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Good morning. I very much thank the IASFM for inviting UNRWA to participate in this conference. It has been most interesting over the past two days to hear about academic concepts and debates that relate to UNRWA’s operational work and often come up in discussion among UNRWA staff, but only fleetingly. I shall be taking many thoughts back to share with my colleagues. This morning I shall focus on Palestine refugees from the perspective of UNRWA’s role as "practitioner". UNRWA offers humanitarian and human development services to a population of some 4.4 million Palestine refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. We discharge our mandate through 28,000 Palestinian refugee staff and 120 international staff directly providing primary education, primary health care, relief and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement and microfinance. In Lebanon and in the occupied Palestinian territory, emergency services are in place to support those refugees affected by armed conflict. I will discuss the contemporary Palestinian experience under the broad headings of causes of Palestinian displacement, the current conditions of Palestinian exile and some prospects for the future. Causes As we heard yesterday, Palestine refugees are those, and their descendants, who were displaced from what was British Mandate Palestine in 1948. At that time over 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes in genuine fear for their lives, seeking sanctuary in neighbouring territories and States. Given the personal danger and threats to life at the time, the flight of Palestine refugees in 1948 was initially a classic refugee outflow triggered by well-founded fear. The initial flight was prompted by the disappearance of British Mandate Palestine, and the coming into being of the State of Israel. This meant that Palestine refugees were deprived of much more than their homes and livelihoods. They were simultaneously dispossessed of a nation/state within whose rubric they defined their destiny as a people. At the moment of acquiring the status of refugees, they were denied the means of resolving that status, as the state to which they might have returned in safety and dignity ceased to exist. In its place was a state defining itself in a manner to obviate the possibility of return. The naqba or catastrophe, as it is termed by Palestinians, overshadows the Palestinian-Israeli relationship to this day, sixty years later. A further point of note is the recurrent nature of the conflict and of Palestinian displacement. Far from being confined to a discrete war in 1948, the conflict which triggered Palestinian flight has persisted over six decades, further precluding durable solutions and imposing perpetual vulnerability on Palestine refugees within and beyond the region. In the occupied Palestinian territory, refugees are repeatedly displaced in the wake of armed incursions, home demolitions and air strikes—and even checkpoints and the separation barrier. Elsewhere in the region, events have demonstrated that Palestine refugees retain their status as a distinct, identifiable people in exile, exposing them to grave risks at times of tension or conflict in their host communities. A case in point was the mass flight in 1990 and 1991 of Palestine refugees who had been resident in Kuwait as migrants for two generations or more. More recently, we saw the example of refugees displaced from Nahr el Bared camp in northern Lebanon and the dispersal of Palestinians from Baghdad in the face of grave persecution. Each of these instances served to remind us that the Palestine refugee experience is defined by a dynamic of events beyond the single historical experience of 1948. The causes of Palestine refugee flight remain extant, frequently renewed by ongoing conflict and repeated displacement. Contemporary situation To turn now to the contemporary situation. I will focus on a few features – many of them closely linked - that distinguish Palestine refugees. One feature comprises the duration, scope and magnitude of Palestinian exile. This year marks the sixtieth year of Palestinian dispossession, an anniversary that resonates with the frustrations of the Palestinian people and the failures of the international community. No other refugee group has had to wait so long for a solution to its plight or been required to confront a future of such deeply uncertain prospects. This extraordinary record for unresolved crisis is all the more striking when we consider the conspicuous profile the Palestinian question occupies within the region and globally. This is hardly a veiled issue the world fails to notice. And the 4.4 million refugees registered and residing in the countries and territories served by UNRWA do not represent the entirety of the Palestine refugee community. There are significant numbers of Palestinians living in the diaspora, at least four to five million according to some estimates. In spite of some of them acquiring citizenship of other countries, almost all identify themselves firmly as Palestine refugees and share the aspirations of Palestine refugees in the region. The size of the Palestine refugee presence invites comparison with