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Part III

Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

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Introductory note

Part III covers the consideration by the Security Council of Articles contained in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). Part III consists of four sections. Section I features material relating to the principle of self-determination of peoples under Article 1 (2) of the Charter. Section II covers material relevant to the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force as enshrined in Article 2 (4). Section III deals with the obligation of States to refrain from assisting a target of the Council's enforcement action as stipulated in Article 2 (5). Section IV highlights the Council's consideration of the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States, as regulated by Article 2 (7).

In 2021, Council members and other participants in Council discussions continued to deliberate on the principle of self-determination in both thematic and country-specific contexts, however none of the discussions held were of constitutional significance. Council members addressed the application and interpretation of Article 2 (4) concerning the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States at meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with cybersecurity, peace operations conducted by regional organizations and developments in Eastern Ukraine and in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. Council members also discussed the obligation of States to refrain from giving assistance to any State or non-State actor against which the United Nations was taking preventive or enforcement action pursuant to Article 2 (5) in connection with the situations in Libya and Yemen as well as in the context of preventing the financing of terrorism and preventing the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, Council members reflected on the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter during their consideration of the situations in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as during their discussions on technology and peacekeeping.

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decisions containing explicit references to Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) or 2 (7). Nonetheless, Part III includes Council decisions featuring language relating to the principles enshrined in those

Articles. In addition, it includes explicit invocations of Articles 1(2), 2 (4) and 2 (7) found in the correspondence addressed to the Council during the period under review.

I. Principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples under Article 1, paragraph 2

Article 1, paragraph 2

[The Purposes of the United Nations are:]

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Security Council regarding the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features decisions relevant to the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2). Subsection B describes the references made to the principle of self-determination in Council discussions during the reporting period. Subsection C sets out instances in which the principle of self-determination was invoked in communications addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, the Security Council did not explicitly invoke Article 1 (2) in its decisions. However, language found in one Council decision, adopted in connection with the envisaged referendum in Western Sahara, is of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 1 (2) (see table 1).

Table 1
Decisions containing implicit references to Article 1 (2)

Decision and date	Provision
The situation in Western Sahara	
Resolution 2602 (2021) 29 October 2021	Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (seventh preambular paragraph) Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (para. 4)

B. Discussion relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, Article 1 (2) was not explicitly invoked in deliberations at meetings of the Council or in open videoconferences. Nevertheless, the principle of self-determination was addressed by Council members in the context of both thematic and country-specific discussions, as elaborated below.

During an open videoconference held on 6 January 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” focused on challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts, the delegation of Azerbaijan, in a statement made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM), relayed the Movement’s commitment to supporting and promoting the purposes and principles of the Charter and the principles and norms of international law, including the right to self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial or alien domination.¹ The representative of Pakistan underscored that foreign occupation, intervention and aggression had led to the untold suffering of millions in the Muslim world, and many Muslim peoples, such as the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir and Palestine, continued to fight for their inalienable right to self-determination and the end of foreign occupation.

During an open videoconference held on 12 January 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the representative of Azerbaijan, speaking again on behalf of NAM, underscored the Movement’s opposition to attempts to equate terrorism with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation in order to prolong the occupation and oppression of innocent people with impunity.² The representative of Libya iterated the condemnation and categorical rejection of terrorism in all its forms and regardless of its source or motivation and emphasized that an equivalence should not be drawn between terrorism and the struggle of peoples for independence and self-determination. The representative of Malaysia highlighted the delegation’s continued belief in the need to conclude the comprehensive convention on international terrorism, and stressed that the draft

¹ See [S/2021/24](#).

² See [S/2021/48](#).

convention must include a definition of terrorism that was all-encompassing to cover acts committed by States and non-State actors alike. In that connection, the representative of Malaysia emphasized that a distinction must be made between terrorism and the legitimate struggle of people under foreign occupation for self-determination, stressing that terrorism should not be associated with any beliefs, ethnic group or nationality.

During an open videoconference held on 19 April 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the representative of Armenia, referring to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, stated that consolidated engagement of the internationally mandated format of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group co-chairmanship was paramount for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of that conflict on the basis of the principles and elements developed over the years, including the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.³ At the same videoconference, the representative of Liechtenstein noted that conflicts relating to self-determination had accounted for around 50 per cent of armed conflicts since the 1960s, and underlined the clear necessity of addressing questions of self-determination as a potential source of conflict. The representative added that paying attention to upholding the human rights of minority groups, finding appropriate forms of self-governance within a State and ensuring the engagement of relevant communities in preventing conflict in an inclusive manner were all ways in which the international community could help to address that highly prevalent, but often politically sensitive, aspect of conflict. The representative emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue by regional and subregional organizations in that regard. The representative of Pakistan recalled that General Assembly resolution 75/16 had requested the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to continue to cooperate in their common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions relating to international peace and security, disarmament and self-determination.

In a written statement submitted in connection with the 8877th meeting of the Council held on 12 October 2021 under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining

³ See [S/2021/394](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2021/20210413.sgsm19202101.html).

peace”, focused on diversity, State-building and the search for peace, the representative of Liechtenstein said that the majority of Council situations began as intercommunal tensions with roots in ethnic, racial, regional, partisan and religious differences.⁴ He also underlined that communities within a country, in particular those that were in a minority within a State, had to be able to benefit from governance arrangements that allowed them to flourish and that were in line with international human rights standards. He added that his country saw the process of seeking out governance arrangements as an extension of the right of self-determination, expressed internally within a State. He elaborated that, applied in such a manner, expressions of self-determination could include self-governance, autonomy and devolution arrangements within a State, and as a preventive measure, with the aim of preventing internal tensions over questions of governance from developing into violent conflict. He added that by applying a “self-determination lens” to the causes of and solutions to conflict, the United Nations could significantly strengthen its conflict prevention and resolution architecture.

Concerning country- and region-specific items, Council members discussed often the principle of self-determination. At an open videoconference held on 23 March 2021 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that any proposed [peace] plan must be realistic, comprehensive and balanced and preserve and be built upon the past achievements of the people and Government of Afghanistan, particularly the present Constitution, the right of the people to self-determination through elections; the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and of women; as well as the commitment to combat terrorism.⁵ At an open videoconference held on 22 June 2021 in connection with the same item, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that preserving the past achievements of the people and Government of Afghanistan, including the Constitution, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and women, the right to self-determination of people through elections, governance system and structures derived from the

⁴ See [S/2021/868](#). See also [S/PV.8877](#). While briefers and Council members participated in-person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

⁵ See [S/2021/291](#).

Constitution, as well as the commitment to combat terrorism, must be one of the main elements of any peace process.⁶

In addition, and consistent with past practice, Council members, other Member and Observer States and entities continued to address and/or reaffirm the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people at meetings and open videoconferences held throughout the year in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁷ Council members also referred to the principle of self-determination in connection with the situation concerning Western Sahara and the adoption of resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) on 29 October 2021, in which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.⁸

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2) in communications

During the period under review, one explicit reference to Article 1 was made in a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela addressed to the President of the Security Council referring to the principle of self-determination enshrined in Article 1 (2).⁹ In the letter, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela emphasized that the use of structures of transnational organized crime and mercenary forces for perpetrating acts of terrorism and assassinating Heads of State and

⁶ See [S/2021/601](#).

⁷ See [S/2021/91](#), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, United Kingdom, Argentina, Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Bangladesh, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Cuba, European Union, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia and Namibia; [S/2021/218](#), France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tunisia; [S/2021/404](#), Tunisia, Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Bangladesh, Cuba, European Union, Islamic Republic of Iran, League of Arab States, Malaysia, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia and Syrian Arab Republic; [S/2021/480](#), Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, Bangladesh, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; [S/PV.8826](#), Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine and [S/2021/685](#) (record of written statements submitted in connection with the 8826th meeting), Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, (Bangladesh, Senegal on behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Cuba, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Oman on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Syrian Arab Republic and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; [S/PV.8883](#), p. 9 (Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine), and Niger, and [S/2021/884](#) (record of written statements submitted in connection with the 8883rd meeting), Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Cuba, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Pakistan and Qatar.

⁸ See [S/PV.8890](#), p. 3 (Mexico), pp. 3-4 (Russian Federation), p. 4 (Viet Nam), and p. 5 (Kenya).

⁹ See [S/2021/688](#).

Government, overthrowing Governments and undermining the constitutional basis of States constituted a clear violation of the Charter, which established as one of its purposes, in Article 1, the development of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.

