29 January 1999





For the sake of greater transparency and for the benefit of all Members of the United Nations, we should be grateful if you would have the text of the reports drawn up by the Special Commission on the current state of affairs with respect to the disarmament of Iraq's proscribed weapons and on ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, dated 25 January 1999, circulated as a document of the Security Council.


(Signed) Danilo TÜRK (Signed) Peter van WALSUM

Ambassador Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Permanent Representative of

the Republic of Slovenia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

the United Nations to the United Nations


Letter dated 25 January 1999 from the Executive Chairman of the

Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant

to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

addressed to the President of the Security Council


With this note, I have the honour to forward to you two reports drawn up by the Special Commission: one on the current state of affairs with respect to the disarmament of Iraq's proscribed weapons; the other on ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq. It is thought that these materials may be useful to members of the Council.


(Signed) Richard BUTLER

(Pages 3-280 are offset)

Enclosure 1


1.     The present report is intended to address those disarmament issues under relevant Security Council resolutions for which the Special Commission is responsible. It comprises four main parts:

            record and methodology;

            priority issues in disarmament;

            three annexes providing the status of verification of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes; and


            an annex on actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament;

Record and methodology

2.     Paragraphs 8 and 9, in section C of resolution 687 (1991), provide that Iraq shall agree to the "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision of" the following:


        all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres;

        all related major parts;

        all repair and production facilities;

For both chemical weapons and biological weapons:

        all weapons;

        all stocks of agents;

        all related subsystems;

        all related components;

        all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities.

3. For the conduct of this work, the resolutions of the Council established a three-step system: full disclosure by Iraq; verification of those disclosures by the Commission; destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all proscribed weapons, materials and facilities.

4. From the inception of the relevant work, in 1991, Iraq's compliance has been limited. Iraq acknowledges that, in that year, it decided to limit its disclosures for the purpose of retaining substantial prohibited weapons and capabilities.

5. Actions by Iraq in three main respects have had a significant negative impact upon the Commission’s disarmament work:

Iraq’s disclosure statements have never been complete;

contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items;

it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions.

6. Historical references made in this report to the relationship between the Commission and Iraq are for the sole purpose of describing the environment in which the Commission’s disarmament work took place and its impact on the accounting for proscribed weapons.

7. The Commission's work has taken five main forms:

evaluation and analysis of Iraq’s declarations;

inspections of relevant sites in Iraq;

interviews of Iraqi personnel connected to proscribed weapons programmes;

seeking access to and study of relevant Iraqi documentation;

seeking assistance from Member States, particularly through the provision of relevant information, as required of them by the Security Council.

8. As has been reported to the Council, over the years, and as has been widely recognized, notwithstanding the very considerable obstacles placed by Iraq in the way of the Commission's work, a great deal has been achieved in: verifying Iraq's frequently revised declarations; accounting for its proscribed weapons capabilities; and in destroying, removing or rendering harmless substantial portions of that capability. A complete and detailed record of the Commission’s disarmament work in Iraq would be considerably more voluminous than the three weapons related Annexes to this report.

9. Those Annexes focus on the material balances of proscribed weapons, major components and agents - and in some cases production equipment and facilities - as defined in paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 687 (1991). It must be pointed out that in many instances the data given in the Annexes rests on an acceptance of Iraq’s basic declarations. The Annexes provide a material balance and an accounting of the totals declared by Iraq. This does not imply that the accuracy of the declared total has itself been verified, in all cases.

10. The Annexes do not cover in depth other obligations of Iraq under the relevant resolutions, such as with respect to full disclosure of research, development, know-how and procurement in the respective weapons areas. Although progress has been made in the verification of these obligations, many have not been resolved. For example, the Commission awaits responses from a number of Governments in order to be able to verify Iraq’s declarations on its foreign procurement for its proscribed weapons programmes.

11. In the BW area, the report has to cover all elements of Iraq’s biological warfare programme as Iraq’s declaration in this area cannot, in its totality, be verified by the Commission as being full, final and complete. For this reason it is not possible to present a material balance in this area when there is no firm basis for either side of such a balance.

