

Annex 1

1. Establishment of UNRWA and the early years – the 1950s

1.1 In the 1950s UNRWA explored various approaches to address the emergency shelter provision requirements of the refugees. These included: i) investigation into the types of housing, materials used and local practice in the countries of the Near East; ii) studies into the layout of village communities to include housing, sanitation and waste disposal, water supply and community facilities; iii) large-scale housing project in Gaza, a housing scheme in Jordan with the cooperation of the Government for middle class Palestinians not on the relief rolls and an experimental urban house in Syria.

1.2 “Urban housing and community facilities” was one of the seven categories of the ‘three-year plan for the rehabilitation of refugees’ undertaken by the Agency, for concluding broad programme agreements with Near East governments. The other categories included industrial and commercial development, banking, research and planning, agricultural development and direct aid to refugees.

1.3 With the UN General Assembly asking UNRWA to undertake initiatives to reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the region, UNRWA planned works programmes that included Yarmuk-Jordan Valley development project, the Sinai project, road building and afforestation, agricultural and housing settlements in Jordan and Syria, major urban housing projects and the Development Bank of Jordan. Urban development projects were a special focus, because the Agency felt that “shelter represents a heavy cost element in the budget of the refugees who wish to become self-supporting” and that “the provision of low-cost housing is therefore a necessity”.

1.4 UNRWA continued in the 1950s with its efforts to increase and improve camp accommodation. A new camp construction programme in Gaza was completed before the winter of 1954-55 ensuring that no refugee in Gaza was in a tent. The Agency embarked on a camp construction programme in coordination with host governments in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Even as new shelters were being built, pressure for expanding existing shelters started building up to accommodate family expansion. The Agency also looked into the shelter needs of about 53,500 bedouins in Jordan who were on the Agency’s relief rolls.

1.5 UNRWA noted in the annual report of the Director to the UN General Assembly for 1954-55 that “the successful carrying out of the Agency’s shelter programme will depend upon the availability of funds, upon the assistance of authorities in the host countries in suitable camp sites, and upon the cooperation of the refugees themselves”. It also noted that while in the past some refugees refused to accept improved quarters “on the ground that this would be in the nature of permanent resettlement”, there was a “noticeable change in this attitude.....and evidence of a better understanding by the refugees that to live in improved shelter is not prejudicial to their political rights”.

1.6 In 1956, UNRWA reiterated the objectives of its shelter construction programme: i) to replace tents with huts in existing camps, and to build new camps to replace unsatisfactory accommodation; ii) to provide accommodation in camps for the most urgent needs caused by social changes among the existing camp population; iii) to provide tents for the 53,500 bedouins in Jordan. Despite UNRWA's efforts, as of 1956, the minimum shelter needs of refugees had not been met. The percentage of registered refugees residing in camps went up from 29.3 per cent in 1950 to 38.9 per cent in 1956, indicating the pressure for the admission of the destitute into the camps. UNRWA reported that there were still refugees "living in caves in the hills of Palestine", "there are still concentrations of refugees in unofficial camps for which the Agency cannot afford to assume responsibility" and that "in and around many official camps there are still so-called squatters – refugees for whom Agency shelter cannot be provided".

1.7 After the 1956 conflict, UNRWA focused on the repair and maintenance of existing shelters in Gaza. It also experimented with distributing roofing material to refugees capable of building their own huts and cash grants to such refugees in Syria. Still, the Director was constrained to state to the General Assembly, that regarding the shelter provided by the Agency "there is not enough of it and some of it is of a very low standard". He cited insufficiency of funds and local problems involving refugees and host governments for not being able to construct new camps that were needed and improve conditions in existing camps.

1.8 As of 1958, UNRWA achieved significant success in the tent replacement programme, with total replacements of tents with huts in Gaza and Syria, though 500 tents in Lebanon and 4,400 in Jordan remained. The needs of squatters, *bona fide* refugees not registered as camp residents but who settled in makeshift housing around camps or in separate agglomerations, and those arising from family changes could still not be addressed due to insufficiency of funds. By the end of 1959, UNRWA succeeded in replacing all tents with huts in camps.

1.9 In 1960, the Director of UNRWA reported to the General Assembly that "ten years of UNRWA history bear out the fact that major development projects designed with the specific purpose of resettling refugees are unacceptable to refugees and host governments alike" and suggested that UNRWA focus on "developing the potential of a human being" which was the "most valuable and priceless asset". He asserted that such expenditure on human development efforts through the education, vocational training and health programmes "should not be regarded as relief any more than is a similar expenditure by any government or by UNESCO". This was to be the primary blueprint of UNRWA's operations in the years to come.

2. The 1960s

2.1 The 1960s decade was marked by a steady increase in the camp-resident refugee population, with over-crowding of camps caused by natural increase and the pull-factor of the location of UNRWA schools, clinics, feeding and distribution centres being located primarily in the camps. The Agency's efforts to establish new camps in Jordan and

Lebanon failed due to difficulties in obtaining land for camp construction and due to UNRWA's budgetary constraints. UNRWA continued to give priority to elderly refugees and families suffering special hardship in the building and maintenance of shelters and encouraged refugees to contribute their own labour and materials in shelter construction and maintenance. An example of such self-help projects was the provision of roofing grants for those huts whose walls were built by refugees themselves at their own expense.

2.2 In the 60s, UNRWA maintained its basic environmental sanitation programme concerned with the provision of safe and adequate water supply, sanitary waste disposal and drainage and vector control, always in close coordination with host authorities. The Agency also pioneered a community participative approach to environmental sanitation especially in relation to the construction of basic sewage removal systems, certain improvements to water supply systems and the construction of family latrines. Yet the problems of environmental sanitation were most acute in the urban camps and further compounded by the problem of "squatters". Where feasible, UNRWA improved water supplies by connecting camp water distribution systems with public or private water company mains, which also permitted the establishment of private domiciliary connections at the expense of the refugees. The camp refuse collection system was gradually changed through replacement of metal-wheeled barrows by rubber-tired hand carts and the introduction of tractor trailers.

