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FROM: Population Growth and Economic Development: Report on the
Consultative Meeting of Economists Convened by the United Nations
Population Fund, 28-29 September 1992, New York. New York:UNFPA, 1993.
STATEMENT ON POPULATION GROWTH AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Adopted by Consultative Meeting
Participants by Consensus
I. Policy and Research Challenges in the 1990s
During the 1980s, a number of economists (many occupying key
positions as policy advisers) have asserted that population is either
a neutral factor vis-…-vis economic growth and development, or that
its importance is being overplayed by aid donors and family planning
advocates.
At the same time, leaders in a growing number of developing
countries have become even more convinced of the need to slow rapid
population growth. In part, this is a result of more open,
responsive governance in many countries. Leaders see immediate
problems associated with high population growth. They are convinced
that organized interventions can do something to slow population
growth and that such a slow-down brings benefits to individuals and
society; also that the community wants and is responsive to family
planning programmes.
The important question thus arises: How to bridge this gap,
actual or perceived, between current research findings and the policy
community's need for guidance for action in the population field.
In our view, the answer is to broaden the population debate, to get
beyond the narrow focus on population and growth of income per capita
that one finds in heuristic models and economists' rejection of them,
and to focus on problems associated with population pressures that
are both specific and tractable.
There is a need to increase recognition among researcher-
advisers that policy makers must make decisions now þ in the face of
probable (though still, in some instances, unconfirmed) consequences
of further delays in checking demographic momentum. Demographers
make a compelling case that the time for action is now, even if it
is unlikely that fully satisfying knowledge about adverse
consequences is possible in the near term. How can we apply the
precautionary principle? How can we use an imperfect knowledge base
to inform decisions that have to be made under uncertainty?
To start with, it is important to understand the history of the
population debate.
II. Origins of Consensus and Commitment to Action on Population
A. The Nature of the Consensus Formed in the 1960s
The consensus of the 1960s was based on recognition of the
health and welfare benefits of family planning for individuals; and
of the human rights aspect as reflected in access to safe, effective
contraceptive methods.
It drew on growing concern about the acceleration of population
growth in developing countries (that resulted from rapid decline in
mortality while fertility remained high), occurring at a time when
these countries were also beginning efforts to raise living
standards; in particular, there was concern that rapid population
growth would inhibit the development required to bring down birth
rates.
There were limitations in the knowledge base of that period. It
was felt, for example, that the European experience of "demographic
transition" would be too onerous if repeated in developing countries.
Moreover, discussion of macroeconomic consequences relied on
heuristic models, using 1950s-vintage economic-growth models, to show
that the young age distribution associated with high fertility would
lower investments needed to boost production for the increasing
number of consumers.
Despite lack of definitive research evidence to support
interventions to slow population growth rates, there was policy-level
consensus of a strong presumptive case for intervention justified by
indisputable benefits to individuals and probable benefits to
society.
B. Mobilization of Political and Financial Support for
Population Interventions in the 1970s
Most research during the 1970s was focused on understanding
reproductive behaviour and how interventions might accelerate
fertility decline. Few questioned the premise that fertility decline
was necess-ary; most agreed that research was needed to help find out
how to do this more effectively.
There was surprisingly little research on consequences of rapid
population growth, except replication of heuristic exercises aimed
at expanding political support. Some theoretical work took place,
such as refinements of growth models, but little empirical work was
undertaken to expand the knowledge base about population/development
links or macroeconomic consequences.
III. Revisionist View of Macroeconomic Consequences in 1980s
During the early 1980s, there was renewed interest by research
community in macroeconomic effects of population growth, in part a
response to the strong counter-attacks by Professor Julian Simon.
This struck a chord of sympathy from mainstream economists who had
been sceptical all along about the arguments used to justify the
earlier consensus. Also, many economists rejected the rigid
structural-growth models of 1950s, being more interested in market
responses and "getting the prices right". The 1986 report of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences played a catalytic role in
legitimizing this "revisionist" view. Even though the report
acknowledged that rapid population growth could cause problems for
developing countries, its very cautious review of the evidence on
adverse economic effect of rapid population growth was generally seen
as a rejection of the earlier consensus.
Concurrently, research findings continued to be positive about
the benefits for health, education, welfare and women's status to be
gained by improving access to safe, effective family planning. The
few economists who focused on population issues mainly took a
laissez-faire or "agnostic" position on macro issues but supported
interventions on individual welfare grounds. Some granted that rapid
population growth could aggravate development problems, but noted
that population fell fairly low on the list of causes of those
problems. Other causes (poor management, distorted incentives, etc.)
need to be attacked directly. These economists were also open to
interventions to correct market failure due to poor information,
distorted prices and externalities. Family planning intervention to
enhance societal equity was also seen by them as justified.