12. Three basic points about this disarmament record need to be made. First, the overall period of the Commission's disarmament work must be divided into two parts, separated by the events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. General Hussein Kamal. This which resulted in the provision to the Commission of an extensive cache of documents on Iraq’s prohibited programmes. These documents and subsequent disclosures by Iraq indicated that, during the first four years of its activities, the Commission had been very substantially misled by Iraq both in terms of its understanding of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes and the continuation of prohibited activities, even under the Commission’s monitoring. Positive conclusions on Iraq’s compliance reported to the Council previously by the Commission had to be revised. They were conclusions generally based on accepting Iraq’s declarations at face value. Analysis of the new material shaped the direction of the Commission’s subsequent work including the emphasis on: obtaining verifiable evidence including physical materials or documents; investigation of the successful concealment activities by Iraq; and, the thorough verification of the unilateral destruction events.

13. Secondly, the Commission has been obliged to undertake a degree of forensic work which was never intended to be the case. This was derived, virtually exclusively, from Iraq's inadequate disclosures, unilateral destruction and concealment activities. These actions, all of which were contrary to the resolutions, made the Commission’s work more difficult and, in many cases, continued even after 1995. Had this behaviour not occurred, a far less searching inquiry by the Commission would have been necessary. The work of verification of Iraq's declarations would have and should have been far easier and should have been able to be undertaken far more quickly than has proven to be the case. Such concerted obstructions naturally raise the question of why Iraq has carried out these activities.

14. Thirdly, these overall circumstances have meant that, in spite of the years that have passed and the extensive work that has been undertaken, it has not been possible to verify, fully, Iraq's statements with respect to the nature and magnitude of its proscribed weapons programmes and their current disposition.

15. With respect to this latter point, two comments are apposite. First, Iraq's current claims that; it has fulfilled all of its disarmament obligations in each weapons area; ceased concealment policies and actions; and, that it has neither proscribed weapons nor the ability to make them are not able to be verified.

16. Secondly, documents or records available in Iraq in which relevant details of its proscribed programmes and actions are set out: production and acquisition records; records of disposition of weapons; and, records of claimed destruction, relevant policy decisions and decisions on termination of concealment, would be invaluable in helping to close remaining gaps and achieve acceptable confidence in Iraq’s declarations. The Security Council recognised these two aspects in resolution 707 (1991) when it demanded Iraq provide immediate and unconditional access to, inter alia, records, and, demanded that Iraq cease attempts to conceal prohibited materials.

17. In response to the Commission's requests for relevant documents, Iraq has repeatedly claimed that they no longer exist or cannot be located, a claim which often has been shown to be false, either because inspection activities have in fact located precisely such documents or because Iraq has reversed its stated position and then produced relevant documents. The Commission briefed the Council on its assessment of the existence and importance of documents in June 1998. The Commission has assessed that the documents provided in August 1995 were only selected categories of documents were provided and that other categories were retained by Iraq. It remains the Commission’s strong view that, under the present circumstances, relevant documentation exists in Iraq and that provision of such documentation is the best hope for revealing the full picture, as required by the relevant resolutions.

18. On certain other occasions, Iraq has not claimed that documents sought by the Commission do not exist but has stated instead that they are not relevant to the Commission. The judgement of relevance of any given document is for the Commission, not Iraq, to make, as has been recognized by the Security Council.

19. In August 1998, Iraq declared that unless the Commission could demonstrate that Iraq retained prohibited items, then it must declare that Iraq had fully implemented its obligations under section C of resolution 687. This is contrary to the system established by the Council which imposed upon Iraq the obligation of full disclosure and upon the Commission the duty to verify those disclosures. Were a reversal of these obligations to be accepted, the possibility of serious error would be high as it is Iraq which controls access to the most fundamental information. The Commission remains convinced that Iraq has the capacity to provide credible information thus allowing the Commission to have confidence in an accurate declaration, when it is provided.

20. Notwithstanding the fundamental sources of difficulty described above, and building on both its past achievements and the substantial body of knowledge of Iraq's proscribed programmes the Commission assembled, in June of 1998, and indicated, first to the Security Council and then to Iraq, what it believed to be the remaining priority issues in disarmament, in particular as regards proscribed weapons. This reflected the Commission’s understanding of the desire of the Council to focus on selected important parts of the requirements of its resolutions. The methodology used in drawing up this list was to focus on unaccounted proscribed weapons and to set aside other aspects such as fully verifying production capacities, research activities, etc. Satisfactory resolution of the specific "priority issues" would make it easier to conclude that other unverified elements were of lesser substantive importance. Conversely, the inability of Iraq to satisfy these issues would point to more ominous explanations for other unverified parts of Iraq’s declarations. Whether these other parts will ultimately be addressed is an open question, but one which has a direct bearing upon confidence in future monitoring.


