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CRSP Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace

UNDP

Re-envisioning Climate Change Adaptation Policy to Sustain Peace

A Typology and Analysis of the National Adaptation Plans

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Introduction – Raising Adaptation Ambition And Sustaining Peace

Though adaptation now stands high in the climate change agenda, this has not yet been adequately reflected into the delivery of sufficient international climate adaptation finance commitments over the years, meaning that developing countries and territories are paying more than ever before for their adaptation needs. Adaptation planning and policy is gaining ground, as evidenced by the number of countries and territories that have included adaptation in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and a growing number of which are also developing and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). While this is encouraging, there are globally many contexts where climate vulnerability is juxtaposed and intersects with human and community insecurity in communities on the ground, affecting both the symptoms and causes of fragility and conflict. These considerations are often not covered explicitly in these instruments.

High climate change vulnerability along with conflict and fragility coincide in very many places where in-situ adaptation needs are the most pressing and peacebuilding is an urgent priority too. According to the IPCC (2023), some 3.3-3.6 billion are highly vulnerable to climate and the human influence on climate is unequivocal and impacts highly heterogeneous,[1] while the IEP (2022) noted the 11th decrease in peacefulness in the last fourteen years and the most significant deteriorations in the categories of: political instability, political terror scale, neighbouring country relations, refugees and Internally-displaced persons (IDPs).[2] Delivering adaptation in climate vulnerable conflict-affected and fragile contexts, where it is most needed so that it addresses the root causes of conflict and vulnerability, means targeted approaches to conflict sensitivity and leveraging peacebuilding co-benefits (see **Box 1.1**).[3] In recent years, a lot of thinking around adaptation and peace has emerged at the project level, but yet remains today mostly anecdotal in nature. Adaptation action in conflict-affected and fragile contexts is also understudied as a topic. One study notes just 13 articles per country in a sample of 15 countries, with only Mali and Nigeria exceeding this and the other countries counting less than four articles each.[4] Unfortunately, there has been little progress in elaborating climate policies which address the climate-conflict intersection[5] and little examination of adaptation policy as it relates to conflict and fragility, or peacebuilding processes, strategies or financing.

Redefining and raising ambition of adaptation in conflict-affected and fragile contexts inherently requires a considered approach to peace, governance and security. Programming alone will also not lead to institutionalizing of needed conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches in adaptation writ-large. Adaptation policy and planning at a national level can help determine key priorities and sectors and ensure alignment with peacebuilding priorities. Consideration of regional and cross-border impacts are important too, especially where natural resources are shared across national boundaries and risks are joint and may help avoid maladaptation. However, this is still not yet the norm. Finding connections early on in vulnerability assessments can allow for the identification of gaps where peacebuilding expertise is needed and peacebuilding investments which often target natural capital too and can bolster results. Such holistic thinking also needs to inform the development of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)[6] and New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance under the Paris Agreement.[7]

Adaptation priority setting and financing, reflecting vulnerability which is not only bio-physical in nature but also socially constructed, in conflict-affected and fragile contexts needs to seek out peace co-benefits which reinforce primary adaptation benefits. In the same way, peacebuilding needs to be cognizant of adaptation priorities. In this regard, the practice of environmental peacebuilding, technical solutions to adaptation are an important opportunity for cooperation and to build peace.[8] This analysis and typology show that understanding in the NAPs goes beyond the first-round NDCs and synergies are observed and described between adaptation and peacebuilding objectives.

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[1] IPCC (2023). Synthesis Report of The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf

[2] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2022. http://visionofhumanity.org/resources

[3] Wong, C. (2022). Climate Finance and the Peace Dividend, Articulating the Co-benefits Argument. In: Cash, C., Swatuk, L.A. (eds) The Political Economy of Climate Finance: Lessons from International Development. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12619-2_9

[4] Sitati, A. et al. (2021). Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative Team; de Perez EC. Climate change adaptation in conflict-affected countries: A systematic assessment of evidence. Discov Sustain. 2021;2(1):42. doi: 10.1007/s43621-021-00052-9. Epub 2021 Sep 27. PMID: 35425913; PMCID: PMC8475313.

[5] Abrahams, D. (2020). "Conflict in abundance and peacebuilding in scarcity: Challenges and opportunities in addressing climate change and conflict," World Development. Elsevier BV. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104998.

[6] For more information, see: UNFCCC (2021). Approaches to reviewing the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation - Technical paper by the Adaptation Committee. Bonn: UNFCCC.https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/AC_TP_GlobalGoalOnAdaptation.pdf

[7] For more information, see: UNFCCC (N.D.). New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance https://unfccc.int/NCQG

[8] Conca, K. & Dabelko, G.D. (2002). Environmental Peacemaking. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press

BOX 1.1: ABOUT CLIMATE ACTION, ADAPTATION AND PEACE CO-BENEFITS

"Co-benefits" are described by the IPCC (2018) as "the positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective may have on other objectives, irrespective of the net effect on overall social welfare' objectives, irrespective of the net effect on overall social welfare."[9] Understanding of the "co-benefits" and "co-costs" of climate action dates back to the 1990's, in relation to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Third Assessment Report by the IPCC (2001) references the need to distinguish between intended co-benefits, as opposed to unanticipated ancillary benefits while describing co-benefits as "often at least equally important rationales"[10] and acknowledging the potential for negative ancillary impacts.

There is a far greater level of understanding of the health and air quality co-benefits of GHG emission reductions vis-à-vis the co-benefits and co-costs of climate adaptation. For example, the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2022) indicates that the "[m]odels of health co-benefits show that a 1.5°C pathway could result in 152 million ± 43 million fewer premature deaths worldwide between 2020 and 2100 in comparison to a business-as-usual scenario, particularly due to reductions in exposure to PM2.5."[11] Adaptation co-benefits are still little considered[12] and underestimated,[13] as are non-environmental benefits.[14]

Understanding of climate change mitigation or adaptation-related co-benefits for peace, stability and security remains has been little examined to date. Tanzler, Maas and Carius (2010) point to the need to "harness the direct co-benefits of adaptation for peacebuilding on a more local, project-based level by designing conflict-sensitive adaptation programmes with a positive transformative effect."

THE CASE FOR ADAPTATION POLICY AND PLANNING MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY AND PEACEBUILDING APPROACHES – INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As many NAPs are still under development, this note provides analysis of 44 NAPs published up to the period ending March 2023, to garner insights and further guidance, as there is value in considering how NAPs are already addressing climate-related security risks:

ADAPTATION POLICY AND PEACE CO-BENEFITS:

Beyond the research and anecdotal evidence on synergizing adaptation and peacebuilding practice, there is limited analysis examining of how adaptation policy can be informed by peacebuilding approaches to reflect the needs of countries suffering conflict and those post-conflict contexts. The inverse is also necessary.

The NAPs, as published, offer insights from a wide range of country contexts, as well as different and more operational perspectives than presented in the extant research on climate, peace and security. They show how climate-related security risks can be addressed in climate change adaptation policy and practice.

CONFLICT, CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION PLANNING:

The NAPs speak to conflicts over the access to natural resources which are likely to be exacerbated by climate change and thus adaptation policy measures and investment strategies must account for such risks. Beyond this, NAPs highlight that conflict matters in adaptation and that other types of conflicts, which might be political, etc. in nature, must also be considered as a function of their interaction with climate change vulnerability in vulnerability assessments.

[9] https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf
[10] IPCC. (2001). Global, regional, and national costs and ancillary benefits of mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/8.pdf
[11] IPCC (2023). Climate Change 2022 – Mitigation of Climate Change https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf
[12] UNECE. (2016). The co-benefits of climate change mitigation, Sustainable Development Brief No. 2, January 2016. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Sustainable_Development_No._2__Final__Draft_OK_2.pdf
[13] Karlsson, M., Alfredsson, E. & Westling, N. (2020). Climate policy cobenefits: a review, Climate Policy, 20:3, 292-316, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1724070
[14] Smith, A. (2013). The Climate Bonus: Co-benefits of Climate Policy (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109571

ADAPTATION PLANNING PROCESSES AND PEACEBUILDING:

Findings from the field have found entry points that demonstrate that adaptation processes can contribute to peacebuilding by incentivizing communities suffering conflict to engage in dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution; foster cooperation rather than conflict in cases of increased competition over natural resources, and promote social cohesion. Adaptation strategies must be designed to seize any plausible opportunity to deliver peacebuilding co-benefits, whenever feasible. Peacebuilding strategies also need to be informed by vulnerability assessments and the NAP processes.

ADAPTATION IN POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS:

Additional considerations are already made in the case of LDCs and SIDS. However, conflict-affected contexts experience different challenges and circumstances. With an inherent understanding of this, various countries, including: Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste all describe in their NAPs, their development context not in economic terms only, but as "post-conflict LDCs." Greater flexibility is needed for NAP processes in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts.

