SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS SUDAN ACT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS IN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT BY 10 MAY, OR FACE LIMITED SANCTIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS SUDAN ACT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS IN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT BY 10 MAY, OR FACE LIMITED SANCTIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS SUDAN ACT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS IN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT BY 10 MAY, OR FACE LIMITED SANCTIONS19960426 Adopts Resolution 1054 (1996) by 13-0-2 Vote, Demands Sudan Desist From Terrorist Support, Other Measures Possible for Non-Compliance in 60 Days
The Security Council this evening demanded that the Sudan take immediate action to ensure extradition to Ethiopia of three suspects sheltered in the Sudan and wanted in connection with the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It further demanded that the Sudan desist from assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements.
Acting Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution 1054 (1996) by a vote of 13 in favour to none opposed, with 2 abstentions (China, Russian Federation). By the text, the Council also demanded that the Sudan, henceforth, act with its neighbours and others in full conformity with the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The demands being made today had been originally contained in Council resolution 1044 of 31 January 1996.
Should the Sudan fail to comply with today's demands by 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on 10 May, the Council decided that all States shall significantly reduce the number and level of the staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts, and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all remaining staff. In addition, all States shall restrict the entry into or transmit through their territory of officials and members of the Sudanese Government and of its armed forces. Those measures would remain in force until the Council determines that the Sudan has complied with its demands.
In support of its action, the Council called upon all States to act strictly in conformity with those sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations prescribed under any international agreements, contracts, licences or permits entered into prior to entry into force of those provisions. It also called on all international and regional organizations not to convene any conference in the Sudan.
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The Council asked States to report to the Secretary-General within 60 days of today's action on measures they will have taken to give effect to its provisions. It also asked the Secretary-General to report within 60 days of the 10 May date on implementation of the resolution. At that time, the Council will re-examine whether the Sudan will have complied with its demands and, if not, what further measures might be adopted.
Addressing the Council, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan said the claim that his country had not complied with the Council's earlier resolution was "amazing". Its invitations to the United Nations to send a fact-finding mission to investigate claims that it was sheltering terrorists had fallen on deaf ears. Neither had his Government received any additional information about the suspects which might help its authorities to determine their location. The imposition of sanctions would undermine all regional initiatives to resolve the matter, he said.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Ethiopia, Uganda, Russian Federation, Italy, Indonesia, Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Korea, Germany, China, France, United States, Honduras, Egypt, United Kingdom, Poland and Chile.
The meeting, which was called to order at 4:23 p.m., was adjourned at 7:18 p.m.
Secretary-General's Report and Letters before Council
The Security Council met this afternoon to consider the Secretary- General's report (document S/1996/179) on the implementation of Council resolution 1044 (1996) which called on the Government of the Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects wanted in connection with the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 26 June 1995. It also had before it several letters on the matter.
On 18 February, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy undertook a mission to the area to gather information. In the course of his two-week mission, the Special Envoy held consultations with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and met with the authorities in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia.
That resolution also called on the Sudan to "desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements". The Council requested the Secretary-General to seek the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the implementation of that resolution and to report to the Council within 60 days.
The report states that with regard to the three suspects, the Government of the Sudan has not yet complied with the demands of the Council. The OAU noted that the main focus of its efforts was the complaint about Sudan's lack of compliance with the extradition request. The OAU saw this as an attack against the OAU itself.
The Ethiopian Government is convinced that the Sudan is sheltering the suspects. The Sudanese Government, for its part, maintains that the Ethiopian Government has not provided it with adequate information on which to base its search for the suspects. Furthermore, even this sketchy information was received from Ethiopia after a lapse of 32 days. Nevertheless, the Sudanese authorities assured the Secretary-General's Envoy that they were continuing in their efforts to look for the suspects. If they succeeded in apprehending the suspects, the Government of the Sudan would have no difficulty in extraditing them to Ethiopia.
Similar differences prevail over the Council's demand that the Sudan stop assisting terrorist activities and giving sanctuary to terrorist elements. All the neighbouring countries visited by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy -- Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and Uganda -- are unanimous in their conviction that the Sudan is actively engaged in supporting terrorist elements who operate from Sudanese territory, carrying out destabilizing activities in their countries.
The governments of the neighbouring countries affirm that they have conclusive evidence of Sudan's involvement in such terrorist activities, but
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were not willing to reveal it for reasons of security and confidentiality. They also affirmed that the Sudan was running camps for training terrorists.
The position of the Sudan is that it is the Sudan that is the victim of destabilizing activities encouraged and supported by its neighbours. The Sudanese interlocutors who spoke with the Envoy spoke of heavy equipment, including tanks and anti-aircraft guns, which had recently been observed in the south and which, according to them, could only have come from Uganda. Similarly, they referred to the activities of the Sudanese rebels who are alleged to be operating from Eritrean territory. As for Ethiopia, the Sudanese authorities complained about attacks launched by Ethiopian forces on the border. Regarding Egypt, the Sudanese Government maintained that it was Egypt that had illegally occupied Sudanese territory.
The Secretary-General says that he intends to keep in close contact with all parties concerned, as well as with the OAU Secretary-General, on all aspects of resolution 1044 (1996). He will keep the Council informed "on all relevant aspects of this difficult situation".