2.3 Despite the shelter construction and camp infrastructure efforts, the Commissioner-General of the Agency noted in 1964 that "there are families who still live in dwellings which are unfit for human habitation; some in dank cellars, others in crumbling tenements, others in grossly overcrowded barracks and shacks". He also informed the General Assembly that "refugees living in camps are probably better housed and better cared for than many of the remaining three-fifths living outside the camps" and that "UNRWA is under constant pressure from these less fortunate refugees to expand its camps and build more shelter". Despite such pressing need, UNRWA was forced since the beginning of 1964 to curtail its shelter programme due to budgetary constraints.

2.4 In this decade, the broad administrative crystallization of the various shelter-related interventions of UNRWA took place. Thus, construction and maintenance of shelters, roads and miscellaneous community improvements in the camps were undertaken through the relief services department, whereas environmental sanitation interventions were undertaken through the health department.

2.5 The 1967 conflict was a watershed in the history of the Agency, and indeed in the long and continuing misery of the refugees. As noted by the Commissioner-General, it disrupted "a slow but steady process of rehabilitation (that) had been at work among the refugees and (which) had begun to make an evident impact in improving their economic and social condition". He further underscored that "the process of rehabilitation was being achieved not by ambitious and costly works projects and schemes of mass resettlement but by the operation of normal economic and human factors". UNRWA stated to the General Assembly that around 175,000 who became refugees a second time since 1948 and the "350,000 or more other persons newly displaced from the occupied

areas of southern Syria, West Bank, Gaza and Sinai” were in “need of the very essentials of physical survival – food, water, shelter, blankets, clothing and health care, and scarcely less important, the education of their children”. Many refugees and displaced persons were thus forced to live in tented accommodation exposed to the elements and the physical danger of military action. UNRWA, in coordination with host authorities, established emergency tented camps, with rudimentary facilities for heating, bedding, concrete floors, surfaced pathways and ditches for surface drainage through these camps. Shelter repair was a priority, especially in areas severely affected by the conflict. Total camp population increased sharply after the war due to the addition of around 100,000 persons in the ten new emergency camps.

2.6 While UNRWA dealt with emergency shelter needs of the Palestine refugees arising from regional conflict in 1948, 1956 and 1967, the end of the decade also brought about a new feature, arising from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – repair and reconstruction of shelters destroyed by the Israeli authorities for reasons of security as stated by them.

3. The 1970s

3.1 UNRWA’s experience in shelter rehabilitation, camp infrastructure and housing development in the 1970s was marked by continued outbreaks of local and international armed conflict which severely affected Agency operations at various periods during the decade, eventually requiring the relocation of Headquarters from Beirut to Vienna. In particular, the outbreak of civil conflict in Jordan in September 1970, the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the Lebanon civil war beginning in 1975, and on-going Israeli air raids in Lebanon during the whole decade resulted in extensive loss of life among Palestine refugees as well as the destruction and/or damage of vast numbers of refugee camps, shelters and Agency installations in and around camps and shelters. For instance, Nabatieh camp in Lebanon was largely destroyed during an Israeli air raid in 1974 and the Agency’s efforts in reconstructing the camp over the remainder of the decade were continually frustrated by repeated Israeli shelling and artillery fire directed at the camp.

3.2 Throughout this period, the Agency focused its interventions on improving the quality of shelter and camp infrastructure in both the “regular camps” established in the period prior to the 1967 war and the “emergency camps” established following the conclusion of the 1967 hostilities. These interventions were complemented by measures undertaken by host governments, local aid organizations, and by the refugees themselves, and included: construction and/or repair of new shelters (both concrete and prefabricated), roads, pathways, playgrounds, sewerage systems, surface water drains and waste water main drains. In addition, the Agency continued to provide basic community sanitation services in the camps, comprising mainly the provision of potable water, sanitary disposal of waste, draining of storm water, latrine facilities and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease. A major aspect of the Agency’s interventions in this regard were its replacement of public latrines with private latrines in virtually all of the camps over the course of the decade.

3.3 The Agency's interventions during this period incorporated a significant level of "self-help programmes", involving a combination of Agency financing with Palestine refugee labour. The idea behind the self-help schemes was to give the refugees a sense of empowerment as well as a source of meaningful employment. Virtually all Agency interventions, including significant projects in shelter construction and repair, involved such self-help programmes.

3.4 In the Gaza Strip, Israeli military authorities demolished thousands of refugee shelters over the course of the decade for "security reasons" and insisted that the refugees whose shelters had been destroyed be moved into housing projects constructed by the military government in other areas of the Strip. In many instances, refugees were ordered to demolish their residences themselves as a condition for allocation of new housing units. This policy retarded Agency interventions in rehousing of refugees in camps, such as Khan Younis and Rafah, where Israeli military authorities had engaged in extensive destruction of refugee shelters early in the decade.

4. The 1980s

4.1 The 1980s were marked by the very considerable difficulties imposed on the Agency by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, internecine Palestinian fighting in the so-called "camps' wars" in Lebanon in the mid-80s, and the intifada beginning in 1987 in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). In addition to unprecedented casualty levels, these events caused the vast destruction of and damage to Palestine refugee shelters and camp infrastructure. According to the Annual Report of the Commissioner-General for the period 1 July 1981 – 30 June 1982, "the scale of destruction of the refugee camps" in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion "was very severe" and resulted in "tens of thousands of Palestine refugees [being] made homeless once more". For instance, in the eight camps in the Beirut, Sidon and Tyre areas, 57 percent of refugee homes were destroyed and 36 percent damaged in aerial bombardment, ground fighting or subsequent bulldozing, affecting almost 73,500 persons or 90 percent of the camp population in these areas. Worst hit was the Ein el-Hilweh camp in Sidon, where 80 percent of the houses were destroyed and the other 20 percent damaged. In the face of this massive damage and destruction, the Agency launched a special USD13 million "housing appeal" in 1983. This appeal, which was separate and apart from the USD39 million emergency appeal for relief programmes in Lebanon launched months earlier, was designed merely to cover the estimated cost of an initial phase of emergency reconstruction of UNRWA installations, camp infrastructure and refugee housing.

