STRENGTHENED STEPS TO ADDRESS THREAT FROM ‘RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM’ CALLED FOR IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION

31 October 2005
GA/DIS/3312

STRENGTHENED STEPS TO ADDRESS THREAT FROM ‘RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM’ CALLED FOR IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION

28/10/2005
General Assembly
GA/DIS/3312
Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Sixtieth General Assembly

First Committee

21st Meeting (PM)

STRENGTHENED STEPS TO ADDRESS THREAT FROM ‘RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM’

CALLED FOR IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION

One of 13 New Texts Recommended for General Assembly Adoption;

Missile Code of Conduct, Outer Space Transparency among Other Issues

(Issued on 31 October 2005.)

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic or use radioactive materials or sources in radiological dispersion devices, the General Assembly would call on Member States to support global efforts to prevent and, if necessary, suppress the acquisition and the use by terrorists of radioactive materials, according to a new draft resolution by France, one of 13 draft resolutions approved today in the Disarmament Committee.

The Committee approved the new draft text, as orally amended by France, by a recorded vote of 162 in favour to none against, with no abstentions.  A further term would have the Assembly urge Member States to take and strengthen national measures to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, as well as terrorist attacks on nuclear plants and facilities which would result in radioactive releases, and, if necessary, suppress such acts by taking effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect such high-risk materials.  (For details of the vote, see Annex X.)

Concerned about the increasing regional and global security challenges caused by, among other things, the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the Assembly would welcome the adoption of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, under the terms of a draft resolution approved by a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 1 against (Iran), with 11 abstentions.  (See Annex IV.)

Prior to approving that text, the Committee took separate votes on three amendments tabled by Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia.  The first proposal was to add to the eighth preambular paragraph, concerning the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, the need to combat the development and proliferation of those weapons and their delivery means in a comprehensive manner.  It was defeated by a vote of 26 in favour to 105 against, with 7 abstentions ( Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen).  (See Annex I.)

The second amendment, which would have described The Hague Code of Conduct as a “first practical step”, rather than “a practical step” in the first operative paragraph, which noted with satisfaction that 122 States had already subscribed to The Hague Code of Conduct, was also rejected, by a vote of 19 in favour to 108 against, with 10 abstentions.  (See Annex II.)

By a vote of 24 in favour to 106 against, with 7 abstentions ( Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen), the Committee also rejected the third amendment.  It concerned the third operative paragraph, and would have replaced the phrase “Encourages the exploration of”, with “Encourages the United Nations to explore”.  (See Annex III.)

A new draft resolution by the Russian Federation, which would have the Assembly invite all Member States to inform the Secretary-General before the start of the next session of their views on the advisability of further developing international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting global cooperation and the prevention of an outer space arms race, was approved by a vote of 158 in favour to 1 against (United States), with 1 abstention (Israel).  (See Annex V.)

Other drafts approved today concerned:  African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (no vote); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (no vote); addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit small arms trade (160 in favour to 1 against (United States), with no abstentions (Annex VI)); assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (no vote); prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) (no vote); and implementation of the Ottawa Convention (147 in favour to none against, with 15 abstentions (Annex VII)).

Also:  activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (no vote); relationship between disarmament and development (164 in favour to 1 against (United States), with 2 abstentions (France, Israel) (Annex VIII)); developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (163 in favour to 1 against (United States), with no abstentions (Annex IX)); and national legislation on arms transfers (no vote).

Statements were made by the representatives of Spain, Egypt, United States, Philippines, Chile, United Kingdom (on behalf of the European Union), Algeria, China, Cuba, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Syria, Netherlands, Jordan, France, Azerbaijan, India, Singapore, Egypt, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Venezuela, Russian Federation and Mali.

The Committee will meet again at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, 31 October, to continue taking action on all draft resolutions and decisions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its third and final phase of work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and decisions.

Expected to be acted on under cluster 1, which concerns nuclear weapons, are drafts on:  African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reviews.

Action is also expected on a draft from cluster 2, which deals with other weapons of mass destruction:  the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).

From cluster 3, which deals with outer space, action is expected on a draft on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.

From cluster 4, which deals with conventional weapons, action is expected on:  humanitarian and development impact of the illicit small arms trade; assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them; man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS); and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty); and regional conventional arms control.

Action is also expected on a draft from cluster 5, which deals with regional disarmament and security:  activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

The Committee is also expected to take up drafts in cluster 6, which deals with other disarmament measures and international security:  the relationship between disarmament and development; information and telecommunications security; national transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology; and preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.

On disarmament machinery, action was expected on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

Draft Summaries

Cluster 1

Under the terms of a draft resolution sponsored by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States and Bangladesh (document A/C.1/60/L.8), the Assembly would call on African States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) as soon as possible, so that it may enter into force without delay.

The Assembly would also call on the African States parties to the NPT that have not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to the Treaty, thereby satisfying requirements of article 9 (b) of annex II to the Treaty of Pelindaba when it enters into force.  It also called on those States to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Agency’s Board of Governors on 15 May 1997.

It would express its appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States that have signed the Protocols that concern them, and call on those that have not yet ratified the Protocols concerning them to do so as soon as possible.

Under a related term, the Assembly would call on the States contemplated in the Treaty’s Protocol III to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

Concerned about the increasing regional and global security challenges caused by, among other things, the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the Assembly would welcome the adoption of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, according to a draft resolution on the Code (document A/C.1/60/L.22).

The Assembly would invite all States that had not yet done so to subscribe to the Code of Conduct, and it would encourage the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons. 

The draft is sponsored by Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

According to amendments tabled by Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Malaysia to the draft resolution on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (document A/C.1/60/L.62:

The eighth preambular paragraph, which reads, “Mindful of the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery”, would read, as follows:  “Mindful of the need to combat the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in a comprehensive manner”.

In operative paragraph 1, the phrase “a practical step” would be replaced with the phrase “a first practical step”.

The phrase in the third operative paragraph, “Encourages the exploration of” would be replaced with the phrase “Encourages the United Nations to explore”. 

