UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
|
| UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) |
|
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For further information please contact the United Nations Population
Fund at 220 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 USA or via E-mail:
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Population Growth and Economic Development
Report on the Consultative
Meeting of Economists
Convened by the United Nations Population Fund
28-29 September 1992
New York
United Nations Population Fund
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The two background papers were researched and drafted by Landis
Mackellar (Recent Developments in Research into the Relationship of
Population Growth and Economic Development) and Rampersaud
Rameshwar (Population Growth and Economic Development: The Policy
Response of Governments). The Meeting Summary was drafted by Stan
Bernstein and Michael Vlassoff. We would like to acknowledge the
comments and suggestions regarding these chapters from several
individuals, in particular, Jyoti Singh, Mari Simonen, M.
Nizamuddin and Liliana Frieiro. We would also like to acknowledge the
work of Thomas Merrick, who served as chairman of the Meeting's
working group for drafting the Statement on Population Growth and
Economic Development. In addition, William A. Ryan prepared the
revised text for publication. The views expressed herein are not
necessarily those of UNFPA or any of the Member States.
Copyright 1993 by United Nations Population Fund.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for.
ISBN 0-89714-187-3
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PREFACE
This report describes the proceedings of the Consultative
Meeting of Economists on the Relationship of Population Growth and
Economic evelopment, convened by the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) from 28-29 September 1992 in New York. The consultative
meeting, the first of its kind organized by UNFPA, was held to review
recent developments in research on the macroeconomic implications of
population growth. Some 30 leading development economists from
around the world participated.
UNFPA's Technical and Evaluation Division designed the
conceptual framework for the consultative meeting, which was
organized around four themes: population growth and economic
development; population growth and economic growth Ä specific
linkages; cost-benefit analysis of family planning; and government
responses to high population growth.
Also included here are the two background papers UNFPA
prepared for the consultative meeting, Recent Developments in
Research into the Relationship Between Population Growth and Economic
Development and Population Growth and Economic Development: The
Policy Response of Governments, as well as a Statement on Population
Growth and Economic Development which the participants adopted by
consensus at the end of the meeting. This important document
emphasizes the need to bridge the gap between economic analysis of
the effects of population growth and the urgency of lowering
population growth rates expressed by policy makers in the developing
world. The Statement is a plea for a more involved approach by
economists in the face of imperfect information and methods of
analysis.
The Statement represents a consensus of many differing
points of view. Several participants, although subscribing to the
Statement, urged the group to adopt an even stronger position
concerning the negative economic effects of high population growth.
Included as an appendix, therefore, is A Dissenting Statement by Mr.
George Stolnitz, one of the participants. He forcefully argues the
case for including population growth as an important factor affecting
the macro-economy. This publication is intended to assist policy
makers in the formulation of population policies and programmes, to
suggest future research needs in the area of population growth and
economic development, and to provide input into the preparations for
the International Conference on Population and Development, to be
held in Cairo in 1994.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
DAC Development Assistance Committee
FP Family planning
GDP Gross domestic product
IEC Information, education and communication
NAS U.S. National Academy of Sciences
NRR Net reproduction rate
MCH Maternal and child health
NDC Newly developing country
NGO Non-governmental organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
PQLI Physical Quality of Life Index
TFR Total fertility rate
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
CONTENTS
PREFACE i
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ii
INTRODUCTION 1
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS 5
I. Opening Session 5
II. Session One: Population Growth
and Economic Development 7
III. Session Two: Population Growth
and Economic Development
-- Specific Linkages 15
IV. Session Three: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Family Planning 23
V. Session Four: Government Responses
to High Population Growth 29
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH INTO
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION
GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 36
I. Introduction 36
II. General Considerations 39
III. Rapid Population Growth and
Savings and Investment 40
IV. Rapid Population Growth and
Labour-Force Growth and
Absorption 43
V. Rapid Population Growth and
Human-Resource Quality at the
Household and National Levels 45
VI. Rapid Population Growth, Economies
of Scale and Induced Technical and
Institutional Change 47
VII. Rapid Population Growth and Externalities 49
VIII.Rapid Population Growth, Income
Distribution and Poverty 50
IX. Correlation Studies and Other Models 51
X. Conclusion 55
POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: THE POLICY RESPONSE
OF GOVERNMENTS 58
I. Introduction 58
II. Regional Focus 61
III. Policy Responses to Sectoral Issues 69
IV. Some Changing Perceptions 76
V. Concluding Remarks 79
STATEMENT ON POPULATION GROWTH
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 85
I. Policy and Research Challenges in
the 1990s 85
II. Origins of Consensus and Commitment
to Action on Population 86
III. Revisionist View of Macroeconomic
Consequences in 1980s 87
IV. Status of Current Knowledge Base and
Implications for Population Policy 88
V. Recommendations 89
A DISSENTING STATEMENT 91
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 98
REFERENCES 101
INDEX 109
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INTRODUCTION
The September 1992 Consultative Meeting of Economists on the
Relationship of Population Growth and Economic Development was
convened to discuss the various effects that rapid population growth
have on economic and social development, and to assess the importance
of such effects. The issue has drawn the attention of economists
world-wide, and has been addressed by numerous studies in the post-
World War II period. The last major analysis of research on this
theme took place in 1986, when the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) published Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy
Questions.
The world's population, estimated at nearly 5.5 billion in 1992,
continues to grow rapidly; at present rates of growth it will double
in 40 years. Some 94 per cent of the annual increase is currently
taking place in developing countries. Urban growth in these
countries is particularly high, estimated at 4.2 per cent annually.
While this rapid population growth remains cause for serious
concern, many countries have made remarkable achievements infor-
mulating population policies and providing accessible family planning
services. Many policy makers and non-population analysts are not
fully aware of this progress. Today, about half of all couples in
developing countries are users of family planning, up from 12-14
percent only two decades ago. The average number of births per woman
inthe developing world has fallen from 6 to 3.8, a drop of more than
37 per cent, in the same time period. This gives reason for optimism
that cost-effective interventions can make a major impact on
population trends in other developing countries in a relatively short
span of time.
And in many countries, policy makers' perceptions of the
impact of rapid population are changing. The August 1992 Summit
Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Jakarta emphasized in its
final communiqu‚ that population growth exacerbates problems of
socio-economic development.
Although dramatic reductions in fertility continue to be made
in a growing number of countries, the transition to low fertility has
barely begun in many more countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and
Latin America; population growth in these countries remains at
unprecedented levels. UNFPA estimates that at least 120 million
couples world-wide want to limit or space child-bearing, but lack
access to adequate family planning services.
Despite the evident strains that rapid population growth is putting
on natural resources and social services in many developing countries,
many economists take an "agnostic" position regarding the relationship
between population growth and economic development. Many have not
given population the attention it deserves. Some even consider it
"neutral" or unimportant.
As the background paper reviewing recent research into this
topic shows, rapid population growth clearly constrains develop-ment,
via its negative effects on income distribution and the development
of human resources. Other linkages, for example, a negative effect
of population growth on savings and productive investments, have not
been clearly established on the basis of existing data and analytical
methods. And economists presently seem unable to answer satis-
factorily the question of just how detrimental rapid population
growth is to development.
One School of thought holds that "population problems will
solve themselves as socio-economic development proceeds". This
school's theoretical prediction of a gradual decline in fertility
in lock step with development has not been borne out by recent
events, however. Where fertility rates have fallen dramatically
in the late 1970s and 1980s, the declines have been far too abrupt
to have been brought about solely or even largely by economic
improvements. For instance, Brazil's total fertility rate has
plunged over the past decade, while the country has suffered one
of the worst economic slumps in its history. In the Indian state
of Kerala, fertility has fallen and family planning has spread
despite economic stagnation.
Some other economists adopt a laissez-faire attitude to popu-
lation growth for different reasons. They contend that population
growth forms part of a self-regulating mechanism: as population puts
pressure on other parts of the economy, relative prices will shift,
making large families less attractive, and thus will induce a
transition to lower fertility.
Again, however, evidence from the past 15 years casts doubt on
this line of thought. In many countries, the trend in fertility has
diverged greatly from economic trends, providing ample evidence that
reproductive behaviour is not overridingly determined by economic
circumstances alone. The sudden and swift drops in fertility
registered in several countries are difficult to explain by the
gradual shifts in relative prices that have occurred over the same
period. Many local instances can be cited where use of family
planning services increased dramatically once these services were
established and real access to them was assured. The point is that
instead of waiting for long-term supply-and-demand interactions to
lower fertility, faster and more dramatic results can be induced by
interventions that relieve pent-up demand for family planning
services.
The influence economic growth has upon fertility seems to be far
weaker than that which changes in population growth may have on
economic growth. Some of the most crucial linkages are in regard to
education and employment.
In much of Africa, for instance, demand for primary school
education is doubling every 20 or so years as a result of
demographic pressure alone. Enrolment rates in much of sub-Saharan
Africa actually declined in the 1980s; population growth rates of 3-4
per cent annually were evidently a major factor in this decline.
This is not only a social tragedy, but an economic one with far-
reaching consequences for African countries' future capacities to
develop.
Rapid population growth also seems to have obvious economic
consequences for the labour force and the attendant problems of
unemployment and underemployment. The burgeoning youth population,
found in so many developing countries with high rates of population
growth, often seems to overwhelm the efforts of Governments and the
private sector to generate productive employment. The contrast
between sub-Saharan Africa, with its high rates of population growth,
high unemployment and economic stagnation, and the dynamic economies
of low-population-growth, low-unemployment East Asia is readily
apparent.
In a number of Asian countries, notably South Korea, Taiwan
and Thailand, success in boosting family planning and lowering
fertility has preceded economic booms.
UNFPA has crudely estimated the costs involved in providing
affordable, convenient contraceptive services to the 300 million
couples who currently lack access to such services to be around $9
billion annually (in 1989 dollars) by the year 2000, about double the
current level of spending. It seems obvious that the benefits to
society would far outweigh this relatively low level of expenditure.
Estimating the value of these benefits, some of which are direct but
others indirect and long-range, poses an important challenge for
economists.
Even though population and family planning programmes are
funded mainly by national Governments in partnership with national
non-governmental organizations, an increased level of international
assistance is needed, particularly to help the least developed and
other low-income countries. International assistance for population
on a per capita basis has actually declined since the early 1970s,
after adjusting for inflation: expressed in constant 1985 dollars,
total international commitments for 1970-1979 averaged $415 million
annually; in 1990, the figure was 32 per cent higher, $549 million,
while the number of women at risk in developing countries increased
by 50 per cent over 1970-1990. Economic arguments need to be
marshalled to convince international donors to give higher priority
to population assistance.
Under the overall theme of population, sustained economic
growth and sustainable development, the 1994 International Conference
on Population and Development will aim to strengthen awareness of
population issues, provide some highly focused recommendations for
action, and enhance the mobilization of resources needed in
developing countries. Further conceptual clarification of the
relationship of population growth to economic development should be
an important part of the Conference preparatory process. It is hoped
that the present volume will help in this process.
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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
I. Opening Session
Dr. Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), opened the meeting. She observed that the
1994 International Conference on Population and Development, to be
held in Cairo, will be devoted to the theme of "population, sustained
economic growth and sustainable development", an emphasis that
recognizes the importance of the relationship between population
growth and development. As part of preparations for the Conference,
she noted, the current meeting was convened to update research
findings since the 1986 report of the United States National Academy
of Sciences (NAS), Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy
Questions (National Research Council, 1986).
In opening, Dr. Sadik repeated Mr. Kenneth Boulding's quip,
"Anyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever is
either a madman or an economist." While exempting the meeting
participants from such a characterization, she noted that many
economists are generally unaware of a number of major population
issues.
Dr. Sadik cited the significant progress family planning
programmes have made in the past two decades, as indicated by: the
increase of contraceptive prevalence in developing countries to 50
per cent today, compared to12-14 per cent in 1971; a 37 per cent
decline in the average number of births per woman in the same time
period; a reduc-tion of world population growth by 400 million from
the number that would have been expected without increased use of
family planning; and the resource contributions by the Governments
of developing countries, which pay for over three-quarters of the
costs of national population programmes.
Some economists understate the negative impact of population
growth on economic development or take an agnostic position on the
issue. These assessments do not accord with UNFPA perceptions, Dr.
Sadik emphasized. She asserted that rapid population growth is
significantly detrimental to development, although it is hard to
determine how detrimental.
Dr. Sadik also challenged the assumption that fertility will
automatically fall as economic development occurs, citing country
comparisons that indicate economic development is neither a
sufficient nor necessary cause of fertility reduction. Fertility
declines in Thailand and Indonesia, for example, were much larger
than one would anticipate based on the rates of economic progress,
while in Brazil, the Indian state of Kerala and Bangladesh, fertility
declined substantially during periods of economic stagnation.
The UNFPA Executive Director questioned the usefulness of the
laissez-faire notion that population increases will cause prices to
rise, in turn increasing "demand" for fertility regulation; she cited
the large and rapid fertility changes observed in contexts where
shifts in relative prices have been merely gradual. The need to meet
pent-up demand for family planning is too urgent to wait for long-
term supply, demand and price interactions to do the job. Making
services available leads to faster declines in fertility than relying
on market-driven effects, and also creates further demand, she
contended.
Dr. Sadik enjoined participants to argue for a higher priority
for international population assistance. She noted that support for
population activities had increased only 35 per cent during a period
in which the number of women at risk of pregnancy increased by 50 per
cent (a 12 per cent drop in per capita assistance before inflation).
She expressed the hope that this Consultative Meeting would mark the
start of a process of investigating these issues.
Mr. Jyoti S. Singh, Director of the Technical and Evaluation
Division of UNFPA, called attention to the recent summit of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The gathering's statement gave great emphasis to
the problems of socio-economic development associated with high
population growth. The summit approved specific
population-related initiatives, including a ministerial meeting to
organize South-South cooperation for population policy formulation
and family planning programming. This represents official concern
and perceptions on population, he stated. Mr. Singh reviewed the
structure of the present meeting of economists and said he hoped the
meeting would give useful guidance to policy makers.
II. Session One: Population Growth and Economic Development
Panellists: R. Barlow, T. Bengtsson, R. Cassen, B. Geurts, N. Islam
The first session began with a presentation by Mr. Michael
Vlassoff of UNFPA on the background paper, Recent Developments in
Research into the Relationship between Population Growth and Economic
Development (see page 36). In summary, the paper
indicates that in the limited number of studies conducted since 1986
on specific relationships between population growth and economic
development, the effects of population growth have been found to be
predominantly negative. This is particularly the case with regard
to:
* Savings and investment. Three new studies were reviewed,
one of which showed that population growth has a negative
impact.
* Labour force and labour absorption. Two studies were
reviewed; both showed a negative impact.
* Human-resource quality. Five studies were reviewed, four
negative and one neutral.
* Economies of scale and technological change. No new work
was reviewed.
* Externalities. The one study reviewed found a negative
impact.
* Income distribution and poverty. One study found a
negative impact.
* Correlation studies. Two studies were reviewed; both
found a negative impact.
Mr. Vlassoff presented details of the reviewed studies. Overall,
he reported, the new research pointed to four main conclusions:
First, population growth impedes economic growth, although available
research says little about the relative strength of this negative
impact. Second, in recent studies the negative effects observed,
especially those at the household level, were more significant than
those noted in the 1986 NAS report. Third, numerator and denominator
effects should be distinguished in all analyses. Fourth and perhaps
most important, deficiencies in both the data base and research
methodologies play key roles in fostering agnosticism about population
-development relationships.
In another presentation, Mr. Robert Cassen of Oxford
University observed that discussion of the relationship between
population and economic factors has been characterized by
emotionalism and exaggeration on all sides. He asserted, however,
that certain specific population-development linkages are not obscure
or difficult to determine, and that the relationship between
population growth and development depends substantially on the
definition of development and the particular indicators used.
At the most general level, he said, it is clear that
population growth will not lead to higher growth of income per
capita. Aggregate economic indicators say nothing about impacts on
individual welfare, particularly in situations where people are
already struggling to meet their current needs. It may also be
stated without reservation, he argued, that rapid population growth
makes it more difficult to attain subsidiary goals like advances in
education, environmental quality and health.
According to Mr. Cassen, revisionist economists minimize the
negative external results associated with individual fertility
decisions; they also tend to accept the claim that parents in poor
rural families believe they are individually better off with large
families, and to view this belief as correct. He said it would be
worthwhile to conduct more research to determine the validity of
these views.
Mr. Cassen expressed his opinion that the meeting should have
included the effects of population on the environment. Efforts to
model population, food production and the environment, he contended,
would clearly show how high population growth drives countries to
produce more food, making it necessary to allocate more of their
resources to activities with relatively slow growth prospects.
The environmental and economic consequences of this dynamic are
considerable, Mr. Cassen maintained. He cited World Bank projections
of food production growth rates required to meet the needs of
increasing populations, and said this would have unacceptable
economic and environmental costs unless technology is improved
significantly. He also pointed out that the limited availability of
water is a powerful constraint on the expansion of food production,
and will only grow worse. And he noted that 90 per cent of the
future increase in food demand will be driven by population, not
income.
In another vein, Mr. Cassen suggested that earlier "neutral"
findings on the relationship of population to economic growth were
based on poor research. Re-analysis using new econometric
approaches (including excluded and latent variables models) has shown
some of the old results to be invalid. Mis-specification effects in
the earlier reports are also clearer now, he said.
Mr. Tommy Bengtsson of Lund University presented a historical
overview of population and economic development. In the late 1950s,
following the publication of Population Growth and Economic
Development in Low-income Countries (Coale and Hoover, 1958), the
major concern of specialists was that population increase would limit
the amount of capital available for productive investment and lead
to slower growth. In the mid-1960s, Kuznets' reexamination put in
question the empirical support for this view (Kuznets, 1965). In the
1970s, the relationship of population to land, food and poverty came
to the fore. At present, the possible environmental impact of
population has become a major concern. And as suggested in D.
Blanchet's work, it is now believed that population growth may have
contributed to the economic stagnation of the 1980s (Blanchet,
1988a).
Mr. Bengtsson contrasted the perspectives of Malthus and J.
Simon (Simon, 1976). Data from E. Wrigley and R. Schofield (1981)
on historical patterns in England make it clear that different
periods revealed different relationships between population and
development. Malthus had the mechanism of population dynamics wrong,
Mr. Bengtsson argued: mortality shifts occur but are not responsive
to economic con-ditions. However, fertility adjustments are large,
with great increases in age at marriage during hard times.
Mr. Bengtsson concluded that population increases are not
sufficient to create change and economic development. The latter
results from a complex sequence of events including changes in
institutions, incentives, property rights, parliamentary
mechanisms, and political stability.
He cited a detailed analysis of a Swedish historical time series
to raise further questions about standard demographic transition
theory and the relation of the demographic transition to economic
development. According to standard theory, the "first stage" of the
transition is supposed to be characterized by high and stable
fertility and mortality rates. The record, however, shows sharp
short-term swings in mortality. Mortality decline, therefore, is not
a good indicator for dating the start of the fertility transition.
He proposed a new definition of the phases of the demographic
transition: stage I, unstable mortality, fertility responsive to
economic conditions; stage II, spontaneous mortality decline prior
to economic growth; stage III, fertility declines despite varying
economic growth experiences; and stage IV, fertility unstable with
long post-transition cycles.
Mr. Bengtsson characterized the European transition as being in
stage I up to 1850; in stage II from 1850-1940; in stage III from
1940-1990; and now entering stage IV. Stage III has been marked by
a high increase in female participation in the labour force, with
consequences both for fertility and economic growth.
Comparing developed and developing countries' experiences, Mr.
Bengtsson concluded that the lesson of Europe shows that among the
critical requirements for transition to occur are the availability
of contraceptive methods (with modern methods leading to faster
transitions), motivation factors (old-age social security systems,
for example) and social acceptability (cited by Mr. Bengtsson as the
reason for the start of Europe's fertility decline at the end of the
19th century).
Mr. Robin Barlow presented an analysis of a pooled cross-
sectional multiple-time-point data set consisting of observations
from 85 countries from the 1960s to the 1980s. Overall, he said,
a zero correlation between economic growth and population growth
was found in bivariate relations. Different kinds of population
growth, however, have different economic consequences. Mr. Barlow
also pointed out that fertility declines have different effects
in the short and long term (with varying impacts, for example,
on savings and labour-force growth).
Even with appropriate discounting of future gains, he found
fertility declines to be economically profitable. Regression
analyses with lagged population variables indicate that countries
with the strongest current economic growth are those with low current
fertility and high past fertility.
Mr. Barlow's work demonstrated that where net fertility (births
minus infant deaths) remained constant over the period of obser-
vations, the rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) was
27 per cent; where net fertility declined by more than 1 per cent,
GDP grew by 38 per cent; and in intermediate countries, GDP grew by
31 per cent. On the basis of his results, he forecast that those
East Asian countries presently experiencing rapid economic growth
would show slower economic improvement in the future, as the short-
term benefits of lower fertility begin to fade.
Mr. Ben Geurts of the Central Planning Bureau of the
Netherlands reported on an exercise conducted by his agency to
forecast future demographic and economic trends. The exercise
projected dire expectations for development in the world's least
developed countries, noting slower than previously forecast declines
in fertility and increasing economic and ecological fragility in many
regions. Particular attention was given to future stresses on the
environment, notably water resource constraints and pollution
Mirroring the concerns raised by of Mr. Cassen, the exercise
found a critical need for substantial increases in food supplies.
Food productivity increases will have to occur at historically
unprecedented levels, and possibilities for economic growth will
depend on sustained development in agricultural growth, Mr. Geurts
noted. He cited recent statistics showing a substantial
degradation of global range and crop land, and asserted that
irrigation is not sustainable as a long-run solution due to
technological limitations and water-access difficulties.
Mr. Geurts presented alternate scenarios ranging from
relatively optimistic to bleak. In these projections, economic
development was posited to be a precondition for fertility decline,
requiring access by developing countries to developed countries'
markets and technologies and substantial levels of financial aid.
Under the bleakest scenarios, population growth will lead to
political instability, increased misery in developing countries and
mass migrations to developed regions. Under all of the scenarios,
some parts of the world will experience serious problems. Mr.
Geurts' analysis suggested that sharp declines in fertility could
help development, although this would also lead eventually to
problems associated with ageing populations.
Mr. Nurul Islam of the International Food Policy Research
Institute, chairperson of the session, noted that the causal links
between population growth and economic growth are reciprocal and
simultaneous. Appropriate multivariate analyses must address both
simultaneity and multi-causality; such analysis requires both
computational and modelling skills. Economic development should not
be seen as a precondition of reduced population growth, he argued.
Rather, the significant declines in fertility that have occurred
without development underscore the impact of policies, people and
programmes.
Mr. Islam cited as a shortcoming in the discussion the omission
of interactions between population growth and agriculture. Following
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), he said, any discussion of population and economic
development must identify the effects on the environment of both
population growth and over-consumption. In regions where the highest
rates of agricultural growth have been observed, yield potentials
have stagnated since the 1960s. As the limits of yield potential
have been neared (under current technologies), the marginal costs of
further improvements have increased. Irrigation costs are growing,
and yield improvements due to fertilizer use will require additional
amounts of increasingly scarce water. He stressed that this
situation would result in increased pollution, loss of bio-diversity,
soil degradation, erosion and desertification.
According to Mr. Islam, population growth should be seen as one
of many factors underlying these problems (others include government
policies, market failures, property rights issues, and poverty). All
factors interact in complex ways to contribute to failures of growth.
In the general discussion, it was noted that the literature
review in the background paper implied that aggregate growth rates
could be expected to have an increasing correlation with population
growth over time. The difficulty in separating the predicted from
the actual in models, given the simultaneity of relationships, was
emphasized, and an over-reliance on single-equation systems was
noted.
The omission of agriculture and the environment from the topics
covered in the research review was said to be particularly
unfortunate, since in most developing countries a majority of the
work force is in agriculture. Kuznets' analyses were cited as
showing that during Europe's demographic transition, agricultural
productivity grew only two thirds as fast as that of manufacturing,
but did not decline with migration to cities as some have
suggested.
Ms. Helen Hughes of Australia's National Centre for Development
Studies voiced concern that the framing of the agenda (and background
paper) according to questions raised in the 1986 NAS report raised
the possibility that this meeting, like the NAS report, would address
the wrong issues. She said she considered the NAS report to be good
on balance, but that shifts in emphasis were required on various
points. While stating that the current meeting was not the
appropriate forum for detailed evaluations of technical papers, she
said it was clear that inclusion of Eastern Europe (with low
population growth and low economic growth) would alter some of the
conclusions and perspectives cited.
Ms. Hughes emphasized that development is more than just
economic growth, and should involve improving the status of women.
She noted that the impact of economic development has, by and large,
worsened women's relative status and increased their workloads
without producing a corresponding increase in rewards. She cited
market failures in the areas of education and job provision for
women. Since these have implications for both fertility and the
economy, she asserted, they should be primary development objectives.
Mr. Thomas Merrick of the World Bank also expressed concern that
the right questions be asked. Citing the many complex technical
issues, he said he wondered whether sceptical economists would ever
be satisfied with any particular analyses, cross-sectional or
longitudinal. For his part, he said he was concerned about data
quality, particularly GDP data, in any conceivable analysis. Cross-
section studies at the national level might also fail to be
informative, he added, noting that differences in Brazil between Sao
Paulo and the North-east states are greater than those between
Zimbabwe and Indonesia. The key task is to address policy makers'
needs for direction, and not necessarily to convince economists about
population issues.
Mr. A.M. Khusro of India's Financial Express, drawing on lessons
from the Indian experience and earlier discussions of phases of the
demographic transition, proposed an alternate formulation and
stressed the need for theoretical refinement and advances.
In his view the four epochs of population and economic develop-
ment relationships could be defined as follows: stage I, demographic
stagnation and income-growth stagnation, with little interaction
between the two and little change; stage II, rising demographic
growth and income-growth stagnation, with some movement in economic
indicators but not to the scale of population growth, differences in
their scale muting the interaction between them; stage III, complex
and dynamic interactions between demographic growth and economic
growth, and complex relationships among investment growth, human-
capital formation, output growth and per capita income; and stage
IV, economic growth beginning to stagnate (recessions and capital-
formation stagnation), and slowing demographic change (as floors are
reached in fertility and mortality), with muted interaction between
the two.
Mr. Khusro asserted that the chairperson's comments and much of
the 1971 NAS report, Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy
Implications (National Research Council, 1971), focused on the third
stage. The 1986 NAS review, by concentrating more on non-interactive
periods, marginalized the impact of population variables. He stressed
the need to identify these distinct stages clearly in analyses of
empirical relationships in this area.
Mr. John I. Nwankwo of the University of Ibadan called for care
in framing conclusions for policy makers. The complex technical
issues must be distilled to produce usable inputs to inform policy.
An overly narrow definition of development is one error to avoid. In
developing countries today, he argued, population growth rates have
an important impact on political stability, a necessary condition for
sustained economic growth. Complex econometric arguments could
mislead the discussion, he said.
Mr. Carlos Urz£a of the Colegio de M‚xico defended econometri-
cians against criticisms of over-complexity and mis-specification.
The value of exercises like Mr. Barlow's is their capacity to suggest
explanations that can be tested against empirical data. He cited as
an example the dependency-ratio effect in decreasing savings, which
is a proposition amenable to empirical testing. He insisted that
investigations should use not raw gross national product data but
quality-adjusted income data, so as to measure the welfare of
societies. He cited the relevance of various macro-economic growth
theory models to the questions at hand, but noted that including
population in these would be complicated, an observation with which
Mr. Geurts concurred.
Mr. Richard Hooley of the University of Pittsburgh also
emphasized the need for more use of sophisticated multi-equation
models, asserting that the complexity of the various relationships
would bias conclusions that relied on single-equation models. If,
for example, population growth leads to labour-force growth with
consequent income-distribution effects affecting savings, which in
turn influence economic growth, a single-equation model will miss the
dynamic effects. He suggested that an economic model with eight or
nine equations would be needed to clarify these interactions. Other
participants replied that such models in the past have been
conspicuously unconvincing, particularly because of mis-specification
problems.
Mr. George Stolnitz of Indiana University's Population
Institute for Research and Training issued some methodological
challenges concerning the existing body of research on population-
development relationships. The proper question to ask, he said, is
not, Does population dominate other influences on economic develop-
ment? or, Does the finding of a positive relationship between
population growth and economic growth mean that all assertions about
negative impacts are erroneous? The real question is, Does
population affect the economy and even if both have grown, would
economic gains have been greater with slower population increase?
He also questioned the use of single-equation models. Such
analyses are useful only for discovering whether one variable
dominates all others, but this should not be claimed of population
growth, he argued. He proposed that economists' simulations of long-
term relationships should be complemented by looking at short-to
medium-term relationships, citing as examples the dramatic
implications of population growth for health-care needs, and
education effects that become apparent within 10 years in numbers of
students to be enrolled and of individuals left out of the system.
Mr. Cassen again called for an emphasis on conclusions that are
not in dispute, rather than focusing on the grey areas of complex
relationships. He said he knew of no studies that suggest that, in
low-income countries with backlogs in social services and human-
resource development and where the status of women is low, rapid
population growth will do anything but make economic development
more difficult.
He also asked what the "economic rationale" is intended to
justify. The population community should guard against any
simplistic views of what should be done, he said, noting that among
other difficulties, there are no clear health or fertility-
reduction "production functions". At the same time, one does not need
a macroeconomic rationale to justify health and family planning
interventions; there are ample justifications of other kinds.
III. Session Two: Population Growth and Economic Development Ä
Specific Linkages
Panellists: H. Hughes, T. Merrick, P. Robertson, G. Stolnitz
Panellists in this session carried the previous session's
discussions into more detailed consideration of specific
population-development linkages.
Mr. Paul Robertson of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) presented findings on two linkages: population
and savings/consumption; and population and labour-force growth and
absorption. A 1987 UNCTAD investigation on the first relationship
showed that it is important to use the right variables in the
analysis (for example, dependency ratios instead of growth rates).
Tracking savings effects is difficult, since they vary considerably
over the human life cycle. In Latin America, dependency-ratio
effects are statistically significant predictors of savings
behaviour.
In the UNCTAD study, he noted, point elasticities with respect
to dependency ratios were almost 1 for private consumption and 2.5
for public consumption. That is, as dependency increases, subs-
tantial rises in consumption also occur. These relationships refer
to areas with high population growth and young populations; the
associations are expected to be lower elsewhere. Similar Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) studies on the
impact on aggregate savings looked at the effect of both young and
old age dependency. Both were statistically significant in pre-
dicting consumption rates; it was difficult, however, to separate
young and old dependency effects. In developing countries, the lack
of elaborate social support networks and dependency ratios for the
young that exceed those for the old have a depressing effect on
savings. This was also seen in OECD countries. In fact, a global
scarcity of savings could be partially explained by the magnitude of
demographic changes both in the North and the South.
Touching upon another linkage, Mr. Robertson compared the rates
of labour-force growth in developed and developing countries. In OECD
countries the growth rate is low or negative (an effect which also
is seen in Eastern Europe). In developing countries, the rate of
labour-force growth is 3 per cent or higher, leading to three
percentage point differences in productivity growth rates of
developed and developing countries. The current differential is
higher than any historical observations. For development to occur,
he observed, a 5 per cent difference in GDP growth rates between
developed and developing countries would be required on the basis of
these labour-force growth differentials, but the financial system
would not be able to cope with such differences. Consequently,
there will be no per capita income growth in Africa for some time.
Mr. Robertson suggested that modelling, using 5-20 variables,
could elucidate this linkage, but said that such an effort would have
to be embedded in a larger international framework to be successful.
Mr. Merrick noted that the gap between economic research and the
concerns of policy makers appears to be widening. Ample justification
for family planning interventions can be found in terms of population
linkages to health, women's status concerns, issues of equity and
societal benefits. Further questions then arise about who should
fund interventions þ Governments, external development assistance or
private initiative. Laissez-faire proponents would advocate market-
based solutions. What, then, would be appropriate responses to
market failures? What actions are needed to remedy a lack of
information, externalities or improper prices?
According to Mr. Merrick, another important question is: Should
family planning compete on a level playing field with other develop-
mental investments þ i.e., is population a special class of
expenditure? Historically, for example, World Bank directors have
called for special status for population, but middle-level managers
have objected. The conclusions of the 1986 NAS study can be read as
calling for a level playing field, but this was done by defining the
relation of population growth and economic growth very narrowly.
Economists want an evidentiary case to justify allocations to
population programmes, he said. Policy makers, on the other hand,
are able to act on a presumptive basis. If there is a substantial
risk that population growth will significantly impede development and
the costs of population interventions are low, this is sufficient
justification for intervention in the population arena. Policy
makers need to act in short time frames, and therefore use
information that falls short of the standards of evidence seemingly
required by the authors of the 1986 NAS report.
Mr. Islam noted that 20 years ago, overly strong economic
arguments were advanced to support population interventions, and that
many economists later distanced themselves from such positions.
Nevertheless, he said, the sizeable unmet demand for family planning
services by itself justifies increased expenditures on the same
grounds as those for increased health and educational investments.
With environmental consequences such as global warming increasingly
a concern, a slowing of population growth rates would be warranted
on precautionary grounds alone. In time, he predicted, analyses
would catch up with concern. Mr. Islam also questioned the need
to pursue a strategy centred on convincing sceptics.
Mr. Cassen noted that in some Latin American countries, for
example, septic abortions have been among the most important causes
of adult female mortality. The case needs to be made, he
suggested, that moral, humanitarian, health and economic grounds
justify efforts to reduce population growth rates and that the longer
the delay, the larger the problems that will have to be dealt with.
Mr. Mohammed Nizamuddin of UNFPA reminded participants that
Governments in developing countries are mainly spending their own
money on family planning programmes: three fourths of current
resources for population come from internal allocations by
Governments.
Mr. Njuguna Mwangi of Kenya's Ministry of Planning and National
Development said this figure showed that Governments are convinced
they need family planning programmes as part of their development
plans. However, there is a danger that programmes begun with
external assistance will die when donors pull out unless strong
arguments are advanced for their continuation. He emphasized that
planners need to make a strong case for family planning allocations
in the face of competing demands.
Other discussion participants reiterated the need for strong
economic arguments to justify allocation preference to family
planning programmes. Constrained resources, like fuel for
vehicles, have to be assigned for programme needs in the face of many
competing demands. Mr. Mwangi noted that, in light of resource
constraints imposed by structural adjustment programmes, family
planning programmes do not usually enjoy universal support.
Mr. Robertson noted that economic arguments for family planning
programmes do not require dire scenarios but only
demonstrations of important linkages. His view was that in our
current state of knowledge it is not possible to say which
programmes (e.g., family planning, or women's income-generating
activities) would have the greatest impact on development at the
macro-level but that important linkages at the micro-level should be
considered.
UNFPA consultant Mr. Landis Mackellar proposed that the key
audience that should be addressed in the meeting's statement is
people who inform policy makers, both within Governments and within
donor institutions. He said that findings of household-level
benefits (for example, benefits to child welfare resulting from
smaller families) are strong and should be stressed to policy makers.
Ms. Pawadee Tonguthai of Thammasat University, citing her back-
ground in Thailand which has seen remarkable fertility declines,
raised some considerations about negative effects of rapid declines
in population growth rates. One is the "vintage effect" on the
quality of the labour force due to the ageing of the population. A
smaller school-age population has also led to the closing of some
schools, increasing travel time and costs for many students and
depriving them of home-prepared food (with potential nutritional
consequences).
Ms. Barbara Janowitz countered by citing J. Knodel's research
in the 1970s comparing families with large and small numbers of
children, which indicated that smaller families had higher levels of
educational attainment by children and greater participation of women
in the labour force. Ms. Tonguthai conceded that household-level data
shows a clear trade-off between quantity and quality, but expressed
concern about the social costs of continuing such choices. Ms.
Janowitz replied that part of Thailand's success in economic
development and fertility reduction, in contrast to the Philippines
experience, resulted from household decisions that facilitated income
growth and improvements in the quality of life.
Mr. Bengtsson felt that the comparison of Philippines and
Thailand in the discussion of the human-resource development effects
was faulty, since the infrastructure, income structures and policies
of the two countries vary in so many ways. Thailand's industry is
more labour-intensive, its service sector is more competitive, and
the two countries have very different structures of agricultural
production.
Addressing the same comparison, Mr. Hooley cited an Asian
Development Bank study indicating that high growth in small business
enterprises in the Philippines had depressed wages. He observed that
a detailed examination of labour markets would be necessary to
specify properly the relationship between population growth and
economic growth.
Mr. John Cleland of the Centre for Population Sciences at the
University of London noted that Thailand's fertility decline started
only about 15 years ago and had not yet had an appreciable effect on
the size of the labour force. The Thai and Philippine labour forces
have shown similar patterns of growth for the last 30 years, he
reported.
For Mr. Hooley, this discussion led to the question of how far
population growth should be reduced. Should the goal be 1 per cent
growth, zero growth, or even negative 1 per cent growth? Is each
equally desirable for all socio-economic systems? He observed that,
for example, agricultural economists do not dispute that irrigation
is beneficial for crop production. To formulate a consensus for
policy, however, the question of how much water is needed must be
addressed. The answer clearly differs for different crops and
different environments. If population policy could be cast in such
terms, more effective policy proposals could be formulated. Such an
approach to population might appear to be difficult, but it could
prove more fruitful than an alternative approach that seems to
address the population issue more directly.
Returning to the review of recent research, Mr. Barlow and
others criticized the background paper's citation of a recent study
(L. Schumaker and R. Clark, 1992), asserting a weak relationship
between dependency ratios and savings rates. Critics raised a
variety of technical objections about the quality of the study and
urged that its conclusions be discounted.
Mr. Naohiro Ogawa of Nihon University's Population Research
Institute also addressed the relationship between population growth
and savings, noting that previous research had failed to differen-
tiate between different kinds and sources of saving (e.g.,
government, household, etc.). He cited a recent OECD study in Asia
stressing the importance of stocks of wealth (inheritance and
bequests). Thus, he pointed out, studies of inter-generational flows
of wealth and savings are needed.
Life-cycle effects and income-distribution patterns within
families are critical to understanding how family size affects family
saving patterns. Also, the relation of higher savings rates to
longer life expectancies must be recognized. Mortality reductions
affect the size of intergenerational transfers of wealth. Equally,
fertility declines, by reducing family size, result in fewer
subdivisions of inheritances.
Mr. Bill McGreevey of the World Bank provided some historical
context for the special emphasis the Bank accords to population
investments. Often, he said, economists underestimate the impact of
decisions that are less-than-optimal and non-rational in regard to
fertility behaviour. This has led to narrow conceptualizations and
a failure to appreciate that fertility outcomes can exceed people's
preferences and goals. Family planning interventions must be
designed so people can attain various goals, bearing in mind that
reproduction and sexual gratification are intertwined. He called for
a re-investigation of studies on the costs of having children.
With respect to the population-savings relationship, Mr.
Stolnitz cited a World Bank report showing that dependency and
urbanization variables significantly influence income and wealth. He
emphasized that reliable data on micro-level dynamics of household
savings are not available. Available studies fail to decompose
national savings into its three parts: household, non-household
private, and government. Each of these is responsive to different
determinants.
Mr. Cassen stressed the important effect rapid population growth
has on human-resource development. He noted that manufacturing is
becoming increasingly sensitive to the skill and training levels of
the workforce. Countries deprived in this respect will increasingly
become uncompetitive. There is a trade-off between widening and
deepening investment in the education sector. Countries where
school populations are growing fast due to high fertility will
be less able to provide quality education than low-fertility
countries. This might foster a kind of international division
of labour, to the former countries' disadvantage.
Mr. McGreevey criticized the background paper for failing to
emphasize that household size and closely spaced births are related
to the health of women and children. This is a critical relation-
ship, which enjoys strong empirical confirmation.
Mr. McGreevey also noted that the Living Standards Measurement
Survey and Social Dimensions of Adjustment survey programmes have the
capacity to generate useful household-level information concerning
the effects of family size on household economic dynamics and socio-
economic conditions, but the information has not yet been exploited.
He cited a study (N. Birdsall and C. Griffen, 1988) whose initial
results indicated that family size has a greater effect on the
availability of resources per child than do income differences among
same-size families. He stressed the importance of obtaining
longitudinal data on family-size effects on health, education and
nutrition.
Mr. Stolnitz pointed out that conclusions in the background
paper regarding population and externalities were derived from the
work of M. Nerlove, A. Razin and E. Sadka (1987), which he said was
based on a simple model that was insensitive to a number of issues
including common-property resources. Other important issues not
reviewed adequately in the document include: (1) the development of
relative-factor endowments and wage rates, the importance of which
is lessened in situations of rapid labour-force growth; (2) the
implications of rural population growth and rural-urban migration,
which affect both wages and age structures in rural areas; (3) the
effects over time of short-term development planning measures to
accommodate internal migration, which may have long-term impacts on
the structure of industry and the environment; and (4) family-
formation and child-spacing patterns, which correlation studies have
shown to be more strongly related to poverty than is income.
Mr. Urz£a argued that human-capital formation is a critical
externality. The direct effects of household size on child welfare
may be modest, but larger households may result in differences in
education and consequently impact negatively on the quality of human
capital.
Mr. Ogawa, citing a 1986 study by Romer, called for more
attention to new endogenous growth theories. He cited in
particular the importance of human-resource development on economic
growth. Other participants, however, felt that this theoretical
perspective had little to offer for the study of population.
Several participants reiterated that technical approaches will
not resolve issues that are central to the relationship between
population growth and economic development, since debate about this
relationship has never been outside the political context of the
time. In its response to an earlier over-statement of the situation,
the 1986 NAS report narrowed the definitions of key questions
too much and therefore failed in its own right. The key challenge,
they said, is to provide policy makers with standards of evidence and
interpretation that make sense.
Mr. Hooley argued that it is not sensible to focus the
discussion narrowly on such questions as the impact of population
policies on savings and investment. Macroeconomic policies will
always have a greater effect on macroeconomics than will population
policies. Instead, in his opinion, the critical linkages are those
of population policies and programmes to human-resource development,
the dynamics of internal migration, and the status of women.
Mr. Robertson disagreed with neo-classical economic perspec-
tives that he said give undue attention to simple correlations and
micro-economic relations, to the detriment of macroeconomic concerns.
He observed a qualitative shift in the relation of population growth
and development before and after 1973. In the latter period, the
debt crisis imposed severe burdens and impeded economic growth,
freezing the international economic system's capacity to respond to
population growth. At the same time, regional differences in
population and labour-force growth engendered massive migration flows.
IV. Session Three: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Family Planning
Panellists: J. Cleland, B. Janowitz, N. Ogawa
Ms. Janowitz began this session by discussing the reasons for
paying for family planning programmes. She pointed out that costing
analyses should include not only direct programme costs, but also
opportunity costs and discounting to arrive at the present value of
future benefits. She reviewed a number of national studies of the
costs (and cost-benefit analyses) of family planning programmes in
Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Jamaica.
She cited a particularly useful, unique study (D. Nortman, D.
Halvas and A. Rabago, 1986) on the costs of family planning and
maternal and child health service delivery in Mexico. This was an
exhaustive analysis of annual costs of the services and immediate
first-year savings, using a exceptionally rich set of data. On the
cost side were services to new acceptors, costs of resupply of
contraceptive methods and equipment, and follow-up costs related to
service recipients. On the benefits side were averted costs for
several items: treatment for women experiencing abortion
complications; consultations; prescriptions; pregnancy and delivery
services; immunizations; and child care (first year).
Comparing these estimates with the costs of a natural
fertility regime (implicitly assuming all averted births were due to
family planning services), it was calculated that in the period
1972-1985, for each peso expended, 9.5 pesos were saved. Since some
women would have used family planning in the absence of the
government programme, the estimated savings were further discounted
by 50 per cent.
Ms. Janowitz reviewed another study, conducted in Thailand by
D. Chao and K. Allen (1984). Here, the analysis included costs
beyond the first year and was not restricted to costs specific to
family planning. A regression analysis showed that half of the
observed fertility decline was due to the family planning
programme. The benefits analysed included savings in education,
health, housing and development infrastructure. Costs were not tied
to specific services (as in the Mexico example), but were per capita
health costs. The calculations suggested that each dollar spent on
family planning saves 16 spent on other services.
Similar studies conducted in other settings with minor
variations in methodology also found benefit-cost ratios, ranging
from 2.8 in Jamaica to as high as 12.5 in Indonesia and 16.2 in
Thailand.
One study with opposite findings, a Brazilian cost-benefit
analysis of family planning services, was also cited by Ms. Janowitz.
Here, no net benefits were found because the level of contraceptive
use among prospective beneficiaries was already high; the family
planning services supplied merely replaced services for which
potential subscribers were already paying.
Analyses in private-sector industries, meanwhile, have con-
sistently shown positive net benefits accruing to enterprises in-
vesting in maternal and child health and family planning services.
Ms. Janowitz, while acknowledging methodological imprecision
in the cost-benefit approach, concluded that most studies have
demonstrated that investments in family planning services have net
economic benefits.
Mr. Cleland examined the social and demographic impact of family
planning programmes. He started by stating three negative
conclusions: (1) the existence of such programmes is not necessary
for fertility declines (as is shown by the examples of Europe, Japan
and Myanmar); (2) actual successes (for example, in Thailand,
Colombia and South Korea) have been less than claimed, since family
planning programmes have served to accelerate already-started
fertility declines, not initiate them; and (3) programmes have
sometimes (as in Pakistan) aroused so much opposition that they
proved counter-productive.
On the positive side, he noted that family planning programmes
can: (1) accelerate fertility decline (the timing of which is
crucial); (2) not just remedy "market imperfections", but also assist
in legitimizing birth-control efforts; (3) effectively reach poorer,
less-educated and more-rural segments of the population; and (4) help
to re-mould behavioural norms, since it has been shown that
acceptance of birth control in families reduces "demand" for
children.
Mr. Cleland concluded from longitudinal fertility data that
desired family size and the proportion of women wanting more children
tend to remain constant (at a moderate or high level) until family
planning services become available.
To illustrate the importance legitimizing the use of
contraception within a cultural context, he cited the example of
Kenya, which shifted from a pro-natalist position in the 1970s to an
anti-natalist one in the 1980s. The World Fertility Survey in the
mid-1970s found desired family sizes in Kenya of six to seven
children, and recorded only 17 per cent of women as wanting to stop
child-bearing. Within five years of the survey, following the
President's strong endorsement of family planning, a decline in
fertility began to be detected. By the early 1980s, desired family
size had been reduced to four children and the proportion of women
wanting no more children raised to 40 per cent.
Mr. Ogawa presented Asian perspectives on population-
development linkages and the role of family planning programmes.
Among the many factors that impede cost-benefit analyses of family
planning programmes, he cited child rearing, production in the home,
child income in the informal sector, and the complexity of
calculating the various costs associated with health and education
services. Studies in Indonesia have revealed that people seek health
care for a variety of reasons, leading to uncertainty about benefits
and costs of programmes. Some costs may be easy to determine, where
markets provide price information, but others remain elusive. The
prevalence of abortion in Japan and other Pacific Rim countries, and
its role in fertility decline pose additional measurement problems.
Costs and benefits of other social investments are equally hard
to measure. Health costs, for instance, are multi-dimensional and
hard to determine. Evaluating the benefits, in mortality reduction,
for example, is similarly complex. The increasing privatization of
health care has exacerbated measurement problems due to deficient
reporting. In the education sector, on the other hand, standardized
measures of attainment have facilitated cost-benefit analysis, but
sizeable differences in quality cannot be measured easily.
Nevertheless, some evidence supports the notion that declines
in the dependency ratio lead to the generation of more capital per
worker. Population growth declines also facilitate increases in
educational spending, both in the aggregate and at the household
level. Various studies show that decreased dependency ratios lead
to pronounced increases in expenditures per secondary student, though
not to increased enrolment þ i.e., quality rather than quantity
improves.
Mr. Ogawa noted that using micro-level household data in
Thailand and South Korea, Andrew Mason (1981, unpublished) had
demonstrated that family planning has been extremely successful in
promoting educational investment. Smaller family sizes are
associated with increases in education expenditures per household.
In Thailand, enrolment increased in smaller households. Although
such benefits depend on a country's development level, in the Asia
and Pacific region, Mr. Ogawa concluded, declining fertility is
strongly connected to improved quality of schooling.
Participants in the subsequent discussion raised a variety of
questions about the cost-benefit calculations in the studies reviewed
by Ms. Janowitz. One problem noted was the difficulty of assessing
substitution effects, as government programmes supply people who
would otherwise have found other sources. Contrasts were drawn
between current studies and earlier flawed methodologies which were
less sensitive to these issues and resulted in exaggerated claims
for the benefits of government programmes.
Commenting on Ms. Janowitz's presentation, Mr. Merrick
suggested that Nortman's Mexico study was free of some of the
shortcomings of earlier work, since it allowed estimation of the net
benefits of shifts in expenditures between family planning and
maternal and child health services. Nevertheless, he said, all cost-
benefit studies need better cost-accounting procedures; rules of
thumb have been used to estimate some cost components. He called for
more research on costs. He also observed that the environmental costs
borne by poor women is an issue of topical interest since UNCED.
Ms. Janowitz responded that little information is available on
most costs of integrated family planning programmes other than
commodities. She noted that countries will increasingly be called
on to decide how to provide services, but lack information about
costs of alternate delivery mechanisms. More micro-level cost-
benefit analyses would also be useful in convincing policy makers.
Mr. Ogawa expressed the opinion that cost-benefit analysis would
never provide precise results. Intergenerational impacts need to be
measured (a task omitted to date), and improvements in the calculation
of benefits are needed.
Reacting to Mr. Cleland's remarks, Mr. McGreevey noted that one
rationale among economists (particularly at the World Bank) for
giving low priority to population programmes is the fear of coercion.
For these economists, alteration of people's "utility functions" is
an inappropriate activity, since these are taken as given in most
economic frameworks. He, on the other hand, supported Cleland's
view that people's desires and their capacity to express them
change, and that such modifications are not coercion.
To this, Mr. Cleland added that in many poor societies children
are seen as economically neutral. In such circumstances, the desire
for more children is normal. Family planning programmes often
provide poor people with their first suggestion that family size
involves choice; this leads to individual reappraisals. He observed
that it would be absurd to assume that parents calculate utility in
the way that economists do. On the same issue, Mr. Stolnitz
suggested that two components of family planning programmes, sex
education and the introduction of greater choice of contraceptive
methods, should be stressed to counter arguments about coercion.
Mr. Cassen noted that in the social field, particularly primary
education, societal coercion has been common. Since Germany first
adopted it in the 17th century, compulsory education has been widely
accepted and has wrought enormous social and economic changes.
Mr. Khusro noted the complexities of evaluating and affecting
social priorities in democratic societies. In India, the promotion
of education and literacy preceded social demand for them. He also
noted that early studies which asked people to prioritize social
outlays almost never mentioned sanitation, but that once investment
began in this sector, its priority increased. A similar situation
could be anticipated in the case of family planning.
In response, Mr. Cleland argued that coercive methods are
unsustainable anywhere, so the issue of coercion is a false one. His
concern was focused on obtaining enough investment to overcome the
initial innovation costs in countries with high resistance to family
planning.
As to the legitimizing effects of family planning programmes,
concern was expressed that knowledge and access, while necessary, are
not sufficient to cause changes in fertility behaviour. Some
participants argued that policy statements provide another dimension
to legitimizing birth control behaviour.
Mr. Cleland agreed with this conclusion, but noted that
"notional policies" (empty policy statements) mean little. In Kenya,
for example, former President Jomo Kenyatta endorsed a policy of
fertility reduction but never spoke about family planning in public.
The magnitude of psychological barriers to acceptance of family
planning varies among societies, and the role of government can be
critical in altering perceptions. On the other hand, as the history
of the Pakistan programme shows, inappropriate government intervention
can create a backlash, raising cultural barriers and harming family
planning programmes.
Mr. Cleland emphasized that networks of field workers and
clinics are insufficient to bring about change, and that
information, education and communication (IEC) efforts are needed to
legitimize family planning. Genuine political commitment needs to
be mobilized; politicians are experts in such efforts. Never-
theless, he stated, some sort of dynamism in society is a necessary
condition for favourable returns on family planning investments. It
is highly unlikely that static societies could show dynamism only in
the realm of family planning acceptance and demographic change.
Mr. John Bongaarts of the Population Council saw Mr. Cleland's
remarks as both important and provocative. He agreed that the role
of family planning programmes is to train and enable people to adopt
new behaviours. This conclusion calls for a greater stress on IEC
efforts, including those directed at political leaders.
Queried about his thesis that desired fertility declines after
the introduction of family planning, Mr. Cleland noted that in Latin
America, the desire for additional children was never very high.
Even early surveys revealed a desired family size of around four
children, well below that observed in some other regions of the
world. Accordingly, family planning programmes are operating in a
favourable environment. Africa is different in this respect,
exhibiting much higher desired fertility.
Mr. Bongaarts contended that the empirical record on the
evolution of demand and behavioural change is not as clear as had
been suggested. In his opinion, desired family size declines after
fertility decline has started, rather than reflecting the intro-
duction of a population programme. In Thailand, for example, during
a time when fertility declined from around six to two children per
woman, desired family size changed from about 3.7 children to 2.8.
He said it was implausible that one could start up a programme
anywhere and promptly see changes in demand. In some programmes,
long periods were observed before fertility began to decline.
Mr. Cleland noted that in the case of Thailand, the desired
family size was at a modest level to begin with; larger declines
could be expected in Africa.
An extended discussion touched inconclusively on the relative
impacts of various types of interventions (for education, for women,
etc.) on development. There was general agreement that access to
family planning programmes would be required to translate the impacts
of non-family planning interventions into demographic change.
V. Session Four: Government Responses to High Population
Growth
Panellists: M. Jambwa, A. Khusro, N. Mwangi, J. Nwankwo, P.
Tonguthai, C. Urz£a
Mr. Nizamuddin gave a summary presentation of the second back-
ground paper prepared for the meeting, concerning national policy
perceptions and responses to rapid population growth (see page 58).
Mr. Maphion Jambwa of Zimbabwe's Central Statistical Office
reported on policy with respect to population growth and economic
development in Zimbabwe. He noted the inadequate quality of data in
sub-Saharan Africa in general, and said that estimates and measures
of savings and consumption in the region were particularly
questionable. He expressed disappointment that the background papers
avoided discussion of migration and rapid rates of urbani-zation,
given the high priority they are accorded by regional policy makers.
Zambia, for example, is 40 per cent urban; and in Botswana concern
is being expressed about the growth rate of Gabarone (which grew by
237 per cent during the period 1971-1981). He added that policy
makers in the region are also concerned with very high youth
dependency ratios.
Mr. Jambwa summarized a number of issues with regard to econo-
mic development:
* Centralized planning has been over-emphasized.
* Population concerns are inadequately integrated in the
planning process.
* Maldistribution of resources favouring urban areas tends
to reinforce migration flows.
* Getting planners and policy makers to use demographic
data has proven difficult given the form in which such
data are disseminated.
* Planners have not been sensitized to the potential uses
to which demographic data can be put.
Mr. Nwankwo presented a Nigerian perspective on policy issues.
He said that the recent census, which differed by 32 per cent from
the projected population size, has considerably confused people's
perceptions; analysis by both the Government and donors is required.
He emphasized his concern about direct macroeconomic policies,
particularly structural adjustment programmes which have led to
declines in the quality of life and to growing levels of poverty.
In Nigeria, family planning is not seen as a special case for
direct allocation of resources. Rather, it is viewed as a part of
the health-care delivery system. External assistance has led to
acceptance of family planning programmes, he noted, but gaps remain
between government policy and will. In countries like Nigeria where
there is political support for family planning programmes,
institutional frameworks have frequently been designed using imported
models. Mr. Nwankwo cited efforts to create population strategies
in a number of countries (Kenya, Nigeria and Namibia, for example).
He criticized inefficiencies in a number of distribution systems,
especially in Nigeria.
He stated that the development of women's commissions (for
example, in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) had made a positive
contribution in encouraging female education and health. Policy
makers still need to rationalize non-population policies that contain
implicit incentives for high fertility. He also noted that
demographers and economists do not share common perspectives and need
to communicate more.
In summary, Mr. Nwankwo cited a number of recent developments
that point to the Nigerian Government's support and concern for
integrating population in the development planning process: (1)
making demographic data collection routine; (2) the framing of the
National Population Policy; (3) the formation of a National
Commission for Women, which created distribution points for
delivering contraceptive methods; and (4) the incorporation of
population issues, including targets, in annual rolling plans.
Donor contributions to the Nigerian programme, although
significantly lower than the national contribution, are seen as a way
to increase government support for programmes. He emphasized that
large government appropriations to family planning occur only when
it is seen as part of an overall development strategy aimed at
alleviating poverty, providing food security, improving education,
etc.
Mr. Khusro discussed population policies in India. Indian
planning strategies were initiated in 1951 when a central planning
approach was adopted; universities in the United States helped
develop various planning models. Family planning was included from
the start as a means to reduce the population growth rate and
facilitate development. Particular attention was given to
constructing an infrastructure to reduce mortality and morbidity.
Education and literacy campaigns were initiated.
He related several anecdotes about the high innovation costs of
and public resistance to various programmes other than family
planning, such as irrigation. In family planning, much room for
administrative improvement remained after the early efforts. India's
family planning programme suffered a temporary set-back during the
country's "emergency" period in the 1980s; the earlier high level of
activity has since been regained.
Mr. Khusro noted that the initial stigma associated with using
contraceptives recedes in time. He called for special attention to
under-served subgroups. He emphasized the need to integrate
population into other vertical service systems, and said that
communication techniques also need further development. And he
supported the widely held view that private efforts will have to
supplement government programmes, which he said should concentrate
on infrastructure development in support of population efforts.
Mr. Mwangi referred to Kenyan econometric models which help to
inform policy. He noted that while the 1989 census showed slight
reductions in the intercensal growth rate, government planners
continue to worry about rapid population growth. Family planning is
now recognized as important to overall development, and since 1986
has been a component of overall policy formulation (including the
structural adjustment programme).
Concern about the adverse impacts of high population growth
dates back to colonial times. The Family Planning Association of
Kenya dates from the 1950s and 1960s. In 1966, family planning was
adopted as part of Kenya's development policy. In 1967, the family
planning programme began, but with little coordination among
agencies. After the 1979 census, which revealed a continuing
increase in the growth rate, the National Committee on Population and
Development was formed to promote modern contraceptive methods,
improve management, motivate men and improve access to services.
Recent developments in the Kenyan programme have included
research into cost sharing, labour-force participation and
education for women, and an emphasis on the need to bring
development to rural areas. Strategies have been formulated to
identify new urban concentrations and provide needed infrastructure
to encourage their growth as alternative centres, in order to slow
migration to large cities.
The Ministry of Planning and National Development generates
various scenarios as inputs to the annual budgetary process;
allocations to slow population growth must still compete with demands
from other constituencies, but the mechanism assures that population
issues are addressed. Following fertility surveys that have
identified continuing sociocultural resistance to family planning
among men, sensitization of men has become a programme concern.
Improving the status of women þ involving income generation,
education, and family life education activities þ is seen as
critical to improving the impact of family planning programmes.
Ms. Tonguthai remarked on Thailand's very successful family
planning programme. It is noted for the pervasiveness of family
planning acceptance, and consequent fertility declines. The
government agency implementing the programme has received much of the
credit for the programme's success, but the speaker paid particular
tribute to the political commitment emanating from the Thai royal
family.
In Thailand, policy makers and planners alike subscribe to the
economic rationale for fostering fertility decline, and have included
such justifications in national development plans. Planners work
closely with demographers and population analysts to produce
extensive simulations of economic development under varying
demographic scenarios, and to monitor surveys on the demand for
children.
The rapidity of Thailand's decline in fertility is attributed
to the large demand for family planning, the wide range of methods
offered, an innovative distribution system and subsidized prices. The
family planning effort is consistent with government policies to
enhance the status of women. Women now demand family planning
services because of the high opportunity costs associated with having
children. This is particularly true for young unskilled women from
the rural areas who have low levels of education. According to Ms.
Tonguthai, the female labour-force participation rate is currently
66 per cent, second highest in the South-East Asian region.
Government development policies encourage intensive manufac-
turing. This has favoured female labour and led to increased
internal migration of women, which in some age groups now exceeds
that of men. The Government did not seek to create jobs for young
women as a means of lowering fertility, but that has been the
undeniable effect of these policies. While explicit policies sought
to reduce the rate of population growth in Bangkok and to disperse
migrants, implicit policy incentives fuelled migration to the
capital.
Mr. Urz£a addressed the question of shifts in Mexico's
demographic policies in the 1970s. He reviewed long-term
(post-1810) trends in Mexico's population growth and fertility,
comparing them to trends in real GDP and GDP per capita. Economic
growth had generally been sufficient to exceed population growth
until 1982, when the external debt burden began to affect economic
growth. The country's dependency ratio reached its peak in the 1970s
and has since been declining. He noted that the savings rate has
remained flat even though the dependency burden has shifted
considerably.
Recounting the history of population policy discussion in
Mexico, Mr. Urz£a noted that high population growth rates have long
been seen as an obstacle to economic growth. In 1970, Francisco
Alejo wrote an analysis questioning whether economic growth
automatically leads to population growth rate declines. By 1973, the
Government had endorsed a policy calling for curbing the population
growth rate (an initial target of 1 per cent per annum was set for
the year 2000; the target is now 1.2 per cent). The rationale for
the policy was that labour absorption had slowed in the 1970s,
necessitating a lower fertility rate. The need to increase the
health and well-being of women and children provided additional
justification. Mr. Urz£a emphasized the role of per-sonal commitment
by policy makers in formulating and implementing population policy.
Mr. Stolnitz described Mexico as providing an excellent rebuttal
against the argument that "development is the best contraceptive",
since the country had experienced economic growth rates of 6 per cent
with no apparent effect on fertility rates. Once a solid political
commitment was articulated, fertility began to drop rather quickly.
In an extended discussion of the Mexican example, it was noted
that much of the observed high economic growth rates reflected growth
in the petroleum industry. Policy makers were described as far-
sighted for anticipating that these economic growth rates were not
sustainable. Government efforts to anticipate and counter opposition
(particularly from the Catholic Church) and the favourable support
received from elite groups were cited as important factors in the
success of family planning efforts.
Mr. Richard Jolly of UNICEF made three general observations.
First, he said that economists and economic modellers tend to
overplay economics and underplay the sociological and human
dimensions of development. He noted that fertility correlates highly
with women's education and that women's empowerment is important for
fertility change. Research has also shown the close relationship
between fertility and infant mortality: people must be convinced that
their children will survive before they will consider having smaller
families. Economists, who tend to concentrate on macroeconomic
relationships, too often ignore these social issues.
Second, he said, for development efforts to succeed, we must
look to non-economic bases for encouraging dynamism and change. Three
important movements in the world are those for the advancement of
women, for protection of the environment and for equitable
opportunity. On moral as well as programmatic grounds, closer
linkages need to be forged between these movements and the
population movement. Commitment to action will be mobilized not by
cost-benefit analyses, but by coupling population concerns with other
world-changing dynamics. "There would have been no end to
colonialism," