In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. President,

CTBT has been a long aspiration of the International Community as a reaction to the commencement and intensification of the nuclear arms race at the initial phase of the nuclear age. The commencement of the negotiations to conclude the CTBT was immediately received with enthusiasm. Four years of negotiations did not, however, satisfy the expectations of the world community. The treaty as concluded did not specifically prohibit all nuclear tests but only nuclear test explosions, which could thus implicitly provide the Nuclear Weapon States with the possibility to improve their arsenals through non-explosive nuclear testing.

CTBT was however welcomed and a great number of states signed the treaty when it was opened for signature. It was emphasized by signatory states that CTBT, however limited in scope, could contribute to nuclear disarmament and is an essential element to implement Article VI of the NPT, which requires practical steps for total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I believe this sentiment remains unchanged. The international community can expect today no less than reinvigorating consolidated efforts to facilitate the entry into force of this important treaty. This Conference, therefore, should review, in accordance with its mandate, the existing situation and formulate appropriate steps to encourage the states to sign and/or ratify the Treaty.

Mr. President

The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its established security policy in advocating and promoting the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, has been an original signatory of the CTBT and has consequently participated actively in the CTBT Preparatory Commission since its inception in Vienna. In addition to its active involvement in the negotiations, my country participated actively in the process of preparation for the implementation of CTBT, through installation of the monitoring stations which my country hosts as means of verification to ensure compliance with the Treaty.

However states cannot decide in isolation. The international security environment has unfortunately highly deteriorated in recent years. We have witnessed serious setbacks in promoting practical steps to achieve nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament. START process has in. practice reached to a halt and freeze. Some limited measures which proceeded, or perceived to proceed, within a whole set of practical steps towards decreasing at least the dependency on nuclear arms, were
not realized or even at some instances reversed.

The culmination of this chain of setbacks was the rejection of the CTBT itself by the US Senate, which has enormously affected the overall CTBT ratification process. This situation has had its impacts on the actual negotiations in Vienna. Withdrawal of the US delegation from the substantive negotiations on the on-site inspection operational manual may lead to the disruption of all activities of the CTBTO in preparing the ground for CTBT entry into force.

Furthermore, no prospect is yet opened up for improvement of international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Disarmament legal instruments create an atmosphere leading to free access of the States Parties to peaceful applications of relevant equipment, materials and technology. The incentives to encourage universal adherence to international disarmament instruments are integral part of regimes arising from them and no attempt for furtherance of regulatory aspects may succeed without due implementation of the promotional ones, particularly in the area of transfers for peaceful purposes.

At the regional level, Mr. President, the Middle East is threatened by the Israeli nuclear program. Numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the very recent 2000 NPT Final Document have clearly called on Israel to join the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards. Israel however, in defiance of the call by the international community, is developing nuclear arsenals aiming to intimidate the countries of the region.

This policy of terror has led to more insecurity and instability in the region, and created a situation where many disarmament and arms control instruments have failed to receive the full support of regional countries.

In the CTBT context, it has negatively affected the organizational structure of the CTBTO. Here, the insistence of some to include Israel in the Middle East and South Asia Group within the Organization, has caused a deadlock and consequently deprived an important group of countries from active participation in some aspects of the work of the CTBTO. In 1996, I stated in the resumed session of the General Assembly convened to adopt CTBT, that "those few who intended to score a political point, have, by doing so, created an obstacle in the implementation of the Treaty." Today I feel sorry that my prediction has proved correct.

Mr. President

We need to be clear in our minds on the steps, which can salvage the CTBT from collapse. The difficulty lies in the security doctrines and not in technical and minor verification issues. As far as Nuclear Weapon States are not ready to renounce nuclear arms race and are determined to develop their arsenals, no easy solution may be found to rectify the setbacks inflicted upon the CTBT. CTBT has a prominent status in the set of practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Multilateralism and consolidation of a security network to ensure the security of all states should be the guiding principle in the new environment of international relations. We should be able to recognize the right of all to be secure and construct our global security arrangement through dialogue and cooperation.

CTBT is of prominent importance and there is no way other than mobilizing all our efforts to consolidate the commitment not to test nuclear weapons. No country should be under the illusion that it can bear the cost of the collapse of the CTBT foundation.