The General Assembly, expressing grave concern over the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to reach any substantive agreement on the follow-up of the nuclear disarmament obligations, would decide to establish an ad hoc committee in 2006 to review the implementation of disarmament obligations under the NPT and agreed in the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, and to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms and strategies for complete nuclear disarmament at its sixty-second session, under the terms of a new revised draft resolution by Iran, Zambia and Zimbabwe entitled, “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (document A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.2).

The Assembly would call for practical steps as agreed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promoted international stability and, based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

-- further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

-- increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities, and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the NPT and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

-- further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

-- concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

-- a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate their total elimination; and

-- the engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

By a further term, the Assembly would note that the 2000 NPT Review Conference had agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

The Assembly would decide to include in the provisional agenda of its next session the item entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.

Cluster 2

By the terms of a draft resolution sponsored by Hungary on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) (document A/C.1/60/L.33/Rev.1), the Assembly would welcome the data and information provided to date, and reiterate its call upon all States to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention.

The Assembly would recall the decisions reached at the Fifth Review Conference, among them to discuss and promote in 2005 common understanding and effective action, including on the topic of the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists, and call on the States parties to the Convention to participate in its implementation.

It would note that the Sixth Review Conference would be held in Geneva in 2006, and that the dates would be formally agreed by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference in Geneva during the week of 24 April. 

(In the revised version, operative paragraph 5 was deleted and the paragraphs were renumbered accordingly.)

Cluster 3

A new draft resolution by the Russian Federation entitled “Measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space” (document A/C.1/60/L.30/Rev.1) would have the Assembly invite all Member States to inform the Secretary-General before the start of the sixty-first session of their views concerning the advisability of further developing international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

The Assembly would decide to include the item “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” in its next provisional agenda.

(In the revised version, a new preambular paragraph 2 now reads:  “Conscious that further measures should be examined in the search for agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space,”.

A new third preambular paragraph now reads:  “Recalling, in this context, its previous resolutions, which, inter alia, emphasize the need for increased transparency and confirm the importance of confidence-building measures as a conducive means of ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,”.

Changes made to the operative portion of the text are reflected in the above summary.)

Cluster 4

According to a new revised text tabled by the Netherlands on addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons (document A/C.1/60/L.34/Rev.1), the Assembly would call on all States to more effectively address the humanitarian and development impact of the illicit small arms and their excessive accumulation, particularly in conflict or post-conflict situations.

The above provision includes the following steps:  developing comprehensive armed violence prevention programmes, where appropriate, integrated into national development strategies, including poverty reduction strategies; and building on States’ and international and regional organizations’ commitment to seriously consider rendering assistance, such as small arms funds, in order to support implementation of measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade.

Also:  encouraging United Nations peacekeeping operations to address the safe storage and disposal of small arms and light weapons as an integral part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes; systematically including national measures to regulate small arms and light weapons in longer-term post-conflict peacebuilding strategies and programmes; and ensuring that those activities take full account of women’s roles and that the needs of women and girl combatants and dependants be addressed in DDR programmes, and that the commitment to promote and protect children’s rights and welfare in armed conflict was also ensured. 

Additional co-sponsors are:  Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland, Germany, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Timor-Leste and Zambia.

Deeply concerned by the magnitude of human casualty and suffering, especially among children, caused by the illicit proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons, the Assembly would encourage the international community to support implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, and to extend further assistance in transforming the moratorium into a legally binding instrument, by the terms of a revised text on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them (document A/C.1/60/L.37/Rev.1).

By further terms, the Assembly would invite the Secretary-General and those States and organizations that are in a position to do so to continue to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.  It would also encourage the collaboration of civil society organizations in the efforts of the national commissions to combat the illicit traffic in small arms and in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

The Assembly would further encourage cooperation among State organs, international organizations and civil society in supporting programmes and projects aimed at combating the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them.  It would call on the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to take action to combat the illicit small arms trade.

The draft resolution is by Andorra, Angola, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Malaysia, Mali on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Swaziland, Sweden, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and Zambia. 

Convinced of the importance of effective national control of transfers of man-portable air defence systems and related training and instruction materials and the safe and effective management of stockpiles of such weapons, the Assembly, under a draft resolution on prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems (document A/C.1/60/L.49/Rev.1), would urge Member States to support current international, regional and national efforts to combat and prevent that illicit transfer and unauthorized use.

The Assembly would stress the importance of effective and comprehensive national controls on the production, stockpiling, transfer and brokering of man-portable air defence systems to prevent the illicit trade in and unauthorized access to and use of such weapons, their components and related training and instruction materials. 

It would encourage Member States to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices and to assist other States, at their request, to exercise effective control over access to and the brokering and transfer of man-portable air defence systems to State and non-State end-users and to ensure that such weapons are exported only to Governments or agents authorized by a Government.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Turkey, United Kingdom and Zambia.

(The eighth preambular paragraph was revised slightly and now reads:  “Acknowledging the role of the unauthorized transfer of relevant materials and information in assisting the unauthorized manufacture and illicit transfer of man-portable air defence systems and related components,”.

The revised eleventh preambular paragraph now reads:  “Acknowledging the considerable efforts of some Member States to collect, secure and destroy voluntarily those man-portable air defence systems declared to be surplus by the competent national authority,”.

Noting with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post-conflict development, a draft resolution on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/60/L.56) would have the Assembly invite all States that did not sign the Convention to accede to it without delay.

The Assembly would stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention, including through the swift implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan.  It would urge all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article 7 of the Convention in order to promote transparency and compliance.

It would renew its call upon al States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, mine risk-education programmes and the removal and destruction of anti-personnel mines placed or stockpiled throughout the world. 

The draft resolution is by Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

A draft resolution on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels (document A/C.1/60/L.44) would have the Assembly decide to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels.

The Assembly would ask the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional conventional arms control agreements, and look forward to a report of the Conference on this subject.

By further terms, the Assembly would note with particular interest the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia.  It would also recognize the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is a cornerstone of European security.

