Nuclear Detonation ‘Leaves Trail of Death and Destruction in Its Wake’, Speakers Tell First Committee, Spotlighting Dangers of Alliances, Excessive Holdings
The immense, uncontrollable capability and indiscriminate nature of a nuclear detonation reached well beyond national borders, leaving a trail of death and destruction in its wake, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) heard today as it continued its debate on nuclear weapons.
Instead of deterring conflict and war, as some had alleged, those weapons had remained a constant source of insecurity and a driver of proliferation, said South Africa’s representative. The humanitarian imperative that underpinned the need for their complete elimination demanded a renewed commitment and determination by all to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
Since the end of the cold war, the pace of the reduction of nuclear weapons had been slow and its scale modest, the representative of Pakistan said. The global struggle to regulate nuclear weapons through legal, normative and political means had been largely unsuccessful. More than 30 States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were members of nuclear-armed alliances and continued to rely robustly on nuclear weapons — some even housing them on their territories. A handful of nuclear-armed States were neither willing to give up their large inventories or their modernization, and were blocking progress.
The fragmentation of the First Committee’s discourse was a clear indicator of the deep differences, she said. Progress was being delayed by some who wished to divert the Conference on Disarmament’s focus to partial non-proliferation measures, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty. However, a treaty that was discriminatory in nature and did not address the existing fissile material stockpiles would impinge on the security of some States while being completely cost-free for those with the largest amounts of fissile material stocks.
The Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts said that the group had unpacked the hitherto contentious issue of so-called “stocks”, factually addressing whether or to what extent the scope of a future treaty should extend to fissile material produced by a State party prior to the treaty’s entry into force.
Four different options, she said, had been considered for the definition of fissile material, and a common thread across those models was the belief that highly enriched uranium and plutonium should be at the heart of those definitions. There was also broad agreement that the verification regime should especially guard against diversion risks and undeclared production and facilities.
India’s representative expressed support for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material cut-off treaty that met its national interests. The Group of Governmental Experts had confirmed that the Shannon Report and the mandate it contained remained the most suitable basis for negotiations. India had a policy of credible minimum deterrence based on a “no first use” posture and the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It hoped the imbalance in the international legal discourse, which had focussed almost exclusively on possession restraints, would be corrected.
China, said its representative, adhered to a strategy of self-defence and keeping its nuclear force at the minimal level required for national security. It did not provide “a nuclear umbrella” for other States, nor did it deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of other States or engage in any form of a nuclear arms race.
Japan’s stockpile of nuclear materials, however far exceeded its legitimate needs.
It had a “huge amount” of sensitive nuclear materials — enough to make 1,350 warheads. China had also noted with concern that some political forces in Japan had “continuously clamoured” for the development of nuclear weapons.
On the humanitarian aspect, the representative of Ireland said that it was “no surprise” that the issue had again come to the fore. Indeed, the only mystery was why it had not always remained the guiding principle. The humanitarian imperative was, after all, what lay behind the initial adoption of the NPT itself and was the reason for its continued existence. She asked: “What else should be our greatest driving force than the preservation and protection of life itself?”
During the meeting, India’s representative introduced a draft resolution on a convention prohibiting nuclear weapon use.
Also speaking were representatives of Oman (on behalf of the Arab Group), Australia, Sierra Leone (on behalf of the African Group), Qatar, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Norway, Canada, Germany, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Romania, Latvia, Italy, Senegal, Thailand and Viet Nam.
The representatives of Japan and China spoke in exercise of the right of reply.
The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, 21 October, to continue its thematic debate on the nuclear weapons cluster.
Background
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met today to continue the first cluster, on nuclear weapons, in its thematic debate. For background information, see Press Release GA/DIS/3527.
Briefing
ELISSA GOLDBERG, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, said the group’s technical, fact-based approach ensured that it had moved beyond the “sterile discussions” that had characterized debate on that treaty and, instead, had identified substantive approaches to its likely elements. Its report aimed to inform future treaty negotiators of key issues, for example, proposals on ways those negotiators could address divergent perspectives. Consensus emerged in the group that a treaty should establish a legally binding, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. There was broad agreement that the Shannon Mandate remained the most suitable basis on which future negotiations should proceed in the Conference on Disarmament.
