Preventing the further
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The importance of on-site inspection in Iraq
Lecture by Dr. Hans Blix,
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
at the Third Training
Course of UNMOVIC
Vienna, 19 February 2001
The Gulf War was fought ten years ago to
liberate Kuwait. The objective was
attained in a short period of time.
However, the world is still grappling with the question whether Iraq
retains some weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles or dedicated capacity
to produce these deadly items. And
Iraq, which was one of the most advanced States in the Middle East – with
excellent schools, universities and health care – has been tragically set
decades back by the combined effect of the long war with Iran, the Gulf War and
sanctions.
I propose to discuss the measures taken by
the United Nations Security Council regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction in the context of the broader international efforts to prevent the
spread of such weapons and their means of delivery globally.
Iraq used chemical weapons in the war
against Iran and against its own citizens.
It used long-range missiles both in the Gulf War and against Iran. So its capacity in these two respects was
known to the world, when the cease-fire was concluded in 1991. Iraq’s achievements in the spheres of
nuclear and biological weapons was not known at the time, but the cease-fire
conditions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) stipulated broadly that
Iraq must be rid of all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles and facilities to produce them.
These provisions of the resolution must be
seen as expressions of the Council’s determination to eliminate the danger
which Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction would present to its
neighbours, but also as a part of the Council’s global efforts to prevent
the further spread of weapons of mass destruction.
In paragraph 14 of the resolution, the
disarmament requirements for Iraq were described as “steps towards the goal of
establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction
and all missiles for their delivery”…
Thus, although the Council has not linked the disarmament of Iraq with
the establishment of a zone, it showed a disarmament vision that went beyond
Iraq and that envisaged future mutually reinforcing commitments from States in
the region.
The regional approach to
non-proliferation is, indeed, one that commends itself especially in areas
where there could be risks of arms races between neighbouring States. While agreement on a zone free of all
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles cannot be negotiated in the
current political climate in the Middle East, zones free of nuclear weapons
have been established in a number of other regions of the world. Indeed, the regional nuclear-weapon-free
zones cover the whole of the Southern hemisphere. While Cuba has yet to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty covering South
and Central America and the Caribbean, The Rarotonga and Bangkok treaties cover
South Asia and the South Pacific, and South Africa’s walk back from a nuclear
weapon capacity allowed the African nuclear- weapon-free zone treaty to be
concluded.
The reference in Security Council
resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) to a Middle East zone free of weapons of
mass destruction was thus to a concept that was well established for nuclear
weapons.
The years since the end of the Cold War have
seen a growing international engagement – including a summit meeting on the
subject in the Security Council – against proliferation. In several respects this engagement has
been successful. In a few cases it has
failed. It is sobering to realize that
if it had not been for the Gulf War and the revelations and disarmament
measures that it brought, Iraq would have been equipped with arsenals of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles to deliver them. Iraq would have constituted a case of
flagrant and dangerous failure.
Let me for a moment discuss the
international non-proliferation efforts apart from NWFZ – regarding the
different types of weapons of mass destruction and for long-range missiles.
The effort to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons beyond the five Permanent Members of the Security Council has been
more successful than many had thought possible and, yet, not as successful as
all had wished. The efforts have
focused on making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal but it has also aimed
at promoting nuclear-weapon-free zones and comprised ad hoc approaches,
as in the cases of Iraq and the DPRK.
The efforts have also been paralleled and helped by quantitative
reductions by Russia and the United States, which have very substantially
reduced their nuclear weapons arsenals.
The UK and France have also undertaken some back-scaling. All this has contributed to a welcome global
reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and a limitation in the number of
nuclear weapon States. Today, not only
NGOs but also many governments demand plans for a complete elimination of
nuclear weapons, a goal that may be somewhat distant but is now acknowledged
and accepted by all. While all this is
encouraging, other developments in the nuclear sphere are not.
Three States – beyond the five – are
generally deemed to possess nuclear weapons:
Israel, India and Pakistan.
While none of these States had adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
their possession of nuclear weapons nevertheless obviously constitutes
proliferation beyond that which is represented by the five Permanent Members of
the Security Council.
The DPRK has agreed to suspend its
indigenous nuclear programme in return for assistance in the building of two
nuclear power plants to be placed under international inspection. In the Middle East, lastly, Iraq was found
to have violated its obligation under the NPT, to have mastered the technique
of enriching uranium and to have been close to developing a nuclear
weapon. The ability of the Security
Council to hold Iraq to the nuclear-weapon-free status to which it had
committed itself by adhering to the NPT is evidently important not only for the
credibility of that treaty, and for future efforts to achieve a zone free from
WMDs in the Middle East, but also for the global outlook. A revival of the nuclear weapons programme in
Iraq would be a grave and colossal failure.
The IAEA is charged by the Security Council to map and to eradicate
Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. While
few question marks were deemed to remain in the nuclear dossier at the end of
1998, the IAEA is now obliged to examine whether the situation remains
unchanged. UNMOVIC is requested to
assist the IAEA – not least at the practical logistical level. We are happy to do so and pleased with the
very close cooperation that exists.
Indeed, I am glad to acknowledge that we at UNMOVIC are learning a great
deal from our friends at the IAEA.
In the field of chemical weapons,
the efforts to prevent a proliferation – indeed to eliminate existing arsenals
– are focused on the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which bans not only
the use but also the possession and production of these weapons. It was especially important that the
Convention covered all States equally – that the great powers were to eliminate
their stocks just as all others. It was
also highly significant that a comprehensive system for inspection, including
on-site inspection, was set up. While
the adherence to the convention is as yet by no means universal – and this is a
concern – we can register with satisfaction how huge quantities of chemical
weapons are being destroyed under international inspection in Russia, the
United States as elsewhere. Iraq has
not yet ratified the convention.
However, its use of chemical weapons was in violation of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and international customary law.
The Biological Weapons
Convention
of 1972 prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and
requires their destruction. Like the
CWC this convention treats all States, including great powers, equally. While not all States have yet adhered to the
convention and while there is so far no international protocol on verification,
States – including Russia and the United States – have taken steps to implement
the Convention. Iraq was moving in the
opposite direction.
Long-range missiles is
a category of weapons system which constitutes a pressing problem. The world community has only had
limited success in regulating it
through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Iraqi use of missiles against neighbouring States and the
testing by the DPRK of a three-stage rocket have contributed to the current
discussion of missile shields of various kinds. Such shields, it is argued, would constitute a response to the
proliferation of long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction. Another approach discussed
would be a common effort to focus on the States perceived as actual or potential
dangers and seek to defuse these dangers.
It is UNMOVIC’s task to seek to ensure that Iraq is rid of missiles of a
range over 150 km and does not produce or acquire any more.
The demand for on-site verification
Whether
we look at bans on the possession of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or
restrictions on long-range missiles, we find that invariably international
on-site verification is demanded. For States to be able to rely on commitments given and to feel
confident that the risk of being cheated is small, they need effective, credible
verification. This is true whether we
talk about multilateral regimes, such as the NPT and the CWC, or commitments
such as Iraq’s under the cease-fire agreement and resolution 687 (1991), and
that of the DPRK under the so-called agreed framework. International inspection is a growth
business.
We have
to note that States are not enthusiastic about receiving foreign inspectors on
their territory and in their industrial and military installations – whether
nuclear, chemical or other. If
sufficiently reliable means of verification were to exist through satellite
imagery or seismic surveillance or other non-intrusive means, it would be
preferred. However, currently existing
non-intrusive means of verification are not deemed sufficient. States come to accept on-site inspection
first because it is important for themselves to create confidence that they are
abiding by their commitments and, secondly, because they want other States to
accept the same kind of inspection.
On-site
inspection regimes may be
(a) mutual-bilateral,
as in the case of many of the bilateral US-Russian
agreements
in the disarmament field;
(b) regional,
as in the case of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) or in various nuclear-weapon-free
zones;
or
(c) international,
as in the cases of the NPT, CWC and CTBT
(Complete
Test Ban Treaty).
