The Sudan has seen civil conflict for all but 11 of the years since it became independent on 1 January 1956. Generations of Sudanese have known nothing but the terrible consequences of perennial war.

The recently-ended north-south civil war began in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. For more than two decades, the Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel movement in the south, fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. Over two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees.

Over the years, there were many attempts by neighbouring States, concerned donors, other States and the parties themselves to bring peace. One such effort, begun in 1993, was a regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The United Nations closely followed and supported the IGAD initiative.

To follow developments in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, the Secretary-General, in December 1997, appointed Mohamed Sahnoun as his Special Adviser on Africa. Mr. Sahnoun and other senior officials represented the United Nations at summit meetings of the IGAD countries and undertook consultations with regional governments and organizations in support of the peace process. These officials also participated in meetings of the IGAD-Partners Forum, composed of donor countries and organizations supporting the IGAD peace process and assisting the regional organization to enhance its capacity in several areas. During 2002, the Sudan peace process under the auspices of IGAD made significant progress.

Adding impetus to peace efforts, the Secretary-General visited the Sudan from 10-12 July 2002.

Machakos Protocol

On 20 July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, in which they reached specific agreement on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. They agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire.

The Secretary-General welcomed the progress made and urged the parties to continue negotiations in earnest. The Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Mr. Sahnoun, and other senior officials from the UN Secretariat served as resource persons in support of the IGAD mediation in Machakos, Kenya, from August 2002.
 
United Nations Advance Mission

To intensify the peace efforts and build on the momentum of the progress made—including the signing of the Agreement on Wealth Sharing on 7 January 2004 and the Protocol on Power Sharing on 26 May 2004 at the IGAD-led talks—the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, established by resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004 a special political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged peace support operation.

The Secretary-General then appointed Jan Pronk as his Special Representative for the Sudan and head of UNAMIS, two Deputy Special Representatives and a Military Adviser. This team was supported by a number of international personnel, including military liaison and political and civil affairs staff, public information officers and experts in logistics and administration, as well as in other requisite areas of expertise.
 
The Special Representative led UN peacemaking support to the IGAD-mediated talks on the North-South conflict, as well as to the African Union-mediated talks on the conflict in Darfur, a region in the western part of the Sudan. In addition, a United Nations multidisciplinary team was assigned to the final stages of the peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, to provide support and to ensure complementarities between the outcome of the negotiations and preparations for an expanded operation in the Sudan.

The Special Representative worked along with the United Nations country team in the Sudan to develop a unified structure to ensure that the United Nations was in the best position to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). UNAMIS administration and support elements focused on developing and refining operational plans on the ground, as well as preparing for the deployment of military and civilian personnel and providing effective forward support to the mission.

The UN role in Darfur

As a response to the escalating crisis in Darfur, the Security Council, on 30 July 2004, assigned additional tasks to UNAMIS by its resolution 1556 (2004).

Darfur had long experienced localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political tensions and competition over scarce resources. Beginning in February 2003, attacks on government targets by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Government’s decision to respond by deploying its national armed forces and mobilizing local militia, took the violence to unprecedented levels. Indiscriminate air bombardment carried out by Sudan’s armed forces, accompanied by attacks by the Janjaweed and other militias, left villages across the region razed to the ground. Often during these attacks civilians were murdered, women and girls raped, children abducted and food and water sources destroyed. The cycle of terror inside Darfur also threatened regional peace and security.

For several years, the African Union led international political efforts to seek a solution to the crisis in Darfur. In July 2004, the AU launched negotiations at the inter-Sudanese peace talks, also known as the Abuja talks. AU political initiatives were complemented by the deployment of 60 military observers and 310 protection troops in Darfur to monitor and observe the compliance of the parties to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N’Djamena on 8 April 2004 by the Government of the Sudan, SLM/A and JEM.

At the same time, the United Nations and a collection of non-governmental organizations launched a massive humanitarian operation in Darfur, constantly expanding activities to respond to the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by violence.