She said that the group had made important headway by unpacking the hitherto contentious issue of so-called “stocks”, factually addressing whether or to what extent the scope of a future treaty should extend to fissile material produced by a State party prior to the treaty’s entry into force. Experts’ willingness to explore the range of different types of “past production” on that sensitive topic, including useful dialogue between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, would help negotiators bridge differences on the treaty’s scope. Four different options were considered for the definition of fissile material; a common thread across those models was the belief that highly enriched uranium and plutonium should be at the heart of treaty definitions.
There was also broad agreement that the verification regime should especially guard against diversion risks and undeclared production and facilities, she said. The group had too little time, or was insufficiently specialized to fully address verification challenges. She hoped that the United States-led International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification would delve into some of those issues identified in the group’s report as needing further scientific and technical study.
Statements
HAMOOD SALIM ABDULLAH AL TOWAIYA (Oman), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group and associating with the Non-Aligned Movement, welcomed the designation of 26 September as an international day for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a tangible step towards their complete elimination. He called on the international community to begin negotiations on a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear weapons, for which a high-level conference should be held no later than 2018. The Arab Group would continue its positive contributions in the global pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in which it had actively participated through all multilateral forums on the topic. Additionally, all of the Group’s members had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and had submitted their relevant programmes to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime.
He rejected the continuation of nuclear-weapon States to adopt military mindsets that allowed the use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear-weapon States. He thus reiterated that the complete and final elimination of those weapons was the only safeguard against their use. The failure of the NPT Review Conference to have upheld the States parties commitments made it necessary to accelerate collective efforts to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. The Arab Group had tried to find a solution to the present situation through a proposal represented through the Arab Working Paper sponsored by the Non-Aligned Movement, but that approach had not achieved its goal and an outcome document had been blocked. Freeing the Middle East of nuclear weapons was a collective and global responsibility. The Arab Group had upheld its part of that responsibility, and it remained the responsibility of other parties to do the same.
EPHRAIM LESHALA MMINELE (South Africa) said that as long as nuclear weapons existed, humankind would continue to face the threat of catastrophe. Experience demonstrated that the immense, uncontrollable capability and indiscriminate nature of a nuclear detonation reached well beyond national borders, leaving a trail of death and destruction in its wake. That impact — including the longer-term humanitarian, environmental and socioeconomic consequences — would persist for generations, together with the ever increasing risk of a nuclear weapons detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. The vast public resources diverted towards nuclear weapons stood in stark contrast to the delivery of development assistance in support of the Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals.
As long as nuclear weapons existed, he said, vertical and horizontal proliferation would persist. The continued development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, together with the fact that those weapons remained entrenched in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States and their allies, was a clear indication that some countries continued to harbour aspirations for the indefinite retention of those weapons, contrary to their legal obligations and commitments. All efforts must be exerted to eliminate those threats; nuclear weapons had no place in today’s security environment. Instead of deterring conflict and war, as some had alleged, those weapons had remained a constant source of insecurity and a driver of proliferation. The humanitarian imperative that underpinned the need for their complete elimination demanded a renewed commitment and determination by all to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
JOHN QUINN (Australia) said his country was committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, pursued in an effective, determined and pragmatic way. The disagreements among States were mainly over how best to achieve the elimination of those weapons, and Australia had consistently argued that short-term fixes, which did not engage possessor States, were no substitute for the hard work necessary to achieve the shared goal of Global Zero. Attaining that, required strong political will on the part of all countries. All States, especially those with nuclear weapons, had a duty to help create the international environment, making possible accelerated progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament.
Australia and its partners in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative regretted that the 2015 NPT Review Conference had been unable to produce a consensus outcome, he went on. However, it was important not to forget that previous consensus outcomes remained valid. Transparency by nuclear-armed States on their arsenals and related developments was crucial for building confidence and setting baselines on which to measure nuclear disarmament progress.
Australia took a pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament, which was why it did not support a treaty banning nuclear weapons, as such an instrument would not result in the elimination of nuclear weapons. States would only get rid of nuclear arsenals when they felt it was safe to do so, which was why the international community also should address the security dimensions of why States possessed those weapons in the first place. Their elimination required much greater trust, as well as new and more effective verification processes. There was a long road ahead, and no shortcuts to achieving eventual nuclear disarmament.
