MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AMONG ISSUES ADDRESSED, AS FIRST COMMITTEE APPROVES 12 TEXTS

23 October 2006
GA/DIS/3333

MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AMONG ISSUES ADDRESSED, AS FIRST COMMITTEE APPROVES 12 TEXTS

23 October 2006
General Assembly
GA/DIS/3333
Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Sixty-first General Assembly

First Committee

19th Meeting (PM)

MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION AMONG ISSUES ADDRESSED, AS FIRST COMMITTEE APPROVES 12 TEXTS

Heading into the final phase of its substantive work for 2006, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today approved 12 draft texts aimed at strengthening regional disarmament measures and reducing the global threat of the use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons.

The Committee approved a draft on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East that would have the Assembly reaffirm the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and placement of all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

That text was approved by a recorded vote of 156 in favour to 4 against ( Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, United States), with 6 abstentions ( Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Tonga) (see Annex II).

Prior to acting on the draft as a whole, the Committee approved, in a separate vote, preambular paragraph 6, which recalls the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which, among other things, called on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it.  Members voted to retain that paragraph by a vote of 151 in favour to 2 against ( India, Israel), with 6 abstentions ( Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mauritius Pakistan, Togo, United States) (see Annex I).

Acting on a related draft, the Committee approved a draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without a vote.

Also acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.  That draft would have the Assembly appeal to all Member States to consider signing and ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in order to bring about its early entry into force and have the Assembly urge all Member States to strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The Committee also approved a number of nuclear weapons-related texts concerning:  missiles, by a vote of 105 in favour to 6 against (Albania, France, Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United Kingdom United States), with 55 abstentions (Annex III); a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, which was approved by a vote of 116 in favour to 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States), with 44 abstentions (Annex IV); and a draft on nuclear disarmament, by a vote of 105 in favour to 45 against, with 16 abstentions (Annex V).

It also approved texts on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon Sates against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, by a vote of 108 in favour to 1 against (United States), with 57 abstentions (Annex VI); reducing nuclear danger, which was approved by a vote of 105 in favour to 50 against, with 13 abstentions (Annex VII); a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, by a vote of 108 to 50, with 10 abstentions (Annex VIII); and measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by a vote of 163 in favour to 0 against, with 2 abstentions (Israel, United States) (Annex IX).

Acting without a vote, the Committee also approved drafts on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

General statements were made today by the representatives of Norway, South Africa, Australia, United States, Ethiopia, Syria and Israel, as well as the Observer of Palestine.

Explanations of vote were delivered by the representatives of Finland (on behalf of the European Union), Canada, Iran, Australia, Switzerland, Brazil, United States, Cameroon, India, Japan and Pakistan.

Drafts were introduced today on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ecuador, speaking on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (Nepal), the Report on the Conference on Disarmament (Slovakia), and the Report of the Disarmament Commission (Republic of Korea).  Nigeria introduced drafts on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training, and advisory services.   Indonesia introduced drafts on convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 25 October, to continue action on all disarmament and security-related draft texts.

Background

The First Committee met this afternoon to conclude its thematic debate on disarmament machinery, hear the introduction of further draft resolutions, and take action on a number of drafts.

Draft Summaries

A draft resolution on establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (document A/C.1/61/L.1) would have the Assembly urge all concerned parties to consider seriously taking the steps to implement such a zone.  The draft would invite those countries to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and call upon all countries of the region that had not done so to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  Further to the draft, the Assembly would invite those countries not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the station of such weapons or nuclear explosive devices on their territories, or territories under their control.

By a draft on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/61/L.2), the Assembly would reaffirm the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.  The draft would call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

A draft resolution on missiles (document A/C.1/61/L.3) would have the Assembly take note of the report of the Secretary-General on the issue of missiles, submitted pursuant to resolution 59/67, and decide to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session the item entitled “Missiles”.

In a text on the United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/61/L.16) would have the Assembly decide to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session the item entitled “United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament”.