21. In the view of the Commission, a correct understanding of the nature of the list of priority issues is essential. It should rest on the following considerations.

22. First, these remaining issues must be resolved as they are the necessary conditions for an acceptable material balance in each of the three weapons areas for which the Commission is responsible.

23. Secondly, it should be noted that, even if full resolution was able to be made of these priority issues, this would not mean that there had been a full accounting of all of the proscribed materials and activities listed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of section C of resolution 687 (1991), as summarized in paragraph 2 of this report. However, their full accounting would considerably increase the level of confidence of the Commission’s overall verification.

24. Thirdly, if the priority issues are not able to be satisfactorily resolved, then it is likely that the settlement of so-called non-priority outstanding issues will assume a greater importance in achieving confident verification.

25. Finally, the implications of not achieving a credible resolution of the priority disarmament issues needs to be considered, both with respect to the assessment of Iraq’s compliance, as well as its implications for the system of ongoing monitoring and verification.

Priority issues in the missile area

Proscribed Missile Warheads

Special Warheads

26. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which had been excavated at the sites of the unilateral destruction. The October 1998 meeting of international experts convened by the Commission concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq’s declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq’s declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.

27. The Commission found that Iraq’s explanations on procedures and methods of unilateral destruction of the special warheads were, in general, plausible. In one aspect related to the destruction of BW warheads, the Commission, after consulting a group of international experts, assessed that Iraq’s declaration that 15 warheads had been destroyed simultaneously conflicted with physical evidence collected at the declared location of their unilateral destruction. This finding indicated that not all BW warheads had been destroyed at the same time as claimed by Iraq and that Iraq had retained some BW warheads after the date of the declared July 1991 unilateral destruction. Obviously, any retained warheads after the declared destruction date would be an indication that not all proscribed missiles for such warheads were destroyed as claimed by Iraq. The discrepancies between Iraq’s declarations and the physical evidence collected need to be resolved. In addition, the Commission’s investigations showed that, despite repeated attempts, Iraq had not provided the true locations of the hiding, immediately prior to the declared unilateral destruction, of at least half of the special warheads including abovementioned 15 BW warheads. Iraq’s continuous inability to disclose hide sites of the special warheads has also prevented the Commission from verification of the declared unilateral destruction of the special warheads.

Conventional warheads

28. The full and verifiable accounting for proscribed missile conventional warheads remains outstanding in the verification of the premise that Iraq has not retained any holding of proscribed missiles and that all proscribed missiles and their warheads indeed had been destroyed. Issues related to remnants of warheads that have not been recovered, but which have been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed (some 25 imported warheads and some 25 Iraqi manufactured warheads), remain unresolved in the accounting of proscribed warheads that Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. Iraq has not provided a definite explanatory statement for the Commission to be able to determine the reasons why no remnants to account for some 50 warheads declared as unilaterally destroyed, were recovered.

Proscribed Single-Use Liquid Missile Propellant

29. The full accounting for imported proscribed missile propellants is outstanding. Any retention of such propellants would be an indication that not all proscribed missiles were destroyed as claimed by Iraq. The propellants at issue are used exclusively for such proscribed missiles only. Documents, including an inventory list on their declared unilateral destruction, requested by the Commission, have not been made available by Iraq to support its declaration on the quantities (over 500 tonnes) of proscribed propellants it claims to have destroyed unilaterally.

Proscribed Indigenous Missile Production

Complete missiles

30. An inventory of proscribed missiles that Iraq declared as destroyed unilaterally contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles which were in possession of the Army in 1991. No remnants which could prove such destruction, have been recovered. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles and repeatedly requested Iraq to confirm, through physical evidence, the declared unilateral destruction of these seven missiles. The verification in this area is considered essential as it might involve operational missiles produced indigenously by Iraq. The November 1997 Emergency Session of the Commission determined that the accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements.

Major components

31. It should be noted that due to the methods used by Iraq for the declared unilateral destruction and lack of supporting documentation made available by Iraq, the verifiable material balance of major proscribed components for indigenous missile production could not be established, or that this work would take a prolonged period of time. Iraq is required to provide, inter alia, unambiguous physical evidence of the unilateral destruction of combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies for indigenously produced missiles and documentary evidence sufficient for complete accounting of all indigenously produced major missile parts and for verification of their unilateral destruction.