There may
also be hybrids between the different types.
The right for individual parties to a multilateral regime to request
so-called challenge inspections introduce a bilateral element. A regional regime could be supplementary to
an international one, as in the case of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, which in
the main uses on-site inspection through the IAEA international safeguards
system but may add some kind of regional inspections for various situations.
An
international regime may appear less disturbing to national sensitivities than
bilateral arrangements, as the inspected State is likely, itself, to be a party
to the regime, which may inspect a large number of States. On the other hand, reaching agreement about
the sharing of costs is often a problem in international arrangements and
providing intelligence to international inspectors is more problematic than
giving it to one’s own.
Means of verification
The rapid
expansion of the need for international inspection and the development of
technology have led to the employment of powerful new means of verification:
·
Satellite imagery provides important overview
and is obtained without any intrusion into the territory or airspace of
States. But satellites do not see
through roofs and camouflage or decoys may fool them. While imagery from them used to be available only to or through a
few States, it is now becoming available commercially – at a price.
·
On-site videos and sensors may provide
continuous surveillance and may even transmit images automatically reducing the
need for inspector presence.
·
Environmental sampling of air, soil or water
and subsequent analysis for relevant chemical, biological or nuclear substances
is becoming ever more powerful means of
inquiry.
These and
other techniques have been used increasingly and much experience of them has
been accumulated in the IAEA, OPCW and UNSCOM.
They may be useful not only in providing data for analysis but also in
providing a disincentive to violations.
However, they supplement but do not replace more traditional means of
verification.
·
Declarations by the inspected State provide
the normal starting point for verification, monitoring and inspection. In banking and business, careful and
consistent accounts provide some confidence of correct operations and the same
is true of States’ accounts relevant to weaponry. Inconsistencies require explanations.
·
The inspectors on the ground can hardly be
replaced. Their professional expertise
and experience may lead them to ask pertinent questions and to observations
unavailable through other means.
·
Information about a State’s imports
– through declarations by the State itself or suppliers – may give important
clues.
·
Open sources, like newspapers, professional
journals, radio and television reports may provide valuable information. They are easily available though not so
easily scanned.
The use of intelligence
A special
source of information for international verification is intelligence. It can readily be used where States are
mutually inspecting each other. It is
by no means given, however, that national intelligence agencies will supply
relevant information to international inspection organizations. Indeed, it appears that before the
revelations of Iraq’s programmes of weapons of mass destruction, no
international inspection regime did receive any national intelligence – not
even satellite imagery.
International
verification regimes are invariably present and active in inspected countries
with the consent of these countries.
They gather information only by methods that are authorized and must use
the information only for purposes authorized.
They do not have the means of checking international electronic communications.
It is
clear, on the other hand, that national intelligence organizations may obtain
much information that could be directly useful in the inspection and
verification work of international organizations, notably to raise pertinent
questions and to identify objects and installations for inspection. It is also obvious that if such information
is not made available to the organizations, it loses some of its potential
value. Moreover, an international
organization could hardly be criticized for not following up a lead, which had
never been given to it. This is not to
say that there could not be good reasons why such information was not made
available. The need to protect sources
could be one. A fear that the
international organization could not handle the information in a secure or
meaningful way could be another.
This
being said, it seems highly desirable that international inspection regimes be
assisted by national intelligence under conditions acceptable to both
sides. Defectors do not normally come
to international organizations but to States, which can give them asylum. Where inspected countries do not provide
full or reliable information, defectors and others may give very important
data. Information about attempted
procurement may provide significant clues and is usually not directly available
to international regimes.
At the
same time it is obvious that an international regime must guard itself against
misinformation. It must critically
analyse all information that may be given to it and preferably have information
from several sources. It must not
engage in any information trading. It
is in everybody’s interest that UNMOVIC is in nobody’s pocket.