In 2021, the principle of self-determination was invoked in numerous communications addressed to or brought to the attention of the Council, including communications from Member States relating to Western Sahara,¹⁰ the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,¹¹ Nagorno-Karabakh¹² and the India-Pakistan question.¹³ Also, in an exchange of letters between the Permanent Representatives of Algeria and Morocco, dated 16 and 19 July 2021, respectively, and both addressed to the President of the Council, references were made to the right of self-determination of the Kabyle people,¹⁴ and the people of the chimeric republic.¹⁵ The reports of the Secretary-General to the Council regarding the mission of good offices in Cyprus;¹⁶ the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,¹⁷ and the situation concerning Western Sahara¹⁸ also made reference to the principle of self-determination. In addition, a reference to self-determination was made in the Chair’s summary of the open Arria-formula meeting held on 12 March 2021 on the situation in Crimea, transmitted to the President of the Council in a letter dated 22 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation.¹⁹

¹⁰ See [S/2021/162](#), annex; [S/2021/475](#), annex; [S/2021/698](#), annex; [S/2021/741](#), annex; [S/2021/903](#), annex; [S/2021/978](#), annex; [S/2021/979](#), annex; [S/2021/980](#), annex and [S/2021/981](#), annex.

¹¹ See [S/2021/74](#); [S/2021/137](#), annex; [S/2021/280](#); [S/2021/285](#), Enclosure; [S/2021/342](#); [S/2021/366](#); [S/2021/403](#); [S/2021/430](#); [S/2021/479](#); [S/2021/529](#); [S/2021/574](#); [S/2021/639](#); [S/2021/665](#); [S/2021/678](#); [S/2021/810](#), Enclosure; [S/2021/829](#); [S/2021/904](#); [S/2021/928](#); [S/2021/1021](#); and [S/2021/1067](#).

¹² See [S/2021/30](#), annex; [S/2021/190](#), annex; [S/2021/205](#), annex I; [S/2021/269](#); [S/2021/440](#), annex; [S/2021/478](#), annex; [S/2021/671](#), annex; [S/2021/734](#), annex; [S/2021/834](#), annex and [S/2021/962](#), annex.

¹³ See [S/2021/102](#), annex; [S/2021/575](#), annex; [S/2021/697](#), annex; [S/2021/901](#), annex and [S/2021/1004](#), annex.

¹⁴ See [S/2021/664](#), annex and [S/2021/666](#), annex.

¹⁵ See [S/2021/666](#), annex.

¹⁶ See [S/2021/634](#), annex II.

¹⁷ See [S/2021/749](#) and [S/2021/1047](#).

¹⁸ See [S/2021/843](#).

¹⁹ See [S/2021/397](#), annex.

II. Prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2, paragraph 4

Article 2, paragraph 4

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council concerning the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A includes implicit references to Article 2 (4) in decisions adopted by the Council. Subsection B highlights constitutional discussions relating to the threat or use of force. Subsection C features explicit references to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, the Security Council did not adopt any decision containing explicit references to Article 2 (4). In a number of its decisions, however, the Council underlined the principles of Article 2 (4) by: (a) reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations; (b) reiterating the importance of good-neighbourliness and non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others; (c) calling for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security; and (d) calling upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories. The four themes are covered below.

(a) Affirmation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

In 2021, the Council stressed the prohibition of the threat or use of force against other Member States through a few of its decisions, in particular concerning the future status of Abyei and the situation in the Middle East (see table 2).

Table 2

Decisions affirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	
Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	Reiterating that the territorial boundaries of States shall not be altered by force, and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means, affirming the priority it attaches to the full and urgent implementation of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and underscoring that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved by negotiations between the parties in a manner consistent with the CPA and not by the unilateral actions of either party, and recalling prior agreements on the administration and security of the Abyei Area (third preambular paragraph)
The situation in the Middle East	
Resolution 2581 (2021) 29 June 2021	Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire (third preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2613 (2021), third preambular paragraph</i> Stresses the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, calls on the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, encourages the parties to take full advantage of UNDOF's liaison function regularly to address issues of mutual concern, as appropriate, and to maintain their liaison with UNDOF to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line, as well as to support the enhancement of the UNDOF liaison function, and underscores that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (para. 2) <i>See also resolution 2613 (2021), para. 2.</i>

(b) Reiteration of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

During the period under review, the Council reiterated in several of its decisions the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation with regard to the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes Region, Libya, and the Sudan and

South Sudan (see table 3). Furthermore, the Council consistently reaffirmed, in many of its decisions concerning country-specific situations, its respect for or commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of States.

Table 3

Decisions affirming the principle of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2582 (2021) 29 June 2021	Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)
<i>See also resolution 2612 (2021), third preambular paragraph</i>	
The situation in the Great Lakes Region	
S/PRST/2021/19 20 October 2021	The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and emphasizes the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (last paragraph)
The situation in Libya	
Resolution 2570 (2021) 16 April 2021	Recalling the commitment of the participants of the Berlin Conference to refrain from interference in the armed conflict or in the internal affairs of Libya and their call on international actors to do the same (fifth preambular paragraph)
	Recalls its decision that all Member States shall comply with the arms embargo, demands full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011) , as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel and demands all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict (para. 13)
Resolution 2571 (2021) 16 April 2021	Calls for full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo, further calls on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict and reiterates that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011) , including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation (para. 5)
Report of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan	
Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of the Republic of South Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

<p>Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021</p>	<p>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)</p>
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(c) Calls for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

During the period under review, the Council adopted decisions calling upon States to refrain from or prevent the provision of any form of support or assistance to armed groups, including through the financing of their activities, in relation to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya (see table 4).

Table 4

Decisions calling for cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
<p>Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021</p>	<p>Notes that the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups requires an integrated regional approach and strong political engagement by the governments of DRC, SADC and the ICGLR to further seize on the positive regional momentum, in close coordination with MONUSCO and the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, underscores that there can be no purely military solutions to these problems, welcomes the establishment of a Contact and Coordination Group to oversee the technical implementation of non-military measures for the neutralisation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, bearing in mind the need to address the root causes of conflict, including the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and put an end to recurring cycles of violence, as outlined in the PSC Framework, reaffirms that the PSC Framework remains an essential mechanism to achieve durable peace and stability in the DRC and the Region recalls the commitments undertaken by the region under the PSC Framework not to tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, urges the signatory States, with the support of the PSC Framework Guarantors, to strengthen their collaboration in addressing appropriately and holistically the threat of all remaining foreign armed groups in the DRC and the illicit flow of weapons in the region, fully supports the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes in fulfilling his mandate to address the remaining challenges in implementation of the PSC Framework and to promote peace and stability in the region, including through good offices, coordinated strategies and shared information with MONUSCO, UNOCA and other UN entities, and stresses the need for coordination and cooperation between the Government of the DRC and other national authorities, United Nations entities, civil society organisations and development actors to build and sustain peace, stabilise, improve the security situation and assist in restoration of State authority (para. 14)</p>
The situation in Libya	
<p>S/PRST/2021/4 9 February 2021</p>	<p>The Security Council urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (fifth paragraph)</p>

- [S/PRST/2021/6](#)
12 March 2021
- The Security Council calls on all parties to implement the ceasefire agreement in full and urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (sixth paragraph)
- Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#)
16 April 2021
- Calls on all Libyan parties to ensure full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement and strongly urges all Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay (para. 12)
- Recalls its decision that all Member States shall comply with the arms embargo, demands full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel and demands all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict (para. 13)
- Resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#)
16 April 2021
- Recalling that providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya may constitute acts that threaten the peace, stability and security of Libya (eight preambular paragraph)
- Further reiterating its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil Corporation, and stressing the need for the unification of Libya's institutions, and, in this regard, calling on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions outside of the authority of the Government of Libya (ninth preambular paragraph)
- Calls for full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo, further calls on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict and reiterates that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation (para. 5)
- Calls on all parties to implement the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement ([S/2020/1043](#)) in full and urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (para. 6)
- [S/PRST/2021/12](#)
15 July 2021
- The Security Council strongly urges all Member States, all Libyan parties and all relevant actors to respect and support the full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay. The Security Council recalls UNSMIL's role supporting the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire and that UNSMIL is requested to support the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism (LCMM) including through the swift, scalable and incremental deployment of UNSMIL ceasefire monitors once conditions allow (tenth paragraph)
- [S/PRST/2021/24](#)
24 November 2021
- The Security Council emphasises the importance of the implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay. In that regard, the Security Council welcomes the Action Plan agreed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Geneva on 8 October 2021 and calls on all relevant actors to facilitate its synchronised, phased, gradual and balanced implementation. The Security Council therefore strongly urges all Member States, all Libyan parties and all relevant actors to respect and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the Action Plan including through the prompt development of timelines and a plan to monitor and verify the presence and withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries (ninth paragraph)
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(d) Calls upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories

During the period under review and consistent with past practice, the Council urged the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar, located on the border between Lebanon and Israel.²⁰

B. Discussion relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, Article 2 (4) of the Charter was explicitly invoked seven times during four open videoconferences held by Council members and three Council meetings. References to this provision were invoked in connection with country- and region- specific as well as thematic items.

