Preface

Terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations continue to illegally cross porous land borders to traffic small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition and explosives, drugs, contraband, other illicit goods, and human beings, as well as deploy terrorist operatives to conduct attacks. Such activities undermine States’ efforts to counter terrorism and restrict cross-border organized crime, increase the vulnerability of affected populations, and provide financing to terrorist and criminal networks in ways that adversely affect international peace and security.

Members of terrorist and transnational organized crime groups, as well as “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTFs), target the gaps of weak border infrastructure and continue to exploit with impunity porous and uncontrolled borders. FTFs make use of forged and/or fraudulently obtained travel documents and visas or abuse genuine travel documents of others, in order to cross international borders to conduct attacks or join extremist groups elsewhere. It is the obligation of every Member State to prevent the travel of FTFs, just as it is imperative for States’ mutual security to stand against violent extremist groups such as Al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and their affiliates.1

Border demarcation or delimitation issues between States may complicate border security and management (BSM) related issues. Exercising sovereign jurisdiction through routine border operations at green and blue borders2 may lead to an escalation of demarcation matters if they are under dispute. At the same time, exercising caution in this regard could help terrorist organizations cross borders more easily. States may also be challenged in implementing good practices on international cooperation, such as joint patrols, when they do not agree on the exact location of a border.

Corruption within border agencies undermines efforts to counter cross-border organized crime, terrorism, and the flow of FTFs, and poses a risk to public safety and security. Effective anti-corruption legislation and mechanisms are required to prevent and combat this threat. Anti-corruption measures should be implemented, such as the development and provision of basic and managerial training courses, protection of whistleblowers, elaboration of mechanisms to report corruption related to BSM, developing codes of conduct and ethics, etc.3

2 Green border means any territory between two official land border control points (BCP). Blue border means any national boundary lines demarcated by water (i.e. maritime, lakes, rivers, streams). Air border is related to international airports.
3 Detailed Good Practices on preventing and combating terrorism are important, but beyond the scope of this document. Reference is made to the UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, A/58/422 (31 October 2003) that addresses prevention, criminalization, and law enforcement measures, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. Reference is also made to relevant technical assistance available from the United
In light of the unique challenges posed by porous borders, States should recognize the importance of securing these borders and the need for cross-border cooperation that allows inter-agency and neighboring border security agencies and border communities to collaborate with one another in a holistic way. States should understand that a multilateral, coordinated approach to border management is integral to addressing the myriad of threats and challenges each State faces individually.

Therefore, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) have decided to collaborate on the development and implementation of the Border Security Initiative (BSI), and to produce a set of non-binding Good Practices on BSM in the context of Counterterrorism and stemming the flow of FTFs.

The BSI aims to assist UN Member States’ implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions, including 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2129 (2013), and 2178 (2014), and, through collaboration with the GCTF, to address the overall challenges that porous borders pose, in particular long remote green border areas between States.4

The UNCCT-GCTF BSI inaugural conference in El Jadida, Morocco in July 2015, the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on “Stemming the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters” in Madrid, Spain in July 2015, the BSI study tour and experts’ roundtable in Cairns, Australia in August 2015, and the BSI expert seminar in Vienna, Austria in September 2015, all provided the opportunity for experts to present lessons learned and discuss effective mechanisms for BSM. The outputs of these meetings have informed and shaped the good practices contained within this document.

Additionally, the key findings of the first workshop in Nairobi, Kenya in December 2015 and the second workshop in Dakar, Senegal in May 2016 dedicated to the identification of good practices (particularly in the area of cross-border cooperation and border community engagement) led to the first compilation of good practices based on lessons learned to enhance BSM standards to counter terrorism and stem the flow of FTFs. Further key findings were compiled in the third workshop in Djibouti City, Djibouti, in May 2016, which focused specifically on gaps and needs analyses, risk analysis and management, as well as anti-corruption measures and border surveillance within the overall framework of BSM.

The good practices contained in this non-binding document are intended to inform and guide governments as they develop policies, guidelines, programs, and approaches for effective BSM, with the specific aim to strengthen cross-border cooperation and border surveillance in a

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counterterrorism context. These good practices can also be used to shape bilateral or multilateral collaboration on BSM, as well as technical or other capacity-building assistance. All states are encouraged to consider using these non-binding good practices, while recognizing that implementation of these good practices must be consistent with applicable international law, as well as national law and regulations, and could be adapted to specific regional and sub-regional realities and needs.

**Good Practices**

The developed paper on good practices in the field of BSM serves as a general guide to inform and assist border practitioners in developing policies, programs and guidelines for various strategies in counterterrorism and implemented programs and strategies can be found that mirror these examples.

Within the overall framework of BSM four main forms should be emphasized: namely comprehensive, cooperative, coordinated, and integrated BSM, which ideally are explicitly formulated in national border management strategies (BMS) and national action plans (NAP). All these BSM models are determined to prevent and avert all kinds of transnational threats in general and countering terrorism, stemming the flow of FTFs, and fighting cross-border crime in particular. All four BSM models are based on the key principles of intra-agency cooperation, inter-agency cooperation, and international cooperation.

While intra-agency cooperation describes the cooperation and coordination of the different levels of a hierarchy within a border agency or ministry, inter-agency cooperation deals with the cooperation and coordination between different ministries and border agencies, both at national and cross-border level. International cooperation includes cooperation and coordination with and among border agencies, training centres, and ministries of other States or international organisations.

**Good Practice 1: Enhance intra-agency cooperation.**

Intra-agency relations can be segmented in general as formal and informal arrangements. Formal agreements or understandings of procedures are to be developed when a continuing working relationship is needed for the orderly conduct of operations. Such formal written arrangements should be developed, *inter-alia* in the areas of standard operational procedures, reporting and communication, methods of analysis, and coordination of workflow mechanisms in alignment with national legislation and administrative directives.

Informal arrangements are better described as *unit-to-unit* or *person-to-person* exchanges of information, consultations, opinions or advice during daily operations. Informal arrangements are by definition not institutionalized within a larger structure.

In order for national border services to effectively achieve their objectives, they have to improve

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5 See more detailed information in good practice 13 of “Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”.
capabilities and increase capacities between and among their subordinate departments and units. To do this, national border services have to share know-how and introduce best practices for increasing performance of the entire organisation, including enhancing efficient coordination of activities and effective cooperation among constituent parts. This requires building up relevant capacities *inter-alia* in the areas of communication, reporting, clear delineation of tasks and responsibilities, and work flow procedures and mechanisms.

Intra-agency cooperation refers to cooperation between subordinated units within a border agency and describes the effective and efficient internal cooperation and management of work flow processes, information exchange, and resource management within a ministry, department, or agency responsible for specific tasks related to the:

- vertical aspect of intra-agency cooperation, between the different administrative levels from the border agency headquarters to the units working at the borders (central, regional, and local level);
- horizontal aspect of cooperation between the various border crossing points (BCPs) as well as inland control stations should be taken into account (different units of the same level).