4.2 During this period, the Agency continued to focus its interventions on improving the quality of shelter and camp infrastructure on its own and in conjunction with host governments, other UN agencies and local aid organizations. Self-help programmes continued to figure prominently in the Agency's interventions and included: clearing of destroyed and damaged camps, provision of tented housing for destroyed camp shelters, provision of cash grants to allow refugees to repair and/or rebuild their shelters, laying of water-supply networks, introduction of indoor water taps, and repair and provision of sanitary facilities and roadbeds. Environmental health initiatives included provision of

adequate quantities of potable water, sanitary disposal of waste, drainage of storm water, sewage construction and augmentation, latrine facilities and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease. UNRWA continued to assist special hardship families with rebuilding and/or repairing their shelters.

4.3 In the OPT, the Israeli military authorities continued to interfere with UNRWA shelter and camp infrastructure activities, particularly in the Gaza field. Scores of Palestine refugees continued to be affected by shelter demolitions carried out by the Israeli authorities, going as far back as the first months of the occupation. The outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 gave rise to greater difficulties for Agency shelter and camp infrastructure interventions, including increased instances of demolition or sealing of homes occupied by families of Palestine refugees accused of security violations, cutting off of water, electricity and telephone services, and closure of schools. As a matter of policy, the Agency pressed the Israeli authorities for compensation for families affected by the demolition of shelters, and protested the punitive demolition and sealing of refugee shelters.

5. The 1990s and Beyond

5.1 UNRWA's experience in shelter rehabilitation, camp infrastructure and housing development in the 1990s and 2000s was marked by the onset of the Oslo peace process in 1993, its subsequent breakdown, and the outbreak of a second intifada in 2000. Throughout the early 1990s, the Agency also continued to face difficulties imposed by ongoing violence in Lebanon, which resulted in the destruction and damage of scores of refugee shelters.

5.2 With renewed initiative and increased donor interest resulting from the Oslo process, the Agency embarked on three new and important initiatives, each of which impacted its interventions on improving the quality of shelter and camp infrastructure. First, the Peace Implementation Programme (PIP) launched in 1993 aimed to demonstrate the tangible benefits of the peace process through a comprehensive initiative to develop infrastructure, improve refugee living conditions and create employment opportunities in refugee communities Agency-wide. A key component of PIP activities concerned the improvement of refugee housing and environmental health conditions in camps. Under the programme, the Agency continued to rehabilitate shelters of refugees and special hardship families, enhance water supply infrastructure, construct pumping stations, implement new electricity networks, and repair and provide roads, pathways and drains in refugee camps. Since the Agency's adoption of the programme-based biennium budget in 2000-2001, no new funding has been received towards the PIP. The second initiative was the Agency's Special Environmental Health Programme (SEHP). Launched in 1993, the SEHP aimed at addressing the urgent environmental health needs of the Palestine refugees, particularly in the Gaza field where contamination of the environment by sewage and sullage continued to constitute a major threat to refugee health. In addition to the provision of adequate quantities of potable water, drainage of storm water, construction of latrine facilities and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease, initiatives undertaken by the Agency under the SEHP included the mechanization of solid

waste collection and disposal, shoreline protection schemes and large-scale sewage network construction. Since the outbreak of the intifada in 2000, a number of SEHP projects have been delayed and are behind schedule owing to Israeli-imposed restrictions on the import of construction materials into the Gaza Strip. The third initiative was UNRWA's Microfinance and Microenterprise Programme (MMP). Designed to provide development assistance to the Palestine refugees through the provision of various market-oriented credit products aimed at stimulating local economies, the MMP has directly and indirectly enhanced the ability of Palestine refugees to repair and maintain shelters.

5.3 Large-scale Israeli military operations in the OPT since September 2000, along with the imposition of widespread closures and curfews, have given rise to what the Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secretary-General, Ms. Catherine Bertini, described as a "serious and mounting humanitarian crisis". The deterioration of the humanitarian situation has been particularly felt in the area of shelter and camp infrastructure. For instance, the rate of punitive shelter demolitions in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli authorities doubled between December 2002 and May 2003, with the number of shelters requiring repair in the West Bank exceeding 10,000 between September 2000 and June 2003. As a result of the massive level of refugee shelter destruction and damage occasioned by Israeli military activity in the OPT since September 2000, the Agency has launched major re-housing and reconstruction projects in Jenin, Deir el-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah.

5.4 In January 2002, the Arab League Conference of supervisors of Palestinian Affairs in the Arab host countries called on UNRWA "to coordinate with the competent authorities in the Arab host countries to carry out projects relating to the infrastructure in the Palestinian camps in these countries..." thereby further underscoring support of Arab host Governments for more comprehensive camp upgrading. The Agency has, in cooperation with the Syrian government, embarked on an integrated rehabilitation/development project for 17,013 refugees in Neirab and Ein el-Tal camps in Syria. After more than two years of preparatory work, implementation of this project started in September 2002 with the construction of the first 28 new housing units in Neirab with related infrastructure in Ein el-Tal.