In connection with “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, on 26 January 2021, at an open videoconference, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the statement by the representative of Israel in connection with Iran’s nuclear programme, underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran reserved its inherent right to self-defence and to vigorously respond to any threat, including those made that day by the Israeli regime’s representative, in clear violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, requiring the Security Council to hold that regime accountable for such threats.²¹ The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran made additional references to Article 2 (4) in written statements submitted in connection with Council meetings held under the same item, on 28 July and 19 October 2021.²² Regarding the meeting held on 28 July, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran made reference to the “continued destabilizing measures and military adventurism of the Israeli regime” in the Middle East region, clear examples of which were the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and parts of Lebanon, as well as the

²⁰ Resolutions [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 19.

²¹ See [S/2021/91](#).

²² While briefers and Council members participated in-person at these meetings, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

systematic violation of the sovereignty of those two countries in contravention of international law, in particular Article 2 (4).²³ In connection with the meeting held on 19 October, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that Israel’s accusations regarding “Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, whose peaceful nature ha[d] been verified on numerous occasions by the International Atomic Energy Agency”, were completely absurd, irrelevant and baseless.²⁴ He added that the representative of Israel had explicitly threatened to use force against a Member State of the United Nations. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran further emphasized that that illegal threat constituted a gross violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, particularly its Article 2, paragraph 4, and had therefore to be denounced and condemned by the Council.

In connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, at an open videoconference held on 16 February 2021, the representative of Mexico took note of the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2522 \(2020\)](#) and reiterated Mexico’s concern about the abuse of invocations of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in the context of the fight against terrorism. He elaborated that the practice ran the risk of de facto broadening the exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force, as contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, was adding that such practice was an irregularity that should not be accepted.²⁵ Articulating a similar position, at a meeting held on 23 November under the same item, the representative of Mexico reiterated his country’s deep concern over the abuse of the invocation of Article 51 in the context of the fight against terrorism, stressing that this practice ran the risk of de facto broadening the exceptions to the general prohibition of

²³ See [S/2021/685](#) (record of written statements submitted in connection with the 8826th meeting, see [S/PV.8826](#)) Islamic Republic of Iran. While briefers and Council members participated in-person at these meetings, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

²⁴ See [S/2021/884](#) (record of written statements submitted in connection with the 8883rd meeting, see [S/PV.8883](#)) Islamic Republic of Iran. While briefers and Council members participated in-person at these meetings, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

²⁵ See [S/2021/152](#). For the report, see [S/2021/120](#).

the use of force, as enshrined in Article 2 (4).²⁶ This was an aberration that Mexico could not accept and one that undermined Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Concerning “The situation in the Middle East”, focused on Syria, at an open videoconference held on 15 March 2021, the representative of Mexico reiterated his country’s concern about certain States abusively invoking Article 51 of the Charter to justify the use force without the authorization of the Council.²⁷ He underscored that such practice ran the risk of de facto increasing exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, as contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter.

In connection with the “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, at an open videoconference held on 25 May 2021, the representative of Pakistan emphasized that counter-terrorism measures did not justify setting aside the limitations of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force. He added that Council resolutions on counter-terrorism did not authorize the use of force on the territory of other States without the Council’s express authorization, neither did they justify compromising the requirement for proportionality in the use of force.²⁸

Additionally, Article 2 was referred to more broadly at two meetings held by the Council in 2021. Firstly, in a written statement submitted in connection with a meeting held on 12 October 2021 under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia underscored that it was vital that all Member States abided by international law and adhered to Article 2, namely the core principles of sovereign equality of States and non-interference, the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the obligation to settle international disputes peacefully in preserving international peace and security.²⁹ Secondly, at a meeting held on 9 December 2021 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Sri Lanka said that international legal analysis tended to focus on the

²⁶ See [S/PV.8910](#).

²⁷ See [S/2021/265](#).

²⁸ See [S/2021/505](#). For more information, see part VII, sect. IV, case 7.

²⁹ See [S/2021/868](#) (record of written statements submitted in connection with the 8877th meeting, see [S/PV.8877](#)). While briefers and Council members participated in-person at these meetings, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

principles of the Charter set out in Article 2, including the principles applicable to the United Nations of sovereign equality and non-intervention and the duties of States, primarily the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force.³⁰

In addition to the explicit references highlighted above, in 2021, Council members and other delegations also discussed issues relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (4) in relation to the situation in Ukraine under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))” (see case 1)³¹ and at several of its meetings held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” concerning developments in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see case 2). In addition, and consistent with previous years, language that may be considered of relevance for the application and/or interpretation of Article 2 (4) was used in open videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the situations in Iraq, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in their internal affairs and the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territories.³²

Concerning thematic items, Council members and other delegations addressed the need for regional organizations to respect the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4), particularly the prohibition of the use of force, at an open videoconference held on 19

³⁰ See [S/PV.8923](#) (Resumption 1).

³¹ See [S/2021/159](#). See also case 1 below.

³² See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, [S/2021/152](#), France, Estonia, China, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tunisia; and [S/PV.8842](#), United States, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, Norway, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, China, Tunisia, India and Iraq; and [S/PV.8910](#), India, Viet Nam, China, Russian Federation, Kenya, Tunisia, Mexico and Iraq; in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, [S/2021/418](#), China, India, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Syrian Arab Republic; [S/PV.8866](#), Russian Federation, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger and Islamic Republic of Iran; and [S/PV.8888](#), Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Mexico, Tunisia, Niger, Syrian Arab Republic and Islamic Republic of Iran; in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, [S/2021/498](#), Estonia, India, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Libya; [S/PV.8855](#), Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Kingdom, Niger, Tunisia, France, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India, United States, Viet Nam, Kenya, Ireland and Libya; and [S/PV.8912](#), United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Niger, Ireland, Tunisia, United States, China, India, Estonia, Kenya and Libya.

April 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” (see case 3). During a high-level open videoconference held on 29 June 2021 in connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, Council members and other delegations discussed the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of other States in the context of cybersecurity (see case 4).

Other discussions of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (4) were held in connection with various items of the Council’s agenda. Those discussions focused on a variety of elements such as the importance for respect of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the fight against terrorism;³³ the prohibition of the threat or the use of force and the sovereign equality of its Member States, in the context of multilateralism;³⁴ the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force, respect for sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs in the context of maritime security;³⁵ the threat of the use of force and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the context of exclusion, inequality and conflict.³⁶ At several other Council meetings and open videoconferences of a thematic nature, reference was made to language that may be deemed of relevance for the application and interpretation and of Article 2 (4).³⁷

³³ In connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, see [S/2021/48](#), Viet Nam, Cuba, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

³⁴ In connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/2021/456](#), Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Secretary of State of the United States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam and Foreign Secretary of India.

³⁵ In connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/2021/722](#), President of the Russian Federation, Prime Minister of Viet Nam, United States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Cyprus, Islamic Republic of Iran and Ukraine.

³⁶ In connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/PV.8900](#), President of Mexico, Russian Federation, China and Peru.

³⁷ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. [S/2021/24](#), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Latvia, Pakistan, South Africa and Ukraine; [S/2021/66](#), Secretary General of the League of Arab States, China, Russian Federation and United Kingdom; and in connection with the item entitled “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, [S/2021/256](#), Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, India, Kenya, Niger, Tunisia, and United States.

Case 1

Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

On 11 February 2021, Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the situation in eastern Ukraine.³⁸ During the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Chairperson-in-Office and the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission. Some Council members condemned or called upon the Russian Federation to cease its aggression against Ukraine³⁹ and/or the occupation or annexation of Ukrainian territories.⁴⁰ Several speakers expressed support for or underlined the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States,⁴¹ including Ukraine specifically.⁴²

The representative of France stated that France and Germany, as members of the Normandy Four,⁴³ were fully committed to the realization of a just and lasting peace and restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas.⁴⁴ The representative of the United States emphasized that, over the previous year, the Russian Federation had stepped up its efforts to destabilize Ukraine and undermine its sovereignty, adding that the United States would never recognize Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea. The representative of China opposed any external interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and the delegation of Tunisia similarly reiterated its stance based on the non-intervention in the affairs of States.⁴⁵

³⁸ See [S/2021/159](#).

³⁹ Norway and United States.

⁴⁰ Estonia, Norway and United States.

⁴¹ China and Tunisia.

⁴² Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, China, Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

⁴³ The Normandy Four (also known as the Normandy format) consists of the representatives of France, Germany, Russian Federation and Ukraine. For more information, see part I, sect. 19.