A draft on nuclear disarmament (A/C.1/61/L.39) would have the Assembly call upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument, on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and, on an instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.  Further to the draft, the Assembly would call for the full implementation of the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  The draft would also have the Assembly call for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament at an early date.

By a draft on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon Sates against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/61/L.45) would have the Assembly appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.  Further, it would recommend that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such an approach or formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be further explored.

A draft resolution on reducing nuclear danger (document A/C.1/61/L.49) would have the Assembly call for a review of nuclear doctrines, as well as for urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of such weapons.  It would further request the five nuclear-weapon States to take measures towards implementing those steps and call upon all Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Noting, with regret, that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 2006 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the Assembly would reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence such negotiations, according to a draft resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/61/L.51).

A draft on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (document A/C.1/61/L.5) would have the Assembly renew its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirm the vital necessity of upholding its provisions.  It would also call upon those States that continued to maintain reservations to the Protocol to withdraw them.

By a draft on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/61/L.19), the Assembly would underline that the Convention and its implementation contributed to enhancing international peace and security and emphasize that its full, universal implementation would contribute further by excluding the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.  The text would further reaffirm the obligation of the States Parties to the Convention to destroy chemical weapons and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities within the provided time limits.

According to a draft on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/61/L.27), the Assembly would welcome the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including enacting penal legislation; national mechanisms to establish the security of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins in 2003; enhancing international capabilities for responding to cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; and the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientist in 2005.

A draft resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (document A/C.1/61/L.52) would have the Assembly call upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.  The text further appealed to all Member States to consider signing and ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in order to bring about its early entry into force.  Furthermore, it would have the Assembly urge all Member States to strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

GLAUDINE MTSHALI ( South Africa) said that the image of disarmament “machinery” led some to imagine that a part of it was broken, which required replacement or fixing.  Perhaps it was time to take a closer look at the operator of the machine, namely the Member States of the various bodies and entities that may be said to constitute the disarmament machinery.  One could not claim that the structure of the Conference on Disarmament did not allow negotiations to take place.  One could not argue that, if the Conference’s Secretariat had more staff, negotiations would commence, nor could one say that a lack of funding or the Conference’s agenda prevented negotiations.  Perhaps it was the misuse of the consensus rule, not the rule itself that had created the problem.  One should not forget that it was the Member States who decided whether or not to negotiate, not the “machinery” or the institution.

She said that the rules of procedure did not prohibit negotiations, but merely sought to structure and expedite the Conference’s work.  Nevertheless, there appeared to be an abundance of experts on rules of procedure and an abundance of interpretations of various rules.  As for the lack of negotiations, one could not overlook the fact that representatives of the countries had an important role to play in recommending courses of actions that might influence or shape the exercise of political will.  Different priorities did not need to be necessarily mutually exclusive.  “Good faith” should not only be displayed during the negotiations, but should also be present beforehand, in order to allow negotiations to begin.

She said that her statement did not apply only to the Conference on Disarmament and did not mean that one could sit back and wait until the day arrived to start negotiating much-needed disarmament instruments.  Even the best of machines could use a drop of oil from time to time.  Any suggestions to improve working methods should, therefore, be welcomed and considered on merit.  She appealed to all delegations to exhibit the good faith, flexibility and compromise required to enable the disarmament machinery to run on all its cylinders.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN ( Australia) said that the status quo of a deadlocked Conference on Disarmament was unacceptable and could not continue.  This year’s Conference had shown signs of renewed determination and that had much to do with the will of the six Conference on Disarmament Presidents.  Their effort had provided the basis for sustained debate on all issues -- including vital international security issues not previously addressed, such as man-portable air defence systems.