IV. Status of Current Knowledge Base and Implications for Population
Policy
Nothing in economic-demographic research contradicts the
proposition that in low-income countries with considerable backlogs
in human development, living standards and infrastructure, population
growth in excess of 2 per cent per year is among the structural
factors inhibiting the achievement of a wide range of development
objectives.
In many countries and circumstances, the longer-run implications
of rapid population growth, particularly pressure on renewable
resources, are severe. Environmental pressures vary in the extent
to which they are driven by population growth as opposed to other
factors such as technology, income growth, policies, etc. But the
food-soil-water relationship is strongly related to population and
individual countries which face these problems already are likely to
be acutely affected in the future. In such circumstances, a
difference of a decade in the onset of the transition to lower
population growth can make a considerable, even essential difference.
Rapid growth in labour-force entrants is a source of stress in
capital-poor economies; in countries where rapid growth of the
school-age population has also contributed to the erosion of
investments in human resources, the potential gains that might have
accrued from having a rapidly growing stock of younger workers are
offset by lower productivity of workers and reduced competitiveness
in a global economy where gains from trade depend primarily on
productivity. When low productivity is coupled with low earnings,
efforts to alleviate poverty are undercut. It is easy to recommend
more investment in social sectors as a remedy to poverty, but
difficult to do that if productivity is so low that neither workers
nor Governments are likely to accumulate the surpluses required to
make such investments.
New evidence from 1980s data shows a negative correlation of
high rates of population growth and the growth of per capita income.
We urge, however, that findings be interpreted cautiously, as
indicative of problems associated with rapid population growth in
countries that have not done well. Countries that have slowed
population growth rates and are now doing comparatively better should
also be examined. Attention should be focused on specific issues:
falling behind in human resource investments; poor governance in face
of population pressures; unsustainable efforts to increase food
production; strains on water resources; other issues that are of
immediate concern to policy makers þ as well as long-run issues
associated with lower versus higher population stabilization.
We also note that recognition of the adverse effects of rapid
population growth does not mean that acceleration of the transition
to lower growth will by itself solve all developmental problems; at
best it may buy time to deal with those problems or keep them from
getting even worse. Most of the immediate benefits to slowing
population growth through increasing access to family planning accrue
to individuals through the welfare and equity benefits of being able
to time and space births more effectively and with less risk to
health. Subsidized family planning services may also help to bring
the individual costs of an added birth better into line with societal
costs thus reducing externalities (costs of children borne by society
at large, but not by individual families). When interventions are
motivated by both individual and societal objectives, respect for the
reproductive rights and health of individuals should be an added
focus of attention.
V. Recommendations
The research community should continue to broaden and deepen the
knowledge base for population policy. Research efforts should focus
on problems in countries where population pressures appear serious
and on the specific aspects of the problem that particularly affect
those countries. An examination of economic benefits in countries
that have successfully slowed population growth should also be given
priority. Further, research should probe specific under-served
groups in countries where market failures may be depriving such
groups from obtaining benefits from family planning and reproductive
health services. The research community should also strive to make
progress in estimating costs and resource
requirements for population interventions.
Analysis of the impact of population on a broad range of
development issues has not received the serious attention it should
have. Implications for poverty alleviation þ particularly in rural
areas þ and infrastructure investment, as well as other issues, stand
out in this regard. An enormous increase in the population of
developing countries over the next three to four decades is
inevitable. Understanding the impacts of this increase is not just
a matter of defending or rebutting the assertions that have dominated
the population debate during the 1980s: it is a matter of great
policy relevance.
Those actions that make sense on micro-level grounds, including
benefits for human rights, equity and women's status, (whether or not
a strong macroeconomic rationale can be established) should be taken
immediately. This list certainly includes striving to meet the
existing and growing unmet need for quality family planning and
reproductive health services and to expand educational and other
opportunities for women. Also, we recognize that government can play
an important role in legitimizing family planning as well as
providing information and services.
Ways should be explored for the research community to do a
better job at informing the policy process about rationales for
intervention and help policy makers deal with complexities of
population-development links. Agnosticism may be safe for
researchers, but it is not helpful at the policy level. Do
researchers really intend to deny the validity of interventions? Do
they want to limit themselves to debunking naive, alarmist approaches
to consequences? A more constructive approach would be to help
decision makers to weigh risks, benefits and costs of
actions/inaction and to make enlightened decisions on the basis of
knowledge that we now possess, however imperfect it is.