⁴⁴ See [S/2021/159](#).

⁴⁵ China and Tunisia.

Some participants commented specifically on the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces and weapons from parts of Ukraine. The representative of the United Kingdom said that Russia had to withdraw its military personnel and weapons from the territory of Ukraine, adding that it was Russia's objective to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, the representative of Estonia, who condemned the occupation of certain territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, expressed regret that Russia had neither acknowledged nor reversed its actions and had instead continued to violate the fundamental principles of international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations and a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Minsk agreements and the conclusions of the Paris Summit held within the Normandy format, particularly regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The representatives of Estonia, Norway and the United Kingdom all urged the Russian Federation to stop providing financial and military support to the armed formations that it backed.⁴⁶ The representatives of Estonia and Norway also expressed concern about the presence of Russian military equipment and personnel in the non-Government-controlled areas of Ukraine.⁴⁷ The representative of Norway explicitly condemned "Russia's aggression against Ukraine" and called on the Russian Federation to reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The representative of the United States, stressing that Russia had to immediately cease "its aggression in eastern Ukraine and end its occupation of Crimea", called on the country to withdraw its forces from Ukraine and cease its support for its proxies and other armed groups. The representative of Tunisia called for the comprehensive and permanent ceasefire to be honored, heavy weapons withdrawn, and the Minsk Agreements implemented fully. The representative of Germany pointed out that Russian heavy weapons had not been withdrawn from the line of command and control, in violation of the Minsk agreements, and further indicated that Russian forces remained in eastern Ukraine.

The Head of the Delegation of Ukraine to the Trilateral Contact Group recalled that at the initiative of the Ukrainian delegation, a plan of joint steps aimed at the

⁴⁶ Estonia, Norway and United Kingdom.

⁴⁷ Estonia and Norway.

implementation of the Minsk agreement had been presented to the Trilateral Contact Group, containing practical proposals aimed at ending the conflict. However, the number of ceasefire violations by Russian illegal armed groups had increased significantly in January and February. He added that obstruction and blocking were becoming almost the norm for the Russian delegation in the Trilateral Contact Group and the negotiation process was taking place against the backdrop of the “harsh reality of Russia’s ongoing aggression”. He further noted the common practice of “illegal crossing of the non-controlled segment of the border by Russian cargo and road convoys”, which he said delivered weapons, ammunition and personnel to the temporarily occupied territory.

The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that instead of implementing the Minsk agreements, Kyiv kept “spinning tales of ongoing Russian aggression” and that Ukraine “blame[d] everything on that”. He added that no one had cared to provide a “shred of proof of this so-called aggression”.

Case 2

Peace and security in Africa

In 2021, the Council met several times to address the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia at meetings held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.

On 2 July 2021, during her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members about the 28 June announcement by the Federal Government of Ethiopia of a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis in the region.⁴⁸ As the Tigray Defence Forces had yet to agree to a ceasefire, she called on them to endorse it immediately and completely, and further called for the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray, underscoring that Ethiopia’s neighbours could play a constructive role in supporting the country’s transition while respecting its sovereignty.

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8812](#).

During the discussion, several Council members similarly called for respecting Ethiopia's sovereignty and territorial integrity,⁴⁹ and for the withdrawal of the Eritrean forces from Ethiopia.⁵⁰ The representative of the United States warned that further fighting posed a risk to the integrity of the Ethiopian State and to the stability of the entire region. She added that a meaningful ceasefire deal would affirm the complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces as well as that neither the internal nor the external borders of Ethiopia would be changed by force. The representative of Viet Nam said that the conflict and the situation in Tigray had had certain impacts on the region that required the relevant parties to exercise self-restraint, adding that under the circumstances, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States should always be upheld. The representative of Norway called on neighbouring States to refrain from aggravating the situation, stressing in particular that the continued presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray was a threat to regional peace and security and had to end. The representative of France called upon all parties to act responsibly by expressing without delay their commitment to a permanent cessation of hostilities and all forms of violence against the population, and emphasized that the Eritrean forces must immediately leave Ethiopian territory, in accordance with the request made by Ethiopian authorities.

On 26 August, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, who reported on the spreading military confrontation in the Tigray region and its political, economic and humanitarian consequences.⁵¹ The Secretary-General stressed that all parties had to recognize that there was no military solution and called on foreign forces to leave the country. Many Council members addressed the need for foreign forces to cease interference in Ethiopia and withdraw from its territories. In that regard, the representative of Estonia called on the Government of Ethiopia to request the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Tigray to ensure unfettered humanitarian access to the region and restore basic services. The representative of the United States pointed out that

⁴⁹ Kenya, on behalf also of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia, India and France.

⁵⁰ United Kingdom, Kenya, on behalf also of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia, Mexico, Estonia, Norway and France.

⁵¹ See [S/PV.8843](#).

the Eritrean defence forces had re-entered Tigray. He further recalled reports of military alliances among armed groups in other regions, which he said risked sparking a wider war in Ethiopia and was eroding the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian State. Other Council members similarly called on Eritrea to withdraw its forces from the Ethiopian territory.⁵² The representatives of Ireland and Mexico called on external or non-Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Ethiopia.⁵³

The representative of China said that his country opposed interference by external forces in Ethiopia's internal affairs in the name of human rights and humanitarianism, expressing support for the African Union and the countries in the region in resolving African issues in an African way. The representative of Ethiopia asserted his country's sovereign integrity as an ancient, independent African country and underscored how harmful the "saviour mentality" that sought to undermine the sovereign right and responsibility of States for their own security and the well-being of their people had proved to be in many instances, while also expressing hope that the right lessons had been learned.

Case 3

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 19 April 2021, Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security".⁵⁴

Some participants focused their interventions on the prohibition of the use or the threat of force. In that regard, the State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China underlined that it was necessary to strive to resolve disputes peacefully whenever possible and to reject the willful imposition of sanctions and the threat or use of force. The

⁵² France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Kenya, on behalf also of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

⁵³ Ireland and Mexico.

⁵⁴ See [S/2021/394](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2021/20210413.sc7987.docstxt.html).

representative of Armenia underscored that strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations was key to addressing challenges to security, such as the threat or use of force in the face of destabilizing military build-up in violation of legally binding commitments in the field of arms control and involving foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries in conflicts.

Other participants recalled more broadly the importance of adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and/or the prohibition of the threat or use of force.⁵⁵ Some discussed the aforementioned principles as they related to specific situations, including the representative of Azerbaijan, who recalled the condemnation in Council’s resolutions of the use of force against Azerbaijan, the reaffirmation of respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory; Georgia, in relation to the ongoing illegal military aggression by the Russian Federation and subsequent occupation of certain regions of Georgia, as well as the occupation and annexation of integral parts of Ukraine’s sovereign territories; Estonia, regarding the threats of the use of military force in connection with the increased military build-up by the Russian Federation along the Ukraine border and in occupied Crimea; and Ukraine, similarly, in connection with Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and parts of Donbas.

Case 4

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 29 June 2021, Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” focused on cybersecurity.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Ibid., State President of Viet Nam, President of Estonia, China, Islamic Republic of Iran and Philippines.

⁵⁶ See [S/2021/621](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2021/20210621.sgsm10001.doc.html).

During the videoconference, many participants addressed the applicability of the prohibition of the use and threat of force and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other States to cyberspace activities. In that regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, expressing support for an international framework that set out rules and norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace, emphasized that activities in cyberspace had to comply with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of States, and non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of China highlighted the need to promote security by maintaining peace and preventing cyberspace from becoming a new battlefield and abiding by the purposes and principles of the Charter, in particular the principles of sovereign equality, prohibition of the use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of disputes. He added that countries should refrain from undertaking cyber activities that endangered the security of other countries. The representative of Tunisia underlined the applicability of international law in addressing States' use of information and communications technologies, and stressed in that regard the importance of respecting the principles enshrined in the Charter including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the refraining from the threat or use of force and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The delegation of Chile similarly submitted that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, was applicable and essential to maintain peace and stability and to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful information and communications technology environment. The delegation added that, together with the specific principles of the Charter, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of resorting to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, non-intervention in internal affairs of other States, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, were as indivisible in the physical as in the digital domains. The delegation of Austria emphasized that the fundamental provisions of the Charter should guide all States in their conduct in cyberspace. The delegation specified that States were in particular obliged to adhere to the prohibition of the use of force as the core pillar of the international security regime. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines encouraged all actors in the international community to comply, in cyberspace, with their international legal obligations including the respect of sovereignty and political independence as enshrined in the Charter. The Ambassador for United Nations Affairs and Cyber Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan said that States must not violate the sovereignty of another State by cyberoperations, nor intervene in matters within domestic jurisdiction of another State by cyberoperations.