Examples include the top-down information flow from central to regional level and further to BCPs and remote border areas in providing relevant information in a timely manner. Information gathered at BCPs and green/blue border areas need to be reported to the central level and the results of the analyses of information gathered should be fed back to the local level to further improve operations.

In some States, border guard, border police, and customs services are autonomous, self-governed institutions and not integrated within a larger ministerial structure, but may be affiliated. Therefore, it can be helpful to specify in the relevant national border management strategies and action plans how to improve cooperation towards an efficient coordination and management of processes, information exchange, and resource management within the services responsible for specific tasks at local, regional and central level. In other States, tasks related to BSM are attributed to different law enforcement agencies simultaneously (e.g. the border guards/police, immigration service, customs service, national police, gendarmerie), whether ad hoc or codified, which can eventuate in duplication and overlapping of competences, hampering the ability to conduct effective BSM.

**Good Practice 2: Enhance inter-agency cooperation.**

Good cooperation between State services responsible for BSM-related issues is often limited with regards to the set-up of overall strategic directions. State border services should improve cooperation in specific areas between relevant departments at the central, regional, and local level and ideally set up coordination/management inter-agency structures, such as inter-departmental committees or working groups. Apart from the Ministries of the Interior and Finance, other Ministries, which are involved in the area of BSM, should be included (e.g. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Health etc.). These inter-institutional bodies usually meet

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6 See more detailed information in good practice 13, *supra* note 5.
several times per year and usually focus on operational and shorter-term issues, rather than setting strategic directions for cooperation.

Inter-agency cooperation describes and defines the cooperation at the central, regional, and local level (BCPs, border zones, green and blue borders) between and among key ministries and state agencies with different tasks related to BSM, thus minimising overlaps and inconsistencies.

Inter-agency cooperation takes a horizontal approach focusing on effective and efficient cooperation and coordination of activities, tasks, and responsibilities between officials of relevant services active at the border (local level), as well as among the regional and central ministries/authorities responsible for those activities.

Inter-agency cooperation should be regulated through official acts and/or memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to cover the whole spectrum of border security and management. In many cases it is regulated insufficiently. Although many national BSM strategies acknowledge the necessity of ‘coordination of the activities of relevant state bodies to ensure secure state borders’, activities are generally not specified.

Without a clear definition/specification of activities, tasks, and responsibilities, the organization and provision of joint activities and operations, exchange of information, development of best practices (based on lessons learned), cooperation in training programmes and courses, common use of equipment and infrastructure (where appropriate), may cause friction, gaps, duplication, and rivalries at the working level.

Complex, dangerous threats, such as terrorist organisations working with other criminal enterprises to support their cross-border activities, require a robust cooperative response. Collaboration between civil services, including border guards, border police, and customs agencies, as well as security services, principally police and defence forces, is the most effective way to maximize the use of resources, build a more comprehensive intelligence picture, and respond to the threats.

Inter-agency cooperation does not require agencies to build formal oversight structures, develop a centralized planning process, nor to homogenize agencies so that they function and react in the same manner. Rather, it is based on regular interaction and the timely exchange of information between agencies, including during their planning processes. Success is built on good relationships, established through early, broad, and multilevel interaction. Inter-agency cooperation is enhanced by common communication platforms, particularly information technology (IT) systems, as they facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence. Establishing common communication platforms among intra- and inter-State security forces (e.g. radios that are compatible), however, is particularly challenging.

Neighbouring States should arrange inter-agency task forces or fusion centres to ensure inter-governmental and inter-departmental efforts to strengthen BSM and counter transnational threats, including terrorism, cross-border organised crime and FTFs. Such task forces or fusion centres are better able to respond to crises and immediate threats, as the responsible structures will already be in place to coordinate effective responses. It is considered a best practice within
the context of inter-agency cooperation for BSM services to conduct regular joint exercises to practice the coordination and response structures already in place, learn from successes/failures, and then address any identified shortcomings.

**Good Practice 3: Enhance international cooperation.**

Engagement between States and cooperation with international, regional, or other multilateral organizations can increase access to information, research, analysis, and intelligence as well as ways and means to strengthen accountability and mitigate corruption. Multilateral organizations can also help provide, or find partners for, capacity building assistance and training. Multilateral forums can provide neutral environments where practitioners can build border security cooperation, share information, and improve coordination. Understanding and articulating specific responsibilities among officials in border areas will also help improve security. In areas in which the clear demarcation of borders is not possible, cooperation between border agencies may be based on practical measures, such as reporting of suspicious activities in border areas. Good command of local languages in the border areas concerned or any other widely used language by cross-border officials is instrumental for the quality and effectiveness of the cooperation.

The July 2015 Madrid Special Meeting of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on stemming the flow of FTFs considered measures taken by Member States since the adoption of the Security Council resolution 2178 (2014). The Council specifically calls on Member States, in operative paragraph 11 of the resolution 2178, to “improve international, regional, and sub-regional cooperation [...] to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories [...] , in compliance with other obligations under international law.” Consequently, States should take appropriate measures to effectively bring perpetrators of terrorist-related crimes to justice.

States should regularly review and update national and regional Sanctions Lists, as applicable, and ensure that they regularly distribute UN Sanctions Lists, particularly the UN ISIL/Al-Qa’ida Sanctions List, as well as implementation practices, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 2253 (2015). In addition, States should consider making use of other inter-state and relevant databases and be also encouraged to share national lists of known individuals having the intent to commit terrorist attacks and if applicable relevant criminal/terrorist “watch lists”.

Cooperation between agencies involved in border issues in different States should be encouraged at local, regional and multinational levels:

(a) Cooperation between officials on both sides of the border at local level: This cooperation focuses on improving day-to-day communication and necessary activities. It can range from

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information exchange to solving possible operational challenges in order to facilitate legitimate cross-border movements.

(b) Cooperation between neighbouring states at bilateral or multilateral level: Some Member States may lack the resources to improve BSM standards in general, and cross-border cooperation and green and blue border surveillance policies in particular, especially as they relate to counterterrorism. Bilateral/multilateral cooperation should include regular meetings between neighbouring States at the local, regional and central levels to elaborate on BSM related issues. This includes but is not limited to the coordination of border patrols on both sides of the border, setting up joint patrols and operations, defining the status of the different BCPs (including prioritisation and working hours), creating of border cooperation centres\(^8\) to intensify communication and exchange of information, as well as preparing procedures for emergency situations (e.g. incidents in border areas), coordinating and cooperating on infrastructure related issues and the possible creation of back-to-back controls.

Issues of delimitation and demarcation of borders needs to be solved on a bilateral (or multilateral where applicable) governmental basis for successful cross-border cooperation and should ensure alternative means to ensure effective border security and management in the absence of agreement on border demarcation.

(c) Cooperation focusing on BSM issues in a multinational dimension: Relevant information can be exchanged and provided and regular training seminars can be organised more easily through multinational cooperation. Seminars organized on a multinational level can also enhance confidence building and the creation of an informal network of border service officials from sister agencies, which will be more inclined to contact each other. Multinational cooperation efforts should focus on preparing States’ access to the various international databases, such as the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) and other databases available through the Interpol Border Management Program and the UNODC goCASE\(^9\) system, for information and intelligence storing, processing and analysis.

