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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) FOR THE PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE TARGETS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS:

REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS*

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* This report has been produced by UNICRI within the framework of the CTITF Working Group on Strengthening Vulnerable Targets

INTRODUCTION

1. While States retain primary responsibility for the implementation of security policies to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, the value of involving non-state actors is increasingly being recognized. One particularly promising partnership is with the private sector. This, however, requires both aligning private sector incentives with engaging in counter-terrorism strategies and adopting guidelines and mechanisms to make such a form of partnership possible and effective.

2. Public-private partnerships (hereinafter referred to as PPPs), in the form of agreements or ventures between one or more public agencies on one side and one or more private enterprises on the other, have become increasingly popular as an effective way to provide services for the use of the general public in various areas. Also in relation to security issues, the PPP constellation is proving increasingly interesting, useful and worth studying further in order to gather best practices and lessons learned; to recommend possible improvements of current PPP practices; and to explore where an extended use of the PPP concept could be relevant and useful, that is, where there could be a comparative advantage in forming partnerships across sectors.

3. The importance of PPPs in a counter-terrorism context is explicitly recognized by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in its Section III, paragraph 13, which encourages the identification and sharing of best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets.

4. Toward this end, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has over the past year conducted applied research on PPPs for the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks¹. This has happened within the framework of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets. The Working Group is led by UNICRI together with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).²

1 The research has focused on so-called ‘soft’ vulnerable targets, identified as principally, but not exclusively, areas where people routinely reside, gather or resort while not in transit, such as open places, including parks and markets; places to which the public are admitted, such as shopping centres, train and bus stations, tourist or recreational facilities, hotels and resorts; and cultural, historical, religious and educational centres, multi-national company premises and financial centres. Some forms of transportation were also considered, particularly tourism and accommodation forms of transport, such as cruise liners and touring coaches. Practices related to the protection of sites in conflict zones and places of sudden onset emergencies were not considered. To avoid overlapping and duplication of efforts, the focus of activity has been on the protection of people and places not already the subject of extensive protective measures involving PPPs. This initially excluded, for instance, critical infrastructure and air travel, as both areas are fairly well developed in terms of research, legislation and control by Member States and international and regional organizations. The research conducted has so far prioritized the collection of information related to the prevention of terrorist attacks rather than crisis management. This does not exclude the possibility, in the future, to expand the scope of analysis to this second aspect as well as to research on how flexible terrorism prevention strategies and techniques can be adapted, in line with a broader security governance approach, to counter other possible threats to vulnerable targets.

2 The Working Group aims to establish appropriate mechanisms to facilitate both the sharing of existing best practices and the development of further best practices to protect vulnerable targets. In addition to UNICRI’s project on public-private partnerships (PPPs), this includes the establishment of a “Referral Centre” at INTERPOL’s General Secretariat in Lyon, France, to facilitate the sharing of vulnerable target protection resources, as well as a DSS-led examination of the specific vulnerability of United Nations implementing partners in areas prone to terrorist attack. Information on the Working Group is available at: www.un.org/terrorism/workgroup8.shtml

5. This report aims to present the outcome of some of UNICRI's PPP research and analysis and to derive some basic principles which should be taken into account when designing, developing and implementing PPP policies for the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks. The report describes some important aspects of PPP practices studied in different Member States and presents various technical tools and other mechanisms that can be used to make a PPP work effectively. The PPPs described vary in terms of public leadership and type of private participation as well as in the modus of information-sharing and interaction. Part of the report has been structured around these key aspects. In the final section, the report offers suggestions as to how such an innovative and challenging form of cooperation as PPPs can be further expanded.

6. To carry out its research work, UNICRI has collected material from a wide range of public and private stakeholders, interviewed experts, organized meetings, circulated questionnaires, and conducted field research and testing. Further details on methodology are included in the Annex to this document.