Several participants expressed concerns regarding the use of cyberspace by some States to commit acts of aggression or other acts that challenged the sovereignty of other States or interfered in their internal affairs. The Prime Minister of the Niger pointed out that the digital revolution, which had “brought us so close together by eliminating our borders”, had also opened the way to new challenges to sovereignty owing to the extra-territorial nature of laws relating to it. The representative of Egypt indicated that under international law and the Charter, all Member States should refrain from any act that knowingly or intentionally damaged or otherwise impaired the use and operation of the critical infrastructure of other States as well as interfering in their internal affairs. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out that cyberspace could be used to commit acts of aggression, breaches of the peace, the threat or use of force, to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, to violate the sovereignty of States or to coerce other States. He further underscored that States must refrain from the threat or use of force within or through the cyberspace environment; and refrain from, and prevent, abusing cyberspace-related supply chains developed under their control and jurisdiction, to create or assist development of vulnerability in products, services and maintenance compromising sovereignty and data protection of other States. The representative of the Russian Federation said that some countries were seeking to justify unilateral pressure and sanctions against other Member States and the possible use of force against them, by distorting agreements, including on the international legal aspects of the use of information and communications technology. He added that it was of grave concern that several technologically advanced States were actively pursuing the militarization of the information space by promoting the concept of “preventive military cyberstrikes”, including against critical infrastructure.

The delegation of Georgia said that cyberspace was a powerful tool for hybrid warfare and interference into internal affairs of States, and the delegation of Ukraine similarly noted that cyberoperations against critical infrastructure and governmental agencies was a widely used method of interference into internal affairs of sovereign States, including Ukraine. The delegation of Georgia further accused Russia of waging the hybrid warfare against Georgia trying to undermine its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The delegation of Ukraine added that Russia used high technologies to get its own political and geopolitical objectives, namely by supporting and exacerbating conflicts in neighbouring States and conducting aggressive information wars.

Some participants deliberated on the importance of adhering to the prohibition of the use of force vis-à-vis the applicability of international law and international humanitarian law in cyberspace. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway and the delegation of Czech Republic underscored that the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace and information and communications technologies did not legitimize cyberwarfare or promote the militarization of cyberspace, respectively. The delegation of Czech Republic elaborated that, to the contrary, international humanitarian law placed limits on the use of force by requiring all used means and methods of warfare in the context of armed conflict to be employed in accordance with its rules, including the principles of humanity, distinction and the rule of proportionality. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway added that any use of force by States remained governed by the Charter and the relevant rules of customary international law and affirmed that international disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains. Stressing that no sphere could remain outside the spectrum of international law, including international humanitarian law, the representative of Ecuador underscored that this did not mean that the militarization of cyberspace would be acceptable. He explained that the Charter prohibited the use of force, and therefore all international disputes in cyberspace should be settled by peaceful means. The delegation of the European Union emphasized that while the European Union and its member States were of the view that international humanitarian law was fully applicable in cyberspace in the context of armed conflict, its application in cyberspace should not be misunderstood as legitimizing any use of force inconsistent with the Charter.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recalled that States had affirmed that international law applied in the informational and communication technology environment, comprising, first and foremost, States obligations under the Charter, in particular the prohibition against the use of force and the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means. The Committee expressed support for the view that cyberoperations during armed conflict were not happening in a “legal void” or “grey zone” but were instead subject to the established principles and rules of international humanitarian law. The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that while the digital sphere was not unregulated, the debate as to how exactly international law could be applied to it was far from over. He recalled that the initial list of rules on responsible conduct of States in the information space had been enshrined in the resolution concerning international information security adopted by the General Assembly in 2018. He said it was unfortunate that “Western colleagues” were attempting to pick out from that list the provisions that were of the greatest benefit to them, while incorrectly interpreting the applicability of international law in the digital sphere as being “automatic”, which would permit the use of force therein, and to present their national views as though they were the product of global consensus. The representative of Pakistan said that the Charter was unequivocal in its categorical upholding the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs of other States. He added that while these principles should serve as guiding star when navigating the complexities of cybergovernance, the extent, scope and nature of the applicability of international law and its interpretation in the conduct of States and their use of information and communications technology required careful consideration.

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications

In 2021, 12 communications from Member States addressed to or brought to the attention of the Council included explicit references to Article 2 (4) of the Charter (table 5). In addition, three communications from Member States addressed to the Secretary-

General and circulated as documents of the Council made reference to the use of force in violation of Article 2 in relation to the situation in Cyprus.⁵⁷

Table 5
Letters containing explicit references to Article 2(4) of the Charter

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Relevant extract</i>
S/2021/72	Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	Recalling the continued threats by the Israeli regime against my country, including the recent provocative statement by the Defense Minister of that regime “to have a military option on the table”, which are in clear breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council must compel that regime to put an end to such unlawful threats and stop all its military adventurism and destabilizing policies and practices in the region. Yet, in conformity with its inherent right to self-defence, the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to protect its people and vital interests, and to respond decisively to any threat or use of force against its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
S/2021/103	Letter dated 1 February 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	These threats are in gross violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations and, given the dark history of this regime in attacking regional countries, necessitate an appropriate response from the international community.
S/2021/141	Identical letters dated 12 February 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	The responsibility of the occupying power derives from international humanitarian law, which has long defined the rules on occupation, complemented by the human rights law binding any state exercising effective control over a territory. The overarching principle is that the occupying power has an obligation to ensure the well-being of the population. In full disregard for international law including in violation of the principle of non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter), the Russian Federation as the power exercising effective control over the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, has intensified steps towards their factual annexation, seeking full incorporation of these territories into its military, political and economic systems. The Russian Federation, as the occupying power has clear obligation to protect the local population of the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia and bears full responsibility for violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms therein.

⁵⁷ See [S/2021/511](#), [S/2021/718](#), and [S/2021/914](#).

- [S/2021/223](#) Identical letters dated 4 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
- Syria categorically rejects the attempts by the United States to justify its act of aggression on the basis of a unilateral and selective interpretation of Article 51, one that distorts the meaning and expands the scope of that Article. Syria would like to point out that Article 51 was drafted with deliberate care and includes restrictions that must be respected, in order to ensure that its provisions are not manipulated, misconstrued or interpreted in an overly broad manner and exploited to carry out acts of aggression under the pretext of self-defence, as that would spread chaos and ignite wars around the world. Syria would also like to point out that the relevant general principle and foundation of international law is found in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. It would furthermore like to point out that no sanction to use force in Syria can be found in the relevant Security Council resolutions, and that Iraq did not request that force should be used in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, it should be remembered that Iraq has denied that the American airstrike was carried out in collaboration or coordination with it. That denial clearly refutes the claims made by the Permanent Representative of the United States that her country had carried out its attack in response to a request for assistance in addressing the terrorist threat posed by certain militias.
- [S/2021/623](#) Letter dated 2 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
- The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the extremely arbitrary interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations by the United States in justification of its unlawful military strike, on 27 June 2021, against two locations in Syria and one location in Iraq. Iran condemns, in the strongest terms, such unlawful acts, which violate the sovereignty of two regional countries. The argument of the United States that such attacks were conducted to “deter” the Islamic Republic of Iran and the so-called “Iran-backed militia groups” from conducting or supporting further attacks on United States personnel or facilities has no factual or legal ground, as it is founded on mere fabrication as well as arbitrary interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The attacks by the United States are conducted in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter.
- [S/2021/706](#) Letter dated 4 August 2021 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
- In view of the very recent provocative statements by the Israeli regime’s officials threatening to use force in gross violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, that regime must be reminded that it shall bear the consequences of all its possible adventurism and miscalculations. Warning about such threats from any source, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not hesitate to take all measures necessary to vigorously protect its people, defend its sovereignty and secure its national interests.
- [S/2021/758](#) Letter dated 27 August 2021 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
- Moreover, the aforementioned explicit threats against a Member State of the United Nations constitute gross violations of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2(4), and therefore must not be tolerated by the international community and the Security Council.