In a 4 April-dated letter to the Council President (document S/1996/246), Sudan's Permanent Representative transmits a 2 April statement from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Ethiopia's decision to hold secret trials for three Egyptians and some Ethiopians suspected of involvement in the assassination attempt on the Egyptian President. Since the Ethiopian authorities attempted to implicate the Sudan even before the trials of the suspects began, the Sudan requests that the trials be held in public, and that its Embassy in Addis Ababa be permitted to attend them. The Ethiopian authorities must also allow international news agencies and other parties to attend the trials. The international community should urge Ethiopia to comply with the request and to reject any justifications for the secrecy, the letter states.
Responding in an 11 April letter (document S/1996/275), Ethiopia describes the statement as another Sudanese attempt to divert the world's attention from the measures to be taken by the Council against the Sudan for not complying with resolution 1044 (1996). As for the closed trials, Ethiopia states that international law allows the exclusion of the public and the press from trials for reasons of national security and public order or morals.
In an 8 April letter addressed to the Council President (document S/1996/254), the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia transmits an annexed press statement by his Foreign Ministry that the Sudan had not complied with the resolution by the end of March. Maximum pressure should be brought to bear to compel them to do so, it states.
The Sudan, in an 8 April letter (document S/1996/255), transmits a statement of protest to Ethiopia regarding massive attacks by Ethiopian forces against Sudan's territories on 17 and 23 March. It states that the recent
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Ethiopian attacks have been marked by joint operations with Sudanese rebel forces and demands that Ethiopia desist from destabilizing the Sudan. Responding in an 11 April letter (document S/1996/264), Ethiopia's Permanent Representative calls those allegations baseless. He adds, in an annexed note to the Sudan, that the latest accusation is, like previous ones, meant to divert attention from the need for further steps after Sudan's failure to implement the resolution.
A 12 April letter from the Central African Republic (document S/1996/294) transmits a communique dated 2 April addressed to the Council by President Ange-Felix Patasse. He appeals for preference to be given to the search for a peaceful solution, precluding punitive measures against the Sudan. Such measures might compromise initiatives being undertaken. One of those was the January summit in Bangui held by Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic to promote an environment of security for subregional integration.
Uganda's Permanent Representative, in a letter dated 15 April (document S/1996/288), transmits a statement by his Government on the Secretary- General's report. The statement says that the Sudan has not stopped supporting, assisting or sheltering rebels of the Lords Resistance Army of Joseph Kony. The Sudan has also supported the West Nile Bank Front rebels of Juma Oris who operate against Uganda from bases in the Sudan. Those actions contravened the Charters of both the United Nations and the OAU. The latest rebel incursion had led to the death of 50 civilians and to the loss of several million dollars worth of property. In addition, the Sudanese armed forces have also shelled or bombed Uganda territory on a number of occasions. The Sudanese air force had bombed some parts of Uganda as recently as 9 April, an action that the Ugandan Government condemned in the strongest terms. Calling on the Security Council, the OAU and the international community to do the same, it requests the strongest possible measures to dissuade the Sudan from committing any further acts of unprovoked aggression against Uganda. In particular, it calls on the Council to take measures, including an arms embargo against the Sudan.
In a 22 April letter to the Council's President (document S/1996/311), Sudan's Permanent Representative states that the imposition of sanctions would have adverse and detrimental effects on his country, "in particular, since it is based on suspicious, inconclusive and very doubtful evidence". Stressing that the Council should base its actions on facts only, he drew attention to a report 21 April edition of the Arabic newspaper Al Hayat. That report contains an interview by the newspaper's correspondent from Konor, Afghanistan, with Mustafa Hamza, one of the three suspects the Council has asked the Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia. The interview should throw doubts on the whole issue and the basis for resolution 1044 (1996). The letter also calls on the Council to establish a fact-finding commission to investigate the emerging new information. The Arabic text of the article and an unofficial English translation is annexed to the letter.
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The Council also has before it a draft resolution sponsored by Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau and Honduras (document S/1996/293), which reads as follows:
"The Security Council,
"Reaffirming its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996,
"Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1996 (S/1996/179) submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1044 (1996) and the conclusions contained therein,
"Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,
"Taking note that the statements of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II) considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,
"Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,
"Taking note of the continued effort of the OAU Secretary-General to ensure Sudan's compliance with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU,
"Taking note also, with regret, that the Government of Sudan has not responded adequately to the efforts of the OAU, "Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to comply with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996),
"Reaffirming that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,
"Determining that the non-compliance by the Government of Sudan with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) constitutes a threat to international peace and security, "Determined to eliminate international terrorism and to ensure effective implementation of resolution 1044 (1996) and to that end acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
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"1. Demands that the Government of Sudan comply without further delay with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) by:
"(a) Taking immediate action to ensure extradition to Ethiopia for prosecution of the three suspects sheltered in Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt of 26 June 1995 on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and
"(b) Desisting from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements; and henceforth acting in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Charter of the OAU;
"2. Decides that the provisions set out in paragraph 3 below shall come into force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on 10 May 1996, and shall remain in force until the Council determines that the Government of Sudan has complied with paragraph 1 above;
"3. Decides that all states shall:
"(a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain;
"(b) Take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces;
"4. Calls upon all international and regional organizations not to convene any conference in Sudan;
"5. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations and the United Nations specialized agencies to act strictly in conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the provisions set out in paragraph 3 above;
"6. Requests States to report tot the Secretary-General of the United Nations within 60 days from the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraph 3 above;
"7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial report to the Council within 60 days of the date specified in paragraph 2 above on the implementation of this resolution;
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"8. Decides to re-examine the matter, 60 days after the date specified in paragraph 2 above and to consider, on the basis of the facts established by the Secretary-General, whether Sudan has complied with the demands in paragraph 1 above and, if not, whether to adopt further measures to ensure its compliance;
"9. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
ALI MOHAMED OSMAN YASSIN (Sudan) said that when resolution 1044 (1996) was adopted, the pretext was that the Sudan had not complied with the requirements of the OAU. Its aim was to reaffirm the will of the international community to combat terrorism, to pursue terrorists, and to support the OAU's efforts to solve the problem. It was clear that resolution concentrated on the need for the United Nations to support the dispute- settlement mechanism of the OAU regarding that matter. However, States parties had resorted directly to the United Nations in an effort to punish the Sudan. The OAU mechanism should have been given an opportunity to do its work. The OAU was continuing its efforts to resolve the question.
