1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 1995



Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

later: Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela)

later: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)


GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Office of Conference and Support Services, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GYLYS (Lithuania) said that his country had become a party to the Treaty shortly after regaining independence, and it encouraged States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty to avoid weakening the non-proliferation regime and jeopardizing the security interests of all.

2. Being concerned about its regional security, Lithuania had noted with great satisfaction the accession of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It felt, however, that the end of the cold war had created a security vacuum in central and eastern Europe which could not be ignored, because it affected disarmament questions.

3. Because it believed that any uncertainty about the future of the Treaty or regarding security assurances would harm the security interests of all, Lithuania supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty and universal accession to the Treaty, which could thus become a pillar of global security in the twenty-first century. In that connection he supported the statement made by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union.

4. However, the Treaty had its weaknesses and, in particular, the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States needed to be addressed. New security assurances were necessary to ensure a balanced non-proliferation regime. Lithuania welcomed the offer, made for the first time by the five nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), to extend both negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

5. It endorsed measures to foster regional security, as provided in article VII of the Treaty. It attributed great importance to the efforts being made to establish an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and appreciated South Africa's decision to dismantle its military nuclear weapons programme, thus, giving reason to hope that Africa might soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

6. Lithuania was also encouraged by the progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on cessation of the production of fissile materials for purposes of weapons production since, in any case, the non-proliferation Treaty needed to be supplemented by other legally binding instruments.

7. With regard to the IAEA safeguards system, it should be strengthened by random inspections to prevent the diversion of fissile material and of sensitive technology. Lithuania had accepted IAEA safeguards for its nuclear activities and supported the ongoing efforts to strengthen the system. Recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances gave cause for concern, and the safe storage of fissile material and the protection of the environment must be ensured during the disarmament process. More effective physical protection, accounting and border controls were needed to counter that problem. International assistance and cooperation should therefore be encouraged where the system of protection and control was inadequate. Being dependent on nuclear energy and having one of the biggest power plants in the world, Lithuania appreciated the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and welcomed assistance in the area of nuclear safety, among others.

8. In conclusion, he said that the process of nuclear disarmament gave reason to hope that the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons could be achieved. However, while the nuclear-weapon States had taken steps in the right direction, bigger steps were needed in the future.

9. Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Yemen) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was of paramount importance and offered a historic opportunity to take stock of the 25 years of existence of the Treaty in order to see how far States Parties had discharged their obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, to study the difficulties encountered and to agree on a common approach to ensure the continuation and universality of the Treaty after 1995. Although the Treaty pursued a wide range of goals, it still had certain deficiencies, the major deficiency being the inequity existing between the responsibilities and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and those of the nuclear-weapon States, to which the Treaty accorded privileges. In fact, as the four previous review conferences had clearly shown, the most difficult problem in the implementation of the Treaty was the failure of nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations and commitments under article VI of the Treaty, in which each Party undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had disregarded the four objectives stated in the preamble to the Treaty, namely to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, to facilitate the cessation of the production and manufacture of nuclear weapons and ensure the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and, lastly, to ensure the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Those States had not provided any adequate negative or positive security assurances and had not even agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

10. His delegation recognized, however, that the end of the cold war had enabled substantial progress to be made in disarmament and it welcomed the important and constructive initiatives taken by Russia and the United States in the matter of bilateral disarmament. It was also pleased to note that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had unilaterally decided to abandon their nuclear programme, thus showing that a country could renounce the possession of nuclear weapons without losing in stature or security.

11. Since the fourth review conference in 1990, more than 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, as well as Algeria and several other countries, had acceded to the Treaty, so that there were now very few States that had not yet signed it. His delegation thought that, in deciding to accede to the Treaty and dismantle its stock of nuclear weapons, South Africa had taken a courageous, constructive and crucial decision that should be imitated by Israel, which had so far expressed no intention of acceding to the Treaty and was even refusing to recognize the existence of nuclear weapons in its territory. That attitude was particularly disturbing as, for some years, positive developments had been noted with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Moreover, at the next Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, the African States were expected to proclaim the denuclearization of Africa.

12. Efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and, in particular, alternative solutions and new means and methods advocated, continued to give rise to differences of opinion and certain reservations. His delegation hoped that measures would be taken to enable those efforts to succeed, and thought that the two States that were permanent members of the Security Council, and whose fleets maintained the largest presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, should participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

13. On the other hand, the plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was still making no headway. In fact, despite the changes that had occurred on the international scene and the peace process that was going on in the Middle East, the many efforts made to establish such a zone had met with a major obstacle, namely the Israeli nuclear-weapons programme. His delegation therefore called on the international community to take practical and effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the region and to press Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and agree to open its installations to inspection by the IAEA. There should also be a complete ban on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, all States without exception should be obliged to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and no State whatsoever should be allowed to stand apart and deliberately remain outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. On that point, Yemen felt that the right to security assurances was a legitimate right of the non-nuclear-weapon States and that it should not be subject to any conditions or restrictions. Furthermore, his country agreed with the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that such assurances should be embodied in a binding international treaty, whose content and provisions could be the subject of negotiations, and which should include complete safety guarantees and clear and explicit commitments taking due account of the security concerns of the developing countries, in view of the serious imbalance which still existed between the rights and obligations of States which, like Israel, were engaged in clandestine nuclear activities and refusing to accede to the Treaty, and those accorded to other countries, such as the Arab countries, which had voluntarily renounced the nuclear option.

14. Although it contained a number of positive aspects, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 did not give the non-nuclear-weapon States the assurances to which they should be entitled under a binding multilateral international treaty. To begin with it did not recognize that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council did not undertake either to take effective collective measures to remove the threats to the peace or to take retaliatory measures against the perpetrators of aggression or those who jeopardized the peace.

15. Development and strengthening of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the Treaty's main objectives. It was important to give IAEA, which thus far had been unable to play a full role in that area, the means it needed in order to help the developing countries develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

16. Maintenance and continuity of the Treaty were two essential conditions for solving the fundamental problems which had prompted adoption of the Treaty 25 years earlier. States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must have the political will to fulfil all the commitments and obligations they had contracted under article VI. Those States were legally and morally bound to strengthen the Treaty and the regime stemming therefrom in order to achieve complete disarmament. Adoption by agreement of a reasonable and balanced solution would satisfy the vast majority of States parties, strengthen the non-proliferation regime, improve international relations, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security and promote coexistence among States. In order to do so the best thing would be to adopt a formula that would provide for an extension and guarantee, in the near future, implementation of the provisions and conditions of the Treaty and its universality, elicit the support of all, take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of the States parties and be consistent with the spirit of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

17. Finally his delegation resolutely supported the positions and viewpoints expressed by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding disarmament and the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Treaty, and it hoped that the Conference would be in a position to adopt a final document that would make the Treaty an effective instrument in the service of peace and security.

18. Mr. KENDALL (Marshall Islands) said that his country was a young State and had acceded to the Treaty only on 30 January 1995. Between 1946 and 1958, the United States had tested 66 atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands. The results of that massive nuclear testing had been devastating to the health of the inhabitants; of all the countries in the Pacific Ocean the Marshall Islands remained the most severely affected by radioactive contamination.

19. As a matter of principle, the Marshall Islands were in favour of general disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It welcomed the existing moratorium and the statement made by the representative of China in support of such a test ban. The Treaty was an integral building block of the whole regime of nuclear disarmament and international security. While recognizing the need for an indefinite extension of the Treaty, the Marshall Islands could understand the concerns expressed by some countries in regard to the strengthening of certain conditions.

20. The Marshall Islands unreservedly supported the statement made at the conclusion of the meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, to the effect that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security. However, the permanent members of the Council had a special responsibility, particularly from a financial point of view, for tackling that problem. They must also reduce their nuclear arsenals in a safe, controlled and verifiable manner. His delegation believed, as did the delegation of the Netherlands, that the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States, one which they were duty-bound to fulfil.