Annex 2

Technical norms, standards & guidelines for the rehabilitation of individual shelters and the implementation of re-housing developments

1.0 Number of rooms

1.1 The criteria of assistance are set as follow for both shelter rehabilitation and re-housing i.e.

1 - 2 Persons:-	1 Room + Kitchen + Shower/WC	(1 Room Unit)
3 - 4 Persons:-	2 Rooms + Kitchen + Shower/WC	(2 Room Unit)
5 - 7 Persons:-	3 Rooms + Kitchen + Shower/ WC	(3 Room Unit)
8 + Persons:-	4 Rooms + Kitchen + Shower/WC	(4 Room Unit)

2.0 Room sizes

2.1 The room sizes are set as follow for both shelter rehabilitation and re-housing i.e.

Living/Bedroom	14M ²	(net area)
Kitchen	10M ²	(net area)
Shower/WC	5 M ² /6M ²	(net area)

- ? Individual room sizes may be varied subject to staying within the total area for the individual unit.
- ? One room can be larger (i.e. 16M²) so that it can also be used as a living room, provided that the total net area for the unit remains within the range listed above.
- ? Provisions for sanitary facilities should occupy a net area of 5M² in the case of 1, 2 & 3 room units and a net area of 6M² in the case of the 4 room units. (N.B. See also paragraph 3 below).
- ? Recommended additional allowances for design purposes:
 - ? Allow an average of 25% of the total net area for internal circulation and construction.
 - ? An additional allowance should be made for staircases.
 - ? Where possible, a minimum of 12M² per unit of useable exterior space should be provided.

3.0 Sanitary facilities

- 3.1 It is proposed to retain the existing criteria for both shelter rehabilitation and re-housing i.e.

Sanitary Facilities for 1, 2, & 3 room units

Maximum net area is 5M².

Alternative (a):-

Two separate cubicles as follows:-

- (i) Washbasin + W.C.
- (ii) Washbasin + Shower

Alternative (b):-

- (i) One cubicle with Washbasin + WC + Shower.
- (ii) Additional Washbasin located outside the cubicle e.g. in the corridor.

Sanitary facilities for 4 room units

Maximum net area is 6M².

Two separate cubicles as follows:-

- (i) Wash Basin + W.C.+ shower
- (ii) Wash Basin + W.C.

4.0 Adherence to UNRWA norms

- 4.1 As a general principle, shelter rehabilitation and re-housing programmes should adhere strictly to UNRWA norms in terms of the number of rooms, room sizes and sanitary facilities provided. Priorities and norms should be dictated by needs rather than the level of funding. (*NB. In the case of shelter rehabilitation it may not always be possible to adhere strictly to the UNRWA norms).

5.0 Provisions for special family needs

- 5.1 An elderly parent/disabled person/second wife may be accommodated by the construction of an additional room instead of constructing a 1-room dwelling unit. Such decisions should be taken on a case-by-case basis following a detailed social study.
(NB. The existing criteria allow for the construction of a 1 room dwelling unit i.e. 1 room + kitchen + shower/WC, for a one or two person family).

6.0 Standard specifications

- 6.1 Bills of Quantities, specifications for workmanship and materials are standardized so that they are similar for all five fields. Specifications for materials should apply to both contractual and self-help approaches.

7.0 Provision for future extension

- 7.1 As a general principle reasonable provisions should always be made, where possible, for future extension. Such extension can be horizontally and/or vertically.
- 7.2 In the case of re-housing developments, provisions should be made for future expansion of up to 4 rooms per floor with essential structural elements designed for future extension. In the case of shelter rehabilitation, extension possibilities will depend on the size/shape of the existing site.
- 7.3 In order to exercise better control over future development for re-housing projects, it is recommended that foundations required for future extension be provided.
- 7.4 In general, structural designs should provide for vertical extension up to a maximum of three floors for both shelter rehabilitation and re-housing projects.
- 7.5 As a general principal, developments should be extended horizontally to the maximum possible before extending vertically.

8.0 Privacy issues

- 8.1 Architectural designs should make due provision for privacy, especially with regard to the privacy of courtyards and boundary wall heights.

9.0 Guidelines for the selection of plot sizes for re-housing developments

- 9.1 The recommended minimum plot size for a 1-storey development is 150M²/family. A 1-storey development provides the maximum in terms of extendibility. However, this option may be influenced by the availability of land and financial considerations.
- 9.2 Where possible, buildings with two or more apartments should only be used to accommodate extended families i.e. different families should not be housed in the same building.
- 9.3 Plot allocation for extended families should make reasonable provisions for future extension. This can be achieved by optimizing land use and spreading the initial construction horizontally as much as possible before extending vertically. This approach is based on:-
 - (a) Providing for better and more organized planning.
 - (b) Providing for controlled vertical expansion.

The above approach is best achieved by adopting semi-detached or attached housing concepts rather than fully detached houses. This approach provides for useable external living spaces in the form of courtyards and also results in more efficient land use i.e. a larger percentage of built-up area compared to land area. The use of set backs should be avoided when land resources are scarce as they result in un-usable strips of land and inefficient land use.

In order to achieve the above approach the recommended minimum plot sizes for the initial development design are:-

1- Storey building/1 dwelling unit:-	150M ²
2- Storey building /2 dwelling units:-	175M ²
2- Storey building /3 dwelling units:-	250M ²
2- Storey building /4 dwelling units:-	280M ²

- 9.4 If the approach outlined in paragraph 9.3 above is not possible due to very limited land resources then it may be necessary to construct up to three or even four storey buildings (e.g. if four '*extended*' families were previously housed together). For this situation the recommended minimum plot sizes for the initial development design are:-

1- Storey building /1 dwelling unit	150M ²
2- Storey building /2 dwelling units	175M ²
3- Storey building /3 dwelling units	200M ²
4- Storey building /4 dwelling units	225M ²

- 9.5 It is proposed that these guidelines will be further developed in the light of experience by the proposed UPU

Annex 3

Strategy for the implementation of contractual and self-help approaches for shelter rehabilitation and re-housing programmes

1.0 General

- 1.1 The objective of the Agency's shelter rehabilitation and re-housing programmes is to ensure, where possible, that refugees, who are living in structurally unsafe, unhealthy shelters or who have lost their houses in military operations, are part of a large scale camp upgrading and that refugees living in substandard housing are provided with adequate housing.

