

3. **Observation 3: Develop more intermediate and advanced-level trainings for more technical and experienced audiences.** Several training projects purporting to be basic or introductory were found to be highly technical for their intended audience (little to no foundational material), reducing their accessibility and effectiveness. Some trainings were entitled as "Advanced" but did not provide material beyond the introductory level. While most trainings were foundational in their technical presentation, this also created a gap in the opportunity for those wanting to advance their knowledge.

The Programme has strong training projects that address the need for basic-level WMD/CBRN information. Apart from the table-top exercises and the Basic radiological and nuclear threats course for Malaysia (which based on the review is not basic or introductory-level), the Programme has a limited number of intermediate and advanced-level offerings.

- Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness and Sustainability
- Priority Level: Medium
- Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team

- Timeframe for Implementation: 12 Months

Recommendations:

1. **Determine criteria for Basic (Introductory), Intermediate, and Advanced training**: Course materials should be tailored to the appropriate audience, ensuring that technical content is accessible while maintaining its accuracy and effectiveness.
   A. Simplification and clearer structuring of materials are recommended to enhance comprehension.
   B. Determine a rubric or metric to be used for standardization of course complexity levels.
   C. Incorporate the complexity levels into the needs assessment for each member state.
   D. Assure that the training complexity rubric is adhered to during the development of the training materials.

2. **Offer more table-top exercises (TTX)**: these activities provide an advanced forum for learning and caters to all levels of participants.
   A. TTXs are a cost-effective means for building capacity and offer a wide range of practitioner and decision-makers and opportunity to engage with CBRN content at various levels of knowledge.
   B. Since the Programme currently turns over the materials developed and delivered to Member States for their continued use, offering more TTXs serves as a tremendous source of sustainability.

3. **Create more advanced trainings**: Using an internationally accepted cognitive learning model, such as Bloom's Taxonomy, develop several existing trainings to incorporate supplemental information that progressively increases participants knowledge and cognitive ability to apply what they have learned.[45] Trainings that would be ideal for creating a more advanced versions include:
   A. **Intermediate Biological Threats:** this course was reviewed as lacking intermediate-level material and would benefit from the addition of more comprehensive and advanced materials.
   B. **Clandestine Lab VR:** this course would benefit from in-person delivery with a skills practicum and more advanced materials.
   C. **Virtual training course on CBRN Countermeasures and Response**: this course would benefit from an in-person delivery with a skills practicum and more advanced material.
   D. **CBRN Countermeasures**: This course was a foundational-level course that was extremely abbreviated and lacking in terms of content. While the term "countermeasures" is in the title, there were no actual countermeasures provided in the materials reviewed, either operational (interdiction), or medical countermeasures (for radiation, chemical or biological exposures. This course would benefit from rebranding/renaming and a basic and intermediate level version, with the intermediate level introducing countermeasures that practitioners and decision-makers can take.

4. **Observation 4: The Program Should Continue to Leverage and Work with External Partners and Networks, as well as Other UN entities to Identify and Integrate Emerging Trends in Terrorism and their Nexus to WMDs.** The Programme has a comprehensive catalogue of training in the traditional CBRN subject areas; however, those topics are increasingly becoming less relevant and obsolete as new technologies threat emerge. The Programme is lacking projects that address the growing concerns of terrorist utilization non-traditional means to create WMDs, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and dual-use technology. The Programme needs to maintain a constant touchpoint with the WMD SME/technical community to stay abreast of these to evolving threats and provide projects to Member States that address the evolving threat environment. This includes establishing academic partnerships that can support UNOCT's research and development (R&D) goals and objectives, including producing high-quality and peer-reviewed publications.
   - Relevant Conclusion: Effectiveness and Sustainability

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[45] NOTE: the technical qualitative systematic review was based on the review of the trainings material alone, and any in person discussions, or case studies presented by trainers that were not included in the material reviewed were therefore not be assessed. As such, certain aspects of the program such as technical impact, technical relevance in the context to the Member State and technical feasibility and adaptability were not considered for this review.