States needed to move forward and look to new approaches, she said.  Australia supported the proposal by the five ambassadors, but it was clear that it did not enjoy consensus, and therefore, could not deliver the Conference from its impasse.  Political commitment, innovation, and flexibility were called for from all Member States.  His Government would remain fully flexible on the issue of approaches.  In the wake of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea test, it was clear that the international community could ill afford another decade of deadlock.  Beginning with the negotiation of a fissile-material cut-off treaty, it was vital that the Committee continue its substantive deliberations on all issues vital to international security.

THOMAS LYNKIN ( United States) said that he wanted to share some observations about this year’s Committee conduct.  Indeed, the well-organized Committee had prospered and confidence was not misplaced.  Ninety-four delegations had addressed the First Committee -- more than in past years.  However, the revitalization of the Committee remained incomplete.  On the issue of contributing further to the effectiveness of working methods, his Government called for the Secretariat to ensure that the Programme Budget Implication statements circulate at least 24 hours in advance so that they could be assessed properly.  As the Group of Governmental Experts impinged on the budget of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, he called for one expert group per calendar year.  He also proposed a cooling-off period of 1 to 2 years, before a new group could be convened.

On organizing interactive dialogue, he said that schedulers should keep in mind the natural interests of States, especially those introducing draft resolutions and give that due priority.  Furthermore, he hoped that suggestions would be received in a constructive spirit.  Indeed, there was ample cause for pride, but he continued to believe that procedural innovations would assist in overcoming difficulties and, thereby, work towards strengthening international peace and security.

DESALEGN ALEMU ( Ethiopia) said that one could hardly talk of development in the midst of arms races and arms conflicts.  For any economic or social development agenda to successfully take effect, peace and security remained the utmost priority, particularly for the developing world.  Spending on armaments by individual countries had started to show signs of reduction during the 1990s, but since the beginning of the twenty-first century, there had been indications that military expenditures of many countries were rising again.  Over the past several years, the United Nations had passed numerous resolutions calling for the diversion of scarce resources from military expenditures to the socio-economic development of developing countries.  Lofty global development schemes had been agreed upon, including the Millennium Development Goals.  All of those would be unattainable, by poor countries, however, in the absence of a mutually shared concern and political will and determination.

Even though some might still be of the view that disarmament per se could not lead to development, its positive contributions in promoting an environment of security and boosting economic strength remained crucial for development, he continued.  The overall cost of global military expenditure was still exceedingly high, at the expense of social and economic development activities.  The United Nations bore a profound responsibility and played an indispensable role in ensuring that developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, were provided with better access to adequate financial and technical assistance, so as to be able to meet their national development objectives, withstand the complex challenges of globalization and defeat poverty.

He said that Ethiopia, while upholding the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation, remained focused on multifaceted domestic development activities, to which all available resources were being channelled.  Due to that unwavering commitment, Ethiopia continued to uphold the banner of peace, despite the present loud and clear threat against her sovereignty by the coalition of extremists and an irresponsible State in its subregion.

BASSSAM DARWISH ( Syria) said that nuclear arsenals were now being developed and there were new threats, while the nuclear powers refused to fulfil the obligations and promises of the 1995, 2000 and 2005 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conferences.  Israel was being overlooked as it acquired weapons outside of the non-proliferation regime, and furthermore, was being supported, while others could not use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Israel continued its aggressive policies, based on a huge arsenal of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destructions -- notably nuclear weapons, he said.  That was dangerous and threatened the region and world.  Hence, the region remained the most susceptible to threats and the falsification of facts.

He said that Syria had been among first to call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Middle East and had contributed to several initiatives that aimed to achieve that objective, including a draft resolution tabled by Syria in December 2003 to make the region free of nuclear weapons.  The Arab initiative was not endorsed, however, and that had encouraged Israel’s behaviour.  He, therefore, called on the international community to put pressure on Israel to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  That would contribute to the stability of the region and would make a just, comprehensive and lasting peace possible.