PPP PROJECTS: ISSUES AND EXAMPLES³

7. Regardless of the specific form that a PPP might take in a given city or country, the stakeholders will, in most cases, have to consider and respond to very similar questions of, inter alia, strategy design, ownership, division of work, delineation of responsibilities, funding and training. They will have to decide who is in charge of the project and best placed to coordinate and draw in the relevant public and private entities to participate and contribute. They will thereafter have to define how information is shared between the public and private partners involved and how relevant training and knowledge exchange mechanisms will be set up.

PPP leadership and participation

8. When PPP initiatives have an international or regional focus, they are typically coordinated by a central authority, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a remit to promote the protection of national interests abroad. When a PPP aims at protecting vulnerable targets across the national territory, the coordination also generally involves a central authority, which retains a pivotal role. In the case of a local PPP initiative, a city council or local public authority is often responsible for the management of the PPP.

9. As an example of the first type of scenario, the United States of America, through the Department of State, has created the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a PPP to promote security concepts and enhance cooperation between the U.S. Department of State and U.S. organizations operating world-wide. OSAC focuses in particular on 'soft' vulnerable targets and provides a forum for the exchange of best practices and a platform for the regular and timely interchange of information between the private sector and the Department of

³ A large part of the information provided in this section was collected during country visits and interviews. The geographic spread of data obtained is fairly representative. UNICRI's future studies will be designed to ensure continued balance in the geographic representation.

State concerning developments in the overseas security environment. Information pertaining to crime, terrorism and other political, economic and social factors that can impact upon the security environment globally and in individual countries around the globe is shared through the OSAC network.

10. A similar initiative has been created by the United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office in establishing the Security Information Service for Business Overseas (SISBO). SISBO assists businesses by providing information on security and risks, including terrorism and other forms of crime that businesses may face when operating in particular markets overseas. In both cases, a leading role is played by the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs with the aim of protecting national private interests overseas.

11. A well-established initiative with a national focus was identified in Portugal, where the National Intelligence Service of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers launched a project that links entities from the public and private sectors while providing an effective framework for dialogue and coordination. From the private side, the group is composed of companies with increased exposure to the threat of terrorism, such as hotels, shopping malls, together with transportation, energy and postal services. Members of the group meet regularly and the development of personal relationships based on common understanding and trust has been the key to the success of the partnership. In this case, the leading role on the public side is played by the intelligence service.

12. Another good example of a national counter-terrorist PPP is the Dutch Counterterrorism Alert System. Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the Dutch government decided to develop a nationwide alert system for terrorist threats. Its goal is to inform government bodies and relevant public and private stakeholders of the state of alert in the event of a terrorist threat on Dutch soil. The Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations appointed a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) tasking him with the nationwide implementation of the System. The Counterterrorism Alert System promotes the exchange of best practices between businesses at both local and national level. It also functions as a national forum, where security managers from the business community and representatives of intelligence agencies and the police can meet and exchange information, creating a strong network enabling the various stakeholders to react quickly in the event of a crisis. Approximately twenty public and private sector agencies in the Netherlands are involved in combating terrorism. It is the task of the NCTb to strengthen cooperation between these agencies. The NCTb is responsible for analyzing intelligence and other types of information; policy development; and coordinating anti-terrorist security measures. Combining these tasks increases the effectiveness of the government's efforts to combat terrorism. The office of the NCTb and its staff fall under the responsibility of two ministers: the Minister of Justice (the lead minister for counter-terrorism) and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

13. In Italy, a network of private entities working with the Italian Ministry of Defense has launched a programme in 2008, still in the development phase, seeking the establishment of an observatory on national security matters including those that involve elements of PPP activity. From the private sector side, it involves a private defense and security systems company, universities and other private sector organizations. The initiative aims to develop, disseminate and keep updated, at the national level, technical tools to enhance national security by optimizing the use of available resources.