Neighbouring States should consider developing bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements between relevant border law enforcement agencies as they may facilitate clear communication and the exchange of information, as well as define methodologies of work and coordinated action, in particular when special departments/units are taking over the responsibility in cases of trans-national threats, terrorism and FTFs, cross-border organised crime and smuggling of goods that constitute a threat to society (e.g. SALW, drugs, stolen goods etc.).

Joint bi-national and multinational activities should be performed *inter-alia* in the following areas:

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\(^8\) See also good practice 8, *supra* note 5.
\(^9\) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) software solution for Investigative Case Management. goCASE is part of the government office “go” family of software products, which has been developed by UNODC’s Information Technology Service (ITS) - Law Enforcement Solutions Team, as an integrated investigative case management and analysis tool for government law enforcement, investigative, intelligence and prosecution agencies of all United Nations Member States.
• Regular routine meetings and exchange of information (i.e. at local, regional, national level)\textsuperscript{10};
• Risk analyses and threat assessments\textsuperscript{11};
• Joint and/or coordinated patrols along the ‘green’ and ‘blue’ borders (where appropriate)\textsuperscript{12};
• Joint BCPs (\textit{single window} or \textit{one-stop-shop} approach)\textsuperscript{13};
• Nomination of contact officers and exchange of liaison officers\textsuperscript{14};
• Establishment of bi- or multinational Border Cooperation Centres - BCCs\textsuperscript{15};
• Search operations\textsuperscript{16};
• Training and exercise;
• Emergency alert plans in case of crisis intervention and disaster management;
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Mutual support in cross-border disaster management (e.g. fires, inundations, environmental cross-border disaster etc.).
  \end{itemize}

\textit{Good Practice 4: Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs.}

Effective surveillance of remote border areas and border zones adjacent to official ports of entry (i.e. road BCPs, rail BCPs, harbours, airports) is required to prevent persons from bypassing official BCPs in order to avoid checks, smuggle commodities, infiltrate to conduct a terrorist attack, or attempt to enter or leave a State’s territory illegally.

A broad and consistent presence of border officers in a given area provides deterrence to terrorists and FTFs as well as other cross-border criminal activities and builds resilience in border communities against the influence of terrorist groups and criminal enterprises. A consistent security presence can also increase awareness of terrorist threats in the area among border communities and build an understanding of the local and personal impacts of activities of terrorist and transnational organized crime groups. When establishing BSM equipment and systems, particularly in remote areas, it is important to take into account the conditions and capabilities on the ground (e.g. climatically and territorial challenges/specialities). Advanced equipment, which requires robust infrastructure, maintenance, training and practice, might not be the best choice in all locations and contexts. States should look into ways to benefit from low-cost, yet agile BSM systems, especially fit for remote control areas, establishing a baseline of infrastructure requirements that are applicable even at the lowest level of investment and capability.

In fulfilling effective border surveillance duties, border guards shall use both stationary and mobile units. The respective legal basis should ensure that border guards are provided with

\begin{footnotes}
\item See also good practice 7, \textit{supra} note 5.
\item See also good practice 12, \textit{ibid}.
\item See also good practice 10, \textit{ibid}.
\item See also good practice 14, \textit{ibid}.
\item See also good practice 9, \textit{ibid}.
\item See also good practice 8, \textit{ibid}.
\item See also good practice 11, \textit{ibid}.
\end{footnotes}
sufficient legal power to carry out this task in such a way as to prevent and discourage persons from circumventing the checks at ports of entry. The laws must ensure that border officials are vested with sufficient legal power to conduct their duties and that the legal framework for mobile units is in place. The number of border guards performing surveillance should be adapted to existing or identified transnational threats and estimated risks.

Furthermore, the development of a national Border Monitoring Program\(^\text{17}\) is an opportunity for States to enhance security at their borders by enabling border communities and the economy to report irregular movements across borders and suspicious behaviour of individuals. People who report to the national Border Monitoring Program know their local environments and anyone can report, despite the fact of being located in capital cities, regional centres and remote areas, and operate in environments as varied as transport, cargo logistics, shipping and fishing industry.

Supporters of a national Border Monitoring Program strive to:

- Provide timely information about any unusual or suspicious incidents of interest to the national law enforcement authorities involved in BSM;
- Work with national BSM services in the development of consultative and cooperative working arrangements;
- Monitor and improve their internal security.

At the same time, national BSM authorities should commit to:

- Provide more border patrolling resources in remote border areas;
- Provide public awareness sessions and advice on matters relating to security;
- Participate in and encourage the development of consultative and cooperative working arrangements;
- Encourage regional and local BSM authorities to engage with their local communities to ascertain the community’s needs, and educate the community on the role of the BSM authorities.

**Good Practice 5: Engage with and empower border communities as key contributors in border security and management.**

Engagement with communities living in remote border zones and nomads wandering in uninhabited border areas can help to generate information that can build comprehensive situational awareness and help officials distinguish between “usual” movements and those that are out of the ordinary or suspicious. Border communities and nomads hold vast amounts of intimate knowledge on the area, characteristics of the terrain, possible criminal networks and terrorist groups operating in the area, their hiding and meeting places and other security issues and can provide relevant information to border services.

Engagement with border communities and nomads can help connect remote border areas with government agencies at the central level. Therefore, border communities need to be informed on

\(^{17}\) National border services are responsible for the protection of borders in close partnership and coordination with a range of intelligence, law enforcement agencies and private sector initiatives. The development of a Border Monitoring Program can significantly support national border services by providing relevant information to protect and control borders effectively.
how common crimes like black market smuggling of everyday goods provide funds both to cross-border organized crime groups and terrorist organizations.

Border law enforcement agencies that connect with communities by building understanding of shared border threats and the local impacts of those threats can help build resilience in those communities against criminal influence. The concept of *Border Community Policing* should be taken as a crucial instrument, where border authorities can raise awareness within border communities on the threats posed by cross-border organized crime and terrorism, and organize and take part in regular meetings with the representatives of border communities. It is also important to consider the economic impacts of border security policies and procedures on the local community to ensure sustainability and to consider development projects that help bridge cross-border communities and build trust with the authorities, preventing them from relying or gradually reducing their reliance on other non-state groups and creating hostile environments for such groups.

The lack of national affiliation of border communities to their State can create the potential for exploitation by organized crime and terrorist organizations and facilitate radicalization to violence. In order to avoid such developments, States should actively pursue social and economic policies to help integrate these communities with the national identity and government. Communities should have access to adequate health, education, and social care systems, as well as enjoy the security of relevant governmental services and a basic infrastructure to maintain their livelihoods.

Trust building measures are essential. As nomadic tribes and settled border communities move around in remote and uninhabited border areas, they represent opportunities for partnership, but could also pose challenges for cross-border crime if neglected. Border communities and nomadic tribes often possess close contacts and excellent local knowledge in remote border areas that can be essential to enhance effective BSM.