The Council was meeting today to adopt some coercive measures against the Sudan, he said. What was the value of resolution 1044 (1996), which was aimed primarily at giving the OAU the opportunity to do its work? What had the Council done to assist the OAU in that work? Had the dispute settlement machinery arrived at a dead end, therefore, making it incumbent on the Council to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter? The resolution to be adopted today fell under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, it must be remembered that resolution 1044 (1996) contained no condemnation of the Sudan. It had not taken the form of a warning to be followed by sanctions.
He said the Sudan had 10 neighbouring States. The selection of only four States to be visited by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy amounted to a premeditated intention to collect accusations aimed at tarnishing the reputation of the Sudan. Those accusations contained no reality. The imposition of any sanctions against the Sudan would undermine all regional initiatives and set back the march towards development.
He reviewed actions which the Sudan had taken to normalize relations with its neighbours. The Secretary-General should not have ignored those efforts in his report. The Special Envoy had not even met those accused in the assassination attempt who were being held by Ethiopia, even though Ethiopia had based its allegations against the Sudan on their statements. The Secretary-General's claim that the Sudan had not complied with the Council's resolution was "amazing".
The Council had ignored the text of the resolution of dispute settlement machinery which called on all parties to the dispute to provide the Government
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of the Sudan with all information which would help it to locate and extradite the suspects, he said. On the contrary, the Council had chosen to reaffirm categorically that the suspects were in the Sudan. Further, no mention was made that the suspects were Egyptian citizens.
The Government had declared its readiness to apprehend and extradite the suspects, as soon as it knew of their whereabouts, he said. A fully dossier of the Government to that end had been made available. Could that be considered non-compliance with resolution 1044 (1996)? None of those efforts were reflected in today's draft resolution. Many States were convinced that there was no proof that the suspects were present in the territory of the Sudan. On the contrary, there were news reports indicating their presence on the territory of other States.
He went on to detail allegations made by one of the suspects in the assassination attempt. Those statements had much higher value than the claims made by the Ethiopian Government, he said.
The demand in resolution 1044 (1996) to cease the support of terrorism was a condemnation of the innocent, and punishing the innocent without any convincing proof. That resolution had failed to clarify what action the Sudan should have taken to comply with it. The Sudan had invited the United Nations to send a fact-finding mission to investigate claims that it was sheltering terrorists. Those invitations had fallen on deaf ears.
One of the four States visited by the Special Envoy was trying to destabilize it, he said. The Envoy had been reminded of letters sent by the Sudan to the President of the Security Council complaining about actions perpetrated against it by some of the States which had been visited. The Sudan had not yet received any additional information about the suspects which might help the Sudanese authorities to determine their location.
He said Egypt had distributed a document claiming to be the transcript of the interrogation of a suspect being held in Ethiopian prison. However, that document was flawed for several reasons. It did not indicate who had been interrogated. Further, it contained undocumented claims of involvement by the Sudan's security forces and of arms smuggling by the Sudan. The mere claim that one or more suspects had entered the Sudan was not proof that they had done so. Neither was it proof that the authorities would know of such movements. Why hadn't Egypt provided the information contained in that document to the Sudan?
He drew attention to allegations by the United States and rejected that Sudan's representatives had any connection with terrorists. The expulsion of Sudan's representative was contrary to the host country agreement. That action had been undertaken as a political mobilization aimed at influencing the Council's consideration of the current draft resolution.
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MULUGETA ETEFFA (Ethiopia) said when Ethiopia decided to bring the grave issue to the Security Council more than three months ago, it had done so with the conviction that the Council would be so enraged by the enormity of the crime committed by the Sudanese authorities that the message it would send to them would be clear, unambiguous and principled. It was our hope that the Council would tell the Sudan that there was no place for a leadership which sponsors assassination plots against a head of State. Ethiopia thought the reaction of the Council would be as forceful as the gravity of the crime dictated and as unambiguous as the blatant nature of the international terrorism carried out and sponsored by Sudanese authorities warranted. The draft resolution before the Council has, however, made us wonder whether Ethiopia's initial confidence had been warranted and whether those like the Sudanese authorities would ever fully and with no equivocation be held accountable for the crime they had committed. With the present draft resolution, "we feel justified to be disappointed when our call for justice is given short shrift and when we see principles being sacrificed on the altar of expediency and political calculations".
