

2. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Secretary-General for having arranged to send a mission to Lesotho to ascertain the assistance needed;
3. *Endorses* the report of the Mission to Lesotho under resolution 527 (1982);
4. *Requests* Member States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist Lesotho in the fields identified in the report of the Mission to Lesotho;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the matter of assistance to Lesotho his continued attention and to keep the Security Council informed;
6. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

NOTES

- ¹ S/15515. *OR*, 3 7th yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1982*.
- ² See chap. III of the present *Supplement* for details.
- ³ 2409th mtg., paras. 3 and 113.
- ⁴ 2406th mtg., paras. 6-11.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 16-37.
- ⁶ S/15524, adopted without change as resolution 527 (1982).
For the vote, see 2407th mtg., para. 3.
- ⁷ 2407th mtg., paras. 6-17.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 25-46.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 5-168.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. X2-97.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 111-125.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, paras. 128-132.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, paras. 149-161.
- ¹⁴ 2408th mtg., paras. 18-26.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 29-39.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 42-55.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 73-84.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 87-100.
- ¹⁹ 2409th mtg., paras. 18-29.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 33-46.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 94-101.
- ²² *Ibid.*, paras. 116-124.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, paras. 127-160.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 161 and 162.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 167-205.
- ²⁶ S/15600.
- ²⁷ 2455th mtg.
- ²⁸ S/15846, adopted as resolution 535 (1983).
- ²⁹ For the vote, see 2455th mtg.

15. LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By a letter dated 19 February 1983 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the deteriorating situation near the Libyan shores that could jeopardize the security and peace of the region and the world. The letter stated that the situation had arisen from the provocative military action of the United States Administration's moving its aircraft-carrier *Nimitz* with some naval vessels close to the Libyan coast and sending four AWACS aircraft to one of the neighbouring countries. In a letter² dated 18 February 1983, the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had called to the attention of the Council the

seriousness of such provocations by one of its members,

At its 2415th meeting, on 22 February 1983, the Council included the item in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of its provisional rules of procedure, the Council invited the following, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote: at the 2415th meeting, the representatives of Benin, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ghana, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic; at the 2417th meeting, the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Madagascar and Viet Nam; and at the 2418th meeting, the representatives of Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba and Ethiopia. At the 2416th meeting, the Council invited Mr. Clovis Maksoud and at the 2418th meeting it invited Mr. Ike F. Mafole, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.³ The Council considered the item at its 2415th to 2418th meetings, on 22 and 23 February 1983.

At the 2415th meeting, the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya reviewed Libyan-American relations and discussed reasons for the present American hostility against his country. Referring to several previous communications,⁴ he quoted numerous violations of the Libyan airspace and territorial waters by the United States Air Force and Navy. Citing various American newspapers, he dismissed the American claims that the movement of the American Sixth Fleet and the AWACS had been related to the alleged Libyan mobilization on the Sudanese borders with a view to interfering in the affairs of that country.

He quoted *The New York Times*, which said that "the plan, according to American officials, was to lure Libya into striking and then to destroy as much of its air force as possible". He condemned the United States' strategy of intervention in the affairs of States that refused to acquiesce in its policies and interests. He accused the United States of shirking its responsibilities as a major Power and a permanent member of the Council. He charged that the United States was indeed at the vanguard of international terrorism which was part of the daily conduct of its policy.

He concluded that although the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was convinced of the goodwill of most of its members it knew that the Council would be unable to adopt any effective measures in view of its structure. However, the Council had to face its responsibility and condemn the aggression. What had happened to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya might happen to other States unless an end was put to the arrogance and cynicism of the United States Administration.⁵

The representative of the United States referred to the letter⁶ dated 22 February 1983 to the President of the Council, in which the Government of the United States had rejected the charges of the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and had called attention to what was called a threat to international peace and security posed by the policies of the Libyan Government. The United States Government and the American people had never sought, and did not seek, any confrontation with the Government or the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and had never engaged

in acts of provocation. But there should be no doubt that the United States would respond, as appropriate, to Libyan threats.

She described briefly the events that had led to that situation, beginning with the official announcement by Sudanese Radio of the discovery of a **Libyan-backed** plot against the Government of President Gaafar Nimeiry, and mentioned in particular the concentrations of Libyan aircraft, which were of concern to the Sudanese and the Egyptians. Because of the situation, the United States had moved up the date of an AWACS training exercise and had sent AWACS and tanker aircraft **into** Egypt, and had also deployed the United States naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Their presence in **international** waters seemed to have a deterring effect on Libyan adventurism in the region.

