

Survey of Practice on Climate, Peace and Security



EMERGING LESSONS
FROM ADVISORS
AND INITIATIVES



CLIMATE SECURITY MECHANISM

The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is a joint initiative by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). It aims to strengthen the capacity of the UN and its partners to systematically analyze and address the linkages between climate change, peace and security.

For more information:

CSM website: <https://www.un.org/climatesecuritymechanism/>

UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office Gateway: <https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jxe00>

Climate, Peace and Security Trello board: <https://trello.com/b/gC7Sz1TW/climate-peace-security-board>

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ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank	LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
AU	African Union	LGA	Liptako Gourma Authority
CCA	Common Country Analysis	NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
COP	Conference of the Parties	OSE HoA	Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
CPAS	Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System	PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
CPS	Climate, Peace and Security	PDA	Peace and Development Advisor
CPSA	Climate, Peace and Security Advisor	RCO	Resident Coordinator Office
CSM	Climate Security Mechanism	SAGE	Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise
CSO	Civil society organization	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
DFA	De Facto Authorities in Afghanistan	SPM	Special Political Mission
DPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations	UN	United Nations
DPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
GCF	Green Climate Fund	UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
GEF	Global Environment Facility	UNOCA	United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace	UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
IFI	International financial institution	UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
IOM	International Organization for Migration	UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
JARS	Joint Analysis and Reporting Section	UNU-CPR	United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
LAS	League of Arab States		

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes lessons learned, and knowledge gained from a small but growing cadre of field-based Climate, Peace and Security Advisors located within UN field missions or seconded to regional organizations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), as well as UN Country Teams (UNCT) who have led the field initiatives supported by the CSM.

The CSM is a collaborative initiative between the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO).¹ The CSM is tasked with providing technical guidance and support to UN field missions, UN Country Teams, regional organizations, and partners to strengthen their ability to assess, mitigate, and address climate-related peace and security risks.

One of the key strategies has been for the CSM, in collaboration with Member States and other UN partners, to deploy and support Climate, Peace and Security Advisors (CPSAs). To date, 10 CPSAs have been deployed across a range of missions and regional and subregional organizations.

In addition to supporting these CPSAs, the CSM has also supported climate, peace and security (CPS) work in a number of other contexts, including supporting CPS risk assessments, programming and other policy action in the Philippines, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Andean States, and in Northern Central America, as well as a number of global trainings, capacity-building workshops and community of practice efforts.

ENTRY POINTS: MOVING FROM ANALYSIS TO ACTION IN THE FIELD

The research and interviews identified a number of entry points by which the CPSAs and other CSM-supported initiatives can contribute to shared thinking and analysis on climate-related peace and security concerns and help support more effective and timely responses. There is no singular entry point or strategy for responding to CPS issues, as pathways of risk and opportunities for action vary depending on the context. However, the research identified a number of common tools, strategies and activities that helped create or leverage these entry points in ways that supported greater action on CPS. CPS risk assessments (often based on a toolbox developed by the CSM) or other analytical products helped establish a common basis of understanding or could function as a process tool for bringing stakeholders together into a CPS discussion.

Establishing mechanisms for regularly tracking CPS issues and responses in mission reporting or other regional data systems helped institutionalize this work within the UN system and also (together with risk assessments) provided the data necessary to support more tailored and effective programming and other responses. Capacity building on CPS and liaising with policy stakeholders helped increase awareness, further collaboration, and in many cases led to greater collective measures and policy action on CPS at a subnational, national or regional level. CPSAs, and the CSM, also helped connect international to local action, by facilitating regional dialogue and programming, supporting bottom-up grassroots and civil society voices to be part of the national or international CPS conversation, and by connecting programming opportunities in a given setting with international or national climate conversations and funds. Collectively, the research pointed to at least five key effects of CPSA activity and other CSM interventions in the contexts examined:

Making the connections between climate, peace and security: While Governmental partners had often observed the impact of climate and environmental change, considering their inter-relation with pressing stabilization or security dynamics tended to provoke fresh thinking, in ways that could elicit new responses at a sub-national, national or regional level. Within the UN system, opening a conversation about the interrelated nature of CPS and the impact



Photo: UNMISS, Gregório Cunha / South Sudan

of climate change for a range of UN priorities and workstreams (security dynamics, stabilization efforts, humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, humanitarian effects, protection concerns, etc.) helped to break down silos, enabling cross-sectoral partnerships that could better respond to these interconnected climate-security effects.

Anchoring CPS action within UN, national, regional and multilateral spaces: Integrated CPS responses require collaboration across different UN entities and workstreams, as well as with national and regional actors. Yet in part because of the newness of this area, in part because it spans multiple geographic and sectoral areas and portfolios of work (and thus is the dedicated responsibility of none), CPS responses risk being overlooked or not fully operationalized. Catalyzing more coherent UN responses thus requires greater awareness of how CPS interrelates with UN priorities, and then institutionalizing CPS within a range of UN mechanisms, workstreams, or processes. This is already being facilitated through the work of CPSAs and other CSM initiatives. CPS risk assessments, trainings and workshops have helped spur greater inter-agency or cross-sectoral discussion and spaces for collaboration. Incorporating CPS indicators or observations within field office reporting or mission tracking, together with individual outreach to UN mission, UNCT staff as well as national and regional actors, has helped identify and socialize these issues as part of the regular workstreams and practice of UN staff. More robust and regular reporting on CPS issues, including to the Security Council, and their uptake by UN leadership in a range of contexts has given greater visibility to CPS issues. This has helped mainstream and increase awareness and recognition of these issues across the UN system.

Informing and shaping responses: Risk assessments and analysis, often elaborated upon through dedicated workshops and training sessions, could identify gaps and bring nuanced, localized information about CPS issues to the table. These contributed to identification of areas ripe for programming or other forms of governmental and inter-governmental response (for example, policy making or early action), as well as the sort of granular information necessary to operationalize them. These assessment, knowledge-sharing, and capacity-building exercises also generated spaces for cross-fertilization and project idea development across UN agencies, and government or local stakeholders, that might not otherwise have naturally collaborated on such issues, enabling novel and diverse programming partnerships to emerge. CPSAs also sometimes actively brought together the key ingredients for programming, connecting programming ideas with partners who could carry it out, and also connecting them with donors and funding sources. CSM seed funding directly supported pilot or catalytic initiatives in some cases. Last, CSM initiatives lay the



Photo UNAMA / Afghanistan

foundation for future programming by chipping away at the gap in funding to fragile and conflict-affected areas, through supporting high-level engagement at forums like climate COPs, as well as through CPSAs' direct outreach and engagement with vertical climate funds or international financial institutions (IFIs). CPSA work, alongside that of other UN partners, helped narrow the climate financing gap by de-risking programming in conflict-affected or politically sensitive environments.

CSM support for more regular monitoring, tracking, and reporting tools has begun to more systematically capture the diverse ways that climate impacts peace and security and the potential responses.

Supporting regional and transboundary strategies and responses: Transnational issues like climate change require regional coordination and collective action, including early warning and response networks. Yet UN capacities to act still largely remain siloed along geographic (as well as pillar or sectoral) lines. Regional cooperation on CPS has been growing and some regional organizations have been leading the way in adopting proactive policies on CPS; nonetheless, even in areas where such cooperation was in evidence, differences among Member States or the additional time and process steps involved in aligning policies and coordinating responses across multiple States can limit responses. CSM interventions have helped to address some of these gaps and barriers by supporting common regional assessments and dialogue spaces, both among UN entities working in different countries and among Member States within a region or subregion. Raising these issues at a higher political level through mission leadership's good offices, as well as behind-the-scenes technical support helped to overcome some of the political sticking points and improving strategic approaches in regions like the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa. CSM initiatives, the CSM Toolbox or other analytical tools, and advisory services also directly contributed to the development of action-oriented regional mechanisms (such as a new early warning meteorological center for West Africa, or the recently established CPS hub in the Horn of Africa) as well as the development of cross-border or regional programming among UN partners.

Advancing international commitments and conversations on CPS: While there have been increased commitments to climate action in recent years at an international level, at each successive climate COP as well as in other high-level forums, what has often been missing are mechanisms that take forward those commitments on the ground. Commitments to support climate adaptation have lagged behind, particularly in conflict-affected and fragile states. Through helping identify areas for investment, and facilitating responsive programming and other local stakeholder responses, the CPSAs and the CSM have helped create a pathway for realizing some of these international commitments in particular those related to the need for more conflict-sensitive climate adaptation. Support from the CSM has also helped advance the international conversation on CPS, by supporting Member States presentations and dialogue at major international climate conferences, and through enabling greater coordination and more proactive positioning among regional and sub-regional bodies. With the support of CPSAs and CSM initiatives, a number of Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations have adopted collective policies, action plans and mechanisms on CPS. In doing so, they have pushed the envelope in terms of collective responses to CPS. Last, CSM support for more regular monitoring, tracking, and reporting tools has begun to more systematically capture the diverse ways that climate impacts peace and security and the potential responses. Over time, this evidence can trickle up and help shape the international conversation about CPS, enabling more effective responses.



UN Photo: Rick Bajornas / Dominica

Key recommendations from this survey of practice include:

Deploying CPS advisors in appropriate contexts

While not all contexts are ripe for this model of CPS support, the reflections suggest that a CPSA can catalyze significant understanding, collaboration and action on CPS in local, national, regional and international contexts.

Adequate UN leadership support and staffing structure

When considering a CPSA deployment, it is critical to ensure mission and/or regional leadership is fully behind the position, and also that other mission and UNCT roles and responsibilities are allocated in ways that the CPSA would be able to keep a focus on CPS issues.

Time horizon for planning and CPS Advisor deployments

As funds allow, encourage a multi-year time horizon for a CPS Advisor deployment and field initiatives, ideally aligning funding for a minimum of two years. Three to four years may be necessary to see real dividends of CPS Advisor assignments.

Flexible funding support for CPS Advisors

A central fund within the CSM that could be drawn on easily, especially for small amounts [e.g. \$500 to \$10,000] through a relatively rapid, streamlined process could significantly facilitate CPSAs' ability to take forward time-sensitive national and regional initiatives.

Enhancing support structures

CPSA deployments may be more effective if supported by at least one other staff, whether a secondment from another UN agency or a national staff member.

Investing in global databases and learning tools

Interlocutors argued for greater investments in global shared databases that might incorporate tracking efforts, assessments and learning products, or otherwise make best practices on CPS action more accessible.

Learning investment in CPS programming

Those engaged in CPS programming and/or partners supporting such work should consider greater investments in monitoring, evaluation and learning, including building in more time and funding for pre- and post-intervention assessments, longitudinal studies and learning, as well as adaptive learning components built into CPS programming.

Expanding the CSM Toolbox

The CSM Toolbox developed in 2020 was useful in some contexts for offering a basic starting point for analysis, but it offered limited guidance on moving into practical avenues for actions and responses. Therefore, it was not as useful in countries where the basic assessment strategies had already been applied and inculcated. The CSM might consider developing a more comprehensive version of the CSM Toolbox, more applicable in contexts that have already gone through the first cycle of risk assessment and socialization on CPS and moving into action.

Mainstreaming CPS in key UN practice areas

CPSA reflections suggest it may be beneficial to think more about how to incorporate CPS perspectives not just into specific geographic contexts, but into thematic UN workstreams and practice areas, such as within discussions and among those working on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus, stabilization issues, human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), rule of law, Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, and mediation

Managing expectations and/or sequencing from literacy to resourcing

Many of the pathways identified here need to build upon one another. For example, building internal UN literacy is often necessary prior to outreach efforts to support national and community partners. While there may be strong pressure from climate-vulnerable countries to “deliver” on financing, in reality this takes several years of careful analysis, national capacity development, etc.



INTRODUCTION

The Climate, Peace and Security (CPS) agenda has gained significant momentum in recent years, with increasing attention to the interconnections between climate change and broader peace and security dynamics in academia, policy, analysis and practice. Within the United Nations (UN) system, there has been increasing demand for climate, peace and security expertise and capacity. Member States, regional organizations, and a range of local partners who are on the frontlines of these issues have sought greater support in how to grapple with the compounding impacts of climate change and conflict or fragility.


In 2018, the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) was formed as a collaborative initiative between the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), then joined by the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO).² The CSM is tasked with providing technical guidance and support to United Nations (UN) field missions, Country Teams (UNCT), regional organizations, and partners to strengthen their ability to assess, mitigate, and address climate-related peace and security risks. Additionally, the CSM provides support to UNCTs and

The CSM is tasked with providing technical guidance and support to United Nations (UN) field missions, Country Teams (UNCT), regional organizations, and partners to strengthen their ability to assess, mitigate, and address climate-related peace and security risks.

Resident Coordinator Offices (RCOs) in integrating CPS perspectives into strategic planning and/or other initiatives applicable to their mandates. The CSM has so far provided support to over 20 UNCTs and field missions.³ One of the key strategies has been for the CSM, in collaboration with Member States and other UN partners, to deploy and support Climate, Peace and Security Advisors (CPSAs). As of the time of writing, the Mechanism was supporting 10 advisors to UN field missions and regional organisations in total. The first advisor was deployed in November 2020, to support the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).⁴ Initially experimental, the perceived success of this model led the CSM to expand it to other settings in the subsequent four years:

- 2021: In January 2021, an advisor was deployed to the Liptako Gourma Authority (LGA) — a regional body for the sub-regional area of the Liptako Gourma that spans Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — and in December 2021 to the League of Arab States (LAS).⁵
- 2022: In 2022 four new advisory positions were created in the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (OSE HoA, February 2022), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (August 2022), the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) (September 2022) and the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS, October 2022).
- 2023: Beginning in mid-2023, two more CPSAs kickstarted work within the Special Political Missions (SPMs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA – deployment formalized in July 2024).⁶ An expert was also deployed briefly to support the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in October 2023.
- 2024: An advisor was deployed on detail assignment to support the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat ahead of new advisor deployment planned for 2025.

GRAPH 1



Graph 1 summarizes this timeline. As of the time of research, a longer CPSPA deployment was in development for the LCBC; there was also a plan to create a position within the UN Office to the African Union (AU); and also one in the Pacific Island region, hosted and facilitated by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) with CSM support.⁷ CSPAs had also been proposed for the missions in Mali and Sudan in 2023 but were both halted due to mission closure and/or conflict developments in these countries.

These positions have been supported through bilateral contributions by Member States via the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office supporting the CSM Joint Programme. Support has been through extra-budgetary funding; proposals to include these positions within mission budgets have so far not been accepted. In some cases, CSM members or other Member State partners have seconded additional staffing to support these CSPAs.⁸

In addition to deploying CSPAs, the CSM has provided analytical, programmatic, or other support in a range of country and regional contexts, including in the Philippines, Somalia, Haiti, among Pacific Island States and in Northern Central America. Interviews with partners in these areas about CSM collaborations helped inform this study. The CSM has been able to draw from limited pooled funding to support pilot programming in some of these settings.⁹ In others, any of the four entities that are part of the CSM (hereinafter ‘CSM entities’) may leverage their respective institutional resources to advance policy, programming or other CPS initiatives.

On a global basis, the CSM has organized knowledge sharing and capacity building workshops for UN staff members, national or regional policy makers, and civil society organizations (CSOs).¹⁰ The CSM also maintains and facilitates a virtual UN Community of Practice on Climate, Peace and Security, comprising some 600+ personnel from more than 35 UN entities. A forum for informal information exchange and knowledge sharing, the Community of Practice sessions are organized every few weeks and are open to all UN staff interested in this topic.¹¹

This survey of practice is designed to identify lessons learned and knowledge gained from the work of the CSM, with a view to informing future action. It is more focused on the work of the CSPAs but will include some discussion of other CSM support in contexts where CSPAs are not present, which the CSM frames as “catalytic initiatives.” Overall the report identifies how the different tools, strategies, and efforts supported by the CSM contribute to entry points for action on CPS in a range of contexts. Part III provides greater detail on the type of tools, strategies, and activities supported by CSPAs, and the CSM in a range of contexts, and how they have helped facilitate further action on CPS. This is followed by a synthesis of the effects of this work, and then a concluding discussion of practices, tools and facets of CSM work that help support these entry points, as well as existing limitations and blockages.



Photo: UNDP / Haiti

2

METHODOLOGY, KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The research for this knowledge product was carried out by the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR), through funding provided by the CSM. It was designed to be a brief knowledge product capturing reflections and inferences on entry points that have emerged from CSM support, in particular in relation to CPSAs and catalytic initiatives. The research methodology was designed to facilitate research consolidation and internal stock-taking, to build from existing knowledge sources and internal reflections of CSM team members. It was not designed to survey perceptions of the CSM and the CPSAs from amongst a wide range of interlocutors, nor to generate new data with respect to the climate, peace and security dynamics and responses in the contexts considered. The findings aim to inform and shape future CSM initiatives by capturing lessons learned and existing insights.

The primary research was conducted between 16 September and 1 November 2024, and constituted 22 interviews as well as an extensive review of background literature, including review of CPS risk assessments conducted, documentation of CSM-supported workshops, conferences, and events, progress reports and internal documentation, and review of outside research reports and academic publications related to the CPS issues in the countries and regions in question. The primary interview subjects included CPSAs, members of the CSM entities, and UN staff members in non-mission contexts where there was not a CPSA who had engaged with CSM catalytic initiatives. Additional background conversations with Member States, UN staff members not connected to the CSM, and other civil society actors familiar with some of the initiatives discussed additionally informed the work. To support candid reflection, all interview sources are anonymized. Although not the primary research tool, the author was also able to draw upon previous research and insights supported by the CSM as it relates to climate, peace and security programming.

Two key sets of terms used throughout the report are worth clarifying. The Climate, Peace and Security Advisors (CPSAs) supported by the CSM had slightly different titles depending on how and when they were created. The acronym CPSA will be used to refer generically to these positions, with more specificity in titles offered only as needed.

Throughout the interviews, and in the literature review, both “climate security” and “climate, peace and security” tended to be used interchangeably. The former was initially used within UN policy circles as the main term of art in this field of practice, and many of the advisory positions discussed formally include climate security in their position title or scope of work (including, notably the “Climate Security Mechanism” itself). However, more recently the field has moved to the broader term “climate, peace and security” in recognition of different interpretations of ‘security’, and also a desire to capture positive peace benefits from engaging in climate-related or other environmental peacebuilding work. Although climate, peace and security will be used more often, climate security will be used as it appeared in other references and interviews.

3

KEY PATHWAYS AND EFFECTS

3

KEY PATHWAYS AND EFFECTS

To understand how CPSA positions or other CSM activities might contribute to further action on CPS, it is important to identify the common tools, strategies or activities observed across these different contexts. This has included (a) developing risk assessments or other pieces of analysis on CPS, (b) instituting mechanisms for regularly tracking CPS issues and responses in mission reporting or other regional data collection or monitoring processes, (c) supporting trainings and workshops on CPS, (d) liaising with policy stakeholders and facilitating policy development and coherence, (e) working to improve awareness and cooperative responses within the UN system, and (f) outreach and network building among civil society. Each of these areas will be discussed in turn, followed by two sections that discuss how these different activities and practices can (g) contribute to informing and shaping responses, including through (h) specific outreach to external sources of funding such as climate vertical funds.