Cluster 5

Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General in May 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-proliferation and development in the subregion, the Assembly would appeal to Member States and to governmental and non-governmental organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to the Committee’s Trust Fund (document A/C.1/60/L.43/Rev.1), according to a revised draft resolution.

By a further provision of a draft, the Assembly would reaffirm its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels, in order to ease tensions and conflicts in Central Africa and to further peace, stability and sustainable development in the subregion.

Under a related term, the Assembly would encourage the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to pursue their efforts to promote peace and security in their subregion.  It would encourage the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to pursue their efforts to strengthen bilateral relations.

The Assembly would emphasize the need to make the early warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that it would serve, on the one hand, as an instrument for analysing and monitoring political situations in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee, with a view to preventing the outbreak of future armed conflicts, and, on the other hand, as a technical body through which the member States will carry out the Committee’s 1992 work programme.  It would ask the Secretary-General to provide it with the assistance necessary for it to function properly.

It would strongly appeal to the international community to support the efforts undertaken by the States concerned to implement DDR programmes.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon.

Cluster 6

According to an Indonesian draft resolution, on behalf of the Movement of non-aligned countries, on the relationship between disarmament and development (document A/C.1/60/L.16), the Assembly would urge the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

Stressing the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection, and concerned with increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs, the Assembly would stress the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship, and request the Secretary-General to strengthen further the role of the Organization in this field, in particular the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, in order to assure continued and effective coordination and close cooperation between the relevant United Nations departments, agencies and sub-agencies.

The Assembly would encourage the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to make reference to the contribution that disarmament could provide in meeting them when it reviewed its progress towards this purpose in 2006, as well as to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities.

A draft resolution on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/C.1/60/L.29), tabled by the Russian Federation, would have the Assembly call upon Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information.

By further terms, the Assembly would request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2009 on the basis of equitable geographical discrimination, to continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and to submit a report on the results of this study to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

By the terms of another draft sponsored by the Netherlands on national legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology (document A/C.1/60/L.35), the Assembly would invite Member States in a position to do so, without prejudice to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, while ensuring that such legislation, regulations and procedures are consistent with States parties’ obligations under international treaties.

Also according to the text, Member States would be encouraged to voluntarily provide information to the Secretary-General on their national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology.  The Secretary-General would be requested to make that information accessible to Member States.

Deeply concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic or use radioactive materials or sources in radiological dispersion devices, the Assembly would call on Member States to support global efforts to prevent and, if necessary, suppress, the acquisition and the use by terrorists of radioactive materials, according to a new draft resolution by France entitled “Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism” (document A/C.1/60/L.39/Rev.1).

The Assembly would urge Member States to take and strengthen national measures as appropriate, to prevent, and if necessary suppress, the acquisition and the use by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources, in particular by taking effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect such high-risk materials in accordance with their international obligations.

In a related term, the Assembly would invite Member States to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Cluster 7

Another draft resolution by Indonesia and Antigua and Barbuda, on behalf of the Movement of non-aligned countries, on the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament (document A/C.1/60/L.18) would have the Assembly reiterate the importance of the United Nations regional activities to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament.

The Assembly would appeal to Member States in each region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives.

Another draft resolution sponsored by Nigeria, on behalf of the Group of African States, on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/C.1 /60/L.41) would have the Assembly appeal once again to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to strengthen the Centre’s programmes and activities and facilitate their implementation.

The Assembly would request the Secretary-General to facilitate close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, in particular in the areas of peace, security and development and to continue to provide assistance towards stabilizing the financial situation of the Centre.

Action on Texts

The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting by announcing the deferment of the resolution on compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements (document A/C.1/60/L.1/Rev.1)) and the deferment of the text on follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (document A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.2).

The representative of Zambia said he wished to withdraw as a sponsor of L.38/Rev.1.

The representative the United States thanked the Chairman for his flexibility and responsiveness for including written statements on resolutions having financial implications.

The representative of the Congo, on behalf of the Central African States, said he would like the draft resolution on activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (document A/C.1/60/L.43) acted on.

The representative of Spain said, since today the Committee would finally take action on the text on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone (document A/C.1/60/L.8), he wanted to reiterate his request that it be concluded in the Committee minutes that his delegation’s explanation of vote was given at the meeting on Wednesday, 26 October.  To save time, he requested that the final report of the Committee include the complete written version of the explanation of vote given last Wednesday.  He wished to reiterate that he did not consider himself associated with the consensus on operative paragraph 3 of the text.

The representative of Egypt, speaking in explanation of vote on the draft resolution on The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (document A/C.1/60/L.22), said he had supported the active involvement of the United Nations in addressing the issue of missiles.  That support for the United Nations emanated from Egypt’s strong belief that the United Nations was the appropriate forum to address that and all issues on peace and security.  Since receiving the first draft of the text, Egypt had conveyed the position that there were serious shortcomings, which had not been addressed.  They related to the lack of the comprehensive scope of the document.  At the same time, it addressed ballistic missiles, but not other types of missiles.  Also, it ignored the most serious problem, that of the presence of nuclear weapons, of which ballistic missiles were but a means of delivery.  The Code of Conduct did not address issues of missiles in a balanced matter.   Egypt wanted the United Nations to be involved in all phases of discussion on the issue of missile proliferation in all its aspects.  It had joined other delegations in submitting amendments.

The United States’ representative said he supported the statement delivered earlier by Spain regarding the resolution on the Pelindaba Treaty, namely, his objection to having been singled out in the draft resolution.  He strongly urged concerned parties to quickly establish effective processes to resolving long-standing problems.  Those processes should take into account the specific circumstances that existed in the area of the Treaty’s application before the draft text was again considered in the First Committee.