14. Project Griffin is an example of a PPP established at the local level in London, the United Kingdom, in April 2004. It is a joint venture between the City of London and the London

Metropolitan Police forces. Its remit is to advise and update the managers, security officers and employees of large public and private sector organizations across the capital on security, counter-terrorism and crime prevention issues. The initiative focuses on protecting the city and the public from terrorist attacks. It brings together and coordinates the resources of the police, emergency services, local authorities, business and the private sector security industry. The project has been providing strategies, direction, awareness and the implementation of counter-terrorism and crime prevention policies and procedures. The involvement and participation of private sector security personnel has dramatically increased awareness and reporting of hostile reconnaissance and other suspicious activity. Following its successful implementation in London, other police forces, cities and communities in the United Kingdom are now adopting the model of Project Griffin. Key elements in this case are the role of the local police and the protection of interests at the city level.⁴

PPP information-sharing and interaction

15. Several issues in relation to communication and information-sharing have to be addressed for a PPP project to be effective. First of all, it is necessary to adopt mechanisms, such as protocols, to facilitate the interaction among and between the different stakeholders involved. These mechanisms are in most cases related to information exchange. Other crucial issues to enhance PPPs are joint public/private sector training and knowledge transfer.

16. In order to facilitate information exchange, the European Commission has produced proposals which apply to the critical infrastructure protection arena. These proposals suggest the setting up of a network to assist in stimulating an exchange of information on shared threats and vulnerabilities and appropriate measures and strategies to mitigate risk through critical infrastructure protection. Member States would make sure that the relevant information is passed to all relevant governmental departments and agencies, including emergency services, and inform relevant industry sector bodies so that they in turn can inform potentially affected owners and operators of critical infrastructure through a network of contacts established within each Member State. Similar guidance for adoption by those involved in the protection of 'soft' targets may be considered in the future by the CTITF Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets.

17. INTERPOL, as the world's largest international police organization, facilitates cross-border police cooperation and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission it is to prevent or combat international crime. INTERPOL has developed information and communication tools and technical platforms (I-24/7, SLTD, MIND/FIND) to enable law enforcement in its member countries to request, submit, access and share vital police information instantly and in a secure environment. The ability to communicate instantaneously and securely may enhance the sharing of critical information when permissible amongst the relevant entities engaged in the protection of vulnerable targets.

18. In Australia, the Government has mechanisms in place within the public sector to prepare and issue travel advice and warnings in relation to countries considered unsafe. These can, inter alia, be addressed to private sector tour operators and travel agencies.

4 Additional information on these initiatives and the different factors that made them successful can be found at the following web addresses:

<http://www.projectgriffin.org.uk/>; <http://english.nctb.nl/>;

<http://www.difesa.it/SMD/CASD/Istituti+militari/CeMISS/Pubblicazioni/OSN>

19. There are also interesting examples of mechanisms facilitating communication between the public and private sectors in place in the hotel industry in several European countries and in the Middle East, where regular meetings take place between hotels' senior security personnel and national police force representatives. Training on how to recognize suspicious activities is at times provided by public authorities. In return, security managers contribute to the national assessment of risk, threat and vulnerability by completing and submitting detailed questionnaires concerning terrorism, security and safety matters to public authorities.

20. Another related example, involving training, comes from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services initiatives called 'Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public Disorder'. Community oriented policing is a strategy based on the notion that community interaction and support can help control crime. The private sector and community members are encouraged to participate actively in the development of prevention strategies including those designed to counter terrorism. This particular initiative involved the development of knowledge resource products (CDs, guidance documents and videos) as well as training involving actors from the public and private sectors.

21. Major events pose a particular challenge to security, and a number of PPP practices and experiences were provided by public authorities engaged in the security preparations of major events, such as large sporting tournaments or economic and political events⁵. In this regard, relevant practices on venue security were collected in relation to the security preparations of major events in Spain, such as the EXPO of Zaragoza in 2008. One of the main lessons learned was that when major event security is managed and planned with care, longer term benefits can be derived for the wider community in terms of terrorism prevention. In this particular case, what was initially short-term arrangements involving the public and private sectors working together in protecting the EXPO, were continued afterwards and became regular day-to-day practice. The cooperation models developed include joint training, joint utilisation of resources and joint investment in the development of mutually beneficial technology.