A. CPS RISK ASSESSMENTS AND OTHER CPS ANALYSIS

One of the most common ‘first steps’, both within mission and non-mission contexts has been to develop a CPS risk assessment for the country or region in question. In the Horn of Africa, a joint risk assessment by the regional body for Member States together with the UN Special Envoy’s office helped form the baseline for the development of a common position and the first regional climate security mechanism. As one illustration of this, the CPSAs in UNOWAS and in the LGA have been working with national stakeholders to conduct pilot risk assessments across West Africa, with six conducted so far, plus four more planned, as first steps toward developing national CPS risk management strategies.¹² Assessments haven’t been limited to contexts in which there are CPSAs. In Haiti, a risk assessment conducted by adelphi which was conceptualized and commissioned by a consortium of UN entities (including UNEP and UNDP), civil society members, and Government stakeholders, became an important precursor step, not only identifying more clearly the climate-related peace and security risks but helping cohere a more dedicated community of partners who might work jointly on this issue.¹³ A sample of the key issues identified in some of these risk assessments is provided in **Box A**.



UNDP / Timor Leste

To generate these risk assessments, many CPSAs and UN staff relied on the Toolbox first developed by the CSM in 2020. Others relied on tools and CPS methodologies developed by other research or academic institutions, or reflecting the methodologies of the UN agencies involved.¹⁵ While in many cases, the CPS risk assessment was the first step initiated by the CPSA, in Iraq and in Central Africa, dedicated CPS risk assessments **helped identify the need for greater attention and coordination on CPS issues**, contributing to support in the missions (UNAMI and UNOCA, respectively) and in the country contexts for the CPSA position.¹⁶

CPS risk assessments have been central in **generating a common understanding of the climate-related peace and security risks**, or in some cases a reframing and reconceptualization of risks that, while well-known, had previously been approached in a more siloed manner. Many of the CPSAs and UN staff interviewed said that while there had previously been awareness of the negative effects associated with climate change — more severe weather patterns, drought or flooding resulting from them, natural resource scarcity or degradation, and other knock-on effects — in many contexts these had not yet been conceptualized in terms of the connected risks for peace and security issues. For example, in Iraq, the CPSA observed that while there was some awareness of climate change, there had been little concerted thinking on the consequences for local governance and stability: “Actors need a better understanding of what climate change is. There is only an initial awareness that climate change impacts can exacerbate security dynamics,” she offered.

While not the sole route, CPS risk assessments helped to open a conversation about the interconnections between climate and peace and security concerns, and how it might be relevant to particular regional, national or even subnational contexts. In South Sudan, for example, the CPSA within UNMISS, together with its Bentiu field office, undertook a climate security assessment in Unity State, a subnational region that was particularly at risk of climate shocks, with heavy flooding leading to displacement and contributing to intercommunal conflicts and other instability.¹⁷ While there was already awareness of the heavy flooding risk in the area, this recentering of the issues around not just immediate flood management, but managing the related peace and security issues that might flow from it improved local risk mitigation strategies and also provided a concrete example of how UNMISS might take climate security considerations into its work.¹⁸

Introducing a climate, peace and security assessment could thus be an important **part of awareness-raising and starting a collective conversation**, both among UN staff and partners, and among national or regional stakeholders. Drawing together these linkages tended to be an eye-opener for government partners and UN staff members alike. “By building that understanding on interlinkages, people see more ideas about projects or focused action that they can take at a local level,” observed the CPSA from UNOWAS.¹⁹

Drawing together these linkages tended to be an eye-opener for government partners and UN staff members alike. “By building that understanding on interlinkages, people see more ideas about projects or focused action that they can take at a local level,” observed the CPSA from UNOWAS.

The way that these risk assessments helped to forge a common understanding could be particularly important as a first step for **furthering policy action in regional contexts**. Among the eight Member States of the Horn of Africa regional economic community the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),²⁰ establishing a common understanding of the collective CPS risks was viewed as the first step toward establishing a collective position, and joint action. The CPSA in the OSE HoA, who has been coordinating with IGAD on these issues since 2022, noted there was “growing bits of awareness among the UN family in the region that we had to address these risks, and positive noises from counterparts at a national and regional level that this was an issue” for them, but what was needed was a better shared understanding and internal coordination within the UN system.²¹ A series of technical consultations between UN agencies, funds and programmes in the Horn and IGAD in July 2022 identified key risks and pathways for the region, and existing gaps in the regional response.²² This contributed to the publication of a joint (OSE HoA and IGAD) CPS risk assessment report, as well as an IGAD policy brief with recommendations for collective regional measures.²³ This process led to the establishment of an IGAD collective position on climate security and a regional climate security mechanism (see section III.D for further discussion of this mechanism).

Although not formally a CPS risk assessment, a comparable example was the development of the “White Paper on the Regional Initiative on Climate Security in the Arab Region”, which was supported by the CPSA to the LAS and was launched on the sidelines of COP27. The goal of this White Paper was to generate greater awareness and shared understanding of the interlinkages between climate change, prevention and sustaining peace among the Member States of the LAS, which would then enable them to take the next step of developing common positions and policies.



An important contribution of these CPS risk assessments and analysis has been as processes that can **bring different stakeholder groups together**, helping to set up a larger conversation about CPS and/or position it as a significant policy issue. An important example of this comes from a recently finalized (February 2024) CPS study in Afghanistan. Afghanistan ranks high on climate vulnerability indices, and climate pressures have been increasingly felt by those living in the country.²⁴ When the CPS focal point in UNAMA (who then formally became the CPSA in July 2024) began consultations for this study in 2023, it was in the context of increasingly severe food insecurity, migration, and local conflict issues following three years of drought, as well as increasing regional tensions over transboundary water issues, and an overall fraught political climate. The study identified that climate change is already acting as a risk multiplier for Afghan communities and the broader region. Equally important, it was able to connect these climate and environmental strains to issues already identified as key international and regional security priorities with regard to Afghanistan — including potential risks to regional stability, migration, counter-narcotics efforts, issues of internal unrest and instability within Afghanistan, and risks of domestic or regional recruitment into armed groups.²⁵ The concretization of these issues, and linking them to already identified priorities within the UN mission and among other donors and international stakeholders helped to position climate-related issues as a central topic within the Afghanistan policy space, together with other outreach and engagement (discussed further in section III.D).²⁶ Although the study was not made public, it has already helped to spur conversations among domestic and international stakeholders. To produce the assessment required a lengthy period of engagement and review by the CPSA, as well as other UN staff members,²⁷ in communities across Afghanistan, with the Taliban, who have assumed the role of De Facto Authorities (DFA) in the country, as well as with other international stakeholders engaged on Afghanistan. These consultations and dialogue about the issue **proved a valuable process element in itself, helping forge the relationships, alliances, and space** for this sort of discussion in the mission and within international engagement.

The general awareness-raising and issue identification in these risk assessments tended to feature as a first step in a larger socialization process that could ultimately **galvanize greater programmatic and other local and national responses**. When the climate advisor (initially outside of the CSM framework) arrived in Somalia in November 2020, climate, peace and security was very much a nascent issue globally, with little thinking on this nexus within the country. At the time there was no ready CSM Toolbox or blueprint for a CPS assessment, but the climate advisor collaborated with a number of think tanks and research organizations to map CPS risks and impact pathways in Somalia, in particular those related to livelihoods, migration, and the connection with armed groups.²⁸ These studies and assessments then enabled the CPSA to engage in greater awareness-raising and engagement with both governmental partners and UN entities (both UNSOM, and the RCO and UNCT). The CPSA described it as a series of interlocking steps, with risk assessments and analysis leading to opportunities for training, outreach and awareness-raising, which then led to certain policy steps and commitments,²⁹ and over time contributed to greater programming and response (discussed further in section III.G).³⁰ Another more localized example of how assessments contribute to action was a joint analysis between UNEP-DHI and Somalia’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources on the impacts of climate change and development on water resources. The assessment of this specific issue informed flood risk reduction activities in the Shabelle River Basin, and also pointed to future areas of work and cooperation with regard to transboundary water

issues. Other examples of CPS risk assessments informing or contributing to follow-on programming are considered further in section III.G.

Risk assessments have also been used to **advance learning on past programming approaches** and identify new approaches. For example, a 2023 CSM-supported risk assessment in Mauritania identified the local climate, peace and security risks and also the degree to which existing programming, including projects supported through the Peace-building Fund (PBF), responded to them. Released in 2024, the findings were viewed as important for gathering more information on the effectiveness of existing approaches and responses, as well as the need for stronger understanding and efforts on key areas, such as water management issues and youth.³¹ As such, these risk assessments can form part of the learning and feedback cycle, which is important in the long-term for developing more tailored and effective responses to CPS issues.

These examples, and other interviews with UN staff, suggest that CPS risk assessments and other related analytical work can help catalyze programming and other local and national responses in two ways. First, they may provide more localized and contextualized data that is nuanced enough to point to specific programmatic responses in key areas. Second, bringing the points of information and available data together into an integrated analysis can also facilitate a more integrated approach in the response. Several staff members observed that even in contexts where parts of the UNCT had been engaging on climate-related initiatives, they often would do so through their particular institutions or sections frame of reference or approach, rather than engaging in the sort of multi-disciplinary, integrated approach that might have a better chance of responding to the mixed environmental, development, governance and security challenges that tend to characterize CPS issues. While not the sole avenue for breaking down these silos, by illustrating the interlinked nature of CPS risks, these assessments could help to identify the need for more integrated action.

Contribution of CPS risk assessments and analysis to CPS action:

- Generating a common understanding on climate-related peace and security risks at a national, subnational or regional level
- Opening a conversation on CPS issues and linkages among diverse stakeholder audiences, enabling a more integrated and collaborative response
- Generating applied knowledge of CPS consequences, in ways that identify programming opportunities
- Capturing learning and fine-tuning responses



Photo UNDP Somalia

Box A Key CPS Pathways Identified in CPS Risk Assessments

The pathways by which climate change affects peace and security and vice versa are complex, indirect and vary in each context. A virtue of the CPS risk assessments is precisely that they are context-specific. This is what enabled them to capture the interest and engagement of key stakeholders, to highlight risks, and to identify further action points. The most prominent pathways linking climate and conflict identified in five CPS risk assessments are summarized below, with columns to the right indicating five common CPS pathways that recurred across almost all of them. As indicated by the numbering and shading, these common issues were:

- Resource scarcity contributing to livelihood deterioration and local conflicts (1); as well as the risk that these resource pressures contribute to:
- Criminality, radicalization, and/or risks related to armed groups (2); and/or
- Climate-induced migration and associated vulnerabilities (3); and/or
- Governance challenges and risks to stability (4); and/or
- Regional and transboundary tensions (5).

Afghanistan - UNAMA CPS risk assessment, May 2024 ³²	1	2	3	4	5
Climate stressors > intensify local conflicts over resources (especially water); particular stress along existing fault lines and risk of elite capture > could introduce future local and national instability .	●			●	
Climate-linked livelihood and economic strains > increased internal and external migration > tensions with host communities, local conflict; intensifying regional tensions over migration .				●	●
Degradation of and declining shared resources (primarily water) > escalation of transboundary tensions , impact on regional relations.					●
Climate pressure > contributes to economic slowdown, poverty, livelihood degradation > potential for increased criminality, social unrest, recruitment to armed groups .		●			
Collective effects of climate change (all above pathways) > degradation of governance capacity > increased individual and community vulnerability, risks to stability.				●	
Horn of Africa - IGAD/OSE HoA risk assessment, November 2022 ³³					
Climate extremes and environmental degradation > food and water insecurity > reinforcing poverty cycles, negative impacts for economy and for key industries > youth unemployment contributing to radicalization .	●	●			
Climate extremes contribute to flooding and drought, rise in sea level pressures > livelihood degradation and food insecurity > climate-induced mobility .			●		
Climate extremes > affect key economic, historical and cultural practices (transhumance, also cattle rustling) > local conflict and economic impact; also risks of conflict over transboundary resources and issues.				●	●
Increased vulnerability due to climate pressures > weakens governance and resilience > exacerbates negative factors such as arms proliferation, marginalization, lack of social services, criminality , and non-state armed group control.		●		●	
Iraq - UNAMI/DPPA risk assessment, April 2023 ³⁴					
Extreme weather events > reduce livelihood options > contribute to migration and rapid urbanization > can reinforce marginalization and inter-group tensions .	●		●		
Loss of livelihood and diminished natural resources > contribute to social unrest > create enabling environment for non-state armed groups (NSAGs) > NSAGs leverage scarce natural resources to benefit their interests.		●			
Diminishing water > heightens national and regional tensions .				●	●
Shift from fossil fuels > loss of revenue in Iraq > if adaptation is poorly managed, could exacerbate power imbalances and inequality .				●	


Box A Key CPS Pathways Identified in CPS Risk Assessments *continued*

Haiti - adelphi risk assessment, 2023 ³⁵	1	2	3	4	5
Climate-induced natural disasters > threaten livelihood and survival; exacerbate governance challenges .				●	
Environmental degradation > harmful adaptation practices, environmental crimes > exacerbate competition over natural resources .	●				
Climate change and environmental degradation > drive internal and external migration > weakens social cohesion and protection systems > increases vulnerability and maladaptive practices (including strengthening armed groups).		●	●		
Climate and environmental pressures > reduce livelihoods and threaten protection systems (especially young people and children) > greater rates of violence, exploitation and abuse.	●				
Institutional fragility and widespread violence > intensify climate and environmental risks > limit effective climate action > limit access to climate finance and future solutions.		●		●	
Somalia - NUPI-SIPRI assessment, 2023 ³⁶	1	2	3	4	5
Changes in rainfall and weather events such as flooding and drought affect agropastoralism and livestock economies > livelihood deterioration and risk of increased conflict . Additional issue: inequal impacts of livelihood deterioration on different groups (gender impact).	●				
Climate-influenced drought and other effects > internal and external migration > exacerbate vulnerability of certain groups due to weak service provision and distance from safety nets; accentuate local tensions . Additional issues: strains on humanitarian system			●		
Drought and natural resource strains > creates opportunities for armed groups to increase control, recruitment, exploitation > further limitations on coping strategies, community vulnerability.		●			
Climate-connected drought and resource pressures > exacerbate local vulnerabilities > can create and exacerbate political and economic inequity and exploitation .				●	
Burkina Faso - UNDP Risk Assessment Report, 2022 ³⁷	1	2	3	4	5
Seasonal climate extremes (floods, droughts) and soil degradation from climate variability > reduced production, loss of yields, and livelihood degradation > increases poverty and vulnerability, as well as conflict, and competition for arable land, forests, and natural resources.	●				
Hydrometeorological and climate extremes (erratic onset and early end of rainfall) > disrupt balance between agricultural and pastoral systems > contribute to migration and changed transhumance routes > increase community conflicts over scarce resources (in particular farmers and herders) and transnational tensions.			●		●
Livelihood degradation and shortages of food and vital resources > aggravate unemployment and conflicts over scarce natural resources > contribute to increased banditry, trafficking and other criminal behaviours > contribute to social and political instability .		●		●	
Weak governance of scarce natural resources and armed violence > increase distrust in political, economic and traditional elites > may encourage harmful adaptation strategies (e.g. mining) > exacerbate environmental harm, social tensions and conflict > exacerbate stability risks at the community level .				●	

B. REGULAR MONITORING, TRACKING, AND INFORMATION COLLECTION MECHANISMS

In addition to supporting CPS risk assessments, CSM initiatives have contributed to improved reporting on CPS risks and responses, and also helped contribute to the development of regular systems of data collection and monitoring. In some of the country and regional contexts examined, there were efforts to integrate CPS analysis and perspectives into Common Country Analyses (CCAs) and UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs),³⁸ as well as in other **mission tracking tools and reporting**. One of the first steps of the CPSA deployed to UNMISS was to integrate tracking of CPS indicators and responses into the mission's information tools, including in regular sub-office reporting, as well as in the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) and the Mission situational awareness system (Sage). Evidence that this data could be collected and analyzed as part of mission tools was also reportedly part of the discussion on whether a more explicit CPS reporting mandate was feasible for UNMISS (the only peacekeeping mission so far with such a reporting mandate).³⁹ It also proved useful in shaping preventive action and crisis response to flooding in 2024 (see Box B below). Within UNAMI, an outreach and training effort with national staff resulted in greater data collection and input on local manifestations of CPS risk issues across Iraq into regular mission reporting — an effort that ultimately contributed to national responses and additional UN programming initiatives (see section III.C and III.G).

Outside of mission reporting streams, CPSAs and other CSM initiatives have also supported the development of new **mechanisms for tracking and predictive modelling of climate-related data**, in order to support programmatic or preventive responses. In Somalia, the CPSA has been supporting the development and use of an open-source geospatial mapping tool known as STRATA, which uses multiple data sets to map climatic events and forward projections. This enhanced ability to model future risks has already been put to use, with STRATA modelling hotspots for climatic events, conflicts and displacement, which was then used to help identify target locations for a flagship programming initiative in two states in Somalia.⁴⁴ The resulting project also had a built-in learning component, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) incorporated as an analytical partner tracking the approaches and results in order to develop learning for the field.⁴⁵



There was also evidence of **monitoring and tracking mechanisms used in regional and cross-border contexts**. In 2023, the CSM together with the regional Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) for Northern Central America, the RCOs in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and an outside research organization, the Institute for Economics and Peace, collaborated to create the Northern Central America CPS barometer, which monitors climate, peace, and security risks at a regional level to facilitate preparedness and decision-making. The CPS barometer was developed as a tool for forward-looking risk management and planning, although its full realization as an early warning and conflict resolution mechanism is still a work in progress.⁴⁶ One of the UN staff members involved highlighted the important role that such data collection and analysis can provide in a context like Northern Central America, where awareness of CPS and its relevance for policymakers is still low: “Granular local data that shows that these changes are currently happening and are not just theoretical would be helpful in order to convince governments to act on it.”⁴⁷ They observed that policymakers would be more responsive to that sort of tangible, real-time data, related to manifestations of current issues, than to more general arguments calling attention to climate security issues.

BOX B From early warning to conflict-sensitive action in response to projected flooding in South Sudan

Nearly one million people per year have been affected by flooding in South Sudan since 2021. In 2024 alone, 890,000 people have been affected by flooding, with 226,000 people being flood-displaced.⁴⁰ Before this latest onset of flooding, there were strong early warning signs: at the start of the rainy season, a regional climate forecasting mechanism for the Horn of Africa sent the alert out to all Member States in the region of a high risk of flooding in a number of areas.⁴¹ To prevent the risk of the Victoria Dam breaking, Uganda would need to release water from the dam, but this would further increase the risk of flooding in downriver communities, notably in South Sudan.⁴² Although the flooding effects could not be prevented, this advance warning and coordination at least allowed for a greater degree of preparedness to better manage the flooding crisis in South Sudan.⁴² The CPSA and others within UNMISS worked with national counterparts to develop a **conflict-sensitive national preparedness and response plan**. In addition, the new data and tracking tools that had been developed helped inform response efforts. In addition to creating significant humanitarian consequences, there was a risk that the displacement of significant numbers of people to limited high-ground areas could spark tensions and inter-communal conflict. The CPSA worked with other members of UNMISS to identify where the high-ground areas were likely to be. Members of UNMISS then supported local authorities in conducting outreach to the communities likely to be affected, to prepare for the likely displacement and crowding, and attempt to manage tensions in advance.⁴³ The response to the flooding has also been integrated into the mission's tracking as it evolved, which may inform future management of flooding and displacement crises.

