UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
|
| UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) |
|
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For further information please contact the United Nations Population Fund
at 220 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 USA or via E-mail at:
vlassoff@unfpa.org
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FROM: Population Growth and Economic Development: Report on the
Consultative Meeting of Economists Convened by the United Nations
Population Fund, 28-29 September 1992, New York. New York:UNFPA, 1993
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
I. Opening Session
Dr. Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), opened the meeting. She observed that the
1994 International Conference on Population and Development, to be
held in Cairo, will be devoted to the theme of "population, sustained
economic growth and sustainable development", an emphasis that
recognizes the importance of the relationship between population
growth and development. As part of preparations for the Conference,
she noted, the current meeting was convened to update research
findings since the 1986 report of the United States National Academy
of Sciences (NAS), Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy
Questions (National Research Council, 1986).
In opening, Dr. Sadik repeated Mr. Kenneth Boulding's quip,
"Anyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever is
either a madman or an economist." While exempting the meeting
participants from such a characterization, she noted that many
economists are generally unaware of a number of major population
issues.
Dr. Sadik cited the significant progress family planning
programmes have made in the past two decades, as indicated by: the
increase of contraceptive prevalence in developing countries to 50
per cent today, compared to12-14 per cent in 1971; a 37 per cent
decline in the average number of births per woman in the same time
period; a reduc-tion of world population growth by 400 million from
the number that would have been expected without increased use of
family planning; and the resource contributions by the Governments
of developing countries, which pay for over three-quarters of the
costs of national population programmes.
Some economists understate the negative impact of population
growth on economic development or take an agnostic position on the
issue. These assessments do not accord with UNFPA perceptions, Dr.
Sadik emphasized. She asserted that rapid population growth is
significantly detrimental to development, although it is hard to
determine how detrimental.
Dr. Sadik also challenged the assumption that fertility will
automatically fall as economic development occurs, citing country
comparisons that indicate economic development is neither a
sufficient nor necessary cause of fertility reduction. Fertility
declines in Thailand and Indonesia, for example, were much larger
than one would anticipate based on the rates of economic progress,
while in Brazil, the Indian state of Kerala and Bangladesh, fertility
declined substantially during periods of economic stagnation.
The UNFPA Executive Director questioned the usefulness of the
laissez-faire notion that population increases will cause prices to
rise, in turn increasing "demand" for fertility regulation; she cited
the large and rapid fertility changes observed in contexts where
shifts in relative prices have been merely gradual. The need to meet
pent-up demand for family planning is too urgent to wait for long-
term supply, demand and price interactions to do the job. Making
services available leads to faster declines in fertility than relying
on market-driven effects, and also creates further demand, she
contended.
Dr. Sadik enjoined participants to argue for a higher priority
for international population assistance. She noted that support for
population activities had increased only 35 per cent during a period
in which the number of women at risk of pregnancy increased by 50 per
cent (a 12 per cent drop in per capita assistance before inflation).
She expressed the hope that this Consultative Meeting would mark the
start of a process of investigating these issues.
Mr. Jyoti S. Singh, Director of the Technical and Evaluation
Division of UNFPA, called attention to the recent summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The gathering's statement gave great emphasis to
the problems of socio-economic development associated with high
population growth. The summit approved specific
population-related initiatives, including a ministerial meeting to
organize South-South cooperation for population policy formulation
and family planning programming. This represents official concern
and perceptions on population, he stated. Mr. Singh reviewed the
structure of the present meeting of economists and said he hoped the
meeting would give useful guidance to policy makers.
II. Session One: Population Growth and Economic Development
Panellists: R. Barlow, T. Bengtsson, R. Cassen, B. Geurts, N. Islam
The first session began with a presentation by Mr. Michael
Vlassoff of UNFPA on the background paper, Recent Developments in
Research into the Relationship between Population Growth and Economic
Development (see page 36). In summary, the paper
indicates that in the limited number of studies conducted since 1986
on specific relationships between population growth and economic
development, the effects of population growth have been found to be
predominantly negative. This is particularly the case with regard
to:
* Savings and investment. Three new studies were reviewed,
one of which showed that population growth has a negative
impact.
* Labour force and labour absorption. Two studies were
reviewed; both showed a negative impact.
* Human-resource quality. Five studies were reviewed, four
negative and one neutral.
* Economies of scale and technological change. No new work
was reviewed.
* Externalities. The one study reviewed found a negative
impact.
* Income distribution and poverty. One study found a
negative impact.
* Correlation studies. Two studies were reviewed; both
found a negative impact.
Mr. Vlassoff presented details of the reviewed studies. Overall,
he reported, the new research pointed to four main conclusions:
First, population growth impedes economic growth, although available
research says little about the relative strength of this negative
impact. Second, in recent studies the negative effects observed,
especially those at the household level, were more significant than
those noted in the 1986 NAS report. Third, numerator and denominator
effects should be distinguished in all analyses. Fourth and perhaps
most important, deficiencies in both the data base and research
methodologies play key roles in fostering agnosticism about population
-development relationships.
In another presentation, Mr. Robert Cassen of Oxford
University observed that discussion of the relationship between
population and economic factors has been characterized by
emotionalism and exaggeration on all sides. He asserted, however,
that certain specific population-development linkages are not obscure
or difficult to determine, and that the relationship between
population growth and development depends substantially on the
definition of development and the particular indicators used.
At the most general level, he said, it is clear that
population growth will not lead to higher growth of income per
capita. Aggregate economic indicators say nothing about impacts on
individual welfare, particularly in situations where people are
already struggling to meet their current needs. It may also be
stated without reservation, he argued, that rapid population growth
makes it more difficult to attain subsidiary goals like advances in
education, environmental quality and health.
According to Mr. Cassen, revisionist economists minimize the
negative external results associated with individual fertility
decisions; they also tend to accept the claim that parents in poor
rural families believe they are individually better off with large
families, and to view this belief as correct. He said it would be
worthwhile to conduct more research to determine the validity of
these views.
Mr. Cassen expressed his opinion that the meeting should have
included the effects of population on the environment. Efforts to
model population, food production and the environment, he contended,
would clearly show how high population growth drives countries to
produce more food, making it necessary to allocate more of their
resources to activities with relatively slow growth prospects.
The environmental and economic consequences of this dynamic are
considerable, Mr. Cassen maintained. He cited World Bank projections
of food production growth rates required to meet the needs of
increasing populations, and said this would have unacceptable
economic and environmental costs unless technology is improved
significantly. He also pointed out that the limited availability of
water is a powerful constraint on the expansion of food production,
and will only grow worse. And he noted that 90 per cent of the
future increase in food demand will be driven by population, not
income.
In another vein, Mr. Cassen suggested that earlier "neutral"
findings on the relationship of population to economic growth were
based on poor research. Re-analysis using new econometric
approaches (including excluded and latent variables models) has shown
some of the old results to be invalid. Mis-specification effects in
the earlier reports are also clearer now, he said.