Cooperation by the inspected State
There is
no doubt that cooperation
by the inspected State is crucial to achieve inspection
results that are credible. Where the inspected State is anxious to obtain the
trust of neighbours and the world, such cooperation should come naturally. An interesting example is South Africa,
which invited the IAEA to verify that the nuclear weapons it had possessed had
been irrevocably eliminated. From the
outset, South Africa offered access to whatever documentation and whatever
sites the Agency wanted to check. While
such attitudes do not by themselves amount to evidence, they create a degree of
credibility that may make it easier for States to disregard the residues of
uncertainty, which will almost invariably exist. It is significant that resolution 1284 (1999) makes “cooperation
in all respects” by Iraq with UNMOVIC the condition for the suspension of
sanctions.
Lessons from Iraq
In the
case of Iraq, nearly ten years of inspection has seen cooperation and very
significant results but also much obstruction.
Many lessons have been learnt:
·
One is that even when they have the most
far-reaching rights of access,
inspectors remain basically ‘observers’ in a country where full
executive power is in the hands of the Government. The host country is always able, if it so chooses, to deny
inspectors access, even though they are legally entitled to it. However, it can only do so at a price,
namely, that the denial of access may suggest to the inspectors and to the
world that prohibited items might be concealed.
·
Another lesson is that it is not practically feasible
to search for every possibly relevant item or data in large weapons programmes
lasting over many years. Matters deemed
of marginal importance may have to be left aside unless and until some new data
invest them with importance. Even
so, there will inevitably be a ‘residue
of uncertainty’ and it will be for the Security Council to decide what impact
it will have. There is no such thing as
a completely ‘clean bill of health’– neither in medicine nor in inspection. The best that can be attained is that after
very thorough inspection and good cooperation no significant questions remain
and no indications of proscribed items are found.
·
A third point is that no inspecting authority
should ever testify to more than actually has been clarified and established. Inability to establish real facts may be
understandable and excusable, especially if there is no cooperation, but it is
not the task of the inspecting organization to discount other than marginal
unresolved issues – and these should be clearly reported. Nor, indeed, should an inspecting authority
artificially enlarge the question marks it cannot straighten out. It should have no other agenda than to use
its skills and instruments to establish the facts and to neutralize the weapons
of mass destructions and their means of delivery.
What will happen?
It is now
over a year since the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999) and
established UNMOVIC. Neither the
resolution nor UNMOVIC, which has been built up in the past year, have been accepted
by Iraq, nor have any inspections taken place since UNSCOM left at the end of
1998. What will happen?
Iraq
contends that all weapons of mass destruction have been eradicated, that the
requirements of 1991 have been fulfilled and that the economic and financial
restrictions should be immediately lifted.
Public opinion in many parts of the world, sympathizing with the people
of Iraq, supports a lifting of sanctions.
At the other end of the
spectrum, many warn that Iraq has not fully revealed its arsenal of WMDs and
long-range missiles and that it may be taken for granted that more prohibited
items have been produced and hidden during the absence of inspectors. It is
also argued that if Iraq were freely to use its oil proceeds much of it would
go to rearmament. What are we to make
of these conflicting views?
First, we
must note that although there are, indeed, differences between the Members of
the Security Council, they seem to remain firmly behind the demand in
resolution 1284 (1999) that Iraq must accept inspection by UNMOVIC. Further, although the resolution
acknowledges that Iraq has made progress towards the required eradication of
its programme of WMDs, it states explicitly that there remain “unresolved
disarmament issues” and among them “key remaining disarmament tasks to be
completed by Iraq”.
Referring
to the failure of Iraq to implement relevant resolutions fully, the Council
states further that it is unable to lift the prohibitions (sanctions). It offers Iraq a – somewhat less ambitious
way from the economic restrictions imposed by the Security Council. The resolution of 1991 holds out a lifting
of sanctions in return for an eradication of the programme of WMDs as foreseen
in the resolution.
The 1999 resolution offers the suspension
of sanctions in return for “cooperation in all respects” with UNMOVIC and
progress on “key remaining disarmament tasks”.
While Iraq seems to decline the new path traced by the Council, it
should be noted that it is additional to the
original solution, which remains in place.