As nomads follow the routes of their livestock and border communities cross borders to villages and markets on the other side of the border and outside of official BCPs for commerce and family reasons, state authorities could explore options for the issuance of ID-cards solely for members of border communities and registers for members of nomadic tribes, which will entitle holders to cross borders outside of official BCPs based on bi-lateral and/or multilateral agreements. Such ID-cards would also allow border guards to identify any other person who is not affiliated with border communities and/or nomadic tribes for conducting a more detailed inspection.

Communication and cooperation among neighbouring border services and relevant law enforcement agencies and coordination of activities within and across a State are inevitable and key elements in effectively preventing transnational threats and combating terrorism, FTFs and cross-border crime. Private sector businesses, including industry, and their counterparts across the border should be integrated into processes of information exchange and liaison programmes.

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18 See also good practice 6, *supra* note 5.
This can facilitate mutual trust building with national border services and increase intelligence and information sharing through a variety of means, including public awareness.

**Good Practice 6: Develop and implement Border Community Policing programs.**

In general, Community Policing is a policing method, which promotes organizational strategies that facilitate the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

A favourable opinion for partnership with border communities to enhancing BSM would take into consideration, that the security of citizens is most important and national border services should engage with border communities on the basis of partnership and dialogue with all stakeholders, through a participatory approach for the improved management of border security, meaning both officials and citizens have responsibilities in the effective management of borders.

Border Community Policing, i.e. collaboration between national BSM authorities and a border community, promotes partnership-based and cooperative efforts between national border services and border communities to more effectively and efficiently identify, prevent, and solve problems related to transnational threats in general, and terrorism, FTFs, and cross-border organized crime in particular. Border Community Policing also addresses public safety and security, social disorder, or social deterioration of the border community in order to improve the lives of border communities based on the fact that border security is human security.

Border Community Policing and border community oriented border police management, facilitates strategic approaches of border policing that concentrates on law enforcement building ties (in this case with state border guards, border police, customs service and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM) and working closely with members of these border communities.

Border Community Policing facilitates a decentralized approach and is focused on border communities. Border officials live and work in a set area, working in a proactive partnership with the border communities, including informal community leaders, to help to prevent cross-border crime and to identify and solve problems and build ownership of regional challenges. Improved access to government and social services by the border communities, particularly in remote border areas, is an extended benefit of Border Community Policing. When border communities are not regarded as part of the local or national security structure, and trust is not built with security providers, it can allow cross-border organized crime and terrorism related activities to flourish. Often border communities are vulnerable to economic shocks and crime, and a feeling of disenfranchisement with or fear of border security providers can turn vulnerability into opportunity for nefarious actors. Engagement of border communities in broader security policy frameworks could include reaching out to the communities on the other side of the border, where possible (e.g. nomads).

Whenever possible, recruiting border patrol forces from local populations is a primary means of leveraging community resources, given their thorough understanding of the local environment,
culture and traditions, languages and geography, and personal networks of family and friends that can help provide information from a wide area. Inclusion of female officials in BSM units would also have a positive impact on better engagement with the border communities. Likewise, it is important to train such Border Community Policing teams in the areas where they will be patrolling.

A Border Community Policing oriented approach to counter terrorism, FTFs, and cross-border organized crime groups inter-alia should focus on:

- Strengthen trust and increase partnership between border communities and BSM services;
- Improve engagement with local communities and community leaders;
- Involve border communities in the elaboration, implementation and evaluation of various BSM related strategies and action plans, policies and measures;
- Create free trade zones for the benefit of border communities (economic and commercial);
- Intergovernmental approach to the socio-economic development of border communities;
- Sensitization of media on good practices in reporting on BSM related issues, terrorism, FTFs and transnational organized crime;
- Take into consideration the deep community ties across borders;
- Establish dialogue with all elements of border communities (including tribal chiefs, ethnic groups, religious leaders, and nomads) and representatives of civil society;
- Border Security is Human Security - countering terrorism, FTFs and cross-border organized groups “should take into consideration border community related concerns, and reinforce state security.” Border Community Policing cannot be understood as a stand-alone tool to prevent terrorism and stemming the flow of FTFs and fighting cross-border organized crime;
- Border Community Policing should not be deemed as an alternative to State’s responsibilities in the area of BSM but as a complementing component of BSM policies;
- Border Community Policing should be an important part of a national Border Management Strategy and NAP.

Recommended key principles of Border Community Policing are inter-alia as follows:

- Accountability and integrity of national BSM agencies;
- Availability, visibility and accessibility of national BSM authorities for border communities and nomad tribes;
- Border community service oriented approaches and policies (national BSM authorities should act as service provider);
- Attention to border communities’ concerns and adequate responses to their needs;
- Human rights and respect towards all border community members.

**Good Practice 7: Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms.**

Clear and precise communication as well as a proactive exchange of information between officials from border police/guard and customs services are fundamental aspects to successful cooperation and effective coordination of activities, both at BCPs and along borders.
Consequently, any barriers to the exchange of relevant information must be addressed and remedied, as barriers to information exchange are obstacles for effective BSM. The timely and accurate exchange of information is related to almost all areas of cooperation in terms of flow of passengers and cargo, investigations, risk analysis, patrolling, and special cross-border operational engagements.

The exchange of information is not only an issue limited to cooperation between officials from border police/guards and customs services. Many of the databases used by such institutions are in many cases within the information systems of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance. Successful cooperation therefore requires a broader format to exchange relevant information that involves these institutions and their various agencies (i.e. criminal police, organised crime units, intelligence services, immigration services, visa regime authorities).

Along the wide spectrum of communication and proactive information exchange, at least four different categories should be mentioned, namely ‘on request’ and ‘ad hoc’ information exchange on the one hand, and the ‘periodic’ and ‘continuous exchange through joint databases’ on the other hand.

The sharing of information ‘on request’ and on an ‘ad hoc’ basis is the most common approach established between States, which have developed a good functioning cross-border cooperation. Shared information mainly relates to incidents, cases of investigation, or specific intelligence information (e.g. irregular migration, cross-border organised crime). The ‘periodic’ exchange of information includes various daily or monthly operations, risk analyses, or intelligence reports shared between border agencies. The ‘continuous exchange through joint databases’ depends on bi-lateral or multilateral agreements between State border agencies and the compatibility of technical standards.

At regional and local levels, communication and information exchange should be assured inter-alia by the heads of border districts, border outposts and BCPs regularly and between border practitioners on an ‘ad hoc’ basis. At the operational level, joint meetings should be held ideally on a daily basis, according to the workload and relevant topics to be discussed. Heads of border police/guard and customs services should hold weekly informal meetings, and also more formal meetings once a month.

Furthermore, developing an effective information exchange system to connect border communities to state border services is crucial and a critical element of comprehensive BSM systems. Public awareness campaigns in terms of ‘know your neighbours, see something, report accordingly’ will sensitize citizens and border communities to be alert and able to observe potential threats through terrorist groups and other dangerous criminals for immediate action.