Mr. Tommy Bengtsson of Lund University presented a historical
overview of population and economic development. In the late 1950s,
following the publication of Population Growth and Economic
Development in Low-income Countries (Coale and Hoover, 1958), the
major concern of specialists was that population increase would limit
the amount of capital available for productive investment and lead
to slower growth. In the mid-1960s, Kuznets' reexamination put in
question the empirical support for this view (Kuznets, 1965). In the
1970s, the relationship of population to land, food and poverty came
to the fore. At present, the possible environmental impact of
population has become a major concern. And as suggested in D.
Blanchet's work, it is now believed that population growth may have
contributed to the economic stagnation of the 1980s (Blanchet,
1988a).
Mr. Bengtsson contrasted the perspectives of Malthus and J.
Simon (Simon, 1976). Data from E. Wrigley and R. Schofield (1981)
on historical patterns in England make it clear that different
periods revealed different relationships between population and
development. Malthus had the mechanism of population dynamics wrong,
Mr. Bengtsson argued: mortality shifts occur but are not responsive
to economic con-ditions. However, fertility adjustments are large,
with great increases in age at marriage during hard times.
Mr. Bengtsson concluded that population increases are not
sufficient to create change and economic development. The latter
results from a complex sequence of events including changes in
institutions, incentives, property rights, parliamentary
mechanisms, and political stability.
He cited a detailed analysis of a Swedish historical time series
to raise further questions about standard demographic transition
theory and the relation of the demographic transition to economic
development. According to standard theory, the "first stage" of the
transition is supposed to be characterized by high and stable
fertility and mortality rates. The record, however, shows sharp
short-term swings in mortality. Mortality decline, therefore, is not
a good indicator for dating the start of the fertility transition.
He proposed a new definition of the phases of the demographic
transition: stage I, unstable mortality, fertility responsive to
economic conditions; stage II, spontaneous mortality decline prior
to economic growth; stage III, fertility declines despite varying
economic growth experiences; and stage IV, fertility unstable with
long post-transition cycles.
Mr. Bengtsson characterized the European transition as being in
stage I up to 1850; in stage II from 1850-1940; in stage III from
1940-1990; and now entering stage IV. Stage III has been marked by
a high increase in female participation in the labour force, with
consequences both for fertility and economic growth.
Comparing developed and developing countries' experiences, Mr.
Bengtsson concluded that the lesson of Europe shows that among the
critical requirements for transition to occur are the availability
of contraceptive methods (with modern methods leading to faster
transitions), motivation factors (old-age social security systems,
for example) and social acceptability (cited by Mr. Bengtsson as the
reason for the start of Europe's fertility decline at the end of the
19th century).
Mr. Robin Barlow presented an analysis of a pooled cross-
sectional multiple-time-point data set consisting of observations
from 85 countries from the 1960s to the 1980s. Overall, he said,
a zero correlation between economic growth and population growth
was found in bivariate relations. Different kinds of population
growth, however, have different economic consequences. Mr. Barlow
also pointed out that fertility declines have different effects
in the short and long term (with varying impacts, for example,
on savings and labour-force growth).
Even with appropriate discounting of future gains, he found
fertility declines to be economically profitable. Regression
analyses with lagged population variables indicate that countries
with the strongest current economic growth are those with low current
fertility and high past fertility.
Mr. Barlow's work demonstrated that where net fertility (births
minus infant deaths) remained constant over the period of obser-
vations, the rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) was
27 per cent; where net fertility declined by more than 1 per cent,
GDP grew by 38 per cent; and in intermediate countries, GDP grew by
31 per cent. On the basis of his results, he forecast that those
East Asian countries presently experiencing rapid economic growth
would show slower economic improvement in the future, as the short-
term benefits of lower fertility begin to fade.
Mr. Ben Geurts of the Central Planning Bureau of the
Netherlands reported on an exercise conducted by his agency to
forecast future demographic and economic trends. The exercise
projected dire expectations for development in the world's least
developed countries, noting slower than previously forecast declines
in fertility and increasing economic and ecological fragility in many
regions. Particular attention was given to future stresses on the
environment, notably water resource constraints and pollution
Mirroring the concerns raised by of Mr. Cassen, the exercise
found a critical need for substantial increases in food supplies.
Food productivity increases will have to occur at historically
unprecedented levels, and possibilities for economic growth will
depend on sustained development in agricultural growth, Mr. Geurts
noted. He cited recent statistics showing a substantial
degradation of global range and crop land, and asserted that
irrigation is not sustainable as a long-run solution due to
technological limitations and water-access difficulties.
Mr. Geurts presented alternate scenarios ranging from
relatively optimistic to bleak. In these projections, economic
development was posited to be a precondition for fertility decline,
requiring access by developing countries to developed countries'
markets and technologies and substantial levels of financial aid.
Under the bleakest scenarios, population growth will lead to
political instability, increased misery in developing countries and
mass migrations to developed regions. Under all of the scenarios,
some parts of the world will experience serious problems. Mr.
Geurts' analysis suggested that sharp declines in fertility could
help development, although this would also lead eventually to
problems associated with ageing populations.
Mr. Nurul Islam of the International Food Policy Research
Institute, chairperson of the session, noted that the causal links
between population growth and economic growth are reciprocal and
simultaneous. Appropriate multivariate analyses must address both
simultaneity and multi-causality; such analysis requires both
computational and modelling skills. Economic development should not
be seen as a precondition of reduced population growth, he argued.
Rather, the significant declines in fertility that have occurred
without development underscore the impact of policies, people and
programmes.
Mr. Islam cited as a shortcoming in the discussion the omission
of interactions between population growth and agriculture. Following
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), he said, any discussion of population and economic
development must identify the effects on the environment of both
population growth and over-consumption. In regions where the highest
rates of agricultural growth have been observed, yield potentials
have stagnated since the 1960s. As the limits of yield potential
have been neared (under current technologies), the marginal costs of
further improvements have increased. Irrigation costs are growing,
and yield improvements due to fertilizer use will require additional
amounts of increasingly scarce water. He stressed that this
situation would result in increased pollution, loss of bio-diversity,
soil degradation, erosion and desertification.
According to Mr. Islam, population growth should be seen as one
of many factors underlying these problems (others include government
policies, market failures, property rights issues, and poverty). All
factors interact in complex ways to contribute to failures of growth.
In the general discussion, it was noted that the literature
review in the background paper implied that aggregate growth rates
could be expected to have an increasing correlation with population
growth over time. The difficulty in separating the predicted from
the actual in models, given the simultaneity of relationships, was
emphasized, and an over-reliance on single-equation systems was
noted.
The omission of agriculture and the environment from the topics
covered in the research review was said to be particularly
unfortunate, since in most developing countries a majority of the
work force is in agriculture. Kuznets' analyses were cited as
showing that during Europe's demographic transition, agricultural
productivity grew only two thirds as fast as that of manufacturing,
but did not decline with migration to cities as some have
suggested.
Ms. Helen Hughes of Australia's National Centre for Development
Studies voiced concern that the framing of the agenda (and background
paper) according to questions raised in the 1986 NAS report raised
the possibility that this meeting, like the NAS report, would address
the wrong issues. She said she considered the NAS report to be good
on balance, but that shifts in emphasis were required on various
points. While stating that the current meeting was not the
appropriate forum for detailed evaluations of technical papers, she
said it was clear that inclusion of Eastern Europe (with low
population growth and low economic growth) would alter some of the
conclusions and perspectives cited.