The facts about the involvement of Sudanese authorities in the assassination attempt were as clear as noon day, he continued. It had been proved beyond a shadow of doubt and the Sudanese authorities knew that they had been caught red-handed. Not only had the Sudanese authorities not complied with the demands of the Council, but they had continued to ridicule the Council by antics and ploys starting from the day after the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996), the latest of which was the alleged interview by Mustafa Hamza, the leader of the terrorist group which vindicated the Sudanese authorities of involvement in the crime. That "is a veritable insult to the intelligence of the members of the Council", he added.
The Secretary-General's report makes it abundantly clear that the Sudan has not complied with the Council's demands contained in resolution 1044 (1996). An arms embargo would have been one of the most appropriate steps that the Council should have taken to secure Sudan's compliance with its demands. All arguments against such a step by the Council were patently hollow, extremely unconvincing, and lacking in transparency. The fact that the Security Council had found it difficult to impose an arms embargo on a leadership which sponsored, assisted as well as supplied arms to terrorists and, which needed the arms to suppress parts of its own people, whom it had difficulty accepting on the basis of equality, was difficult to comprehend, he said.
That the Council had found it impossible at the present time to ban the international flights of the Sudanese Airway, which had been used and was being used by Sudanese authorities for shuttling terrorists and for transporting weapons used by terrorists, was equally perplexing, he continued. Again, expediency had the upper hand, and the major instrument of terror in the hands of Sudanese authorities was allowed to be unaffected even though the proposal would not have affected flights into and out of the Sudan by other
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carriers and would hardly have affected the people of the Sudan. The Council was, therefore, sending a confusing message to the Sudanese authorities.
Trying to appease those who have consciously chosen terrorism as an instrument of State policy would not work and would not produce the desired results. The Sudanese authorities were bound to view the present resolution as a successful outcome of their ploys and prevarication. It might be too soon for the Sudanese authorities to believe that they could continue to carry out terrorism and target heads of State for assassination, with impunity. "There is one clear victor today -- expediency. There is one clear loser -- principle. The fact that principles -- and very important principles having to do with international law and with the fight against international terrorism -- have been sacrificed today on the altars of political expediency and political calculations should be admitted with all candour." The world was not yet ready to fight against State-sponsored terrorism with determination, courage and with a sense of responsibility, justice and solidarity. That was one of the lessons to be drawn from this experience.
PAUL MUKASA-SSALI (Uganda) said since the matter before the Council dealt, to a large extent, with the dangerous policy of the Sudanese Government's support for terrorism, especially in the subregion, he would inform the Council of the persistent and determined efforts by the Sudanese regime to destabilize Uganda. In spite of Uganda's efforts to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness, the Sudanese regime had continued to assist, support, facilitate and give shelter and sanctuary to two rebel movements based in the Sudan, whose sole purpose was to wreck havoc and misery on defenceless civilians in the north and north-western districts of Uganda.
Recalling that his Government had severed diplomatic relations with the Sudan on 13 April 1995, over incidents aimed at destabilizing and compromising the security and stability of Uganda, he said since then the situation had progressively worsened with frequent incursions by Kony Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front of Juma Oris into northern and north- western Uganda, respectively.
He then went on to give details of a number of incidents which had taken place from last year to the present, including the killings and abductions of women and children; the murder of over 200 civilians in April 1995; and attacks and pillage of property in July 1995.
In addition, the Sudan had used rebels to destabilize Uganda and to harass the Sudanese refugees in the camps in Koboko and Adraga and allow its territory to be used as a safe rear base for support and logistics, he continued. The rebels were under instructions to step up acts of insecurity such as the laying of mines and other acts of sabotage in Uganda. The latest of the horrendous incursions into Uganda by the Sudanese-assisted rebels took place on 7 February 1996, in which over 50 innocent civilians had been killed, with many others abducted and million of dollars worth of personal and State
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property looted or destroyed. Others, mostly women and children, had been maimed by anti-personnel mines planted in their farm lands by the rebels. In another incident on 17 April, LRA rebels planted anti-tank and anti-personnel mines along the route after attacking the Ikafe refugee camp and abducting nine workers from OXFAM whom they later released.
In response to these incidents, the Ugandan people and security forces had played, and would continue to play, their appropriate roles in defending the country against foreign aggression. However, Uganda also needed the support of the international community and the Security Council, he said. The latest acts of shelling and bombing of Ugandan territory had been perpetrated between 8 and 10 April when the Sudan shelled Ugandan territory in north- western Uganda for three consecutive days. Sudanese Air Force planes also dropped bombs in the same area on 9 April 1996.
Uganda was in the process of holding Presidential and Parliamentary elections between early May and early June, he said. The incidents mentioned above had not made it easy for Ugandans in the affected districts to prepare to freely exercise their democratic rights as citizens, for the first time in about 30 years, to elect a government of their choice. Economic, social and political activities in north and north-western Uganda had been disrupted, and there was general panic. That situation could not be allowed to continue.
Efforts to improve and normalize relations between Uganda and the Sudan, he said, would be helped if the Sudan disbanded and disarmed the Ugandan dissidents or rebels in the Sudan, confined them in camps which should be monitorable and verifiable, and confined leaders of the rebels or resettled them in a second country of asylum in accordance with international conventions on refugees. The Sudanese Government had not heeded Uganda's advice, but had stepped up its destabilization programme against Uganda. Their pretext had been the alleged Uganda Government support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which Uganda had dismissed as unfounded and without any basis. The conflict in the Sudan was purely an internal matter.