21. His delegation agreed with the German delegation that the production of weapons-grade fissionable material must be stopped. The German proposal for an international plutonium regime was most interesting. He also welcomed the United Kingdom's announcement that it would unilaterally cease production of such material, and hoped that that effort would be supported by all the members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

22. His delegation also agreed that the safeguards regime of IAEA needed to be further strengthened, and it paid tribute to the Agency and to its Director General for their excellent work.

23. Like many other delegations, his delegation was very concerned at the potential for so-called "horizontal" proliferation. It appealed, on the one hand, to the countries which were on the threshold of becoming nuclear-weapon States, to follow the example set by South Africa and, on the other hand, to the States which had not signed the Treaty, to adhere to the Treaty and to the safeguards currently provided and to work for a comprehensive improvement in the regime, particularly article VI.

24. His Government's main concern was the lack of safe radioactive waste disposal sites anywhere in the world and the fact that so little attention was given to disposal of the waste resulting from the dismantling of civilian reactors and military weapons, let alone the nuclear decontamination of the islands in the Pacific. The present Conference should review article IV, paragraph 2, with a view to finding a way to help clean up radioactive contamination around the globe. The exchange of scientific and technological information provided for in the Treaty did not, strictly speaking, include decontamination efforts. As his delegation had suggested at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the international community should mobilize resources in order to study the feasibility of setting up an international waste disposal site. Such a step would be in keeping with the goals of the Treaty.

25. His delegation therefore fully supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but it would like to see more work done in the following areas: strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; preparation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; cessation of the production of fissionable nuclear materials and enhanced disarmament measures to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States with further assurances to be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

26. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh) said that his country unequivocally supported the continuance, consolidation and progressive development of the Treaty. Bangladesh was constitutionally committed to working for renunciation of the use of force and general and complete disarmament, and considered the Treaty the most effective existing mechanism to that end.

27. The Treaty provided two critical balances. First of all, review and extension of the Treaty were inextricably linked. They could not be dealt with separately. Inasmuch as all speakers had underscored the unequal and imperfect nature of the Treaty, it was essential to strengthen the review process.

28. The second balance was the linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament. In that connection, the Conference offered a historic opportunity. The Treaty was not an end in itself but a means of moving towards averting the dangers of nuclear war and safeguarding the security of all people. The fact that it was the most widely adhered to arms control treaty and that States continued to accede to it up to the present attested to its credibility and continued relevance.

29. The fact that the non-proliferation Treaty had in the first instance been adopted for a limited duration had not been the result of a North-South conflict. Notwithstanding the security of the nuclear umbrella, some important States of the North had had reservations about renouncing nuclear weapons for all time and a trial period of 25 years had been established to enable States parties to take an informed decision about the future of the Treaty. In that connection, he said he believed that the Conference had met not to decide whether to extend the Treaty but to decide on the best means of extending it in accordance with article X, paragraph 2.

30. The major success of the Treaty had been to arrest horizontal proliferation; as in 1970, there were still only five declared nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had established a moral norm, as evidenced by South Africa's voluntary renunciation of the nuclear option and its accession to the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, all as non-nuclear-weapon States.

31. The results achieved in vertical non-proliferation were much more disappointing. The objective of the Treaty had not been to codify or legitimize inequality. His delegation agreed with many others that article VI of the Treaty and the preambular paragraphs relating thereto obligated the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a cut-off convention prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and an instrument prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. Those steps should lead to further negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear weapons, with the ultimate aim of eliminating them from national arsenals.

32. The progress in disarmament achieved in recent years was welcome, but it should be borne in mind that, according to reliable estimates, even after the START II Treaty had been implemented, the nuclear forces of the nuclear Powers would still exceed the level they had been in 1970 when the non-proliferation Treaty had entered into force. Bangladesh believed, however, that, with the end of the cold war, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence should be disavowed and it found disconcerting reports that some countries were allocating to their nuclear-weapons programmes, and in particular to research in that field, funds which were far in excess of those which they were allocating to the dismantling of their arsenals. While long and complex negotiations might well be required to draw up a schedule for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear Powers could, at the present stage, reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties by reaffirming that nuclear disarmament was their ultimate goal.