A new initiative in West Africa offers another example of regional monitoring and tracking, and the strong **potential to contribute to transborder early warning and preventive action**. The CPSAs for the LGA and UNOWAS have been collaborating together with colleagues in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and UNDP to help form a new regional forecasting and early warning entity for West Africa to be known as the 'AGRHYMET Centre Climatique Régional de l'Afrique de l'Ouest'.⁴⁸ All the countries in the designated area have agreed to share meteorological data, which will be compiled by the Center and used to forecast potential CPS ramifications, in terms of anticipating displacement or migratory flows, pressures on resources, or other potential conflict hotspots.

In 2020, the CSM began providing support for the development and use of a geospatial mapping tool known as Geoguard to support a dashboard for climate, peace and security monitoring and assessment for missions.⁴⁹ Several CPSAs observed it was already being relied upon in their contexts. In Central Africa, UNOCA has relied on this Geoguard tool to more systematically track climate-driven vulnerabilities, including floods, droughts, desertification, displacement, and conflict hotspots. It has been viewed as a way to identify and quantify CPS threats, thereby strengthening early warning systems and enabling more informed and effective CPS responses. The spatial analysis capacity of Geoguard has also provided the foundation for more detailed analysis to meet specific needs in other contexts. In Iraq, for example, climate change has intensified flooding events that regularly displace unexploded landmines, causing a serious hazard. Geospatial analysis has helped to identify where intense flooding events are likely to happen so that these areas can be targeted for de-mining.



Overall, these different monitoring, tracking and reporting tools for different audiences have contributed to CPS action in a number of ways. They have helped to inculcate regular awareness of CPS issues within mission responses and the UN system, which has the long-term ability to contribute to more coherent and systematic responses to these risks. As with the example of the STRATA data in Somalia and also the use of regular mission tracking in Iraq, these data collection and assessment tools have helped inform and lead to the development of response measures. In the countries in Central America, where CPS discussions are still nascent, the CPS Barometer was used as a tool to improve awareness of potential risks and lay the seeds for stronger collective management and early action.⁵⁰ Many of those interviewed also suggested that these regular monitoring and data collection tools could over time contribute to greater long-term trend analysis, and learning in terms of CSM practice globally, and that this was something a mechanism like the CSM could facilitate.

While such regular monitoring and tracking could in theory be developed by UN staff even without a CPSA or other CSM intervention, these proved to be substantial undertakings in terms of staff time and attention, and on a specialized subject matter that then would have to be tailored to the particular contexts. In many contexts, the UN mission or UNCT personnel do not have the staff time or capacity to support the development of such monitoring systems, much less to support analysis of a consistent flow of data. As one CPSA in a mission context commented, “A lot of the country teams don’t necessarily have this analytical capacity, or if they do they don’t have the reach of [a mission] to systematically evaluate these risks in all areas.”⁵¹ In regional contexts, capacity and mandate issues may make it difficult to develop monitoring or tracking tools across multiple countries, and in some cases the much needed support is not to develop a new data tool but to build in the CPS considerations to the existing data platforms of the Member States and regions. Overall, this stream of work thus represents a significant added value of CPSAs and CSM initiatives, and one with strong potential to lead to other responsive or preventive action.

Contribution of regular reporting, monitoring, and analysis tools to CPS action:

- Institutionalizing CPS perspectives and monitoring in regular UN processes
- Collection of more nuanced, evolving data streams that may be more likely to generate policy uptake and action
- Enabling tailored responses also investing in local efforts, and also early warning and preventive action
- Contributing to learning over time and more coherent system-wide responses

C. CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING

A complementary step to the CPS assessments in many contexts has been to then provide training or capacity-building on CPS issues and possible avenues for response. CPSAs working in their national contexts have facilitated learning workshops both among the UN staff members (with mission or UNCT staff) as well as with policymakers at a national and subnational level, and other civil society or interested stakeholders. The CSM has also supported a range of training and capacity-building initiatives at global or regional policy levels as well as in country contexts where a CPSA is not present, often in collaboration with other UN bodies and outside research organizations (for example, the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), and adelphi).⁵² A strong example of this is the Climate, Peace, and Security Experts Academy, supported by UNDP and the CSM. It was launched at COP27 in response to requests from CPSAs and others for direct support to affected countries, where no advisory capacity was deployed and on topics where little dedicated training is provided. The Academy has so far provided training to over 250 policymakers and representatives from national government representatives and regional entities through seven workshops, covering topics including from access to climate finance in contexts affected by fragility, conflict and violence, mainstreaming of climate-related security risks into policies and strategies on climate and peacebuilding, and cross-cutting themes like the role of women and youth.⁵³

Additionally, these workshops proved to be a space for the different policy and programming stakeholders to come together, in ways that could lead to coordinated action.

These training initiatives and workshops have proven a key tool for improving awareness about CPS and beginning to generate applied knowledge on CPS risks for different national and regional contexts, as well as for anchoring CPS within the mission or within key policy spaces, and for forging connections that could support programmatic or other Government responses. Trainings or workshops on CPS have tended to be one of the first engagement steps that CPSAs have undertaken in their mission or country contexts as a way to **start conversations about CPS and its possible application across different areas of work**. For example, in Somalia, a variety of trainings, workshops and other learning exercises were an early part of socializing climate security ideas among the mission, the UNCT, and national stakeholders. Among these training activities, the CPSA organized trainings for UNSOM personnel and police to broaden their awareness of climate-conflict dynamics; “learning workshops” for different parts of the UNCT and also for donors about some of the climate security pathways identified in risk assessments (and their relevance to particular areas of the country); and a range of workshops and learning sessions with local and national authorities. These various training and learning initiatives had multiple effects. For example, the “learning workshops” proved to be a space for helping various stakeholders think about how CPS affected humanitarian objectives and spaces, and also intersected with stabilization objectives and risks in particular communities. Additionally, these workshops proved to be **a space for the different policy and programming stakeholders to come together**, in ways that could lead to coordinated action. For example, within some of those learning workshops, the CPSA to UNSOM introduced some of the issues identified in the Shabelle River Basin related to water strains and local conflict, which piqued the interest of one potential donor (the United Kingdom) as well as implementing partners who were well positioned to respond to the issues. This resulted in a joint project by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the UNEP-DHI Partnership — Centre on Water and Environment in 2022 that sought to develop nature-based solutions for water management, combined with supporting local government efforts to strengthen local resilience.⁵⁴

The training with UNSOM staff also illustrates the dual role of these training initiatives, going beyond simple awareness of CPS issues. First, it played a role in improving police and personnel’s ability to anticipate and respond to certain security dynamics and risks connected to climate and environmental issues. Additionally, an activity highlighting the relevance of climate awareness to security personnel helped make the link between CPS issues and the security and stabilization mandate of the mission.

Local workshops and capacity-building in the mission have also been an important part of **integrating CPS considerations within the operating functions and responses of UN missions**, which over time can lead their integration in the UN system more broadly. One training in South Sudan helps illustrate these multiple effects. In February 2023 (shortly after the CPSA was deployed in August 2022) CSM members (DPPA, DPO) together with SIPRI and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) organized a training for UNMISS and UNCT personnel in South Sudan. The training helped anchor CPS within the UN mission and UNCT by identifying key CPS issues and their relevance to different parts of the mission or UNCT, while also creating a space to develop greater mission-interoperability and response on these issues. For example, in addition to raising information about CPS issues and connections, it kick-started greater data and information sharing between those participating, both among humanitarian, development and peace and security actors within the UN system, as well as their coordination with local actors such as the Rift Valley Institute. This contributed to some of the regular mission tracking and integration processes noted in section III.B. as well as strong programming and response coordination. The training also contributed to the revitalization of the Climate Change Working Group co-chaired by UNMISS and the UNCT,⁵⁵ a further example of institutionalization and one that would lay the groundwork for further cooperation and engagement on CPS action. Finally, the South Sudan training was used as a pilot to develop a training module for UN peace missions that DPPA and DPO could subsequently adapt to deliver in other contexts.

The success of this training also paved the way for a follow-on training with national stakeholders, which took place in April 2024 (supported by UNMISS, DPO, the CSM, and UNSSC). Since that time, the CPSA has received multiple requests for workshops at different levels of governance (for example, both at national level and by governors or other sub-national actors) as well as by field offices, suggesting that local stakeholders view them as a highly valuable contribution of the UN.

A final important example of how training and capacity-building can catalyze innovation and action comes from Iraq. One of the first initiatives of the CPSA in UNAMI was to organize a series of CPS trainings for national UN staff members from across the country.⁵⁶ In Iraq, water scarcity and disputes over usage, as well as local management of water resources, has been a recurrent flashpoint, creating sources of local conflict as well as other negative human security effects. Although the national staff members had all observed the impact within their communities, they had not generally been analyzing these issues as a climate security issue, and also lacked a framework for reporting them up to the mission as such.



The CPS trainings enabled a sudden flow of reporting on this issue from across the country, **allowing for more granular analysis of recurrent or emerging hotspots**. This in turn facilitated at least two immediate action pathways. First, it fed into the creation of new programming. After developing this analysis of key existing and potential flashpoints over water, the CPSA engaged with members of the UNCT involved in related work. The more nuanced, locality-specific UNAMI reporting made it possible to develop new programming that would better target areas where water issues were likely to prove a significant flashpoint (see further discussion in section III.G).⁵⁷

Second, this additional evidentiary base **gave momentum to a new Government initiative and response**. The data and analysis suggested that while some of the tensions were due to localized environmental pressures and the way they interacted with local tribal or community conflicts, some of the issues were also generated by local governance issues, and grievances related to local water management. The Ministry of Water had long committed to do popular consultations on water management, but had for many years not taken these forward. With this more detailed information on the issue, and its link in many places with local water governance, the ministry renewed its commitment to take these popular consultations forward, as well as a larger stakeholder mapping.⁵⁸ At the time of research, preparatory meetings for these consultations were under way.

Beyond the national context, the CSM and CPSAs, in particular at a regional level, have also used workshops and capacity-building sessions to improve connectivity of regional and subregional actors on CPS, which has both created a space for developing cross-border responses and also in some cases contributed to elaboration of regional policies and positions. Examples of this include:

- In the Sahel, the CPSA in the LCBC organized a CPS-focused regional workshop in La Somone, Senegal, in March 2024 that brought together technical experts from various institutions—including the LCBC, UNDP, and the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region—who engaged in cross-sector discussions to explore how CPS approaches could enhance stability. Held alongside a UNDP Regional Stabilization Team workshop, this workshop could be seen as helping to align regional dialogues about climate and its effects, and also identifying their nexus with stabilization efforts.
- While not a full training, in May 2024, the CSM contributed some insights and learning to an African Union (AU) interdepartmental retreat on the CPS nexus, which was designed to facilitate understanding of CPS issues across Africa and thereby contribute toward the emerging Common African Position on CPS.⁵⁹
- In the Horn of Africa, the new UN Climate, Peace and Security Hub partnered with IGAD and the Clingendael Institute to provide training to the IGAD Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism focal points from ministries of environment, foreign affairs, defence and interior of IGAD Member States on conflict resolution in the context of CPS in 2024. Although only a recent intervention, the workshop was seen as a way to create follow-on action and steps for the Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism through both national and regional elaboration of policies. The creation of this hub and this regional mechanism are discussed further in section III.D.
- In October 2024, UNOCA, UNSSC, DPPA and DPO convened a workshop in Gabon to strategize on CPS approaches across UN entities working in Central Africa, civil society organizations and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The workshop convened 35 participants from various UN entities. By the end, the participants had formed a regional Community of Practice to ensure sustained collaboration and identified key next steps and recommendations, including greater regional and national policy integration, recommendations for the ECCAS to develop a comprehensive regional climate strategy, and for UN entities to strengthen support for local and regional CPS initiatives.⁶⁰

In addition to facilitating regional conversations and potential programming avenues, some of these regional workshops have also **fed into higher level policy discussions**. For example, following the regional experts' workshop on CPS in the Sahel noted above (the one held in Senegal in March 2024), conclusions and findings were shared in a subsequent High-Level Partnerships Forum in New York in April, which helped encourage awareness among high-level Permanent Mission representatives and policymakers around CPS issues and potential partnership strategies.⁶¹

One PDA in Central America (where there is not a CPSA, but other CSM outreach, collaboration and trainings have occurred) observed that there is still a de facto “siloeing of peace and security work from climate adaption and mitigation work,” and few mechanisms and processes in the UN that bring them together in a way that would generate cross-sectoral or collective responses in practice. “We need to have those sort of multi-disciplinary conversations more frequently, and mechanisms set up to enable that,” they observed, because otherwise UN staff tend to be very busy and absorbed in their own work and the sort of “cross-fertilisation” that is necessary will not happen on its own.

Finally, as already illustrated in some of the examples above, these training workshops and capacity-building initiatives have also **contributed to programming by identifying actionable entry points for projects** that address both climate risks and security concerns, and/or by creating a space for collaboration between different UN entities or actors whose collective efforts might be necessary to realize programming initiatives. Some interlocutors observed that one of the real strengths of these trainings is that they tend to draw participants coming from a range of backgrounds (i.e. from a mix of mission and UNCT positions, or integrating them with civil society or government stakeholders). The trainings can then become a forum for cross-collaboration and discussion that might not otherwise exist. One PDA in Central America (where there is not a CPSA, but other CSM outreach, collaboration and trainings have occurred) observed that there is still a de facto “siloeing of peace and security work from climate adaption and mitigation work,” and few mechanisms and processes in the UN that bring them together in a way that would generate cross-sectoral or collective responses in practice. “We need to have those sort of multi-disciplinary conversations more frequently, and mechanisms set up to enable that,” they observed, because otherwise UN staff tend to be very busy and absorbed in their own work and the sort of “cross-fertilisation” that is necessary will not happen on its own.⁶² Some of the examples of how training initiatives have contributed to follow-on programming are discussed further in section III.F.

Contribution of capacity-building and training initiatives to CPS action:

- Awareness-raising and socializing CPS issues among key stakeholders
- Anchoring CPS with UN missions and UNCT protocols and activities
- Supporting regional cooperation and mechanisms
- Creating spaces for cross-fertilization and collaboration on CPS responses

D. LIAISING WITH NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS TO FACILITATE POLICY DIALOGUE AND ELABORATION

The efforts to support CPS risk assessments and analysis have frequently been taken in parallel with and in support of broader engagement with policymakers in the countries or regions in question. Beyond simply awareness-raising, such liaising has helped ground CPS within national, regional and even international policy discussions; enabled concrete policy steps, such as national CPS strategies or action plans, to be taken forward; and provided local, national and regional actors with the information and space to develop corresponding action in their spheres of work. In some situations, this outreach has also contributed to further anchoring CPS within the UN mission contexts and work, by identifying it as a key issue within the national or regional policy context.

Outreach and relationship-development on CPS issues has helped facilitate corresponding policy action in many of the national and regional contexts where CPSAs have been deployed. Several examples were provided:

- The CPSA in Somalia has engaged with a wide range of Somali policymakers across federal ministries and in Somali states to raise awareness about the intersection of climate and other key security and governance issues and to create a foundation for further cooperation and action. At a federal level, this has contributed to a National Development Plan with stronger language on climate, as well as proposals to have a climate security advisor within the National Security Council, and other nationally led initiatives (for example, Government organized conferences) leading on the issue of climate security.⁶³ In addition, UNDP staff in Somalia, as part of a CSM-supported field initiative, have informed national policies and strategies, particularly the national and state adaptation plans and the revision of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for Somalia.
- In Central Africa, the CPSA embedded in UNOCA has worked with individual Member States to identify ways that CPS might be relevant to national frameworks and policies — from its centrality within Disaster, Relief and Recovery frameworks in Rwanda, to dialogue with authorities in Gabon on policies and preparedness for responding to violence generated by climate-induced changes in wildlife migratory routes.⁶⁴

- CPSAs embedded in the LGA and UNOWAS have been engaged in a wide range of outreach and engagement with both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders at local and national levels on ways to take CPS issues forward into national policies and actions plans. These have taken place in the context of (and helped promote) broader consultative processes (led by LGA's CPSA and the respective national governments) elaborating National Strategic and Action Plans on CPS in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.⁶⁵
- Although it did not result in a formal policy statement or position, the CPSA for UNAMI observed that some of the greatest impact seen has been through engagement with local Iraqi officials about potential opportunities for addressing CPS issues in their communities. "Their proximity to the actual problems," meant that they were highly receptive to discussions about CPS and also in many cases in a position to bring about local governance changes or other interventions that could tangibly resolve them.⁶⁶

Facilitating or informing policy responses is not limited to settings in which a CPSA is active. For example, the UNDP Philippines, with the support of the CSM, extended technical and operational assistance for the updating of the Bangsamoro Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2023-2028. One of the key emerging issues identified during the consultations on the action plan highlighted experiences of women in the Bangsamoro region relative to climate, peace and security. Thus, key inputs on CPS and peacebuilding in relation to the WPS agenda have been integrated into the action plan.

One of the most interesting arenas for this policy engagement has been at the regional level. A prominent challenge within the CPS field is that the risks are almost inherently transnational or cross-border in nature, but most response capacities — whether of the UN or of Government or non-governmental stakeholders — are organized at a country level. By seconding experts into regional bodies, and leveraging the mandates of UN regional offices, the CSM has supported various entry points for policy action in a number of regional contexts. CSM-supported experts contributed to cross-border or transnational assessment and analysis, and have facilitated regional or cross-border linkages, common policies, and collaboration. Two of the strongest examples of the impact of such work have been in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel, where CPSAs and other CSM efforts have contributed to the development of an IGAD Regional Climate Adaptation Strategy and Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, as well as a common position on CPS (the "Bamako Declaration") among Member States of the Sahel. To further support the IGAD Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, a UN CPS Hub for the Horn of Africa (led by the CPSA in the region) has recently been created, the first of its kind to exist. Box C provides further background on these landmark CPS policies and the role that CPSAs and other CSM efforts had in supporting them. However, broadly, those involved observed that while there was already substantial interest in these issues across the various Member States and regional organizations, there was often not sufficient technical expertise, or the level of time and bandwidth needed to bring about the necessary policy steps across so many countries. This was where the CPSAs and other CSM-supported initiatives had the potential to add value, and through these coordinating efforts, to contribute toward collective responses.