EBUN STRASSER-KING (Sierra Leone), speaking on behalf of the African Group and associating with the Non-Aligned Movement, reiterated the urgent need to free the world, including outer space, of nuclear weapons, because their presence constituted an “existential threat to our planet, global peace and the future survival of humanity”. The status of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone provided a shield for the continent, including by preventing the stationing of nuclear explosive devices on the territory and prohibiting their testing.
The African Group was confident in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA and rejected any attempts to politicize its work, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute. She underlined the importance of strictly observing that statute and relevant safeguards agreements and stressed as well the need to strengthen the regime for the protection of confidential information regarding safeguards. The Group called for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. She appreciated the support of delegations for the Group’s resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
HAMAD TAMI AL-HAJRI (Qatar), associating with the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, said that nearly 50 years had elapsed since the conclusion of the NPT, but the world had yet to draw benefit from it. The international aim of nuclear disarmament would never be achieved unless a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East was created, and the 1995 resolution adopted by the Review Conference had considered this issue as a key pillar in the package of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Peace in the Middle East could only be achieved by international resolutions and collective responsibility, and a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would contribute to that goal. The 2015 Review Conference had failed and international cooperation should be intensified. Aware of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, his country had endorsed the Austria Pledge and was keen on participation in all efforts aimed at curbing such consequences.
HENK COR VAN DER KWAST (Netherlands) said that it had been a turbulent year for nuclear diplomacy. There had been successes but also setbacks, and his delegation was casting its eye on the way forward. The best path towards a world without nuclear weapons was through a step-by-step process and by taking practical and concrete measures while pairing ambition with realism. Realism did not imply leaning back, but rather, working harder and taking multiple steps at the same time. Humanitarian considerations not only reinforced the objective of a global zero, but compelled the international community to do everything it could to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, pending achievement of that goal.
His delegation was pleased that the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear and other explosive devices had managed to produce a substantial consensus report. The international community should build on that momentum. The new United States-led International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification was a constructive and necessary initiative that could help the world deal with important verification issues. All States with nuclear weapons, both inside and outside the NPT, should take immediate concrete disarmament measures including creating greater transparency of their arsenals, further diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security and military doctrines, de-alerting their nuclear forces to help lower the risk of inadvertent use, and immediately reducing all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.
EDITA HRDA (Czech Republic) said that while she regretted the lack of consensus on the NPT Review Conference’s final document this year, she hoped that work towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction would be resumed in a constructive, inclusive, and consensus-based manner. Welcoming the agreement between the E3+3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom, China, Russian Federation and United States) and Iran on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, she emphasized that its full implementation, facilitated by the additional protocol to Iran’s safeguards agreement, would provide the international community with the necessary assurances on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Her country had been a “steadfast supporter” of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, financially contributing to the Peaceful Uses Initiative under the IAEA. Responsible exercise of that right could yield societal benefits in non-energy nuclear applications, ranging from advancements in cancer therapy to water treatment.
She also attached high priority to the start and early conclusion of negotiations in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Her country’s expert had actively participated in the Group of Governmental Experts and contributed to the adoption of a substantive consensus report. In the past five years, Prague had established itself as a venue for taking stock of issues relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. The fifth Prague Agenda Conference, which had taken place last week, had explored lessons learned and future prospects for the NPT, emerging nuclear Powers, nuclear deterrence and the humanitarian initiative.
STEPHAN TAFROV (Bulgaria) said that the year had been marked by many developments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the historic agreement between Iran and the E3+3. It also marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force. Despite the inability of States parties to have reached consensus on a final document during the 2015 Review Conference, the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the framework for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Ongoing efforts to focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons were closely linked with the concerns about the consequences for humanity from a nuclear-weapon detonation or a terrorist attack involving fissile material.
Advancing nuclear disarmament required joint efforts, he said, adding that a common understanding on the steps needed could be built through an inclusive and comprehensive discussion only, with the substantive participation of the nuclear-weapon States. All those steps were needed to strengthen the NPT regime, in line with the article VI obligations. Aligning with the statement made by Australia on the issue of humanitarian consequences, Bulgaria, he said, supported a constructive and realistic, gradual approach, based on practical and implementable measures and building blocks that would strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was another crucial step.