33. Bangladesh welcomed the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and it hoped that agreement would soon be reached on a universal and effectively verifiable instrument. It also hoped that techniques which were not directly covered by such a treaty would not be used for the development of nuclear weapon systems. It was also pleased to note that the Conference on Disarmament was working on the preparation of a cut-off convention to prohibit the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and, in that connection, it believed that the issue of existing stockpiles should also be addressed.

34. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, he welcomed the Treaties of Tlatelolco and of Rarotonga and the progress made towards the denuclearization of Africa. Bangladesh, which believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones promoted non-proliferation and strengthened confidence, regularly sponsored General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone in South Asia.

35. The question of security assurances did not fall strictly within the purview of the non-proliferation Treaty. Such assurances were, however, essential to the effectiveness of the Treaty and should ideally have been incorporated into it. Resolution 984 (1995), which had been adopted unanimously by the Security Council on the eve of the Conference, had, however, marked some progress, particularly with regard to negative security assurances. Nevertheless, it still fell short of a legally binding international instrument enjoying the same status as the non-proliferation Treaty which would offer cast-iron guarantees in the event of an attack or threat of an attack by nuclear weapons.

36. With reference to article IV, he said that the non-aligned countries called for all States parties to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. That was all the more important in that some States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty appeared to have benefited more from international trade in nuclear material and equipment than other non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. In that connection, it was his country's expectation that the Nuclear Suppliers Group would operate in a transparent manner and that arbitrary and discriminatory restraints would not be imposed on peaceful nuclear trade.

37. With regard to the safeguards system, the Gulf War had demonstrated the weakness of the system, namely that it was applied only to declared nuclear installations. IAEA had no independent sources of information and it was therefore difficult for it to detect undeclared materials or installations. The non-aligned countries had urged that all nuclear activities and installations should be placed under comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards. In that connection, it would be helpful if IAEA were to be given greater access to information and sites of interest to it.

38. The non-proliferation Treaty was not a perfect instrument, but it had served an admirable purpose during times of great tension. If the procedure for its amendment were not so complex, it would be tempting to adjust it for a transitional period of 25 years. Since that was not a feasible option, the Conference must endeavour to strengthen confidence in the Treaty and promote its objectives.

39. Very cogent arguments had been advanced in favour of both indefinite extension and extension for additional fixed periods. The debate focused on ways of promoting the universality of the Treaty, disarmament, confidence and predictability. Some also wondered whether there might be a viable alternative to the Treaty, which remained the only multilateral legal instrument binding States to conduct negotiations with a view to nuclear disarmament. Some non-nuclear-weapon States parties were afraid of forfeiting their leverage to promote nuclear disarmament if the Treaty were to be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. In conclusion, he emphasized that, in view of the vital importance of the Treaty for all States parties, the Conference should make every effort to reach a decision by consensus.

40. Mr. Taylhardat (Venezuela), Vice-President, took the Chair.

41. Mr. SAMANA (Papua New Guinea) said that his delegation fully subscribed to the remarks made recently by the representative of Indonesia, to the effect that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would be tantamount to the legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. That was contrary to the objective of the Treaty, which was to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

42. A realistic analysis of the way in which the Treaty had been implemented showed that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had failed to meet the obligations they had undertaken under article VI of the Treaty, namely to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. That was why the Treaty had been unable to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons - it had only been able to control horizontal proliferation - and had instead facilitated the centralization of the control, possession and qualitative development of nuclear weapons by a very small number of nuclear-weapon States. Papua New Guinea also believed that the bilateral efforts made by the United States and the former Soviet Union - now the Russian Federation - to reduce their nuclear arsenals were the result of detente between the two countries rather than of the vigorous implementation of the Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It therefore called for the immediate implementation of the following measures: the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, and the inclusion of China, France and the United Kingdom as parties to the START treaty to which such reductions would give rise; the standardization of nuclear export policies and the incorporation in the Treaty of provisions providing for sanctions in the event of violations of the established standards; the conclusion of a treaty containing positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; and the concerted efforts to strengthen security safeguards, which meant the strengthening of the resources available to IAEA and transparency in its operations.