Introduction of Drafts

Introducing a draft on convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (document A/C.1/61/L.4), ANDY RACHMIANTO (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that such a session was timely and appropriate, because it would set a future course of action, including a comprehensive review of the disarmament machinery.  Existing and new threats to the machinery needed to be addressed, and a lasting solution, in which the United Nations played an active role, was needed.  Member States needed to agree on the need to revitalize the disarmament machinery.  They could not afford to have the disarmament agenda deadlocked.  He encouraged all Member States to fully utilize the open-ended working group.  He added that, because of ongoing work, he was requesting a postponement of consideration of the draft.

Introducing a draft resolution on the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament (document A/C.1/61/L.9), he said that the draft called on Member States in each region and those that were able to do so, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their initiatives and activities.  He hoped the draft would enjoy support.

Introducing a draft on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (document A/C.1/61/L.14), GERMÁN ORTEGA ( Ecuador), speaking on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, said that the Centre played an important role in disarmament in the region.  He called on the Committee to analyze the draft and adopt it unanimously.

ARUN PRASAD DHITAL (Nepal) introducing a draft resolution on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (document A/C.1/61/L.28) said that regional centres were important as confidence-building measures.  Nepal would work on consolidating the Kathmandu process in its region.  As most paragraphs remained unchanged, he hoped that all Member States would adopt the resolution.

KAROL MISTRIK ( Slovakia) introducing a draft resolution on the Report on the Conference on Disarmament, (document A/C.1/61/L.29) said that its structure and content were built on past resolutions, which had been adopted.  The Conference on Disarmament had been able to come to an understanding, but failed to reflect that in its report -– that remained a challenge for next year.  Furthermore, the 2006 experience proved that consultations between the current and incoming Presidents were helpful.

Introducing a draft resolution on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/C.1/61/L.24), CHUKA UDEDIBIA (Nigeria) said that the draft was submitted in recognition of the important role that the Regional Centre could play in promoting peace, security, arms control and disarmament at the regional level, thereby enhancing progress in the area of sustainable development.  Regrettably, the Centre had been carrying out its mandate under very strenuous financial and operational difficulties.  The most worrisome development regarding the Centre was the report by the Secretary-General that its future looked bleak, due to lack of reliable source of funding that would ensure the sustainability of its operations.  There was still an urgent need for more financial contributions from the donour community.  In addition to the need to reorganize the Centre, there also was a need to establish close cooperation between it and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

He said that the consultative mechanism of interested States for the reorganization of the Centre had not completed its work and would require more time.  In view of that, the draft requested the consultative mechanism to continue its work with a view to identifying concrete measures to revitalize the Centre.  The draft urged all States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations to make voluntary contributions to strengthen the Centre’s programmes and activities and facilitate their implementation.  It further appealed to the Regional Centre, with the cooperation of the African Union and regional and subregional organizations and the African States, to promote the consistent implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action against the illicit small arms trade.

Introducing a draft resolution on United Nations disarmament fellowship, training, and advisory services (document A/C.1/61/L.12), he said that the Programme had succeeded in developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows so that they could participate more effectively in arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations at all levels.

He said that the draft considered that the Programme contributed significantly to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security.  It also considered that the Programme had trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its 28 years of existence, many of whom held positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament and recognized the need for Member States to take into account gender equality when nominating candidates to the Programme.

He said that in the resolution, the Assembly would express its appreciation to all Member States and organizations that had consistently supported the Programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success.  It also commended the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the Programme had continued to be carried out and requested him to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based Programme within existing resources.

Withdrawing a draft resolution on Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (A/C.1/61/L.23), PAUL MEYER ( Canada) said that based on important developments over the past year, this year’s Conference on Disarmament had engaged in focused debates on agenda items and that was indeed cause for optimism.  He believed that it was appropriate for the First Committee to call for the immediate start of negotiations on such a treaty.  That would, in turn, send a signal to the Conference on Disarmament that it needed to take the next step.