Ms. Hughes emphasized that development is more than just
economic growth, and should involve improving the status of women.
She noted that the impact of economic development has, by and large,
worsened women's relative status and increased their workloads
without producing a corresponding increase in rewards. She cited
market failures in the areas of education and job provision for
women. Since these have implications for both fertility and the
economy, she asserted, they should be primary development objectives.
Mr. Thomas Merrick of the World Bank also expressed concern that
the right questions be asked. Citing the many complex technical
issues, he said he wondered whether sceptical economists would ever
be satisfied with any particular analyses, cross-sectional or
longitudinal. For his part, he said he was concerned about data
quality, particularly GDP data, in any conceivable analysis. Cross-
section studies at the national level might also fail to be
informative, he added, noting that differences in Brazil between Sao
Paulo and the North-east states are greater than those between
Zimbabwe and Indonesia. The key task is to address policy makers'
needs for direction, and not necessarily to convince economists about
population issues.
Mr. A.M. Khusro of India's Financial Express, drawing on lessons
from the Indian experience and earlier discussions of phases of the
demographic transition, proposed an alternate formulation and
stressed the need for theoretical refinement and advances.
In his view the four epochs of population and economic develop-
ment relationships could be defined as follows: stage I, demographic
stagnation and income-growth stagnation, with little interaction
between the two and little change; stage II, rising demographic
growth and income-growth stagnation, with some movement in economic
indicators but not to the scale of population growth, differences in
their scale muting the interaction between them; stage III, complex
and dynamic interactions between demographic growth and economic
growth, and complex relationships among investment growth, human-
capital formation, output growth and per capita income; and stage
IV, economic growth beginning to stagnate (recessions and capital-
formation stagnation), and slowing demographic change (as floors are
reached in fertility and mortality), with muted interaction between
the two.
Mr. Khusro asserted that the chairperson's comments and much of
the 1971 NAS report, Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy
Implications (National Research Council, 1971), focused on the third
stage. The 1986 NAS review, by concentrating more on non-interactive
periods, marginalized the impact of population variables. He stressed
the need to identify these distinct stages clearly in analyses of
empirical relationships in this area.
Mr. John I. Nwankwo of the University of Ibadan called for care
in framing conclusions for policy makers. The complex technical
issues must be distilled to produce usable inputs to inform policy.
An overly narrow definition of development is one error to avoid. In
developing countries today, he argued, population growth rates have
an important impact on political stability, a necessary condition for
sustained economic growth. Complex econometric arguments could
mislead the discussion, he said.
Mr. Carlos UrzŁa of the Colegio de M‚xico defended econometri-
cians against criticisms of over-complexity and mis-specification.
The value of exercises like Mr. Barlow's is their capacity to suggest
explanations that can be tested against empirical data. He cited as
an example the dependency-ratio effect in decreasing savings, which
is a proposition amenable to empirical testing. He insisted that
investigations should use not raw gross national product data but
quality-adjusted income data, so as to measure the welfare of
societies. He cited the relevance of various macro-economic growth
theory models to the questions at hand, but noted that including
population in these would be complicated, an observation with which
Mr. Geurts concurred.
Mr. Richard Hooley of the University of Pittsburgh also
emphasized the need for more use of sophisticated multi-equation
models, asserting that the complexity of the various relationships
would bias conclusions that relied on single-equation models. If,
for example, population growth leads to labour-force growth with
consequent income-distribution effects affecting savings, which in
turn influence economic growth, a single-equation model will miss the
dynamic effects. He suggested that an economic model with eight or
nine equations would be needed to clarify these interactions. Other
participants replied that such models in the past have been
conspicuously unconvincing, particularly because of mis-specification
problems.
Mr. George Stolnitz of Indiana University's Population
Institute for Research and Training issued some methodological
challenges concerning the existing body of research on population-
development relationships. The proper question to ask, he said, is
not, Does population dominate other influences on economic develop-
ment? or, Does the finding of a positive relationship between
population growth and economic growth mean that all assertions about
negative impacts are erroneous? The real question is, Does
population affect the economy and even if both have grown, would
economic gains have been greater with slower population increase?
He also questioned the use of single-equation models. Such
analyses are useful only for discovering whether one variable
dominates all others, but this should not be claimed of population
growth, he argued. He proposed that economists' simulations of long-
term relationships should be complemented by looking at short-to
medium-term relationships, citing as examples the dramatic
implications of population growth for health-care needs, and
education effects that become apparent within 10 years in numbers of
students to be enrolled and of individuals left out of the system.
Mr. Cassen again called for an emphasis on conclusions that are
not in dispute, rather than focusing on the grey areas of complex
relationships. He said he knew of no studies that suggest that, in
low-income countries with backlogs in social services and human-
resource development and where the status of women is low, rapid
population growth will do anything but make economic development
more difficult.
He also asked what the "economic rationale" is intended to
justify. The population community should guard against any
simplistic views of what should be done, he said, noting that among
other difficulties, there are no clear health or fertility-
reduction "production functions". At the same time, one does not need
a macroeconomic rationale to justify health and family planning
interventions; there are ample justifications of other kinds.
III. Session Two: Population Growth and Economic Development Ä
Specific Linkages
Panellists: H. Hughes, T. Merrick, P. Robertson, G. Stolnitz
Panellists in this session carried the previous session's
discussions into more detailed consideration of specific
population-development linkages.
Mr. Paul Robertson of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) presented findings on two linkages: population
and savings/consumption; and population and labour-force growth and
absorption. A 1987 UNCTAD investigation on the first relationship
showed that it is important to use the right variables in the
analysis (for example, dependency ratios instead of growth rates).
Tracking savings effects is difficult, since they vary considerably
over the human life cycle. In Latin America, dependency-ratio
effects are statistically significant predictors of savings
behaviour.
In the UNCTAD study, he noted, point elasticities with respect
to dependency ratios were almost 1 for private consumption and 2.5
for public consumption. That is, as dependency increases, subs-
tantial rises in consumption also occur. These relationships refer
to areas with high population growth and young populations; the
associations are expected to be lower elsewhere. Similar Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) studies on the
impact on aggregate savings looked at the effect of both young and
old age dependency. Both were statistically significant in pre-
dicting consumption rates; it was difficult, however, to separate
young and old dependency effects. In developing countries, the lack
of elaborate social support networks and dependency ratios for the
young that exceed those for the old have a depressing effect on
savings. This was also seen in OECD countries. In fact, a global
scarcity of savings could be partially explained by the magnitude of
demographic changes both in the North and the South.
Touching upon another linkage, Mr. Robertson compared the rates
of labour-force growth in developed and developing countries. In OECD
countries the growth rate is low or negative (an effect which also
is seen in Eastern Europe). In developing countries, the rate of
labour-force growth is 3 per cent or higher, leading to three
percentage point differences in productivity growth rates of
developed and developing countries. The current differential is
higher than any historical observations. For development to occur,
he observed, a 5 per cent difference in GDP growth rates between
developed and developing countries would be required on the basis of
these labour-force growth differentials, but the financial system
would not be able to cope with such differences. Consequently,
there will be no per capita income growth in Africa for some time.