In its resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council, among other things, reiterated its grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations, including continued attacks on civilians. In addition to requesting a monthly report on the Government's implementation of commitments vis-à-vis the Janjaweed militias and their leaders, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for the Darfur region, including by assisting the African Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Darfur and by preparing to support the implementation of a future agreement in Darfur in close cooperation with the African Union. Accordingly, the mission initiated such contingency planning.
 
In its resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, the Council, among other things, expressed grave concern at the lack of progress with regard to security and the protection of civilians, disarmament of the Janjaweed militias and identification and bringing to justice of the Janjaweed leaders responsible for human rights and international humanitarian law violations in Darfur. Another provision of the resolution requested that the Secretary-General take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights monitors deployed in Darfur.

As a result of these developments, the Special Representative and UNAMIS were deeply engaged in Darfur over the ensuing months, particularly in supporting the African Union and its mission in the Sudan by, among other things, participating in the Abuja peace talks and establishing a United Nations assistance cell in Addis Ababa, which supported the African Union Commission at the strategic level as it deployed and managed the AU mission in the Sudan.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

On 9 January 2005, in an event that marked a turning point in the history of the Sudan, the Government of the Sudan, represented by Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), represented by Chairman John Garang, signed in Nairobi, Kenya, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included agreements on outstanding issues remaining after the Machakos Protocol and had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil.

The Agreement consisted of four protocols, two framework agreements and two annexes regarding the implementation modalities of the aforementioned protocols and framework agreements. The parties acknowledged in the chapeau of the agreement that, taken together, the documents represented a concrete model for solving the wider problem of conflict within the country and that, if successfully implemented, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that would help to create a solid basis for the preservation of peace and would make unity appear attractive.

While the parties established the unity of the Sudan as a priority under the agreement, they decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim period during which interim institutions would govern the country and international monitoring mechanisms would be established and operationalized. At the end of the period, the people of southern Sudan would vote in an internationally monitored referendum to confirm the unity of the Sudan or to vote for secession.

The international mechanism would work for a further six-month period after the referendum to help the Government ensure implementation of the result, the successful implementation of which would mark the exit point for the peace support operation.
 
United Nations Mission in the Sudan

On 10 January 2005, immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, the UN Security Council, in a press statement, welcomed the move and pledged to expeditiously consider international assistance, including the deployment of a peace support operation in southern Sudan. Reporting to the Council on 31 January, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a multidimensional peace support operation, consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component including more than 700 police officers.

Mission Structure

As set out by the Secretary-General, the UN Mission in the Sudan would be headed by his Special Representative and would include components focusing on the following four broad areas of engagement:

• good offices and political support for the peace process;
• security;
• governance;
• humanitarian and development assistance.

Good offices and political support for the peace process would be addressed by the Secretary General's Special Representative, as well as political affairs and public information components. The political affairs component would support the Special Representative and the UN operation as a whole through the provision of political advice, reporting, analysis and assessment and secretariat support as required.
 
The Special Representative would be assisted by two Deputy Special Representatives. One would work closely with the Special Representative in addressing good offices and political support to the peace process and governance, while the other would act as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan and deal with assistance matters.

Security aspects would be addressed by the military component. This component would monitor and verify ceasefire agreements, protect UN personnel and facilities, and ensure freedom of movement for its personnel. Furthermore, the military would protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capability, assist the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and support other UN programmes.
 
Governance would be addressed by the UN police, rule of law, human rights, civil affairs, electoral assistance and gender components. The UN police component would assist in the development of a transparent police service while the rule of law component would help to support the establishment and operation of essential legislative, executive and judicial institutions of the Government of National Unity, as well as the government of southern Sudan.
 
Humanitarian and development assistance would be addressed by components for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; humanitarian coordination; protection; recovery, return and reintegration; and mine action. The peace support operation would also include a mission support component and an integrated security management structure. In addition, HIV and personnel conduct units would provide mission-wide advice and training.
 
The Mission would be headquartered in Khartoum and would be widely represented in the South, including in Rumbek, the provisional capital of Southern Sudan. The Secretary-General noted that, because an operation of this envisaged scope and size would require a certain degree of decentralization, the Mission area would include six distinct sectors.