The process of elaborating a common position, and the events and inter-governmental collaboration tied to this also had secondary effects for broader African positioning and engagement on CPS. Those interviewed argued that it helped build momentum for an AU common position on CPS, consultations for which were announced in September 2024. Those involved also saw ways that the Horn of Africa regional process, as well as the inter-ministerial side meetings organized at COP27 and COP28, contributed to the idea of organizing an African Climate Summit (a regional summit mirroring the COP platforms), which was held in Kenya in September 2023.⁶⁷



Photo UNDP Somalia

■ Horn of Africa: a Common IGAD position and mechanism on CPS

An initial CPS risk assessment and consultation period over the course of 2022 helped in formulating a better shared understanding of climate-related peace and security risks facing the Horn of Africa among the eight Member States of IGAD in Eastern Africa, as well as in the UN offices and entities working in them (see section III.A). These consultations contributed to an IGAD endorsement of a common regional position on CPS.⁶⁸ Further discussion on this common position in the lead up to and at a high-level inter-ministerial event at COP27 helped to build momentum and identify the contours of this common position among IGAD member states.⁶⁹ This led to the adoption of the IGAD Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023-2030) at COP28,⁷⁰ wherein IGAD member states recognized regional climate adaptation as a key component of peacebuilding efforts in the region.⁷¹ This was then followed by the creation of the IGAD “Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism” in June 2023⁷², the first regional CPS mechanism to exist.⁷² While still new, its focus will be on evaluating climate-related risks to peace and security, coordinating strategies to address them, and channeling funding to the region’s most fragile and climate-vulnerable areas.⁷³



The CPSA within the HoA Special Envoy’s office played a critical role in supporting these steps, up to the creation of the Climate Security Coordination Mechanism. Among these eight member states there was already a high level of recognition of the impact of climate change for their region and individual territories, and a sense that regional organizations like IGAD might have to take the lead on pushing for more proactive and coordinated CPS action.⁷⁴ Each of the steps noted above created a process that could build momentum and buy-in toward a common position and also create discussion spaces for hashing out differences between them. The OSE HoA (notably the CPSA within it) was critical in keeping this momentum going — from furnishing content at key moments (for example, in the CPS assessment process), to helping organize the inter-ministerial event, to identifying roadblocks and issues among Member States in between these key events. While there was overall consensus on the importance of this issue, it is still a region with significant political sensitivities and differences, and the bureaucratic structure of IGAD does not necessarily lend toward formulating assertive policy positions. As a result, the Special Envoy (supported by the CPSA) played a key role in enabling these successive policy processes. In recognition of this, IGAD Member States created a built-in role for the OSE HoA within IGAD’s Climate Security Coordination Mechanism.⁷⁵ To further facilitate this, the OSE HoA has set up a UN CPS Hub for the Horn of Africa — the first hub of its kind in a UN regional context.⁷⁶

■ Sahel Ministerial Bamako Declaration and West Africa and the Sahel’s Dakar Call to Action on CPS

In November 2023, at a Ministerial Sahel CPS Forum in Bamako, Mali, seven Member States from the Sahel region of West Africa together with the Prime Minister of Mali adopted a declaration of a common position on climate, peace and security, the Bamako Declaration.⁷⁷ The Declaration not only recognized the unique and significant CPS implications in the Sahel but also committed to develop national and regional strategies to strengthen climate resilience, peace and security, and to advocate for greater financing and interventions related to CPS.⁷⁸ It was notable both for the strength of the commitments and also that such a strong collective statement emerged at a time of substantial political sensitivity and divisions within West Africa.⁷⁹ The CPSAs in the LCBC and the LGA, in partnership with the African Union Commission (AUC), Climate Commission for the Sahel Region, Member States and partners such as UNOWAS and UNOCA contributed to the Bamako Declaration, and will also be critical in supporting follow-on action steps to it.

BOX C Two case studies of CSM contributions to regional policies and mechanisms

These advisors also helped support a series of regional workshops and conferences in 2022 and 2023, which led inter alia to the Dakar Call to Action addressed to the Governments in West Africa and the Sahel, preliminary commitments by some of those involved, and overall greater momentum toward a collective policy.⁸⁰ Simultaneously, the CPSAs (alongside other UN staff members and entities) were also working with individual Governments in the region on their national policies related to CPS and also their engagement vis-à-vis this collective position. A series of risk assessments, consultative workshops, and other awareness-raising activities in individual Member States during this period of time continued to give prominence to the issue and to channel bottom-up support for this regional initiative.⁸¹ Side events and inter-governmental discussions in the context of COP27 and COP28, supported by these regional organizations and the CPSAs, provided further forums for advancing this collective policy formulation and action steps.⁸²

While the IGAD Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism and the Bamako Declaration offer the strongest example of regional policy development, they are not unique examples. There was evidence of CSM initiatives supporting regional cooperation and advocacy on a range of climate-related risks across the areas examined.

- The “White Paper on the Regional Initiative on Climate Security in the Arab Region” (2022) was one example; although not yet publicly available, its launch at COP27 was intended to facilitate a common regional agenda on climate security and climate finance for peace within the Member States of the Arab League.
- In Central Africa, on the margins of the One Forest Summit in March 2023,⁸³ the UNOCA CPSA (together with other UN partners and ECCAS) helped support a working session to discuss establishing a common regional consortium that would foster collaboration in the region on issues including “climate change and biodiversity, peace and security, transhumance, climate finance and sustainable development in Central Africa.”⁸⁴ The session was successful in garnering initial commitments toward establishing this Consortium, and the Partnership Agreement that would activate it is currently under consideration in ECCAS’ internal procedures.⁸⁵

A final interesting example of how stakeholder engagement — equally UN, international, and domestic stakeholders — could contribute to policy momentum and identification of CPS as an international issue emerged from Afghanistan. While Afghanistan has long been identified as one of the most climate-vulnerable countries, climate issues have not been a prominent issue in the Afghanistan policy space for the last two decades of UN engagement there (or before). As noted in section III.A, the first CPS assessment study for the country helped put the issue on the map in terms of the Afghanistan policy space, in part by generating a conversation within and outside the country about how climate was intersecting with key issues in Afghanistan. This involved not only engagement on the substantive issues, but also gaining a sense of the parameters of the policy space following the August 2021 Taliban takeover — what the receptivity would be among national and international stakeholders, among UN entities as well as by the DFA and international civil society to different types of work on CPS in a highly constrained political and operational environment.

This outreach and these stakeholder consultations not only helped garner greater attention toward CPS as an important policy issue within Afghanistan, but also positioned CPS as a potential space for common ground for international dialogue and engagement vis-a-vis Afghanistan — a much larger international and regional policy dilemma since the Taliban’s assumption of control in August 2021. The Security Council-mandated independent assessment of Afghanistan, which was released in November 2023 and subsequently endorsed by the Security Council, identified cooperation and engagement on climate adaptation and transboundary natural resource management as a “priority area”, and an area for which international engagement and support should not be withheld subject to progress on other political issues.⁸⁶ Some international trust funds and donor instruments have also identified climate adaptation and response as priority areas, notwithstanding other freezes on international assistance.⁸⁷ Climate change-related issues were considered as one of the possible areas for technical dialogue between the DFA and the international community within the evolving Secretary-General-convened meetings of Special Envoys on Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar. While ultimately this was not

the focus chosen for the third Doha dialogue in July 2023, because inroads had been made, and many international Member States support engagement on climate-related issues in Afghanistan, Norway, supported by UNAMA staff including the CPSA, facilitated technical discussions between the DFA and international stakeholders on climate change in July 2023.⁸⁸

Contribution of stakeholder outreach to CPS action:

- Awareness-raising and socializing CPS issues among key stakeholders
- Contributing to national, local and regional action plans and policy elaboration
- Facilitating emergence of regional cooperation, positions, and mechanisms
- Issue identification and elevation to national and international platforms

E. ENGAGEMENT WITHIN AND ACROSS THE UN SYSTEM

Another important impact of both CPSA positions and other CSM activities has been to increase awareness and space for CPS activity within the UN system. A near universal description of the early phase of CPSA work in each of the contexts examined was simply trying to increase awareness of CPS among UN entities, and demonstrate its relevance and connection with the mandates and work of the UN mission or entities involved. As the CPSA in Somalia offered (reflecting the experience of many CPSAs), “early on my role was to figure out what climate, peace and security actually is,” for the mission context in question. “The Resident Coordinator didn’t have anyone working on climate at all,” so there was a lot of awareness-raising and dialogue that had to happen even within the mission itself.⁸⁹

The CPSA in South Sudan offered a similar perspective, noting that, “no one at UNMISS was dealing with climate before I got here,” and that there was not even a prominent level of discussion about climate issues.⁹⁰ This was not because CPS considerations were un-important in the context of South Sudan — clear manifestations of climate security implications in South Sudan well before the CPSA advisor arrived in late 2022 were one of the reasons that UNMISS became the first UN peacekeeping mission to have specific reporting requirements on climate, peace, and security (as of March 2023).⁹¹ There was also long-standing work on transhumance and intercommunal violence.



Photo Reha/Afghanistan

However, prior to this, it had not been considered a core part of the mandate; lacking the perceived mandate and in-house expertise, it was also not woven into the operations, reporting, and political considerations of the mission.

Some of this awareness raising came about through engaging other UN mission and UNCT staff in risk assessments or through the capacity-building and training initiatives discussed above. In addition, CPSAs frequently described other individual outreach and collaboration with members of the mission and UNCT, which helped to **identify ways that CPS might be relevant for different UN portfolios**. Following the Taliban takeover and, separately, the UNEP country office closure in Afghanistan (both in 2021), climate dimensions were not a particular focus of the UNCT despite Afghanistan's vulnerability.⁹² Although environmental stressors frequently affect the operational work of humanitarian and development entities, attention to climate and environmental issues within the CT in Afghanistan was often fragmented due to differing UN entities' mandates, and also hamstrung by political constraints on certain types of engagement. Any of this work by the CT also remained distinct from the larger political mission of UNAMA. To address this, the CPSA reached out not only to humanitarian and development actors within the CT, but also the political and security parts of the mission to consider how CPS related to their portfolios and parts of the mandate, for example, how it might affect regional relations, engagement with the DFA, and even security monitoring.⁹³



Photo UNAMI/Iraq

In Afghanistan and in other contexts, CPSAs' engagement with different parts of the mission or UNCT helped to **bring CPS considerations into key UN workstreams and issue areas**. For example, the CPSA in Somalia observed that it proved important to raise CPS issues as part of the context surrounding the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus and also surrounding stabilization objectives. Others noted a need to bring climate effects and dynamics into discussions with UN staff working on political dialogue, good offices and mediation, in security sector monitoring and interventions, and in human rights and protection spheres. A common reflection was that de facto siloing and specialization can mean that climate dimensions or climate-related areas of work are often not raised across the full span of issues covered by UN CTs and entities, which can lead to missing natural synergies with CPS issues. For example, one UN staff member specializing in human rights noted that they were rarely given the opportunity to feed into programming related to climate or environmental issues, despite clear implications for socio-economic rights.⁹⁴ Past studies have, in some cases, also linked climate change and environmental issues to decisions to join or cease engagement with armed groups; yet CPS considerations do not tend to automatically come into most disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration discussions.⁹⁵ In at least three of the mission contexts, the process of engaging with different parts of the mission identified a climate-related mine action risk. More severe flooding associated with changing weather patterns in many countries had created a risk of shifting the location of mines and unexploded ordnance, undercutting containment and safety demarcation strategies. In at least one case, the CPSA was able to work with UNMAS to identify the areas most at risk for this flooding-induced mine displacement risk, to take preventive action.⁹⁶

Reporting to the UN Security Council

Many of the countries or regions in which the Security Council mandates UN missions are among the most climate exposed areas of the world. Yet the effects of this, and their implications for peace and security are often not mandated in the reporting to the Security Council. UNMISS has the most explicit requirement to report on the impacts of climate change on peace and security to the UN Security Council.⁹⁷ However, in other country and regional settings, CPS dynamics may be highly relevant to other mandated components or tasks, depending on the local context.

Notwithstanding the clear relevance of CPS to many UN missions, these linkages are often not fully documented and incorporated in mission reporting. This is where CPSA deployments (and other CSM initiatives) have proven useful. Many of the monitoring and reporting tools, assessments, and other efforts described above have contributed to the availability of greater CPS-related data, which has enhanced Security Council reporting. This includes, for example, integration of CPS indicators into mission tracking in South Sudan, as well as more regular reporting on CPS issues and responses (the result of dedicated internal training efforts) within UNAMI. Such improvements in data collection and availability, combined with having a designated staff member(s) like a CPSA with both the expertise and time to draw together such data into analytic inputs has contributed to more nuanced, timely and mission-relevant reporting on CPS issues.

To assess this, the UNU-CPR research team analyzed Security Council reporting across 8 missions, 6 of which hosted a CPSA and two others where there had been some significant CSM engagement.⁹⁸ Increasing use of CPS language was observable in nearly all the Security Council reporting where a CPSA was stationed. The reporting on UNAMA offers perhaps the most dramatic example. While there was no climate-related reporting preceding the CPSA, from 2023 (S/2023/151) the Secretary-General reports have repeatedly identified Afghanistan's high climate-vulnerability, and how this intersects with the humanitarian and economic crises, food insecurity and population vulnerability, as well as with regional and global security and stability concerns, such as counter-narcotics and migration.⁹⁹ The nature of the Security Council reporting for UNMISS and UNOCA also illustrates the impact of a CPSA deployment: while in both missions there were some references to climate in prior Secretary-General reports, the reporting after each CPSA was put in place is far more detailed, nuanced and concrete, marking a significant change in terms of elaborating the CPS impacts in each country.

In addition to this Security Council reporting, CPSAs provided other examples of how their work was garnering increased attention in UN forums and policy spaces. For example, with mention of climate-related risks increasingly appearing in briefings to the Security Council, to the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on climate, peace and security, to the 70+ group of Member States that have joined the Group of Friends on Climate and Security,¹⁰⁰ in Arria Formula meetings, or before other relevant UN regional bodies.¹⁰¹

Overall these findings suggest a positive trend of increasing awareness of CPS issues in high-level briefings to the Security Council or in other forums. However, a lag was still observable, with events on the ground running ahead of senior-level deliberations. This highlights the important added-value of CPSAs and other investments in CPS reporting, but perhaps also a need for even further investment in areas where the reporting and action gaps are greatest.

Contribution of UN engagement and elaboration to CPS action:

- Anchoring CPS within the UN system
- Identifying applicability of CPS for key UN workstreams and mandate areas
- Institutionalizing mechanisms (tracking and reporting, collaboration) that would enable integrated responses on CPS
- Mainstreaming discussion of CPS effects and consequences within international discussions
- Increasing and improving reporting to the UN Security Council and other high-level forums

F. OUTREACH AND NETWORK BUILDING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Running through each of the workstreams and tools identified above has been engagement with other non-governmental organizations, research institutions and civil society. Civil society organizations were viewed as important stakeholders in all settings, but in some situations **civil society actors were the indispensable partners and key leaders on climate-related work due to blockages at the governmental or inter-governmental level**, weak governance in climate-affected areas, or other political sensitivities.

Some of the most significant examples of CPS risk assessments or consultations that helped to coalesce support behind CPS action were undertaken in partnership with or led by civil society organizations. In Haiti, for example, the CPS assessment, which received notable recognition internationally and was positioned to set up a new national strategy in Haiti, came as the result of collaboration between UN entities, including CSM entities, and a range of civil society organizations.¹⁰² The research was led by the adelphi research group and the community of practice that emerged surrounding the study — the Haiti Climate Security Working Group — remains the most active group on CPS issues. By the end, the working group included 60 to 90 organizations, many of which contributed funds and supported the risk assessment. In many ways, the formation of this Working Group, bringing together an active constituency on CPS in Haiti, represents the most significant outcome of the assessment.

Some of the most significant examples of CPS risk assessments or consultations that helped to coalesce support behind CPS action were undertaken in partnership with or led by civil society organizations.

In Afghanistan, where engagement with the DFA is sensitive, Afghan civil society and research organizations proved to be important stakeholders. Their ability to act as a bridge, and engage with all sides, put them at the forefront of CPS action in Afghanistan. An Afghan non-governmental organization (with the support of the CPSA) led a series of seven multistakeholder dialogues on climate change at a subnational and national level. These consultations created a conduit for inclusive engagement on CPS issues in Afghanistan, with both the DFA and a diverse range of civil society participating.¹⁰³ The fact that these consultations could go forward across the country, and be held in such a participatory manner, is one of the reasons that climate-related issues have appeared to offer a safe space for greater engagement in Afghanistan.

In other contexts, because of limited government capacity or presence, civil society engagement has been crucial. In the volatile and remote Liptako Gourma subregion that spans Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, for example, government presence is limited and engagement by international actors (whether UN agencies or other international organizations) virtually nil. As a result, civil society stakeholders and other sources of community authority, from tribal and community leaders to youth networks, can be important in filling the governance gap and in taking forward CPS-related responses. In the border regions of all three countries the CPSA to the LGA has engaged in a range of outreach and public consultations, including participatory workshops related to the validation of the proposed national CPS strategies, as well as workshops focused on supporting the CPS engagement of particular groups (for example, youth networks).¹⁰⁴

Public participation and civil society engagement can be particularly crucial for certain areas of CPS work. For example, a major CPS issue across West and Central Africa has been the way that changing weather patterns and climatic change has affected traditional transhumance migratory routes, bringing herders into conflict with farmers and sedentary populations more frequently. Several CPSAs gave examples of ways that they have tried to involve those directly affected by and engaged in this transhumance issue in CPS work:

- The CPSA in the LGA worked to engage those involved with transhumance in local dialogues, including in the national consultations for CPS Strategic and Actions Plans for the three countries concerned.¹⁰⁵ Those involved with transhumance issues have also taken part in regional and national dialogues and workshops facilitated by the CPSA in UNOWAS.¹⁰⁶
- The CPSA in UNOCA worked with civil society networks engaged on pastoralism, land rights and transhumance issues to raise awareness on linkages between environmental factors and peacebuilding and to engage local communities in Chad and Cameroon.¹⁰⁷ Part of this has been to establish a Community of Practice on Farmer-Herder Dynamics in Central and West Africa, which is open to all technical and financial partners, including UN entities and civil society organizations in the region.¹⁰⁸

Several of the CPSAs and CSM representatives also noted continuing emphasis on including women and youth, both in programming and in other engagement. Of particular note in several of the contexts was the importance of engaging and including youth in any initiative, because of the large youth population in many of these countries, their vulnerability to the effects of climate change (and other related security dynamics), as well as their potential to contribute to some of the positive peacebuilding aspects of CPS work. The CPSA for the LGA observed that in the LGA, youth are considered to constitute 70 percent of the population and so they have the potential to be a strong “catalyzer” of action: “there is no activity, no strategy developed in this region without youth in it,” he observed.¹⁰⁹ There were multiple examples of outreach and engagement happening with youth — in dialogue and training initiatives led by the UNOWAS and LGA CPSAs in West Africa; of youth-centered CPS programming in Somalia, the Philippines, and South Sudan; and of engagement with youth networks in Central Africa, via the UNOCA CPSA.¹¹⁰ For example, in Somalia, workshops promoting collaboration and knowledge exchange among young people brought together over 200 participants, including 150 Climate Youth Champions and 70 representatives from 25 youth organizations. The spread and increasing amount of youth engagement surfacing at a local and regional level is notable given that other research has pointed a lag in work at the intersection of the Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) and CPS agendas.¹¹¹ The UNDP-led Climate, Peace, and Security Experts Academy (see section III.C.) also organized a dedicated youth iteration of its workshop in October 2024, bringing together young leaders from the Sahel, who have since together founded the Coalition of African Organizations for Climate, Peace and Security.

Contribution of collaboration with civil society and other stakeholders to CPS action:

- Can help advance CPS risk assessments and issue mobilization
- May be more effective channels for CPS engagement in sensitive contexts or in areas where Government and UN presence is limited
- Essential in reaching critically affected populations, and developing appropriate solutions

G. INFORMING AND SHAPING RESPONSES

All of the above strategies can contribute to the development of programming, which as one CPSA framed it, could be seen as the necessary “boots on the ground” in facilitating CPS responses. “Programming is necessary to move to action,” he observed.¹¹² CPS risk assessments or trainings can help generate programming ideas, or bring together different UN agencies or actors to support multi-sectoral responses. CPS analysis and assessments can also result in more targeted or tailored programming, for example, steering proposed programming to the specific regions or localities that are facing the most critical combined climate, peace and security risks.¹¹³ In addition to this analytical and assessment support, CPSA and CSM activities that help advance national or regional policies and positions, or create more dedicated and integrated attention to these issues within the UN mission or UNCT, can create the sort of space necessary to support programming or other national and local responses.