Concerning the amendments contained in document A/C.1/60/L.62, the representative of the Philippines recalled that the Committee had decided not to accept the same amendments last year.  Yet, the same ones were introduced this year, in writing, in the form of a draft resolution.  There had been time to reflect on those amendments.  However, it was an unusual practice that raised some doubts.  Dialogue was needed to bridge the conceptual gaps.  The co-sponsors of the text on The Hague Code of Conduct (document A/C.1/60/L.22) had attempted to hold such a dialogue, and his delegation had requested that the co-sponsors withdraw the amendments, with the assurance that the Philippines would “elevate” their concerns to The Hague Code of Conduct subscribing States. 

Notwithstanding the inability of the proponents of the amendments to agree to the request, he said that the Philippines would nevertheless bring the proposal to the next meeting of the Code.  But, at the present meeting, he was unable to consider the proposals contained in the amendments in a positive manner and regretted that he would vote against them.  He invited the other sponsors of L.22 to do the same.

The representative of Chile said he supported the statement just made by the Philippines in the latter’s capacity as the present Chair of The Hague Code of Conduct.  Chile, as with other members of the Code, had always been open to dialogue with non-party States.  Last year, when his country was Chair of the Code, it had not accepted the oral proposals to the draft, since those had been introduced orally and only moments before the vote.  They had been put in writing this time, but he regretted that their submission had not been announced prior to the Code’s meeting last June.  That would have allowed the subscribing States to study and discuss them, and allowed time for the Philippines to come to the General Assembly with a mandate on them.  He also regretted that the sponsors of the amendments had not been in a position to defer their proposals to the next Assembly session in 2006, which would have given the Code members more time to discuss them at the next meeting of contracting parties in June 2006.

He said that, for Chile, it was very important to avoid politicizing the Code, as its purpose was to contribute to increasing the international community’s transparency and confidence, as well as to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.  On the basis of those considerations, he would vote against the amendments, although he was prepared to discuss and analyse them in Vienna next year.  He invited all interested States to start a dialogue to allow for greater knowledge of the concerns of all parties, and to establish joint work with a view to improving the present Code of Conduct.

Next, the Committee approved the resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) (document A/C.1/60/L.8) without a vote.

It was then announced that Kyrgyzstan and Marshall Islands had become co-sponsors of the amendments contained in L.22.

On a point of order, the representative of the Philippines sought clarification on whether the Marshall Islands had co-sponsored L.22.

The Committee CHAIRMAN said he had no record of their co-sponsorship.

On a point of order, the representative of Kyrgyzstan said there had been a mistake -- he had sponsored L.22 and not L.62

On another point of order, the representative of the Marshall Islands also said he would co-sponsor L.22.

Then, in a separate vote, the Committee defeated the first amendment to L.22, by a vote of 26 in favour to 105 against, with 7 abstentions ( Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen) (Annex I).

The Committee rejected the second amendment by a vote of 19 in favour to 108 against, with 10 abstentions ( Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Haiti, India, Lebanon, Mauritius, Thailand, Yemen) (Annex II).

The third amendment was also rejected, by a recorded vote of 24 in favour to 106 against, with 7 abstentions ( Belize, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen) (Annex III).

Turning to the text as a whole, the Committee approved it by a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 1 against ( Iran), with 11 abstentions (Annex IV).

The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Union concerning the African nuclear-weapon-free zone (L.8), said the Union attached great importance, wherever possible, to strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones, which enhanced regional and global peace and security, and promoted harmony, peace and confidence.  It welcomed adherence to the relevant protocols by nuclear-weapon States, as well as efforts by the Committee to preserve consensus on the draft resolution.  Nevertheless, as contemplated in the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999 on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zone on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, every zone must reflect the diversity of circumstances within it, and every such zone must be a well defined geographical entity.  He shared Spain’s concern about being singled out in the text.

Speaking on L.22, Algeria’s representative said that was undeniably a measure in line with the objective of disarmament and non-proliferation of all categories of weapons.  Algeria supported the initiative to promote the elimination of mass destruction weapons and their delivery systems and it had had faithfully complied with its international obligations in that area.  He had been unable to support L.22, however, given that the text had not been discussed in time with other Member States, nor had it taken into account the amendments proposed by them since the last session.  Those had introduced the question of curbing the vertical ballistic missile proliferation, with a focus on the role of the United Nations in that process.  A comprehensive, balanced and non-selective treatment of the issue of missiles meant going beyond only horizontal proliferation, to include components no less important, namely, those systems’ design, development, testing and deployment -- which were done vertically.  The natural framework for those negotiations remained the Conference on Disarmament.

China’s representative said he had voted in favour of L.22 because he had agreed with the non-proliferation objective of The Hague Code of Conduct.  Because some of China’s concerns had not been included in the Code, it had not joined it, but it would continue in joint efforts to prevent ballistic missile proliferation.  China had long supported missile non-proliferation, as well as non-proliferation efforts achieved through broadly inclusive dialogue and cooperation.  The United Nations should fully play its role in that process.

Cuba’s representative said that, like last year, he abstained in the vote on L.22.  His country had participated actively in 2002 in two of the meetings devoted to negotiating the international Code of Conduct.  At that time, it had indicated its main difficulties, from both a substantive and procedural standpoint.  The process of adoption of the Code should not constitute a precedent for future negotiations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.  There had been a lack of transparency in the negotiations leading to the Code’s adoption, in a process that had been developed outside the United Nations framework.  Plus, the main promoters of that initiative had been unwilling to introduce any substantive changes to the text.

Based on the above, he said that the result of the negotiations had been a political instrument, which had not adequately reflected the main interests of an important group of countries.  For example, the Code had not addressed the question of the peaceful use of missile technology and the need for cooperation in that regard.  In addition, its approach was limited to horizontal proliferation and it disregarded vertical proliferation.  Nor did it address the need to achieve the disarmament goal, particularly nuclear disarmament.  Ballistic missiles, able to deliver mass destruction weapons, were only one part of the problem.  In that light, he felt that the Code only selectively addressed the question of missile proliferation.  That contrasted with the treatment being given to the question of missiles in all its aspects, being addressed within the General Assembly framework. 

Moreover, missile technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction was the heritage of only a few States, while the aspirations for development and economic growth were a goal for all countries, especially the developing countries, he said.  Promoting those countries’ economic development should be the “other side of the coin” when trying to put an end to ballistic missile proliferation.