Unified approach

As the Mission would be dealing with a broad range of issues, the Secretary-General stressed the importance of a joint, integrated strategy among the UN agencies, funds and programmes in order to successfully implement the CPA and achieve the goal of “supporting the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan where all citizens will live in conditions of greater dignity and security.” Nevertheless, a clear distinction would be maintained between the coordinating role of the Mission and the implementation responsibility of agencies, funds and programmes.

Risks and challenges

According to the Secretary-General, harmonizing all aspects of the CPA would be a “hugely complex task” for the parties and those assisting them. Some grey areas and potentially difficult issues remained where the parties might have differing interpretations of the texts that could prove controversial at a later stage. Some complicated issues were left for the Presidency to decide and some decisions were deferred to a later date.
 
Other major challenges included security risks arising from the initially destabilizing effects of implementing the peace agreement, the integration of other armed groups in both the north and the south, and a chance of further violence as a result of threats posed by dissatisfied or disaffected armed groups or militias unwilling to subscribe to either of the two main parties. The process of reconciling these armed groups and militias with the Government of the Sudan or SPLM/A was not detailed in the peace agreement.

Overall, the implementation of the peace agreement would radically alter the political, economic and social landscape of the country. The stakes and tasks were enormous for both the Sudanese people and the parties.

On how to avoid or minimize these risks, the Secretary-General said that strong and concerted strategies at both the national and international levels were required. The Sudanese leadership, in collaboration with the international community, would need to identify ways to prevent competing interests from derailing the process. To promote the inclusive implementation of the CPA, the new Sudanese leadership would have to promote its acceptance beyond its immediate constituencies to the wider body politic and civil society. The new Government would have to take the lead, with the help of the international community, in starting to restore confidence and reconciliation in an all-inclusive national process. The United Nations would continue to encourage the Government to adopt a coherent and consistent national formula that addressed the root causes of the various conflicts, based on free, full and meaningful participation.

Darfur

Even as the civil war in the south concluded with the signing of the CPA, conflict continued in the Darfur region. According to the Secretary-General, “a stable Sudan requires a peaceful Darfur".

In this regard, it was essential that the work of the United Nations and the African Union in the Sudan be complementary. The Secretary-General referred in particular to the on-going discussions between the two organizations and the importance of maintaining strong liaison between the AU mission in the Sudan and the UN mission at the operational, headquarters and strategic levels.

The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), had enhanced its numbers in October 2004, bringing it to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel and 815 civilian police, as well as complementary civilian personnel. The mandate of the enhanced mission was to monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N’Djamena on 8 April 2004, and to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The liaison referred to by the Secretary-General would include placing some United Nations military observers and police officers, in addition to civilian staff, in field offices in Darfur. It would also require reinforcing relations between the Secretary-General's Special Representative and African Union officials, in particular the Special Representative of the Chairperson.

The Secretary-General pointed out that the human rights presence authorized in resolution 1564 (2004) would be incorporated into the UN Mission, as would a capacity for humanitarian coordination and facilitation in Darfur. The close relationship with the African Union, as well as the broader presence in Darfur, would strengthen the ability of the Mission to conduct contingency planning for Darfur, as requested in Security Council resolution 1556 (2004).

Commission of Inquiry

On 7 October 2004, at the request of Security Council, the Secretary-General established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to determine whether or not acts of genocide had occurred in Darfur. The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary-General in January 2005.

The Commission found that while the Sudanese Government had not pursued a policy of genocide, both its forces and allied Janjaweed militias had carried out "indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement."

According to the report, the conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that had been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide, the report said.

Among other things, the panel also concluded that rebel forces in Darfur were responsible for possible war crimes, including murder of civilians and pillage, and recommended that the Council refer its dossier on the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

UNMIS is established

On 24 March 2005, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The Council took this action in its resolution 1590 after determining that the situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

Acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Council decided that the tasks of UNMIS would be: (a) to support implementation of the CPA signed by the parties; (b) to facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; (c) to assist the parties in the mine action sector; (d) to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS' capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations. [For more on the mandate of the mission see the Mandate section.]