COSTING ADAPTATION PLANNING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE CONTEXTS:

Costs are often higher in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Making a clear case for increased costs can help strengthening planning, costing and implementation of adaptation measures, more robust evidence-based NAPs and make a stronger case for adaptation investments. Addressing conflict and insecurity risks can help avoid maladaptation. At the same time, more flexibility in costing adaptation options is needed, tailoring to the conflict and political risks and difficulties of gathering data, while understanding that planning at national and sub-national levels will not be as coherent. Mobilization of non-governmental actors that have more information on effective adaptation options and their costs is also needed.

HOLISTIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS:

There are some NAPs produced in contexts which are suffering from conflict and fragility, but do not address these issues at all. Integrating risks for peace and security may help identify entry points, where complementary peacebuilding investments can be made to address risks, which might not typically be addressed through adaptation financing. While climate change alone is not the direct cause of conflict, the IPCC (2022) finds that "risks to peace are reduced, for example, by supporting people in climate-sensitive economic activities and advancing women's empowerment."[15]

CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS:

Extremely fragile and conflict-affected contexts are amongst the lowest recipients of climate finance. In this regard, it is noted that conflict, fragility, and peace and security are not addressed in global climate change governance, and neither the Paris Agreement, Kyoto Protocol nor UN Framework Agreement on Climate Change make reference to such terms. Climate finance which better reflects the needs of conflict-affected and fragile contexts has to find a basis in climate policy.[16] NAPs serve as an important vehicle for driving and prioritizing investments. Peacebuilding finance which often addresses natural capital that also needs to work in the same direction.

[15] IPCC (2022). Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.001. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf

[16] UNDP (2021). Climate finance for Sustaining Peace – Making Climate Finance Work for Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts. New York: UNDP. https://www.undp.org/publications/climate-finance-sustaining-peace-making-climate-finance-work-conflict-affected-and-fragile-contexts

BOX 1.2: ABOUT THE NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLANS

The Cancun Adaptation Framework under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) laid the foundation and outlined the process for creating and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in 2010. The Paris Agreement reiterates the importance of NAPs in Article 7. Differing from the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)[17] which focused on "urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change - those needs for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage," NAPs are a process for countries and territories to identify medium- and long-term adaptation needs and to develop and implement strategies and programmes to address those needs. NAPs are pivotal to defining aspirations for resilient development pathways as they apply a systematic and iterative planning approach to address climate change across medium- to long-term timeframes.

The objectives of the NAP process as per the UNFCCC guidance are two-fold:

a. To reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience;

b. To facilitate the integration of climate change adaptation, in a coherent manner, into relevant new and existing policies, programmes and activities, in particular development planning processes and strategies, within all relevant sectors and at different levels, as appropriate.[18]

The Technical Guidelines for the NAP process were developed by the UNFCCC Least Developed Country Expert Group (LEG), which outlines the primary steps included in the process. These include: (1) laying the groundwork and addressing gaps, an exercise that launches the NAP process and evaluates the capacity, data and information, and resources required to engage in the NAP process properly; (2) preparatory elements, a process that analyses current and future climate change scenarios and vulnerabilities; (3) implementation strategies, a process that entails developing long-term national implementation strategy and promoting coordination and synergy at the regional level and with other multilateral environmental agreements and (4) reporting, monitoring and review, a process that monitors the NAP process and assesses progress, effectiveness and gaps.[19] The guidelines are not prescriptive and emphasize the importance of a country-owned, participatory, gender-sensitive and empowering process. There is also no formal guidance offered on how to address climate-related security risks in the context of the NAPs.

[17] For more information on the NAPAs, see: UNFCCC (N.D.). National Adaptation Programmes of Action. https://unfccc.int/topics/resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-programmes-of-action/introduction

[18] (Decision 5/CP.17, paragraph 1)

[19] Least Developed Countries Expert Group (2012). National Adaptation Plans. Technical guidelines for the national adaptation plan process. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC secretariat. Available at: http://unfccc.int/NAP.

ADAPTATION AND PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EGYPTIAN COP27 PRESIDENCY INITIATIVE, CLIMATE RESPONSES FOR SUSTAINING PEACE

Questions of sustaining peace and security are currently not tackled as part of the formal agenda of the international negotiations on climate change. However, the Egyptian COP27 Presidency initiative "Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace" broke new ground as the first COP Presidency Initiative to highlight how climate action can contribute to peacebuilding outcomes at Sharm el-Sheikh. Developed by the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA)[20] with the support of UNDP and the African Union Commission (AUC), the initiative aims to advance holistic and integrated climate responses that strengthen sustainable peace, security and development, in line with national ownership and context specificity, while addressing gaps between global, regional and national endeavors to tackle the impacts of climate change and those to advance sustaining peace, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.[21] The initiative is based on the Conclusions of the third edition of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development (June 2022), which underscored "the need to pivot the narrative on climate and security, from focusing on threats and conflict, towards advancing peace, resilience, and sustainable development."[22] Its four pillars aim to:

- Strengthen the climate adaptation and peacebuilding nexus;
- Sustain peace through climate-resilient food systems;
- Advance durable solutions to the climate-displacement nexus; and
- Accelerate climate finance for sustaining peace in Africa.[23]

This report serves as a deliverable under Pillar I of the initiative, to inform the codification of knowledge on adaptation practice and policy, and development of peace co-benefit metrics.

ABOUT UNDP'S WORK ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND THE NAPS

UNDP supports climate change resilience and risk management[24] at the local, regional and global levels through cross-sectoral solutions in key domains of: adaptation policy and planning, cross-sectoral resilient livelihoods, fostering resilience for food security, ecosystem-based adaptation, climate resilient water resources and coastal management, climate urban resilience, and climate information and early warnings. Public health is also of increasing importance as the world warms and investments need to scale in resilient health planning, infrastructure, institutions, and services. Over the past two decades, UNDP has supported 96 developing countries, including 46 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 18 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and 47 African states to implement their adaptation priorities through its portfolio of adaptation project and programmes which includes 151 successfully completed projects (worth $526 million) and 99 projects (worth $1.1 billion) currently under implementation. This also includes a billion dollars in support (pipeline and mobilized) being provided in 40 countries affected by fragility and conflict.

UNDP's policy and institutional support on climate change adaptation planning and policy is delivered through the NAP processes in over 50 developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and territories. The NAPs are carried out in an integrated approach linking to NDCs and contribute to UNDP's Climate Promise.[25] At the core of UNDPs work on NAPs is a commitment to accelerate climate action and action on SDGs through mainstreaming climate risk at all levels of development- local, national, regional and global.

[20] For more information on the work of CCCPA, see: https://www.cccpa-eg.org/
[21] COP27 Presidency (2022). COP27 - Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP). Available at: https://www.cccpa-eg.org/publications-details/1107
[22] The Aswan Conclusions on Sustainable Peace and Development in Africa – Third Edition, 21-22 June 2022, at: https://www.aswanforum.org/img-uploads/8380_25074921.pdf
[23] COP27 Presidency (2021). COP27 - Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP). Available at: https://cop27.eg/#/presidency/initiative/CRSP
[24] For more information on UNDP's climate change adaptation work, see: https://www.adaptation-undp.org/mainstreaming-adaptation
[25] For more information the Climate Promise, see: https://climatepromise.undp.org/

BOX 1.3: UNDP AND THE CLIMATE SECURITY MECHANISM

Launched in 2018, the work of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM)[26] has been a catalyst and a critical first step toward institutionalizing efforts to address climate, peace, and security within the UN system and beyond. The CSM has embedded climate, peace and security advisors in United Nations field missions in South Sudan and Central Africa (UNMISS and UNOCA), regional entities in the Global South, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), League of Arab States and the Liptako Gourma Authority. Building on its work with the Climate Security Mechanism and with the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), UNDP was able to put in place, a global climate security team for the first time, in 2022, with dedicated specialists/advisors covering all geographic regions, deployed directly to those regions. In particular, it supports hotspots and contexts underserved by the climate security agenda thus far in: Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa where no other partners deploy such international advisory expertise.

[26] The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is a joint initiative by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO).


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2. Objective, Methodology And Quick Scan Results

OBJECTIVE

This study maps the extent to which climate, peace and security intersections are described and addressed within the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).[27] Consideration of violent conflict, insecurity and fragility are salient to climate change vulnerability and thus, the effective design and implementation of the NAPs, in particular, ensuring that adaptation measures reach and meet the needs of climate-vulnerable conflict-affected populations which otherwise risk being left behind. Conflict and fragility drivers, if not fully considered, may result in unsustainable or maladapted solutions and are thus critical considerations as climate change adaptations investments which currently, at a global and local level pale in the face of growing adaptation needs and likewise need to be robust in conflict and fragility-affected contexts. Peacebuilding strategies similarly need the same kind awareness of adaptation-related considerations.

