High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society
Security Council relations with Civil Society
PDF, 26KThe Security Council (SC) has greatly enhanced its informal relations with civil society in recent
years. This largely reflects the changing roles of the SC in the post-Cold War era.
The characteristics of security issues addressed by the UN today are radically different from those
of earlier decades. Conflicts tend to be intra-state, rather than between states. They largely
involve developing countries, not rich ones [Note 1]Two thirds the SC discussions in recent
years have focused on African situations.. Whereas in the first half of the 20th Century
90% of casualties were combatants, in the second half 90% were civilians. Their origins often lie
in ethnic or sectarian divides, rather than national politics. And the SC increasingly focuses on
threats other than armed conflicts, including global public health threats. These changes come as public
attitudes towards conflict have changed. Now there is much greater awareness and so abhorrence
of collateral human suffering [Note 2]The Protection of
Civilians agenda was defined in the SC President’s Aide Memoire of 15 March 2002 (S/PRST/2002/6).
It includes impact of sanctions, access to vulnerable populations, protection of women and children,
promotion of rule of law, and exploitation of resources in conflicts. Human rights and humanitarian
NGOs both engage in advocacy on these issues.; much greater attention is given to
reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction; and the needs of vulnerable groups, especially
children, are emphasized.
Whereas “traditional” conflicts of old were well understood by diplomats and specialists in political
science, the new agenda requires much more on-the-ground knowledge, new skills of social and cultural
analysis, the active involvement of communities and their leaders, links to vulnerable groups,
bridges into mainstream development processes and new ways of working
[Note 3]In recent years sanctions and fact-finding panels have become
key tools; the SC increasingly sets up tribunals (eg Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia), hybrid court (Sierra
Leone) and commissions (Kosovo). SC now has on average six field missions per year. There are
several working groups (Africa, Peace Operations, Rules and Procedures, Conflict Diamonds etc) and
Sanctions Committees to oversee particular sanctions regimes. In all of the above, civil society can
be relevant informants.. Humanitarian NGOs and other categories of civil society often
have strong (sometimes unique) comparative advantages in all these new needs.
Hence members of the SC have come increasingly to rely on information and analysis from a narrow
range of CSOs [Note 4]Five categories of New York-based CSOs feature
particularly: human rights NGOs (eg Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International
Campaign for the ICC); Humanitarian NGOs (eg Oxfam, CARE, Medecins sans Frontiere, Save the Children,
World Vision, International Rescue Committee); Peace/security groups (eg Int’l Crisis Group, WILPF,
Quakers, Global Witness); CSOs concerned about UN Governance (eg Global Policy Forum, World
Federalist Movement, Parliamentarians for Global Action); and think tanks (mostly attached to
Columbia, NYU, NY City and other universities, also Int’l Peace Academy - the largest – comprising
30 professional staff). as an important element of the intelligence on which they base
their judgements. Four aspects of this are particularly important:
- “Arria formula” meetings: these arose in 1993(??) and have recently become more common. Named after the UN Ambassador who initiated them, these are closed meetings on specific topics hosted by a SC Ambassador with a select group of humanitarian and perhaps human rights NGOs. While there are many variations (depending on the host Ambassador) they all tend to be restricted to SC Ambassadors or their deputies and the small number of CSO representatives handpicked by the host because of their expertise in the given subject. No UN Secretariat officials attend, no note is made of them and the only briefing of press is by CSO representatives, who may put on record the information they conveyed but no other aspects of the meeting.
- Contact with NGOs in capitals: Only a handful of humanitarian NGOs that have intimate knowledge of the countries and issues of concern to the SC have offices in New York. Those that do usually have only 1 or 2 professional staff in these offices who, hence, are not first-hand specialists in the issues. The in-depth and regular exchange of information and advocacy to influence governments’ position usually takes place with foreign affairs ministries in capitals – particularly for the three OECD members of the P5, less with the governments elected on a rotation basis (the E10). International humanitarian NGOs are stepping up their efforts to reach some of the E10 governments, however.
- Field visits: The SC increasingly sees fact-finding field visits as important for their deliberations (reflecting the new dimensions of the issues they currently address). In these, the SC delegations may meet with community leaders and humanitarian NGOs – though such meetings may be hastily organized and late at night.
- Meetings with the NGO Working Group on the Security Council: : this is an ad hoc group of largely humanitarian and human rights NGOs, convened by Global Policy Forum (a New York based CSO). It meets about 40 times per year usually with one of the SC Ambassadors, sometimes with senior UN Secretariat officials or even Foreign Ministers. These are often very candid discussions.
Proposed changes in SC relations with Civil Society
The SC is the most politically sensitive organ of the UN. The relations it has built up with CSOs
are mostly very recent. Through discussions with a wide range of Permanent Representatives (PRs),
CSOs and senior UN officials it is clear that all parties find the informal and ad hoc mechanisms to
be very valuable – particularly smaller E10 missions [Note 5]Since SC
has no official secretariat, members largely rely on professional staff in their own missions, which
is very uneven. The P5 in total have 339 such staff (US has 123), while the E10 have about 10
each.. It is tempting just to say: “leave well
alone”. On the other hand, there are some increasingly clear signs of weaknesses that could readily
be addressed: New York-based CSOs and large international humanitarian NGOs with New York offices
have disproportionate access, many CSOs are left out [Note 6]Civil
society advocacy at the UN is small-scale and new compared with that at the World Bank. The CSOs
focusing on the SC deploy no more than the equivalent of 20 full-time staff for this. Most offices
are less than 2 years old.; the success and even occurrence of meetings
with civil society depend pivotally on the personality of a few UN PRs (the UK and French PR host
a high proportion of the Arria meetings); these meetings have declined in quality and attendance –
either because they are less well prepared or because their novelty has worn off; and interaction
with civil society in field visits is usually poorly organized and haphazard.