43. Extending the Treaty for a series of fixed periods would provide a dynamic environment within which clear and verifiable targets could be negotiated for the reduction of nuclear weapons, and would facilitate gradual achievement of all the objectives of the Treaty. That would not in any way undermine the permanence or the continuity of the Treaty. While Papua New Guinea supported the NPT as the only existing instrument for non-proliferation, it believed that the Treaty must reflect the goal of establishing global norms that were binding on all States parties. Unilateral decisions of nuclear-weapon States in the absence of a legally binding international treaty afforded no guarantee for the security of other States, big or small. Papua New Guinea also believed that the goal of the NPT should be not only non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the total eradication of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. That was why it had taken an active part in sponsoring and voting for the World Health Organization (WHO) resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to consider the possibility of declaring any threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal. Papua New Guinea took the view that the Treaty in its current form legalized the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States -thus polarizing States into nuclear "haves" and "have nots" - a condition which might continue to fuel proliferation and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The major nuclear-weapon States had not denounced their policies of nuclear deterrence, and continued to impede progress towards non-proliferation, inhibiting the desire of the international community to establish lasting global peace and security.

44. The Pacific countries continued to suffer from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear wastes. It was well known that the health problems and environmental degradation caused by such activities had resulted in the uprooting of some of the Pacific communities. The Pacific countries believed that the continuous nuclear testing in their waters directly contravened their most fundamental rights, and therefore called on the international community to guarantee their environmental security without delay, realistically and resolutely, within an internationally and legally binding treaty with the necessary safeguards and assurances.

45. The Pacific Island region had been a pioneer in establishing a nuclear-free zone, demonstrating its commitment to meet the obligations of the Treaty. The Pacific countries were encouraged by other regional initiatives, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and by initiatives to establish nuclear-free zones in Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East. It was disheartening, however, that certain nuclear-weapon States which had a direct influence in the South Pacific region had failed to sign the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and were not making every effort to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that respect, the Pacific countries fully appreciated the positive decision by China and Russia to sign the Treaty of Rarotonga and accede to the relevant Protocols. They hoped that others would follow suit immediately.

46. While his delegation would very much welcome a strengthening of the NPT regime to meet the immediate objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, the lack of security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly for the protection of their environment, made it extremely difficult for it to vote for an indefinite extension.

47. Mr. CHEIKH SYLLA (Senegal) said that the NPT had had somewhat mixed results. The determination of the parties, referred to in the eleventh preambular paragraph, to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time had not led to specific commitments or, more important, binding commitments. While it was true that most of the nuclear Powers had voluntarily suspended testing, a comprehensive test-ban treaty remained elusive, despite constant appeals by Senegal and other countries. Likewise, with regard to the intention, stated in the preamble, to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the disappearance of the old bipolar system had encouraged significant progress. But it had to be admitted that that threefold objective was far from being achieved.

48. Another area where much had been expected concerned the promotion of access by the non-nuclear-weapon States to the technology and applications of nuclear energy for economic and social progress. The opportunities offered by the use of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and industry, for example, made that aspect of the NPT regime second to none, especially as far as the developing countries were concerned. Yet, despite the generous provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty, the measures taken were inadequate for the most part. No doubt commendable efforts were being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but the initiatives in that area, as in others, had been largely inadequate. For example, for over 10 years there had been regular reductions in the resources of the technical cooperation fund on which the Agency's activities related to the transfer of nuclear energy were based, because of the shortage of donor contributions. The allocation of a tiny portion of the peace dividend to that cooperation fund would go a long way towards redressing the situation and would enhance the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

49. Senegal attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. They should be established with the express collaboration of the nuclear Powers, for it was their role to guarantee respect for the status of such zones and to provide the participating States with the required security guarantees. The African countries were working on a draft treaty to make Africa a nuclear-free zone; they would very much like the nuclear Powers to undertake commitments in that regard when the drafting was completed.