Hotline numbers are useful, but when designing the system, practitioners should consider the importance of having the infrastructure behind the hotline to triage and direct calls to the correct and responsible agency and at a local level. Centres housing the hotlines should triage incoming calls so that information that is immediately actionable is treated with the highest priority and directed to the correct operational agency almost immediately.
It is important that those who report information, particularly in remote areas, see a result from their efforts to report suspicious or criminal border activities. Beware of ‘caller fatigue’ where the border communities may be overloaded with ‘hotline’ numbers from different border law enforcement agencies, which can result in confusion and misdirection.

General and targeted public awareness can be used to enhance understanding of the system. Border services could also follow up with callers to advise them of what action was taken and how their information helped improve security. This helps state border agencies to build and maintain trust, partnership, rapport, credibility, and relevance with the citizens they serve.

**Good Practice 8: Establish Border Cooperation Centres.**

Effective BSM systems seek new forms to enhance cross-border cooperation, including joint cooperation and contact centres for law enforcement agencies involved in BSM related issues.

Communication, coordination, and cooperation among neighbouring border services and relevant law enforcement agencies within and across a State are imperative, and comprise key elements in effectively preventing transnational threats and combating cross-border crime. Border Cooperation Centres (BCCs) are valuable tools in the process of direct cross-border cooperation, taking into account recent and future developments, especially regarding the exchange of information. Located in positions of strategic importance for observing cross-border crime, BCCs play a key intelligence role for the operational services. BCCs host various representatives from multiple relevant agencies within a State (for example from border guards, border police, customs service, coast guard, police, immigration service etc.) in a compatible mirroring system with their counterparts across the border, that can help build mutual trust and increase intelligence and information sharing at the regional level through a variety of means, including joint training programs.

Bilateral or multilateral agreements to establish BCCs as joint cooperation centres for border law enforcement agencies should include cross-border operational engagements (such as surveillance, controlled deliveries and authorized hot pursuit), joint police operations (such as joint patrols and coordinated patrolling), information-sharing, cross-border personnel support, where the border guards/police and customs authorities of the partner States work together under one roof and are responsible for the common border area. The joint cooperation centres should be ideally located near the border.

These BCCs facilitate cross-border information sharing and assist inter-alia the responsible border guard, border police and customs authorities and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM in carrying out their operational tasks. This includes support in coordinating cross-border operations and locating the relevant contact persons in the neighbouring States by creating bridges between law enforcement agencies in different States. BCCs help in overcoming language barriers. Officers at the centres should speak the language(s) of the neighbouring State and have consistent communications equipment.
**Good Practice 9: Nominate and assign Border Liaison Officers.**

*Border Liaison Officers* (BLOs) aim to achieve the best utilization of resources or employment of border agencies of one state authority by another. BLOs often provide technical or subject matter expertise of their parent organization and are embedded in other organizations to provide face-to-face coordination and knowledge exchange.

Cooperating with neighbouring border services outside the national jurisdiction should be understood as an integral part of States’ BSM strategies and action plans. One of the primary objectives is to intensify existing bilateral cooperation with neighbouring States, as well as with States of origin and transit for irregular migration. As with other national BSM related activities, external cooperation is mainly based on the findings of risk analyses and risk management. Building external relations through the assignment of BLOs is a valuable tool for effectively handling irregular migration, detecting forged travel documents, recognizing travellers holding genuine travel documents issued for other persons, and fighting cross-border organized crime in accordance with national Border Management Strategy and NAP.

BLOs may be posted to executive border law enforcement agencies and/or customs services working at the maritime and land borders and corresponding airports, as well as the coast guard. They could advise and support officers from the border agencies of the partner State in the surveillance and control standards and measures at international borders at their request and in agreement with the host authority and in accordance with their legal framework and standard operating procedures (SOP). BLOs may observe and gather evidence, based on statements of suspects and defendants and/or witness reports, to establish a presumption relation to irregular migration and cross-border crime (i.e. people smugglers and traffickers). BLOs should not carry out any tasks relating to the sovereignty of the partner State and, in order to be most effective, should be posted principally at BCPs and stretches of the border, which are of particular interest in terms of cross-border crime and prevention of transnational threats.

The BLOs activities should be without prejudice to the sovereignty of the assisted State; domestic law and administrative regulations should not be affected by the performance of their tasks.

In each case the formulated tasks of BLOs should be fulfilled:

- in accordance with national law;
- in strict compliance with the specific regulations contained in the various bilateral agreements which may, if necessary, be supplemented by more specific arrangements;
- in agreement with the host State authorities and in accordance with their instructions.

BLOs, who are alternately nominated by border police/guard and customs services, usually have access to all databases and the systems of both agencies. Therefore, BLOs play a central role in inter-agency cooperation, international cooperation and information exchange and specialised units working on cross-border operational engagements can contact each other directly.
Coordinating border surveillance activities between neighbouring States in alignment with national legislation and based on mutual agreements (for example through memoranda of understanding) is crucial for effective cross-border cooperation.

*Joint patrols* are border-patrolling teams, which consist of two or more border officials from neighbouring States and consequently coming from different State border services (i.e. border police, border guards, customs service, coast guard), do carry out joint patrols in alignment with constitutional and national legislation. *Joint patrols* have long proved useful and at the same time are a visible sign of good cooperation and mutual trust.

*Coordinated patrolling* means that border-patrolling units from one State are patrolling along the border of the neighbouring State, covering the interests and legal commitments of both States. The patrols will alternate taking place in each State in agreement between the State border agencies concerned (i.e. border guards, border police, customs service, sometimes military service).

*Mixed patrolling* describes border-patrolling teams that consist of border officers coming from different border services (e.g. border guards, border police, customs service), either at national or international level (cross-border). *Mixed patrols* help in sharing expertise and information, in building trust and in developing cross-border cooperation between law enforcement authorities.

*Joint multi-agency and interdisciplinary operation exercises* should be organised and held with the participation of relevant border agencies from States from within a region, as relevant in cooperation with external partners. Such exercises can be developed on an individual basis and customized as needed. The exercises could include various sections focusing on border management strategies at a national and regional level, regional strategic cross-border security issues, review of national policies on BSM cooperation, developed mutual aid frameworks, and modules that emphasize the role of human rights and community engagement in porous border areas. Additionally, the exercises could address incident command management consultation, provide incident commander training to operate bilaterally and regionally, and address cross border security implementation plans in the conduct of tactical operations. Joint tactical border patrol interdiction operations and consultations may address advanced operational skills necessary for day and night operations, including advanced navigation and tracking, advanced firearms training, tactical medicine, expedient checkpoints, information development, and rapid interdiction operations.

Lessons learned from such exercises demonstrate the importance of robust inter-agency cooperation at the national level and across borders in order to effectively respond to serious security incidents and showcase the importance of effective communication among the command and control structures.
Good Practice 11: Define parameters for cross-border operational engagement.

Joint operations between border law enforcement agencies, at the national as well as cross-border level, are vitally important as they provide opportunities for efficient coordination and effective cooperation. State authorities involved in BSM related issues across regions might define the term ‘cross-border operational engagement’ differently, but it generally refers to a range of activities that are not carried out on a routine basis, but are planned and take place over a longer period of time, with a greater degree of complexity/coordination, or over a wider territory.