The draft did establish parameters in starting such negotiations.  Some States were not convinced that a minimalist approach was the right way forward, however.  On the issue of starting negotiations, there was a divergence of views on under what conditions they would take place.  Thus, his Government was obliged to conclude that it would withdraw the resolution and hope that those in support would understand.

Introducing a draft resolution on the report of the Disarmament Commission (document A/C.1/61/L.11), JOON OH (Republic of Korea) said that the resolution, in addition to organizational elements, which were basically unchanged from the last year, contained recommendations on additional measures for improving the effectiveness of the Commission’s working methods, which were agreed by consensus at the 2006 substantive session.  The Commission’s Bureau had decided to propose 9 to 27 April as the dates for its 2007 session.

He said that in the course of seven meetings devoted to general discussion within the framework of Working Group I, delegations made comments on a wide variety of nuclear disarmament and related international security issues, expressed their concerns over emerging trends and presented concrete ideas and proposals.  As a result, the Chairman of the Working Group I submitted two versions of his working paper, the second of which took into consideration written and oral submissions as well as comments by delegations on his first draft.  With regard to Working Group II on “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms”, Member States showed flexibility and were ready to work toward an agreement on the issue.

He said that the Chairman’s working papers of both Working Groups were not attached to the Report of the Commission, due to the absence of agreement on whether they should be attached.  He said it was somewhat disappointing that it was not possible to overcome the few remaining obstacles and attach the texts.  He reminded delegations that the organizational session of the Commission would be held in mid-November and that the regional groups were kindly requested to nominate their candidates for the Bureau as soon as possible.

Action on Drafts

General Statements

JOSHUA ZARKA ( Israel) said that, in light of the current realities, it was obvious that the draft on the Middle East nuclear proliferation (A/C.1/L.2) was blatantly one-sided, missing in facts and divisive.  It undermined rather than enhanced confidence between States in the region.  There was no doubt that proliferation in the Middle East existed.  There were growing threats from States, particularly Iran and its ongoing disregard of the IAEA.  Under such a title, one could have expected the resolution to call for compliance with relevant international regimes.

Lamentably, he continued, the resolution did not reflect the realities of the troubled region.  Moreover, it completely ignored the evidence and resolutions by the IAEA and the Security Council.  It also overlooked profound hostility in the region toward Israel, refusal of mutual recognition and threats to its existence.  The draft focused entirely, and by name, on Israel, singling it out in a way that no other Member State was being singled out in the First Committee.  Israel had never threatened its neighbours or violated its obligations under any disarmament treaty and exercised the utmost responsibility in the nuclear domain.  The draft would not serve the objective of non-proliferation in the Middle East, but would compromise it.

Referring to draft resolutions L.1 and L.2, AMMAR HIJAZI, Observer of Palestine said that the proliferation of nuclear and non-conventional threats to world security, and in particular to the Middle East, meant that the international community needed to ensure that region remained free of those weapons.  It was imperative that the effort was comprehensive -- not selective.  There should not be a blind eye by the international community to some countries that had stockpiled and refused to undergo inspections.  No State -– and especially those who violated the rights of other people -- should be above international law.  He hoped that adoption of both resolutions would consolidate efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.  The region was in need of evidence of economic and social prosperity, human rights and most of all, hope.  It did not need more weapons, he added.

Speaking in explanation of vote, KARI KAHILUOTO (Finland), speaking on behalf of the European Union, on the draft on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (L.2), said that, while supporting a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East, he believed the draft did not cover some relevant recent developments on nuclear proliferation in the region.  Iran’s non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards’ obligations and Security Council demands raised serious questions and were not compatible with the international non-proliferation regime.  The Union reiterated its view that prompt and full Iranian compliance with the relevant international obligations would facilitate negotiations for a diplomatic solution.

On the draft resolution on missiles (L.3), he said that the Union was not in a position to support it, even though it was convinced that the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction put at risk the security of all States and people.  His delegation supported the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation launched in 2002 and the draft did not make any specific reference to that Code.  Furthermore, it was important that the third panel of experts be based on work conducted in the two previous panels.