He condemned, in the strongest possible terms, the unprovoked acts of aggression visited on Uganda by the Sudanese regime and called upon the Security Council and the international community to do the same and take the strongest possible measures to halt them completely. The Council should send a clear and strong signal to the regime in Khartoum that terrorism and aggression would not be rewarded and that those who made them an integral part of their policies would be held accountable by all peace-loving people.
Expressing disappointment at the draft resolution, he said it did not send the strong signal he had hoped for. Uganda's terrorized and brutalized people were looking to the Council and the international community for an assurance that the Sudanese Air Force would no longer bomb their homes, that Sudanese Armed Forces would no longer shell their villages, and that Sudanese- sponsored rebels would no longer kill, rape, maim and rob them of their
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property or abduct their children simply because the international community had finally prevailed on the Sudanese regime to desist from all acts of terrorism and aggression against all her neighbours. He called on the Council to take any measures necessary, including an arms embargo against the Sudan, to ensure that it desisted from engaging in activities that were destabilizing Uganda and plunging the entire subregion into chaos.
SERGEY V. LAVROV (Russian Federation) said his country had strongly condemned the attempted assassination of President Mubarak and strongly urged that a complete investigation be carried out and those involved be brought to justice. There must be close cooperation between all interested parties, including the OAU, and also on a bilateral level. Such an approach provided a real chance to find the suspects, to unravel the web of confusion surrounding the Sudan, and to strengthen security in that region of Africa. However, his country's views had not been taken duly into consideration.
The current draft resolution seemed intended, not to locate the suspects, but to isolate the Sudan internationally, he said. Really convincing evidence of Khartoum's involvement in the assassination attempt had not been provided to the United Nations. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution had been forced to acknowledge that fact. There was also information that one of the suspects was not even in the Sudan. If that turned out to be true, other practical steps would need to be taken.
He said the draft resolution disregarded those points. Moreover, it created a problem totally unrelated to the situation in the Sudan. That involved the implications of the use of sanctions by the Security Council. The arbitrary application of sanctions was flawed when there was no clear criteria regarding their imposition or for the lifting of them. Apart from the understandable demand for extradition of the three suspects -- if they were in the Sudan -- abstract demands, such as living in friendly relations with their neighbours, were being made of Khartoum.
No means existed to measure compliance with such demands, he said. As a result, such sanctions could remain in effect indefinitely. That could result in an unavoidable humanitarian crisis, leading to a well-known vicious cycle. The fact that it was known in advance that such a demand could not be met in a way predetermined the inevitability of further escalation of sanctions against the Sudan. That could lead to a stalemate whose resolution could be difficult.
His country opposed the use of sanctions to punish certain regimes or attain the political goals of one or more Member States. Such an approach was not only destructive for the Sudan and the States of the region; it could do real damage to the authority of the Security Council. The Russian delegation, therefore, could not support the draft resolution. It was not able to prevent its adoption only because implementation of the measures it specified depended on the actions of individual States.
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LORENZO FERRARIN (Italy) thanked the Non-Aligned members of the Council for introducing the draft resolution and said he had great respect for the positions of the Non-Aligned Movement caucus, particularly its African members, since they were the ones that had worked on the same case in the framework of the OAU.
The resolution met the Council's purpose, which was to send a strong signal in the hope that the Sudan would comply with resolution 1044 (1996), thereby avoiding a dangerous isolation of that country by the international community.
The time had come for Khartoum to heed its responsibilities towards the international community and show its political will to fully comply with Security Council resolutions, he said. Italy wanted peace to return to the African region, but also strongly believed in the need to fight terrorism in the interest of international peace and security. Stating that Italy would vote in favour of the draft resolution, he expressed the hope that Khartoum would be responsive to its strong signal. The Sudan should make every effort to fulfil is obligations and return to normal relations with other counties, in the interests of the Government and people of the Sudan, of the States in the region, and of international peace and security.
MAKARIM WIBISONO (Indonesia) said the assassination attempt on the Egyptian President, in Addis Ababa in June 1995, required serious attention. That act created concern among the international community, bearing in mind the profound interest the international community attached to the question of international terrorism and to the safety and security of heads of State or government. Indonesia was firmly against international terrorism and strongly condemned all acts of violence. Such acts constituted the most flagrant violation of human rights. When the matter was brought to the Council, his delegation unequivocally condemned the assassination attempt and called for the perpetrators to be brought to swift justice.
It seemed that the Government of the Sudan had not yet fully fulfilled all its obligations to the efforts undertaken by the OAU, he said. However, the Sudan had taken some steps and was continuing its efforts to fulfil its obligations under Council resolution 1044 (1996). Such steps reflected the positive attitude of the Government of the Sudan which the international community should acknowledge. It should redouble its efforts to fulfil the provision of resolution 1044 (1996).
It would have been more appropriate if Sudan's compliance was dealt with in a gradual manner by a presidential statement, rather than a resolution containing elements of sanctions, he said. A step-by-step approach would provide the opportunity and the time necessary for the Sudan to respond positively to the Council's requests. By responding positively and urgently, the Sudan would be making important contributions to confidence-building measures and would demonstrate its peaceful intentions towards its neighbours.