Joint operations could vary from detailed checks to large-scale cross-border operational engagement aimed at intercepting trafficking channels and countering transnational threats. Furthermore, such cross-border operational engagement might take place at a major BCP, at the national level, or even across borders and involving several States’ law enforcement agencies involved in BSM related issues. Joint operations might involve the patrol and surveillance of borders by utilising joint mobile units.

There are clearly benefits of joint operations, both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Greater effectiveness is usually achieved because all institutions involved can contribute intelligence based information and/or resources that make their impact much greater. Enhanced efficiencies are created by the fact that the competent authority is on site and can immediately take over further proceedings if, in the course of cross-border operational engagement, a crime that falls within its competence is uncovered. This saves the time-consuming process of preparing documentation for criminal cases, and simplifies the procedure of subsequent handover to the responsible authority. Further benefits of joint operations include the pooling of personnel and relevant technical equipment.

Effective coordination and close cooperation in the field of cross-border operational engagement requires the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Particularly when there are vast distances between settlements in many border regions – such as in the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions, agreements should address, inter-alia, the following central points in relation to cross-border operational engagement:

- The stipulation of the permissible distance into the neighbouring State under which cross-border operational engagement can take place;
- The determination of the leading authority, which coordinates first measures on cross-border operational engagement and its duration;
- The duration of the response of first measures to a cross-border security threat;
- Formulation of adequate countermeasures potentially to be conducted (e.g. overland with air or maritime support if necessary);
- How a state may seek the transfer of an apprehended suspect from the other state;
- Information exchange in relation to the progress of investigations and their results in relation with the cross-border operational activity;

For example, a perpetrator who was apprehended by border guards/police officers because of smuggling goods and the Customs is involved in the framework of the cross-border operational engagement then it would be easy to hand over the perpetrator to the responsible state authority for further processing. Another example, if border guards/police officers would apprehend a perpetrator smuggling SALW or huge amounts of drugs, then it would be in most States the responsibility of special police forces (mainly criminal police).
Identification of specific official points of contact, so that border officials know exactly whom to notify, engage with, in various scenarios.

The aim should be for the forward-deployed officers to have all necessary instruments available for effective collaboration with their partner across the borders, combined with efficient mechanisms to conduct investigations, apprehend suspects, protect their citizenry and provide public safety and security.

The agreements should provide clearly stated operational parameters and also allow for cases in which mediation may be required. In some cases, duration may be the preferred way to define the permissible scope of cross border operational engagement and coordination.

**Good Practice 12: Conduct effective risk analysis assessments.**

The conduct of risk analyses play a key role in the area of BSM on which to base *inter-alia* the development of cooperation, both at national and cross-border level, joint operations, and training related to the management and control of the external borders. Analyses should focus on the risks related to public safety and security and in parallel on the threats that may affect the security of external borders.

The overall objective of a risk analysis is to provide comprehensive and detailed information that will provide senior border officials with the information they need to reduce and mitigate explored and identified risks in relation to insufficient resources and capabilities. Risk analyses will help to address and minimize identified gaps between risk and capabilities, while it is not possible to eliminate risk entirely, understanding the scope and nature of risk is vital to performing effective risk management. During the process of conducting risk analyses, experts will assess identified risks and any uncertainties in its measurement and explore intelligence gaps, as well as recommend priorities where multiple threats exist. Risk analyses contribute to mitigating transnational threats by considering information of post-incident reports and presenting this information to decision makers who will take appropriate action based on the analyses.

Relevant activities to be developed and realised by responsible border services are meant to

- carry out checks and surveillance at external borders in accordance with national legislation and international law, including bi-lateral and multilateral treaties;
- collate, analyse and exchange any specific intelligence or general information enabling the competent authorities to analyse the risk that an individual, object or asset constitutes for the national security of the common area of freedom of movement, law and order or the national security of a State;

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20 Border control is an activity carried out at a border exclusively in response to an intention to cross that border, regardless of any other considerations. It includes activities concerning persons, their means of transport and the objects in their possession. It covers: (a) checks carried out at authorised BCPs to ensure that persons, their vehicles and the objects in their possession are authorised to enter, or to leave a State; and (b) surveillance of borders outside authorised BCPs and fixed hours, in accordance with national legislation, to prevent persons from by-passing BCPs in order to avoid checks and enter or leave a State’s territory illegally.
• analyse the evolution of threats likely to affect the security of the external borders and to set the priorities for action accordingly;
• anticipate the needs related to human resources and equipment to ensure security at external borders;
• develop strategic plans for the implementation of operational and tactical plans.

Coherent and comprehensive analyses of risks affecting security at borders require the development and understanding of common indicators. Continuous observations and the evaluation of such indicators will allow effective measures to be taken on the ground. The joint risk analysis process should be systematic and continuous with agreed upon and clearly defined content, matrix structure, and measures to process relevant information. The analysis will facilitate the identification of potential risks that arise from and along a State’s borders.

Risk analysis can define preventive measures to reduce the probability of trans-national threats and to explore successful countermeasures to threats. Information exchange between States and border services across borders with regards to decision-making processes is important at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A crucial objective in the area of risk management is to develop a conceptual framework to assist Member States when preparing risk analyses. The aim is to promote a common understanding of risk analysis and management to explain how this tool can contribute to greater coherence in the area of BSM generally and the control of the external borders in particular.

The basis for any BSM related risk analyses is regularly collected statistical data from national law enforcement agencies involved in BSM. Key indicators collected through national BSM authorities are inter-alia as follows:
• Detections of illegal border crossings across the green and blue borders or bypassing BCPs;
• Refusals of entry/exit for travellers;
• Detections of illegal stay, both inland and at the exit border control;
• Detections of traffickers of human beings and smugglers of people;
• Recognition of forged travel documents and visas;
• Detections of abuse of genuine travel documents and identification cards;
• Detections of fraudulently obtained travel documents and identification cards;
• Administrative decisions for return and readmission and/or expulsion;
• Detections of illicit trafficking of drugs;
• Detection of smuggling of excisable goods;
• Detections of smuggling of small arm and light weapons (SALW);
• Information and intelligence gained in relation to cross-border organized crime activities;
• Passenger flow (when available);
• Data on asylum applications.

The conduct of risk analyses is very important to safeguard the ideal allocation of resources related to effective border control standards at BCPs and border surveillance in providing uniform levels and result-producing control standards along the external borders. It provides advice to relevant authorities to allocate more financial, human, and material resources in higher
threat border areas, and assigns a lower level of resources to lower risk areas. States can better understand the risks they face by analysing probability, likelihood, and anticipated consequences, and by understanding the motivations, enabling factors, and identified vulnerabilities concerning the threats they face. Border agencies can consider accepting lower level risks, such as illegal border movements of people or goods that are not involved in terrorism or serious cross-border crime, so that resources can be directed towards higher-level threats.

Risk analyses should be based upon systematically gathered and analysed, centrally co-ordinated intelligence. Relevant data should be categorised by border type (land, air, and sea). Data related to land borders should be additionally specified/categorised by border districts with neighbouring States. All data collected should be analysed on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Priority is given to the use of the data for management purposes and to rapid sharing among a State’s BSM authorities.