Mr. Robertson suggested that modelling, using 5-20 variables,
could elucidate this linkage, but said that such an effort would have
to be embedded in a larger international framework to be successful.
Mr. Merrick noted that the gap between economic research and the
concerns of policy makers appears to be widening. Ample justification
for family planning interventions can be found in terms of population
linkages to health, women's status concerns, issues of equity and
societal benefits. Further questions then arise about who should
fund interventions ţ Governments, external development assistance or
private initiative. Laissez-faire proponents would advocate market-
based solutions. What, then, would be appropriate responses to
market failures? What actions are needed to remedy a lack of
information, externalities or improper prices?
According to Mr. Merrick, another important question is: Should
family planning compete on a level playing field with other develop-
mental investments ţ i.e., is population a special class of
expenditure? Historically, for example, World Bank directors have
called for special status for population, but middle-level managers
have objected. The conclusions of the 1986 NAS study can be read as
calling for a level playing field, but this was done by defining the
relation of population growth and economic growth very narrowly.
Economists want an evidentiary case to justify allocations to
population programmes, he said. Policy makers, on the other hand,
are able to act on a presumptive basis. If there is a substantial
risk that population growth will significantly impede development and
the costs of population interventions are low, this is sufficient
justification for intervention in the population arena. Policy
makers need to act in short time frames, and therefore use
information that falls short of the standards of evidence seemingly
required by the authors of the 1986 NAS report.
Mr. Islam noted that 20 years ago, overly strong economic
arguments were advanced to support population interventions, and that
many economists later distanced themselves from such positions.
Nevertheless, he said, the sizeable unmet demand for family planning
services by itself justifies increased expenditures on the same
grounds as those for increased health and educational investments.
With environmental consequences such as global warming increasingly
a concern, a slowing of population growth rates would be warranted
on precautionary grounds alone. In time, he predicted, analyses
would catch up with concern. Mr. Islam also questioned the need
to pursue a strategy centred on convincing sceptics.
Mr. Cassen noted that in some Latin American countries, for
example, septic abortions have been among the most important causes
of adult female mortality. The case needs to be made, he
suggested, that moral, humanitarian, health and economic grounds
justify efforts to reduce population growth rates and that the longer
the delay, the larger the problems that will have to be dealt with.
Mr. Mohammed Nizamuddin of UNFPA reminded participants that
Governments in developing countries are mainly spending their own
money on family planning programmes: three fourths of current
resources for population come from internal allocations by
Governments.
Mr. Njuguna Mwangi of Kenya's Ministry of Planning and National
Development said this figure showed that Governments are convinced
they need family planning programmes as part of their development
plans. However, there is a danger that programmes begun with
external assistance will die when donors pull out unless strong
arguments are advanced for their continuation. He emphasized that
planners need to make a strong case for family planning allocations
in the face of competing demands.
Other discussion participants reiterated the need for strong
economic arguments to justify allocation preference to family
planning programmes. Constrained resources, like fuel for
vehicles, have to be assigned for programme needs in the face of many
competing demands. Mr. Mwangi noted that, in light of resource
constraints imposed by structural adjustment programmes, family
planning programmes do not usually enjoy universal support.
Mr. Robertson noted that economic arguments for family planning
programmes do not require dire scenarios but only
demonstrations of important linkages. His view was that in our
current state of knowledge it is not possible to say which
programmes (e.g., family planning, or women's income-generating
activities) would have the greatest impact on development at the
macro-level but that important linkages at the micro-level should be
considered.
UNFPA consultant Mr. Landis Mackellar proposed that the key
audience that should be addressed in the meeting's statement is
people who inform policy makers, both within Governments and within
donor institutions. He said that findings of household-level
benefits (for example, benefits to child welfare resulting from
smaller families) are strong and should be stressed to policy makers.
Ms. Pawadee Tonguthai of Thammasat University, citing her back-
ground in Thailand which has seen remarkable fertility declines,
raised some considerations about negative effects of rapid declines
in population growth rates. One is the "vintage effect" on the
quality of the labour force due to the ageing of the population. A
smaller school-age population has also led to the closing of some
schools, increasing travel time and costs for many students and
depriving them of home-prepared food (with potential nutritional
consequences).
Ms. Barbara Janowitz countered by citing J. Knodel's research
in the 1970s comparing families with large and small numbers of
children, which indicated that smaller families had higher levels of
educational attainment by children and greater participation of women
in the labour force. Ms. Tonguthai conceded that household-level data
shows a clear trade-off between quantity and quality, but expressed
concern about the social costs of continuing such choices. Ms.
Janowitz replied that part of Thailand's success in economic
development and fertility reduction, in contrast to the Philippines
experience, resulted from household decisions that facilitated income
growth and improvements in the quality of life.
Mr. Bengtsson felt that the comparison of Philippines and
Thailand in the discussion of the human-resource development effects
was faulty, since the infrastructure, income structures and policies
of the two countries vary in so many ways. Thailand's industry is
more labour-intensive, its service sector is more competitive, and
the two countries have very different structures of agricultural
production.
Addressing the same comparison, Mr. Hooley cited an Asian
Development Bank study indicating that high growth in small business
enterprises in the Philippines had depressed wages. He observed that
a detailed examination of labour markets would be necessary to
specify properly the relationship between population growth and
economic growth.
Mr. John Cleland of the Centre for Population Sciences at the
University of London noted that Thailand's fertility decline started
only about 15 years ago and had not yet had an appreciable effect on
the size of the labour force. The Thai and Philippine labour forces
have shown similar patterns of growth for the last 30 years, he
reported.
For Mr. Hooley, this discussion led to the question of how far
population growth should be reduced. Should the goal be 1 per cent
growth, zero growth, or even negative 1 per cent growth? Is each
equally desirable for all socio-economic systems? He observed that,
for example, agricultural economists do not dispute that irrigation
is beneficial for crop production. To formulate a consensus for
policy, however, the question of how much water is needed must be
addressed. The answer clearly differs for different crops and
different environments. If population policy could be cast in such
terms, more effective policy proposals could be formulated. Such an
approach to population might appear to be difficult, but it could
prove more fruitful than an alternative approach that seems to
address the population issue more directly.
Returning to the review of recent research, Mr. Barlow and
others criticized the background paper's citation of a recent study
(L. Schumaker and R. Clark, 1992), asserting a weak relationship
between dependency ratios and savings rates. Critics raised a
variety of technical objections about the quality of the study and
urged that its conclusions be discounted.
Mr. Naohiro Ogawa of Nihon University's Population Research
Institute also addressed the relationship between population growth
and savings, noting that previous research had failed to differen-
tiate between different kinds and sources of saving (e.g.,
government, household, etc.). He cited a recent OECD study in Asia
stressing the importance of stocks of wealth (inheritance and
bequests). Thus, he pointed out, studies of inter-generational flows
of wealth and savings are needed.