HELENA NOLAN (Ireland), associating with the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), said that not a single nuclear weapon had been disarmed under the NPT or as part of any multilateral process, and there were no structures or effective measures in place for that to happen. In those circumstances, it was only right to reach for new approaches that could enhance understanding, stimulate debate and provoke action. It was no surprise that the humanitarian issue had come to the fore again. Indeed, the only mystery was why it had not always remained the guiding principle. The humanitarian imperative was, after all, what lay behind the initial adoption of the NPT itself and was the reason for its continued existence. What was “humanitarian” if not that which related to all humanity? “What else should be our greatest driving force than the preservation and protection of life itself?”
She was heartened to see so many NPT States parties united, at the recent NPT review, in agreement to a humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. She had taken careful note of the moving and powerful messages conveyed by representatives of many developing countries, and from the African Group in particular, and she shared their concerns regarding the impact of any potential nuclear detonation on their already fragile circumstances. She was dismayed at the vast financial resources allocated by some States to the modernization of their nuclear arsenals, at a time when 850 million people still suffered from hunger, 8,000 children died every day due to malnutrition and 800 women still died each day from causes related to pregnancy or childbirth. If the resources currently devoted to the modernization and maintenance of nuclear weapons were freed up, there was no greater good for their use.
HALVOR SÆTRE (Norway) said that a world free of nuclear weapons was a vision his country shared with the majority of other States. Seventy years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world must recognized that that vision would not be realized without real commitment from the world community, including from those States that had nuclear weapons and those that had none. What was needed was a realistic, constructive approach to the issue, and the NPT remained the fundamental cornerstone of those efforts. The progress on developing tools for nuclear disarmament verification added an important dimension to the discussion. Also welcome was the continued implementation of the START by the United States and the Russian Federation.
However, he said, his delegation was disappointed by the stalemates in certain disarmament areas. The Russian Federation, for example, had not yet responded positively to the United States’ proposal to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads by an additional one third. Meanwhile, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was continuing its highly regrettable development of nuclear weapons and missiles. One of the trends underlying such negative developments seemed to be the continued and growing polarization of the global nuclear disarmament debate, whose goal in the multilateral forums was to bring the international community closer to a nuclear weapon-free world.
ROSEMARY MCCARNEY (Canada) said that the international community continued to face nuclear-related security challenges, many of which were rooted in a lack of confidence and compromise that made progress increasingly difficult. Those also overshadowed positive developments. While it was unfortunate that a lack of compromise had caused the 2015 NPT Review Conference to end without a final document, that did not represent a weakening of the NPT nor did it invalidate the 2010 Action Plan. International security and stability continued to be threatened by the non-compliance of Syria and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with their international obligations. North Korea’s activities continued to represent a serious threat, and she asked all States to observe the full implementation of United Nations sanctions. The world would be a much safer place when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea once again became a party to the NPT.
While the number of nuclear warheads had been drastically reduced from their cold war peak, she said, much more could be done to bolster international confidence in nuclear-weapon States’ commitments to further reduce their arsenals, de-alert them and reduce their role in defence doctrines. Canada remained convinced that progress on nuclear disarmament required that both the humanitarian and strategic dimensions of nuclear weapons be taken into account. Her delegation also remained deeply concerned about the Russian Federation’s actions, which were undermining decades of work to strengthen international and regional security and stability. A fissile material cut-off treaty would be a tremendous leap forward for both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Diplomacy and compromise were the tools available to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and it was incumbent upon the international community to use them to overcome the remaining challenges, in order to achieve the greater peace and security desired by all.
TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said that the global struggle to regulate nuclear weapons through legal, normative and political means had been largely perceived as unsuccessful. Despite reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war, the pace had been slow and the scale modest. Advancement towards multilateral nuclear disarmament was being resisted by a handful of nuclear-weapon States, which were neither willing to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons nor their modernization programmes. Such duplicity only aggravated the sense of insecurity among States. Instead of fulfilling their legal disarmament obligations, those States had almost exclusively pursued non-proliferation. That gap in legality and reality had eroded the global faith in the mutually reinforcing nature of those processes. Moreover, more than 30 NPT States parties that were members of nuclear-armed alliances continued to rely robustly on nuclear weapons, some of them even housing tactical nuclear weapons on their territories. Pursuit of those double standards had engendered a wide sense of dissatisfaction in the international community, including in Pakistan.