Iran’s representative said that, like last year, he, too, had been forced to vote against L.22.  Its sponsors had not been ready to consider improvements to the text.  The text was drafted and tabled without consideration of the views of other non-subscribing States to the Code.  He, accordingly, had presented amendments with the aim of improving the text and “giving room” to some non-subscribing States.  The Code had been drafted and endorsed outside the United Nations and without the participation of all interested countries.  The aim of introducing a resolution at the United Nations should be to involve all Member States, in this case, including non-subscribers to the Code.  Unfortunately, discussions had taken place behind closed doors, and States had been asked to agree on a draft without any further consultations, on a “take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.  He hoped that policy would be reconsidered.  He was glad that informal consultations, albeit too late, had been organized by the delegation of the Philippines.

The representative of India, in an explanation of vote on draft L.22 on The Hague Code of Conduct, said India was fully committed to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.  The proliferation of ballistic missiles had impacted on India’s security.  Multilaterally negotiated instruments provided the best mechanisms to deal with disarmament and non-proliferation, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles.  An inclusive approach allowed the international community to deal with it in a comprehensive manner.

The representative of Indonesia, in an explanation of vote of why Indonesia abstained on draft resolution L.22, said Indonesia recognized the importance of the issue of ballistic missile proliferation and the need to address it.  Given the complex nature of the problem, from the very beginning of deliberations, Indonesia had wanted a comprehensive solution, but such a solution would depend on the ways and means needed to approach it.  While recognizing that the current mechanisms had contributed to international peace and security, he believed it was only the first practical step, given the complex nature of the problem.

It was his firm conviction that as an international body responsible for international peace and security, the United Nations should be given a greater role in that process, he said.  Those elements were lacking in draft resolution L.22, which was just adopted.  For that reason, Indonesia and some other members proposed some amendments to L.22, which the First Committee failed to adopt.  Indonesia also had other concerns, such as the non-inclusive negotiation process, and was of the firm conviction that the issue of missiles should be addressed within the United Nations system.  If the proponents of The Hague Code of Conduct were serious about creating such a universal norm, then the engagement of non-subscribing States were in order to prevent the process from being regarded as non-transparent.

The representative of Pakistan, in an explanation of vote on L.22, said the issue of missiles remained complex and the proposal to address it had lacked consensus.  Pakistan underlined the need to address the issue in all its aspects in a multilateral forum, so the views of all countries could be taken into account.  Some effort was made to accommodate the concern of States, but it could not gain support and the acceptance of several missile-possessing States.  The Code of Conduct did not address Pakistan’s security concerns.  While the sponsors had held informal consultations, the absence of any attempt to negotiate a generally acceptable text was apparent.  The sponsors seemed more interested in getting the resolution adopted, rather than promoting its objectives.

The representative of Syria, in an explanation of vote of L.22, said Syria had abstained in view of the fact that the Code was selective and discriminatory.  Its focus was on one particular kind of missile, ballistic missiles, and it did not touch on other types. It had also been monopolized by one particular State.  It did not discuss the reasons behind proliferation.  That runs counter to a multilateral approach within the United Nations.

The Committee then adopted a draft resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) (document A/C.1/60/L.33/Rev.1), without a vote.

The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the European Union, in explanation of vote on draft resolution L.33/Rev.1, said the Union very much agreed on the importance of consensus on the resolution.  The Union reiterated its commitment to the Biological Weapon Convention process, as well as its support for all decisions of the Fifth Review Conference, including the 2006 Review Conference.

The draft resolution on “Measures to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space” (document A/C.1/60/L.30/Rev.1) was approved then by a recorded vote of 158 in favour to 1 against ( United States), with 1 abstention ( Israel).  (See annex V.)

The representative of China, in an explanation of vote, said his country was in favour of draft resolution L.30/Rev.1 on transparency in outer space.  Outer space was the common heritage of mankind.   China was of the view that the fundamental way to prevent the weaponization of outer space was to negotiate and conclude relevant legal instruments.

The representative of the Netherlands said he wanted to address draft resolution L.34/Rev.1 on the humanitarian impact of small arms.  By introducing that resolution, the Netherlands aimed at making the work of the First Committee more relevant.  It was a one-time only resolution and it was a resolution on a topical subject, which was connecting the concepts of the close interlink among development, peace, security and human rights with the issue of small arms.  The resolution was timely and topical and did not pre-empt the process leading up to the review conference.

The representative of Cuba, in a general statement on cluster 4, which deals with conventional weapons, said he wished to reaffirm that he shared humanitarian concerns related to the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons.  At the same time, Cuba believed the Committee should look into and take real measures to prevent some countries from continuing to develop and use increasingly sophisticated conventional weapons that caused collateral damage -- a phrase used to conceal innocent victims.  Under that cluster, several resolutions were submitted dealing with small arms.   Cuba reiterated its support for the relevant United Nations Programme of Action adopted in 2001 along with Cuba’s firm will to comply with commitments.  At the same time, there should be no reinterpretation of the agreements reached at that time.

The representative of Jordan, in support of draft resolution L.34/Rev.1, agreed with the sponsors that addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture of small arms, was of the utmost importance for peace, safety and security and should be addressed.   Jordan noted that the resolution, as a starting point, had respect for international law and, therefore, clearly set the frame for the Committee’s work.  Jordan was aware of the importance of the issue to many countries coming out of conflict.   Jordan recognized the resolution reaffirmed the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance and that it called on States to seriously consider rendering such assistance. The new resolution addressed a very important aspect.

The representative of France, speaking about the draft resolution on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus (document A/C.1/60/L.40), said the Secretariat had today tabled a revised version of the resolution, which France wished to see adopted on Monday.   France wanted to draw attention to the fact that they were looking for consensus, and it might need to make some very minor adjustments to the text between now and Monday.  The addition of the second revision would set the Committee back to Tuesday or Wednesday.  He said France could distribute later that evening by fax a new version of the text.