Life-cycle effects and income-distribution patterns within
families are critical to understanding how family size affects family
saving patterns. Also, the relation of higher savings rates to
longer life expectancies must be recognized. Mortality reductions
affect the size of intergenerational transfers of wealth. Equally,
fertility declines, by reducing family size, result in fewer
subdivisions of inheritances.
Mr. Bill McGreevey of the World Bank provided some historical
context for the special emphasis the Bank accords to population
investments. Often, he said, economists underestimate the impact of
decisions that are less-than-optimal and non-rational in regard to
fertility behaviour. This has led to narrow conceptualizations and
a failure to appreciate that fertility outcomes can exceed people's
preferences and goals. Family planning interventions must be
designed so people can attain various goals, bearing in mind that
reproduction and sexual gratification are intertwined. He called for
a re-investigation of studies on the costs of having children.
With respect to the population-savings relationship, Mr.
Stolnitz cited a World Bank report showing that dependency and
urbanization variables significantly influence income and wealth. He
emphasized that reliable data on micro-level dynamics of household
savings are not available. Available studies fail to decompose
national savings into its three parts: household, non-household
private, and government. Each of these is responsive to different
determinants.
Mr. Cassen stressed the important effect rapid population growth
has on human-resource development. He noted that manufacturing is
becoming increasingly sensitive to the skill and training levels of
the workforce. Countries deprived in this respect will increasingly
become uncompetitive. There is a trade-off between widening and
deepening investment in the education sector. Countries where
school populations are growing fast due to high fertility will
be less able to provide quality education than low-fertility
countries. This might foster a kind of international division
of labour, to the former countries' disadvantage.
Mr. McGreevey criticized the background paper for failing to
emphasize that household size and closely spaced births are related
to the health of women and children. This is a critical relation-
ship, which enjoys strong empirical confirmation.
Mr. McGreevey also noted that the Living Standards Measurement
Survey and Social Dimensions of Adjustment survey programmes have the
capacity to generate useful household-level information concerning
the effects of family size on household economic dynamics and socio-
economic conditions, but the information has not yet been exploited.
He cited a study (N. Birdsall and C. Griffen, 1988) whose initial
results indicated that family size has a greater effect on the
availability of resources per child than do income differences among
same-size families. He stressed the importance of obtaining
longitudinal data on family-size effects on health, education and
nutrition.
Mr. Stolnitz pointed out that conclusions in the background
paper regarding population and externalities were derived from the
work of M. Nerlove, A. Razin and E. Sadka (1987), which he said was
based on a simple model that was insensitive to a number of issues
including common-property resources. Other important issues not
reviewed adequately in the document include: (1) the development of
relative-factor endowments and wage rates, the importance of which
is lessened in situations of rapid labour-force growth; (2) the
implications of rural population growth and rural-urban migration,
which affect both wages and age structures in rural areas; (3) the
effects over time of short-term development planning measures to
accommodate internal migration, which may have long-term impacts on
the structure of industry and the environment; and (4) family-
formation and child-spacing patterns, which correlation studies have
shown to be more strongly related to poverty than is income.
Mr. UrzŁa argued that human-capital formation is a critical
externality. The direct effects of household size on child welfare
may be modest, but larger households may result in differences in
education and consequently impact negatively on the quality of human
capital.
Mr. Ogawa, citing a 1986 study by Romer, called for more
attention to new endogenous growth theories. He cited in
particular the importance of human-resource development on economic
growth. Other participants, however, felt that this theoretical
perspective had little to offer for the study of population.
Several participants reiterated that technical approaches will
not resolve issues that are central to the relationship between
population growth and economic development, since debate about this
relationship has never been outside the political context of the
time. In its response to an earlier over-statement of the situation,
the 1986 NAS report narrowed the definitions of key questions
too much and therefore failed in its own right. The key challenge,
they said, is to provide policy makers with standards of evidence and
interpretation that make sense.
Mr. Hooley argued that it is not sensible to focus the
discussion narrowly on such questions as the impact of population
policies on savings and investment. Macroeconomic policies will
always have a greater effect on macroeconomics than will population
policies. Instead, in his opinion, the critical linkages are those
of population policies and programmes to human-resource development,
the dynamics of internal migration, and the status of women.
Mr. Robertson disagreed with neo-classical economic perspec-
tives that he said give undue attention to simple correlations and
micro-economic relations, to the detriment of macroeconomic concerns.
He observed a qualitative shift in the relation of population growth
and development before and after 1973. In the latter period, the
debt crisis imposed severe burdens and impeded economic growth,
freezing the international economic system's capacity to respond to
population growth. At the same time, regional differences in
population and labour-force growth engendered massive migration flows.
IV. Session Three: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Family Planning
Panellists: J. Cleland, B. Janowitz, N. Ogawa
Ms. Janowitz began this session by discussing the reasons for
paying for family planning programmes. She pointed out that costing
analyses should include not only direct programme costs, but also
opportunity costs and discounting to arrive at the present value of
future benefits. She reviewed a number of national studies of the
costs (and cost-benefit analyses) of family planning programmes in
Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Jamaica.
She cited a particularly useful, unique study (D. Nortman, D.
Halvas and A. Rabago, 1986) on the costs of family planning and
maternal and child health service delivery in Mexico. This was an
exhaustive analysis of annual costs of the services and immediate
first-year savings, using a exceptionally rich set of data. On the
cost side were services to new acceptors, costs of resupply of
contraceptive methods and equipment, and follow-up costs related to
service recipients. On the benefits side were averted costs for
several items: treatment for women experiencing abortion
complications; consultations; prescriptions; pregnancy and delivery
services; immunizations; and child care (first year).
Comparing these estimates with the costs of a natural
fertility regime (implicitly assuming all averted births were due to
family planning services), it was calculated that in the period
1972-1985, for each peso expended, 9.5 pesos were saved. Since some
women would have used family planning in the absence of the
government programme, the estimated savings were further discounted
by 50 per cent.
Ms. Janowitz reviewed another study, conducted in Thailand by
D. Chao and K. Allen (1984). Here, the analysis included costs
beyond the first year and was not restricted to costs specific to
family planning. A regression analysis showed that half of the
observed fertility decline was due to the family planning
programme. The benefits analysed included savings in education,
health, housing and development infrastructure. Costs were not tied
to specific services (as in the Mexico example), but were per capita
health costs. The calculations suggested that each dollar spent on
family planning saves 16 spent on other services.
Similar studies conducted in other settings with minor
variations in methodology also found benefit-cost ratios, ranging
from 2.8 in Jamaica to as high as 12.5 in Indonesia and 16.2 in
Thailand.
One study with opposite findings, a Brazilian cost-benefit
analysis of family planning services, was also cited by Ms. Janowitz.
Here, no net benefits were found because the level of contraceptive
use among prospective beneficiaries was already high; the family
planning services supplied merely replaced services for which
potential subscribers were already paying.
Analyses in private-sector industries, meanwhile, have con-
sistently shown positive net benefits accruing to enterprises in-
vesting in maternal and child health and family planning services.
Ms. Janowitz, while acknowledging methodological imprecision
in the cost-benefit approach, concluded that most studies have
demonstrated that investments in family planning services have net
economic benefits.
Mr. Cleland examined the social and demographic impact of family
planning programmes. He started by stating three negative
conclusions: (1) the existence of such programmes is not necessary
for fertility declines (as is shown by the examples of Europe, Japan
and Myanmar); (2) actual successes (for example, in Thailand,
Colombia and South Korea) have been less than claimed, since family
planning programmes have served to accelerate already-started
fertility declines, not initiate them; and (3) programmes have
sometimes (as in Pakistan) aroused so much opposition that they
proved counter-productive.
On the positive side, he noted that family planning programmes
can: (1) accelerate fertility decline (the timing of which is
crucial); (2) not just remedy "market imperfections", but also assist
in legitimizing birth-control efforts; (3) effectively reach poorer,
less-educated and more-rural segments of the population; and (4) help
to re-mould behavioural norms, since it has been shown that
acceptance of birth control in families reduces "demand" for
children.
Mr. Cleland concluded from longitudinal fertility data that
desired family size and the proportion of women wanting more children
tend to remain constant (at a moderate or high level) until family
planning services become available.
To illustrate the importance legitimizing the use of
contraception within a cultural context, he cited the example of
Kenya, which shifted from a pro-natalist position in the 1970s to an
anti-natalist one in the 1980s. The World Fertility Survey in the
mid-1970s found desired family sizes in Kenya of six to seven
children, and recorded only 17 per cent of women as wanting to stop
child-bearing. Within five years of the survey, following the
President's strong endorsement of family planning, a decline in
fertility began to be detected. By the early 1980s, desired family
size had been reduced to four children and the proportion of women
wanting no more children raised to 40 per cent.
Mr. Ogawa presented Asian perspectives on population-
development linkages and the role of family planning programmes.
Among the many factors that impede cost-benefit analyses of family
planning programmes, he cited child rearing, production in the home,
child income in the informal sector, and the complexity of
calculating the various costs associated with health and education
services. Studies in Indonesia have revealed that people seek health
care for a variety of reasons, leading to uncertainty about benefits
and costs of programmes. Some costs may be easy to determine, where
markets provide price information, but others remain elusive. The
prevalence of abortion in Japan and other Pacific Rim countries, and
its role in fertility decline pose additional measurement problems.
Costs and benefits of other social investments are equally hard
to measure. Health costs, for instance, are multi-dimensional and
hard to determine. Evaluating the benefits, in mortality reduction,
for example, is similarly complex. The increasing privatization of
health care has exacerbated measurement problems due to deficient
reporting. In the education sector, on the other hand, standardized
measures of attainment have facilitated cost-benefit analysis, but
sizeable differences in quality cannot be measured easily.
Nevertheless, some evidence supports the notion that declines
in the dependency ratio lead to the generation of more capital per
worker. Population growth declines also facilitate increases in
educational spending, both in the aggregate and at the household
level. Various studies show that decreased dependency ratios lead
to pronounced increases in expenditures per secondary student, though
not to increased enrolment ţ i.e., quality rather than quantity
improves.
Mr. Ogawa noted that using micro-level household data in
Thailand and South Korea, Andrew Mason (1981, unpublished) had
demonstrated that family planning has been extremely successful in
promoting educational investment. Smaller family sizes are
associated with increases in education expenditures per household.
In Thailand, enrolment increased in smaller households. Although
such benefits depend on a country's development level, in the Asia
and Pacific region, Mr. Ogawa concluded, declining fertility is
strongly connected to improved quality of schooling.
Participants in the subsequent discussion raised a variety of
questions about the cost-benefit calculations in the studies reviewed
by Ms. Janowitz. One problem noted was the difficulty of assessing
substitution effects, as government programmes supply people who
would otherwise have found other sources. Contrasts were drawn
between current studies and earlier flawed methodologies which were
less sensitive to these issues and resulted in exaggerated claims
for the benefits of government programmes.
Commenting on Ms. Janowitz's presentation, Mr. Merrick
suggested that Nortman's Mexico study was free of some of the
shortcomings of earlier work, since it allowed estimation of the net
benefits of shifts in expenditures between family planning and
maternal and child health services. Nevertheless, he said, all cost-
benefit studies need better cost-accounting procedures; rules of
thumb have been used to estimate some cost components. He called for
more research on costs. He also observed that the environmental costs
borne by poor women is an issue of topical interest since UNCED.
Ms. Janowitz responded that little information is available on
most costs of integrated family planning programmes other than
commodities. She noted that countries will increasingly be called
on to decide how to provide services, but lack information about
costs of alternate delivery mechanisms. More micro-level cost-
benefit analyses would also be useful in convincing policy makers.
Mr. Ogawa expressed the opinion that cost-benefit analysis would
never provide precise results. Intergenerational impacts need to be
measured (a task omitted to date), and improvements in the calculation
of benefits are needed.
Reacting to Mr. Cleland's remarks, Mr. McGreevey noted that one
rationale among economists (particularly at the World Bank) for
giving low priority to population programmes is the fear of coercion.
For these economists, alteration of people's "utility functions" is
an inappropriate activity, since these are taken as given in most
economic frameworks. He, on the other hand, supported Cleland's
view that people's desires and their capacity to express them
change, and that such modifications are not coercion.
To this, Mr. Cleland added that in many poor societies children
are seen as economically neutral. In such circumstances, the desire
for more children is normal. Family planning programmes often
provide poor people with their first suggestion that family size
involves choice; this leads to individual reappraisals. He observed
that it would be absurd to assume that parents calculate utility in
the way that economists do. On the same issue, Mr. Stolnitz
suggested that two components of family planning programmes, sex
education and the introduction of greater choice of contraceptive
methods, should be stressed to counter arguments about coercion.
Mr. Cassen noted that in the social field, particularly primary
education, societal coercion has been common. Since Germany first
adopted it in the 17th century, compulsory education has been widely
accepted and has wrought enormous social and economic changes.
Mr. Khusro noted the complexities of evaluating and affecting
social priorities in democratic societies. In India, the promotion
of education and literacy preceded social demand for them. He also
noted that early studies which asked people to prioritize social
outlays almost never mentioned sanitation, but that once investment
began in this sector, its priority increased. A similar situation
could be anticipated in the case of family planning.
In response, Mr. Cleland argued that coercive methods are
unsustainable anywhere, so the issue of coercion is a false one. His
concern was focused on obtaining enough investment to overcome the
initial innovation costs in countries with high resistance to family
planning.
As to the legitimizing effects of family planning programmes,
concern was expressed that knowledge and access, while necessary, are
not sufficient to cause changes in fertility behaviour. Some
participants argued that policy statements provide another dimension
to legitimizing birth control behaviour.
Mr. Cleland agreed with this conclusion, but noted that
"notional policies" (empty policy statements) mean little. In Kenya,
for example, former President Jomo Kenyatta endorsed a policy of
fertility reduction but never spoke about family planning in public.
The magnitude of psychological barriers to acceptance of family
planning varies among societies, and the role of government can be
critical in altering perceptions. On the other hand, as the history
of the Pakistan programme shows, inappropriate government intervention
can create a backlash, raising cultural barriers and harming family
planning programmes.