Her country shared the concerns and anxieties associated with the humanitarian costs of nuclear weapons, and had therefore participated and contributed to that discourse during all three conferences on that subject. At the same time, Pakistan believed that the subject of nuclear weapons, while relevant and important, could not exclusively be reduced to the paradigm of the humanitarian dimension. It was important to recognize the context and motivation of each State possessing those weapons. In the case of Pakistan, its security was qualitatively challenged by the introduction of nuclear weapons in its region. Pakistan had been left with no option but to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent capability to defend itself. The country had advocated for nearly a quarter-century for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Faced with an existential threat to its security, Pakistan had demonstrated its defence capability. Her delegation firmly believed in the right of every State to equal security. It was vital to address the motives that drove States to acquire weapons, including nuclear weapons, to defend themselves.
There had been an ongoing debate on the most effective approach to nuclear disarmament, she went on. Some States advocated a step-by-step approach, while others, mostly those relying on extended nuclear deterrence, had advanced the “building blocks” approach, compromising a set of mutually reinforcing unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement preferred a direct and comprehensive approach for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. The fragmentation of the First Committee’s agenda and discourse was a clear indicator of deep differences of perspective, approach and modalities as to how to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was evident that the progress towards nuclear disarmament was being delayed by some who wished to divert the Conference on Disarmament’s focus to partial non-proliferation measures, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty. A treaty that was discriminatory in nature and did not address the existing fissile material stockpiles would impinge on the security of some States while being completely cost-free for those with the largest amounts of fissile material stocks. Claims by some delegations that such a treaty would put a quantitative cap on nuclear weapons were false.
VENKATESH VARMA (India), associating with the Non-Aligned Movement, said that the pathways for nuclear disarmament should flow from the experiences gained from the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention. The international community had a vital interest in preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons and other sensitive materials and technologies. India had a policy of credible minimum deterrence based on a “no first use” posture and the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. There was no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It supported the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty that met India’s national interests. The Group of Governmental Experts had confirmed that the “CD/1299” on the Shannon Report and the mandate it contained remained the most suitable basis for negotiations.
India had participated, he said, in the three meetings on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, hoping that those would generate momentum for increased restraints on the use of those weapons and correct an imbalance in the international legal discourse, which had focussed almost exclusively on possession restraints. That process should be inclusive, do no harm to the disarmament machinery and promote genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament. He regretted that some of the proposals tabled this year in the First Committee had “deepened differences instead of bridging them”.
On behalf of sponsors, India presented a draft resolution on a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons use, which was firmly anchored in the humanitarian tradition of nuclear disarmament, which had for many years been supported by the vast majority of Member States. However, some States continued to vote against the resolution. That showed a “serious credibility gap” in the positions of those who were “quick to embrace the humanitarian discourse” but opposed restraints on the use of nuclear weapons.
MICHAEL BIONTINO (Germany), associating itself with the statement made by Australia, condemned in the “strongest possible terms” the Democratic Republic of Korea’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and urged Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Though the NPT Review Conference had not agreed on a final document, “few treaties have contributed in such a substantial manner to making this world a safer place,” and while it was not perfect, it remained the best basis on which to pursue nuclear disarmament. Germany welcomed the ongoing implementation of the START between the United States and the Russian Federation, but a new disarmament round between those countries should begin as soon as practicable, and should include sub-strategic nuclear weapons. He called on the Russian Federation to respond constructively to President Barack Obama’s nuclear arms control initiative.
He supported efforts to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, preferably in the Conference on Disarmament, but Germany was also open to alternate forums. The work of the Group of Governmental Experts provided an excellent basis for negotiations. Events over the past year had led to a harsher security environment and were a reminder that nuclear disarmament did not “take place in a vacuum”. Mutual trust between partners was a necessary condition for further progress and it was not realistic to expect that nuclear disarmament could advance without engaging State-possessors. The debate about nuclear weapons had a humanitarian and also a security dimension which could not be ignored.
KANG MYONG CHOI (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said that the arms race of the twenty-first century was characterized by qualitative improvement of weapons rather than quantitative superiority. The policy of world domination through development of highly advanced technology and indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals was being pursued in a blatant manner. The nuclear doctrine implying pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons was nearing the red line, which was unprecedented, even in the cold war era. Today’s reality was the translation of the threat of a nuclear pre-emptive strike against other countries into practice, not just confined to words. Modernization of nuclear weapons and accelerated deployment of global missile defence systems by the world’s largest nuclear-weapon State gave rise to a new nuclear arms race.