Azerbaijan, on draft resolution L.56, on the Landmine Convention, said during the past few years, Azerbaijan had abstained.  One of the reasons was because landmines were being used on the front lines as a measure of deterrence and possible attack.  However, Azerbaijan supported the aims of the Ottawa Convention, and to show their support, it voted in favour.

Then the draft resolution on addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons (document A/C.1/60/ L.34/Rev.1), was approved by a recorded vote of 160 in favour to 1 against (United States) with no abstentions.  (See annex VI.)

The Committee adopted a resolution entitled assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them (document A/C.1/60/L.37/Rev.1) without a vote.

Turning to the draft on the prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) (document A/C.1/60/L.49/Rev.1), the Committee approved the text without a vote.

On a point of order, Uganda said he wished to co-sponsor the draft resolution on the Ottawa Convention (document A/C.1/60/L.56).

By a recorded vote of 147 in favour to none against, with 15 abstentions, the Committee approved that draft resolution on the Ottawa Convention (Annex VII).

Argentina’s representative registered her co-sponsorship of L.34/Rev.1 on small arms.

China’s representative said it was the first time his delegation had voted in favour of the landmine draft.  He had understood the humanitarian concern with respect to anti-personnel landmines.  The Convention was an important international effort to resolve those concerns, and he endorsed the humanitarian concerns and objectives contained therein.  Though China was not a party to the Convention, it would “keep” contacts and exchanges with its States parties.  His country had always been deeply concerned about civilian casualties caused by the inappropriate use of anti-personnel landmines and had been making unremitting efforts, with the international community, to address the humanitarian concerns.  It had also been engaged in international demining and assistance efforts.

Cuba’s representative said that, as in previous session, he had abstained in the vote on implementing the landmine Convention.  His country, which was a State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, had always attached due importance to the legitimate humanitarian concerns related to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel landmines.  However, for more than four decades, Cuba had been subjected to a policy of continuous hostility and aggression by the military super-Power and, consequently, it had not found it possible to renounce the use of that type of weapon.  Rather, it had had to preserve its territorial integrity, in keeping with the right to self-defence, as recognized in the United Nations Charter.  Cuba would continue to fully support all efforts towards allaying the humanitarian concerns, while maintaining the necessary balance between those and security concerns.

The representative of India said he supported the vision of a world free from the landmines threat, where individuals and communities lived safely and in environments conducive to development.  India’s participation at the Nairobi review conference had been a reflection of its commitment to that vision.  It had also ratified Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and had adopted all necessary measures to adhere to its provisions.

Since 1997, he said, his country had discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel landmines and had observed a moratorium on their transfer.  It had also remained fully committed to global cooperation and assistance for a mine-safe world, under the United Nations umbrella.  India also strongly supported technical cooperation in mine-clearance technology, equipment and training, and had set up a number of camps to fit artificial limbs to landmine victims in Afghanistan.  Nevertheless, the defence of States, especially those with long borders, required the use of landmines.  Their elimination, however, would be facilitated by the availability of appropriate, militarily effective, non-lethal and cost effective alternative technologies.

Austria’s representative had wished to co-sponsor the draft on the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit small arms trade (L.34/Rev.1).

The representative of the United States said he fully supported the Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit small arms trade, as well as the review conference to be held in New York next year.  Despite his support for the action plan, however, he had opposed the draft resolution, because it linked efforts to curb and prevent that illicit trade with social and economic consequences.  Although the United States recognized those issues, those should not be raised in the First Committee, which was a forum for disarmament and security concerns.  The draft also pre-empted planning for the upcoming review conference.  Those discussions should be left to the discretion of the preparatory committee in January.  He looked forward to working with all delegations in shaping that review, in order to strengthen implementation of the action plan.

Singapore’s representative said he had voted in favour of L.56 on landmines.  His country’s position had been clear and open, and it would continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of landmines.  It had declared a two-year moratorium in 1996 on those weapons’ export, and in February 1998 it had expanded the moratorium to include all types of anti-personnel landmines and had extended the moratorium indefinitely.  At the same time, legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State could not be disregarded.  Thus, a blanket ban on landmines might be counter-productive.  He would continue to work with the international community to find a durable and truly global solution.

Explaining his vote on L.34, Egypt’s representative said he had supported the draft, believing in the good intentions of its co-sponsors, which had sought to discuss the illicit trafficking from its humanitarian and development aspects.  He had supported the draft resolution in light of his conviction of the need to look at the development and humanitarian aspects of the illicit trade in States emerging from conflicts, in a manner that conformed to efforts under way to develop the concept of a Peacebuilding Commission.  It was known that the majority of States emerging from conflicts were situated in Africa, which prompted Africa to pay special attention to enhancing the capacities of States to grapple with the illicit small arms trade.  Yet, the draft had not specifically addressed that.  Moreover, the text had not emphasized the right to self-determination and self-defence.  Despite those and other reservations, including that the issues might be outside the Committee’s purview, he had opted, nevertheless, for a positive vote.

On L.56, he said he had abstained in the vote because the Convention contained substantial imbalances.  The Convention had not tackled States’ legitimate right of self-defence, nor had it mentioned, among other things, the actions taken by States to clear anti-personnel landmines.  Hence, he abstained.

The representative of Morocco explained that his country was not a signatory to the landmines Convention, and it had legitimate national security concerns.  This year, however, he had decided to vote in favour of the draft.  In confirming his positive vote, he reiterated Morocco’s support of and commitment to the objectives and principles contained in the Convention.  The positive vote had come on the eve of the sixth meeting of States parties in Zagreb, in November.  He reiterated his commitment to that review.  As always, Morocco had applied, de facto, many of the Convention’s provisions.  It had never produced or exported anti-personnel landmines and, long before the Convention’s adoption, it had stopped importing anti-personnel landmines.  In 2002, it ratified the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons relating to mines, booby traps and other devices.