S/2021/794	Letter dated 14 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	These statements constitute clear manifestations of explicit threats to conduct nuclear terrorism against the peaceful nuclear programme of a State Member of the United Nations, constituting gross violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2(4). This is also a violation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) .
S/2021/816	Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Turkey's new unlawful actions aiming at hindering Cyprus from exercising its legitimate rights constitute yet another severe violation of the sovereign rights of Cyprus under international law: both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and customary international law. The position of Cyprus regarding its rights to maritime zones is reflected in my previous letters addressed to you and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Moreover, the aforementioned Turkish conduct constitutes a threat of use of force, in breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.
S/2021/872	Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	Such systematic explicit and public threats by the Israeli regime against a founding member of the United Nations constitute flagrant violations of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.
S/2021/951	Letter dated 15 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	Yet, emboldened as a result of the inaction by the Security Council to hold it accountable for all its expansionist and destabilizing policies and unlawful acts committed in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2 (4), the Israeli regime's leaders have continued to explicitly threaten to use force against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its peaceful nuclear programme.
S/2021/1059	Letter dated 16 December 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	This is part of systematic public threats made by the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the number and severity of which have reached an alarming level in the year 2021. This and other threats of the Israeli regime constitute gross violations of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

III. Obligation under Article 2, paragraph 5, to refrain from assisting the target of enforcement action

Article 2, paragraph 5

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (5) of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, the obligation of Member States to refrain from providing assistance to a State against which the United Nations has taken preventive or enforcement action.⁵⁸ Subsection A features implicit references made to Article 2 (5) in the decisions of the Council, and subsection B features discussions held by the Council which may be considered relevant to the interpretation of Article 2 (5). Communications addressed to the Council in 2021 did not contain any references to Article 2 (5).

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (5)

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 2 (5) in its decisions. The Council, however, included language which may be considered of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (5) in decisions concerning the situations in

⁵⁸ For the practice of the Security Council relating to assistance by Member States to United Nations action in accordance with the Charter, see part V, sect. II (Article 25) and part VII sect. V and VI (Articles 43, 45 and 48).

Libya,⁵⁹ Somalia,⁶⁰ and South Sudan,⁶¹ as well as in connection with the prevention of terrorism.⁶²

B. Constitutional discussion relating to Article 2 (5)

During 2021, Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in the meetings or open videoconferences of the Council. However, implicit references which may be considered of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (5) were made in several meetings and open videoconferences of the Council during the period under review.

Regarding thematic items, in statements submitted for an open videoconference held on 12 January 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” focusing on international cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#), Member States recalled the obligation of States to refrain from providing any form of support, actively or passively, including through financing, to entities and individuals involved in terrorism and terrorist acts.⁶³

In addition, at a meeting, held on 6 October 2021 under the item entitled “Small arms”, the representative of China emphasized that all countries must strictly implement the Council resolutions on arms embargoes and the relevant provisions of the sanctions committees of arms embargoes by refraining from the transfer or sale of arms to countries subject to Security Council embargoes.⁶⁴ He underlined that countries should make every effort to prevent the flow of small arms and light weapons into illegal channels and effectively shoulder the responsibility of controlling the flow of small arms and light weapons within their borders. The representative of India noted the increase in the

⁵⁹ Resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), para. 9.

⁶⁰ Resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), paras 9 and 20.

⁶¹ Resolutions [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 16 and [2577 \(2021\)](#), para. 7.

⁶² [S/PRST/2021/1](#), ninth paragraph and resolutions [2610 \(2021\)](#), thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-ninth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eight and forty-fourth preambular paragraphs and para. 13, 24 and 28, and [2617 \(2021\)](#), sixteenth preambular paragraph and para. 28.

⁶³ See [S/2021/48](#), Prime Minister of Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Myanmar and Turkey.

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8874](#).

volume and the quality of the small arms arsenal acquired by terrorist organizations, indicating that they could not exist without the sponsorship or support of States.

Concerning region- and country-specific items, at open videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Libya” in 2021, Council members continued to stress the need to cease or refrain from all actions in violation of the arms embargo, including the provision of military support inconsistent with the embargo.⁶⁵

At an open videoconference held on 18 February 2021 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of Mexico noted the substantive increase in arms transfers to the Middle East region in recent years, stressing that the uncontrolled flow of those weapons had fueled the violence in Yemen.⁶⁶

Referring to the reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), which he indicated had consistently shown clear evidence of violations of the arms embargo and the use of increasingly sophisticated weapons and delivery systems, the representative of Mexico urged exporting countries to seriously consider the dire consequences for the civilian population of such arms transfers, the end users of which were largely responsible for the humanitarian tragedy in Yemen. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines called on members to cease the transfer of weapons to parties within Yemen, whether directly or through proxies or third parties, and stressed the need for other forms of assistance that enabled attacks on the different sides to stop.

On 14 December 2021, in a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the United States, condemning the intensification of Houthi cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia in preceding months, said that such provocative acts underscored the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to end its lethal support to the Houthis, which contravened Council resolutions and enabled the Houthis’ reckless attacks.⁶⁷ The representative of Yemen said that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to protract the war and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by violating relevant

⁶⁵ See, for example, [S/2021/498](#), Estonia, Niger, United Kingdom and United States; [S/PV.8855](#), p. 16 United States and [S/PV.8911](#), United States.

⁶⁶ See [S/2021/167](#).

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8929](#).

Council resolutions and the arms embargo and providing the Houthi militias with arms and military expertise, as well as various kinds of missiles, most recently Iranian weapons intercepted on their way to the Houthi militias.

IV. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of States by the United Nations under Article 2, paragraph 7

Article 2, paragraph 7

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Security Council in relation to the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features references to that Article in the decisions of the Council. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council touching upon the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7). Subsection C features references to Article 2 (7) in communications brought to the attention of the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (7)

In 2021, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 2 (7) in its decisions. This notwithstanding, language used in some Council decisions under country- and region-specific as well as thematic items may be considered of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) as laid out in table 6 below.

Table 6

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 2 (7), by region and country

Decision and date	Provision
Peace and security in Africa	
S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	The Security Council recognizes that there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development, and that the work of the entities of the United Nations development system, in accordance with their respective mandates, through their support for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, including in Africa, contributes to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa, when reducing people's needs, addressing risks for development programming and fostering resilience, at the request of those countries and in accordance with their national ownership, plans and priorities (fifteenth paragraph)
Peace consolidation in West Africa	
S/PRST/2021/3 3 February 2021	The Security Council calls for continued national, regional and international engagement in cooperation with the countries of the region in an effort to prevent and address the peace and security challenges they face, while reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries in West Africa and the Sahel. It recognizes that responsible and credible mediation by UNOWAS requires, inter alia, national ownership, the consent of the parties to a particular dispute or conflict, and respect for national sovereignty, as set out in A/RES/70/304 (fourth paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/16 17 August 2021	<p>The Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the briefing held on 8 July 2021 by the Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, Mr Annadif Khatir Mahamat Saleh and expresses full support to the Special Representative in carrying out his mandate, including in his capacity as Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. The Security Council recognizes that responsible and credible mediation by UNOWAS requires, inter alia, national ownership, the consent of the parties to a particular dispute or conflict, and respect for national sovereignty, as set out in A/RES/70/304 (first paragraph)</p> <p>The Security Council recalls the importance of political dialogue and consensus building on key national priorities among all stakeholders as a means to achieve sustainable reconciliation. While reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and emphasising the need to respect fully the principle of non-interference, the Security Council stresses that good governance is critical for long-term peace and stability in West Africa and the Sahel. It commends the recent democratic transition in Niger and the reconciliation efforts in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo and encourages the continued pursuit of these dialogues. It further commends the good offices role provided by UNOWAS in supporting democratic practices and the leadership of ECOWAS in mediation in the region (tenth paragraph)</p>
The situation in the Great Lakes Region	
S/PRST/2021/19 20 October 2021	The Security Council recognises the important role the United Nations can play in helping the States concerned, as appropriate, upon their request and with full respect for their sovereignty over natural resources, to prevent illegal access to and trade in natural resources and to lay the basis for their legal utilisation and trade with a view to promoting sustainable development, in particular through building the capacity of governments in post-conflict situations to manage their resources lawfully, transparently and sustainably. In this regard, the Security Council encourages the continued efforts of United Nations organisations, in accordance with their mandates, and acting in close cooperation with the

regional and sub-regional organisations, in supporting the resource-endowed countries to transform the entire natural resource extraction continuum from illegal exploitation into a legal productive use of natural resources in order to provide legal socio-economic opportunities with a view to contributing to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction (eleventh paragraph)

The situation concerning Iraq

Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#)
27 May 2021

Decides further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Iraq to the Security Council on 11 February 2021 ([S/2021/135](#)), shall (a) provide a strengthened, robust and visible UN team, with additional staff, in advance of Iraq's forthcoming election, to monitor Iraq's election day with as broad a geographic coverage as possible, to continue to assist with the election, in a manner that respects Iraqi sovereignty, and report to the Secretary-General on the election process (para. 2 (a))

Requests further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General ([S/2021/135](#)), shall: promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in order to strengthen the rule of law and improve governance in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) established in resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) (para. 4 (d))

The situation in Libya

[S/PRST/2021/4](#)
9 February 2021

The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the UN-facilitated Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya (last paragraph)