50. Demands for negative security guarantees had been made over and over again but had not yet been met. Though the question had been under lengthy discussion since the Treaty had been negotiated, it was not really so complicated. There was nothing more natural than for States that had voluntarily renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons to request firm assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. To date, however, no satisfactory solution had been found. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) undoubtedly represented progress towards a solution, but much more was needed: precise and binding legal commitments were called for. Negative security guarantees were indispensable if an equitable and properly balanced non-proliferation regime was to be promoted.

51. It was clear therefore that there were gaps, inadequacies and imbalances both in the conception and the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference should not therefore restrict itself to the question of the extension of the Treaty; it should also provide an opportunity of reaffirming the objectives of nuclear disarmament, of consolidating the achievements in that field and of filling the gaps that might prejudice the maintenance of the Treaty's authority. Indeed, in spite of its gaps, inadequacies and imbalances, the Treaty was a basic contribution to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. In proscribing dissemination of nuclear weapons on a large scale, the Treaty was a key to the security of all countries. That contribution was more significant than all the inadequacies that could be found in the Treaty's structure and in the implementation of its provisions. For that reason, Senegal, which had always called for general, complete and verifiable disarmament and which had begun for several years to work alongside the African countries in preparing a treaty which would banish nuclear weapons from Africa, supported the option of an unlimited extension of the Treaty.

52. Mr. VELLISTE (Estonia) said that his country associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the Eastern and Central European States associated with the Union. In the post-cold war world, it was clear that the ability to carry out nuclear war was no longer an acceptable measure of a nation's political, economic or security strength. Only through global stability brought about by disarmament would peace and sustainable human development be possible.

53. Estonia supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Non-use of nuclear weapons was a starting-point. All countries must agree that real efforts aimed at reduction of nuclear weapons would lessen the chances of nuclear accidents, blackmail and war. The Conference provided an unprecedented opportunity to support and continue the diverse efforts that had already been started in the field of disarmament. Estonia would like to see the acceptance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the end of the year and an eventual ban on the production of fissionable material for military purposes. It was hard to imagine that multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral disarmament activities would effectively continue unless the Treaty was unconditionally accepted.

54. Estonia supported the review process already embodied in the Treaty. Safeguard mechanisms such as nuclear-free zones and the verification work begun by IAEA were of particular importance for the implementation of the Treaty. Estonia would like to see the continuation of a dynamic NPT that would not have to be renegotiated at any particular time in the future and would be comprehensive enough to include means through which new circumstances could be addressed.

55. In Security Council resolution 984 (1995) the permanent members recognized the concerns of non-nuclear States. The resolution was an important step forward in ensuring acceptance of the NPT provisions by all Member States because it provided a framework for more concrete and binding security assurances. It was important for Estonia that the Security Council had affirmed a collective role for the United Nations that emphasized confidence-building through security assurances, transparency and cooperation in areas of disarmament, and conflict resolution.

56. In pursuit of global disarmament and regional security, Estonia would continue seeking to cooperate with various existing and international organizations and alliances that had shown a commitment to stability and the responsible management of nuclear materials.

57. Estonia attached importance to the dismantling and transport, as well as the short-term and permanent storage procedures, used in regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The issue of smuggling nuclear materials through Estonia was being addressed. The environmental concerns related to the peacetime uses of nuclear energy at nearby plants and the conversion of military facilities that contained nuclear weapons to peacetime uses were of particular importance.

58. Estonia supported detailed accounting for fissionable materials and export controls.

59. Universal accession to the Treaty would reduce the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The rule of law must prevail over a lawless situation based on the threat of total annihilation.