An additional way that CPSAs or CSM initiatives can facilitate programming action is by **making the links between analysis, potential programming partners, and donors or funding sources**. As noted above, an early CPSA initiative was to support the reporting capacity of UNAMI local staff members on CPS (see section III.C). These trainings enabled a sudden flow of reporting on local tensions and conflict related to water scarcity and management, allowing for more granular analysis of recurrent or emerging hotspots. Following analysis of this data, the CPSA engaged with members of the UNCT involved in related programming. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) already had some programming in drought-affected areas, and through the CPSA's engagement with Iraqi ministries, they were able to identify a heretofore unused source of climate adaptation funding within the Ministry of Agriculture to realize a more tailored programming response in key hotspots.¹¹⁴ Another relevant example was in Somalia, where the CPSA's analysis of potential climate and migration hotspots through the STRATA tool (see section III.B above) captured the interest of staff working with one of the European Union funds. The CPSA was able to work together with UN agencies already engaged on related work (IOM and UNEP) to develop tailored programming (known as the Deegaan Bile Initiative) that would respond to some of the key hotspots identified in Galmadug and Hirshabelle states.¹¹⁵ Sometimes the connections go beyond in-country sources of funding, to include broader vertical climate funds. These are discussed further in section III.H.



Photo UNDP Philippines

Of particular note is the way that CPSAs and other CSM initiatives can **facilitate cross-border or regionally-linked programming initiatives or responses**. While most of the risks in the CPS field are transnational, available response mechanisms tend to be largely national or country-focused. Many sources of funding are earmarked or allocated on a country basis. Even where funding is available (for example, through the PBF, which prioritizes cross-border programming) UN agencies or other non-governmental implementing partners tend to cultivate expertise and be organized within UNCTs, limiting the conception and implementation possibilities for cross-border work.¹¹⁷ The very different contexts that may exist even in adjacent countries can lead to different approaches and “head-spaces” for the UNCTs involved.¹¹⁸ One interlocuter offered the example of Somalia and Kenya, which, though they share some common CPS risks and stressors, are at very different points in the peace, conflict, and development spectrum. As a result, the UN staff and implementing partners are “operating on completely different response plans,” they observed.¹¹⁹ The additional legwork in terms of outreach, project set-up, even simply internal coordination among implementing partners working in different country spaces, can make cross-border or regional projects significantly more time-intensive to implement. Among staff who may already feel overloaded with work, “this is asking them to do something that is more difficult than what they’re already doing. And it’s not something they feel they have time to worry about,” the same interlocuter observed.¹²⁰

All of these barriers have tended to limit the amount of cross-border or regional programming. Yet CPSAs, as well as other support by the CSM as a whole, have proved helpful in **providing the technical and analytical support and collaborative spaces** that contribute to programming that transcends these geographic divisions. Those working on CPS programming in regional contexts, such as the Liptako Gourma sub-region of the Sahel and in the Pacific island region noted the role of the CSM in informing the project design and development of several cross-border and regional projects supported by the PBF — including a PBF-supported project on climate security in the Pacific islands of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu that produced a climate security risk assessment for the region and may have helped lay the foundations for a CPSA to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS).¹²¹ In Northern Central America, a December 2020 dialogue session organized by the CSM (with adelphi and UNU-CPR) on integrated climate security approaches-proved generative in terms of conceptualizing regional programming.¹²² According to those who participated, this workshop, together with follow-on discussions also supported by the CSM helped to develop the concept for a new cross-border PBF project related to a national park that spans the tri-border region. Although still in the finalization stage, the project is designed as a CPS prevention project, getting ahead of anticipated tensions connected to deforestation, environmental damage and water scarcity in this area.¹²³

CPSAs, as well as other support by the CSM as a whole, have proved helpful in providing the technical and analytical support and collaborative spaces that contribute to programming that transcends these geographic divisions.

While there has been increasing attention to cross-border and regional programming, there are a number of outstanding challenges in carrying them out. An issue observed within past cross-border projects has been that in practice, the cross-border elements — for example, engagement or activities between governmental officials in the respective countries — are often confined to a small portion of the activities, and appeared to have a high rate of non-completion compared to more localized or purely in-country activities.¹²⁴ As a result, as one interviewee for this study observed, the cross-border programming can more often resemble implementing projects “side by side simultaneously” across borders rather than truly integrated, cross-border projects.¹²⁵

Interviews suggested that the tendency for these more political or inter-governmental exchange elements to drop out of cross-border programming may relate in part to the difference in who is designing these projects versus who tends to be implementing them. While CPSAs, members of the CSM entities, or PDAs may be formative in conceptualizing and designing these projects, they are often taken forward by operational agencies, who specialize in local peacebuilding and development rather than functions like facilitating inter-governmental cooperation and dialogue.¹²⁶ Yet for CPS cross-border or regional programming responses to work as proposed, the political engagement element may be necessary. To take one example, the countries within the Horn of Africa face water resource and management challenges that stem in part from shared water resources across the region. To address potential CPS risks in the Shabelle River Basin in Somalia might require not only localized activities in Somalia (some of which are being supported through ongoing programming) but also a degree of political mediation and cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia on water management in the Juba-Shabelle River Basin.¹²⁷ As one UN expert observed, there will need to be an element of ‘hydro-diplomacy’ to any sustainable solution for the region.¹²⁸ New initiatives like the CPS Hub for the Horn of Africa (see previous discussion in section III.D) may do better at bringing together the mediation and political engagement aspects of the UN system together with these more operational programming resources. However, to fully realize CPS action at a transnational or cross-border level will require thinking through some of these deeper operational challenges and disjunctures within the UN system.

Finally, although still limited due to limited CSM financial resources, the CSM has **directly funded pilot catalytic field initiatives** related to CPS. For example, in the Philippines, seed funding from CSM enabled UNDP to integrate climate and environmental considerations into the peace agreement and demonstrate a pilot intervention for women’s fishing cooperatives in communities vulnerable to climate security threats.¹²⁹ This was later expanded through other funding sources and initiatives to help bring in local peacebuilding into projects that respond to a wider range of livelihood vulnerabilities and climate adaptation in the affected communities, including programming on women and CPS

priorities. In Somalia, CSM tools, engagement and funding facilitated the launch of the “Somalia Climate Security Pilot Project” in 2022, led by the UNDP and Berghof Foundation. This pilot project supported community-based approaches to mitigate and manage climate-related risks, including institutional mapping, identifying climate-security hotspots, engaging stakeholders, and delivering climate security trainings and workshops for federal and state institutions as well as women’s and youth networks. It resulted in integrating climate security considerations into national policies and strategies, particularly in national and state adaptation plans and revision of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for Somalia. It also resulted in Climate Security Action Plans for communities in Beledweyne, Mogadishu and Puntland.¹³⁰

Contribution of CPSA and catalytic field initiatives with CSM support to CPS-related programming:


- Supporting more nuanced and operation-able CPS analysis
- Creating collaborative space to overcome geographic or sectoral silos, develop joint programming
- Facilitating key ingredients for project development– analysis and idea generation, to partnerships to funding
- Facilitating spaces for cross-border and regional approaches to be conceptualized
- Directly funding pilot initiatives

H. CREATING A BRIDGE TO CLIMATE VERTICAL FUNDS AND SCALABLE RESPONSES

A persistent barrier to encouraging more CPS action has been the gap in climate financing going toward fragile and conflict-affected areas. In 2021, the 10 most fragile states received only \$223 million in climate adaptation finance — less than 1% of global adaptation funding. A 2024 World Bank study identified that per capita adaptation funding for fragile and conflict-affected countries was less than two-thirds of that allocated to other low-income nations.¹³² In 2021, a UNDP/CSM study found that people in fragile states had received an average \$10.8 per capita of climate finance from vertical funds over the period 2014 to 2021 compared to \$161.7 per capita for non-fragile states (including the Small Island Developing States).¹³³ A significant gap persists in donor strategies and policies when it comes to connecting climate change with conflict and fragility.¹³⁴ Even where climate adaptation funding is provided, vertical climate funds and international financial institutions (IFIs) often lack policies or guidance to enable these to be provided in a conflict-sensitive way.¹³⁵

In addition to the gap in climate financing in fragile and conflict-affected settings overall, **CPS-related programming often lacks a ready pathway for being continued or scaled.** Climate-related peacebuilding or development projects may often be initially supported on a pilot basis, with the expectation that they could then — if successful — be scaled up by larger funds that support climate adaptation at a national or regional scale, such as through climate vertical funds or the larger international financing instruments. Yet those linkages are not automatic, and in practice have not been readily forthcoming. Climate-related vertical funds like the Global Environment Facility (GEF) or Green Climate Fund (GCF) or IFIs do not always share the timelines and procedures of their investments in line with existing UN or CSO programming efforts in a given country or region, and have difficulty considering ways to scale them. On the flip side, the UN entities or CSOs involved in implementing often lack the time or continuity to directly connect with these larger sources of funding, in order to make them aware of the programming and its potential for expansion.¹³⁶

Per Capita of Climate Finance from Vertical Funds (2014-2021)



CPSAs have acted as a go-between, engaging in outreach and forging the linkages with climate vertical funds or other financial sources that are necessary to catalyze greater investment. In Somalia, the CPSA has increasingly engaged with vertical climate funds and IFIs, such as the GCF, GEF, the World Bank, and African Development Bank, to identify promising CPS programming that could be expanded or extended. As an illustration of the effects of this ‘financing advocacy’, as it might be framed, the GCF conducted its first-ever visit to Somalia in March 2024. It subsequently committed to allocating USD 100 million for climate initiatives in the subsequent year (with a potential to continue this commitment in subsequent years).¹³⁷

This has also been an important part of the CPSA’s role in Afghanistan, in particular because of the sensitivities surrounding international assistance within Afghanistan since August 2021. After the Taliban took control of the Government, many existing development projects or commitments were cancelled or put on hold, including some climate- or environmentally related programming supported by the GEF, the Adaptation Fund, the GCF, IFIs and bilateral donors. To ascertain whether any of these might be reactivated to meet Afghan needs in the domain of CPS-related work, what was required first was a stock-taking of what projects existed, versus were suspended or put on hold, and then outreach to the specific funders in question about the rationale for suspension, prospects for re-engaging and under what conditions, as well as opportunities for future funding. For institutions like the GEF and GCF, exploring funding opportunities (whether new ones or restarting those on hold) can require many months (in one case, over a year) of back-and-forth through formal submission of letters and informal inquiries, as well as other outreach and engagement across multiple parts of these institutions.¹³⁸ While the funding environment in Afghanistan remains complex, such efforts have borne fruit in terms of the resumption of two projects under revised implementation modalities, new project development in the pipeline, and an increased openness of these vertical climate funds and IFIs towards discussions on whether certain activities related to climate adaptation or CPS could be supported.¹³⁹

These examples help illustrate important lessons about what might be required to see greater climate financing in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In both cases, what was required was persistent outreach, follow-up, and efforts to identify synergies between vertical climate funds and peacebuilding or development programming in country, continuing for an extended period of time.

These examples help illustrate important lessons about what might be required to see greater climate financing in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In both cases, what was required was **persistent outreach, follow-up, and efforts to identify synergies between vertical climate funds and peacebuilding** or development programming in country, continuing for an extended period of time (multiple years in the case of Somalia efforts). Without having someone dedicated to taking up this effort (like a CPSA) it would be difficult to imagine this level of engagement and results devolving naturally within the UN system.

In addition, these examples illustrate another way that UN programming or engagement can help fill the gap in terms of CPS financing. For large IFIs or vertical climate funds, part of the hesitation of investing in fragile or conflict-affected settings, or in the case of Afghanistan, in politically sensitive ones, is that these appear to be riskier investments compared to other environments. By offering proof of concept of programming that might work, demonstrating UN commitments to working in these environments, and (in the case of Afghanistan) helping to support the necessary political space for engagement, UN staff members could in effect **help de-risk these climate programming environments**, making them more feasible and attractive for external investment.¹⁴⁰ While the CPSAs cannot do this alone, they can significantly advance this de-risking function through enabling the conversation with the funds and IFIs, and outside investors in a more targeted way.

Another way by which CPSAs have contributed to entry points for climate financing is in engagement surrounding climate COPs. Climate financing for fragile and conflict-affected settings has garnered increasing attention in the last climate COPs through the Presidency initiatives, most prominently supported through the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace.¹⁴¹ CPSAs in the Horn of Africa, UNAMA, UNMISS, UNOCA, UNOWAS, and UNSOM mentioned engaging with national and regional counterparts in the lead-up to those COPs, for example, by supporting national counterparts to prepare for COP engagement or facilitating side discussions.¹⁴² Helping national counterparts coming from fragile or conflict-affected countries or regions to prepare interventions for COP could indirectly encourage greater climate financing by informing discussions about the need for greater investments in these areas, but also presenting the idea that solutions and large-scale climate adaptation responses are possible in these difficult contexts.

Contribution of UN engagement and elaboration to climate and CPS funding:

- Creating pathways for UN CPS programming to be scaled up via vertical climate funds or scalable responses of IFIs
- Helping to de-risk CPS programming in fragile, conflict-affected or politically sensitive contexts
- Supporting Member States and regional organizations to represent concerns about financing and climate adaptation support in global forums (climate COPs, etc.)



Photo UNDP Somalia

4

OVERALL EFFECTS OF CSM ACTION

4

OVERALL EFFECTS OF CSM ACTION

The research and interviews identified a number of entry points by which the CPSAs and other CSM-supported initiatives can galvanize new ways to approach climate-related peace and security concerns, as well as future action. There is no one singular entry point: the sequencing and way that the different tools identified above — from supporting CPS risk assessments, to outreach with Government officials, to engagement with civil society and vertical climate funds — differed across each context. The overall trajectory was of incremental advancement of an issue, building space for discussion and identifying potential allies and common bedfellows for taking forward initiatives, and then seizing moments for bringing them together as they arose. Collectively, the research pointed to at least five key effects of CPSA activity and other CSM interventions in the contexts examined:



Photo UNEP/Haiti

Making the connections between climate, peace and security: The tools identified above — including risk assessments, the more regular reporting and tracking, and training and capacity-building efforts — were used collectively to help increase awareness of CPS issues, and demonstrate their impact and relevance for the national, subnational or regional contexts in question. Encouraging a conversation about the interrelation between climate issues and other peace and security concerns, backed by evidence of the effects already manifesting, tended to invite a fresh conversation about these risks, which led to new policy, commitments and ideas for how to respond among Government partners as well as between Governments facing cross-border challenges. Within the UN system, opening a conversation about the interrelated nature of CPS and the impact of climate change for a range of UN priorities and workstreams (security dynamics, stabilization efforts, HDP nexus, humanitarian effects, peacebuilding efforts, humanitarian effects, conflict prevention, management and resolution, mediation, etc.) helped to break down silos, enabling cross-sectoral partnerships that could better respond to these interconnected CPS effects.

Anchoring CPS within UN national, regional and multilateral spaces: Integrated CPS responses require collaboration across different UN entities and workstreams, as well as with national and regional actors. Yet in part because of the newness of this area, in part because it spans multiple geographic and sectoral areas and portfolios of work (and thus is the dedicated responsibility of none), CPS responses risk being overlooked or not fully operationalized. Catalyzing more coherent UN responses thus requires greater awareness of how CPS interrelates with UN mission or country team priorities, and then embedding CPS within a range of UN mandates, mechanisms and processes.

This anchoring of CPS within UN spaces was taken forward through the combined effect of a number of the tools introduced above. CPS risk assessments, training and other engagement frequently led to the formation of inter-agency or cross-sectoral communities of practice, working groups, regional hubs, and other UN mechanisms. This created dedicated constituencies with a mandate to take forward multi-disciplinary, and in many cases cross-border responses to these issues. Incorporating the collection of CPS indicators or other observations within field office reporting or mission tracking, together with individual outreach to UN mission UNCT staff as well as national and regional actors about how these issues manifested in their work, helped identify and socialize these issues as part of the regular workstreams and practice of UN staff. The more systematic reporting and tracking also created a ready flow of information and a record of the issues manifesting (and of relevant responses), helping to further engrain these issues in UN work. More robust and regular reporting on CPS issues, including to the Security Council, and their uptake by UN leadership in a range of contexts has given greater visibility to CPS issues. This had helped mainstream and increase awareness and recognition of these issues at an international level and across the UN system.

Informing and shaping responses: Risk assessments and analysis, often elaborated upon through dedicated workshops and training sessions, could identify gaps and bring nuanced, localized information about CPS issues to the table. These contributed to identification of areas ripe for programming or other forms of governmental and inter-governmental response (for example, policy making or early action), as well as the sort of granular information necessary to operationalize them. These assessment, knowledge-sharing, and capacity-building exercises generated spaces for cross-fertilization and project idea development across stakeholders that might not otherwise have naturally collaborated on such issues, enabling novel and diverse programming partnerships to emerge. CPSAs also brought together the key ingredients for programming, connecting programming ideas with partners who could carry it out, and also connecting them with donors and funding sources. CSM seed funding directly supported pilot initiatives in some cases. Last, CSM initiatives lay the foundation for future programming by chipping away at the gap in funding to fragile and conflict-affected settings, through supporting high-level engagement at forums like climate COPs, as well as through CPSAs' direct outreach and engagement with vertical funds or IFIs. CPSA work, alongside that of other UN partners, also helped to narrow the climate financing gap by helping to de-risk programming in fragile, conflict-affected or politically sensitive environments.

Through helping identify areas for investment, and facilitating responsive programming and other local stakeholder responses, the CPSAs and the CSM have helped create a pathway for realizing some of these international commitments and calls for conflict-sensitive climate adaptation.

Supporting regional and transboundary strategies and response: Despite consensus that efforts to address transnational issues like climate change will require regional coordination and collective action, the multilateral system remains poorly positioned to facilitate regional responses. UN capacities to act still largely remain siloed along geographic (as well as pillar or sectoral) lines. Divisions between Member States in the same regions may make it difficult for regional organizations and other multilateral bodies to take proactive stances even when facing common trans-boundary challenges and threats. CSM interventions helped address some of these gaps and barriers by supporting common regional assessments and dialogue spaces, both among UN entities working in different countries and among Member States within a region or subregion. Raising these issues at a higher political level through mission leadership's good offices, as well as behind-the-scenes technical support to regional organizations and their Member States, helped to overcome some of the inertia and political sticking points. This helped facilitate common positions and strategies in regions like the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa. CSM initiatives, tools, and advisory services also directly contributed to the development of action-oriented regional mechanisms (such as a new early warning meteorological center for West Africa, or the recently established UN CPS Hub in the Horn of Africa) as well as the development of cross-border or regional programming among UN partners.

