PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

6 June 1996



Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

19960606 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, briefed correspondents on the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for flood-related emergency assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He said that after the unprecedented floods of last July and August, the Government had asked for international assistance. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs then led a joint United Nations assessment mission with the participation of the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Last September, a $15 million inter-agency appeal, later revised to $20 million, was launched; only 45 per cent of the target had been reached. However, a total of $31 million in international contributions had been donated through all other channels. A full listing of the donors was contained in annex 5 of the appeal document.

Mr. Akashi said, because of the magnitude of the problem, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had asked the United Nations in March to prepare another consolidated appeal, particularly for food aid and non-food items. A team from the Department had drafted the current appeal based on input from the agencies and consultations with the Government. The team had received excellent cooperation from the agencies and from the Government, he added. The team itself did not conduct an assessment, although it had visited two of the affected counties. The Department's agency colleagues in the area had a more thorough assessment of the problem.

The appeal requests $43,632,935 for the period 1 July 1996 to 31 March 1997, he continued. Just over $26 million would go for food aid; $10 million would go towards returning arable lands to production; $5.9 million for the restoration of basic health services; and $566,000 for ensuring adequate monitoring and reporting procedures. The Department wanted to make sure all of the humanitarian assistance reached the targeted recipients. The Government and United Nations agencies had agreed to those measures. Emergency activities in the three priority areas of food aid, recovery of arable lands and restoration of basic health services would be integrated and focus on the most affected provinces to achieve a multi-sector approach. And they would be linked to longer-term rehabilitation. However the current appeal would address only the most urgent needs. A later, longer-term programme, outside the framework of the current appeal, would deal with flood damage.

The appeal would target people and local communities in the most affected provinces of Chagang, North and South Hwanghae, North and South Pyongan and Kangwon, Mr. Akashi continued. Project proposals from non- governmental organizations were included in the appeal so as to increase their food aid and facilitate their relations with the Government. Important projects from Karitas and Medecins sans frontières were included in the list of programmes.

Given the urgency of the humanitarian needs of the disaster victims, Mr. Akashi called on the international community to give immediate attention and broad support to the appeal. He said he would meet with some donor governments tomorrow and separately with countries from the Asian-Pacific region to get a positive response. Timely assistance could ease suffering. It would also build the Government's confidence about the wisdom of approaching the international community and encourage continued future interaction.

Monitoring arrangements by United Nations agencies had worked well in the past, he said. According to WFP, the monitoring had been thorough and the Government had not impeded its efforts. The monitoring arrangements were based mainly on random field visits. A list of 1995-1996 field visits by WFP and UNICEF was included in annex 4 of the appeal document and information on how the United Nations assessed whether target populations received humanitarian assistance was given on pages 8 and 9. Each agency would determine its particular monitoring requirements in consultation with the Government, he added.

A correspondent asked whether China had made uncommercial donations to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, if not, had the United Nations or any of its agencies approached Beijing about the matter? Would Mr. Akashi be approaching China tomorrow? Mr. Akashi said he hoped China would be represented in his discussions with Asian governments. He called attention to annex 5 of the appeal document which listed bilateral cash contributions by China of over $3 million. The Republic of Korea had contributed significantly in three different amounts. The United States had made quite a lot of cash contributions and had asked UNICEF and WFP to purchase needed goods. The European Community, through its humanitarian aid agency, ECHO, had also given assistance. Many other governments had also contributed. Japan had been quite generous with two contributions of $120,000 and one of $160.000. Although the response had not been totally satisfactory, it had been significant.

Another correspondent asked Mr. Akashi if he could guarantee that this appeal would be more successful than the last one. Was he expecting big contributions from the United States? Mr. Akashi replied that he could not guarantee anything. The Director of the WFP North American Office, Douglas Coutts, had given a graphic presentation in Washington and New York. Mr.

Akashi Briefing - 3 - 6 June 1996

Akashi said he was confident there would be a good response, given the seriousness of the situation.

How many monitors did the United Nations need and would the $500,000 for monitoring activities go on staff salaries? a correspondent asked. Monitoring would basically be done by the agencies concerned who had the expertise and experience, Mr. Akashi said. Off-hand, he could not give figures of how many people would be hired.

Mr. Coutts referred correspondents to page 57 of the appeal document, which listed by agency the number of staff and their responsibilities under the section on monitoring and reporting. The non-governmental organizations listed would also be involved in monitoring on the food aid side.