This analysis and the findings of the typology are therefore useful and may offer an initial blueprint for the mainstreaming of climate-related security risks into NAPs. The study takes the methodology approach from the UNDP (2020) study with UNFCCC, "A typology and analysis of climate-related security risks in the first-round Nationally Determined Contributions" as its point of departure, to develop a more extensive list of terms and themes and extend the typology to examine the NAPs in greater detail. This report more specifically also builds on the IISD (2020) study of the 18 NAPs available at the time, to consider now three years later,[28] what additional insights can be further garnered from the larger data set of all 44 NAPs available at the end of March 2023 in addition to the earlier of work, inter alia, of Tänzler, Maas, & Carius (2010) which examines conflict sensitivity in the NAPA process.[29]

The analysis and those risks and measures identified in the NAPs may be considered indicative of the level of awareness of the interactions between climate, peace and security only and the actions and measures needed to promote adaptation, conflict prevention and sustaining peace. Needless to say, they should not, however, be considered alone as a sole basis to how climate-related peace and security risks should be addressed in the NAPs.

The study does provide an important reference point to explore the scope of climate-related security risks in the NAPs, specifically and climate change adaptation policy and planning and related sectoral policies in general and how they are currently being addressed from a policy and strategic perspective. Adaptation practice, especially in conflict-affected and fragile contexts and the integration of conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches and in responding to the actual realities on the ground obviously requires a different methodology, but could equally be informed by these results. Further analysis, consultation and engagement including of local level conflict prevention and peacebuilding expertise, would be critical to informing NAP processes. This also cannot be successful in isolation, peacebuilding efforts also need to reinforce adaptation priorities.

The study brings to light the experience of various countries and territories which have been underserved by the climate security agenda thus far and could benefit from further support in adaptation planning and peacebuilding. Findings moreover show a need to not only focus on support on NAPs and peacebuilding in countries and territories suffering violent conflict, but also on post-conflict contexts and with broader lens to promote integrated prevention and sustainable peace in adaptation planning in general. The purpose of the exercise was not to try to establish a causal relationship between climate and conflict, nevertheless many NAPs do make reference, inter alia, to the risk multiplier effects of climate change on drivers of conflict and fragility.

[27] The scope of the study comprises the 44 NAPs which have been published at the time of the drafting of the report in March 2023.
[28] Crawford, A. and Church, C. (2020). "The NAP Process and Peacebuilding." NAP Global Network. Available at: https://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/napgn-en-2020-the-nap-process-and-peacebuilding.pdf.
[29] Tänzler, D., Maas, A. and Carius, A. (2010), Climate change adaptation and peace. WIREs Clim Chg, 1: 741-750. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.66

METHODOLOGY

All available NAPs in March 2023 were included in the quick-scan desk study process. This comprised 44 NAPs in total, submitted to the UNFCCC over the period 2015 to March 2023, when the draft report was prepared. The NAPs were sourced directly from the UNFCCC's National Adaptation Plan Registry, which can be accessed at https://napcentral.org/submitted-naps. **Table 2.1** lists the NAPs included in this review. Most (i.e., 27 out of 44) of the NAPs were submitted after 2020.

A four-step approach has been adopted to review the NAPs and prepare this report. The following key steps were followed:

- Conduct a quick scan of each NAP for direct references to climate-related security risks[30] to identify whether specific references are made in the NAPs and the overall extent to which risks are addressed in the NAPs.[31]
- Interrogate the results of the quick scan through a detailed review of the context of each reference. This provided a clearer indication of the extent to which the climate, peace and security intersection is addressed in the NAPs.
- Apply the categorization methodology used in the UNDP (2020) study to classify each of the vetted climate-security mentions according to the same typology used in that paper, as illustrated in **Figure 2.1.**

TABLE 2.1: NAPS INCLUDED IN THE QUICK SCAN

No.	Country	Date Posted
1	Albania	10/27/2021
2	Armenia	9/24/2021
3	Bangladesh	3/23/2023
4	Benin	7/8/2022
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	12/21/2022
6	Brazil	5/12/2016
7	Burkina Faso	10/15/2015
8	Cambodia	7/7/2021
9	Cameroon	10/26/2015
10	Cabo Verde	10/23/2022
11	Central African Republic	2/16/2022
12	Chad	2/15/2022
13	Chile	9/7/2017
14	Colombia	2/27/2018
15	Costa Rica	5/5/2022
16	Democratic Republic of Congo	7/6/2022
17	Ecuador	7/6/2022
18	Ethiopia	3/1/2019
19	Fiji	12/12/2018
20	Grenada	11/6/2019
21	Guatemala	8/2/2019
22	Haiti	1/5/2023
23	Kenya	2/28/2017
24	Kiribati	1/21/2020
25	Kuwait	2/11/2021
26	Liberia	12/16/2021
27	Madagascar	5/29/2022
28	Nepal	10/30/2021
29	Niger	11/14/2022
30	Paraguay	7/14/2022
31	Peru	7/22/2021
32	Saint Lucia	9/21/2018
33	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	11/14/2019
34	Sierra Leone	2/8/2022
35	South Africa	9/29/2021
36	South Sudan	11/1/2021
37	Sri Lanka	11/1/2016
38	State of Palestine	11/11/2016
39	Sudan	9/26/2016
40	Suriname	6/2/2020
41	Timor-Leste	3/31/2021
42	Togo	1/17/2018
43	Tonga	10/27/2021
44	Uruguay	12/3/2019

[30] For the purpose of this exercise, "climate-related security risks" are understood as the adverse impacts of climate change on human security – the 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' – but also how such impacts relate to the security of the State and the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

[31] An expanded set of 27 specific words were included in the initial English/French/Spanish word searches. An advanced search was conducted in Adobe Acrobat software to determine how many of such terms are included in the NAP. Of the 27 keywords, several, in particular, resulted in erroneous references. The quick scan ignored instances of: "attack/attaque/ataque" if used in reference to disease or pests, etc.; "combat/combat/lucha" if used in reference to combating climate change in general, desertification, fires, or hunger, etc.; "fight/lute/pelear" if used in a generically, i.e. to describe the fight against climate change etc.; "security/sécurité/seguridad" that were used in reference to food, nutritional, energy, health, water or infrastructure security, etc.; and "violence/violence/violencia" that were used in reference to extreme events, for example violent weather conditions, etc.

FIGURE 2:1 TYPOLOGY OF SIX OVERARCHING THEMES IN FIRST-ROUND NDCS (2020)[32]



- Assemble the results of the review. This involved preparing a spreadsheet that provides tabular and graphical summaries of the results of the quick and vetted scans and the typological classifications of the climate-security keyword mentions. Other indirect references which were not captured in the word search as part of the quick scan but are relevant to this exercise are explored in the analysis, in the respective categories.

LIMITATIONS

With the budget and time constraints, the quick scan comprised a desk review only, with a view to analyzing and typologizing the main themes represented in the NAPs. Key informant interviews, stakeholder consultations and other types of supplementary first and second-hand data collection would be valuable to informing the mainstreaming of climate-related security risks into NAP processes.

QUICK SCAN RESULTS

A quick scan of the NAPs was conducted to identify direct references to climate-related security risks. Each NAP was scanned for the mention of any of the 27 specific words in English, French or Spanish. This was intended, as the first step, to capture all references, as a first step, without scrutiny of the context in which the word is referenced. The quick scan revealed a total of more than 600 simple references to the different terms across all the available NAPs in March 2023, in English, French or Spanish. For the purpose of a quick scan of the NAPs, all references were categorized under one category to avoid double-counting. In reality, climate change impacts on development, peace and security are extremely complex. Many references are in fact thus “compound” references, which describe interactions between multiple different types of drivers of conflict and insecurity as they interact with climate change. Further details are unpacked and explored in the relevant categories of the typology below. **Figures 2.2** and **2.3** illustrate the distribution of the keywords relative to the mentions of the terms themselves and the frequency of their mention on both a word and country count.

[32] UNDP (2020). “A typology and analysis of climate-related security risks in the first-round Nationally Determined Contributions.” New York: UNDP. https://www.undp.org/publications/typology-and-analysis-climate-related-security-risks-first-round-nationally-determined-contributions

FIGURE 2.2: REFERENCES TO CLIMATE-SECURITY KEYWORD MENTIONS ACROSS ALL NAPS



FIGURE 2.3: REFERENCES TO KEYWORD BY COUNTRY



The Fragile States Index (FSI)[33] and ND GAIN rankings[34] were compiled for the countries and territories in the sample to complement the results of the quick scan. Of the 44 countries and territories whose NAPs are considered in this review, a total of 40 were included in the 2022 FSI and of these, 12 of the countries were classified as being in the top fifth most fragile countries and territories. In regard to the ND GAIN framework, a total of 39 countries and territories featured in the 2020 results as the latest year available. Of these, seven of the countries and territories are classified as being in the top fifth most vulnerable countries to climate change.