Advancing international commitments and conversations on CPS: While there have been increased commitments to climate action in recent years at an international level, at each successive COPs as well as in other high-level forums, what has often been missing are mechanisms that take forward those commitments on the ground. Commitments to support climate adaptation have lagged behind, particularly in conflict-affected and fragile settings. Through helping identify areas for investment, and facilitating responsive programming and other local stakeholder responses, the CPSAs and the CSM have helped create a pathway for realizing some of these international commitments and calls for conflict-sensitive climate adaptation. Support from the CSM has helped advance the international conversation on CPS, by supporting Member States presentations and dialogue at major international climate conferences, and also through enabling greater coordination and more proactive positioning among regional and sub-regional bodies. Member States, as well as regional organizations like IGAD, ECOWAS, the LCBC, the LGA, LAS, ECCAS have adopted collective policies, action plans and mechanisms on CPS. In doing so, they have pushed the envelope in terms of collective responses to CPS. While led by the Member States in question, CSM activities have provided critical support at key moments. Last, CSM support for more regular monitoring, tracking, and reporting tools has begun to more systematically capture the diverse ways that climate impacts peace and security and the potential responses. Over time, this evidence can trickle up and help shape the international conversation about CPS, enabling more effective responses.



Photo UNDP Philippines

5

KEY ADVANTAGES, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5

KEY ADVANTAGES, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The forgoing discussion has identified key ways that CPSAs or other CSM interventions can help promote CPS awareness and analysis, and contribute to follow-on responses. The evidence of entry points leading to action for UN actors appeared stronger in the contexts in which a CPSA was deployed rather than those without one. In part this may reflect the underlying conditions in that regional or country context and in that mission — advisors have so far been deployed in areas with a clear need and interest in supporting this type of work. The contexts where CPSAs have not been deployed thus tend to represent environments that are in a different place in terms of readiness to act on climate, peace and security issues.

However, independent of these underlying conditions deployment of a CPSA demonstrated clear results. A persistent challenge in the climate, peace and security field has been siloing across the different fields, agencies, and institutions whose collective activity would be necessary to generate a response — whether in terms of assessment or other types of planning, programming, or financing responses. Breaking down those siloes and generating actions across a wide range of actors takes time and energy, as well as sufficient internal backing and the mandate to generate that cross-sectoral work. CPSAs were positioned to bring this unique added value to the missions and regional organizations where they worked.

The conversations and analysis pointed to several features of CSM support that enabled the above entry points for action, but also some limitations and drawbacks in the current structure of support. This concluding section will discuss each of these in turn followed by some recommendations proposed in the course of interviews. Given the greater focus on the CPSAs, the analysis will focus more on ways that CSM support has enabled the CPSA's work, as well as limitations to this model, but some other advantages and drawbacks of CSM support in contexts lacking a CPSA will also be noted.

A. ENABLING MECHANISMS, FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF CSM SUPPORT

The following mechanisms or modalities were highlighted for enabling CPSAs efforts or adding value to CPS work in other contexts where CPSAs are not present:

CSM profile: One of the strongest advantages that the CSM brings to bear is its multi-agency profile and the built-in multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral approach that comes with that. This was viewed as automatically steering the supported initiatives toward a more integrated, coordinated approach. For CPSAs, it was particularly helpful to be supported by this multi-agency mechanism because it enabled them to rise above the siloing that can limit UN work on CPS. One CPSA observed that while each individual UN entity had a strong contribution to make, institutional mandates could also proscribe set ways of approaching a problem that could limit some activities or create barriers to the sort of cross-sectoral or cross-institutional thinking and engagement that was

“Because my role was funded through and tied to CSM, it allowed me to have a clarity of focus to my work — working specifically on where climate risks intersect with peace and security risks.”

necessary on an issue like CPS. As a result in their view, a key advantage of the CSM association was that, “it allows us to get over the barrier of mandate.”¹⁴³ Because of this CSM association, CPSAs deployed within UN missions tended not to be organized into one mission desk or UNCT agency (for example, within the political affairs section, or within UNDP or UNEP's office within the UNCT). Instead, they tended to have direct channels to mission leadership,

and also a free-floating status that enabled them to engage across the mission. A related benefit of being linked to the CSM was its clear titular goal to work on climate and peace and security issues collectively. As one CPSA observed, “Because my role was funded through and tied to CSM, it allowed me to have a clarity of focus to my work — working specifically on where climate risks intersect with peace and security risks. If the CSM had not been involved that would not have been the case. I would have been pulled into a lot of directions.”¹⁴⁴ CPSAs also observed that it was helpful that stimulating and corraling cross-sectoral and cross-agency work was effectively written into their terms of reference and position by virtue of their linkage with the CSM.

Leadership support: A key criterion for deploying the CPSAs so far has been a strong degree of interest and support from UN leadership of the mission, regional organization or entity. Continued support from the leadership also proved crucial in creating many of the entry points identified above. In many cases, follow-on action happened after the mission leadership elevated the issue in question to a mission priority or raised it at a high-level either with national or regional counterparts, or other UN entities and bodies (for example, in New York).

Peer networks: One of the significant contributions of the CSM affiliation for the CPSAs was that they had a built-in peer network among other CPSAs. This allowed them to discuss common experiences or strategies, to share training materials, and where there was a geographic overlap, to collaborate on programming development, workshops, and other CPS events. Although not as strongly cohered, the Community of Practice supported by the CSM and the informal networks of peers that are sometimes established when the CSM supports trainings and workshops for staff from different mission and geographic contexts also received commendation as a helpful peer network, and supportive function within the UN system.



Photo UNDP Haiti

CSM link with New York: An additional added value of the linkage between CPSAs and the CSM was that it allowed a continuous feedback loop with UN entities, Member States, and other bodies in New York. Several noted that this linkage was what allowed them to feed perspectives and concerns back into processes in New York, but also that being in touch through the CSM allowed more insights in how other UN institutional actors and bodies (outside of their geographic area) were responding to CPS issues or country developments.

Analytical support and the CSM Toolbox: The CSM Toolbox was viewed as a valuable starting point for encouraging CPS work. CPSAs and others in non-mission context observed that they had used the CSM Toolbox for doing CPS assessments in their country or regional context.¹⁴⁵ While it was not fit-for-purpose for every circumstance, there was broad consensus that it was useful to have something to start with, providing a methodology for

engagement.¹⁴⁶ The practice of having CPS assessments, somewhat codified with the CSM Toolbox, was also useful in terms of creating precedent for initiating a CPS assessment, which could then lead to other action points. Beyond the Toolbox specifically, there was also broad recognition that the additional analytical capacity brought by CPSAs or other CPS initiatives was important, given that CPS recognition is still nascent within the system, and also that other UN entities and actors do not always have the capacity or bandwidth to engage in this more complex and cross-disciplinary analysis.

Training and workshops: The CSM's ability to support training and capacity-building, or other discussion forums for CPS was viewed as a major value-added. While many actors in the UN system can organize such trainings or workshops, the CSM (or by extension CPSAs) were viewed as being in a unique position to do so because of their multi-agency profile and the multi-disciplinary mandate built into the CSM focus areas.

Mission Mandates from the Security Council: The degree of support for CPS work within a mission's Security Council mandate varied. The mandates for UNSOM and UNMISS clearly identify climate-related functions, in a way that almost necessitates some staffing position for these tasks to be fully carried out.¹⁴⁷ UNAMI also previously had one mandated task related to climate, but this language was removed along with the drawdown of other UNAMI functions that happened in May 2024, in anticipation of overall mission transition.¹⁴⁸ Having some degree of support within the language of the mandate was viewed as helpful, putting CPSA on a stronger footing to take forward a range of CPS-related work. However, weak or absent language in the mandate would not prevent work on CPS, nor would CPS work be in any way be limited to settings within peace missions. In mission contexts, because CPS has implications for any number of other peace and security issues that do typically appear in mandates, there were often multiple linkages with mandated tasks even without explicit "climate" language.¹⁴⁹ Nonetheless, some observed that lack of directly mandated language and priority tasks related to climate issues might require CPSA in mission contexts to rely more on working through partners than direct mission response and outreach on CPS.

B. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN ADVANCING CPS WORK

Notwithstanding the many positive effects observed, there were also some identified limitations on the CPSAs' position and work, as well as challenges that the UN system faces more broadly in enabling greater action on CPS issues.

Lack of consistent budgetary support for CPSA positions and work: All of the CPSAs have been supported through extra-budgetary processes, often in one-year time frames. Given that most of the work undertaken would require a multi-year timeline to achieve progress, this creates a strong degree of personal and work uncertainty and potentially limits the impact of the work. Proposals to move at least certain positions onto regular mission funding have so far not been approved.

Limited staffing: In most of the contexts examined, greater staffing resources would have increased the impact of the work. Most of the CPSAs appeared overstretched, particularly those embedded in missions that had significant reporting requirements, or in situations where CPSAs were multi-hatted and took on additional mission or UNCT responsibilities. Even in the most well-staffed post — the CPSA in UNMISS, which is supported by two seconded analysts (supported by a Norwegian institute) and a national staff member — the CPSA observed that it was not possible to respond to all requests from national and local stakeholders. Several CPSAs saw particular value in creating funding for a national post, as this might relieve staff burden, improve possibilities to outreach to national and local stakeholders, and create more opportunities for sustainability.

Limited budgetary resources: The CSM has some sources of funding available through a pooled funding channel, but these are limited and do not necessarily cover all the potential needs or opportunities that CPSAs or other partners identify. Another issue flagged was that even requesting a small amount of funding, such as a

couple thousand dollars to support travel or workshop costs, can take significant staff time because of the nature of extra-budgetary funding processes.

Distinguishing CPS work from a broader climate mandate: It is important to protect the focus on climate, peace and security (as opposed to climate or environmental work writ large), given that this area of work is relatively new, and requires greater socialization and consolidation to see follow-on action. While the CSM association tended to naturally inculcate a CPS focus, some CPSAs described being pulled into broader climate-related work due to their double hatting or lack of coverage by others in the mission or UNCT. This might include being pushed to lead on UNCT coordination for all environmental issues, or supporting programming and policy work not tightly linked

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to CPS. While some saw a broader remit as a potential advantage — opening up more opportunities for cross-fertilization and collaboration — there was also a risk of draining CPSA resources and watering down the CPS focus. The lack of clear CPS focus was also observed in some of the initiatives examined in contexts where there was not a CPSA. Many of those interviewed offered examples of programming that was more akin to climate-informed development work, or environmental peacebuilding, without a strong peace and security dynamic within it. While this work is also important to have within the UN system, it might be better to distinguish this work from the CSM's specific CPS efforts.

CSM Toolbox still not applicable for advanced “action-oriented” CPS work: The CSM Toolbox was useful in some contexts for offering a basic starting point for analysis, but was not advanced enough to support most CPSA work, and was also not as useful in countries where the basic assessment strategies had already been applied and inculcated. Further growth in this area may require more nuanced analytical tools, adaptable to different contexts and needs.

Learning systems still not mature: Systems for tracking CPS issues, monitoring risks and evaluating the effectiveness of any response were still only a nascent or absent practice across the areas surveyed. Only UNMISS CPSAs have attempted to incorporate a regular tracking of CPS effects and mission responses, but this practice has so far not been incorporated in other peacekeeping operations. Other CPSAs had developed other methodologies for beginning to track CPS issues, for example, incorporating it in sub-office reporting within UNAMI. However, these too are not happening at a systematic level and risk being lost with staff turnover. Moreover, several interlocutors (including those outside a CPSA deployment context) noted the lack of any global system to capture tracking or programming, and to make it accessible in a way that would lend toward comparative learning. Many also noted an absence of regular learning tools and approaches within the programming being developed (notwithstanding some outstanding examples). Even where CPS issues were a central impetus for the project, the monitoring, evaluation and learning activities connected with these projects rarely attempted to assess the impact for CPS issues upon project conclusion. This makes it difficult to ascertain if theories of change related to CPS issues are fit-for-purpose and whether programming is scalable or worth replicating in other contexts.

Barriers to operationalizing regional and cross-border work, and integrated programming:

Amidst larger discussions about the need for the UN system to be able to address transnational and regional challenges more effectively, the CPSAs, and other CSM training initiatives, stand out as a strong example of models and activities that do generate greater cross-border and regional action. However, so far, this has been easier at the level of dialogue, political engagement and (in some cases) supporting regional organizations' policy development. The amount of cross-border or regional programming is still small, with the cross-border elements often not

sufficiently linked in with the political aspects of UN missions or activities or falling by the wayside in implementation. Although CPSAs and the CSM have often been able to feed into project design in ways that result in an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach, because key project components tend still to be taken forward by individual UN entities or other implementing partners, siloing can re-emerge in the operationalization of programming. Early warning and preventive mechanisms are also still far more common at a project or UNCT level than truly integrated across borders or at a regional level. Overall the UN system's ability to operationalize regional and cross-border work in a way that also embodies an integrated response — inclusive of the necessary steps in terms of national and regional political dimensions — remains low.

Lack of clear pathways and linkages to scalable funding: CPSAs observed challenges in seeing local initiatives and action related to CPS being scaled up by larger donor sources or vertical funds. The examples from Afghanistan and Somalia discussed in section III.h illustrated an important role for CPSAs in linking promising programming and approaches with larger funding sources, but absent the individual proactivity of CPSAs, this means of facilitating scalability of programming does not exist within the UN system.



Photo UNDP Somalia

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Deploying CPSAs:** While not all contexts are ripe for this model of CPS support, the reflections suggest that a CPSA can catalyze significant understanding, collaboration and action on CPS in local, national, regional and international contexts.
- **Adequate UN leadership support and staffing structure:** When considering a CPSA deployment, it is critical to ensure mission leadership is fully behind the position, and also that other mission and UNCT roles and responsibilities are allocated in ways that allow the CPSA to keep focus on CPS issues.
- **Time horizon for planning and CPSA deployments:** As funds allow, encourage a multi-year time horizon for a CPSA deployment and field initiatives, ideally aligning funding for a minimum of two years. Three to four years may be necessary to see real dividends of CPSA assignments.
- **Flexible funding support for CPSAs:** A central fund within the CSM that could be drawn on easily, especially for small amounts [e.g. \$500 to \$10,000] through a relatively rapid, streamlined process could significantly facilitate CPSAs' ability to take forward national and regional initiatives.
- **Enhancing support structures:** CPSA deployments or capacities in the field may be more effective if supported by at least one other staff, whether a secondment from another UN agency or a national staff member.
- **Investing in global databases and learning tools:** Interlocutors argued for greater investments in global shared databases that might incorporate tracking efforts, assessments and learning products, or otherwise make best practices on CPS action more accessible.
- **Learning investment in CPS programming:** Those engaged in CPS programming and/or partners supporting such work should consider greater investments in monitoring, evaluation and learning, including building in more time and funding for pre- and post-intervention assessments, longitudinal studies and learning, as well as adaptive learning components built into CPS programming.
- **Expanding the CSM Toolbox:** The CSM Toolbox developed in 2020 was useful in some contexts for offering a basic starting point for analysis, but it offered limited guidance on moving into practical avenues for actions and responses. Therefore, it was not as useful in countries where the basic assessment strategies had already been applied and inculcated. The CSM might consider working with CPSAs to develop a more advanced version of the CSM Toolbox, applicable in contexts that have already gone through the first cycle of risk assessment and socialization on CPS.
- **Mainstreaming CPS in key UN practice areas:** CPSA reflections suggest it may be beneficial to think more about how to incorporate CPS perspectives not just into specific geographic contexts, but into other key UN workstreams and practice areas, such as within discussions and among those working on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus, stabilization issues, human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), rule of law, Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, and mediation.
- **Managing expectations and/or sequencing from literacy to resourcing:** Many of the pathways identified here need to build upon one another. For example, building internal UN literacy is often necessary prior to outreach efforts to support national and community partners. While there may be strong pressure from climate-vulnerable countries to "deliver" on financing, in reality this takes several years of careful analysis, national capacity development, etc.

NOTES

- 1 See generally, Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), *2020-2021 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2021); CSM, *2021-2022 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2022); *2022-2023 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2023). CSM, *2023 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2024).
- 2 See generally, United Nations Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), *2020-2021 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2021); CSM, *2023 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2024).
- 3 CSM, *2023 Progress Report* (New York, United Nations, 2024), p. 8.
- 4 The UNSOM Advisor was funded separately to the CSM and deployed outside its framework. Notably, the mandate renewal, for UNSOM, which passed in August 2020, prior to the CPSA deployment requested the United Nations to “consider the adverse implications of climate change, ...in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies” and requested an update on these in mandated reporting. S/RES/2540 (2020). See also, Jenna Russo, *The UN Environmental and Climate Adviser in Somalia* (New York, IPI, 2022). The advisor was deployed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with the support of Member State funding.
- 5 The Liptako Gourma Authority (LGA), established in 1970, is considered a regional body covering the Liptako Gourma border sub-regions of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The initial advisor to the LGA was embedded in the Stabilization facility and was involved in examining institutional frameworks for addressing climate-related security risks. That initial advisor position ended, and a new advisor was deployed in 2023. The advisor to the League of Arab States (LAS) was to help coordinate dialogue and support policy development among the Member States (later evolving into a White Paper with the League of Arab States). The position ended in 2022, and has not been replaced.
- 6 With regard to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) position, initially from July 2023 it was supported through an empty political affairs officer post up until February 2024 (with the completion of the planned CPS risk assessment). It was then supported as an extra-budgetary post, funded through the CSM from July 2024.
- 7 The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is an intergovernmental organization encompassing 18 countries and territories in the Pacific region, with the objective of fostering cooperation and policy coordination among its Member States on political, economic, security, and development issues. Support was mobilized in 2024 to establish a Climate Security Advisor position within the PIF Secretariat, helping to fill existing gaps and enhance capacity in this critical area.
- 8 These have included, for example, a seconded DPPA staff member working with the CPSA in the OSE HoA; two seconded NORCAP staff and provision for a national staff member supporting the CPSA's work in UNMISS; and UN volunteers assigned under the CPSA in Somalia.
- 9 The CSM mobilizes funding through a pooled funding modality managed by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office while keeping bilateral channels are possible. UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, “JP Climate Security Mechanism”. Available at <https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jxe00>.
- 10 A pivotal workshop was organized, for instance, in Turin in 2022. The “Climate and Security Practitioners Dialogue”, organized by the CSM and UNSSC brought together 25 practitioners including all existing CPSAs and one future CPSA to take stock of the CPS agenda, facilitate dialogue and create a CPS network. See, UNSSC, “Reflecting on the first climate and security practitioners dialogue”, 28 February 2023. Available at <https://www.unssc.org/news-and-insights/blog/reflecting-first-climate-and-security-practitioners-dialogue>.
- 11 CSM, “Climate, Peace and Security Trello Board”. Available at <https://trello.com/b/gC7Sz1TW/climate-security-board>. See also CSM, “Climate Security Mechanism Brochure”, May 2023. Available at https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2023-10/climate_security_mechanism_brochure_may_2023.pdf.
- 12 Six risk assessments have been conducted in Mali, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, with follow-on risk management strategies associated with each. Four more are planned. These risk assessment processes have generally involved outreach and consultation with civil society, affected communities, experts, and others in the general public.
- 13 Beatrice Mosello, Lucas Destrijcker, Spencer Adrian McMurray, *Roots for peace: Uncovering climate security challenges in Haiti and what to do about them* (Berlin, adelphi, 2023).
- 14 The Toolbox consists of five guidance documents published by the CSM online, divided into an overview, a briefing note on climate security, a conceptual approach to risk assessments, relevant data sources and a checklist to help climate-proof political analysis. UNDP, DPPA, UNEP, “Climate Security Mechanism: Toolbox”. Available at www.unep.org/topics/fresh-water/disasters-and-climate-change/climate-security-mechanism-csm.
- 15 For example, some of the more prominent CPS assessments in Haiti, Somalia, and parts of the Pacific were conducted in partnership with international research institutes like adelphi (a thinktank based in Germany) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). adelphi, PBF, IOM and UNDP, *Kiribati Climate Security Risk Assessment Profile* (2022); adelphi, PBF, IOM and UNDP, *Tuvalu Climate Security Risk Assessment Profile* (2022); Spencer McMurray, Lukas Ruttinger, Serena Arcone and Michael Crowe, *Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide* (2023); Beatrice Mosello, Lucas Destrijcker and Spencer Adrian McMurray, *Roots for peace: Uncovering climate security challenges in Haiti and what to do about them* (Berlin, adelphi, 2023); Emilie Broek and Christophe M. Hodder, *Towards an Integrated Approach to Climate Security and Peacebuilding in Somalia* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2022); Lindsey Jones, “Closing The Adaptation Finance Gap in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings”, World Bank Blogs, 1 August 2024. Available at <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/dev4peace/closing-the-adaptation-finance-gap-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-settings>; NUPI and SIPRI, *Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Somalia* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2023); adelphi and PIK, *Weathering Risks: Climate Risk Profile Somalia* (Berlin, adelphi, 2022).
- 16 In 2022, UNOCA, in collaboration with members of UNCTs in the region, completed a scoping study of climate security risks, projects and actors in Central Africa, and then jointly with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), published a comprehensive climate-related security risk assessment. The proposal to have a CPSA emerged among discussions of how to take forward some of the recommendations of these studies and scoping exercises, with the advisor chosen recruited in part because of experience working in some of the key pathways identified in the risk assessment. UNOCA-ECCAS-CSM, “Soutenir la paix en Afrique centrale en répondant à l'impact négatif du changement climatique sur la paix et la stabilité”, June 2022. Available at: <https://unoca.unmissions.org/en/central-africa-unoca-publishes-report-impact-climate-change-peace-and-security>