60. There was no doubt that international peace and security would be enhanced through discussions that led to disarmament and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Estonia thanked and congratulated all the States that had taken part in article VI negotiations. Estonia believed that the Conference could genuinely contribute to world peace through creating confidence, stability and victory for common sense.

61. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.

62. Mrs. des ILES (Trinidad and Tobago) said that her country was a firm supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. It had signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The attainment of universal adherence would undoubtedly further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute to enhanced regional and international security and stability. She therefore expressed the hope that States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty would soon do so.

63. Her delegation was encouraged by the recently held negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The completion of such a treaty by 1996 would demonstrate the degree of commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI. Agreement on a universal treaty which was internationally and effectively verifiable and which would ban testing in all environments would constitute a key step forward in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

64. Trinidad and Tobago shared the concerns expressed by the Non-Aligned States for legally binding positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties and for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissionable material for nuclear weapons that was non-discriminatory. Recent efforts to enhance security assurances through statements made by the nuclear-power States and the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were timely.

65. Trinidad and Tobago, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which underlined the importance that regional organizations and arrangements could play in promoting and maintaining international peace and security. The fact that all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had not become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrated their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Her delegation also welcomed the proposal which had been put forward for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East and the finalization of the draft treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

66. She was of the view that the objective of general and complete disarmament should be supported by a permanent legal instrument. Trinidad and Tobago therefore supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty.
67. The process of nuclear disarmament was not devoid of challenges, with the increasing need to store the components of nuclear weapons securely, especially enriched uranium and plutonium which required numerous logistic, administrative, legislative, technical and safety arrangements that must be urgently addressed. The smuggling of radioactive material also posed serious potential threats to the international community.

68. Trinidad and Tobago, together with other developing countries, placed importance on the link between disarmament and development, and had always believed that a reduction in arms expenditure should liberate funds for economic and social development. The recent World Summit for Social Development had again brought to the fore the importance of the security of the individual for international peace and security and the urgency with which the international community must address developmental needs.

69. As Chairman of the Alliance of Small Island States, she wished to state, on behalf of the members of the Alliance which were States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, that they considered it legitimate and opportune to use the current Conference to express their concerns regarding the potentially catastrophic effects of the marine transport of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and highly radioactive wastes. The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States had identified pollution prevention and the transboundary movement of hazardous materials as critical issues for such States. It would be impossible for them to respond effectively to possible accidents, which had a long-lasting impact on people's health and the economy. That was why the members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty called upon shipment countries to respect the wishes of the Governments and peoples of small island developing States, which had called for an end to shipments of irradiated fuel, plutonium and other radioactive wastes through their archipelagic and territorial waters as well as their exclusive economic zones. They also believed that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive environmental impact assessment regarding the marine transport of such materials, and for improvement of the international safety regime governing such shipments. Members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty were also of the view that any future transport of those materials through the oceans should be based on the strict liability of shipment countries for full compensation for the recovery of lost consignments and for any resulting damage.

70. Mr. BOISSON (Monaco) said that his country, a small State which had no nuclear weapons and no army, attached great importance to the undertakings given by the large States and the nuclear Powers, and particularly to resolution 984 (1995) recently adopted by the Security Council. It considered that all those undertakings were reassuring both for the present and for the future. It also considered encouraging the conclusion of the START I and II Treaties, as well as the efforts made by the major nuclear Powers to reduce their arsenals, emphasizing that the process could be described as irreversible.

71. He noted that the 178 States which had acceded so far to the Treaty were clear proof of their confidence in the safeguards offered by the Treaty and in the results already achieved during the past 25 years. Accordingly, by his recent decision to ratify the Treaty, his Highness the Prince of Monaco had also wanted to demonstrate his confidence and to associate himself with the struggle against the nuclear scourge.