Priority issues in the chemical weapons area

Material Balance of Chemical Munitions

Expenditure of chemical munitions in the 1980s

32. In July 1998 during an inspection the Commission found a document which detailed the consumption of special munitions by Iraq in the 1980s. Iraq took the document from the Chief Inspector and did not return it to the Commission despite demands by Security Council that it do so. The figures in this document indicate serious discrepancies with Iraq’s declarations on the expenditure of CW-munitions in the 1980s. According to this document, Iraq consumed about 6,000 chemical aerial bombs less than it is stated in its declarations. This invalidates the starting point of the Commission’s accounting for chemical weapons which remained in 1991. The provision by Iraq of this document together with clarifications of the discrepancies is required to increase the degree of confidence with respect to Iraq’s declarations of chemical weapons which remained in Iraq in 1991 and their disposition.

550 Artillery shells filled with Mustard

33. Iraq declared that 550 shells filled with mustard had been "lost" shortly after the Gulf War. To date, no evidence of the missing munitions has been found. Iraq claimed that the chemical warfare agents filled into these weapons would be degraded a long time ago and, therefore, there would be no need for their accounting. However, a dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a former CW storage facility in the period 1997-1998. The chemical sampling of these munitions, in April 1998, revealed that the mustard was still of the highest quality. After seven years, the purity of mustard ranged between 94 and 97%. Thus, Iraq has to account for these munitions which would be ready for combat use. The resolution of this specific issue would also increase confidence in accepting Iraq’s other declarations on losses of chemical weapons which it has not been possible to verify.

R-400 Aerial Bombs

34. Among 1,550 R-400 bombs produced by Iraq, more than 1,000 bombs were declared as destroyed unilaterally by Iraq, including 157 bombs stated as having been filled with biological warfare agents. The accounting for about 500 bombs unilaterally destroyed has not been possible due to the state and extent of their destruction. In order to bridge the gap, the Commission asked Iraq to provide documentation on the disposition of the parachute tail sections of R-400 bombs. The accounting for these components would enable the Commission to verify the maximum number of R-400 bombs, which Iraq could have produced. Though this would not solve the specific issue of the quantity and composition of BW bombs, including allocation of BW agents, it may facilitate the final accounting for the chemical R-400 bombs. Iraq presented the information sought on the disposition of tail sections but field inspection activities are still required to verify the full accounting for these weapons.

Accounting for the Production of the Chemical Warfare Agent VX

35. The degree of verification achieved is not satisfactory. Iraq declared that it had produced a total of 3.9 tonnes of VX. Iraq provided documents on production in 1988, but failed to provide verifiable evidence for its activities in 1990. Iraq also denies that it weaponized VX. Sampling by the Commission of special warheads has thrown significant doubt upon this claim. Iraq needs to provide verifiable evidence and clarifications to support its declarations on the production and weaponization of VX. Technical meetings with the Iraqi specialists and field verification are required.

Material Balance of CW-Production Equipment

36. One hundred and ninety-seven pieces of glass CW production equipment were removed by Iraq from its prime CW facility prior to the Commission’s arrival in 1991 and were repeatedly moved in shipping containers between several facilities throughout Baghdad until 1996. This production equipment from two of 20 shipping containers was destroyed under the Commission’s supervision in 1997. To ensure that all CW production equipment removed from the CW facility has been accounted for, the Commission requested Iraq to provide its clarifications on their movement. Iraq presented such clarifications in July 1998. Field verification is still required to increase the degree of confidence that all equipment has been accounted for.

Priority issues in the biological weapons area

37. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991 and until July 1995, Iraq denied that it had had any proscribed biological warfare (BW) activities. Based on the results of its inspection and verification activities, the Commission assessed and reported to the Council in its report of April 1995, that Iraq had not provided an account of its proscribed biological programme nor accounted for materials and items that may have been used or acquired for such a programme. The Commission stated that with Iraq’s failure to account for the use of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological warfare agent. Iraq was provided with evidence collected by the Commission. On 1 July 1995, Iraq, for the first time, acknowledged that it had had an offensive BW programme but still denied any weaponization. Subsequently, in August 1995, after the departure form Iraq of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents and deployed biological weapons for combat use.

