GERMANY

Address
by Joschka Fischer
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany

at the
Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
 
 

New York, 11 November 2001

Check against delivery


The 11th of September has dramatically altered the very basis of security policy. Resolute action by the international community is now required to fight terrorism and to safeguard our security. This also includes developing political responses to crises, conflicts and threats. This is particularly true for endeavors to effectively counter the unforeseeable dangers presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A powerful political impulse for a strict disarmament and non-proliferation policy is urgently needed. For prior to 11 September efforts towards global disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation left much to be desired. Much of the momentum seemed to have been lost. And this even though we faced new dangers from the uncontrolled proliferation of NBC weapons and missile technology. The Federal Government therefore believes that the Test-Ban Treaty must enter into force as soon as possible, both because of its great practical value, and in order to send a vital political signal. It could become a crucial step on the road towards successfully halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 

Mr. President,

We have emerged from the shadow of the Cold War, have cast off confrontational modes of thought and now face a new, no less dangerous challenge. A new impetus for global disarmament and arms control must be part of the response of the community of states in order to live up to the core task of maintaining international peace and security, as laid down in the UN Charter. In Germany's opinion, it is particularly important

(1) to avoid new, mainly regional arms races,

(2) to maintain and enhance the comprehensive system of disarmament and non-proliferation
 treaties, and

(3) to contain more effectively than hitherto the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to state and non-state actors, using political means as well as treaties.

The American President's announcement that the US will dramatically reduce its nuclear potential sends an important signal, especially as regards the disarmament obligation contained in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Federal Government is confident that the ongoing US-Russian talks on strategic offensive and defensive systems will result in agreements which will drastically reduce their nuclear potential and advance global stability and disarmament. We hope that the reduction of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, on which US-Russian agreements from 1990/1991 already exist, will also be addressed in this framework, with effective provisions on verification.

It is not just the nuclear threat that gives cause for concern, but also the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) remains a weak point in the international non-proliferation framework. For ten years now the community of states has agreed that it must be strengthened. The insidious bioterrorist threat, which is currently faced by the people of the US and elsewhere, makes this the priority task for the forthcoming 5th Review Conference. We need to take innovative steps towards strengthening the BWC in a legally binding, multilateral manner supported by all groups of states. In our view, the consultations should concentrate on the key issues of verification, transparency and practical cooperation. We welcome President Bush's announcement to put forward new proposals in Geneva next week.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) now faces the test of eliminating the large stockpiles of chemical weapons remaining from the Soviet era. This, and nothing else, is the current focus of the Convention. Germany has so far spent over 25 million euro on helping just Russia fulfill its treaty obligations and is willing to contribute further as part of an international effort.
 

Mr. President,

It is true that multilateral treaties do not solve all problems, but global non-proliferation can only be successful if all members of the community of nations are involved. Germany staunchly supports the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference from May last year, which expressly names the signing and ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty as the first of the necessary steps.

Germany appeals to all states of the group of 44 whose signature and ratification is required for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force: do the necessary now, so that a legally binding framework can replace unilateral test moratoria.

We call on India, Pakistan and North Korea, who have so far refused to sign, to do so now and to ratify the treaty promptly, and so show their neighbors and the world at large that they are serious about world peace and international security.

We appeal to the US and China as nuclear-weapon states to ratify the Treaty and so help it achieve universal validity. As nuclear-weapon states, they can make a special contribution to giving international non-proliferation policy the impulse it so urgently needs.
 

Thank you.