The following is a menu for reinforcing what works well and for modest expansion:
- The S-G could express support for the SC’s enhanced dialogue with CS actors and could encourage putting this on a firmer footing.
- “Arria formula” meetings could be strengthened, in particular by giving CSOs longer lead-time (which could enable them to bring partners from the field to present evidence). UN Secretariat should offer to assist the process by helping to identify the most knowledgeable CSOs on the subject, working with these to identify possible field-level invitees, and perhaps assisting with the travel arrangements (costs, visas, logistics). Where the host PR agrees, it would be useful for a representative of the Secretariat to attend for continuity purposes and so as to be equipped to advise PRs on enhancing the quality of future meetings.
- Engagement between SC field missions and well-informed and representative civil society leaders and humanitarian NGOs should be a greater priority, particularly through well-organized briefings for civil society at the start and/or close of the missions. The Secretariat could facilitate this, with SC PRs. Occasionally a civil society leader might even accompany the mission. There should be a strong priority on engaging with women civil society leaders.
- There is much to be said for introducing a new category of SC meeting that falls, in stature, between the formality of public SC meetings and the closed, un-minuted “non-meetings” (eg Arria meetings). Many issues the SC now addresses involve a complex array of social and contextual factors hence the need for a clearer discursive phase, including gathering evidence from CSOs and outside specialists, before an SC position is negotiated. In the World Bank similar dictates led the Board of Executive Directors to institute “Board Seminars”. These deal with upcoming issues that are highly complex, new or sensitive; they include all EDs and feature presentations by specialist staff and perhaps external specialists. No decisions are made; they and the notes of the meeting follow Chatham House rules (no participant discloses specific positions taken by other participants or gives details other than the broad points covered). The EDs are not briefed in advance by their capitals. Hence the seminars assist the deliberative process, because the EDs are able to test out positions informally, learn from one another and the experts and inform capitals about likely concerns and positions that will arise on the issue as well as the evidence presented. The S-G could propose Security Council Seminars to meet similar purposes. These might be open to non-SC PRs interested in the subject; they would be serviced by the Secretariat (including for identifying speakers, noting and perhaps providing background press briefings). Special Rapporteurs might be particularly appropriate speakers. It is likely that such seminars (for which there is no legal impediment) will be particularly useful and least controversial in generic rather than country specific issues (e.g. small arms trade and child soldiers). They would also be useful for discussing post-conflict situations – if the government concerned gives assent and participates. It is likely that parliamentarians around the world would strongly support such a mechanism as it increases the transparency of SC processes and opportunities for civil society involvement.
- The SC and S-G could institutionalize independent Commissions of Inquiry after major UN operations under SC mandates (such as the Kosovo Commission). These would both include and take evidence from CS leaders. If the Panel’s parliamentary proposals are accepted, a “Global Public Policy Committee” connecting national Foreign Affairs committees could serve as such a commission.
Other proposals
The panel has heard various other proposals that it does not support or choose to emphasize. Some
would like to see much greater SC transparency with little use of closed meetings, detailed
press/civil society briefings after closed meetings etc – but this could jeopardize the sensitive
deliberative process [Note 7]Much SC work is in informal consultations (off the record, open just to SC members and Secretariat). These discussions are usually frank and productive. Because of their informality, governments feel able to adjust their positions, even radically – though if a strong P5 interest is entailed they are constrained by strict instructions from capitals. In contrast, the open SC meetings usually entail much reading of set statements. If the informals were discontinued it is likely that decision-making would be driven into bilateral deal-making; detailed notes of the meetings would destroy their candour and slow negotiations.. Some suggest that CSOs should be given a chance to comment on draft
resolutions; again, this would be seen by too many member states as intrusive. At present any member
state could in theory include a civil society representative in their private discussions within their
permanent mission (and some have consulted humanitarian NGOs privately on some draft resolutions) –
even on their delegation if they choose. Some suggest the NGO Working Group be made an advisory
group to the SC Chair – but it is neither established nor inclusive enough for this. While it
includes most of the best-known humanitarian and human rights NGOs, it also comprises others that
have little name-recognition outside New York; hence some CSOs question the basis for the selection.
Responsible CSOs recognize very well the sovereign nature of governments and the need for privacy in
sensitive inter-governmental negotiations. They seek to help ensure that the decisions reached are
well-informed ones and that appropriate action is taken to implement the decisions once reached; they
do not want to usurp governments.
Some have also suggested that civil society establish a Security Council Watch (as a resource for
CSOs, the press, smaller E10 governments, non-SC governments etc). While this is a matter for civil
society to decide, the Panel hopes that such a mechanism would be designed to minimize any negative
impact on the informal consultations. Already, CSOs (as well as the journalists who are based in the
UN) provide a valuable service informing the interested public about the
issues coming to the SC [Note 8]Global Policy Forum, for example, has
110,000 hits/day on its website which is dedicated to SC issues..