PAUL MEYER ( Canada), explaining his Government’s abstention on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/61/L.2), said that he had previously voiced concern over a lack of balance in the draft.  Proliferation posed a serious threat, yet there was no reference made regarding Iran’s obligation pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  The issue of Iran’s nuclear activities remained unresolved.  Though Iran was called upon to return to compliance, actions by the Security Council had been ignored.  It was imperative that there be clear and unequivocal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on behalf of Iran.

In conclusion, he had reservations on the unbalanced nature of the resolution and its incomplete scope.  He hoped that the next resolution would more fully reflect the situation in the region, and his Government would then reconsider.

Speaking on drafts A/C.1/61/L.1 and A/C.1/61/L.2, REZA NAJAFI ( Iran) said that the General Assembly had annually adopted the draft on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East -- L.1 -- by consensus since 1980.  Unfortunately, due to the non-adherence of Israel to the NPT and its refusal to place unsafeguarded, clandestine facilities under IAEA safeguards, realization of such a zone had yet to materialize.  Support from a certain nuclear-weapon State put establishment of such a zone in the near future in doubt.  The international community must apply pressure to Israel to join the NPT and submit to IAEA safeguards in order to obtain a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

He said that Iran would not abandon the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a result of outside pressure.  The IAEA had repeatedly reaffirmed that there had been no diversion of nuclear material to weapons or other explosive devices.  Ridiculously, the Israeli regime, which was not a member of the NPT and which was repeatedly recognized as the single greatest threat to the region, cried wolf about Iran’s peaceful programme, which had led to a campaign of threats, lies, and misperceptions.

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) explaining her Government’s vote on resolution L.2, said that it supported a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and staunchly supported the right for States to exist and live in peace in secure and defined borders; yet, it had substantive difficulties with the resolution.  That included the fact that Iran was in non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreement, yet, there was no reference to that matter.  Australia did, however, remain fully committed to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and would continue to pursue those objectives.

JURG STREULI ( Switzerland) said that he would vote in favour of resolution L.2.  On the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it was imperative that great importance be attached to better implementing existing obligations.  It was essential that there be full cooperation of States with the IAEA.  Furthermore, he shared the concerns expressed by the Security Council and the Board of Governors on the issue of Iran and fully supported Security Council resolution 1696.

The Committee then approved the draft on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (A/C.1/61/L.1) without a vote.

On the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (A/C.1/61/L.2), the Committee voted to retain the sixth preambular paragraph by a vote of 151 in favour to 2 against (India and Israel), with 6 abstentions (Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Togo, and the United States).  (For details see Annex I).

On the draft as a whole, the Committee approved it by a vote of 156 in favour to 4 against ( Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and the United States), with 6 abstentions ( Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, and Tonga) (see Annex II).

On the draft on missiles (A/C.1/61/L.3), the Committee approved it by a recorded vote of 105 in favour to 6 against ( Albania, France, Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United Kingdom and the United States) with 55 abstentions (see Annex III).

On the draft on the United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (A/C/1/61/L.16), the Committee approved it by a vote of 116 in favour to 3 against (France, United Kingdom, and the United States), with 44 abstentions (see Annex IV).

The Committee then approved a draft on nuclear disarmament (A/C.1/61/L.39) by a vote of 105 in favour to 45 against, with 16 abstentions (see Annex V).

The Committee then approved a draft on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon Sates against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/61/61/L.45) by a vote of 108 in favour to 1 against (United States), with 57 abstentions (see Annex VI).

The Committee then approved a draft resolution on reducing nuclear danger (A/C.1/61/L.49) by a vote of 105 in favour to 50 against, with 13 abstentions (see Annex VII).

The Committee then approved a draft on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/C.1/61/L.51) by a vote of 108 to 50, with 10 abstentions (see Annex VIII).