[33] The Fragile States Index (FSI) is produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP). Developed in the 1990s, its origins date back to the peer-reviewed Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), intended as a framework to better understand and measure conflict drivers in complex contexts. Higher values indicate more instability and a higher risk of conflict. The Fund for Peace (2022) Fragile States Index | Measuring Fragility Risk and Vulnerability in 179 Countries. Available at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/

[34] The ND-GAIN Country Index is composed of two key dimensions of adaptation: climate vulnerability and readiness. Higher values indicate greater levels of vulnerability and lower readiness to respond. The ND-GAIN makes of uses 20 years of data across 45 indicators to assess the climate change vulnerability and readiness to implement adaptation solutions of over 180 countries. For more information, please see: https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/


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3. Typological Classification Of The National Adaptation Plans

This section provides a) an overview of the quick scan results for accuracy, b) a typological classification of the vetted references to climate-related security risks for each NAP, and c) a synthesis of the main findings from the typological classification.

Vetting the quick scan

The approach to the vetting of the references to climate-related security risks in the NAPs consisted of two steps as summarized in the bullets below:

1. Validate and classify each of the references. This consisted of identifying whether the references related to climate-related security concerns. Three categories were adopted to classify keyword mentions: high validity; low validity, and not applicable.[35] This resulted in a refinement of the results of the quick scan, reducing the total number of valid mentions from 628 to 424 (308 high validity; 116 low validity).

2. Describe how countries and territories are handling peace and security dimensions. This consisted of examining the context and circumstances for each of the references from the quick scan and key takeaway(s) from qualitative descriptions.

Typological classification

The approach to the typological classification of the references to climate-related security risks in the NAPs consisted of several steps as summarized in the bullets below.

i. Evaluate the existing typology developed for NDCs for suitability of application to NAPs. This consisted of evaluating whether each of the qualitative descriptions for high-validity mentions could be categorized under one of the six overarching typologies that were established in the UNDP (2020) study of the first-round NDCs. This evaluation resulted in three additional high-level categories to augment the typology developed in that paper. These additional categories are noted in the bullets below:

1. **Climate, peace and security interlinkages are not well-understood and in need of more research:** A country's capacity to address climate-related security risks depends to a large extent on the level of understanding climate change and security risks and the interactions between these phenomena. While there is a mainstream understanding that climate change does not directly cause conflict, in-and-of-itself, less understood are the scope and intensity of indirect linkages and causal pathways through which climate change can exacerbate drivers of conflict and security. Countries, territories and communities suffering under a range of peace and security risks whether directly related to climate change or not, would still benefit from research devoted to reaching a more nuanced understanding of climate-related security links. Conflict and security risks not related to climate change, environmental sustainability, etc. are considered salient in the NAP process. This is because violent conflict, insecurity and fragility:

    a. May be an obstacle to climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts and may have the effect of reversing hard-won adaptation gains[36];

    b. May directly limit the full participation of some actors in adaptation planning processes, especially women, vulnerable and marginalized groups such as youth, indigenous peoples, local communities, and people with disabilities, local actors, conflict-affected communities, displaced populations;

    c. May limit the capacities of actors to collect data (as noted by Timor-Leste in its NAP) and develop analytics necessary to conduct climate change vulnerability assessments and conceptualize, development and implement adaptation strategies, in the first instance; and

    d. May still be contributing factors to maladaptation or may mean that adaptation efforts may inadvertently exacerbate grievances and drivers of conflict, if not considered in the design and implementation phases.

[35] "High validity" mentions are those with reference to a climate context (e.g., climatic impacts leading to conflict/security risks); "Low validity" mentions are those without reference to a climate context (e.g., emergence from past civil war); "Not applicable" mentions are those without a climate or security risk context (e.g., institutional conflict of interest).
[36] UNDP (2020). Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism. New York: UNDP. https://www.undp.org/publications/undp-climate-security-nexus-and-prevention-violent-extremism

2. **Conflict and insecurity integrated into vulnerability assessment/scoping and adaptation planning.** Different dimensions of human security[37] have traditionally been addressed in vulnerability assessments and adaptation priority setting by focusing on energy security, food security, water security, livelihood security, infrastructure security, nutritional security. Existing methods and tools for vulnerability assessments account for these dimensions across disaster preparedness/ prevention and humanitarian paradigms. The recent development of the toolkits, such as the Climate Security Mechanism's conceptual approach and toolbox for the integrated analysis of climate-related security risks[38] offers the possibility of expanding the scope of traditional frameworks for vulnerability assessment and adaptation priority-setting. This can help ensure that socio-economic vulnerability and adaptation needs of conflict and fragility-affected contexts and communities, including women, children, and vulnerable and marginalized groups as well as key concepts such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding are integrated early in the climate change vulnerability assessments and adaptation planning processes.

3. **Peace and security are important to NAP processes.** More than a national policy document, the NAP is a strategic process that enables countries and territories to assess climate change vulnerability, and identify and address their medium- and long-term priorities for adapting to climate change. Many of which are not only highly vulnerable to climate change, but also suffer from fragility and/or violent conflict. The process is undertaken by national teams and involves analyzing current and future climate change and assessing vulnerability to its impacts. Ensuring consistency between the NAP process and peacebuilding efforts is a way to strengthen policy, planning, and project development synergies between peacebuilding efforts and climate change adaptation.

ii. Conduct a qualitative analysis and typological classification of each high-validity reference, providing examples from NAPs and noting any common approaches to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, conflict and security risks that could be useful in application to climate change adaptation policies.

TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF THE TYPOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF KEY CLIMATE-SECURITY WORD SEARCHES

Category	#	Theme	Validity of climate-security mentions				High validity
			High	Low	NA	Total	
Original typology	1	Climate implications for peace and security	53	0	0	53	308
	2	Climate change exacerbating extant conflict dynamics over land/water access	74	0	0	74	
	3	Lack of security as an obstacle to climate action	41	0	0	41	
	4	Co-benefits of climate change adaptation and mitigation for sustaining peace	6	0	0	6	
	5	Measures to integrate climate and security considerations	120	0	0	120	
	6	Sub-regional and cross-border impacts	14	0	0	14	
New themes from 2023 NAPs typology	7	Climate, peace and security not well understood and in need of more research	15	0	0	15	116
	8	Conflict and insecurity addressed in vulnerability assessment/scoping and adaptation planning	63	0	0	63	
	9	Peace and security important to NAP process	38	0	0	38	
		Generic/non-climatic reference to conflict dynamics	0	121	0	121	
		Not applicable	0	0	83	83	
		Total	**424**	**121**	**83**	**628**	

[37] For more on the human security, see UNDP (2022). 2022 Special Report: New threats to human security in the Anthropocene - Demanding greater solidarity. New York: UNDP. https://hs.hdr.undp.org/pdf/srhs2022.pdf

[38] UN Climate Security Mechanism (2019). Conceptual Approach and Toolbox for the Integrated Analysis of Climate-Related Security Risks. New York: United Nations. https://dppa.un.org/en/climate-security-mechanism-toolbox-conceptual-approach

Synthesis of main findings

This section provides a synthesis of the major climate, peace and security related themes as identified in the NAPs. After a brief overview of the highlights of the vetted word scan and typological classifications, the specific findings associated with each of the typological classifications for each category are presented.

Overview

Major highlights of the vetted keyword scan and the corresponding typological classifications are summarized in the bullets below.

- Approximately 10% of references to conflict and security issues were generic, describing the country situation only and make no direct connection to vulnerability assessment, adaptation planning or any of the typological categories. They were nevertheless important to providing a context for NAP development and implementation, as these dynamics do not occur in isolation from social and economic activity, which are moderated by conflict, climate and other shocks and stressors. Most of these references were connections to conflict and some aspect of socioeconomic development, without a clear connection to the climate context (e.g., years of conflict have led to 50% of food needs imported at high cost). Their mention, particularly the high frequency of these references overall suggest that they are salient considerations, but that there may be a lack of awareness about how such factors may interact with climate change vulnerabilities and adaptation planning. To avoid taking these references at face value only and due to insufficient information provided in the NAPs, these references are not individually examined further in this study. In providing country level support to adaptation planning, it is recommended that such connections should be further explored.