Border security agencies, individually or working together, should be enabled to gather intelligence, analyse it, and utilise the results in fieldwork. The criterion for the evaluation of the effectiveness of a risk analysis system is the correlation of the number of checks and the number of detected cases. The aim is to keep the difference between these figures as small as possible. States should identify the lead BSM agency in a range of threat scenarios.

By involving a broad range of governmental agencies and ministries in a joint risk analysis, Member States can ensure a broader level of commitment from these stakeholders, including when the analysis forms the basis of decision-making.

**Good Practice 13: Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans.**

The development and implementation of effective border management and control mechanisms in alignment with good practices and international recognized standards at States’ ports of entry, calls for the involvement of all relevant national stakeholders. The implementation of a Border Management Strategy (BMS) requires a National Action Plan (NAP) for describing relevant activities inter-alia in the areas of protection against transnational threats, counterterrorism measures, fight against cross-border organized crime, human resource management, education and training, technical equipment, including public awareness campaigns and public private partnerships to be implemented jointly by all relevant stakeholders.

A BMS provides any government with:
- a comprehensive overview of the current border management situation;
- information on border related initiatives and projects;
- clearly identified and defined strategic and operational goal(s) and specific objectives;
- a tool with which to mobilise and coordinate further international assistance.

While a national BMS should clearly define the strategic goal(s) - specific activities, results to be achieved and benchmarks to be reached should only be formulated and included in the NAP.
Through a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, relevant key players, both national and international, should be identified to facilitate, lead, and supervise the implementation of the NAP.

The use of decision analysis tools, such as a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats/Risks) will facilitate the elaboration of a BMS and NAP for State authorities, defining the current and projected border management situation and providing an opportunity to analyze the situation against known good practices.

Another decision analysis tool, a Force-Field diagram, visualizes priorities in the development of a comprehensive BMS and NAP in line with internationally recognized standards.

Further elaborations of a SWOT analysis and Force-Field diagram are provided in Annex 1. Effective BSM should focus on two main areas:

- domestic coordination and integration between governmental agencies within one State;
- international cooperation and coordination between neighbouring States.

These areas of focus require inter-agency cooperation, parallel processing, and coordination at ports, harbours, and land border points of entry (collectively referred to as ports of entry) for an optimal collective efficiency of these border institutions.

Internationally, neighbouring or contracting national authorities are requested to cooperate with one another and to consider aligning border crossing facilities and procedures (i.e. joint BCPs, one-stop-shop BCPs).

Customs administrations are usually best situated to develop integrated procedures for the processing of goods at points of entry. Border police/guards and immigration services focus primarily on the processing of people at those points of entry as well as the regulation of both people and goods attempting to cross borders illegally between those points of entry.

Effective BSM requires a clear delineation of responsibilities for goods (customs) and passenger processing (migration). While these responsibilities require different operations (e.g. goods classification, carrier and goods inspection, revenue collection, and transaction verification for customs, versus visa verification, health, and anti-smuggling for immigration), the evolution of training and the use of technology have enhanced border integration and increasingly allow border officers to perform both functions. In most cases, a State will integrate its own processes before it initiates efforts to integrate with a neighbour or trade agreement partner.

The national strategy should clearly formulate the goals to be achieved for a period of three to five years, whereas specific proposals for action should be only included in the NAP.

This NAP, which lists the specific actions that must be undertaken (including timelines, benchmarks and mandatory results to be achieved) should be ideally in alignment with the standards of international stakeholders and institutions, the national BMS, and other relevant documents in which the strategic and operational objectives, including improved intra-agency, inter-agency co-operation and coordination, and international co-operation are defined.
Relevant stakeholders to facilitate, lead and supervise the implementation of the NAP shall be identified. This should include all relevant bodies of neighbouring State’s public administration as well as international organizations involved in BSM, readmission and reintegration, and border traffic at international airports.

An inter-agency working group (IAWG), consisting of relevant ministries and their departments, shall be responsible for the implementation of the NAP, which would facilitate three major areas:

- Enhancement of security and border control standards at ports of entry, including data management, processing, and protection;
- Enhanced and easier flow of persons and goods to be controlled at ports of entry;
- Coordination of procurement (i.e. external funding and other donor support) of modern technical equipment to check travel documents, border infrastructure development, training, and capacity building related to border control at ports of entry.

**Good Practice 14: Establish Joint Border Crossing Points.**

States who are aiming to develop encompassing border management concepts (i.e. comprehensive, coordinated, cooperative, integrated) recognise the importance in the short and medium terms of intensifying efforts to improve and reconstruct the State border infrastructure, creating a widespread system for security and the admission of persons, vehicles, and goods through the State border.

Those States with the intention to modernize the state border infrastructure and create a more comprehensive system should consider in the future constructing joint border crossing points (BCPs) empowered by the competent authorities from partner States for the crossing of external borders. The sharing of common facilities largely depends on the size and type of the BCP and the actual location (e.g. major or minor BCP). In smaller States at small BCPs, or in States with limited financial resources, the pressure to share equipment and facilities is greater.

In comparison, separate BCPs require higher investment in infrastructure regarding facilities and road systems and their maintenance, equipment, energy, and more personnel and for travellers it is more time consuming to cross borders. Joint BCPs save money and time and human resources and make borders more secure. Therefore, many large ports of entry in States could be operated as joint BCPs on the territory of one state, which should be implemented only according to international standards and good practices developed, depending on the geographical situation and the pre-existing infrastructure, to be located on one state territory.

Among others, well-coordinated border checks of transnational flow of persons and goods are the push factor for most effective and efficient control procedures, but also for detection of criminal offences and prevention of cross-border criminal activities, which constitute the core elements of effective management at external borders.

At most States’ ports of entry, passport (travel document) control and customs control are currently performed in separate control positions/cabins and even built separately at new BCPs control positions. Where appropriate, border police/guard officers together with customs officers should consider either joint or more efficiently coordinated controls at BCPs and promote
synchronisation of control activities and avoid double checks of travellers, vehicles and travel documents.

Therefore, a number of factors determine the specific needs for effective cooperation at joint BCPs, such as strategic planning, proactive communication and information exchange, coordination of workflow procedures at BCPs, risk analysis, criminal investigations, joint operations, control outside BCPs (i.e. adjacent areas), contingency/emergency, infrastructure and equipment sharing, and training and human resource management.

The management of border services might differ according to the type and size of a BCP, or its institutional set-up, and may also include more law enforcement agencies rather than customs service and border police/guards (e.g. immigration service, veterinary and phytosanitary services\(^{21}\)) at the BCP. On a daily working basis, the most common activities are the coordination of checks of persons and vehicles that need special attention (i.e. selective control and detailed checks), the coordination of available space, and the coordination of specialised personnel (e.g. sniffer dog handlers).

“One-Stop-Shop” is the strategic approach of state services to carry out all necessary activities and bureaucratic steps related to national administrative procedures (for example travellers stop only once at BCPs to show their travel documents at exit and entry points).

“Single Window” enables economic operators to lodge electronically and one time only all the information required by customs and non-customs legislation for cross-border movements of goods.