Speaking after the vote, JOSHUA ZARKA ( Israel), speaking on L.1, said Israel had once again joined the consensus on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, notwithstanding certain reservations.  Israel was committed to a Middle East free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles.  In the current realities, that noble vision would not materialize any time soon.

He welcomed the return to consensus spirit that had been absent at the IAEA conference.  Current political realities required a gradual process.  What was needed were confidence-building measures, so as not to detract from any State’s security, followed by mutual recognition, good neighbourliness and arms control measures.  That could lead to more ambitious goals, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.  Establishment of such a zone should emanate from the region and could only be achieved if freely arrived at by the regions of those directly concerned.  Such a zone could not be imposed from outside, and the process clearly could not begin in a situation where some of the parties clearly maintained a state of war with each other, refusing to maintain peaceful relations with Israel or recognizing its right to exist.  Threats had been significantly exacerbated by a certain State and its export of weapons of mass destruction technology, and the discrepancy between its obligations and its behaviour.

He said that three out of four cases of NPT non-compliance had taken place in the Middle East.  Israel had a vision of regional peace and stability.  That process required a fundamental change in regional circumstances and a significant change in the attitude of States toward Israel.

JOSE ARTUR DENOT MEDEIROS (Brazil), explaining his vote on L.49, said that his Government had voted in favour, as it was convinced that doctrines could indeed contribute to the reduction of the unintentional use of nuclear weapons.  Reducing nuclear danger was not a substitute for multilaterally-agreed disarmament measures, however.  Verification and transparency were also required.  Moreover, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was essential to remove danger completely.

Although, he had voted in favour of L.51 and supported a binding agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, negative security assurances were not a substitute for elimination.  The bilateral measures of the Russian Federation and the United States were welcome, but were not a substitute for multilaterally-agreed disarmament measures.

THOMAS LYNKIN ( United States), on the issue of L.3’s adoption, said that his Government had voted against it.  Referring to the devoted work of two earlier panels on missiles, he said that efforts should not be wasted.  Work should not be repeated if already conducted and the third panel should reflect that.  Furthermore, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report on missiles was inappropriate for the third panel to begin its work.  On voting against L.45, he said his Government continued to oppose any proposal for a negative security assurances treaty.

FERDINAND NGOH NGOH ( Cameroon), speaking on L.1 and L.2, said that his country had customarily joined the consensus on the draft calling for creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.  Creation of such zones had a positive aspect, because they contributed to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.  He had abstained from voting on L.2 because, while Cameroon shared the essential principles of the draft, he had difficulty with the wording of certain provisions targeting a single State.  That provision should be reformulated in a more balanced, non-discriminatory and less polemical manner.

JAYANT PRASAD ( India) said that he had voted against the sixth preambular paragraph of L.2 and abstained from voting on the draft as a whole, because the focus should have been on the region it was intending to address.  According to the 1969 Law of Treaties, States were bound to adhere to treaties to which they had given their free consent.  The call for States outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to that treaty and accept IAEA safeguards was at variance with that basic principle.  On draft L.39, he said that the threat of nuclear weapons could only be addressed through their complete elimination by pursuing global disarmament.  India’s commitment to universal nuclear disarmament was its core concern.  It shared the resolution’s objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon free world.  India had to abstain because of the incorporation of references to the NPT, but that in no way detracted from the longstanding position of the Non-Aligned Movement in favour of disarmament.

YOSHIKI MINE ( Japan), referring to L. 39, said that he shared the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  He also appreciated that it contained a reference to the NTP as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.  However, he hoped for a different approach, as it lacked certain elements.  Steps taken needed to be both realistic and progressive.  Referring to L.45, he said that he had voted in favour, and that the issue of negative security assurances needed to be dealt with.  It would also need to be based on the result of ongoing discussions in the Conference on Disarmament.