Implementation of CPA and deployment of UNMIS

In his report to the Security Council of 23 June 2005, the Secretary-General noted that he had visited the Sudan during the previous month, including Khartoum, Rumbek and Darfur. Before the visit, he co-chaired with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, a meeting in Addis Ababa at which the international community committed itself to support an expansion of the AU mission in Darfur, AMIS. On 28 April 2005, the AMIS force was increased by the AU Peace and Security Council to a total authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.

With regard to implementation of the CPA, the Secretary-General reported that, while the Government and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had not been able to adhere strictly to the timetable they had set, they had fulfilled commitments and demonstrated a realistic appreciation of the tasks involved. They could rightly claim that some progress had been achieved, including among other things the establishment of the Joint National Transition Team, the presence in the capital of a large SPLM/A advance delegation, the inauguration of the National Constitutional Review Commission, the establishment of the Joint Media Commission, and the development of a coordinated national strategy on mine action, although resources for implementing effective mine action were still limited.

At the same time, there were a number of concerns. Although the CPA set forth a broad framework for an inclusive implementation process, efforts to bring other political parties into the Agreement had only just begun. Many of the political players in the north, as well as some forces in the south, had been hesitant to commit to an agreement they were not party to, and the Secretary-General warned that armed groups in southern Sudan might become spoilers to implementation. He urged the Government and the SPLM/A to redouble their efforts to demonstrate an inclusive approach in implementing the CPA. The Secretary-General noted that UNMIS was fully prepared to support the work of the Collaborative Committee of Other Armed Groups and pointed to the potential salutary impact of a positive outcome of the South-South Dialogue.

The parties continued to respect ceasefire obligations after the signing of the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement on 31 December 2004. In the Nuba Mountains, however, a number of complaints were lodged by both parties. Other problem areas included matters related to details of SPLM forces and differences over the release of prisoners of war. The Secretary-General also noted that key institutions had not yet been launched, and that they could be established only by the two parties working together and ensuring that other political forces and groups were included.

With regard to UNMIS, the Secretary-General reported that the mission continued to carry out its broad mandate with the overarching goal of supporting implementation of the CPA. In Darfur, UNMIS coordinated closely at all levels with AMIS, and cooperation was broadened beyond political and military planning to include a concerted effort in humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights. UNMIS also closely followed and supported the African Union-led efforts to restart the political talks at Abuja.

The Secretary-General reported that the deployment of UNMIS military elements had commenced, enabling the force headquarters in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Office in Juba to achieve an initial operating capability, but a number of factors had resulted in delays in the deployment rate of some military and police elements. The Secretary-General noted that it would be critical that UNMIS be given sufficient capability to perform at the level assigned by the Security Council and anticipated by the parties. At the same time, the deployment of human rights monitors to Darfur was accelerated. 

Further progress

By the end of 2005, the Secretary-General was able to report that the implementation of CPA had gained some momentum, despite the death of First Vice-President John Garang, Chairman of SPLM, on 30 July in a helicopter crash and the ensuing violence. Earlier in July, a caretaker government had been established and the interim National Constitution had been signed. The Ceasefire Political Commission was established in August to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the CPA and provide a forum for dialogue. In the south, a constitutional drafting committee was set up and a south-south dialogue meeting convened, although the meeting was unable to resolve differences between the Southern Sudan Defence Force and SPLM/A.

In September 2005, the Government of National Unity was established, although some observers questioned whether the parties were fully committed. In addition, a number of northern and southern parties joined the Government, or stated their respect for CPA. The Secretary-General also reported that, in October, the Government of Southern Sudan had been established as a caretaker government pending adoption of the Interim Constitution, which was signed into law on 5 December. A number of key commissions were been established.

At the same time, a delay in implementing the decision of the Abyei Boundary Commission contributed to a tense situation in a vital area of the country. As a result, UNMIS increased its presence in Abyei, completed deployment of the UN protection force there and convened meetings with the parties on the ground to discuss areas of mutual concern. In southern Sudan, the problem of other armed groups remained of crucial importance.