22. Information on PPP practices was also collected from the experience of the Cricket World Cup hosted in 2007 by the Caribbean countries, during which significant projects to enhance the security of tourist and recreational facilities were adopted. UNICRI also conducted a mission to Beijing, People's Republic of China, to collect information on PPP practices, such as the protection of sponsors in connection with the 2008 Olympic Games. Central to the success of the policing and security operations at official venues as well as for the wider community was the Beijing Public Security Bureau and the Games Organising Committee's resolve to – through conferences, formal meetings and more informal contact and liaison – engage with other stakeholders, including private sector representatives from sponsors, to ensure that the delineation of joint and individual tasks was clearly understood, that resourcing issues were resolved and that strategies designed to counter terrorism were developed.

⁵ UNICRI has conducted further research on the topic within its "International Permanent Observatory on Major Events Security (IPO)" and has produced a report on PPPs, available upon request, in the context of the EU-SEC project, a platform, coordinated by UNICRI and consisting of 22 European Union Member States and EUROPOL.

BASIC PPP PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE TARGETS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS

23. Regardless of the form that a PPP takes, a number of basic common principles and considerations have been identified as essential in facilitating PPP interaction in relation to the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks. They are:

- Policy makers at all levels should be aware of the important role that PPPs can play in counter-terrorism and security governance matters.
- The role of the private sector should not be limited to involvement in crisis situations. Measures to prevent terrorism and enhance overall security governance should also be explored, and PPPs should be established in advance and be proactive in terms of preventing and/or deterring terrorist attacks.
- There should be clear guidelines as to which type of information public authorities can share with the private sector in compliance with data protection regulations. Likewise, minimum standards should be set for the safe and secure retention of such information, ensuring that private sector stakeholders know how to handle the information correctly. Information sharing protocols between private and public entities can help set out the principles of the partnership's data sharing arrangements, detailing what will be exchanged, by whom, with whom, for what purposes and with what safeguards. A shared understanding of such a protocol's limits, as well as what it permits, is fundamental.
- Public authorities should provide private sector stakeholders with the relevant information and guidance to assist them in countering any identified threat to the infrastructure or facilities they manage. In terms of physical protection, detection and crisis management plans, the public sector should, where relevant, provide guidance to the private sector on the security measures adopted or planned. Similarly, risk assessments carried out internally by the private sector should be shared with relevant public sector security providers. The private sector should also provide public authorities with information on suspicious behaviour and, in return, public authorities should provide feedback to the private sector, thereby enhancing channels of communication and improving security.
- Joint training for personnel from the public and private sectors can assist in breaking down communication barriers, promoting a common language and further enhancing trust between participating partnership members. The public and private sectors to a large extent have different professional cultures and need a common language to be able to communicate well. "Building bridges" between the personnel of private and public entities is highly important and can be an effective security and contingency investment, central to the success of PPPs.
- Economic costs and benefits are important factors in determining whether the private sector is interested and willing to engage in a PPP. As there are typically short-term costs related to private enterprises' engagement in the adoption of measures protecting vulnerable targets, it is important to consider how to provide incentives to the private sector to encourage its investments in the security field. There is a need to draw attention to the longer term benefits of investing in security. There must, however, be clear rules as to which type of benefits, such as for instance tax relief, the private sector can receive following its investment in enhancing security. An effort could, for instance, be made to further emphasize and explain how improved security in relation to possible targets of terrorist attacks or other forms of violence is typically correlated with a subsequent significant reduction of insurance costs. A broader effort

could also be made to raise the general awareness within the private sector of the positive impact that its role can have on the implementation of security strategies. Accordingly, the concept that security should not be perceived as a cost but rather as an investment as well as a contribution to the protection of the community should be promoted.