- Almost all of the NAPs (i.e., 39 out of the 44 reviewed) made at least one direct high-validity reference to climate-related security risks, suggesting some understanding among NAP teams of the linkages to national adaptation policymaking and project planning, although country to country variations exist in how fully they are addressed. Only five countries (i.e., Cambodia,[39] Guatemala,[40] South Africa,[41] Tonga,[42] and Uruguay[43]) did not make any highly relevant valid reference to any of the key terms. The keyword mentions for two countries were of low validity only.

- References to conflict/conflit/conflicto, security/securité/seguridad, and peace/paix/paz account for over 80% of high-validity references, while stability/stabilité and violence/violence/violencia account for just over 5% each, indicating that such references are the dominant terms in the NAPs. This suggests the need for development for guidance and training to address these issues in the design of adaptation (and mitigation) policies. Lack of attention to the some of the other issues may also be due to a lack of awareness, although it is not possible to determine through the ambit of this exercise only.

- A small subset of NAPs demonstrate a more holistic understanding of climate-related security risks and account for a majority of the documented references. Taken together, the CAR,[44] Chad,[45] Niger,[46] South Sudan,[47] and Sudan[48] comprise around 50% of all the highly-relevant references. This might be explained by the importance of peace and security in the local contexts of these countries and can be further indication that those country NAP teams have a good grasp of the importance of addressing such risks as a basis for effective adaptation action.

- The six categories within the original typology of the UNDP (2020) study with UNFCCC account for almost 70% of the high-validity mentions (**Table 3.1**). A total of 116 high-validity mentions are noted across the additional three categories explored in this study, which reflect the substance of the NAP vis-à-vis the NDC to adequately capture the importance and distinctiveness of these references.

[39] Cambodia, NAP, 7 July 2021
[40] Guatemala, NAP, 2 August 2019
[41] South Africa, NAP, 29 September 2021
[42] Tonga, NAP, 27 October 2021
[43] Uruguay, NAP, (Executive Summary English), NAP (Executive Summary (Spanish), NAP (Agriculture) 3 December 2019
[44] Central African Republic, NAP, 16 February 2022
[45] Chad, NAP (English) NAP (French), 15 February 2022
[46] Niger, NAP, 14 November 2022
[47] South Sudan, NAP, 1 November 2021
[48] Sudan, NAP, 26 September 2016

FIGURE 3.1: TYPOLOGY OF OVERARCHING THEMES IN THE NAPS (2023)



CLIMATE CHANGE HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

As observed in the study of the first-round NDCs, climate change is frequently recognized as having implications for peace and security in the NAPs. In this regard, a comprehensive understanding is observed, including references to human, national, and international peace and security. About 15% of the total number of classified high-validity mentions make a specific connection to security. The dominant related themes include the interactions with climate hazards, vulnerability and impacts, gender considerations – including violence against women, human mobility, displacement trends, and food insecurity. These cut both ways with some countries and territories acknowledging increased violent conflict following specific climatic events (e.g., droughts in Cameroon) while others indicate that some climate hazards are leading to increasing risks for peace and security (e.g., the CAR). A synthesis of how the NAPs have characterized climate change increases risks for peace and security is summarized in the bullets below:

- **Climate hazards/impacts:** almost 90% of the references to climate change and its implications for peace and security can be characterized by the way that climate change hazards and impacts are viewed as undermining resilience and represent a potential driver for current and future conflicts as they are considered a threat multiplier. Drought, sandstorms, coastal zone erosion, extreme events, and reduced

crop and livestock production are the most cited hazards and impacts. However, it is not just the physical impacts of climate change that are regarded as a security issue alone. Climate and extreme weather impacts occurring in tandem, sequentially or repeatedly together with conflict and insecurity are a recurrent topic too. This is highlighted, for example, by Chad in the Lake Chad Basin region, but also Timor-Leste, where destruction of 50-90% of homes and 442 sucos are attributed to floods, landslides and violence in 1999.[49]

- **Gender considerations:** There are several references to the role of gender and climate-related security risks. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),[50] the NAP notes a clear link between climate change vulnerability and the instability of women's lives. This is associated with having to move unexpectedly from their homes destroyed during conflict episodes thereby increasing their vulnerability to climate change. In Kiribati,[51] the public health system recognizes gender-based violence (GBV) and mental health as a double-burden of climate change on the health of women. In Fiji,[52] the NAP notes an increase in cases of sexual and GBV during environmental and climate events. Violence against women and girls is also highlighted as a risk in Peru's NAP in collecting water for domestic use, often far away from a place of abode and moreover, in the case of economic dependence on men in a dedicated section on the indirect effects of climate change vulnerability, respectively on water and agriculture. In the case of Benin, [53] women's incomes are described as more precarious than men's following extreme weather events and men's mobility as being higher, leaving women with greater economic responsibilities and exposed to GBV and HIV infection.

- **Human security:** There are explicit mentions of human security in the NAPs. Niger [54] notes the number of conflicts in the world has increased over the last decade, at a global level and the elevated levels of resulting displacement and the knock-on effects on the fragility of ecosystems. It makes the connection between human insecurity and the insecurity (degradation) of wetland ecosystems and calls for more research on the nexus between peace, security and wetlands (le nexus paix – sécurité – zones humides).

- **Displacement trends:** There are two direct references to climate, the displacement of communities and insecurity. In the DRC, internal migration is recognized as driven partly by conflicts and resulting in agricultural land fragmentation and deteriorating soil quality which then decreases adaptive capacity. In Liberia,[55] coastal erosion continues to pose increasing threats to coastal cities' shorelines, including major infrastructure and investments which have led to displacement, loss of lives and properties, thereby affecting security. There are many other broader references to climate change and human mobility, and more broadly on human mobility in its different manifestations, some which go beyond the scope of this study. See **Box 3.1 Climate, peace and human mobility** below, for human mobility-related references, the sub-section, **Sub-regional and cross-border impacts** on connections to the increased climate change vulnerability of refugees and the next section on climate change and seasonal transhumance.[56]

[49] Chad, NAP (English) NAP (French), 15 February 2022
[50] Democratic Republic of Congo, NAP, (English) NAP (French), 6 July 2022
[51] Kiribati, NAP, 21 January 2020
[52] Fiji, NAP, 12 December 2018
[53] Benin, NAP, 8 July 2022
[54] Niger, NAP, 14 November 2022
[55] Liberia, NAP, 16 December 2021
[56] For more information see: United Nations (2020). Preventing, Mitigating & Resolving Transhumance-Related Conflicts in UN Peacekeeping Settings. New York: United Nations.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/transhumance_and_un_pkos_final_web.pdf

BOX 3.1. CLIMATE, PEACE AND HUMAN MOBILITY

There are many broader references to climate change and changing mobility in the NAPs. This includes the elevated levels of climate change vulnerability of displaced persons and their dependence on natural resources in wetlands, in Niger. Dedicated water reservoirs for transhumance in the case of Togo is seen as positive way to reduce conflict between herders and farmers. In a dedicated section on "Transnational considerations in climate change adaptation planning," South Sudan also highlights the vulnerability of almost a quarter of a million refugees, it hosts, who have fled violence from neighbouring Sudan and that climate and extreme weather events may be an indirect factor "as a driver of the conflicts that force people from their home." Sea level rise-related displacement and impacts on conflict are also referenced by Togo in its NAP.[57] Immobility is likewise recognized, in the case of those in living in the Lake Chad Basin region, where populations trapped by conflict suffer not only from conflict itself, but also climate which together add further pressures and undermine coping capacities. The security situation is described as limiting the access of both refugees and host communities to land and fishing areas. In the case of shared natural resources, in particular transboundary water resources, the role of regional actors: Niger Basin Authority and the Lake Chad Basin Commission is stressed in adaptation and peace outcomes.

- **Food insecurity:** While there are numerous references to food security and/or agriculture as impacted by climate change, there are few detailed and specific references to how food insecurity is linked to climate-related security risks. In Togo,[58] climate change is considered a source of food insecurity and as a potential source of social instability and future conflict. In the CAR, the combination of food insecurity, deforestation, and conflict are viewed together as linked to climate change.
- **National security:** Armenia[59] stresses that its NAP is in alignment with its national security objectives. Moreover, a coherence is also noted, as the 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia is also highlighted as making reference to climate change and adaptation issues.[60] In Albania,[61] the adequate reflection of potential climate change-related water conflicts within foreign policy is highlighted as an area for future policy discussion, the need for mainstreaming and a lack of an approach to do so.

