

Advance Executive Summary: “Action-Oriented” Analysis Initiative on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the Protection of Vulnerable Targets against Terrorist Attacks

Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

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1. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has led an “action-oriented” analysis initiative on public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks, within the framework of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets. The Working Group is led by UNICRI together with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).¹ A report on the work and findings will be available in 2008. The current executive summary provides an overview.

2. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in its Section III, paragraph 13, encourages the identification and sharing of best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets and recognizes the importance of developing public private partnerships in this area. The analysis was aimed at improving understanding of the main components, potential developments and basic principles that could guide public-private partnerships to prevent terrorist attacks against vulnerable targets. It focused on so-called “soft” vulnerable targets, identified as principally, but not exclusively, areas where people routinely reside, gather or resort while not in transit; places to which the public are admitted; and cultural, historical, religious and educational centers, multi-national company premises and financial centers. Some forms of transportation were also considered, particularly tourism and accommodation forms of transport. Such vulnerable targets have garnered less attention so far from the international community than, for example, the “critical infrastructure” and air travel arenas, both of which are fairly well developed in terms of research, activity, legislation and control by Member States and international and regional organizations. Attention was given in particular to preventive measures rather than crisis management.

3. The analysis was grounded on information gathered through desk research, interviews with subject experts and two ‘brainstorming’ meetings attended by experts and representatives from public authorities, the private sector and regional organizations, such as the Anti-Terrorism Committee (CICTE) of the Organization of American States, the

¹ The Working Group aims to establish appropriate mechanisms to facilitate both the sharing of existing best practices and the development of further best practices to protect vulnerable targets. In addition to the work on public-private partnerships discussed in this executive summary, this includes the establishment of a “referral centre” at INTERPOL’s General Secretariat in Lyon, France, to facilitate the sharing of vulnerable target protection resources, as well as an examination led by DSS of the specific vulnerability of United Nations implementing partners in areas prone to terrorist attack. Information on the Working Group is available at: www.un.org/terrorism/workgroup8.shtml.

European Commission (EC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

4. Examples of relevant PPP practices and experiences have been initially drawn from Australia, Israel, Italy, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In addition, activities and tools developed by INTERPOL, the European Commission, OSCE and CICTE were considered. The analysis also references initiatives both in the Caribbean countries and the People's Republic of China related to major events, which are seen as laboratories for innovation in the field of PPPs.

5. With a view to assessing which types of cooperation can be best implemented in different contexts, identified PPP practices were tested through a field test ("testing event") in Nairobi, Kenya in August 2008. The Nairobi "testing event" focused on the central business district and was tailored towards the local context. Similar activities in cooperation with CICTE and in consultation with the relevant national authorities, with a focus on tourism and recreational facilities, are planned for different Mexican cities in the second half of September 2008.

6. The analysis identified a number of basic principles that can be useful to drive forward the role of PPPs in the protection of vulnerable targets. These are summarized as follows:

- Public authorities have a statutory role to deliver security and prevent terrorism. State action alone, however, is not enough, and private sector input is essential.
- The role of the private sector should not be limited to involvement in crisis situations, and should be explored also in the context of proactive measures to prevent terrorism and enhance overall security governance.
- The coverage of security costs is not exclusive to the public domain and the extent to which the private sector should contribute should be further defined.
- Security should not be seen as a cost, but as an investment; reducing vulnerabilities means reducing potential risk.
- The introduction of incentives for private companies to invest in security could be considered.
- In terms of physical protection, detection and crisis management plans, the public sector should provide guidance to the private sector, as well as validation of the security measures adopted or planned.
- In terms of information exchange to prevent possible attacks, building trust between the two sectors is essential. The nature and type of information that can be shared should be defined and minimum standards set for the safe and secure retention of such information.
- The public sector should provide private sector targets with enough information and guidance to assist them in countering any identified threat.
- Similarly, risk assessments carried out internally by the private sector should be shared with relevant public sector security providers.

- The private sector should provide public authorities with information on suspicious behavior and in return public authorities should provide feedback to the private sector, thereby enhancing channels of communication and improved security.
- At the implementation level, public authorities should be informed of the roles and the responsibilities of those who will receive information and how the information will be used or managed.
- The development or consolidation of a shared language on relevant security issues should be considered as one step towards building mutual trust. The existence of a common language can also facilitate the development of common goals. To this end, joint training activities can be helpful in enhancing mutual knowledge and trust between partners.
- PPPs should be established early and be proactive in terms of preventing and/or deterring terrorist attacks.
- Policy makers at all levels should be made aware of the important role that PPPs can play in counter-terrorism and security governance matters.
- Synergies should be strengthened between security providers, technology producers and end users through an analysis of the practical needs of practitioners from the public and private sectors.

7. In terms of PPP policies, the analysis shows the importance of maintaining some flexibility in the face of change and evolution. The policy process will have to consider the importance of continuity, but must also feature an inherent ability to innovate and take on new models of cooperation. Furthermore, it is important that PPP policies involve all relevant government entities, since coordination and cooperation within the government itself represents a good basis for effective policy implementation. Given that policies may impact upon existing practices and security arrangements, it is also recommended that private stakeholders are consulted and are granted opportunities to contribute to policy design and to take part in PPP projects.

8. The action-oriented analysis initiative led by UNICRI within the framework of the Working Group on Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets shows that significant results can be achieved in protecting vulnerable targets by continuing to enhance public and private sector responsiveness to the subject. The analysis can provide a good basis for future testing and development of new PPP practices in different regions. Future work led by UNICRI building on the findings of the action-oriented analysis and on the “testing events” could involve the design and establishment of a broader PPP capacity building programme. The main aim of such a programme would be to further promote and facilitate, with the full engagement of national and local partners, as well as with the possible involvement of relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, the creation or enhancement of PPP initiatives around the world.