She added that a major fact of Libyan foreign policy had been and remained subversion and destabilization of moderate independent Governments in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere and mentioned Chad as a recent principal victim of the aggressive policies of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The United States representative warned that her country would intervene wherever and whenever it felt that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was threatening a country that was friendly to the United States. All States with aggressive designs on their neighbours would be discouraged by the lawful response of others such as the United States, and would desist from their unlawful **plans**.⁵

At the 2416th meeting, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic **said** that the American provocations and acts of aggression against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had drawn his Government's attention to the following: (a) they coincided with Washington's military and economic offensives to reimpose its hegemony on the area as a whole; (6) the direct American provocations by land, sea and air came on the heels of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the aggression against the Arab forces, which proved that the provocations served the **purpose of implementing** the economic, geographical and political **dimensions** of the Camp David Agreement; and (c) the provocations fell **within** the worldwide American policy of creating tension at the international, regional, national and domestic levels from Latin America to Asia. The latest threat against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was another attempt to subjugate the Arabs to the Camp David logic. The Syrian Arab Republic urged the Council to consider the complaint by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with the utmost responsibility and concern.'

The representative of Nicaragua stated that the actions taken by the United States Government against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya manifested derogatory rhetoric against Libyan leaders, destabilization plans, zealous **international propaganda** campaigns, attempts at economic blockades and technology boycotts as well as threats and acts of aggression. Such an aggressive attitude seemed to ignore the fundamental principles embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. But the peoples of the third world were on the alert to defend resolutely their independence and territorial integrity.'

The representative of Malta stated that his country's commitment to peace and security in the Mediterranean had inspired it to propose at the European Security Conference held at Madrid the

convening in Malta later that year of a meeting of experts to discuss questions **relating** to security in the Mediterranean as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. Malta was particularly worried about the active deployment in close proximity to its territory of warships and other **military** equipment. For Malta, it was clear that the regional States themselves bore the main responsibility for safeguarding the peace and security of their region. From the outside Powers Malta requested genuine cooperation to enable the region to evolve the collective effort.'

The representative of China said that the third world countries should and could **find** fair and reasonable solutions to their differences through peaceful consultations. No foreign infringement of the independence, sovereignty and **territorial** integrity of those countries, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, should be allowed, nor was outside interference in their internal affairs **permissible**.⁷

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran condemned the American military presence and intervention in the Middle East in general, and the recent American threat to the Libyan Arab **Jamahiriya** in particular. He deplored that no revolutionary people or Government could be immune from American conspiracies and expressed his delegation's hopes that the Council could demonstrate its independence and its commitments to the Charter so as to exert pressure upon the United States as one of its **permanent** members in order to prevent it from following such destructive policies in different parts of the world.'

The representative of Democratic Yemen said that the brief scenario produced and directed by the United States Administration was actually part of a campaign in African and Arab capitals to bring pressure to bear on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to undermine the African Summit Conference scheduled to be held at Tripoli.'

The representative of the Sudan accused the **Libyan** leadership of the attempt to prevent the Sudan from exercising full sovereignty over its territory and from pursuing foreign and domestic policies **reflecting** the aspirations of its people. He also charged the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with disregarding the principles governing normal conduct among nations, including the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the principle of the **non-use** or threat of force in international relations. He informed the Council of acts of aggression and provocation by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the Sudan, including a **Libyan** plan to overthrow the legitimate Government of the Sudan. Faced with those grave events, the Sudan had taken defensive measures to thwart that plan and to preserve its own independence and territorial integrity in co-operation with all friendly and fraternal countries. He **expressed** support for the measures taken by the United States Administration in that respect. He appealed to the Council to follow closely developments in that area caused by the Libyan policy, which had negative consequences for the programmes of development required by the countries of the region.'

The representative of **Egypt** made clear before the Council that Egypt was **fully** committed to defending fraternal Sudan, **in** response to its request and to the extent that would be agreed upon. **All** Egypt wished from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was to work for the consolidation of peace and security in the area.'