The representative of the Republic of Korea said he had abstained in the vote on L.56.  As previously stated, his country fully shared and supported the spirit and objectives of the landmines Convention, which played an essential role in eliminating human suffering caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines.  But, the unique security situation in his part of the world had not allowed it to adhere to the Convention.  Yet, it had joined certain instruments, namely, the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and it actively participated in a range of discussions aimed at deploying mines in a balanced manner that mitigated the humanitarian concerns.  Currently, his country did not produce or export anti-personnel landmines, and it was supporting international mine-clearance efforts.  It had also supported the voluntary trust fund in that regard and had assisted demining operations in Iraq.

The representative of Kazakhstan, in an explanation of vote on draft resolution L.56 on the Ottawa Convention, said his country fully supported the objectives of the Ottawa Convention and the non-discriminatory global ban on anti-personnel landmines.  The issue involved not only humanitarian aspects, but legitimate security aspects as well.  Kazakhstan would become party to the Ottawa Convention, but since it was not a signatory, his delegation had abstained in the voting of the draft resolution.

The representative of Myanmar, in an explanation of his country’s position on draft resolution L.56, said he was in favour of banning the export, transfer and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines.  Myanmar was not a State party to the Ottawa Convention, but it respected the parties to the Convention.  All States had the right to self-defence.  No State would compromise its national security and sovereign interest.  But, at the same time, Myanmar opposed the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines.  Based on that reality, a total ban would not lead to a practical or effective solution.  He reiterated Myanmar’s belief that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum to deal with the illicit trafficking of anti-personnel mines, which was why Myanmar abstained.

The representative of Venezuela said his country supported measures in the Programme of Action to prevent combat and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms, so Venezuela voted in favour of draft resolution L.34/Rev.1 on the humanitarian impact of small arms.  However, he wished to state that Venezuela was not satisfied with the resolution, as worded.  The references to excessive accumulation in the title of that draft resolution did not make clear what would be considered excessive accumulation.  Venezuela also supported the efforts of the international community aimed at assisting countries that needed to stop the illicit trade in those weapons.  For those reasons, Venezuela did not oppose draft resolution L.37/Rev.1 on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic.  However, he disagreed with the eleventh preambular paragraph, which referred to the final document of the World Summit.  He wanted to reiterate that, at the time it was adopted, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela entered a reservation, because of the way it was negotiated and the way it was being adopted.  Later on, President Hugo Chavez denounced it as illegal.  The World Summit outcome was only valid as a working paper for his delegation.

Venezuela subscribed to the prohibition on anti-personnel mines.  His country had contributed to the mine-clearing project in Central America.  So Venezuela voted in favour of L.56.  However, he had reservations on the eighth preambular paragraph, which referred to the World Summit outcome.  He recognized the threat posed by the illicit traffic of MANPADS, and the threat to civil aviation, and he supported measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring those weapons.  So, Venezuela did not oppose L.49, but it did wish to emphasize the sovereign rights of States to acquire and possess those weapons to meet their needs of self-defence.

The representative of Pakistan, in an explanation of vote on draft resolution L.34/Rev.1, said his country reaffirmed the humanitarian, social and economic concerns that arose from the trade in illicit small arms and light weapons.  He appreciated efforts by the Netherlands to incorporate suggestions.  However, as Pakistan and others pointed out, while the negative impact was understandable, Member States had yet to agree on a common understanding of what constituted to the illicit manufacture of weapons.  He would have preferred that the resolution keep its focus on the negative impact, rather than introducing elements that had yet to be agreed.  The issue of illicit transfer required further efforts to develop a consensus.   Pakistan hoped its support for the resolution was not construed as agreement on issues.  On draft resolution L.56, Pakistan’s position was well known.  Given its need to guard borders, the use of landmines formed an important part of Pakistan’s self-defence policy, so it could not agree to the complete prohibition of anti-personnel mines.  Therefore, he abstained on the resolution.

The representative from the Russian Federation said he had abstained on draft resolution L.56.  While Russia shared the humanitarian purpose of the Ottawa Convention and it didn’t reject the idea of joining it, it could only do so when it did not interfere with Russia’ obligations.  For that, Russia needed to resolve some military, economic and financial problems.

The representative of Mali was pleased with the adoption without a vote of draft resolution, L.37/Rev.1.  The adoption without a vote signified that the question of small arms remained an important aspect of general and complete disarmament.  Far from being only a subject of interest to Africa, the issue of small arms continued to occupy a central place in concerns of the international community.

Croatia wanted to put on record that it supported draft resolution L.34/Rev.1.

The Committee then adopted a resolution entitled United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, (document A/C.1/60/L.43/Rev.1), without a vote.

The representative of the United States said the Secretariat issued draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.1/Rev.1 on compliance with non-proliferation.  But, late yesterday, the United States had discovered that text differed in a number of important respects from the one it intended to have published.  The United States, therefore, faxed to all delegations an authoritative text.  It also had copies.  The United States understood it took particular effort to issue that correction, and it appreciated the prompt assistance in rectifying matters.  However, there still remained an omission.  Rather than seek a technical revision, he wished to point out that in preambular paragraph three, the last line read “for regional and global security and stability”.  The word peace should be added, so it read “for regional and global peace, security and stability”.  In addition, the United States believed delegations might need time to review the changes reflected to ensure that they had time to study the authoritative text.  Therefore, he asked that action be postponed until the next meeting.

The representative of France wished to introduce stylistic corrections on draft resolution L.39/Rev.1, entitled preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.   France kept carrying on consultations to ensure consensus on that proposal.  Due to delays, he understood it would take until Monday for the Secretariat to publish a second revision, so he proposed to take action on the first revision with the stylistic corrections added.

The representative of India, in an explanation of vote on draft resolution L.39/Rev.1, said India was aware of the threat posed by terrorists, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction, and it fully shared the objectives of preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.   India had been at the forefront of international efforts to combat the dangers.  Since 2002, it had tabled a resolution on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The representative of the United Kingdom said his country supported draft resolution L.16 on the relationship between disarmament and development.  But, the United Kingdom did not believe there was an automatic link between the two and the resolution did not fully explain fully the complexity of that relationship.  He had questions about the report of the group of governmental experts.  But, despite those reservations, the United Kingdom’s commitment to developmental goals meant it could continue to support it.