UNHCR’s dwindling caseload of 1951 Convention refugees, currently, as we heard yesterday, estimated at 8.3 million. The physical size and geographic spread of the Palestine refugee population are not the only reasons for the attention they command on the international plane. That prominence derives even more from the global significance of the issues raised by the Palestine refugee question. These include: the sovereignty of international law over all nations regardless of military or material might; the right of all people to govern themselves in a State that allows them freedom to pursue economic, social and cultural development in peace with other nations; the inherent dignity of all human beings from which flows entitlements to freedom from occupation, poverty and fear; freedom of movement; and the injunctions on humane restraint in the conduct of armed conflict. These ideals are enshrined in binding international obligations of universal application. They are fundamental to human endeavor and underpin the standards by which most nations and peoples measure human development. Why are these ideals so little observed in the occupied Palestinian territory and for Palestinians generally? While we may assume we know the answer, as long as this question is unaddressed, the issue of Palestine will persist and continue to contribute to simmering conflicts, discontent and be cited as justification for the actions of extremist groups around the world. A range of serious deprivations feature regularly in the contemporary lives of Palestinians and Palestine refugees. Among them, measures restricting or prohibiting the movement of people and goods stand out as particularly severe. The closure regime in the West Bank exemplifies the extent to which these measures could cause permanent damage to the Palestinian body politic and defeat the feasibility of a viable Palestinian State—or even the successful use of the $7.4 billion pledged in Paris last month. In the West Bank, the illegal separation barrier divides and isolates Palestinian communities, stifling livelihoods and making it difficult or impossible for hundreds of thousands of people to reach their jobs, families, markets, schools and hospitals. The barrier and its allied regime of permits, security checks, towers, trenches and electronic fences constrict movement to a point where normal Palestinian life has become a thing of the past. The barrier effectively expropriates some 640 square kilometers of land - an area over 1.5 times the size of the Gaza Strip – in addition to the large areas effectively seized to support the extensive security infrastructure of army bases, checkpoints, buffer zones and settler-only roads. The West Bank is splintered into multiple enclaves, with Palestinian movement between each section strictly controlled. By contrast, the million and a half Palestinians of Gaza are held captive as a whole. They are free to move within Gaza but prohibited from leaving it – with very few exceptions. While restrictions on entry into or departure from Gaza have always been an element of the occupying power’s system of control, the near-absolute nature of the closures since June is without precedent. The stated intention of the occupying power is to reduce essential supplies to the barest minimum, exceptions made only for humanitarian supplies, with the broader intention to rid the territory of those currently in control in Gaza. Since June last year, there has been a 70 per cent reduction in the supply lines into Gaza. The World Food Programme reports that by the end of 2007, just over half (56.5%) of the territory’s food needs were met. Owing to a lack of fuel and spare parts, public health conditions have declined steeply as water and sanitation services struggle to function. The electricity supply is sporadic (and was reduced further along with fuel supply reductions in these past days), and for some 210,000 poorest people, piped water is available for no more than two hours a day. (And keep in mind that Gaza is a largely urban setting where people live in high rise buildings and even refugee camp housing is often multi-story, requiring electricity for basic services to reach the population.) In mid-November last year, the World Health Organization reported that Gaza had less than one month’s supply of 91 essential drugs and necessary medical supplies. The humanitarian and human development work of UNRWA and other agencies and the private sector is hampered by the closure of Karni and Sofa crossings - Gaza’s main access points for goods. Projects valued at over $213 million have been suspended, of which some $93 million are UNRWA’s and another $120 million those of other UN agencies. Restrictions are imposed also on the shipment of cash into Gaza, crippling the banking system, impeding the inflow of badly needed remittances and forcing normal business activity to grind to a halt. The de facto blockade applies to people as well as essential commodities. Seriously ill patients have been prevented from obtaining the care they require in Egypt, Jordan or Israel as in past practice. One result has been a number of preventable deaths, 52 at end December. Several thousand more Gazans are languishing in limbo in Egypt, having been denied