38. Since August 1995, Iraq has submitted a number of "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures" (FFCD) of its declared BW programme. These declarations have been assessed by the Commission and by international experts as incomplete, inadequate and containing substantial deficiencies. They were not accepted as a full account of the scale and the scope of Iraq’s BW programme. This refers in particular to weaponization of produced BW agents, bulk BW agent production and acquisitions for the BW programme.

39. In the Commission’s view, Iraq has not complied with requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions on the disclosure of its biological warfare programme. A full, complete and verifiable disclosure of all its biological weapons activities needs to be presented by Iraq.

40. Because Iraq has failed to disclose fully, the scope and nature of its BW programme, the priority issue in this weapons area involves the whole scope of the BW programme. This means that Iraq must furnish a complete and verifiable disclosure as a matter of absolute first priority. The Commission would then need to assess and verify that disclosure.

41. Finally, it needs to be recognised that Iraq possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base, through which biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume, if the Government of Iraq decided to do so.



Appendix 1



1. In its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities. To that end, Iraq was specifically required:

to submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of the resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all such items in the missile area;

to agree to urgent, on-site inspection by the Special Commission of its missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

to destroy, under supervision of the Special Commission, all its missile capabilities, including launchers.

2. The inadequacy of Iraq's initial declarations was one of the elements leading to the adoption of Security Council resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, in which the Council, inter alia, demanded that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD), as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations.

3. With Iraq’s full cooperation and its commitment to the implementation of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions, these tasks in the missile area could have been accomplished in a relatively short period of time. Instead Iraq has chosen a course of withholding its proscribed missile capabilities and obstruction of the Commission’s work. Examples of this policy were Iraq’s decision, immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, to retain two-thirds of its operational force of proscribed missiles and the concealment of its capabilities to indigenously manufacture proscribed missiles with liquid propellant engines.

4. By the end of 1991, the Commission had completed the task of the destruction of proscribed missile weapons and materials that Iraq had chosen to declare immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). At that time, the Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq had not declared all its holding of such weapons nor disclosed all its proscribed capabilities and programmes. In March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had withheld from the Commission a considerable amount of proscribed weapons and their component, and declared that it had destroyed them unilaterally in Summer 1991 without the Commission’s supervision. This unilateral destruction by Iraq was in direct violations of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

5. The Commission's verification has subsequently focussed on the following main tasks:

the accounting of all proscribed missiles and related operational missile assets, including missile launchers, warheads and propellants in particular those declared as destroyed unilaterally;

the accounting of indigenous production of proscribed missiles and related major parts;

obtaining a full understanding of other issues related to Iraq’s missile activities and capabilities proscribed by the Security Council.

6. Through its verification process, the Commission has been accumulating evidence that Iraq’s initial and subsequent disclosures of proscribed weapons holdings and missile capabilities were inadequate. This required additional actions by the Commission to dispose of proscribed items, identified through the verification process, as well as new declarations to be presented by Iraq. In August 1995, Iraq admitted that important information on its proscribed programmes had been hidden from the Commission including a considerable amount of documentation. As a consequence, Iraq agreed to prepare a new Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in the missile area. Such an official declaration was provided by Iraq in November 1995. The Commission did not accept this declaration as either a full or complete disclosure. Iraq submitted another FFCD in June 1996. The latter document, supplemented subsequently by numerous Iraqi explanations and clarifications, has been the basis for the Commission’s verification activities.

7. In June 1996, Iraq and the Commission established a Joint Programme of Action and agreed to concentrate work on certain fundamental areas. The first priority among them was the material balance of proscribed weapons and their major components. The other established priorities were: the unilateral destruction of proscribed items; further provision of documentation, when available, related to proscribed weapons programmes; and the identification of measures taken in 1991 and the measures used by certain individuals to retain some proscribed items until August 1995. Subsequently, the June 1996 Joint Programme of Work was elaborated through discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman.

8. This paper provides, in broad terms, information on the current status of the material balances of proscribed operational weapons and capabilities in the missile area. The material balance approach has been the cornerstone of the Commission’s verification effort. This approach has been designed to allow the Commission to reconcile, in a reasonable but verifiable manner, the quantities and the types of proscribed weapons and their major parts, acquired by Iraq either through production or importation, with the quantities of these items disposed of through consumption or destruction or rendering harmless. Throughout this process, it has been Iraq’s responsibility alone to provide sufficient evidence to support its own data and declarations on both sides of this equation.