**Good Practice 15: Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM.**

Corruption is recognized as a common risk for effective BSM and undermines overall efforts for implementation of robust and coherent BSM policies. Any level of corruption is understood as a direct threat to national and international security. Poor governance standards and endemic corruption are a major impediment to free travel and trade, decrease levels of foreign investment, cause human rights problems for travellers, and are a significant factor in the alienation of border communities.

Corruption initiates many negative impacts on various aspects of BSM, and corruption creates a fertile ground for exploitation and degradation of effective BSM. Consequently, the impact of corruption in relation to BSM in alignment with rule of law undermines States’ efforts to counter effectively cross-border organized crime, terrorism, and the flow of FTFs. Terrorist organizations and organized crime groups exploit vulnerabilities arising from corrupt practices within weakened BSM systems.

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\(^{21}\) A phytosanitary program tracks the inspection of agricultural products and certifies compliance with statutory and regulatory plant standards of importing States. This capability provides better security, reporting functions, and monitoring capabilities for exported commodities.
Raising awareness on corruption among officials involved in BSM related issues as well as within the border communities is key for its recognition as a huge risk to a State’s security as well as border communities’ prosperity. To address these challenges, Governments and border services can adopt a focused approach on tackling corruption in some key areas, such as identity verification, travel documentation, detection of criminal offences, and monitoring of cross-border commerce. Furthermore, border services should strengthen their aspiration of integrity through the development of comprehensive code of conduct to consolidate their standing and reputation within their societies.

Therefore, comprehensive preventive activities are recognised as key in the fight against corruption and all anti-corruption activities have the potential to play a preventive role. Awareness campaigns to the public in general and border communities in particular and training of border practitioners can sensitise to the cost of corruption. Additionally, it would reduce societal tolerance toward it, and particularly encourage border communities and travellers to report illegal activities, thereby curbing the incidence of the phenomenon. Effective investigation and prosecution of corruption-related offences do not only ensure retroactive punishment, but may also deter potential offenders from engaging in such practices in the future.

Related activities most commonly associated with corruption prevention functions are generally regarded as including the following:

- diagnostics, research and proposals for legislative reforms;
- development of anti-corruption policies, strategies, and action plans for implementation;
- coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of anti-corruption policies;
- dissemination of knowledge on corruption prevention and promotion of international cooperation;
- strengthening the integrity and solidarity of members of border services and customs;
- elaboration of code of conduct and anti-corruption guidelines;
- establishment of a national anti-corruption agency (ACA) as an independent authority.

Furthermore, Governments need to consider developing national anti-corruption strategies and action plans to take practical measures to cultivate a culture against corruption with a particular focus on BSM related issues. Border services and customs should consider incorporating the issue of tackling corruption as a primary topic in the front-line officers’ training modules and in the managerial training programs with an emphasis on its potential cost to national security. Furthermore, models should be explored to develop codes of conduct and ethics at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

Amongst others, the establishment of joint BCPs (i.e. one-stop-shop), salary adjustments for border officials and online payments to reduce use of cash might help States to reduce corruption within the context of BSM. The introduction of Single Window schemes in Member States

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23 See also good practice 14, supra note 5.
24 See also good practice 14, ibid.
would be a great step forward in all respects, and should help establish a real enabling environment for increased trade and foreign direct investment. They can help address the corruption issue also, especially if they can move over time to online payment systems that ensure electronic audit trails, and which reduce the need for cash at borders. Engagement with the private sector can also build accountability within BSM agencies. Governments can further introduce mechanisms to report corruption in remote border areas through facilitated access of the border communities to the border agencies to counter corruption.

States need to take into account the protection of whistleblowers and to have an effective reporting mechanism. Also, periodical integrity testing of the personnel involved in activities of border control should be considered. Increased cross-border, regional, and international cooperation as well as increased engagement with the border communities can also help reduce corruption and strengthen accountability in the field of BSM.
Annex 1 - SWOT Analysis and Force-Field Diagram

Utilize SWOT analyses and Force-Field Analyses related to gaps and needs assessments

A SWOT analysis (i.e. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats/Risks) to be developed will facilitate further developments of ways to identify adequate methods of resolutions for state BSM institutions in relation to the current and future BSM situation in alignment with best practices developed based on lessons learned.

- **Strengths**: characteristics of the national BSM structure that give it an advantage over others
- **Weaknesses**: characteristics that place the national BSM structure at a disadvantage relative to others
- **Opportunities**: elements that the national BSM structure could exploit to its advantage
- **Threats** (alternatively Risks): elements in the environment that could cause trouble for the national BSM structure

Identification of SWOTs is very important for border services and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM because they provide detailed and comprehensive information in relation to current state of play and future steps in planning to enhance effective BSM.

Users of SWOT analysis must ask and answer questions that generate meaningful information for each category (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) to make the analysis useful and find their competitive advantage.

Heads of national border services should analyse whether the objective(s) is/are attainable, given the SWOTs. If the objective(s) is/are not attainable, they must select a different objective and repeat the process.

In principle, SWOT analyses are aiming to identify the key factors, both internal and external seen as important to enhance effective and efficient border security and management. Generally spoken, SWOT analysis can be categorized into two main areas:

- **internal factors** – the strengths and weaknesses internal to the border services and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM;
- **external factors** – the opportunities and threats presented by the environment external to the border services and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM.
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<tr>
<td>- Law enforcement agencies involved</td>
<td>- Law enforcement agencies involved</td>
<td>- Individuals or small groups of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in border security and management</td>
<td>in border security and management</td>
<td>divided border communities seek to</td>
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<tr>
<td>recognize their responsibility and the</td>
<td>recognize their responsibility and the</td>
<td>engage with terrorist and/or organized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessity to cooperate with border</td>
<td>necessity to cooperate with border</td>
<td>crime groups to enhance their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services to prevent terrorism and</td>
<td>services to prevent terrorism and</td>
<td>status and legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stem the flow of FTFs.</td>
<td>stem the flow of FTFs.</td>
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**Force-Field Analysis** is a working method to be used to define positive and negative aspects that influence national border services and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM in order to help them making the right decisions.

It is a working tool elaborated for influential development in social science and provides a framework for looking at the factors (forces) that (can) influence national border services and other law enforcement agencies involved in BSM.

It looks at forces that are:
- either driving movement toward a goal (helping forces); or
- blocking movement toward a goal (hindering forces).

Forced-field analysis can contribute significantly to visualize and enhance effective and efficient BSM *inter-alia* in the areas of organizational development, process management, change management, sector reform process, and communication and exchange of information.

Steps in Force-Field Analyses are:
1. Define the problem (current state of play) and target situation (target state);
2. List forces working for and against the desired changes;
3. Rate (categorize) the strength of each force;
4. Draw diagram(s) (length of line denotes strength of the force {positive/negative});
5. Indicate/define how important each force is;
6. Define how to strengthen each important supporting force;
7. Define how to weaken each important resisting force;
8. Identify resources needed;
9. Prepare an action plan: time lines, benchmarks, tasks and responsibilities etc.