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Close cooperation between the United Nations, the OAU, Ethiopia and the Sudan was of the utmost importance if the matter was to be resolved in a peaceful manner. If, however, after all avenues had been explored and all efforts exhausted, the Council ultimately assessed that the Government of the Sudan had still not yet fully complied with its requests, only then should the Council consider adopting further measures to ensure implementation of resolution 1044 (1996).
While the draft resolution supported the thrust and objectives of the statements adopted by the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, on 11 September 1995 and 19 December 1995, he was concerned that it went beyond his expectations. In spite of accommodations made to addressing the concerns of the Council members and the parties involved, it was unfortunate that the draft still contained measures which constituted sanctions. Indonesia maintained the view that the imposition of sanctions as a means to bring pressure to bear on some governments was a matter of utmost seriousness. Sanctions should be considered only after all means of pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter had been exhausted and a thorough consideration undertaken of the long-term and short-term effects of such sanctions. Sanctions were not meant to be punitive; for it is widely acknowledged that sanctions, irrespective of the objectives, do affect the innocent population. The adverse humanitarian impact, therefore, deserved its serious consideration and must be given primary attention.
In order for a resolution to become a truly effective tool in rectifying a situation, by persuading the concerned party to comply with the obligations of the resolution, it was imperative that it not only properly addressed the concerns of the issue at hand, but also maintained strict adherence to those basic principles to which all Member States aspired. Referring to operative paragraph 1 (a) of the resolution, he said that the matter of extradition was a legal one and only involved two States. The Sudan could only extradite to Ethiopia those suspects who were in its territory.
Regarding operative paragraph 8, his interpretation was that that paragraph did not prejudge whether the Sudan had or had not complied with the Council's requests. The adoption of further measures by the Council would only be determined by its assessments on the situation and conditions prevailing after the 60 days re-examination period had elapsed. Under those circumstances and in the light of the observations he had expressed, he said he would vote in favour of the draft resolution.
MOTHUSI D.C. NKGOWE (Botswana) said he had hoped that resolution 1044 (1996) would be the last resolution to be adopted by the Council on the question of extradition to Ethiopia of the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the Egyptian President. He had hoped the Government of the Sudan would comply with the resolution's demands and avoid a prolonged dispute with the Security Council. It was not too late; the Sudan could still do what was expected of it.
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Referring to the Sudan as a fellow African country, he said Botswana did not harbour any ill-intentions against its brotherly people. However, he was aware that the resolution was not as harsh on the people of the Sudan as it could have been. He hoped that the Sudan would hand over the three suspects to Ethiopia and that it would not be necessary to adopt a third resolution on this issue.
What was most striking about the report of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Africa, following resolution 1044 (1996), was that all of Sudan's neighbours, visited by the Special Envoy, accused the Sudanese Government of supporting terrorist activities in their countries, he continued. That was very disturbing. Africa was drowning in all manner of problems and it could ill-afford to add more. He, therefore, appealed to the Sudan and its neighbours to respect each others' territorial integrity.
Botswana had voted in favour of resolution 1044 (1996) because of its firm aversion to terrorism, he said. Terrorism was the scourge of world society today, and it was incumbent upon all States, including the Sudan, to get rid of that scourge. The extradition of the three suspects to Ethiopia would serve as a deterrent for terrorist in the region and beyond. Those with terrorist intentions would know that there was no place to hide. The draft resolution sent the right message about the commitment of the international community to combat terrorism. He expressed the hope that the Government of the Sudan would take concrete steps to ensure compliance with the demands of the international community.
ADELINO MANO QUETA (Guinea-Bissau) said it was regrettable that the Sudan had not met the requirements of the Security Council, despite the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the OAU. Guinea-Bissau reaffirmed its support for the General Assembly's resolution on measures to eliminate international terrorism. He encouraged the Sudanese authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure implementation of Council resolution 1044 (1996). The current draft resolution did not seem to have economic implications which could adversely affect the civilian population of the Sudan. His delegation would support the draft resolution.
PARK SOO GIL (Republic of Korea) said terrorism was a major source of threat to international peace and security. His country remained committed to its global eradication through concerted international action. His country generally advocated the utmost caution and prudence in taking actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, in the case at hand, it saw no other alternative. The Sudan was given sufficient time to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia. There had been no lack of diplomatic efforts to seek Sudan's compliance with resolution 1044 (1996). Unfortunately, those efforts had been to no avail.
Although the current draft resolution invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, the sanctions it contained were of a symbolic rather than substantive
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nature, he said. They excluded any action that could have a direct impact on the Sudanese population. Nevertheless, it demonstrated the Council's determination to consider further measures should its demands not be met within 60 days from 10 May. The Republic of Korea would support the draft resolution.
GERHARD HENZE (Germany) said the current draft resolution reminded all Member States of their obligation to fight terrorism. The function of sanctions should not be punishment, but to achieve aims agreed upon by the Council. Further, they should only be used when conditions were so serious that coercive measures were required. Those conditions were met in the situation at hand. Germany appreciated the effort to target the sanctions in such a way that they did not target the population but only those who were in a position to take the required measures.
He said the draft resolution aimed at ensuring compliance by the Sudanese Government with resolution 1044 (1996). That Government must do all it could to ensure that the three suspects could be prosecuted in Ethiopia. The Sudan could not free itself of its obligation by allowing the suspects to leave for other countries. He appealed to the Government to use the 60-day period provided by the text to avoid further measures and to allow for an early lifting of the measures to be imposed today. Germany would support the text.