9. The methodology adopted in this paper, is to indicate, based on the most recent declarations from Iraq, quantities of proscribed items available to Iraq, and then provide factual statements as to how the declared quantities have been accounted for. Where feasible, the data is presented in a tabular format for ease of comprehension.

10. The paper’s focus is on proscribed missile systems that either had been made operational by Iraq or had been close to an operational status. The paper also provides a report on the status of missile repair and production facilities which were required to be destroyed or rendered harmless under resolution 687 (1991). Iraq’s other proscribed missile capabilities are dealt with only to the extent required for the paper’s main focus.

11. Beyond the material balances related to proscribed missiles and the status of relevant facilities, the paper does not address other issues that were investigated by the Commission and which may or may not have reached a satisfactory resolution. This includes Iraq’s efforts related to the development of missiles or their sub-systems which have been assessed by the Commission as not having achieved operational status or which would not contribute substantially to proscribed operational capabilities already available to Iraq. Examples of such issues are missile delivery means for nuclear weapons, parachute retarded missile warheads "Meteo 1", separating missile warheads, undisclosed warhead designs, Iraq’s efforts to develop missiles with ranges from 1000 to 3000 kilometers and Iraq’s space launch vehicle, Al-Abid. Issues related to retention by Iraq of expertise in the proscribed missile area, and design/production/assembly documentation as well as military infrastructure of the proscribed missile operational force have not been addressed in this paper. The paper does not describe the Commission’s investigations of Iraq’s foreign procurement in support of its proscribed missile activities.

12. Section 1 of the paper provides a status report of the material balances of proscribed missiles and related operational assets. Section 2 describes the status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles, their related major parts, production equipment, and the status of missile repair and production facilities. Section 3 summarises missile activities in Iraq after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) relevant to the verification of its proscribed activities.

Section 1: "Status of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets"

13. For the purpose of the verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets, the Commission has focussed on the following key items: the missiles as well as their launchers, warheads and single-use propellants for proscribed missiles. The Commission has also investigated the accounting for other elements of operational assets such as key missile guidance and control instruments and auxiliary vehicles for missile fuelling, transportation and testing. The Commission has determined that the full accounting of these latter elements, despite remaining ambiguities, could be considered secondary in importance, provided a solid and verifiable accounting of the selected key items is established.


14. Iraq declared that it imported 819 long-range combat missiles that fall under prohibitions established by resolution 687 (1991). Over half of them were modified by Iraq, since 1987, into missiles known in Iraq as Al Hussein class missiles. Al Hussein missiles used by Iraq during recent wars had a range of some 650 kilometres.

15. The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq’s importation of SCUD-B class missiles from any but a single supplier. The data on the missile deliveries, serial numbers of missile engines and other components that was provided to the Commission by the supplier, was essential in establishing the material balance in this area. Table 1 provides a summary of the material balance of the 819 proscribed combat missiles imported by Iraq.

Table 1

Expenditure/disposal event

Declared quantity

Accounting status

Pre-1980 expenditures, such as in training


Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq.
Expenditure during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), including the War of the Cities in February-April 1988


Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq’s data on some of these missile firings, in particular during the War of the Cities, was corroborated by independent sources.
Testing activities for development of Iraq’s modifications of imported missiles and other experimental activities (1985-1990)


Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq’s data on a number of these test firings was corroborated by independent sources.
Expenditures during the Gulf War (January-March 1991)


Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. Iraq’s data on nearly all of these firings was corroborated by independent sources. A discrepancy in the accounting of a small number of fired missiles exists between Iraq’s data and data provided by other sources.
Destruction pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (early July 1991)


UNSCOM verification during the destruction.
Unilateral destruction by Iraq (mid July and October 1991)


Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. The Commission carried out laboratory analysis of remnants of the unilaterally destroyed missiles excavated in 1996-1997. The Commission identified remnants of engines from 83 out of the 85 missiles declared.

16. As a result of the emergency session of the Special Commission on 21 November 1997, the members of the Commission stated that they were "satisfied that 817 of the 819 proscribed missiles imported by Iraq have been effectively accounted for".