By March 2006, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, although the parties had on the whole respected the letter of the CPA, the spirit of cooperation, inclusiveness and transparency had been less than hoped for. A number of commissions had not yet been established, and among those that had, only the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission had met regularly. The Ceasefire Political Committee established in August 2005 had met for the first time on 23 February 2006. On other matters there had been some movement, including the appointment of the president and members of the Constitutional Court. In northern Sudan, most states had adopted their state constitution, and in southern Sudan a drafting committee prepared a model constitution for southern states.

A serious concern in southern Sudan was the presence and activities of the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army. The Secretary-General noted that the parties to the CPA had agreed in Naivasha that they were responsible for addressing the issue of foreign insurgency groups and should work effectively with their Ugandan partners to seek resolution.

UNMIS continued its deployment at a steady pace, albeit behind schedule, and assisted the parties in implementing the CPA and resolving ongoing conflicts. At the same time, the Secretary-General noted a growing anti-United Nations campaign in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities, as well as personal attacks on the leadership of UNMIS. The Secretary-General called on political, military and civil elements of society to work with the United Nations, which had been invited into the country by the governing authorities, to help achieve peace and prosperity for all Sudanese.

Referring to Darfur, the Secretary-General pointed out that the crisis there was having a direct and negative effect on the implementation of the CPA, with efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict putting considerable pressure on the relationship between the partners in the Government of National Unity. He said it was essential that all parties in Darfur seriously engage in finding a swift and durable political solution in order to avoid the prolonged suffering of civilian populations and to ensure that the region did not further slip into chaos.
 
The Darfur Peace Agreement

African Union efforts to seek a solution to the crisis in Darfur culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May 2006. The Secretary-General said that the DPA, signed after more than three years of conflict, had given hope that the parties might be prepared to lay down their weapons. At the same time, he noted that the Agreement still faced formidable challenges.

The Agreement consisted of four substantive chapters, on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, a comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements, and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

While all parties to the conflict were present at the talks, only the Government delegation and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Agreement. Despite the decision of the African Union to extend the signing deadline to 31 May, two of the parties—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Abdelwahid faction of the SLM/A—remained outside the Agreement. In addition, the Agreement failed to receive support from internally displaced persons and others who had been affected by the conflict. This increased the possibility that implementation might face difficulties. Following the signing of the Agreement, there was also an escalation of clashes between those who supported it and those who did not.

In June, however, some members of the Abdelwahid faction and JEM splinter groups announced that they agreed to be bound by the Agreement’s provisions and participate fully in its implementation. A number of other groups, however, formed the National Redemption Front (NRF), an umbrella movement opposing the DPA and demanding adjustments. A further escalation in fighting occurred on 3 July when the NRF attacked Northern Kordofan.

As a result of the violence throughout Darfur, access to populations in need decreased At the same time, violence against humanitarians continued to rise. It was feared that any attempt to implement the Agreement through force, including the forced return of internally displaced persons, could push Darfur into an even bloodier round of conflict.

Recommendations on expanding UNMIS into Darfur

With all this in mind, the Secretary-General suggested in his report to the Security Council of 28 July 2006 that a United Nations peacekeeping force of as many as 18,600 troops might be needed in Darfur to ensure that all sides complied with the peace agreement. The military force would have to be “large, agile and robust”. Depending on the required speed of deployment, levels of troop density and mobility, as well as risks accepted for civilians and United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General recommended to the Council three different options, based on the force capacity and composition deemed necessary. Option I required 17,300 troops; option II, 18,600; and option III, 15,300 troops.

The mission’s main focus would be on protecting civilians, especially the vast population of internally displaced persons living in camps across Darfur’s three states. The Secretary-General warned that the region’s harsh terrain and lack of usable roads, especially during the annual wet season, posed particular problems. He also noted that, at start-up, the peacekeeping mission would need up to 3,300 police officers, especially in helping manage internally displaced persons’ camps, with more probably required later.

The Secretary-General urged the Government of the Sudan to accept a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur, arguing that the peace in southern Sudan could be put in jeopardy. “Peace in the Sudan is indivisible”, he said. “Peace cannot take root in one part of the country while another part remains chronically unstable and prone to extreme violence.”