KHALIL-UR-RAHMAN HASHMI (Pakistan), referring to L.39, said that though nuclear disarmament was a goal that Pakistan always supported, his Government had remained in line with its well-known position on the NPT.

KARI KAHILUOTO ( Finland), speaking on behalf of the European Union, and referring to L.27, said that the objective of the Union was to further strengthen that Convention.  The EU would do that by contributing to a full review of the operation of the Convention; promoting efforts to enhance transparency through an increased exchange of information among States Parties; supporting further action being taken on the results of the intersessional work; and supporting a further intersessional work programme until the seventh review conference to be held no later than 2011.

The Committee then approved the draft on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/C.1/61/L.5) by a vote of 163 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Israel, United States) (see Annex IX).

JACEK JANUCHOWSKI ( Poland) said that before action was taken on L.19, he wished to propose an oral revision.  On 20 October, the Central African Republic had acceded to the treaty/protocol.  He asked the Secretariat to reflect the additional accession in preambular paragraph 3 by changing the number of States that had acceded to the Convention since last year from 5 to 6 and changing the number of States Parties to the Convention from 179 to 180.

The Committee then approved a draft on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/C.1/61/L.19), as orally revised, without a vote.

On the draft on Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/C.1/61/L.27), the Secretary read out a statement saying that adoption of the draft would not give rise to financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.  The Committee then approved it without a vote.

The Committee then approved the draft on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (A/C.1/61/L.52) without a vote.

KHALIL-UR-RAHMAN HASHMI ( Pakistan), referring to the vote on draft resolution L.52, said that though he supported the objective therein, the language could have been improved to better represent reality.  It was imperative that the international community not lower its guard on dirty bombs.  It was also necessary for all States to enforce export measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists.

On the issue of biological and chemical weapons, elimination was the best guarantee against their use, he said.  But, as long as that prospect proceeded at a slow pace and huge quantities still existed, the possibility of their falling into the hands of terrorists remained.  That Convention needed strengthening and a comprehensive strategy would involve stopping terrorists from getting those weapons.

ANNEX I

Vote on Preambular Paragraph 6/ Middle East Nuclear Proliferation

Preambular paragraph 6 of the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/61/L.2) was adopted by a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 2 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  India, Israel.

Abstain:  Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Togo, United States.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX II

Vote on Middle East Nuclear Proliferation

The draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (document A/C.1/61/L.2)was adopted by a recorded vote of 156 in favour to 4 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, United States.

Abstain:  Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Tonga.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX III

Vote on Missiles

The draft resolution on missiles (document A/C.1/61/L.3) was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 in favour to 6 against, with 55 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:  Albania, France, Israel, Federated States of Micronesia, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain:  Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine

Absent:  Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX IV

Vote on Eliminating Nuclear Dangers

The draft resolution on a United Nations conference to identify ways to eliminate nuclear dangers (document A/C.1/61/L.16) was adopted by a recorded vote of 116 in favour to 3 against, with 44 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  France, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Mali, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX V

Vote on Nuclear Disarmament

The draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/61/L.39)was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 in favour to 45 against, with 16 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain:  Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, Uzbekistan.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX VI

Vote on Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

The draft resolution on arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/61/L.45) was adopted by a recorded vote of 108 in favour to 1 against, with 57 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  United States.

Abstain:  Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX VII

Vote on Reducing Nuclear Danger

The draft resolution on reducing nuclear danger (document A/C.1/61/L.49)was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 in favour to 50 against, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstain:  Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Ecuador, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX VIII

Vote on Convention on Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons

The (document A/C.1/61/L.51) was adopted by a recorded vote of 108 in favour to 50 against, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States

Abstain:  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Côte d’Ivoire, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

ANNEX IX

Vote on Upholding Geneva Protocol

The draft resolution on measures to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol (document A/C.1/61/L.5) was adopted by a recorded vote of 163 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstain:  Israel, United States.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

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For information media • not an official record
For information media. Not an official record.