entry into Gaza since the Rafah crossing was closed in June. What we are witnessing is an entire populace effectively incarcerated at the whim of the occupying power. Human rights instruments provide that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his or her own, and to return to that country. In the normal course of things, one expects an affected community to have a choice - either to weather the adverse situation or to seek temporary refuge in a safer, more conducive location. Many Palestine refugees, particularly those under the yoke of occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, are denied that simple human choice. I would like to comment further, though briefly, on socio-economic decline as another major aspect of life in Gaza and the West Bank. A useful source of information on this subject is an UNRWA report of November 2007, titled: Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Recent Socio-Economic Developments. This study notes – as others by the World Bank and the IMF have done -that in 2006, the Palestinian economy experienced retrenchment and continued to stagnate in 2007. In November last year, the Palestinian Federation of Industries reported the closure of 95 percent of Gaza’s factories and workshops (3,200), swelling the ranks of the unemployed by 80,000. More than 30 per cent of Palestinians now live below the poverty line as those who were self-sufficient before the intifada began in September 2000 or until the Hamas electoral victory in January of 2006 or the internal conflict of June 2007 are now compelled to turn to humanitarian assistance to survive. In Gaza, 80% of the population is now receiving humanitarian aid. The World Bank conservatively estimates unemployment at 44 per cent in 2007. As telling as statistics may be, they cannot convey the misery, frustration and mounting despair - the bitter fruits of deepening, and, I emphasize, manmade, poverty - that threaten to engulf Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Statistics also do not speak to the potentially irreversible damage being done to the economic foundations of the occupied Palestinian territory. Investors and entrepreneurs are moving their capital to Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere, and skills that are lost from long periods of unemployment are not easily reclaimed. In addition, tens of thousands of Palestinians are applying to emigrate—a new phenomenon and a very sad indicator of their living conditions. Part of the tragic irony of prevailing socio-economic gloom is that prior to the current crisis, Palestinians and Palestine refugees were renowned for their business acumen and high level of skills. Unlike many refugee groups whose opportunities for settlement and higher education are limited, many Palestine refugees have been favoured with access to citizenship in Jordan and elsewhere and given prospects for professional advancement in and beyond the Gulf Region. Prior to the second intifada in the year 2000, this highly skilled labour force took advantage of open borders and respectable capital flows to create real potential for self-sustaining growth in the occupied Palestinian territory. There can be no sharper contrast than that between the economic optimism of the pre-2000 period and the depression that currently prevails. Prospects and conclusion In light of all that Palestinians and Palestine refugees endure, particularly in Gaza and the West Bank, what can we realistically say about future prospects? When I ponder this question, I conclude that we – certainly those of us in humanitarian and development service - must maintain a positive outlook, at the very least to serve as a counterweight to the dread and despair seeping through many Palestinian communities. Neither we nor the Palestine refugees we serve can afford to abandon hope or surrender to apocalyptic predictions. The meeting in Annapolis last November and the subsequent pledging conference in Paris demonstrate both the pitfalls and the opportunities lying in the way of resolving this seemingly endless conflict, and with it, the plight of Palestine refugees. The pledges made at the Paris conference, almost two billion dollars more than requested, suggest that the most powerful—or wealthiest—governments recognize the scale of the challenge and the imperative of solid economic and fiscal foundations for the occupied Palestinian territory. This implies that they acknowledge the indivisibility of security, socio-economic stability and the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Acknowledging these linkages is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for accomplishing meaningful change in the fortunes of Palestinians and Palestine refugees. To achieve this requires a genuine, more explicit focus on fulfilling the rights and freedoms to which Palestinians are entitled under international law. These include (and I repeat) freedom of movement, freedom from occupation and the protection of international humanitarian law. Experience has shown that without a cessation of hostilities and a significant level of respect for human rights, efforts towards economic revival will be fraught at best. Some statements at the Paris conference—notably from Arab