2.0 Rationale for the Agency's self help approach

- 2.1 The use of a self-help approach for shelter rehabilitation and re-housing is one of UNRWA's several implementation strategies for the improvement of housing conditions in refugee camps. These approaches include contractual, self-help approaches and combinations of both. The self-help approach has the primary objective (where possible and within the constraints of the Agency's policy) of building on the capacities of refugees and their communities to enable them to become more self-reliant. The self-help approach serves as a catalyst for the active participation of families and individuals in the improvement of their housing conditions and changes the nature of the intervention from refugees being recipients of aid to refugees becoming partners with the Agency.

3.0 Definitions & types of self-help

- 3.1 Self-help refers to a system by which refugees on a voluntary basis, contribute skilled or unskilled labor, management ability, building materials or funds in order to build, extend or repair/renovate their shelters/houses.
- 3.2 Participants in self-help projects, especially a low-income refugee or family, may receive whether financial or technical assistance from UNRWA, NGOs, community bodies or other third parties. This form of self-help is referred to as *aided Self-help*.
- 3.3 Different variations of the self-help approach can be undertaken. Those utilized by the Agency are in line with the principles of the World Bank's model of progressive development (Keare and Parris), whereby housing construction or improvements can be achieved through:
- (i) Staged development, in which the infrastructure (where applicable e.g. in the case of re-housing) and parts of the dwelling unit e.g. structural works, are constructed by the Agency by contractual means and the rest of the dwelling e.g. finishing works, are completed by the family either by *Aided Self-help* or

by means of *Direct Self-help* i.e. which is self help funded *directly* by the family;

(ii) *Aided Self-help*, can be organized in a variety of ways including:

- Self-help construction, in which a family hires a contractor to undertake finishing and/or repair works;
- Self-help construction, in which a family uses its own skilled or unskilled labour to undertake finishing and/or repair works.

3.4 Recently, *Shelter Improvement Loan* pilot projects have been initiated in Jordan and Syria. The development of financing housing strategies will be undertaken by the UPU when established in coordination with the Micro-finance, Micro-enterprise programme.

4.0 Implementation strategies

4.1 In order to effect a common, field-wide policy, all fields are required to use both contractual and self-help approaches. The extent and suitability of each approach, or combination of each approach used, will be dependent on prevailing circumstances and should be determined by the Field Office Director in consultation with DRSS/HQ(A).

4.2 All infrastructure works - where applicable - and structural works i.e. reinforced concrete, are to be undertaken directly by the Agency by contractual means. It is also envisaged, in the case of re-housing developments, that all external works e.g. boundary walls etc. will be undertaken directly by the Agency by contractual means, in order to ensure that the overall development is controlled and constructed in a proper manner.

4.3 In general, a self-help approach is recommended for repairs and finishing works, provided the family (either individually or in cooperation with others) is able and willing to undertake such works and there is adequate Agency support staff to properly manage the process.

4.4 A staged development approach is recommended, where possible, for all shelter rehabilitation and re-housing construction, whereby the Agency undertakes infrastructure/structural works etc. and the concerned families take responsibility for the finishing works.

4.5 The extent to which any of the above approaches are utilized is dependent on the suitability of the approach to the prevailing circumstances, available resources and specific donor requirements. It is recognized that the possibilities for the utilization of a self-help approach may be limited or impossible in the case of

poor families, especially those who fall into the Agency's Special Hardship Case category.

5.0 Selection of beneficiaries

- 5.1 In formulating the priority listing for those that are most in need of repairs or re-housing, first priority will be given to refugees who live in unsafe houses, second priority will be given to those who live in unhealthy houses and the third priority will be given to those refugees who need housing assistance because of specific social considerations (e.g severe overcrowding, access/specialized housing needs of a disabled person in the family, etc.)
- 5.2 In order to assess priorities in a systematic and uniform manner, the scoring systems currently in use in the fields will be further developed.

6.0 Designs & standards for implementation

- 6.1 The Agency is responsible for the provision of detailed individual architectural and structural designs for all shelter rehabilitation and re-housing programmes, including all designs for programmes which include a self-help approach.
- 6.2 In the case of self-help, adequate on site engineering technical support is provided to ensure that all materials and workmanship are in compliance with acceptable technical standards.

7.0 Guidelines for the implementation of self-help.

- 7.1 The self-help approach requires close cooperation and teamwork between ECSD and RSSD personnel at Field as well as at Headquarters level. Of primary importance are the social worker/engineer team visits to families at all critical stages of self-help implementation.
- 7.2 A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) should always be signed between UNRWA and the self-help participant, when using any *aided* or *direct self-help* approach. The MoUs now used in individual fields will allow for field-specific differences. The MoUs detail the respective responsibilities of the different parties i.e. UNRWA, the beneficiary and any third parties where applicable. Stages of construction, specific engineering requirements and any financing arrangements must be clearly detailed and explained. The consequences of not adhering to respective responsibilities must be clearly stated.
- 7.3 To ensure that the self-help approach is fully understood and supported at the local level, it is important that the Agency engineering and relief and social services staff meet with community leaders to explain how decisions are made and what role community organizations and individuals can play. In addition, it is also critical that all key members of any participating family understand what the

self-help approach entails in its entirety and that they specify in advance what their contribution will be. The experience of families who have already used the self-help approach can be helpful in facilitating more extensive use of this mechanism by other families and in evaluating how education, networking and implementation procedures can be improved.