The correspondents asked whether the figures on page 57 were for staff salaries or for other costs. Mr. Coutts replied that the figures were for total costs. The staff would be international, not locals.

The correspondent then asked whether the agencies had negotiated with the Government about the nature of staff, where they would placed and the type of monitoring mechanism. Mr. Coutts said those details would be worked out depending on the response to the appeal.

Mr. Akashi said that the Government would be asked to give a full accounting to United Nations agencies and donors to ensure that the aid reached its intended recipients and destinations.

A correspondent asked if, given the increase in grain prices, another appeal was anticipated. Mr. Akashi said inclement weather worldwide meant that the available money would buy less grain and cereals, and the United Nations might have to ask for more assistance later. The current appeal was an honest assessment of current needs.

In reply to a question on when off-shore letters would be sent to donor countries, Mr. Akashi said in the next few days.

A correspondent then asked for comment on an article in today's edition of the New York Times referring to a television documentary on the role of the United Nations and Mr. Akashi in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Aksahi replied that press speculation on conversations which had reportedly taken place between certain political leaders was not very helpful. He had not been privy to those conversations, but he had a clear recollection of the internal discussions at the headquarters of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

The period from June to July 1995 was very tense, but his people were very clear that they were still adhering to the principles of United Nations peace-keeping, and Headquarters had fully agreed with that approach, Mr.

Akashi Briefing - 4 - 6 June 1996

Akashi said. Some of his people, especially those in Bosnia, felt the Organization would have to go beyond classical peace-keeping to some kind of peace enforcement. But United Nations troops had been sent for peace-keeping and were not armed, trained nor did they have the command to engage in anything else. Besides, the troops were spread all over Bosnia and Herzegovina to stabilize the situation, and more importantly, to enable relief convoys and other humanitarian activities to take place. The United Nations purpose was not to create a peace which did not exist, but to contain the situation in order to assist over 2.5 million innocent civilians.

A lot of "ex post facto wisdom is being heard about Srebrenica" he continued. His people did not have access to confidential military information through satellite pictures. He was not aware that UNPROFOR's Force Commander, General Bernard Janvier, had access to such information. No one knew the intentions of the Bosnian Serb leaders. Their troops had advanced and stopped and then advanced and stopped. It was not clear, until the last moment, that they wanted to completely occupy Srebrenica where there were thousands of Bosnian Serb troops and thousands of Bosnian Government troops which at some date disappeared. The United Nations had only 450 lightly armed Dutch troops left to defend the city. They were very courageous and efficient soldiers, but they were no match for the Bosnian Serbs.

The United Nations agonized over whether close air support should be taken against the advancing Bosnian Serbs, but the terrain, geography and the configuration of the front lines were not considered very suitable until the last moment. When General Janvier finally asked for close air support on 11 July at around 12:25 p.m., Mr. Akashi said he gave his approval within five minutes and planes from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started attacking Serb tanks within two hours. About two hours later, he received a phone fall from the Dutch Minister of Defence who said that Serb troops were too close to the Dutch lines which might be imperilled by close air support. Mr. Akashi said he then had no alternative but to comply with the Minister's wish.

The Secretary-General in his reports to the Security Council had made it clear, a number of times, that the whole concept of "safe areas" was faulty, Mr. Akashi continued. One of the parties was able to station, retrain and re- equip its troops in the safe areas and often used them for command centres. That gave the other side a pretext to attack them. When the six safe areas were declared, the Secretary-General asked for 34,000 troops and the Council, in its wisdom, granted him only 7,000 troops which arrived about a year later. It was quiet clear UNPROFOR was not given the resources to carry out its mandate with regard to the safe areas. It would be debated for many years as to whether resolution 836 (1993) was serious with regard to implementation or whether it was some kind of instantaneous reaction to television sound bites which depicted the horrors and cruelty of the fighting in Bosnia. The United Nations knew that with the forces at hand it was not able to implement any deterrence for the safe areas.

Akashi Briefing - 5 - 6 June 1996

As to the use of air power, there were vulnerable troops spread all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, he said. It might be possible to break through one checkpoint, but there were 20 other checkpoints. It might be possible to protect one humanitarian convoy but what about the 15 other convoys going through Bosnian Serb controlled territory? he asked. Unless those questions were answered satisfactorily, the United Nations could not be criticized for doing the best it could under the circumstances. He paid tribute to his military and civilian colleagues who, he said, had done their best. Second- guessing after the events in question, with much more information than was available at the time, was not a helpful or productive exercise.

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For information media. Not an official record.