Some nuclear-weapon States, he said, were against the total elimination of those weapons and sought their indefinite possession while attempting to use non-proliferation as a pretext to attack sovereign States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea supported the calls of a majority of United Nations Member States for urgent commencement of negotiations of a nuclear weapons convention aimed at those weapons’ total elimination. In order to create conditions conducive to accomplishing complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons, the countries that possessed the largest arsenals should take the lead in abolishing those weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.
ION JINGA (Romania) said that as chair of the Main Committee II of the Bureau of the last NPT Review Conference, his country had worked with States parties and other Bureau members to ensure the adoption of an outcome document. Though the Conference had fallen short, that should not overshadow the process. He supported all initiatives meant to kick-start work in the Conference on Disarmament, and his country was reluctant to endorse proposals and resolutions which would only “harden divergent views”, forging discord and misunderstandings.
As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Romania would continue to support the international security architecture and the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It also supported the right of any State to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that non-proliferation, safety and security conditions were met fully. On Romania’s nuclear programme, it counted on a solid domestic legislation on nuclear security, was party to all relevant legal instruments and had also participated in the Nuclear Security Summits in Seoul and The Hague.
ANDA GRINBERGA (Latvia) stressed the importance of the NPT as the “foundation stone” of her country’s approach to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Review Conference Action Plan was substantive, balanced and extensive, and Latvia urged States to continue its step-by-step implementation. That approach could also be dynamic and multidimensional. The intersessional process of the Treaty should also be strengthened, as that could contribute to dealing more effectively with challenges in the future. In particular, she suggested discussing ways to strengthen the link between the Preparatory Committees and the Review Conference. Her country would also support bilateral and multilateral efforts to advance the Treaty’s substantive goals, including the “P5” process and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, among others.
Vinicio Mati (Italy) said that the disarmament community achieved landmark success on 14 July with the conclusion of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, in full conformity with the NPT principles. Italy welcomed the agreement, as well as its unanimous endorsement by the Security Council and called on the international community to strongly support its implementation. Additionally, in the interest of a peaceful world for future generations, it was crucial that all States fulfilled their disarmament commitments and worked to ensure that nuclear weapons were neither used nor proliferated. Italy deeply regretted the inability of States to have achieved consensus at the recent NPT Review Conference, however, efforts made to bridge different positions would hopefully serve as a good basis for further progress in implementation, including full application of the 2010 Actions Plan.
Entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a treaty banning production of fissile material in the Conference of Disarmament remained Italy’s top priorities. Reductions in the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States was another priority, as was implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) by the Russian Federation and the United Sates, which promoted strategic stability, enhanced transparency and promised further reduction of their nuclear arsenals. Italy supported the inalienable right of all NPT States parties to carry out research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, according to the highest standards of safety and security.
GORGUI CISS (Senegal), associating with the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, said that his country advocated for the total elimination of military nuclear activities, not simply reducing those weapons. This would enable the survival of the planet and allow future generations to live without the fear of an atomic bomb detonation. The total destruction of nuclear weapon stocks should remain the goal of possessor countries. However, nuclear disarmament was increasingly becoming “a utopian dream”. Treaties provided only for the destruction of delivery systems and not warheads.
The IAEA, he said, had a primarily role to play in halting vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it would only be able to properly discharge its duties if the necessary tools and resources were made available. Peace was a measure of conscience and collective consciousness and while it was “good to talk about it”, without the means to develop it, it would remain a set of “fine words”. Senegal was in favour of holding a 2018 high-level United Nations conference on nuclear disarmament.
SIRITHON WAIRATPANIJ (Thailand), associating himself with the Non-Aligned Movement, said that almost 20 years from the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the time was ripe to address gaps in the existing international legal regime. The humanitarian conferences had revisited and reshaped Thailand’s collective thinking on the disastrous impacts of nuclear weapons, and despite the disappointing result at the NPT Review Conference, his delegation reaffirmed its commitment to that Treaty. As the country’s draft legislation also covered nuclear testing, Thailand supported the universalization of the CTBT and was working towards ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Regarding regional initiatives on nuclear security, safety and safeguards, he recognized the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, he said that his country had been exploring ways to formalize relations between the Network and the IAEA. Beyond technical coordination, the Network would also play a role in raising awareness on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, bridging national, regional and global efforts. Thailand’s efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) were ongoing and the country was actively pursuing standard operating procedures for weapons of mass destruction-related situations and interdiction. Recent additions to Thailand’s Customs Act had clarified transit, transhipment, search and inspection provisions, while a new draft of the Customs Act was being considered.