- 7.4 For monitoring, evaluation and reporting purposes, the social worker/engineer team should always record the contributions made by the concerned parties i.e. the Agency, the concerned family and/or any third parties. A special effort should be made to quantify the financial value of any in-kind contributions.
- 7.5 In any instance of rehabilitation, renovation or rebuilding the Agency has responsibility for overall supervision in order to avoid non adherence to UNRWA standards regarding housing and urban planning.

Annex 4

OBJECTIVE I Preparation of an Urban Development Policy for the Palestinian Refugee Camps in UNRWA's Areas of Operation

Activity 1. Assess housing stock and deficiency

Assess the housing stock (quality and quantity) and current living conditions in the camps. The study should be based on the information available within the Agency and from the general census and socio-economic surveys to be carried out in each field. In addition, to obtain missing data required for the study, a survey concerning the housing needs and priorities should be undertaken. This information has already been requested by some host countries in view of future negotiations on the refugee issue. Based on the above it will be possible to assess the current situation of housing in the camps.

Activity 2. Identify and assess problems

Identify and assess prevailing problems and obstacles in the current housing provision system regarding:

- a) Legislative, organisational, policy (or lack of) and logistical issues;
- b) Availability of land;
- c) Availability of infrastructure;
- d) Building materials and construction systems;
- e) House architectural designs;
- f) Labour: availability and skills ;
- g) Housing finance mechanisms and institutions (Housing bank, the role of the private sector banking institutions, etc.);
- h) Housing market analysis (owner and tenant occupied) to identify supply and demand.

Activity 3. Quantify housing demand

Based on available population data and trends, conduct housing-needs assessment until the year 2010. The assessment should include:

- a) Need for new housing as a result of increased population;
- b) The need to replace as a result of inappropriate/unsuitable housing assessed in the current stock;
- c) Need for additional housing as a result of current shortage ;
- d) Needs related to expansion and improvement;
- e) Additional expansions aimed at achieving suitable shelter (appropriate, safe and adequate).

Activity 4. Evaluate current policy

- a) Evaluate current housing policy (approach to housing delivery) and analyse the causes of its successes and failures as reported in the initial policy paper on camp infrastructure development;

- b) Understand the policies and strategies of other sectors that affect the provision of housing.

Activity 5. Assess current legal framework and propose changes

- a) Assessment of the current lack of legal framework and the degree to which it harms the implementation of the housing policy;
- b) Proposing the types of changes necessary to create an environment that enables the achievement of the goals outlined above.

Activity 6. Identify goals and policy alternatives

- a) Assess the specific issues that should be addressed;
- b) Identify the problems and obstacles that need to be addressed and solved to facilitate the implementation of the housing policy;
- c) Analyze alternative policies to identify the most suitable, the most culturally acceptable, and the most economical from the point of view of solving problems and overcoming obstacles;
- d) Recommend the best alternative that would enable the Agency to address the housing needs of all the income groups

Activity 7. Prepare a draft housing policy

- a) Prepare the proposal for a housing policy that articulates the Agency's commitment to address and/or solve the housing problem including a clear rationalisation for the Policy, the objectives of the Policy and how to plan to achieve these goals;
- b) Establish at field and HQ level offices to undertake the responsibility of implementation;
- c) Organise and conduct a consultative workshop that will include representatives of the various Departments and interested parties to present, explain and discuss the Draft Housing Policy;
- d) Finalise the housing policy based on the results of the above workshop, and present to the Commissioner General for comments and/or adoption.

OBJECTIVE II Development of a Comprehensive Camp Upgrading Strategy

Activity 1. Conduct a socio-economic survey

Conduct a socio-economic survey of a sample of families with the objective of obtaining data concerning the housing stock, living conditions and to provide specific data on the various target groups of the population. The study should identify and provide sufficient information regarding the following elements:

- a) Current housing stock: age, categories, quantity (sufficient or insufficient), quality (acceptable, needs improvement or not acceptable), urban quality and social service available to existing housing;
- b) Income (or expenditure) groups of target families: for example, high, middle or low income groups of refugees and high, middle or low income groups of non-refugees;

- c) area and privacy: family size, occupancy per room, area occupied by each individual (m.sq/person);
- d) legal status of occupant: “owner”, tenant (in this case the owner is identified and the duration of the lease) and other data (to be identified);
- e) acceptance and comfort in current residence from the social, cultural etc. points of view
- f) immediate living environment, how are services delivered (provision of water, electricity, sewerage networks, water treatment, solid waste collection) adherence to safety norms, pollution etc.;
- g) distance from workplace and specific transportation arrangements.

Activity 2. Define standards and unit costs

Define standards related to land, infrastructure and building materials. Cost all components including labour cost and administrative costs for appropriate housing types selected for each of the income groups. The definition of standards should take into consideration not only the extended experience and information available within the Agency in the different fields but should integrate the standards and practices of the host countries and other relevant actors in the housing and development sector. This should facilitate:

- a) calculation of the costs of each unit based on the above information;
- b) assessment of the effects of various shelters standards based on residents’ sensitivity analyses (how to change costs of the various elements based on new selected standards);
- c) sensitivity analyses for infrastructure;
- d) assessment of the effect of administrative costs on affordability;
- e) assessment of the effect of self-help labour to assist lower income groups to meet payments;
- f) analyze affordability vis-à-vis each of the target income groups;
- g) analyze housing financing alternatives including the roles of the various banking institutions (the housing Bank, the Agency’s own credit programme, the private sector banking institutions and NGOs).

Activity 3. Conduct affordability study

Based on the above-mentioned studies, the Agency will conduct “affordability analyses” for the income levels of the target families with respect to the various suitable shelter alternatives (including the cost infrastructure development and administration cost to the Agency). The analysis should aim at identifying the target income groups that will require assistance from the Agency and to identify the types of assistance and their magnitude. The analyses could cover both ownership and rental systems.