The representative of Kazakhstan, in an explanation of vote on resolution L.39/Rev.1 said his country supported Security Council resolution 1540.  His Government was undertaking stepped up measures to strengthen the systems of oversight.   Kazakhstan would vote for the resolution.

The Committee approved the resolution entitled relationship between disarmament and development (document A/C.1/60/L.16), by a recorded vote of 164 in favour to 1 against ( United States), with 2 abstentions ( France, Israel).  (See annex VIII.)

Then, the Committee approved the resolution on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/C.1/60/L.29) by a recorded vote of 163 in favour to 1 against ( United States), with no abstentions (Annex IX).

Acting without a vote, it next approved the draft resolution on national legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology (document A/C.1/60/L.35).

Before approving the draft resolution, as orally amended, on preventing the risk of radiological terrorism (document A/C.1/60/L.39/Rev.1), the following countries added their names to the list of co-sponsors:  Chile, Congo, and Guinea.

It then approved the draft text, as orally amended, by a vote of 162 in favour to none against, with no abstentions (Annex X). 

The representative of the United States, explaining his vote on L.16, said he had again voted “no” on the relationship between disarmament and development.  He continued to believe that disarmament and development were two distinct issues, which did not lend themselves to being linked.  Thus, the United States had not participated in the 1987 conference on that matter.  Accordingly, it would not consider itself bound by the declaration emanating from that conference.

He said that L.29 had been under consideration by the Committee for six years.  Member responses to repeated requests for views had not demonstrated any keen passion for seeking negotiated limits on the development and use of information technology.  For the past two years, a group of governmental experts had been meeting to explore further the merits of the subject.  The United States had supported the resolution through the last session and had participated in the work of the governmental experts.  The stalemate within the expert group over the attempt to itemize and limit existing and potential threats had underscored the difficulties.  He had hoped for a thoughtful redraft, emphasizing areas of common ground.  Instead, the text acknowledged the work of the expert group, but not its failure, and it sought to cover the same ground, calling for a global instrument and yet another group of governmental experts in the future.  While he welcomed the clause calling for strengthened security and promoting cooperation, he felt that was not enough to offset the rest of the text.  So, he had voted against it.

Explaining his position on L.35, on national legislation on arms transfers, Cuba’s representative reiterated that it was only in the framework of legally binding international treaties, negotiated multilaterally, where one could effectively guarantee strict international control of the transfers of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology.  The existence of systems of export controls based on selective and discriminatory criteria, in practice, were a serious obstacle to implementation of the right of all States to use for peaceful purposes the various material and technologies existing in the chemical, biological and nuclear spheres.  Only the broad and non-discriminatory participation in export and import controls could guarantee their effectiveness.

He added that multilateral efforts must be supplemented by national measures, which strengthened the disarmament and non-proliferation of States, entered into under the multilateral treaties to which they were parties.

On L.39/Rev.1, as orally amended, he emphasized the need to prevent the risk of radiological terrorism.  Cuba supported relevant efforts in the framework of the United Nations and other relevant organizations in that regard.  He reaffirmed the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting and strengthening technology and physical security of the source of radioactive sources and materials.  International efforts under way in that field should be fully in keeping with international law and with the Charter.

(annexes follow)

ANNEX I

Vote on Preambular Paragraph 8/Hague Code

The amendment to the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution on The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (document A/C.1/60/L.62) was rejected by a recorded vote of 26 in favour to 105 against, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Venezuela, Viet Nam.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:  Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX I)

ANNEX II

Vote on Operative Paragraph 1/Hague Code

The amendment to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution on The Hague Code of Conduct (document A/C.1/60/L.62) was rejected by a recorded vote of 19 in favour to 108 against, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Syria, Venezuela, Viet Nam.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:  Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Haiti, India, Lebanon, Mauritius, Thailand, Yemen.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX II)

ANNEX III

Vote on Operative Paragraph 3/Hague Code

The amendment to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on The Hague Code of Conduct (document A/C.1/60/L.62) was rejected by a recorded vote of 24 in favour to 106 against, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Venezuela, Viet Nam.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:  Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Lebanon, Thailand, Yemen.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX III)

ANNEX IV

Vote on Hague Code of Conduct

The draft resolution on The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (document A/C.1/60/L.22) was approved by a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 1 against, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Iran.

Abstain:  Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Syria.

Absent:  Bahamas, Bahrain, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam.

(END OF ANNEX IV)

ANNEX V

Vote on Outer Space Transparency

The draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building in outer space activities (document A/C.1/60/L.30/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 158 in favour to 1 against, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  United States.

Abstain:  Israel.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX V)

ANNEX VI

Vote on Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms

The draft resolution on addressing the negative humanitarian and development impact of small arms (document A/C.1/60/L.34/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 160 in favour to 1 against, with no abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  United States.

Abstain:  None.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX VI)

ANNEX VII

Vote on Ottawa Convention

The draft resolution on implementation of the convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines (document A/C.1/60/L.56) was approved by a recorded vote of 147 in favour to none against, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstain:  Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria, United States, Viet Nam.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX VII)

ANNEX VIII

Vote on Disarmament and Development

The draft resolution on the relationship between disarmament and development (document A/C.1/60/L.16) was approved by a recorded vote of 164 in favour to 1 against, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  United States.

Abstain:  France, Israel.

Absent:  Bahamas, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX VIII)

ANNEX IX

Vote on Telecommunications and International Security

The draft resolution on developments in the field of information and communications technology in the context of international security (document A/C.1/60/L.29) was approved by a recorded vote of 163 in favour to 1 against, with no abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  United States.

Abstain:  None.

Absent:  Bahamas, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX IX)

ANNEX X

Vote on Radiological Terrorism

The draft resolution on preventing the risk of radiological terrorism (document A/C.1/60/L.39/Rev.1) was adopted by a recorded vote of 162 in favour to none against, with no abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstain:  None.

Absent:  Bahamas, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

* *** *

For information media • not an official record
For information media. Not an official record.