17. In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission an inventory of missiles destroyed unilaterally. This inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles, in addition to the 85 imported missiles. The November 1997 emergency session determined that accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles. (For more details, see Section 2, below)

18. In July 1991, the Commission supervised the destruction of 9 Fahad missiles. Fahad missiles were Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missiles that Iraq modified for a surface-to-surface application, with ranges over 150 kilometres. Twenty-one flight tests of Fahad missiles were declared to have been conducted by Iraq before the Gulf War. No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq to ascertain how many such missiles were modified. Unmodified Volga missiles declared by Iraq in 1996 are currently under the Commission's monitoring in order to ensure their non-modification for a surface-to-surface application or for delivery of non-conventional warheads.

Missile Launchers

19. Iraq declared that, during the Gulf War, it had 14 combat mobile launchers for Al Hussein class missiles, including ten which had been imported and four which were indigenously produced. It also imported one launcher of this type for training purposes. Iraq declared that it had indigenously constructed two mobile launchers that had not been made operational, and that it had three experimental prototype mobile launchers.

20. The quantity of imported launchers has been confirmed by the supplier. The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq’s importation of this class of proscribed missiles launcher from any but this supplier.

21. Iraq declared that it had acquired from a foreign supplier ten 50-tonne flatbed trailers suitable for the construction of indigenous mobile launchers. This information has been confirmed by the supplier. Six of these trailers were converted to the abovementioned indigenously produced mobile launchers, called Al Nida. The Commission verified the destruction of the launching equipment erected on these six trailers, and allowed Iraq to use, for non-proscribed purposes, these and the four other, unused trailers that had been imported.

22. Iraq declared that 28 operational fixed launchers for Al Hussein class missiles had been deployed. In addition, 28 "stand-by", training, testing or decoy fixed launchers were constructed or were under construction.

23. Table 2 provides a summary of the material balance of mobile and fixed missile launchers.

Table 2


Declared quantity

Accounting status

Imported combat mobile launchers


5 launchers destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991. 5 launchers destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. Remnants of all 10 launcher vehicle chassis, launching arms and stools were identified in August 1997. It was not possible to identify remnants of all launching and support equipment from these launchers.
Imported training mobile launcher


Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991.
Indigenous combat operational mobile launchers (Al Nida)


Launching equipment and two associated launch control vehicles were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq and the identification of some remnants of destruction. The trailers of the launchers were released by the Commission for use in non-proscribed activities.
Indigenous non-operational mobile launchers (Al Nida)


Launching equipment and two associated launch control vehicles were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. The trailers of the launchers were released by the Commission for use in non-proscribed activities.
50-tonne trailers suitable for Al Nida launchers


Released by UNSCOM for use in non-proscribed activities. 3 of these trailers have been seen by UNSCOM. In November 1997, Iraq declared that the fourth, missing trailer had been stolen and could not be located.
Indigenous prototype launchers


Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.
Fixed launch sites (completed or under construction)


Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision or their destruction certified by UNSCOM.
Completed control panels for indigenous launchers


2 sets were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. 22 sets were declared to have been destroyed by Iraq unilaterally. Some remnants of destroyed panels have been seen by UNSCOM.

24. The Commission's verification efforts, with respect to Iraq's declarations on combat missile launchers, have been frustrated by Iraq's misleading statements. Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that several imported mobile launchers had been destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1992, it declared that those launchers had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. This statement was repeated in Iraq’s June 1996 FFCD. In the course of its follow-up verification, the Commission established that Iraq's statement on the unilateral destruction of mobile missile launchers was wrong. This finding was presented to Iraq by the Commission in July 1997. Iraq then made a new statement, in August 1997, that five imported launcher chassis had in fact been destroyed in October 1991, and not in July 1991, as had previously been declared by Iraq. A fuller explanation of Iraq's actions to retain mobile launchers after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) and to conceal the events and timing of their unilateral destruction was requested. In September 1997, the Commission asked Iraq to explain the operational requirements for the retained proscribed missile assets that Iraq had concealed after April 1991. In response, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave an explicit order, in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission.

Missile Warheads

25. Iraq declared that it had imported 819 combat warheads for proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al Hussein class and that 121 combat warheads of the same type had been produced indigenously or had been under production at the time of adoption of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq’s declarations on the material balance in this area have changed several times. Table 3 provides a summary of the material balance of declared warheads based on Iraq’s most recent declarations of 1998.

Table 3

Expenditure/ disposal event

Declared quantity


Accounting status