Activity 4. Analyse macro considerations for supply

Analyse the various elements (building materials, labour and finance) and their availability with the goal of preparing an implementation plan. These will differ from country to country in the region. In case supply of any of the required materials is insufficient then affordability should be reviewed. Then appropriate changes should then be made in order to render the plan feasible (i.e. within the available resources).

Activity 5. Develop implementation plan

- Develop a realistic implementation plan for the Housing Policy (shelter strategy)
- Develop a document on a shelter strategy for the Palestinian refugee camps including:
 - a) goals (housing policy);
 - b) rationale behind the selection of the strategies;
 - c) legal framework and proposed organisational and institutional arrangements;
 - d) propose housing programmes, projects, activities and locations;
 - e) propose housing finance alternatives: redefine the role of the Housing Bank, enhance the role of the Agency financing structures and private sector banking;
 - e) design detailed and realistic schedules for all activities;
 - f) assign responsibilities to all the various institutions participating in the various stages of implementation (including camp committees, local organisations etc);
 - g) identify materials and resources available to each of the institutions participating in the implementation (available funds, land, support, labour force, institutional support etc);
- Organise and conduct a consultative workshop (same as in the case of the policy described in phase I above) to be attended by the various responsible organisations, institutions, investors and implementing agencies with the objective of presenting to them an overview of the selected strategies in order to obtain their support during implementation
- Based on the results of the above workshop, finalise the housing strategy and present to the Commissioner General for comments and/or adoption.

OBJECTIVE III Implementation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Comprehensive Camp Up-grading Strategy

The long-term work of the Urban Planning Unit will be to follow up on the Shelter Strategy by undertaking the following activities:

Activity 1. Implement the camp development strategy

- a) Develop operational modalities to implement the strategy;
- b) Develop working relationships with the relevant partners for the implementation of the strategy;
- c) Develop guidelines, for implementation to ensure effectiveness and efficiency;
- d) Coordinate implementation activities in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank;
- e) Set-up implementation units in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank within the Department of Engineering and Construction Services.

Activity 2. Monitoring and overseeing the camp development strategy

- a) Develop monitoring and oversight modalities to implement the strategy;
- b) Coordinate monitoring and oversee activities in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank;

- c) Set-up monitoring and oversee units in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank within the Department of Engineering and Construction Services.

Activity 3. Evaluation

- a) Develop independently verifiable indicators to evaluate the implementation of the strategy
- b) Based on evaluation, redirect and redesign components of the strategy as needed to avoid bottlenecks and to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in performance.

Annex 5

REPORTS NEEDED AS BASIS FOR HOUSING POLICY AND SHELTER STRATEGY

Some of the following documents are already available and others have been requested by the Host Countries.

HOUSING POLICY

- 1) Reports assessing housing stock and deficiency, including:**
 - 1.1 Housing stock (quality and quantity) and current housing and living conditions in Palestine refugee camps;
 - 1.2 General census and socio-economic surveys and any other relevant studies;
 - 1.3 Procedures for submittal of housing requests presented by the public (supported by existing application forms) with relevant questions; and,
 - 1.4 Housing needs and priorities of nationals and non-nationals.

- 2) Reports identifying housing contextual information/issues/problems, including:**
 - 2.1 Housing institutional set-up;
 - 2.2 Legislative, organisational, policy (or lack of) and logistical issues;
 - 2.3 Availability of land;
 - 2.4 Availability of infrastructure;
 - 2.5 Building materials and construction systems;
 - 2.6 House architectural designs;
 - 2.7 Labour: availability and skills;
 - 2.8 Housing finance mechanisms and schemes; and,
 - 2.9 Housing market analysis (owner and tenant occupied) including supply and demand.

- 3) Housing demand, including:**
 - 3.1 Need for new housing as a result of increased population;
 - 3.1 The need to replace existing stock as a result of inappropriate/unsuitable housing assessed in the current stock;
 - 3.3 Need for additional housing as a result of current shortage;
 - 3.4 Needs related to expansion and improvement; and,
 - 3.5 Additional expansions aiming at achieving suitable shelter (appropriate shelter).

- 4) Current policy**
 - 4.1 Current housing policy and analysis of the causes of its successes and/or failures; and,
 - 4.2 Policies and strategies of other sectors that affect the provision of housing.

- 5) Current legal framework**

- 5.1 Current legal framework and the degree to which it supports the implementation of the housing policy; and,
 - 5.2 Types of changes previously identified as necessary to create an environment that enables the achievement of the goals outlined above.
- 6) Institutional framework**
- 6.1 Current institutional set-up and its capacity to support the implementation of policy decisions.
- 7) Goals and policy alternatives**
- 7.1 Alternative policies already proposed; and,
 - 7.2 Government's position vis-à-vis such policies.

SHELTER STRATEGY

- 8) Socio-economic surveys**
- 8.1 Current housing stock: age, categories, quantity (sufficient or insufficient), quality (acceptable, needs improvement or not acceptable), urban quality and social service available to existing housing;
 - 8.2 Income (or expenditure) groups of target families, for example: high, middle or low income groups of nationals and high, middle or low income groups of expatriate non-nationals;
 - 8.3 Area and privacy: family size, occupancy per room, area occupied by each individual (m.sq/person);
 - 8.4 Legal status of occupant: owner, tenant (in this case the owner is identified and the duration of the lease) and other data (to be identified);
 - 8.5 Acceptance and comfort in current residence from the social, cultural and design etc. points of view;
 - 8.6 Immediate living environment, how are services delivered (liquid water treatment, solid waste collection) danger, pollution etc.; and,
 - 8.8 Distance from workplace and specific transportation arrangements.
- 9) Standards and unit costs**
- 9.1 Standards related to land, infrastructure and building materials and the cost of all components as well as labour costs in addition to administrative costs for appropriate housing types selected for each of the income groups;
 - 9.2 Costs of each housing units;
 - 9.3 Effect of administrative costs on affordability; and,
 - 9.4 Affordability vis-à-vis each of the target income groups.
- 10) Affordability studies**
- 10.1 Affordability analyses for the income levels of the target families with respect to the various suitable shelter alternatives (including the cost of land, infrastructure and administration); and,

- 10.2 Target income groups that will require assistance from the Government and the types of assistance and their magnitude for both ownership and rental systems.

Annex 6

Terms of Reference HEAD OF UNIT- Architect /Urban planner

Country:	Regional, Middle East
Project Title:	UNRWA Urban Planning Unit
Project Number:	P4/5
Post Title:	Head of Unit (with background in architecture/town planning)
Duration:	2 years
Expected Starting Date:	2004-07
Duty Station:	Amman, Jordan with travel in countries of the region to Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank

Purpose of the Assignment:

To provide technical support to UNRWA to produce three main components: (I) a Housing Policy; (II) a Shelter Strategy; and (III) Implement Shelter Strategy.

Activities and Responsibilities:

The candidate, in close collaboration with appropriate Government institutions in the countries where the camps are located, and as leader of the project team, is expected to manage the project and coordinate and participate substantively in the following activities and responsibilities:

- I Elaborate a Housing Policy:** including the following activities: (1) assess housing stock and deficiency; (2) identify and assess problems; (3) quantify housing demand; (4) evaluate current policy; (5) assess current legal framework; (6) assess institutional framework; (7) identify goals and policy alternatives; and, (8) prepare a housing policy.
- II Elaborate a Shelter Strategy:** including the following activities: (1) conduct a socio-economic survey; (2) define standards and unit costs; (3) conduct an affordability study; (4) analyze macro considerations for supply; (5) develop an implementation plan.

Expected outputs: Housing policy and shelter strategy for the refugee camps in the countries where they are located.

Qualifications:

Housing expert with architectural/urban planning background and experience in preparation and implementation of housing policies and strategies as well as preparing several housing alternatives including their cost estimates in addition to experience in land use planning, standards, and effective, economically and socially acceptable planning for residential areas of varying densities and typologies. Experience in project management a must. At least 15 years experience. Languages: English, Arabic a plus.

Terms of Reference URBAN PLANNER

Country: Regional, Middle East
Project Title: UNRWA Urban Planning Unit
Project Number:
Post Title: Urban Planner (Civil Engineer/Urban Planner with experience in implementation of housing programme)
Duration:
Expected Starting Date: 2004-07
Duty Station: Amman, Jordan with travel in countries of the region to Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank

Purpose of the Assignment:

To provide technical support to UNRWA to produce three main components: (I) a housing policy; (II) a shelter strategy; and (III) implement shelter strategy.

Responsibilities:

The candidate, in close collaboration with appropriate Government institutions in the countries where the refugee camps are located, and under the leadership of the project team leader, is expected to participate substantively in the following activities and responsibilities:

- I Elaborate a Housing Policy:** including the following activities: (1) assess housing stock and deficiency; (2) identify and assess problems; (3) quantify housing demand; (4) evaluate current policy; (5) assess current legal framework; (6) assess institutional framework; (7) identify goals and policy alternatives; and, (8) prepare a housing policy.
- II Elaborate a Shelter Strategy:** including the following activities: (1) conduct a socio-economic survey; (2) define standards and unit costs; (3) conduct an affordability Study; (4) analyze macro considerations for supply; (5) develop an implementation plan.

The candidate will undertake housing and infrastructure design alternatives and assess their financial implications of each (land, building materials, skilled and unskilled labour, administrative costs, market costs per square meter/unit etc.).

Expected outputs: Housing policy and shelter strategy for the refugee camps in the countries where they are located.

Qualifications:

Civil engineer with a broad experience in housing and the provision of infrastructure and financial implication of various design alternatives and experience in various housing alternatives and the cost implications of each (land, building materials, skilled and unskilled labour, administrative costs, market costs per square meter/unit etc.). Applicant must have at least 15 year experience. Languages: English, Arabic a plus.

Terms of Reference
SOCIO-ECONOMIST CONSULTANT

Country: Regional, Middle East
Project Title: Housing Policy and Shelter Strategy Study
Project Number:
Post Title: Socio-Economist Officer (housing financing background)
Duration:
Expected Starting Date:
Duty Station: Amman, Jordan with travel in countries of the region to Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank

Purpose of the Assignment:

To provide technical support to UNRWA to produce three main components: (I) a housing policy; (II) a shelter strategy; and (III) implement shelter strategy.

Responsibilities:

The applicant, in close collaboration with appropriate Government institutions in the countries where the refugee camps are located, and under the leadership of the project team leader, is expected to participate substantively in the following activities and responsibilities:

- I Elaborate a Housing Policy:** including the following activities: (1) assess housing stock and deficiency; (2) identify and assess problems; (3) quantify housing demand; (4) evaluate current policy; (5) assess current legal framework; (6) assess institutional framework; (7) identify goals and alternative policies; and, (8) prepare a housing policy.
- II Elaborate a Shelter Strategy:** including following activities: (1) conduct a socio-economic survey; (2) define standards and unit costs; (3) conduct an affordability study; (4) analyse macro considerations for supply focusing on funding strategies including the role of the private sector banking system; (5) develop an implementation plan.

The applicant will particularly undertake tasks related to housing finance and housing finance institutions, their functions, organisations and sources of finance etc. in addition to proposing effective cost recovery techniques applicable to the Gulf States. The candidate will also manage and analyse the data and process results.

Expected outputs: Housing policy and shelter strategy for the refugee camps in the countries where they are located.

Qualifications:

Socio-economist with experience in: housing finance; housing finance institutions (functions, organisations and sources of finance etc.); effective cost recovery techniques preferably with experience in the Gulf States. The applicant should also be experienced in the management and analysis of data and processing of results. Consultant must have at least 15 year experience. Languages: English, Arabic a plus.