- Priority Level: Medium
- Responsibility: UNOCT Programme Team
- Timeframe for Implementation: 12 Months

Recommendations:
1. **Work with Technical SMEs to understand the Evolving WMD threat landscape.** The project would be well served to tap into the international SME community to stay ahead of evolving and emerging threat. This can be accomplished through UNOCT-supported workshops and/or TAGs. Utilize SMEs to help identify and determine the nexus between terrorists and VNSAs and over-the horizon threats such as the use of artificial intelligence, drones, and cryptocurrencies and dual-use technologies by terrorist organizations.
2. **Collaborate with Leading Universities and Research Institutions:** Partner with academic institutions renowned for their work in counterterrorism and WMD studies to conduct joint research and development of projects on emerging threats.
3. **Develop projects with the UNOCT Global Vulnerable Targets Network**: although the Programme is an active participant of this group, none of the projects or trainings reviewed were created in conjunction with them. Terrorist organizations and lone actors increasingly target soft targets—public spaces with high civilian foot traffic and minimal security—to maximize casualties, psychological impact, and disruption. The exploitation of these spaces for CBRN attacks presents significant challenges due to the difficulties in securing open-access environments. This recommendation calls for development of projects that focus on the use of CBRN at soft targets and critical infrastructure such as:
   A. **Crowded Public Venues:** Shopping malls, sports stadiums, concert arenas, and religious sites provide dense gatherings where a single CBRN attack could have mass casualties.
   B. **Mass Transit Systems:** Subways, buses, and airports present opportunities for the covert release of chemical, biological, or radiological agents with the potential for widespread exposure.
   C. **Healthcare and Emergency Services:** Hospitals and medical facilities, due to their reliance on biological agents, radiological materials, and chemical supplies, are attractive targets for sabotage or exploitation.
   D. **Food and Water Supply Chains:** Contamination of food distribution centers or water treatment facilities can cause mass poisoning, illness, and public panic.
   E. **Emerging threats:** see recommendation 4.

4. **Develop an Emerging Threats Programme**: Terrorism threats are rapidly evolving due to technological advancements, geopolitical shifts, and the increasing capabilities of non-state actors. The Programme should initiate projects that address the evolving nexus between terrorism and WMDs, encouraging innovation in detection, prevention, and response strategies. Topics that currently have been identified as emerging CBRN and WMD terrorism threats include:
   A. **Technological Advancements Facilitating Terrorism**
      - **Artificial Intelligence (AI):** Terrorist groups are leveraging AI to enhance attack planning, weapon development, and target selection. Notably, there have been instances where extremists utilized AI to design vehicle-borne explosive devices, highlighting the potential for AI to lower the barrier to executing sophisticated attacks.
      - **3D Printing:** The proliferation of 3D printing technology enables the fabrication of weapons and weapon components, making it easier for individuals or groups to produce firearms and potentially parts for more complex weapons systems without traditional manufacturing infrastructure.
   B. **Biological Threats**
      - **Synthetic Biology:** Advancements in biotechnology and synthetic biology raise concerns about the creation of novel pathogens or the modification of existing ones to increase their virulence or resistance to treatments. The misuse of such technologies could lead to biological attacks with potentially devastating consequences.
   C. **Cyber Threats to CBRN Facilities**

- **Cyber Attacks:** The increasing integration of digital systems in CBRN facilities introduces vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. Malicious actors could exploit these vulnerabilities to sabotage facilities, steal sensitive materials, or disrupt critical safety systems, potentially leading to uncontrolled releases of hazardous substances.

D. **Insider Threats**
- **Radicalization of Personnel:** The potential for individuals with authorized access to CBRN materials or facilities to become radicalized poses a significant security risk. Insider threats are particularly challenging to detect and can facilitate the theft or sabotage of dangerous materials.