QIN HUASUN (China) said his country strongly condemned all forms of terrorism. Such activities wreaked havoc on life, property and social stability. They also threatened international peace and security. The terrorists involved in the attempt on President Mubarak should be brought to justice. China was also of the view that the act in question should be addressed by the Council in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Its action should be based on fact, and on firm legal ground.
He said that China opposed in principle the frequent recourse to sanctions under Chapter VII. No matter how complex the question might be, dialogue and mediation should be insisted upon, with the aim of reaching a peaceful solution. Sanctions might exacerbate tensions and have adverse effects on both the target country and neighbouring countries.
Although the current draft resolution spoke only of diplomatic sanctions, they were still a form of sanctions, he said. The text also raised the possibility of further sanctions. Imposing sanctions on the Sudan before incontrovertible evidence was in hand would set a bad precedent for the future work of the Council. China also held reservations to the part of the resolution which called on the Sudan to refrain from assisting, facilitating and supporting terrorist activities. China would, therefore, abstain in the voting.
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The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (China, Russian Federation), as Security Council resolution 1054 (1996).
ALAIN DEJAMMET (France) said the current resolution sought the extradition of the suspects in the assassination attempt. It was based on information which led the Council to assume that those three suspects were in the Sudan. It required the Sudan to try to extradite the suspects if they were in its territory. To ask more than that would not be appropriate. The Council had chosen not to impose sanctions which might have an economic impact on the population of one of the poorest countries in Africa.
EDWARD W. GNEHM, JR. (United States) said his Government supported the resolution, with reservations. It did not believe the sanctions outlined in the resolution were sufficient to convince the Government of the Sudan to cease its sponsorship of international terrorism and return to the fold of responsible, law-abiding nations. He welcomed the Council's concern to combat terrorism. However, in failing to impose more meaningful sanctions against the Sudan, it risked further insecurity and instability for the people of Eastern Africa, the Middle East and the Sudan. In passing resolution 1044 (1996), the Council recognized Sudan's complicity in supporting and sheltering those who plotted the attempted assassination of the Egyptian President and the Sudanese Government's sponsorship of terrorism as part of its foreign policy. That resolution had required the Sudan to surrender the three remaining suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt, and to cease its support for terrorism.
The Government of the Sudan had refused to comply with those two simple requirements, he continued. Instead, Khartoum had focused its efforts on a public relations campaign, and on smuggling the three suspects out of the Sudan. He noted press reports that one of the suspects had now turned up in Afghanistan, making the unbelievable claim that he had not been in the Sudan in months. His recent arrival in Afghanistan from the Sudan did not change the fact that the Sudanese Government had the responsibility to ensure his extradition to Ethiopia.
If the Sudan believed that it could escape its responsibility simply by sending the three suspects out of the Sudan, it was wrong, he said. The Government of the Sudan, which sheltered these terrorists, had broad responsibility to see those terrorists were returned to Ethiopia for trial. Any action to evade the requirements of the Council would only lead to stronger action in the Council in the future. The United States would not be satisfied until the Sudan had fulfilled that responsibility. The claims of the Government of the Sudan that it had tried to locate the three wanted suspects had no credibility. Sudanese authorities had been aware of the location of the three before, during and after the assassination attempt, and after the extradition request from Ethiopia was received.
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Such actions were only part of a broader pattern of Sudanese support for terrorism, which equally demanded action by the international community, he continued. Under the policy of the National Islamic Front, the Sudan welcomed a long list of terrorist organizations, providing a meeting point and training centre for their violent activities outside of the Sudan. He listed numerous organizations whose members were harboured by the Sudan. The Sudanese National Islamic Front also supported Islamic and other opposition groups from Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. All of those Governments had beseeched the Sudan to cease its sponsorship of violent opposition movements, without success. Uganda and Eritrea had been forced to sever relations with Khartoum because of the threat those organizations based in the Sudan posed to them.
Sudan's efforts to export terrorism had even reached the United Nations. Two employees of the Sudanese Mission had been active accomplices in the plot to assassinate President Mubarak during a visit to New York, and to blow up the United Nations. He provided details of the plots and said his statements were not just allegations, but were part of the public records of the courts in New York. He elaborated on other support by the Sudan for terrorists, including the use of its airline and financial resources.
All Member States faced the international threat of terrorism, he said, and had stressed in various forums that they would fight global terrorism wherever it appeared. The Council's objective was to bring about an end to the Sudan's support to terrorist groups. Today's resolution was another step towards truly meaningful action. On the positive side, the Council had finally determined that Sudan's actions in supporting the cowardly terrorist attack on President Mubarak, and continuing to foster terrorism around the globe, were a threat to international peace and security. By imposing initial sanctions, the Council was telling the Government of the Sudan that it would not be content with mere words.
He favoured the steps the Council was taking, but they were not big enough. Firmer measures should be taken, not against the people of the Sudan, but against their unresponsive Government.
The Government of the Sudan, he continued, should not take comfort in the fact that today's measures were not as strong as they might be. The Council had promised that if the Government of the Sudan failed to meet our requirements in the next 60 days, we will seek more meaningful sanctions. He hoped the Government of the Sudan got the message and turned over the suspects and stopped supporting other terrorists. If not, the Council would be back in two months to do whatever it took to compel the Sudan to abide by the rules of civilized nations.