Mr. Cleland emphasized that networks of field workers and
clinics are insufficient to bring about change, and that
information, education and communication (IEC) efforts are needed to
legitimize family planning. Genuine political commitment needs to
be mobilized; politicians are experts in such efforts. Never-
theless, he stated, some sort of dynamism in society is a necessary
condition for favourable returns on family planning investments. It
is highly unlikely that static societies could show dynamism only in
the realm of family planning acceptance and demographic change.
Mr. John Bongaarts of the Population Council saw Mr. Cleland's
remarks as both important and provocative. He agreed that the role
of family planning programmes is to train and enable people to adopt
new behaviours. This conclusion calls for a greater stress on IEC
efforts, including those directed at political leaders.
Queried about his thesis that desired fertility declines after
the introduction of family planning, Mr. Cleland noted that in Latin
America, the desire for additional children was never very high.
Even early surveys revealed a desired family size of around four
children, well below that observed in some other regions of the
world. Accordingly, family planning programmes are operating in a
favourable environment. Africa is different in this respect,
exhibiting much higher desired fertility.
Mr. Bongaarts contended that the empirical record on the
evolution of demand and behavioural change is not as clear as had
been suggested. In his opinion, desired family size declines after
fertility decline has started, rather than reflecting the intro-
duction of a population programme. In Thailand, for example, during
a time when fertility declined from around six to two children per
woman, desired family size changed from about 3.7 children to 2.8.
He said it was implausible that one could start up a programme
anywhere and promptly see changes in demand. In some programmes,
long periods were observed before fertility began to decline.
Mr. Cleland noted that in the case of Thailand, the desired
family size was at a modest level to begin with; larger declines
could be expected in Africa.
An extended discussion touched inconclusively on the relative
impacts of various types of interventions (for education, for women,
etc.) on development. There was general agreement that access to
family planning programmes would be required to translate the impacts
of non-family planning interventions into demographic change.
V. Session Four: Government Responses to High Population
Growth
Panellists: M. Jambwa, A. Khusro, N. Mwangi, J. Nwankwo, P.
Tonguthai, C. UrzŁa
Mr. Nizamuddin gave a summary presentation of the second back-
ground paper prepared for the meeting, concerning national policy
perceptions and responses to rapid population growth (see page 58).
Mr. Maphion Jambwa of Zimbabwe's Central Statistical Office
reported on policy with respect to population growth and economic
development in Zimbabwe. He noted the inadequate quality of data in
sub-Saharan Africa in general, and said that estimates and measures
of savings and consumption in the region were particularly
questionable. He expressed disappointment that the background papers
avoided discussion of migration and rapid rates of urbani-zation,
given the high priority they are accorded by regional policy makers.
Zambia, for example, is 40 per cent urban; and in Botswana concern
is being expressed about the growth rate of Gabarone (which grew by
237 per cent during the period 1971-1981). He added that policy
makers in the region are also concerned with very high youth
dependency ratios.
Mr. Jambwa summarized a number of issues with regard to econo-
mic development:
* Centralized planning has been over-emphasized.
* Population concerns are inadequately integrated in the
planning process.
* Maldistribution of resources favouring urban areas tends
to reinforce migration flows.
* Getting planners and policy makers to use demographic
data has proven difficult given the form in which such
data are disseminated.
* Planners have not been sensitized to the potential uses
to which demographic data can be put.
Mr. Nwankwo presented a Nigerian perspective on policy issues.
He said that the recent census, which differed by 32 per cent from
the projected population size, has considerably confused people's
perceptions; analysis by both the Government and donors is required.
He emphasized his concern about direct macroeconomic policies,
particularly structural adjustment programmes which have led to
declines in the quality of life and to growing levels of poverty.
In Nigeria, family planning is not seen as a special case for
direct allocation of resources. Rather, it is viewed as a part of
the health-care delivery system. External assistance has led to
acceptance of family planning programmes, he noted, but gaps remain
between government policy and will. In countries like Nigeria where
there is political support for family planning programmes,
institutional frameworks have frequently been designed using imported
models. Mr. Nwankwo cited efforts to create population strategies
in a number of countries (Kenya, Nigeria and Namibia, for example).
He criticized inefficiencies in a number of distribution systems,
especially in Nigeria.
He stated that the development of women's commissions (for
example, in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) had made a positive
contribution in encouraging female education and health. Policy
makers still need to rationalize non-population policies that contain
implicit incentives for high fertility. He also noted that
demographers and economists do not share common perspectives and need
to communicate more.
In summary, Mr. Nwankwo cited a number of recent developments
that point to the Nigerian Government's support and concern for
integrating population in the development planning process: (1)
making demographic data collection routine; (2) the framing of the
National Population Policy; (3) the formation of a National
Commission for Women, which created distribution points for
delivering contraceptive methods; and (4) the incorporation of
population issues, including targets, in annual rolling plans.
Donor contributions to the Nigerian programme, although
significantly lower than the national contribution, are seen as a way
to increase government support for programmes. He emphasized that
large government appropriations to family planning occur only when
it is seen as part of an overall development strategy aimed at
alleviating poverty, providing food security, improving education,
etc.
Mr. Khusro discussed population policies in India. Indian
planning strategies were initiated in 1951 when a central planning
approach was adopted; universities in the United States helped
develop various planning models. Family planning was included from
the start as a means to reduce the population growth rate and
facilitate development. Particular attention was given to
constructing an infrastructure to reduce mortality and morbidity.
Education and literacy campaigns were initiated.
He related several anecdotes about the high innovation costs of
and public resistance to various programmes other than family
planning, such as irrigation. In family planning, much room for
administrative improvement remained after the early efforts. India's
family planning programme suffered a temporary set-back during the
country's "emergency" period in the 1980s; the earlier high level of
activity has since been regained.
Mr. Khusro noted that the initial stigma associated with using
contraceptives recedes in time. He called for special attention to
under-served subgroups. He emphasized the need to integrate
population into other vertical service systems, and said that
communication techniques also need further development. And he
supported the widely held view that private efforts will have to
supplement government programmes, which he said should concentrate
on infrastructure development in support of population efforts.
Mr. Mwangi referred to Kenyan econometric models which help to
inform policy. He noted that while the 1989 census showed slight
reductions in the intercensal growth rate, government planners
continue to worry about rapid population growth. Family planning is
now recognized as important to overall development, and since 1986
has been a component of overall policy formulation (including the
structural adjustment programme).
Concern about the adverse impacts of high population growth
dates back to colonial times. The Family Planning Association of
Kenya dates from the 1950s and 1960s. In 1966, family planning was
adopted as part of Kenya's development policy. In 1967, the family
planning programme began, but with little coordination among
agencies. After the 1979 census, which revealed a continuing
increase in the growth rate, the National Committee on Population and
Development was formed to promote modern contraceptive methods,
improve management, motivate men and improve access to services.
Recent developments in the Kenyan programme have included
research into cost sharing, labour-force participation and
education for women, and an emphasis on the need to bring
development to rural areas. Strategies have been formulated to
identify new urban concentrations and provide needed infrastructure
to encourage their growth as alternative centres, in order to slow
migration to large cities.