[57] For more information on see IOM, UNP and UNEP (2021) "Integrating Migration Into Environment and Climate Change Interventions." https://www.undp.org/publications/integrating-migration-environment-and-climate-change-interventions
[58] Togo, NAP, 17 January 2018
[59] Armenia, NAP, 24 September 2021
[60] A dedicated section in Armenia's NAP, on "Rehabilitating, Protecting, and Improving the Environment" outlines the importance of natural resources to national security, as well as the priorities of remediation, biodiversity preservation, and "global climate change and increasing resilience and adaptability, including a reduction in land damaged by mining, preventing the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of natural areas, as well as a reduction in levels of atmospheric air pollution." For further details see: 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia – A Resilience Armenia in a Changing World. https://www.mfa.am/filemanager/security%20and%20defense/Armenia%202020%20National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf
[61] Albania, NAP, 27 October 27 2021

CLIMATE CHANGE EXACERBATING EXTANT CONFLICT DYNAMICS, INCLUDING OVER LAND, WATER ACCESS, FORESTRY AND FISHERY RESOURCES

Climate change as exacerbating underlying conflict dynamics accounts for around 50 references, or just under 10% of the total number of classified high-validity mentions which is consistent with the mainstream understanding of the issues and the broader research on this topic. For these references, there is a connection made between climate change impacts and increasing competition over water and land resources. The dominant themes include security issues intersecting with resource scarcity, resource management, and positive adaptation potential. These intersections start from a baseline of pressure across livelihood communities (i.e., farmers, herders, fisherfolk, energy facility owners) on constrained land and water resources, etc. A synthesis of how the NAPs have characterized how climate change is exacerbating extant conflict dynamics over land/water access is summarized in the bullets below.

- **Resource scarcity:** Almost all of the references characterized the intensification of resource scarcity due to climatic conditions as a strong driver for increased current and future conflicts among different resource user groups. Increasing rainfall variability and more frequent climate impacts such as drought, sandstorms and flooding are putting pressure on communities to expand their search of land and water resources to sustain their livelihoods. In the Sahel, violent conflicts between herders and farmers are often attributed, in the NAPs, due to pastoralists expanding or changing livestock grazing range that encroaches on farming communities or the traditional pasturelands of other pastoralists. For Kiribati, potential increases in conflict arise between subsistence fisherfolk and commercial fishing activities over declining fish stocks. All these instances are linked to high demand for – and low productivity of – natural resources leading to increased conflicts over scarce resources. Costa Rica[62] not only identifies the increased cost of hydropower, salinization of fresh water and scarcity of water resources during dry seasons, but also increased conflict over water resources as a result of climate change and their interactions with underlying drivers of vulnerability.

- Beyond actual and potential violent or social conflicts, other manifestations of insecurity are clearly noted in various NAPs, as also evident in NDCs (UNDP, 2020). South Sudan observes increased cattle theft after droughts and floods. In addition, Chad references increased displacement in the Lac region, due to the presence of Boko Haram which is accelerating "environmental instability" as well as increased tensions between herder and farmer groups, in addition to the "spillover effects" of conflict from Sudan. Clashes between armed opposition groups and state security forces are also referenced in the mix. Likewise in addition climate change and lack of water forcing subsistence herders to seek out new water sources, sometimes encroaching on protected areas in the process and resulting in agro-sylvo-pastoral conflicts, elites play a role in tandem, by capturing land, but not developing it to the detriment of landless peasants. Timor-Leste likewise describes "climate change-driven social unrest and insecurity."

- **Resource management:** numerous references are made in the NAPs to the perceived link between conflict-sensitive water, land, and forestry management plans and either the intensification or deintensification of extant conflict dynamics over land/water access. In Brazil,[63] climate change impacts on run-of-river hydro plants could impact the management of reservoirs in a way that is unconnected to local needs, leading to an intensification of water use conflict. In Saint Lucia,[64] the establishment of transparent river usage zoning and regulations is intended to improve the integrity of riverine ecosystems and water quality, and lead to a deintensification of water-use conflicts. In South Sudan, the upscaling of traditional conflict management systems to address projected increase in conflicts due to climate change is expected to lead to a deintensification of farmer-herder conflicts.

[62] Costa Rica, NAP, 5 May 2022
[63] Brazil, NAP (English), NAP (Portuguese), 12 May 2016
[64] Saint Lucia, NAP, 21 September 2018

CONFLICT, FRAGILITY AND INSECURITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO CLIMATE ACTION AND ADAPTATION

Lack of security as an obstacle to climate action accounts for some 40 classified keyword mentions, or about 15% of the total number of classified high-validity references. For these mentions, there is a clear link between the underlying drivers of conflict and insecurity and the prospects for the implementation of effective adaptation actions. The dominant themes are climate intersecting with political instability, socioeconomic drivers, and weak institutions. In the case of the State of Palestine,[65] in appraising its adaptive capacities, it notes that energy security is precarious due to its security situation. These interactions start from a baseline of fragility that has the effect of hindering effective climate action. A synthesis of how NAPs have characterized fragility and the lack of security as an obstacle to climate action is summarized in the bullets, below:

- **Political instability:** Political instability is described as hindering the advancement of climate change adaptation priorities in various NAPs. In Burkina Faso,[66] political instability is noted as a risk to at-risk populations and the management of vulnerable zones. In Niger, political instability has hampered an adaptation initiative that promotes improved access to agro-meteorological information and strengthens organizational capacities of livestock owners. In Haiti, recurrent political instability, extreme weather events and more recently COVID-19 are noted to have impacted the tourism sector. There are also references to social stability to keep in mind too, this includes for example, Cabo Verde.[67]
- **Weak institutions:** Issues related to institutional capacities, including weak environmental regulations, poor development planning, and fragility resulting from past or current conflict, instability, and insecurity are a recurrent theme. South Sudan makes several references to the importance of institutions. Its NAP recognizes that forests and wetlands, seen as critically important for climate change adaptation, are at risk due to weak institutional capacities.
- **Socioeconomic drivers:** The remaining references are to the lack of security as one of several factors that conspire to impair the delivery of adaptation activities. In Sierra Leone,[68] efforts to improve quality of life are noted to be hampered by the combination of extreme poverty, structural weakness in the economy, and civil conflict. These socioeconomic drivers are having the effect of making the country even more vulnerable to climate change impacts.

[65] State of Palestine, NAP, 11 November 2016
[66] Burkina Faso, NAP (English) NAP (French), 15 October 2015
[67] Cabo Verde, NAP (English) NAP (Portuguese), 23 October 2022
[68] Sierra Leone, NAP, 8 February 2022

BOX 3.2: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF WAR

Various NAPs make reference to the challenges and increased vulnerabilities due to conflict and in some cases, explicitly reference a "post-conflict LDC" context. The environmental impacts of war[69] is a topic that is addressed directly in some NAPs, and indirectly in others. Timor-Leste refers to the challenges of a lack of availability of credible data sets due to conflict related to disasters and disaster impacts. The destruction of weather stations during the civil war in South Sudan impacting data capabilities and also during the civil war in Sierra Leone, as resulting in a lack of data on precipitation, in their respective NAPs. Apart from the toll of the physical destruction to infrastructure in Sierra Leone, political instability related to the civil war period is also recognized to impact on vulnerabilities today. Unexploded ordinance will affect land use and availability in often resource-constrained and climate vulnerable environments, as described by South Sudan. Overexploitation of wildlife was also noted by South Sudan, with combatants and civilians alike left dependent on wildlife for survival during the war and a decline in conservation personnel of the same period. Kuwait[70] notes the impacts of the Gulf War and climatic conditions on both land and agriculture. It can be observed that many of the "low validity" references also relate to the environmental impacts of war and/or violent conflict which if more fully considered could help inform analysis and results. Overall given their wide-reaching impacts and even when conflict ended many years previously, there is still a need to consider in NAP processes, the environmental impacts of war on vulnerability and adaptation planning.

CO-BENEFITS OF ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND SUSTAINING PEACE

The co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation to prevent conflict and sustain peace account for six keyword mentions. While the term "co-benefits" is mentioned recurrently in the NAPs, no explicit connections are made to climate-related security risks.[71] Clear indirect references to co-benefits of the use of certain adaptation measures on the lessening of ongoing conflict dynamics is noted.

Niger reports that recent transboundary coordination on adaptation efforts around Niger River and the Lake Chad Basin, together respectively with the Niger Basin Authority and the Lake Chad Basin Commission have helped to reduce conflicts over resources in wetland areas. The Niger NAP also includes improved climate information and forest management effects as having effective the co-benefit of reducing conflicts among natural resource users.[72]

[69] The ICRC originally produced guidance, in the form of the "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict" in 1994, responding to a request from UN General Assembly. Reflecting the developments in related international legal frameworks, this has since been updated. For more information, see the ICRC (2020). Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict Rules and Recommendations relating to the Protection of the Natural Environment under International Humanitarian Law, with Commentary. Geneva: ICRC. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4382-guidelines-protection-natural-environment-armed-conflict

[70] Kuwait, NAP, 11 February 2021

[71] Nearly all these mentions are focused on the co-benefits of adaptation initiatives on achieving GHG mitigation goals (i.e., improved efficiency of energy use and materials consumption) or vice-versa.