E. **Geopolitical Instability and State-Sponsored Proliferation**
- **State Collapse and Unsecured Stockpiles:** Political instability in certain regions can lead to unsecured CBRN stockpiles, increasing the risk of these materials falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.
- **State-Sponsored Terrorism:** Some nations may covertly support terrorist groups by providing them with CBRN materials or expertise, thereby amplifying the threat of WMD terrorism

F. **Emerging Terrorist Tactics**
- **Lone-Actor Attacks:** There is a growing trend of individuals conducting attacks independently, often radicalized online and without direct ties to established terrorist organizations. These lone actors can be challenging to detect and may utilize readily available materials to conduct attacks.
- **Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems:** Terrorist groups are increasingly exploring the use of drones and other unmanned aerial systems to deliver CBRN agents, offering a means to conduct attacks remotely and potentially evade traditional security measures.

G. **Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)**
- **CBRN Training in Conflict Zones:** Some returning fighters may have received specialized training in chemical, biological, or radiological weapons in conflict zones controlled by violent non-state actors.
- **Radicalization Networks:** FTFs often serve as recruiters, spreading extremist knowledge and potentially guiding future attacks involving CBRN agents.
- **Operational Expertise:** These individuals may possess knowledge of improvised CBRN tactics and act as force multipliers in domestic terrorism efforts.

H. **"Hybrid" Threats and Protection of Critical Infrastructure**
- **Targeting Nuclear Power Plants & Industrial Sites:** Cyberattacks could disable security systems at nuclear reactors, chemical plants, or water treatment facilities, leading to catastrophic consequences.
- **Cyber Attacks on Safety Mechanisms:** Malicious cyber intrusions could disable containment systems of facilities that house CBRN, causing hazardous material leaks or even large-scale industrial accidents or releases.
- **AI-Powered Cyberattacks:** The use of AI to automate cyber threats against CBRN security systems could accelerate and expand the potential impact.
- **Cyber-Biological Attacks:** Malicious actors could use cyber intrusions to manipulate biotech research, sabotage vaccine production, or alter genomic databases to disrupt public health efforts.
- **Cyber-Enabled Supply Chain Attacks:** Disrupting the distribution of critical medical supplies, chemicals, or radiation-detection equipment could exacerbate the impact of a CBRN attack.
- **AI-Driven Biohacking:** AI tools could be exploited to accelerate biological agent design, making synthetic biology more accessible to non-state actors.
- **Sabotage of Critical Infrastructure:** CBRN attacks/releases on water supplies, air ventilation systems, or public utilities could result in mass contamination and casualties.
- **Drones and Remote Dispersion Systems:** Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could be used to disperse CBRN agents crowded events.

5. **Facilitate Knowledge Exchange Platforms:** International contemporaries of the UNOCT WMD/CBRN Programme (such as the NATO CBRN Center of Excellence, European Commission Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, INTERPOL, US Department of Homeland Security, etc.) routinely organize

conferences, meetings, workshops, online webinars and seminars that bring together scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to discuss the latest research findings and technological advancements related to counterterrorism and WMDs.

These events can be held in UN facilities or virtually and could be performed at little to no cost. At a bare minimum, the Programme should hold an annual or biennial (every other year) event to showcase its projects, bring relevant stakeholders together (Member States and SMEs), and generate requirements and concepts for subsequent projects and collaborations.

Conclusion:

The recommendations outlined in this document provide a practical roadmap for strengthening UNOCT's WMD/CBRN technical oversight, training programmes, and research capabilities. Establishing a more structured SME network and implementing standardized quality assurance mechanisms will improve the accuracy and effectiveness of training materials. Expanding advanced-level training and ensuring regular updates to regional threat assessments will further enhance UNOCT's ability to address evolving security challenges. Finally, the Programme would be best served to expand its projects to include emerging threats such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, lone-actor attacks, and returning foreign terrorist fighters. These improvements will not only bolster the Programme's credibility but also provide Member States with more effective tools to mitigate WMD threats. By adopting these strategic recommendations, UNOCT can enhance its operational effectiveness and maintain its position at the forefront of global counterterrorism efforts.