It should also be noted that “sanctions” in 1991 included a total ban
for Iraq to sell oil; today, Iraq can sell all the oil it is able to pump. “Sanctions” today is rather a control of
what Iraq is allowed to import.
If Iraq
accepts inspection, it would seem that ‘cooperation in all respects’ with
UNMOVIC will be necessary, regardless of which attitude it takes to resolution
1284 (1999). Indeed, as I have already
explained, cooperation between an inspected State and the inspecting
organization is a crucial factor to achieve credible verification. Such cooperation has no room for harassment,
humiliation or provocation from the inspecting party but also no room for
laxity. Cosmetic inspections are worse
than none. They may create impressions
that do not correspond to the reality.
Only firm, professionally competent and effective inspections serve the
purpose for which they are undertaken, namely, to create justified confidence. Resolution 1284 (1999) envisages such
inspection and explicitly makes ‘cooperation in all respects’ – including
progress on ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’ the crucial condition for a
suspension of sanctions.
Iraq
might perhaps ask what UNMOVIC will regard as such cooperation. It is not possible to make a checklist. In some earlier comments on this question, I
have pointed to two essential matters and they may deserve to be repeated.
First,
Iraq must cooperate to ensure the full protection of UNMOVIC
personnel. The Government of
Iraq has full control on the ground and is responsible for the security of our
personnel, premises, equipment and transportation against any violence, threat
of violence or harassment.
Second,
Iraq must cooperate to assure UNMOVIC and the IAEA access to
all sites that they wish to inspect. As
the Security Council has stated many times,
access must be “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted”. There are good reasons for
these requirements. Access that is not
‘immediate’ loses in effectiveness. If
the inspected party were to learn in advance about the object of an inspection,
it would be in a position to remove or conceal objects and equipment. Even if it would not do so, the very
possibility that it could have done so, would reduce the value – the
effectiveness – of the inspection.
Obviously, infrastructure and heavy equipment could not be moved away or
hidden in minutes but documents might.
I should add that for the special case of inspections of sites that are
‘sensitive’, UNSCOM issued special internal guidelines and UNMOVIC is doing
likewise.
As it is
in the interest of both Iraq and UNMOVIC that inspections have maximum
credibility, there should be cooperation to ensure immediate access. An obvious need parallel to the need for
immediate access is that inspections should take place without prior notice or,
with short notice. Another need is for
the means of transportation to allow the speediest possible arrival of
inspectors on site. For distant sites,
fixed-wing or helicopter transport is desirable. To reduce transportation time, there may also be good reasons for
some field offices in areas far away from Baghdad.
The value
of access would be reduced if conditions were attached, e.g.
regarding the number of inspectors to be admitted, or restrictions on samples
to be taken or similar. The credibility
and value of inspection would also be reduced, if there were restrictions
as to where on a site inspectors could go.
Locked rooms, rooms for which keys are lost, etc. do not inspire
confidence.
While
access usually denotes access to sites, access to persons, data and
documents is of similar great importance.
Iraq has submitted large volumes of data to UNSCOM in the past and will
be asked to continue to do so.
At this
point I should like to add, however, that UNMOVIC should avoid making requested
cooperation unnecessarily burdensome.
We should make periodic reporting as simple as possible and we might
discuss with Iraqi counterparts how to achieve this. There is no point in asking for data that are not needed. It would burden both them and us. It would be important, on the other hand, to
have data in electronically readable form.
We should
also aim to be as transparent as possible.
When Iraq is expected to cooperate with UNMOVIC, it is reasonable that we
make it quite clear what cooperation is expected.
By cooperating in all respects with
UNMOVIC in providing data and access to sites and persons and destroying
whatever is left of the programme for WMDs and long-range missiles, Iraq can
facilitate implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions. This is precisely what Iraq needs in order
to build confidence, and to be enabled eventually to resume its place in the
family of nations. Evidently, the
Members of the United Nations – and not least the Members of the Security
Council – must, on their part, also fully abide by Security Council decisions –
as, indeed, they are obliged to under Art. 25 of the UN Charter.