See also [S/PRST/2021/6](#) (last paragraph)

[S/PRST/2021/12](#)
15 July 2021

The Security Council welcomes the Second Berlin Conference convened on 23 June 2021, the Conference Conclusions ([S/2021/595](#)) and the commitment of the participants to the UN-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. The Security Council welcomes the inclusion of Libya as a member of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (first paragraph)

The situation in Mali

Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#)
29 June 2021

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability, security and protection of civilians throughout the territory of Mali, urging the Malian authorities to uphold their efforts to meet their obligations in that regard, and expressing great concern at the violent and unilateral actions taken by non-State actors hampering the return of State authority and basic social services (second preambular paragraph)

Resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#)
30 August 2021

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and underscoring the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives (second preambular paragraph)

The situation in the Middle East

Resolution 2591 (2021) 30 August 2021	Further requests UNIFIL, in line with resolution 1701, to take temporary and special measures, that should not be considered as a precedent in the future, to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support for a limited period of 6 months, within the existing resources and without implications to the increase of the budget level, in the framework of the LAF-UNIFIL joint activities and in compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation, the concept of operations and rules of engagement of UNIFIL, while fully respecting Lebanese sovereignty and at the request of the Lebanese authorities, and that such support be subject to appropriate and immediate oversight and scrutiny (para. 11) Urges all parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in all its operations and UNIFIL's access to the Blue Line in all its parts is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, condemns in the strongest terms all attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of UNIFIL's personnel and all attacks on UNIFIL personnel and equipment as well as acts of harassment and intimidation of UNIFIL personnel; calls on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate UNIFIL's prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line which UNIFIL reported as a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) , in line with resolution 1701, while respecting the Lebanese Sovereignty (para. 16)
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The situation in Somalia

Resolution 2563 (2021) 25 February 2021	Decides to authorise the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 14 March 2021, authorises AMISOM to take all necessary measures in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate, as set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its resolution 2520 (2020) (para. 1)
Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	Decides that AMISOM shall be authorised to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate (para. 11)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution 2579 (2021) 3 June 2021	Decides that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure, shall, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, continue to have the following strategic objectives: (para. 3)
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Table 7

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 2 (7), by thematic issue

Decision and date	Provision
Maintenance of international peace and security	
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	The Security Council recognises that there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development, and that the work of the entities of the United Nations development system, in accordance with their respective mandates, through their support for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, contributes to peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the request of those countries and in accordance with their national ownership, plans and priorities (seventh paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	The Security Council further recognizes in the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission, in supporting peacebuilding in conflict affected countries with respect for national ownership and the countries' national priorities as an important addition to the capacity of the international community in the broad peacebuilding agenda in accordance with its mandate (eleventh paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	
S/PRST/2021/1 12 January 2021	The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and stresses that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (sixth paragraph)
Resolution 2617 (2021) 30 December 2021	<p>Stressing that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (ninth preambular paragraph)</p> <p>Directs the CTC, with the support of CTED, to determine on an annual basis a list of Member States that CTED should request consent to visit for the purpose of conducting assessments, and underscores that the composition of the list should take a risk-based approach that acknowledges existing gaps, emerging issues, trends, events, and analysis, while also taking into account prior requests by Member States and consent previously expressed, as well as the fact that a number of Member States have never been visited, and underscores further that the CTC, with the support of CTED, may decide, after the adoption of the list, on changes to its composition, as necessary, emphasizing transparency in planning for visits, including by making available its country visit schedule in advance of such visits, and producing ensuing reports (para. 12)</p> <p>Requests the CTC to report, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council on the state of the overall work of the CTC and CTED, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairs of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and taking into account its efforts to strengthen coordination with other United Nations bodies, facilitate provision of consent from Member States for country visits and reports, improve implementation of recommendations, how its assessments and analytical work has contributed towards improvements in Member States' counterterrorism efforts, and expresses its intention to hold informal consultations at least once per year on the work of the CTC (para. 18)</p>

B. Discussion relating to Article 2 (7)

During the period under review, Article 2 (7) was not explicitly invoked in the Council's deliberations. Nonetheless, during several meetings and open

videoconferences, Council members discussed the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the domestic affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7).

Concerning country- or region-specific items, the Council addressed matters relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) at several meetings held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” (see case 5). In addition, Council members and other Member States also addressed the role of the United Nations vis-à-vis the sovereignty of Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, in discussions in connection with “The situation concerning Iraq”,⁶⁸ “The situation in Somalia”⁶⁹ and “The situation in the Middle East”,⁷⁰ respectively.

Concerning thematic items, the Council discussed the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) regarding the use of new technologies in peacekeeping (see case 6). In addition, Council members addressed issues relevant for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) in the context of the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance at its meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”.⁷¹ Council members also addressed the need for the United Nations to respect the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the political independence and national priorities of States when coordinating peacebuilding activities in connection with the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,⁷² and in the context of preventive diplomacy under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.⁷³

Case 5

Peace and security in Africa

⁶⁸ See, for example, [S/2021/152](#), France, India, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Iraq.

⁶⁹ See, for example, [S/PV.8779](#), Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China.

⁷⁰ See, for example, [S/PV.8803](#), India, China and Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁷¹ See [S/2021/505](#), President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, China, India, United Kingdom, Brazil and Ethiopia; and [S/PV.8822](#), India, Viet Nam, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Russian Federation.

⁷² See [S/PV.8877](#), Viet Nam; and [S/2021/868](#) (record of written statements submitted by Member States in connection with the 8877th meeting, see [S/PV.8877](#)), Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran and Morocco.

⁷³ See [S/PV.8906](#), China, Niger, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, and Islamic Republic of Iran.

In 2021, the Council met several times to address the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia at meetings held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.⁷⁴ On 2 July 2021, during her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members about the announcement by the Federal Government of Ethiopia on 28 June of a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis in the region. The Under-Secretary-General offered the full expertise and support of the United Nations, including assistance to domestically driven, inclusive and comprehensive mediation and dialogue processes and expressed readiness to extend all the means of support at the disposal of the United Nations to help put the country back on track.

During the discussion that ensued, some Council members addressed the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) as it related to the potential involvement by the Security Council in the dispute. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that politicizing the issue was unacceptable, and that the situation in Tigray had to remain an internal affair of Ethiopia. He added that interference by the Council in resolving the issue would be counterproductive. The representative of Viet Nam, stressing the need for compromise to be made towards a comprehensive solution for Ethiopia’s sustained stability and development, on the basis of the principles of international law and the Charter, underscored that the international community, including the Council, should support all efforts to that end, in full respect of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. He also emphasized that under the circumstances, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means should always be upheld. The representative of China indicated that the Tigray issue was by and large an internal affair of Ethiopia and stressed the need for the international community to respect the sovereignty of Ethiopia when providing humanitarian assistance. He further noted that when dealing with this issue, the Council should carefully and prudently calibrate the timing and approach taken to ensure that its actions contributed to improving the situation

⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8812](#).

in Tigray, rather than having the opposite effect. Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Kenya reiterated their call for the Council to take careful and responsible actions that would encourage humanitarian outreach to suffering people, and not to imperil the situation in Tigray. He also restated that the Council should allow Africa the space to resolve its challenges with the support of the international community and encourage and support African solutions, meaning in that instance, Ethiopian solutions starting in the order of the ceasefire, humanitarian delivery, dialogue, reconciliation and responsibility. He reaffirmed the respect for and commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and emphasized that Africa would not agree at the time or in the future for the debate in the Council to be turned into a platform that undermined the people and State of Ethiopia. The representative of Ethiopia encouraged Council members to play a constructive role in supporting the Ethiopian Government in the implementation of the humanitarian ceasefire, while also noting that political pressure against Ethiopia was unacceptable and in violation of basic tenets of international law.

On 6 October 2021, the Council held another meeting under the item, during which the Secretary-General briefed on the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Ethiopia as well as on the United Nations engagement in providing humanitarian support in various regions of the country.⁷⁵ Recalling that all efforts should be squarely focused on saving lives and avoiding a massive human tragedy, he found disturbing the announcement by the Government of Ethiopia to expel seven senior United Nations officials, most of them humanitarian staff. The Secretary-General assured that the United Nations would continue to play its mandated role and work with the Government of Ethiopia and with local and international partners to support millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, Amhara and Afar and across the country, in full accordance with the Charter and General Assembly resolution [46/182](#).

During the discussion, several Council members expressed concern and disappointment regarding the decision by the Government of Ethiopia to expel United

⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8875](#).

Nations staff from the country.⁷⁶ Some Council members deliberated on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the context of the provision of humanitarian assistance. In that regard, the representative of China underscored that the international community should continue to provide assistance to Ethiopia while respecting the country's sovereignty and ownership. The representative of the Russian Federation, expressing regret concerning the decision by the Government of Ethiopia to expel United Nations officials, insisted that humanitarian assistance be provided fully in line with General Assembly resolution [46/182](#) and the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, as well as international law and national legislation. She stressed the vital need for credible and constructive dialogue and close cooperation with the sovereign Ethiopian authorities, who continued to cover the lion's share of all humanitarian needs in Tigray and in neighbouring regions.

Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Tunisia underlined the obligation of all humanitarian personnel, United Nations personnel and associated personnel to observe and respect the laws of the country in which they were operating, including the principle of non-interference. He further stressed the importance of humanitarian organizations upholding the core principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity in their humanitarian activities, in full respect of the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the host State, in accordance with the Charter. Nevertheless, the representative highlighted the risks of a large-scale famine, which, to a great extent, was being prevented by the aid delivered by the organizations to which the expelled individuals belonged. The representative of Tunisia added that even within their sovereign rights, Governments should observe their domestic and international humanitarian law obligations, and the rights of the Ethiopian people to receive aid in the dire emergency were of the highest moral and legal character. The representative of Mexico, noting with concern the claims by the Government of Ethiopia which had led to the expulsion of the United Nations officials, said that his country

⁷⁶ Ireland, Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Tunisia, on behalf also of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Viet Nam, Mexico and Russian Federation.

remained convinced that the United Nations humanitarian operations were at all times guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence set out in General Assembly resolution [46/182](#). He underscored, however, that when a State or a party to a conflict consented and agreed to the provision of certain humanitarian assistance, the latter could not be subject to discretionary decisions. On the basis of that consent, the parties concerned must allow and facilitate unrestricted access for humanitarian assistance.

With respect to the involvement by the Security Council in the dispute, the representative of Viet Nam underscored that the Ethiopian authorities and all other concerned parties should give the highest priority to the interests of its people. She added that the international community, including the Council, should support all efforts aimed at achieving this end, with full respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed certainty that pressure involving the Security Council and threats regarding the adoption of resolutions were counterproductive. The representative of Ethiopia said he was surprised at the convening of the Council meeting and that Ethiopia found it incomprehensible that the Council was discussing the decision of a sovereign State, which had been exercised within the domain of international law and its sovereign prerogative. He underscored that the Government of Ethiopia was not under any legal obligation to provide justifications or explanations for its decisions. Citing General Assembly resolution [46/182](#), which provided that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, he emphasized that the most fundamental element of the sovereignty of States had to do with their prerogative to determine who entered, remained in and exited their territory. He added that when appealing for support from, or to work with, the United Nations or other humanitarian operators, Ethiopia did not forgo that fundamental right.

Case 6

United Nations peacekeeping operations

On 18 August 2021, at the initiative of India, who held the presidency for the month,⁷⁷ the Council held an open debate under the above-referenced item and the subitem entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”.⁷⁸ During the meeting, Council members deliberated on questions of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7).

Some participants addressed the importance of respect for the sovereignty of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs by peacekeeping missions. In that regard, the representative of China emphasized that the use of new technologies in peacekeeping operations should respect the sovereignty and will of host countries. He added that while using technology of all kinds to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, peacekeeping missions should conduct prior consultations with host countries to ensure that the relevant technology was used in full respect for their sovereignty, upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter, including non-interference in their internal affairs, and following the guiding principles of peacekeeping. The representative of Viet Nam encouraged Member States to continue to engage in dialogue and cooperation, including through the engagement with the Secretariat, the Council and other relevant United Nations forums in order to find effective measures for the use of existing and new technology in peacekeeping, while respecting the principles of peacekeeping, international law and the sovereignty of States.

The delegation of Guatemala noted that technology must be implemented by peacekeeping missions according to the principles of peacekeeping operations, namely: consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except for self-defence and/or defence of the mandate.⁷⁹ The delegation of South Africa recognized the efficacy of peacekeeping intelligence utility in the protection of civilians and enjoined the United Nations to seek the collaboration and consent of host States when undertaking such sensitive activities. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that

⁷⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 26 July 2021 ([S/2021/681](#)).

⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8838](#).

⁷⁹ See [S/2021/732](#) (record of the written statements submitted by Member States in connection with the 8838th meeting, see [S/PV.8838](#)).

special attention must be paid to the full respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of all States and non-intervention in matters that were essentially within their domestic jurisdiction, as well as impartiality, the consent of the parties, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The delegation explained that the use of modern technologies should aim at increasing the safety and security of United Nations personnel, including peacekeepers. At the same time, their use must be considered on a case-by-case basis and must uphold the principles enshrined in the Charter, particularly the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, and also the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, especially the consent of the host State. Noting that technology should help peacekeeping missions to deliver on their mandate, measure performance and foster accountability for peacekeeping, the delegation of Rwanda similarly stressed that this should be in full respect of the host nation's sovereignty. The delegation of Brazil, citing as an example the use of unmanned aircraft by all stakeholders, said that the use of new technologies must be the object of careful regulation, scrutiny and oversight to avoid the creation of situations the deployment of peacekeeping operations sought to circumvent in the first place, including violations of national sovereignty and disrespect to the provisions of the Charter.

Some delegations focused on the use of modern technologies by peacekeeping missions to collect, store and access data. On that note, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the introduction and use of information and digital technologies by peacekeepers must not undermine the sovereignty of the host State or its neighbours, or violate the privacy of its citizens.⁸⁰ He stressed that the issue was particularly sensitive with regard to the United Nations — an organization with a unique reputation for justice and impartiality, and whose main task was to selflessly help those most in need. In a similar vein, the delegation of Fiji stated that collection, use and protection of data in peacekeeping was a sensitive issue, due to the multinational nature of United Nations peacekeeping, and it could impinge on host country sovereignty.⁸¹ The

⁸⁰ See [S/PV.8838](#).

⁸¹ See [S/2021/732](#) (record of the written statements submitted by Member States in connection with the 8838th meeting, see [S/PV.8838](#)).

delegation further suggested that guidelines would need to be established and adhered to, by field missions and all peacekeepers, regarding the collection and the protection of data. The delegation underlined the need for data collection in peace operations to only be used for peacekeeping purposes, with its use, protection and disposal conforming to international laws and norms and host country guidelines. The delegation of Pakistan asserted that using technology to collect, store and access data had always invoked certain sensitivities and concerns, adding that a responsible use of technology, which respected national sovereignty and addressed confidentiality concerns, could expedite the integration of cutting-edge solutions in peace operations. Pakistan therefore recommended that the United Nations system explore the options for establishing an inclusive framework for the governance of new technologies, including in the peacekeeping domain. The representative of Kenya underscored the need to gain and maintain the trust of host nations by ensuring that the information collected using modern technology was utilized only to protect the United Nations mandate, its personnel and installations, as well as civilians; and indicated that the Council should emphasize the responsible use of technology by avoiding unnecessary deployments and ensuring strict adherence to the principles of impartiality and neutrality.⁸².

C. Invocations of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7) in communications

During 2021, six communications brought to the attention of the Council included explicit references to Article 2 (7) of the Charter (table 8).

Table 8

Letters containing explicit references to Article 2 (7) of the Charter

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Relevant extract</i>
S/2021/209	Letter dated 19 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	To request the relevant organs of the United Nations to include the question of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Arab States on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.

⁸² See [S/PV.8838](#).

- [S/2021/285](#) Identical letters dated 22 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council To request the Group of Arab States in New York to take the necessary action to transmit the present resolution to the competent United Nations bodies and have it issued as a document of the United Nations, and to request that they include the question on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.
- [S/2021/352](#) Letter dated 13 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council In that resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been falsely accused of interfering in the internal affairs of certain Arab States, while the resolution is replete with several cases of interference in Iranian domestic affairs and thus is in gross violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations.
- [S/2021/417](#) Letter dated 30 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council Like similar resolutions adopted at previous meetings of the League of Arab States, this resolution contains series of disinformation and false accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran. We condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this Iranophobic campaign and all allegations, including on the so-called violation by Iran of Security Council resolutions [2216 \(2015\)](#) and [2231 \(2015\)](#). The resolution also includes certain claims, which represent clear cases of interference in the Iranian domestic affairs, in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations, all of which are categorically rejected.
- [S/2021/790](#) Identical letters dated 14 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council Request the Group of Arab States in New York to take the necessary action to transmit the present resolution to the relevant United Nations bodies and have it issued as a document of the United Nations, and to request that they include the question on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.
- [S/2021/857](#) Letter dated 7 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council The resolution also includes certain claims, which represent clear cases of interference in Iranian domestic affairs, in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations, all of which are condemned in the strongest terms and categorically rejected.
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