72. His delegation had given much consideration to the statements of preceding speakers concerning the technical or political aspects of the question, but wished to emphasize the philosophy and the humanist aspirations which had inspired the drafters of the Treaty. No one could remain indifferent to the issue of nuclear disarmament, since nuclear weapons recognized neither the frontiers nor the size of States. The Principality of Monaco, which had neither arms nor army, had devoted its modest resources to its economic, social and cultural development, and he noted that the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations had also chosen not to possess or transfer nuclear weapons or to facilitate an expansion of the nuclear threat. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the conclusion of regional agreements banning the use of nuclear weapons, and warmly welcomed the new South Africa and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had decided to renounce their nuclear weapons or to reduce them considerably.

73. His delegation had noted with great interest the reports prepared by IAEA concerning its activities pursuant to the Treaty, and had listened with satisfaction to the statement by the Director General of the Agency and welcomed his conclusions. His delegation also welcomed the rigorous action taken by IAEA in the context of its responsibilities under the Treaty, and described the Agency as an instrument that could undoubtedly be improved but was none the less irreplaceable. Furthermore, it commended the very high level of competence of the IAEA laboratory for marine radioactivity in Monaco and considered that the Agency provided a guarantee of scientific competence and political neutrality which could not but encourage States to ensure the perpetuity of the Treaty.

74. In conclusion, he said that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty, under conditions of transparency and openness which would leave no doubts as to the genuine intentions of the greatest number of States, seemed the most equitable solution and above all the one most in keeping with his country's conception of the spirit and letter of the Treaty, and he invited all States to choose that option. He also stressed that Monaco fully endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the words of the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, who had so eloquently appealed to nations to foster a universal culture of peace.

75. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply to delegations other than the delegation of the Republic of Korea which had cast aspersions on his country during the general debate, emphasized that the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula was a glaring example of the shortcomings of the non-proliferation Treaty. The most serious problem lay in the implementation of the Treaty. The influential States parties took advantage of its discriminatory nature to divide States at their whim into "friendly" States and "enemy" or "evil" States, which amounted to applying double standards in the implementation of the Treaty. Moreover, the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula had originated from the introduction by the United States of nuclear weapons into South Korean territory. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a small, non-aligned country without nuclear weapons which, having concluded a cease-fire and not a definitive peace agreement, lived under the constant threat of such weapons. That was why, in the desire to guard against such a threat, it had acceded to the Treaty in the belief that that instrument could protect it. However, that had not been the case at all, and the threat against it persisted. Its numerous appeals to the international community calling attention to its plight had fallen on deaf ears. In addition, feeling that it was useless to remain bound by a Treaty which was of no benefit to it, it had decided to withdraw from the Treaty, a measure which it had subsequently suspended in the light of the "Agreed Framework" it had concluded with the United States. In that regard, he pointed out that those who were currently denigrating his country had never asked the question whether it was threatened by a nuclear attack and whether that was a violation of the Treaty. Such indifference was the fruit of biased minds which had sought from the outset to categorize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an enemy State and to portray it as an evil country.

76. He emphasized that the Korean nuclear question was a political and military issue which must be settled by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States; the solution must not be entrusted to IAEA, which was a technical organization manipulated by certain influential States. He pointed out that, having already had the aide-mémoire of his country's Atomic Energy Commission circulated to the participants in the Conference, his delegation would not respond in detail to the statement by the Director General of IAEA. But it was ridiculous for the Director General to have called for special inspections of two military bases which he had already inspected himself. He also wished to point out that the States members of IAEA had already rejected the idea of utilizing satellite-imaging techniques, fearing that such procedures might infringe their sovereignty. All that scheming stemmed from a desire to use the Treaty and IAEA as a means of isolating and strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the political, military and economic fields. The 25 years of operation of the Treaty created the impression that a number of influential States had taken over the non-proliferation Treaty, fashioning it and IAEA into instruments which they sought to use for controlling and dominating most non-nuclear-weapon States. So long as the States parties were divided into friendly and enemy or evil States, and so long as some of them were the subject of discriminatory treatment, the non-proliferation regime could never be strengthened, even if extended for an indefinite period.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.