The Ministry of Planning and National Development generates
various scenarios as inputs to the annual budgetary process;
allocations to slow population growth must still compete with demands
from other constituencies, but the mechanism assures that population
issues are addressed. Following fertility surveys that have
identified continuing sociocultural resistance to family planning
among men, sensitization of men has become a programme concern.
Improving the status of women ţ involving income generation,
education, and family life education activities ţ is seen as
critical to improving the impact of family planning programmes.
Ms. Tonguthai remarked on Thailand's very successful family
planning programme. It is noted for the pervasiveness of family
planning acceptance, and consequent fertility declines. The
government agency implementing the programme has received much of the
credit for the programme's success, but the speaker paid particular
tribute to the political commitment emanating from the Thai royal
family.
In Thailand, policy makers and planners alike subscribe to the
economic rationale for fostering fertility decline, and have included
such justifications in national development plans. Planners work
closely with demographers and population analysts to produce
extensive simulations of economic development under varying
demographic scenarios, and to monitor surveys on the demand for
children.
The rapidity of Thailand's decline in fertility is attributed
to the large demand for family planning, the wide range of methods
offered, an innovative distribution system and subsidized prices. The
family planning effort is consistent with government policies to
enhance the status of women. Women now demand family planning
services because of the high opportunity costs associated with having
children. This is particularly true for young unskilled women from
the rural areas who have low levels of education. According to Ms.
Tonguthai, the female labour-force participation rate is currently
66 per cent, second highest in the South-East Asian region.
Government development policies encourage intensive manufac-
turing. This has favoured female labour and led to increased
internal migration of women, which in some age groups now exceeds
that of men. The Government did not seek to create jobs for young
women as a means of lowering fertility, but that has been the
undeniable effect of these policies. While explicit policies sought
to reduce the rate of population growth in Bangkok and to disperse
migrants, implicit policy incentives fuelled migration to the
capital.
Mr. UrzŁa addressed the question of shifts in Mexico's
demographic policies in the 1970s. He reviewed long-term
(post-1810) trends in Mexico's population growth and fertility,
comparing them to trends in real GDP and GDP per capita. Economic
growth had generally been sufficient to exceed population growth
until 1982, when the external debt burden began to affect economic
growth. The country's dependency ratio reached its peak in the 1970s
and has since been declining. He noted that the savings rate has
remained flat even though the dependency burden has shifted
considerably.
Recounting the history of population policy discussion in
Mexico, Mr. UrzŁa noted that high population growth rates have long
been seen as an obstacle to economic growth. In 1970, Francisco
Alejo wrote an analysis questioning whether economic growth
automatically leads to population growth rate declines. By 1973, the
Government had endorsed a policy calling for curbing the population
growth rate (an initial target of 1 per cent per annum was set for
the year 2000; the target is now 1.2 per cent). The rationale for
the policy was that labour absorption had slowed in the 1970s,
necessitating a lower fertility rate. The need to increase the
health and well-being of women and children provided additional
justification. Mr. UrzŁa emphasized the role of per-sonal commitment
by policy makers in formulating and implementing population policy.
Mr. Stolnitz described Mexico as providing an excellent rebuttal
against the argument that "development is the best contraceptive",
since the country had experienced economic growth rates of 6 per cent
with no apparent effect on fertility rates. Once a solid political
commitment was articulated, fertility began to drop rather quickly.
In an extended discussion of the Mexican example, it was noted
that much of the observed high economic growth rates reflected growth
in the petroleum industry. Policy makers were described as far-
sighted for anticipating that these economic growth rates were not
sustainable. Government efforts to anticipate and counter opposition
(particularly from the Catholic Church) and the favourable support
received from elite groups were cited as important factors in the
success of family planning efforts.
Mr. Richard Jolly of UNICEF made three general observations.
First, he said that economists and economic modellers tend to
overplay economics and underplay the sociological and human
dimensions of development. He noted that fertility correlates highly
with women's education and that women's empowerment is important for
fertility change. Research has also shown the close relationship
between fertility and infant mortality: people must be convinced that
their children will survive before they will consider having smaller
families. Economists, who tend to concentrate on macroeconomic
relationships, too often ignore these social issues.
Second, he said, for development efforts to succeed, we must
look to non-economic bases for encouraging dynamism and change. Three
important movements in the world are those for the advancement of
women, for protection of the environment and for equitable
opportunity. On moral as well as programmatic grounds, closer
linkages need to be forged between these movements and the
population movement. Commitment to action will be mobilized not by
cost-benefit analyses, but by coupling population concerns with other
world-changing dynamics. "There would have been no end to
colonialism," Mr. Jolly asserted, "if it had been left to cost-
benefit analyses."
Third, he noted an ominous despair about the growing gap between
developed and the developing countries that is leading some
respectable health analysts to accept that people should be allowed
to die in order to enable Governments to exercise some measure of
control. He cited a note published to that effect in Lancet (1990).
In the general discussion that followed, Mr. Khusro noted that
family planning is recognized as a private decision, and said the
role of government should be to provide infrastructure for family
planning programmes, paying special attention to correcting
imbalances between urban and rural areas. Programmes must be
adequately funded to meet existing demand and to create demand
through female education, IEC efforts and improvements in women's
status. In light of the arguments advanced at the meeting concerning
population-development relationships at the micro-level, he said the
burden of proof rests with those who insist that the macro-
relationship is neutral.
Many participants felt that research to date into demographic-
economic relationships has been insufficiently focused. Studies are
needed to discover whether market forces will be sufficient to curb
rapid population growth in a timely manner.
In this regard, Mr. Stolnitz offered several topics for such a
research effort: "retrospective" studies of consequences of fertility
declines (for example, if fertility had declined from six to two
children per woman instead of to only five, what would have been the
demand for social-sector services?); a broader analysis of population
and labour-force growth, addressing not just absorptive capacities
but also quality of labour and productivity issues, noting the
limited supply of entrepreneurial expertise in developing countries;
studies of the impact on wage rates of changes in relative-factor
endowments and returns under a regime of rapid population growth; an
investigation of population-resource relationships; analyses of the
impact of rapid urbanization on investment capacities to increase the
supplies of housing, potable water and other social-sector needs;
studies that explain why economic development is not a sufficiently
timely initiator of contraceptive practice; an examination of the
effects of population dynamics on incentives to save, including age-
structure effects; and more-focused research into the effects of
population growth on the balance of payments, export capacities and
import needs.
Mr. Geurts urged that the meeting report also include consi-
deration of the relationship of population to agriculture. He
asserted that long-term population growth endangers sustainable
economic development, since it drives economic agents to adopt short-
term planning horizons. Disagreeing with Mr. Cassen, Mr. Geurts
expressed the opinion that high population growth drives people into
agriculture primarily because alternative employment opportunities
are lacking. He added that such demographic pressure on agriculture
impedes the intensification of agriculture, because it prevents the
sector from generating sufficient capital on its own.
In conclusion, Dr. Sadik thanked the participants for their
input, and said that the meeting had initiated a more coherent
process of addressing economic and population relationships. She
pledged that UNFPA would promote additional discussion on the topic,
including a meeting of policy makers.