[72] Niger, NAP, 14 November 2022

MEASURES TO INTEGRATE CLIMATE, PEACE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Measures to integrate climate and security considerations account for about 30% of the total number of high-validity references. The high number of references to adaptation measures is unsurprising given the intended scope of the NAP process to propose high priority measures to adapt to climate change. What is surprising is the number of mentions of concrete measures that aim to integrate climate and security considerations. For these mentions, three types of measures are indicated: project-based measures, capacity building measures, and system management measures. A synthesis of how NAPs have characterized measures to integrate climate and security considerations is summarized in the bullets below.

- **Project-based measures:** The majority of references made are to specific adaptation projects. These project ideas span the range of communities and resource systems that are vulnerable to both current conflict situations and climate change. All of these measures address conflict prevention and mitigation measures as part of adaptation project design. In the CAR, numerous measures are proposed aimed at improving livestock management and food production systems in a way that can decrease the risks of conflict. In Sudan, all measures to address increasing rainfall variability and recurring drought in rural areas are intended to be designed in a conflict-sensitive manner.

- **System management measures:** Many references are also made to water or land management initiatives, in which conflict prevention and mitigation measures are explicitly addressed. In Niger, new rangeland management systems are proposed in support sustainable pastoralism practices as a way of reducing conflict associated with extreme climatic events. Niger also proposes integrated water/conflict management initiatives and sustainable water use as a way of reducing conflict associated with recurrent drought episodes in water basin. Fiji and Kiribati, as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), propose management-based initiatives with a clear link between climate change and security issues (e.g., adaptation, disaster risk management training and awareness focused on safety, security and livelihoods). In Ethiopia,[73] conflict management itself is viewed as part of coping mechanisms in response to climate-induced resource scarcity in some regions of the country.

- **Capacity building measures:** The remaining references address conflict-sensitive capacity building measures. In Cameroon,[74] building adaptive capacity is viewed as a no-regrets strategy that makes society less vulnerable to climate change but also less vulnerable to political instability. In Niger, the need to engage the range of key stakeholders and institutions, in accessing and applying climate change information in support of peacebuilding is considered a strategic priority. In particular, empowering local actors including traditional and religious leaders is noted as critical to ensuring peace and harmonious cooperation in given the pivotal role they play in addressing food insecurity and ensuring the social cohesion of their communities.[75] Paraguay's[76] NAP calls for addressing existing capacity gaps for the application of integrated management of water resources, particularly in the planning, protection, supervision, resolution of conflicts.

[73] Ethiopia, NAP, 1 March 2019
[74] Cameroon, NAP, 26 October 2015
[75] Niger, NAP, 14 November 2022
[76] Paraguay, NAP (First NAP), 3 May 2020 Updated NAP 14 July 2022

SUB-REGIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER IMPACTS

There is an understanding conveyed in various NAPs about the impacts of regional, sub-regional and cross-border impacts of conflicts and insecurity and interactions with climate change vulnerability and risks. Sub-regional and cross-border impacts account for a very small number of direct references overall. However, if counting compound and indirect references, there are many more valuable references. Dominant themes in these NAPs include the way that climate change is aggravating migration as well as transboundary movements and the increased climate change vulnerability of refugees in host countries. Various countries and territories including Chad, the DRC, Ethiopia, Niger, the State of Palestine, Peru,[77] South Sudan, and Togo address these particular issues. Except for Peru, it is noted that all are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and territories.

As abovementioned, South Sudan addresses extensively the needs of its refugee population in a dedicated section on "Transnational considerations in climate change adaptation planning." This section also explores cross-border wildlife cooperation through transboundary peace parks, with a memorandum of understanding already signed with Uganda and planning underway for similar agreements with Ethiopia, Kenya, the CAR, and the DRC; in addition to transboundary water resource issues; and as abovementioned, refugees and human mobility.

The DRC stresses the impacts of the broader changes in the regional context, including displacement but also immobility as exacerbating vulnerability to climate change, while inflows of refugees are noted as a concern for fragile wetland ecosystems. Given the increasing impacts of climate change an anticipatory approach is recognized as necessary by South Sudan. Likewise, Ethiopia explicitly stresses that climate change adaptation planning will need to take into account the well-being of "environmental refugees."

CLIMATE-SECURITY LINKS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IN NEED OF MORE RESEARCH

Calls for research to develop a better understanding of the climate, peace and security intersection and how it may inform analysis of climate change vulnerability and adaptation planning accounts for more than a dozen different references. It was surprising to find that NAPs identified the need for more research to better understand the interlinkages, as opposed to limiting adaptation action to project- or management-oriented ideas. Madagascar's[78] NAP calls for research on the evolution of pastoralism as affected by climate change to identify ways to lessen future conflict among farmers and pastoralists. Niger considers the development of a better understanding of the climate-peace-security nexus as fundamental to the design of effective adaptation measures. South Sudan's NAP highlights the need for a long-term research plan to further understanding of the nexus between climate change, migration and conflict. Timor-Leste[79] calls for a short-term priority to undertake research to inform a White Paper with policy recommendations addressing the nexus of climate change adaptation, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. As abovementioned, Albania[80] highlights a lack of understanding of how to reflect potential climate change-related water conflicts within foreign policy.

The effects of relocation due to sea-level rise and coastal erosion, etc. also need to be further explored and adaptation planning to address. Land use conflict are mentioned by Saint Lucia as likely to occur due to the relocation of coastal populations and activities, Kiribati also notes that relocation may result in increased conflicts, over water use and land ownership, but also with the potential relocation of public infrastructure due to coastal erosion, and between subsistence and commercial fisheries due to the reduction in fish stocks.

A lack of understanding of climate change impacts may also be a factor in identifying climate-related security risks. This may be true in conflict-affected and fragile contexts, where security needs and humanitarian response prevail as the most urgent priorities, but not limited to such. In the case of Grenada,[81] its NAP describes crime and violence, together with unemployment and poverty as being considered the most pressing challenges for Caribbean countries. By comparison, it highlights that less than two percent of those surveyed by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States regarded climate change as one of the most important issues for the region. Conclusive conclusions cannot be drawn from this exercise only.

[77] Peru, NAP, 22 July 2021
[78] Madagascar, NAP, 29 May 2022
[79] Timor-Leste, NAP, 31 March 2021
[80] Albania, NAP, 27 October 27 2021
[81] Grenada, NAP, 6 November 2019

PEACE AND SECURITY IN VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT/SCOPING AND ADAPTATION PLANNING

The integration of conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches in vulnerability assessment/scoping and adaptation planning accounts for around 10% of the total number of high-validity references. For these mentions, there is a clear intention to move beyond traditional approaches to vulnerability assessments and adaptation planning in which the focus is limited to impacts on physical systems (e.g., forestry, water, agriculture) and traditional frameworks for assessing livelihood sustainability (i.e., reliance on socioeconomic indicators such as occupation, education, income, and wealth) and explicitly account for climate-related security risks through new methods, tools and the broadening of adaptation planning processes. The dominant themes are oriented toward the need to mainstream peacebuilding needs and approaches within vulnerability assessments and adaptation planning, as well as the reverse – that is, to mainstream climate action within peacebuilding initiatives themselves. A synthesis of how NAPs have characterized security issues in vulnerability assessment/scoping and adaptation planning is summarized in the bullets below.

INTEGRATION OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITHIN ADAPTATION PLANNING

The need to mainstream conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches within the adaptation planning process accounted for most of the classified mentions. Suriname,[82] Kenya,[83] and Brazil urge for conflict prevention and resolution to be integrated into adaptation planning, including specific suitably empowered bodies, contingency plans and allocation of water during drought conditions in the case of Brazil. South Sudan notes that climate-conflict links are not fully understood, but recognizes anecdotal evidence of conflicts and cattle rustling increasing after drought and flood events and the need for more research. It nevertheless recognizes the importance of peacebuilding approaches to be incorporated into climate change adaptation planning and policies, as climate change "poses multiple threats that have the potential to derail South Sudan's development and peace-building trajectory." [84]

The Sudan NAP stresses that adaptation planning should include revision of property right laws and the development of new land dispute mechanisms. In recognition of the link between adaptation, peacebuilding, and women's empowerment, Timor-Leste calls for mainstreaming climate change impacts in adaptation planning and priorities with a view toward gender equity and inclusion frameworks. Chile's[85] NAP calls for improved institutional frameworks for resource planning, including allocation, protection, control and conflict resolution.