At the 2417th meeting, on 23 February 1983, the representative of Poland recalled that the States members of the Warsaw Pact for years had been putting forward proposals concerning the lowering of the level of deployment of the naval forces of the opposing military blocs in the Mediterranean. They were in favour of withdrawing nuclear-equipped vessels from the Mediterranean and of renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Mediterranean non-nuclear countries.⁸

The representative of Viet Nam mentioned the **anachronistic** position of the United States with regard to the extent of the territorial waters of coastal States. Ignoring the new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which had extended the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, the United States Administration persisted in recognizing a limit of only 3 miles.⁸

At the 2418th meeting, on 23 February 1983, the representative of Pakistan said that the air and naval activities in the eastern Mediterranean had created fears concerning their impact on the **security** of States of the region. Pakistan had taken note of the expression of those fears and hoped that States Members of the United Nations would have recourse to the Council whenever they perceived a threat to their security, instead of resorting to the threat or use of force to achieve their objectives. Only in that way would the Council be enabled to function as an effective instrument for the maintenance of **international** peace and security as provided for by the Charter. He appealed to all the parties concerned to co-operate in taking steps to reduce tension in the region and to avoid any precipitate action that might endanger international peace and **security**.⁹

Then the President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the Soviet Union, said that for some years the authorities in Washington had been pursuing a systematic campaign of threats and intimidation against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and its leaders. The United States was seeking to militarize the region of the Middle East, to expand direct American military presence and to interfere in the affairs of States in that area. In places beyond the reach of its strategic ally--Israel--Washington turned up as a self-styled **arbiter** trying to dictate its conditions to other countries. There was another aspect of those recent events, which should not be forgotten: Was the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya the only target of the United States attempts to wave the big stick? It would be closer to the truth to say that the actions of the Administration were aimed against all non-aligned countries, particularly those that did not want to go along with the hegemonistic policies of the United States aimed at subverting the basis of international relations, leading to a further exacerbation of tension in that already explosive region of the Middle East. He called for an immediate end to such acts of provocation against the Libyan Arab **Jamahiriya**.⁹

At the end of the 2418th meeting, the President declared that the Council had concluded for the day its consideration of the agenda item and adjourned the meeting.

NOTES

¹ S/15615, OR, 38th yr., *Supplement for Jan.-March 1983*.

² S/15614, *ibid.*

³ For further details regarding participation in the proceedings of the Council, see chap. III of the present *Supplement*.

⁴ S/10939, OR, 28th yr., *Suppl. for April-June 1973*; S/14094, *ibid.*, 35th yr., *Suppl. for July-Sept. 1980*; S/14636, *ibid.*, 36th yr., *Suppl. for July-Sept. 1981*; S/14860, *ibid.*, 37th yr., *Suppl. for Jan.-March 1982*; and S/15614, *ibid.*, 38th yr., *Suppl. for Jan.-March 1983*.

⁵ 2415th mtg.

⁶ S/15617, OR, 38th yr., *Suppl. for Jan.-March 1983*.

⁷ 2416th mtg.

⁸ 2417th mtg.

⁹ 2418th mtg.

16. **LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHAD TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

Decision of 6 April 1983: Statement by the President of the Council

By letter dated 16 March 1983 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Chad requested an urgent meeting of the Council in order to consider the extremely serious situation resulting from the occupation of a part of Chad's territory by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and from repeated acts of aggression by that country against the people of Chad. The letter charged that since 1973 the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had occupied a part of Chad's territory commonly known as the Aouzou Strip, and had also openly intervened in the internal affairs of Chad in **flagrant** violation of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

At its 2419th meeting, on 22 March 1983, the Council included the item in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote: the representatives of Chad, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and the Sudan; at the 2428th meeting, the representatives of Benin, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Niger, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Republic of Cameroon; and at the 2429th meeting, the representative of **Ghana**.² The Council considered this item at its 2419th and 2428th to 2430th meetings, from 22 March to 6 April 1983.

At the 2419th meeting, the representative of Chad stated that the situation in his country was serious and disturbing because of the outright intervention of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Chad and the occupation by force of the part of Chad territory commonly known as the Aouzou Strip, which in fact represented the Tibesti sub-prefecture of more than 150,000 square kilometres. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had attempted to take over that part of Chad's territory as far back as 1971 and had occupied that territory since 1973.

In the view of the Government of Chad, the situation endangered the very existence of Chad as a sovereign State and as a member of the international **community** and it constituted a serious danger to the peace and territory of that part of the African continent.⁷

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stated that the Government led by the **former**