delegations—included appeals for reconciliation among Palestinians. For those like us who witnessed firsthand the horrific bloodshed of intro-Palestinian fighting in June last year, and the destructive internecine rift that followed, this call has particular merit. Healing the rift will be a vital step toward establishing a unified and viable Palestinian State existing in peace and security with its neighbours. But let me turn to some preliminary outstanding issues that lie beneath the larger geo-political and economic uncertainties of today. One outstanding question relates to the identity of the Palestine refugee. If the political challenges were resolved and a just settlement agreed, by what criteria would Palestine refugees be identified? UNRWA’s refugee rolls and the over 16 million records in the Agency’s archives (currently being digitized under the Palestinian Refugee Records Project) would certainly be the first port of call. These records would be an indispensable resource for tracing family histories, tracking property titles (along with the UNCCP) and verifying the bona fides of individual residence in mandate Palestine prior to 1948. An issue of possible contention is whether the international community could deny or exclude from the benefit of a just solution, those who maintain their claim to be Palestine refugees and yet are outside UNRWA’s refugee records. The list of such claimants could be long. It would include refugees who are registered by States and governments but not by UNRWA; those who are registered neither by UNRWA nor any State, such as the so-called "non-ID Palestinians" (as those in Lebanon); and those Palestinians who fall within the terms of the Statelessness Convention. It would include those who for a variety of legitimate reasons cannot provide documentation to meet the UNRWA definition, viz. proving that their normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and that they lost both home and livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict (obvious examples being Bedouin groups in West Bank, Jordan and Syria and many of the Palestinians in Iraq). The preoccupation with other final status issues (Jerusalem, borders, water) and the perceived demographic 'threat' associated with the right of return has distracted attention from seeking clear answers to such basic questions. A second outstanding issue is that of refugee representation. A prominent failing of peace processes to date has been the practice of shying away from issues deemed too thorny. The preference has been to concentrate small steps on areas where progress has been thought possible and to postpone all others to the indefinite future. One outcome of this approach has been to shunt the refugee issue into the shadows where it has more or less languished for six decades. This inclination to forsake the refugee issue has as its corollary the silencing of the refugee voice and a disregard for refugee choice. Under the universal refugee protection framework, informed individual choice is the foundation on which durable solutions are identified and applied, and this principle should equally benefit Palestine refugees. Indeed, given the complexities of return and settlement issues in the Palestinian context, informed choice must be the essence of any effort to sift through and clarify the range of varying Palestinian expectations and rights. And yet the reality of representational needs has not been reflected in practice, as witness the trend of peace proposals (for example Taba, Geneva and Aix) negotiated mainly by non-refugees. There is talk of resolving the refugee issue but there is no system or mechanism in place to solicit, record and respond to the views of Palestine refugees. The power of informed Palestinian voices was demonstrated in 2004 and 2005 by the Civitas Project out of Oxford – a participatory civic needs assessment for Palestine refugees implemented by Palestinian activists and local leaders. The impressive results of this work are recorded in the report titled: Palestinians Register: Laying the Foundations and Setting Directions. If we wish to fathom the way ahead, where better and most legitimately to seek directions than from those whose interests are most immediately engaged? By way of a concluding reflection, in the final analysis, the fortunes of Palestinians rest on their citizenship in a secure, well-functioning State, within which they can pursue normal lives, rediscover their dignity and achieve the full extent of their human potential. Over several decades, Palestinians have been a people whose territory is shackled and whose sovereignty is suppressed by an unrelenting occupation. The way forward is towards Palestinian self-determination, and just and lasting solutions to the plight of refugees – I again emphasize - through an informed choice. But first, and more immediately, open borders, freedom of movement, access for goods and people, and above all, a unified government equipped, willing and able to represent, protect and defend Palestinian and Palestine refugee interests. In this sixtieth year of Palestinian exile, we have no choice but to work toward these elusive – but achievable – goals. |
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