- 17 S/2024/572 (2024).
- 18 United Nations, United Nations Mission in South Sudan, “300,000 lives on the line - how UNMISS protects Bentiu residents from climate shocks”, press release, 6 February 2024.
- 19 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 27 September 2024.
- 20 These are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda. The CPSA advisor in the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa (OSE HoA) (who has been in position since February 2022) works in coordination with Member States within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a coordinating function also built into the Special Envoy’s mandate. See, i.e., S/2018/955. The advisor also coordinates on some initiatives with representatives from the AU, as well as other CPSAs and UN entities covering this region.
- 21 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.
- 22 IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre, “IGAD Consultative Workshop on Integrating Climate Risk Management into the Security Sector”, 26 July 2022. Available at: <https://www.icpac.net/events/igad-consultative-workshop-on-integrating-climate-risk-management-into-the-security-sector/>.
- 23 IGAD, Policy Brief: Addressing Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa (Nairobi, IGAD, 2022). IGAD and OSE HoA, State of Climate, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa (Nairobi, IGAD, 2022).
- 24 In the 2021 version of the ND-Gain Index, Afghanistan ranked 179 out of 185 countries in terms of climate-vulnerability. See <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/>. By 2022, it ranked 181 out of 187. See <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/>.
- 25 The risk assessment (which is not publicly available) identified ways that climate change was contributing to local conflict, pressures on migration, regional tensions both with neighbors to the north and with Iran on several dams, irrigation and other transboundary water projects. In addition, the study identifies other potential risks including the impact of climate change induced livelihood degradation on levels of criminality, illicit narcotics production and trafficking, recruitment into armed groups, and social unrest.
- 26 An interesting sub-strategy within this was the way that the CPSA was able to link CPS issues to existing priorities within the UNAMA mandate. There is not explicit language in the UNAMA mandate about CPS. However, there is language in the mandate about promoting regional cooperation and connectivity with a view to promoting stability and peace regionally (S/RES/2626 (2022), para. 5h); transboundary water issues, exacerbated by climate change, currently represent one of the most significant sources of tension for regional stability. Similarly, UNAMA has a mandate to support durable solutions for displaced persons (S/RES/2626 (2022), para. 5a), and the risk assessment illustrated linkages between existing displacement and outbound migration and climate change and natural resource degradation. As such, placing these climate-related issues within the existing mandate helped anchor it within the UNAMA portfolio of work, even beyond the particular duties of the CPSA.
- 27 The CPSA led the assessment, but other UNAMA national and international staff made contributions to the research and consultations, as did a member of DPPA’s Mediation Support Unit who came with expertise on mediation and water disputes.
- 28 There have been multiple studies by SIPRI, adelphi, NUPI, and other research organizations on climate, peace and security risks in Somalia. However, the two that were noted as having clear follow-on effects in terms of supporting training and galvanizing further programming were: Anab Grand et al., *Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Somalia* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2023); Emilie Broek and Christophe M. Hodder, *Towards an Integrated Approach to Climate Security and Peacebuilding in Somalia* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2022); adelphi and PIK, *Weathering Risks: Climate Risk Profile Somalia* (Berlin, adelphi, 2022).
- 29 Examples of these ideas on CPS being embedded in policy steps and commitments included the National Development Plan for 2020-2024 evolving to have much stronger climate perspectives, recent conferences on climate co-sponsored and -led by the Deputy Prime Minister, and a recent proposal to have climate advisors embedded in the Office of National Security. The Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, “Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2040”. Interview #18.
- 30 This included a project (known as the Deegaan Bile project) responding to drivers of migration and conflict in Galmudug state through nature-based solutions. It is implemented jointly by IOM, UNEP, and SIPRI. For more see European Commission, “Breaking the climate-conflict cycle: EU-backed initiative revitalizes Galmudug”, Somalia, press release, 27 April 2023. Available at https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/breaking-climate-conflict-cycle-eu-backed-initiative-revitalises-galmudug-somalia_en. Another example is a project designed to respond risk pathways between climate change and armed groups (and risks of al Shabaab control) in Hirshabelle state. It is supported through a consortium of donors (valued at \$170 million), and implemented by a range of UN entities and local partners. It responds with interventions related to food security, agricultural renovation, land management, and migration response, among other strategies. For more on the climate-risk pathway related to armed groups see Broek and Hodder, “Toward an Integrated Approach”, pp. 12-14.
- 31 The study, which was requested by the Resident Coordinator Office (RCO), was conducted in six towns and villages in September 2023, with research led by a member of the CSM (a political officer from DPPA), the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) CPSA, as well as the Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) in Mauritania and other national colleagues. It was published in 2024. DPPA/CSM/UNOWAS, “Climate, Peace and Security in Mauritania. Executive Summary”, 2024. Following publication of the study, there was a request from the RCO for a follow-up study focusing more on water management.
- 32 UNAMA and DPPA, “Climate Change, Peace and Security in Afghanistan. A study on the interlinkages”, May 2024.
- 33 IGAD, “Report on State of Climate, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa”, November 2022.
- 34 DPPA, “The interlinkages between climate, peace and security in Iraq. A desk review by PMD/DPPA”, April 2023.
- 35 Beatrice Mosello, Lucas Destrijcker, Spencer Adrian McMurray, *Roots for Peace: Uncovering Climate Security Challenges in Haiti and what to do about them* (Berlin, adelphi, 2023).
- 36 There is not one signature CPS risk assessment for Somalia. Instead this summary is drawn from a SIPRI publication that is representative of several of the key CPS risks identified across various national and local assessments. Cedric de Coning (NUPI) and Florian Krampe, “Climate, Peace, and Security Fact Sheet: Somalia. SIPRI & NUPI,” SIPRI and NUPI Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets (Oslo / Stockholm, NUPI & SIPRI, 2023).
- 37 UNDP, “La Sécurité Climatique au Burkina Faso: Le Cas de La Province du Séno”, 2022. Other assessments from the region include : ALG/ UNDP, “Plan d’Actions de la Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Climatique du Burkina Faso 2024-2026”, 2024. Available at: [bkf_plan_d_actions_snsdc_dvf_.pdf](#). UNDP, “La Sécurité Climatique au Liptako-Gourma”, 2022; adelphi, Climate, “Peace and Security Assessment: Mali”, September 2022. Available at: Climate, Peace and Security Assessment: Mali | Weathering Risk.

- 38 For example, there was evidence of CPS considerations being integrated or strengthened in the Common Country Analysis (CCA) for South Sudan, Rwanda and Chad, in connection with some of the engagement and awareness-raising work by CPSAs or other CSM initiatives. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024; Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024. United Nations, “South Sudan. Common Country Analysis”, October 2023; United Nations, “Chad. Common Country Analysis”, 2023; United Nations, “Rwanda. Common Country Analysis”, March 2024. Language and considerations on CPS were also integrated into the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) in Gabon. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024.
- 39 The tracking is largely focused on description of incidents, for example, identifying what is happening, where it is happening, how many people were affected, and the consequences. Any responses provided by the mission would also be tracked. The additional reporting requirements related to CPS effects were incorporated within the mandated tasks for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in the mandate revision of March 2023. The CPSA has been engaged not only in the subsequent CPS reporting but in responding to Security Council Member State representatives’ queries about the feasibility of such reporting. Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024. Tools like Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) exist in all UN peacekeeping missions but to date UNMISS is the only mission to incorporate CPS indicators and monitoring within these mission awareness and information tools.
- 40 For example, there was evidence of CPS considerations being integrated or strengthened in the Common Country Analysis (CCA) for South Sudan, Rwanda and Chad, in connection with some of the engagement and awareness-raising work by CPSAs or other CSM initiatives. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024; Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024. United Nations, “South Sudan. Common Country Analysis”, October 2023; United Nations, “Chad. Common Country Analysis”, 2023; United Nations, “Rwanda. Common Country Analysis”, March 2024. Language and considerations on CPS were also integrated into the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) in Gabon. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024.
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- 42 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan: Floods Snapshot”, 18 October 2024.
- 43 The mechanism is housed within the regional body IGAD in Eastern Africa. It is known as the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and does weather and climate research, including predictions on heavy rainfalls and flooding since 2020. IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre, “June to September 2024 Seasonal Forecast: Above-normal rainfall and higher-than-normal temperatures are predicted over most parts of the Greater Horn of Africa”, press release, 21 May 2024. For more, see: <https://www.icpac.net/>.
- 44 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024. See also: Mark Townsend, “A drowning town: are Bentiu’s dykes high enough to save it from disaster?”, *The Guardian*, 13 August 2024.
- 45 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024.
- 46 The initiative, funded under the project title “Breaking the Climate Conflict Cycle” and known as the Deegaan Bile Initiative, has been supported since August 2022. See, e.g., European Commission, “Breaking the climate-conflict cycle: EU-backed initiative revitalizes Galmudug, Somalia”, press release, 27 April 2023; IOM, “Climate Initiative Empowers Communities for a Greener, Peaceful Somalia”, press release, 3 June 2024.
- 47 SIPRI characterized these as “environmental peacebuilding case studies”. Kheira Tarif, *Tackling Climate Change and Conflict in South-central Somalia* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2024), p. 2.
- 48 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 4 October 2024.
- 49 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 4 October 2024.
- 50 For further information on Centre Climatique Régional de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, see: <https://agrhymet.cilss.int>. Countries in the initiative are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The initiative is still new and not yet operational, with the terms of reference only agreed in July 2024. Interview #9; Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 27 September 2024.
- 51 UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, “Geoguard: Geospatial Dashboards for Climate Assessment and Early Warning” (Project Document). Available at: https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-07/1st_extension_prodoc_dppa_signed_redacted.pdf.
- 52 In 2023, the CPS Barometer was presented to representatives of the three Member States in question, as well as a regional environmental conservation mechanism — the Trifinio Plan Commission (*Comisión Trinacional del Plan Trifinio*) – to socialize them about linkages between development, climate change and environmental triggers, and potential ramifications in terms of conflict and migration. For more on the Plan Trifinio Commission, see: <https://www.sica.int/trifinio/breve.aspx>.
- 53 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, September 2024.
- 54 For example, in February, the CSM co-organized a workshop with the RCO in the Dominican Republic, where participants explored CPS-related risks specific to the country, as well as cross-border implications. Another example is the Climate, Peace and Security Programming Training last organized by UN PBSO, CSM and adelphi at the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) in July 2023 in response to the findings of the Thematic Review on Climate Security and Peacebuilding 2023. Targeting 23 participants from diverse UN agencies and countries including The Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, and others, the training aimed to strengthen programming capacity to address climate-related risks affecting peace and security. A second iteration took place in December 2023 with continued CSM support. Additionally, the UNDP and CSM-supported CPS Experts Academy available to experts from national governments and regional entities has taken place four times, focusing on different areas of CPS policy and financing as well as cross-cutting themes like the role of women and youth. UNDP Philippines, with support of the CSM, undertook a pilot initiative supporting three capacity-building workshops for a total of 42 local government units in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Sulu to formulate enhanced Local Climate Change Adaptation Plans that integrate CPS considerations.

- 55 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 3 October 2024. It also was important that the CPSA was engaging concurrently with local authorities in the area, so there was also a ready connection and receptivity to this programming from local stakeholders. This example also goes to evidence the linkage or liaison role played by CPSAs, discussed in section III. G. UNEP DHI Centre, Project brief Nature-based solutions supporting climate resilience in the Shabelle River basin (New York, UNEP, 2022).
- 56 As a result of this training, UNMISS's Joint Mission Analysis Center's Early Warning Group refined its climate-related early warning activities, incorporating new strategies to address climate risks more effectively within South Sudan's security landscape.
- 57 The target was to provide the training to two national staff members from each of the suboffices, which broadly cover all the governorates in Iraq.
- 58 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.
- 59 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024.
- 60 AU Peace Dividends, "AU strengthens approach to address climate security risks", press release, 21 June 2024. Available at <https://peaceau.org/en/article/au-strengthens-approach-to-address-climate-security-risks>.
- 61 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024. Additional information received by email, 4 November 2024.
- 62 UNDP, "High-Level Partnerships Forum on Climate, Peace and Security Stabilization Contexts", press release, 7 April 2024. Available at <https://www.undp.org/africa/waca/events/high-level-partnerships-forum-climate-peace-and-security-stabilization-contexts>.
- 63 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 4 October 2024.
- 64 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 3 October 2024. There has also been substantial engagement at a subnational level, with State ministries and actors. These have tended to be more focused on the particular CPS risks emerging in those States, and working to ensure that any responses taken give due attention to both climate and environmental concerns, and connected stabilization and security risks.
- 65 In Gabon, this has primarily related to changing migration patterns of elephants, which have created damage and destruction to crops and infrastructure, with some villages entirely relocated as a result. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024.
- 66 In all three countries, there is a plan to have a consultative process, first engaging a range of national actors, researchers, civil society, those displaced or otherwise affected by climate change, among others, followed by a validation process for the national strategies and action plans. The first stages of this consultative process have already taken place in all three countries, with a goal to have a national strategy finalized in all three by the end of 2024. Interview #9, Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 27 September 2024.
- 67 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024. An additional issue at the national level was a degree of competition between different ministries.
- 68 The first one was organized in 2023 and it has generally been lauded for advancing more proactive positions on a number of key CPS issues, including on gender and youth engagement in CPS, as well as on climate finance. It also helped build momentum toward a common position on CPS among African Member States. African Union, *Summary of the African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action* (Nairobi, AU, 2023).
- 69 IGAD, "Policy Brief".
- 70 IGAD and OSE HoA, "Communiqué: High-Level Inter-Ministerial Event on Climate Change, Peace and Security at the Margins of the 27th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP27)", 7 November 2022. Available at <https://igad.int/communique-igad-un-osehoa-high-level-inter-ministerial-event-on-climate-change-peace-and-security-at-the-margins-of-the-27th-session-of-the-conference-of-the-parties-cop27/>.
- 71 IGAD, "Opening Statement Workneh Gebeyehu, IGAD Executive Secretary IGAD COP28 High-Level Presidential Event on Climate, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa Monday, 4th December 2023", 4 December 2023. Available at <https://igad.int/opening-statement-workneh-gebeyehu-igad-executive-secretary-igad-cop28-high-level-presidential-event-on-climate-peace-and-security-in-the-horn-of-africa-monday-4th-december-2023/>.
- 72 IGAD, *The IGAD Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023-2030)* (Nairobi, IGAD, 2023). Available at <https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IGAD-Climate-Adaptation-Strategy-2023-2030-.pdf>. Further description of the common position and the processes that established it can be found in IGAD-OSE HoA, "State of Climate, Peace and Security", p. 57.
- 73 IGAD, "Final Communiqué of the 14th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government – June 12, 2023 Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti", 12 June 2023. Available at <https://igad.int/final-communique-of-the-14th-ordinary-session-of-the-igad-assembly-of-heads-of-state-and-government-djibouti-republic-of-djibouti-12th-june-2023/>; IGAD, "Communiqué – IGAD- UN OSEHOA High Level Inter-Ministerial Event on Climate Change, Peace and Security at the margins of the 27th Session of the Conference Of The Parties (COP27)", 7 November 2022. Available at <https://igad.int/communique-igad-un-osehoa-high-level-inter-ministerial-event-on-climate-change-peace-and-security-at-the-margins-of-the-27th-session-of-the-conference-of-the-parties-cop27/>. Belen Teferi and Thandekile Moyo, "Addressing climate-conflict dynamics in the IGAD region" (Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2024), pp. 5-6.
- 74 Climate Security Mechanism, "CSM Updates and Impact Stories: Informal note", 20 November 2023, p. 16.
- 75 As pointed out in the collective IGAD policy brief developed in February 2022, there was a sense that action on these issues was stalled in the UN Security Council following the Russian Federation's veto of a draft resolution on climate-related security risks in the Security Council in December 2021. IGAD, *Policy Brief: Addressing Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi, IGAD, 2022), p. 3. See also: United Nations, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Integrating Climate-Related Security Risk into Conflict-Prevention Strategies", 13 December 2021. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14732.doc.htm#:~:text=The%20Security%20Council%20today%2C%20in,the%20risk%20of%20conflict%20relapse>. Although the AU has been more active on CPS than the Security Council, with communiques on CPS in November 2021 and April 2022, there was a sense among IGAD members that differences within the AU held back action necessary for a common policy response, and that African regional organizations would have to lead. IGAD, *Policy Brief: Addressing Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa*, p. 3.
- 76 For example, the proposed organigram for the Regional Coordination Mechanism lists the OSE HoA as one of the four political entities involved in overseeing the mechanism, and also identifies linkages with the Hub and the CSM as part of its process. File on copy with the authors.