FU CONG (China) said that his country had consistently advocated and promoted the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, adhering to a strategy of self-defence and keeping its nuclear force at the minimal level required for national security. It did not provide “a nuclear umbrella” for other States, nor did it deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of other States or engage in any form of a nuclear arms race. China had ratified the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, solved outstanding issues on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty with ASEAN States, and would continue to support Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.
He said that, over the years, Japan had accumulated a “huge amount” of sensitive nuclear materials, giving rise to grave risks. Presently, Japan possessed about 1,200 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and about 47.8 tonnes of separated plutonium, among which 10.8 tonnes were stored on Japanese territory, enough to make 1,350 warheads. Japan’s current stockpile of nuclear materials far exceeded its legitimate needs, and the situation contravened not only Japan’s policy of “no excess plutonium” but also violated the relevant rules and guidelines of the IAEA and the purposes and objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. His country had also noted with concern that some political forces in Japan had “continuously clamoured” for the development of nuclear weapons and had claimed that Japan should have such weapons if it wanted to be a Power that could sway international politics.
Nguyen Khanh Toan (Viet Nam), associating with the Non-Aligned Movement, welcomed all ongoing efforts and initiatives on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including bilateral and multilateral agreements and the Nuclear Security Summits. He noted, in particular, the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, as it demonstrated that political and diplomatic means were the only effective way to overcome differences among the States. Additionally, Viet Nam welcomed the outcomes of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, especially the Humanitarian Pledge adopted in Vienna, as a demonstration of the renewed interest and resolve of the international community to address the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons. Those initiatives also illustrated the belief that the best way to prevent catastrophe was total elimination of those “horrendous weapons”.
However, he said, much more work remained. Nearly 20 years after adoption of the Test-Ban Treaty, it had not come into force. Additionally, negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not begun in earnest. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament had not broken the two decades-long stalemate to commence substantial work on nuclear disarmament. Viet Nam urged all Member States to overcome their differences and take further steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones continued to play an important role in providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the necessary security assurance, pending the signing and ratification of those treaty’s protocols by the nuclear-weapon States. He specifically highlighted the protocols to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
Right of Reply
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Japan responded to the Chinese delegation by saying that all nuclear materials in Japan had been under IAEA safeguards for over half a century, and that Agency had concluded that all nuclear material in Japan had remained for peaceful activities. The Japanese governance was committed to not possessing reserves of plutonium, and had been very careful about the balance between separation and utilization of it. As a voluntary effort, Japan had been publishing information on the subject of plutonium management, and disclosed the situation of highly enriched uranium to the IAEA, ensuring the transparency of Japan’s situation with regard to nuclear materials.
Also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of China said that some basic facts remained unchanged and he needed to alert the world to them. Japan was the only non-nuclear-weapon State with complete nuclear facilities and had a huge stockpile of nuclear materials that was still increasing. It had no plausible civilian use for all those materials. A portion of the Japanese population, including prominent politicians, had been clamouring for nuclear weapons for many years, and Japan had a history of failed attempts to develop them. In view its technology, accumulation of fissile material, and the policy decisions taken, the break-out time until japan became a nuclear-weapon State would be extremely short.
Japan had claimed that material referring back to the United States was under way, he said. China would like to know more about that process because he had not seen any progress report. Japan claimed it did not maintain a policy of supply exceeding demand, but it now had a surplus of more than 10 tonnes of separated plutonium on its territory. He asked if the Japanese Ambassador could give a plausible explanation as to the legitimate use of such a huge amount of separated plutonium. The IAEA had reports, but he still remained concerned that the breakout time for Japan to become nuclear-weapon State was extremely short.
Exercising his second right of reply, the representative of Japan said that his country had an exclusively defence-oriented policy of not becoming a threat to other countries. It would continue to adhere to its course as a peace-loving nation.
The representative of China, in a further intervention, said that the Japanese Ambassador had not responded to his question. That country claimed to be peace-loving, but could not explain why it needed enough fissile material to produce over 1,000 nuclear warheads. That was the crux of the matter.