24. In terms of PPP policies, it is important to maintain some flexibility in the face of change and evolution. The policy process will have to innovate and take on new models of cooperation as risk profiles change. It is important that PPP policies involve all relevant government entities, since coordination and cooperation within the government itself represents a good basis for effective policy implementation. Given that the policy may impact upon existing practices and security arrangements, it is also recommended that private stakeholders are consulted and are granted opportunities to contribute to the policy design of PPPs.

TESTING IDENTIFIED PRACTICES

25. Beyond the collection and analysis of information, UNICRI has sought to assess the robustness of the models, practices and principles identified in different contexts and to test their implementation potential and adaptability in specific local or national environments.

26. Field research activities have been undertaken to test the practices and technical tools identified through the brainstorming meetings, interviews and desk research and to encourage the development of new PPP approaches. These included a first testing event (field-test) in Nairobi, Kenya in August and November 2008, following an earlier mission to assess whether the infrastructure and the general conditions of the city were conducive to support field-testing activities designed to strengthen PPPs for the protection of vulnerable targets.

27. The testing event focused on the central business district of Nairobi and promoted the concept of adapting international practices to a specific local context, focusing on local needs and local solutions. The field test involved experts from UNICRI, DSS, INTERPOL, a high-level Norwegian police representative as well as private sector experts. It showed the robustness, if properly adapted, of a number of PPP principles identified through the conducted research and analysis.

28. Participants in the Nairobi meetings made a significant contribution to the design of a roadmap to enhance cooperation between the public and private sectors to improve security governance in Nairobi's central business district and protect vulnerable targets from terrorist attack. This was achieved through participants freely sharing their experience in relation to existing practices and suggesting, among other things, innovative ways to improve information flows.

29. It was, however, concluded that in terms of mentoring, guidance, information-sharing and operational support for the group brought together to form the core of the Nairobi PPP project, it would without doubt have been beneficial, had UNICRI been in a position to dispatch a larger group of people to communicate, first hand, their own concrete experiences in the field. UNICRI has discovered – in particular through its experience in the field of security at major events – that this type of approach is particularly beneficial in terms of

assisting host practitioners to comprehensively understand the complexities and dynamics of such an undertaking and enable them with the best information available to develop and apply the best possible response nationally and locally.

30. Regardless, participants were of the view that the Nairobi Group could possibly be developed to become an important and influential consultative resource in terms of the development of counter-terrorism and security governance policy and operational practice elsewhere in Nairobi, extending nationally throughout Kenya and potentially further in the regional context. Furthermore it was envisaged that the Nairobi Group could be developed to become a valuable communication and networking forum through which the security concerns of both the general public and the private sector could be channeled. Thereafter, if relevant and falling within the remit of the Nairobi Group, PPP activity could be designed and implemented.

31. UNICRI is in the process of planning further testing events to assess the principles and practices in other contexts as well.

NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUSION

32. UNICRI's research work, carried out within the framework of the CTITF Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets, shows that significant results can be achieved in protecting vulnerable targets by continuing to enhance public and private sector cooperation.

33. The body of knowledge described in this report can be further developed through the continuation of relevant analytical activity, supported by an enlarged network of national representatives and private companies.

34. To this end, UNICRI intends to continue the project on PPPs and organize additional brainstorming meetings and workshops with a regional or sub-regional focus, possibly to be hosted by countries particularly interested in PPPs. In addition, further testing events are planned in the future, the first of which will take place in Mexico in March 2009 in close cooperation with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) of the Organization of American States (OAS).