- 77 While still at the conceptual stage, the main functions will be to formalize the coordination, advocacy support, technical advisory and future programmatic responses that CPSA(s) provide. See DPPA, “Addressing the Link between Climate, Peace and Security”. Available at <https://dppa.medium.com/addressing-the-link-between-climate-peace-and-security-ff38b5ef0c7f>.
- 78 These were: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia. For further information see: <https://www.undp.org/africa/waca/events/sahel-climate-peace-and-security-forum>.
- 79 Sahel Climate, Peace and Security Forum, “Bamako Declaration”, 11 November 2023. In this Declaration, the participating Member States emphasized the importance of “regional and international collaboration in favor of climate security” that respects the region’s unique character, while stressing that global support will be indispensable to tackle climate change. They call for inclusive strategies to enhance climate resilience, and “adaptation of the conditions of access to climate financing for countries requiring urgent support given fragilities and crises.”
- 80 These tensions are illustrated by an announcement in January 2024 by the Governments of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (all of which have recently undergone military coups and changes in leadership) that they would withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Boureima Balima and Tiemoko Diallo, “Three West African junta-led states quit ECOWAS regional block”, *Reuters*, 28 January 2024.
- 81 A regional conference on Climate Change, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel was organized on 6-7 April 2022 in Dakar, Senegal, hosted by UNOWAS, the governments of Ireland and Ghana as well as ECOWAS. It resulted in a Call to Action addressed to Sahelian governments as well as regional organizations and the UN system (2022). *Dakar Call to Action*, Regional Conference on Climate Change, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel, held on 6 and 7 April 2022, in Dakar, Senegal. Available at: https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/call_to_action_-_regional_conference_on_climate_change_peace_and_security_in_west_africa_and_the_sahel.pdf
- 82 Over the course of 2022 and 2023, UNOWAS and other UN actors (including CSM members) helped support a number of risk assessments and consultations in Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Liberia, Senegal, and Gambia, and also undertook efforts to work with ECOWAS on more conflict-sensitive climate adaptation plans.
- 83 For example, the CPSA in UNOWAS noted that because COP28 was organized just after the Bamako Declaration, they were able to use time during COP to already begin discussions with parties to the Bamako Declaration about next steps and how to take it forward within national contexts.
- 84 One Planet Summit, “One Forest Summit”, 1 March 2023. Available at <https://oneplanetsummit.fr/en/events-16/one-forest-summit-245>.
- 85 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024. Additional information received by email, 4 November 2024.
- 86 Ibid. The CPSA played a significant role in elaborating the Partnership Agreement. Although there has been no indication of substantial objections or issues with the proposed partnership, internal ECCAS processes can take time, and so approval may take some time.
- 87 S/2023/856, para. 76(d).
- 88 The World Bank-managed Afghanistan Resilience Trust Fund was given approval for additional financing in early 2024, with an explicit commitment to “expand activities focused on building climate resilience.” World Bank, “World Bank, ARTF Provide Additional Financing to the Afghanistan Community Resilience and Livelihoods Project”, 30 April 2024. In April 2024, the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan approved climate change adaptation and response as one of the priority areas for use of the funds. S/2024/469, para. 48. Interviews suggest other Member States that have been significant donors to Afghanistan have also considered creating carve-outs within their funding for climate-related work.
- 89 S/2024/664, para. 45.
- 90 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.
- 91 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 24 September 2024.
- 92 S/RES/2677 (2023), para. 32. The UNMISS mandate provides that every 90 days the Secretary-General should provide to the Security Council an “analysis of risks associated with climate change that may adversely impact peace and security in South Sudan, and implementation of the UNMISS mandate”.
- 93 Some parts of the UNCT continue work related to CPS. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has maintained a country presence and continues to actively work on programming across Afghanistan, including some sustainable agriculture activities that might be considered relevant to CPS.
- 94 For example, among this outreach there were discussions with those involved in security monitoring, analysis and reporting such as the Joint Analysis and Reporting Section (JARS), to identify ways that climate was intersecting with the security dynamics being analyzed. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024.
- 95 Interview with UN agency staff, MS Teams, 9 May 2023. This interview was conducted under the auspices of another project and has been used with permission in this context.
- 96 See, e.g., Managing Exits from Armed Conflict project (MEAC), *North West Nigeria Baseline Survey* (North West Nigeria, January-March 2024), UNIDIR, Geneva; DPO, *Climate Change and Armed Groups – Strengthening Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Practitioner’s Analysis of and Response to the Links between Climate Change and Armed Group Recruitment Patterns: A SCORE Analysis in the Tillaberi Region in Niger* (March 2024).
- 97 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024. The issue of flooding-induced displacement of unexploded ordnances (UXO) was noted in Iraq, in Abyei, and in Chad in the context of the work of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC).
- 98 S/RES/2677 (2023). See the following Secretary-General reports on the impact of climate change on peace and security in 2023 and 2024: S/2024/572 (2024); S/2024/188 (2024); S/2023/955 (2023); S/2023/433 (2023). A reporting obligation could also be inferred within the UNSOM mandate.
- 99 Security Council reporting was examined for UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Port-au-Prince (BINUH); UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Kabul (UNAMA); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Baghdad (UNAMI); UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA); UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU); UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM); United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In each of the missions where a CPSA was deployed, reporting was examined both before and after the introduction of a CPSA. In BINUH and UNOAU, where there was not a CPSA but there was other CPS activity, the reporting was examined to assess any notable change over time. There did not appear to be a discernible impact.

- 100 The reporting examined was: S/2023/151 (2023); S/2023/453 (2023); S/2023/678 (2023); S/2023/856 (2023); S/2023/941 (2023); S/2024/196 (2024); S/2024/469 (2024); S/2024/664 (2024). The reporting also identified other factors behind this increased reporting — including the significant effects of continuing drought as well as de facto authorities in Afghanistan regularly raising the issue.
- 101 As of the last formal public statement by the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, there were 66 Member States. See, e.g., “Statement of the Group of Friends ‘Climate and Security’ in the UN Security Council Open Debate on Climate Change, Peace and Security,” 13 June 2023. Available at: <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/-/2601564>. However, internal sources suggest the number of Member States has since grown to 70.
- 102 For example, CPSAs in South Sudan and the OSE HoA connected to the UN CPS Hub for the Horn of Africa (“the Hub”) have supported briefings to the Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council related to climate, peace and security. Those supporting the Hub have also fed into an Arria Formula Meeting on preventive action. CPSAs in Somalia and Afghanistan were also able to integrate learning from CPS assessments and work into Security Council briefings by the SRSG. UNDP also facilitated a presentation to the Group of Friends on Climate and Security on CPS efforts in the Pacific. Early findings from a regional climate-related security risk assessment in Central Africa developed in 2021 were shared by UNOCA and ECCAS at a 2021 meeting of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.
- 103 The resulting report “Roots for peace: Uncovering climate security challenges in Haiti and what to do about them”, published in 2023, was a collaboration between adelphi, Haiti’s Ministry of the Environment, the Haiti Climate Security Working Group, UNEP and UNDP. Beatrice Mosello, Lucas Destrijcker, Spencer Adrian McMurray, *Roots for peace: Uncovering climate security challenges in Haiti and what to do about them* (Berlin, adelphi, 2023). The Haitian government, which was one of the partners on the study, had planned to use it as a basis for a national climate security policy. However, the tumultuous events in Haiti over the last year and a half have been an obstacle to further action on this. Interview #11.
- 104 Of the seven sessions, six were held in sub-national regions of Afghanistan and a seventh, in Kabul, was designed as a high-level, national consultation. Four out of seven of the consultations involved female participants including the one in Kabul involving high-level DFA representatives. This was notable given formal and informal restrictions on women’s participation since the Taliban took control.
- 105 Interview #9.
- 106 Interview #9.
- 107 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 27 September 2024.
- 108 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 15 October 2024.
- 109 Ibid. Additional information received by email, 4 November 2024.
- 110 Interview #9.
- 111 AU-led initiatives on youth, such as the Great Green Wall Initiative have been a strong driver of the demand for youth-inclusive work and trainings in West Africa. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 27 September 2024. Other examples of youth and CPS work supported via the CSM include some observations of youth engaged in positive peacebuilding in the Cyprus mission, ongoing discussions about sending a youth civil society advocate (notably, a young woman) from Afghanistan to COP29, and other global youth training initiatives, such as a UNDP supported training academy. Interview with UN Staff members, New York, 16 September 2024, Interview with UN Staff members, New York, 17 September 2024, Interview with UN Staff members, New York, 17 September 2024, Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024. Much of the programming work discussed was supported through the PBF (e.g. in South Sudan, Haiti, Somalia and in several areas of West Africa), although often with CPSAs or other CSM staff reviewing the proposed project design and development. Another relevant example was a UNDP-organized youth Climate & Security Workshop in Hargeisa, Somaliland in June 2023, providing a platform for collaboration between and empowerment of youth organizations. Anab Ovidie Grand, “Navigating the crossroads of climate change, peace and security in Somalia”, UNDP, 15 February 2024. Available at <https://www.undp.org/blog/navigating-crossroads-climate-change-peace-and-security-somalia>. CSM, Updates and Impact Stories, informal note, 20 November 2023, pp. 29-30.
- 112 Maria Kero, *Beyond vulnerability: A Guidance Note on Youth, Climate, Peace, and Security* (Stockholm, FBA, UNDP and SIPRI, 2024); Erica Gaston, Imane Karimou, Luisa Kern, and Emma Bapt, *Peacebuilding Fund Thematic Review on Youth, Peace, and Security* (forthcoming 2025, UNU-CPR) (on file with authors).
- 113 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 October 2024.
- 114 Although many CPSAs try to encourage or support greater CPS-related programming overall, they may also work to ensure that any programming proposed and undertaken by UNCT members gets to the most vulnerable areas in terms of climate security risks. In Somalia, for example, some UN entities demonstrated a tendency to focus on programming areas that were more stable, but these were often not the ones most vulnerable to climate-effects or where a climate security engagement might have the strongest stabilization effects. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 3 October 2024.
- 115 Although IOM was already working in some of these areas, the additional information that came in from this UNAMI governorate reporting stream influenced the targeting of this new programming, for example, affirming the need for tailored responses in Basra governorate (where IOM was already working) but also suggesting expanding activities to neighboring Dhi Qar and Muthana governorates. The programming agreement was being finalized at the time of research. Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024.
- 116 The initiative comprises two projects in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states, which are funded by the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instruments. For more, see: Tarif, *Tackling Climate Change*. For more see European Commission, “Breaking the climate-conflict cycle: EU-backed initiative revitalizes Galmudug”, Somalia, press release, 27 April 2023. Available at https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/breaking-climate-conflict-cycle-eu-backed-initiative-revitalizes-galmudug-somalia_en. IOM, “Climate Initiative Empowers Communities for a Greener, Peaceful Somalia”, press release, 3 June 2024. Available at <https://somalia.iom.int/news/climate-initiative-empowers-communities-greener-peaceful-somalia>.
- 117 “Vertical funds” are development financing mechanisms confined to single development domains with mixed funding sources. The climate vertical funds such as (in order of establishment) the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are critical part of the evolving international climate finance architecture.
- 118 Interview with UN staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.

- 119 Ibid.
- 120 Ibid.
- 121 The project was implemented by UNDP and IOM. See: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122866>. UNDP and PIFS 2023, “Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide,” December 2023. Available at: <https://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/Pacific-Climate-Security-Assessment-Guide.pdf>. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024. The Liptako Gourma subregion, and the Sahel region more broadly has been the site of a number of CPS-related cross-border projects supported by the PBF. See Gaston et al., Climate security and Peacebuilding Thematic Review, pp. 26-32; 45-48.
- 122 The workshop facilitated discussion on local and cross-border climate-related security risks, and was attended by UN staff as well as non-governmental organizations working in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Climate Security Expert Network, “Summary note: Regional Dialogue on Climate Security in Northern Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador)”, February 2020. Available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/summary_csen_regional_dialogue_nca.pdf.
- 123 Interview with UN Staff member, New York, NY, 1 October 2024; Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 4 October 2024. As of the time of writing the project had received tentative approval for PBF support, but had not been finalized, so there were no publicly available project documents.
- 124 See Gaston et al., Climate security and Peacebuilding Thematic Review, pp. 43-48.
- 125 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.
- 126 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 1 October 2024; Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024.
- 127 Some existing programming is already under-way in Somalia. See <https://unepdhi.org/nature-based-solution-project-somalia/>.
- 128 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 25 September 2024. There have been ongoing discussions about greater transboundary cooperation (for example, in relation to proposed hydro-power development and downriver impact) and this hydro-diplomacy, or quiet good offices and facilitation of inter-governmental dialogue have been key to that. However, no examples of cross-border programming related to this issue surfaced in the interviews.
- 129 UNDP Philippines, “Japan, UNDP support livelihood of fisherfolk communities in Maguindanao del Norte”, 23 June 2024. Available at <https://www.undp.org/philippines/press-releases/japan-undp-support-livelihood-fisherfolk-communities-maguindanao-del-norte>; UNDP Transparency Portal, “Enhancing Food Security and Livelihoods in Bangsamoro”. Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects/01000425>.
- 130 Berghof Foundation, “Climate Security in Somalia: Designing a climate security action plan in Beledweyne”. Available at <https://berghof-foundation.org/work/projects/climate-security-in-somalia>. CSM, “Updates and Impact Stories”, informal note, 20 November 2023, pp. 28-29.
- 131 Mercy Corps, Overcoming the Fragility Barrier: Policy Solutions for Unlocking Climate Finance in Fragile States (Washington, D.C., Mercy Corps, 2023).
- 132 Lindsey Paul Jones and others, Executive Brief: Closing the Gap: Trends in Adaptation Finance for Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings (Washington, D.C., World Bank Group, 2024).
- 133 Mercy Corps, Overcoming the Fragility Barrier: Policy Solutions for Unlocking Climate Finance in Fragile States (Washington, D.C., Mercy Corps, 2023).
- 134 Lindsey Paul Jones and others, Executive Brief: Closing the Gap: Trends in Adaptation Finance for Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings (Washington, D.C., World Bank Group, 2024).
- 135 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are among the largest multilateral climate funds. As of July 2020, 45 percent of GEF projects were located in at least one conflict-affected country, while a much larger share — 88.3 percent — were in countries that might be considered “fragile”. Some \$4 billion in GEF funds had been invested in countries experiencing major armed conflicts. However, despite this substantial activity, the GEF has not so far developed specific safeguards, policies or procedures to address issues of conflict sensitivity or other risks associated with these investments. Karl Bruch et al., GEF Support in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (Washington DC, GEF, 2024), pp. ix-x. For further discussion of gaps in climate financing in fragile states, see GEF Programming Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change for the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund for the GEF-8 Period of July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2026 and Operational Improvements (June 23, 2022). The GCF allocated \$ 1,119 million to the 25 least developed countries (LDCs) dealing with fragile and conflict-affected situations within their borders, representing about 38 percent of the total approved GCF funding for LDCs. GCF Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Evaluation of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund’s Investments in the Least Developed Countries. Final Report (Incheon, GCF, 2022), p. 73. On the lack of conflict sensitivity in climate financing by the GCF, see Cesare M. Scartozzi, Conflict sensitive climate finance: lesson from the Green Climate Fund, Climate Policy, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 297-313 (2024).
- 136 Although many donors require a sustainability strategy for projects, the staff time that would be necessary to achieve this is often not incorporated in staffing budgets. This is not only an issue of budgetary limitations but that many of these connectivity strategies would happen well after project closure.
- 137 The commitment followed a recent GCF visit to Somalia organized by the CPS advisor. Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 3 October 2024. In addition to this GCF commitment, there were also recently accepted or emerging proposals that would have brought more Asian Development Bank (ADB), and GEF support for climate-related programming in Somalia on the horizon. Ibid. See also: <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/page/climate-security-mechanism-united-nations-and-group-friends-climate-and-security>
- 138 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024. While there tend to be existing mechanisms for working directly with established donors in a given country context, vertical climate funds like the GEF or GCF are global funds, often located in different cities (in Washington, DC, in GEF’s case and in Songdo, Incheon in GCF’s case). Identifying the particular individuals or boards that must be appealed to regarding funding provisions in a particular country can thus take a significant amount of legwork to identify beyond already established processes within the UN system..
- 139 Interview with UN Staff member, by MS Teams, 30 September 2024.
- 140 The greater willingness to engage also connects with the CPISA’s success in positioning climate-related work as a potential “safe space” for donor engagement in Afghanistan, as discussed in section III.D. A representative of one of these larger funding sources observed, “If you can create the political space, then we can step into it”. Interview #D13.

- 141 COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace (2023). See also, CCCPA, Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP) COP27 Presidency Initiative (Cairo, CCPA, 2022).
- 142 The CPSA in the OSE HoA supported the High Level Inter-Ministerial Event on Climate Change, Peace, and Security at the Margins of COP27 and the Launch of the IGAD Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023 – 2030) under the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace. The CSPA in UNOWAS worked with the Ministries of Environment of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger to prepare ahead of COP28 and will support an ECOWAS-led side event at COP29. In UNOCA, UNMISS, and Somalia, the CSPAs have also supported the government in building their engagement strategy for COP29. In Afghanistan, the CSPA had been working to enable the participation of a female Afghan youth (civil society) representative at COP29. Several of the key regional declarations or common positions on CPS have been announced at, or in conjunction with the COPs, in part because of the importance of making a common appeal with regard to climate financing. The LAS White Paper on Climate Security in the Arab Region was announced at COP27. The IGAD policy brief committing to work toward common position coincided with deliberations at COP27. The Bamako Declaration and the adoption of the IGAD Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023 – 2030) coincided with COP28. Both had significant elements focusing on climate-financing concerns.
- 143 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, September 2024.
- 144 Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, September 2024.
- 145 This included by those working with risk assessments in Afghanistan, Iraq, in Guatemala, Haiti, and in parts of the Horn of Africa.
- 146 As an example of some of the critiques, one CPSA commented that while the CSM Toolbox can be useful for a generic assessment, the advisors themselves need CPS analysis that is more specific and actionable than would be supported by the CSM Toolbox, something that would enable them to “give advice on a weekly basis” to UN officials policymakers. Interview with UN Staff members, by MS Teams, September 2024.
- 147 The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change in Resolution 2408 in Somalia since 2018 and highlights in the UNSOM 2023 extension “the importance of the United Nations, and the FGS and FMS considering the adverse implications of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking comprehensive, gender-sensitive risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors”. S/RES/2408 (2018); S/RES/2705 (2023). For UNMISS, the Security Council is recognizing in 2021 “the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, on the humanitarian situation and stability in South Sudan, and emphasizing the need for comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies”. S/RES/2567 (2021). The focus on climate security is strengthened by the Secretary-General’s obligation to report on “risks associated with climate change that may adversely impact peace and security in South Sudan, and implementation of the UNMISS mandate”. S/RES/2677 (2023); S/RES/2729 (2024).
- 148 First included in Resolution 2576 in 2021, language related to climate was extended in the subsequent mandate renewals for UNAMI in 2022 and 2023. S/RES/2576 (2021); S/RES/2631 (2022); S/RES/2682 (2023). The language related to climate in these resolutions generally recognized the adverse effects of climate change, that it can aggravate food insecurity, humanitarian risks and instability, and emphasized “the need for comprehensive risk assessments” and provided for UN actors “to take meaningful actions to adapt to or mitigate challenges posed by climate change [...]” (S/RES/2682 (2023)). The UNAMI mandate was renewed in 2024, but in anticipation of the eventual drawdown of the mission, some of the mission tasks and functions were paired back, and the language related to climate was one of the areas that was cut. S/RES/2732 (2024).
- 149 There is no explicit climate language in the mandate for UNAMA. However, there is clear language about issues that have a strong intersection with CPS. For example, UNAMA is mandated to encourage regional cooperation and connectivity with a view to promoting stability and peace regionally. S/RES/2626 (2022), para. 5h. A major impediment to regional peace and stability at the moment are transboundary water disputes linked in part to overall declining water resources and drought linked to climate change. UNAMA also has a mandate to support durable solutions for displaced persons. S/RES/2626 (2022), para. 5a. In the current context in Afghanistan, it would be difficult to pursue durable and sustainable migration solutions without taking into account effects of climate change on migration.