- *Peacebuilding actors, approaches and initiatives:* There are different concrete examples of mainstreaming climate action into peacebuilding initiatives. In South Sudan and the CAR, it takes the form of calling for developing a toolkit that can support the integration of climate change adaptation within conflict/peacebuilding programmes based on the best practices emerging from other country contexts. South Sudan goes further in urging the coordination of adaptation planning within the National Dialogue for Peace and Reconciliation as well as the identification of entry points to support mainstreaming climate change adaptation within peacebuilding initiatives. Colombia[86] also makes reference to the need to focus on climate change adaptation efforts to consolidate "territorial peace." In addition to these direct references, there are separately various other good peacebuilding practices which are noted in relation to strengthening adaptation outcomes. Niger, as abovementioned, highlights the role of regional actors: Niger Basin Authority and the Lake Chad Basin Commission in both adaptation and peace outcomes. At a local level, it also describes the role of local and religious leaders given their people's daily lives to adaptation, peace and social cohesion.

[82] Suriname, NAP, 2 June 2020
[83] Kenya, NAP, 28 February 2017
[84] South Sudan, NAP, 1 November 2021
[85] Chile, NAP, 7 September 2017
[86] Colombia, NAP, 27 February 2018

- *Integration of conflict sensitivity and resolution mechanisms within vulnerability assessments:* Integrating conflict sensitivity and resolution mechanisms within vulnerability assessments accounts for the remaining high-validity references. Chad's NAP stresses accounting for conflict management at regional scale within disaster preparedness modeling while Madagascar's NAP calls for starting to use the number of water-use conflicts noted as an indicator to evaluate the extent to which vulnerability is reduced by measures to improve access to drinking water in urban and rural areas. Adaptation modeling is described, in Colombia's NAP, as necessary to better understand interactions between environment and socio-economic development, develop appropriate policies and identify potential conflicts over natural resources, as impacted by climate change.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN NAP PROCESSES

There are more than 50 references to climate change in relation to peace and security, or just over 10% of the total number of high-validity references. The DRC's NAP indicates that priority adaptation actions account for conflict sensitivity, enhanced social cohesion, and long-term peace and prosperity. Social cohesion is a surprisingly frequently referenced concept too. It is mentioned three times by Niger in its NAP, including in response to conflicts over pastoral resources and thus sustainable ecosystems management which have also been impacted by climate change.

Timor-Leste likewise identifies conflict sensitivity and social cohesion as guiding principles in its NAP preparation. Burkina Faso also references the maintaining and strengthening of social cohesion as a targeted outcome of proposed pastoralism initiatives. South Sudan aims to align the NAP process with the goal of reinforcing peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The NAP process in Timor-Leste was designed with a view to addressing the nexus of climate change adaptation, nation-building, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. Other NAPs that addressed this theme include those submitted by the CAR, Liberia, Nepal,[87] Peru, Sri Lanka,[88] and Suriname. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[89] makes reference to a "culture of peace and non-violence" in examining connections with NAP and SDG achievement.

[87] Nepal, NAP, 30 October 2021
[88] Sri Lanka, NAP, 1 November 2016
[89] Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, NAP, 14 November 2019

BOX 3.3: EMERGING GOOD PRACTICES FROM THE NAPS ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY AND PEACE

Conflict analysis – the use of a conflict analysis is identified as a measure by South Sudan under the objective to "[i]dentify synergies between peacebuilding and adaptation objectives, and incorporate joint peacebuilding-adaptation objectives and actions into appropriate policy and strategy frameworks at the national, sectoral, and subnational level," in addition to a toolkit for adaptation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[90]

Gender – various countries including Fiji and Kiribati note greater attention to gender and GBV is needed particularly following climate-related disasters, where women's income generating opportunities may also be more limited and usual social protections may not be available.

Research on climate security interlinkages – research to be commissioned to inform a White Paper with policy recommendations which address climate change adaptation, peace building, and conflict resolution in Timor-Leste.

Policy coherence – Timor-Leste's climate change NAP makes numerous references to the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security 2016-2020 as there is no standalone gender policy. The participation of Timorese women, is stressed as important to in the NAP process and to peace and state-building efforts.

Regional/ cross-border solutions for adaptation and peace – Transboundary Peace Parks in South Sudan with neighbouring countries are intended to build trust and advance cooperation on adaptation into biodiversity and protected area management.

Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms – the support of elders to sought in conflict resolution in the Afar, Somali and Oromia regions in Ethiopia, traditional mechanisms are stressed by other countries including Timor Leste and South Sudan which notes in its own context, that such traditional mechanisms need to be scaled up, in response to increasing climate change impacts.

[90] South Sudan, NAP, 1 November 2021


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4. Conclusions

This report attempts to take stock of how climate-related security risks are framed and addressed in the 44 NAPs published up to the period ending March 2023, by conducting an analysis, and applying and expanding on the typology of emerging themes originally developed by UNDP with the UNFCCC, in 2020. The findings of this study show that climate, peace and security interlinkages are increasingly recognized in the context of assessing climate change vulnerability and developing adaptation policies. Notably, the most frequently made reference is to measures to integrate peace and security considerations which accounts for nearly a fifth of all references. The theme of climate change exacerbating extant conflict dynamics over access to natural resources accounts for the second-most at over 10% of all references. Another common narrative is climate change as a "threat" or "risk multiplier" effect in relation to natural resource-based conflicts. In this regard, there are many references to the increased risk of conflict among farmer, herder and/or fishing communities that rely on constrained water resources, land availability and fish stocks. This also points to the need for greater sector-specific analysis and action plans.

For the most part, countries and territories which are currently experiencing acute conflict dynamics make the most comprehensive references to climate-related security risks. South Sudan, Niger, Chad, the CAR, and Sudan taken together account for over half of all references. Notably, these countries ranked amongst the ten most fragile countries and territories in 2022, with the exception of the NAPs by Niger[91] and the DRC, which are outliers in this comparison. A high number of references to climate-related security risks are made by Niger, around 10% of the total even though it has a comparatively lower ranking in terms of its fragility at twentieth overall vis-à-vis the other countries. In contrast, the DRC is ranked as the sixth most-fragile state while having a disproportionately lower number of references at 3% of the total. For several countries and territories, matters of conflict, insecurity and fragility are clearly of importance to and should not be ignored in NAP processes.

Whereas the related NAPs do not address such factors and how they may or may not interact with underlying climate change vulnerabilities and/or impede climate change adaptation planning and implementation. This may indicate a lack of awareness and the need to strengthen the NAP process. Peacebuilding processes in such countries should likewise take reference from the NAP. The quick scan process provides lots of valuable reference points which can be useful to NAP and climate change adaptation policy development, but has its limitations too. A search of the key terms used across all countries and territories did not yield any other positive results in the case of South Africa. It is noted that some specific contextual references are not captured through a simple quick-scan process alone, for example, South Africa's NAP, which refers the impacts of "post-apartheid political and policy landscape." Another example is the impacts of activities by violent extremist organizations, including Boko Haram on displacement and environmental stability, which are noted, including by Chad.[92] In the study, the nuances of many of the references are addressed in more detail, in **section 3, Typological classification of the National Adaptation Plans**. In-depth country level analysis beyond the scope of the NAPs would be a useful way forward.

Many of the NAPs were submitted before the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic, the wide-reaching effects on the global economy, energy and food prices and socio-economic stability will thus not be reflected in the NAPs, but will be salient. Regional dynamics accounted for the second lowest number of valid references overall, but are nevertheless important.

[91] South Sudan ranked third; Chad, as ninth; the CAR was ranked as fifth; and Sudan, seventh. For full details, please see: The Fund for Peace (2022). Fragile States Index - Annual Report 2022. Washington DC, 2022. https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22-FSI-Report-Final.pdf

[92] Also see: UNDP (2020). Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism. New York: UNDP.

The NDCs and NAPs vary very much in terms of the scope of analysis and identified actions from one country or territory to another, with NAPs going much further than NDCs in addressing peace and security issues. This suggests that finding coherence between the processes can be beneficial. In terms of the low-validity references which have been included, in some instances they are not relevant at all, in others they are actually insufficiently explored themes which otherwise, if fully developed, could provide indications of where further research and/or or technical assistance is needed on climate, peace and security interlinkages. This includes the environmental impacts of war (see **Box 3.2**) which are referenced in numerous instances. Numerous NAPs propose priority adaptation actions that explicitly address the need to strengthen conflict sensitivity, enhance social cohesion, and/or the promotion of long-term peace and prosperity.

Moreover, there are NAPs that directly call for more research to better understand climate, peace and security linkages; suggesting a broadening of the scope of vulnerability assessment methods; and proposing that conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches be integrated within adaptation measures being implemented. Taken together, these demonstrate opportunities for flexible adaptation planning and policymaking that address drivers and root causes of conflict and insecurity, but also to maximize peace co-benefits and sustain peace. Efforts like the COP 27 Presidency initiative, “Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace” can provide a platform to take forward such efforts working together with a broad range of partners and stakeholders.

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