A comprehensive dialogue between the UN and
Iraq
There is
no sign at the present time that Iraq is inclined to accept inspection whether
related to the resolution of 1991 or that of 1999. In this situation, the Secretary-General of the UN has agreed to
a ‘comprehensive
dialogue’ with Iraq.
Although
UNMOVIC is not a party to this dialogue and no agenda is indicated, we may
surmise some of the items that may be in focus.
From the
side of the UN, the implementation by Iraq of binding resolutions seems likely
to be a priority item, e.g. regarding inspections, repatriation of Kuwaitis or
third country nationals and cooperation with the UN coordinator for that
issue. The Iraqi side has urged that
the dialogue should be without preconditions.
The Secretary-General, for his part, has noted, naturally, that the UN
must take cognizance of existing resolutions.
The Iraqi
side might raise the issue of no-fly-zones and the bombings, and demand respect
for the principle of territorial integrity and political independence. This UN Charter principle is, evidently
applicable to Iraq as it is to all other States, including Iraq’s
neighbours. Iraq might also like to
know what arrangements there would be at the end of the tunnel that leads to
suspension, in particular the
“effective
financial and other operational measures” that
are to be put in place in connection with such suspension “to ensure that Iraq
does not acquire prohibited items” (para. 33).
While these and many other matters that might come up in the
dialogue are not linked to UNMOVIC, some questions relating
to Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) are.
For a
suspension of sanctions, progress has to be made on “key remaining disarmament
tasks to be completed by Iraq” (para. 7). Iraq would like to know which these tasks
are. The procedure foreseen in the
resolution is that UNMOVIC will list them in a work programme to be submitted
for Security Council approval 60 days after the organization has started work
in Iraq. In the last resort, it is thus
the Security Council, which will decide, which the ‘key remaining disarmament
tasks’ are, although it is envisaged that the Council do so on the basis of a
report from its technically competent subsidiary body, UNMOVIC. Iraq may have an idea of which issues were
regarded as ‘priority issues’ by the Security Council panel that was headed by
Ambassador Amorim early in 1999.
However, about two years have passed since then without inspection and
‘key issues’ cannot be defined by UNMOVIC until it has acquired substantial
experience through new supplementary Iraqi declarations and has undertaken new
on-site inspections.
What
UNMOVIC is trying to do today is to make an inventory of the much broader
category of “unresolved disarmament
issues’. Even this task can only be
tackled provisionally, pending access to supplementary declarations and essential
rebaselining.
For its
part, Iraq seems to be saying that, contrary to the view expressed by the
Security Council, there are no unresolved disarmament issues and
that it will demonstrate this by documents.
It would be welcome if Iraq could volunteer new information that may
shed light on issues – not least the biological ones – which were deemed
unresolved, when inspections ceased at the end of 1998. However, such information will not obviate
the need for new inspections. Given the
statements of Iraq that all prohibited programmes have been eradicated and that
this can be shown, it would seem natural that Iraq would avail itself of the
opportunity to place relevant evidence, especially new evidence, before UNMOVIC
as the professional international inspection regime set up by the Security
Council.
Two more
points. Iraq seems to have been
concerned about the time frames laid down in resolution 1284 (1999) – that new
inspections would go on forever. Let me say that it is regrettable that over
one year has been lost in starting the activities foreseen. For its part, UNMOVIC is at present doing
all it can with a staff that represents the whole UN family to move close to a
readiness for work inside Iraq.
However, before there is green light for inspections, we do not wish to
assume large financial commitments, e.g. contracts for helicopter
services. Nor do we want to take a
large number of staff on board at present.
The training we provide is designed to give us a rostrum of experts who
would be available to work for us in Iraq.
Lastly,
there is sometimes a tendency to see disarmament functions and humanitarian
functions as conflicting efforts. I
think that is a false way of looking at the problems. To provide food and other necessities for life and to seek to
ensure the absence of weapons of mass destruction are, in my view, both
humanitarian missions. UNMOVIC works
side by side with the Oil for Food Programme and the rest of the UN system.
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