35. Future work led by UNICRI, through its Security Governance/Counter-Terrorism Laboratory, building on the conducted research as well as the testing events, will involve the design of a capacity building programme to promote change and innovation regarding PPPs while making full use of national and local expertise. Such a PPP capacity building programme will involve the following main activities:

- Assist in the design of relevant PPP policies and guidelines to encourage private participation.
- Develop at the national and/or local level the necessary organizational and knowledge infrastructure for permanent PPPs for counter-terrorism and security governance activities.
- Enhance mechanisms for effective internal and external communication, including knowledge and information exchange.

- Enhance mechanisms for overcoming cultural barriers, building trust and promoting a common language between public and private sectors.
- Propose reasonable solutions in relation to the provision of assistance in the form of training, equipment, technical support, resource procurement and administration.
- Build experience, participate in project evaluation activities and gather and disseminate good practice.
- Assist in the identification of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats and rewards in relation to PPPs.

36. Parallel with the implementation of a capacity building programme to enhance PPPs, UNICRI plans to further develop its applied research programme. A range of topics – such as the legal and economic aspects of PPPs, information exchange mechanisms and the elaboration of guidelines for the participation of the private sector in security-related projects – have been identified as particularly important and in need of further analysis and study in order to consolidate a body of knowledge to facilitate the future development of PPPs and enhance their capacity to cope with the new challenges posed by international terrorism.

37. UNICRI plans to continue its PPP project in coordination with other entities in the Working Group. UNICRI will be drawing on, inter alia, the experiences and data collected through INTERPOL's Referral Centre in Lyon, France. The Referral Centre was established to facilitate the sharing of vulnerable target protection resources, using INTERPOL's existing world-wide network to identify responsible ministry units, relevant experts, resources and best practices and, upon request, to assist Member States seeking either to develop protection strategies or enhance established strategies by securing relevant assistance from among the network of experts/resources identified by INTERPOL. The PPP project will also be benefiting from the network of contact points compiled at the Referral Centre based on information obtained from INTERPOL's National Central Bureaus of experts, resources and ministry units connected to vulnerable target protection in their respective country.

38. Overall, there have been important PPP developments at all levels, including the local one, where a significant number of PPPs have been launched by cities all around the world. Civil society and the business sector are playing a growing role in the development of new security governance strategies and have demonstrated the will to participate as active partners in projects aimed at reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing the level of security.

39. The positive engagement of Member States in the review of the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, along with the enthusiasm shown by the private sector in welcoming UNICRI's work on PPPs, show a ripe environment for intensified cooperation between the public and private sectors in the security field.

ANNEX: METHODOLOGY

40. In the research and analysis of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks, UNICRI has brought together public authority and private sector representatives and experts to facilitate the collection of security practices from different regions of the world. This report covers research conducted in the period from November 2007 to November 2008.

41. In order to facilitate the collection of technical information and security practices on PPPs, two brainstorming meetings were organized at UNICRI Headquarters in Turin, Italy, in November 2007 and March 2008. Representatives from the Working Group's lead entities played a crucial role in these meetings, which were also attended by representatives of regional organizations, such as the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) of the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Commission (EC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A third brainstorming meeting took place in October 2008 in Portugal, co-hosted by the National Intelligence Service.

42. In addition to the three brainstorming meetings, UNICRI staff has interviewed relevant subject experts and undertaken missions to different countries to gather data, information and documentation concerning experiences and approaches towards PPPs.

43. UNICRI, in cooperation with DSS and INTERPOL, has also circulated a questionnaire to relevant international and regional organizations and entities to help map ongoing activities related to the protection of vulnerable targets. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, CICTE, EC and OSCE have also provided relevant information.

44. Public sector involvement was mobilized through national agencies responsible for providing or validating national security measures, as well as those responsible for gathering, analyzing and disseminating the intelligence and information required to prevent and investigate terrorist attacks.

45. Private sector involvement has come from selected enterprises regarded as potentially vulnerable and from private security companies engaged by these enterprises to provide security. Designers, manufacturers and distributors of technology that can be used or adapted for use in the counter-terrorism and security governance arena have also participated.