GERARDO MARTINEZ BLANCO (Honduras) condemned all acts of terrorism, wherever they occurred and whoever might commit them. The assassination attempt against President Mubarak was a reprehensible act which threatened the
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stability of the entire region. It should not be allowed impunity. It was a matter of regret that the Sudan had not complied with Council resolution 1044 (1996), nor with the extradition requirements of the OAU.
In the struggle against international terrorism, States must be aware of their obligation to adopt measures to that end, he said. It was hoped that the current resolution would prompt the Sudan to comply with the Council's demands. The resolution had been carefully worded so as to avoid measures which would have a harmful effect on the people of the Sudan.
NABIL A. ELARABY (Egypt) said the Council had adopted resolution 1044 (1996) unanimously during January. The OAU had determined that the attempt against President Mubarak was an attempt against the whole of Africa. The Secretary-General's Special Envoy had concluded that the Sudan had not yet complied with the requirement to extradite the suspects to Ethiopia. He had also concluded that all the States he visited claimed that the Sudan had supported terrorist activities within their territories.
The representative of the Sudan cited a document which he said Egypt had circulated, he said. Egypt had not circulated that document. The representative should be more precise in such matters. The infamous relationship between the suspects and the Sudanese Government had been proven by those who sought to deny it. Over a month ago, a Sudanese newspaper had reported that the three suspects would appear in different countries and claim that the Sudan was innocent of the allegations against it. One suspect had now done so.
He said Egypt was still hopeful that the Sudan would comply, without delay or stalling, with the international demand included in resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996). It was hoped the Secretary-General would be able to tell the Council that the Sudan had implemented all the measures in the two resolutions. It was further hoped that the measures taken by States in implementation of today's resolution would contribute to encouraging Sudan's compliance.
Every Egyptian felt and appreciated the special nature of the historical relations which bound the peoples of the Nile Valley and the Sudan, he said. Anything that harmed the people of the Sudan harmed the people of Egypt, and vice versa. The relations between their countries should return to normal, so the people of the Sudan might enjoy good relations with all its neighbours.
Sir JOHN WESTON (United Kingdom) said the conclusions of the Secretary- General's comprehensive report in response to resolution 1044 (1996) were clear. First, the Sudan had not complied with the demand to extradite the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa. Secondly, many of Sudan's neighbours remained concerned about its support for terrorist activities within their territories. For those reasons, the Council had had to take
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further action. It had nothing to do with the orientation of the current Government in the Sudan. It was purely and simply a necessary response to Sudan's failure to respond adequately to the demands of the Council and the OAU.
Welcoming the initiative of the non-aligned members of the Council to propose the resolution, he said he fully supported the measures it contained, and hoped that they would contribute to an early change of heart in Khartoum. The solution to the problem was simple. The Government of the Sudan must recognize international concern about its behaviour and comply with the Council's demands and those of the OAU.
One of the principal demands of the resolution was the requirement that Sudan should ensure that the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak were brought to justice in Ethiopia. He was convinced that the Government of the Sudan knew where they were. If they were still in the Sudan, the answer was straightforward. The Government must extradite them to Ethiopia under the terms of the bilateral extradition treaty. If the Sudan had helped at least one of the three to leave the country, it was up to the Government to take immediate action, including, for example, by providing the necessary evidence, to bring about extradition to Ethiopia. The Council would not be satisfied until the Sudan had ensured that objective, and had also ceased its support for international terrorism.
Drawing the attention of the Government of Sudan to the last paragraph of the resolution, he said it was a clear message that the Security Council would remain engaged in the matter.
ZBIGNIEW MATUSZEWSKI (Poland) said his Government condemned terrorism in every form, and that there were no circumstances that could possibly justify its use. It had also made it clear that the accountability of those who committed the acts of terrorism was of primary importance. Regretfully, resolution 1044 (1996) remained unheeded especially in its main thrust, which was to ensure that those suspected of the terrorist attempt on the life of President Mubarak were extradited from the Sudan to Ethiopia to stand trial in the court of law. Such action would demonstrate that the Government of the Sudan conformed to the international community's standards with regard to terrorism.
Poland voted for the resolution, he said. It believed that it contained a clear message to all those responsible to allow justice to be served. The message was that the perpetrators of the acts of terrorism would not go with impunity.
The Council President, JUAN SOMAVIA (Chile), said his country condemned terrorism and rejected the assassination attempt on President Mubarak. He reviewed the Council's action on the matter and said he regretted the adoption
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of another resolution. To determine what action could be taken, he had been guided by the African members on the Council, as well as the views of the OAU. It had been important to ensure fair and transparent treatment of the matter, taking into account all the possible evidence and with the cooperation of all the governments concerned.
The draft resolution had given rise to a discussion of sanctions, he continued. Chile was not in favour of sanctions because they disproportionately affected the weaker members in any State, and not those responsible for reprehensible actions. The present case raised the issue of how to have meaningful sanctions. That was not being achieved with the Organization's current approach to sanctions. There was need to ensure that sanctions were not aimed at the common person.
In the case of the Sudan, the Council dealt with diplomatic sanctions which could not be equated with economic sanctions, he said. The complaints of the neighbouring countries and the information on terrorist group action in their territory were cause for concern. The terrorism of a few, or of many, needed action by the Council. He appealed to the Sudan to comply with today's resolution. If it did, the item could be removed from the Council's agenda. Chile had voted in favour of the resolution.
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