Security Council decision to expand UNMIS

On 31 August 2006, the Security Council, by its resolution 1706, decided to expand the UNMIS mandate to include its deployment to Darfur, without prejudice to the mission’s existing mandate and operations. The Council invited the consent of the Sudanese Government of National Unity, called on Member States to ensure expeditious deployment and requested the Secretary-General to ensure additional capabilities to enable UNMIS to deploy in Darfur.

The Council decided that the mandate of UNMIS would be to support implementation of the DPA and the N’djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur by performing a number of specific tasks. Furthermore, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council authorized UNMIS to use all necessary means as it deemed within its capabilities to, among other things, prevent disruption of the implementation of the DPA by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, and to protect civilians under threat of physical violence. (For details of the mandate, please see Mandate section.)

The Council decided that UNMIS would be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units. The Council expressed its determination to keep the Mission’s strength and structure under regular review, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground.

By further terms of the text, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the parties to the DPA, including the Government of National Unity, on a plan and timetable for a transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation in Darfur.

Limited progress

One year after the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, the
Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 12 September 2006 that the parties were observing their security commitments under the CPA reasonably well, reducing the likelihood of future conflict. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees were largely functioning as intended. Nevertheless, implementation of other major provisions appeared to be selective and had fallen behind schedule. Southern Sudan was still insecure due to the presence of other armed groups, communal violence and forced disarmament campaigns. The Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee had met only for a second time, on 5 August. The formation of Joint Integrated Units had also been slow, but both parties expressed their desire for international support in this regard. International support would also be required for the reform of the rest of the national security sector.

In the report, the Secretary-General noted that some contentious issues had not been resolved, with little progress in the crucial areas of power- and wealth-sharing. Nor had the parties done enough to begin preparing for national elections or brought the question of Abyei to resolution. Few of the commissions called for in the CPA functioned as originally intended, but the Secretary-General saw as an encouraging sign that the National Assembly was emerging as a vibrant forum for broad political dialogue. At the same time, the parties had fallen behind in implementing the legislative reform agenda required by the CPA.

For its part, UNMIS had continued to provide good offices and political support to the parties, monitored and verified their security arrangements and offered assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development. UNMIS had completed its monitoring mandate in the east of the country following the redeployment of SPLA troops, and had commenced its withdrawal from that region. In the south, UNMIS, among other things, had played an important early warning role, identifying and acting to defuse inter-communal tensions.

The Secretary-General also noted that UNMIS had assisted in efforts to implement and build support for the DPA and had substantially increased its support for AMIS.

UNMIS military and police components were close to full strength at 8,727 troops, 695 military observers, 186 staff officers, and 666 police officers. In his report, the Secretary-General provided details of the activities of these and other UNMIS components.
 
The Secretary-General concluded his report by noting that the implementation of the CPA had entered a new and challenging phase. The parties, he said, needed to make substantial progress on difficult tasks in the months ahead. He also noted that Sudan’s own history confirmed that peace was indivisible and that efforts to implement the CPA would prove inadequate until durable peace also came to Darfur. In view of the negative reaction of the leaders of the Sudan to the proposals of the international community with regard to Darfur, the Secretary-General hoped that the leaders were fully aware of the possible consequences of that reaction.

UNMIS mandate extended

UNMIS mandate was due to expire on 24 September 2006.  The Security Council met on 22 September and decided, by resolution 1709, to extend it until 8 October, with the intention to renew it for further periods. The Council reiterated in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to end the violence and atrocities in that region.  It also expressed its grave concern over the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur.

In a briefing that preceded the Council’s debate, members noted that the implementation of the CPA between North and South was on track, but also agreed with the assessment of Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, that it was still “a bumpy ride and the train could easily derail”.  They noted that efforts to implement the CPA would prove inadequate until durable peace also comes to Darfur. 

The Council met again on 6 October 2006 and, by its resolution 1714, extended the mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2007, while stating its intention to extend it further beyond that date.

The Council called upon the parties to the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the N’djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement to respect their commitments and implement fully all aspects of the Agreements without delay.  It also called upon those parties that have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the Agreement.

On 30 April 2007, the Security Council, by its resolution 1755, decided to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 31 October 2007, with the intention to renew it for further periods.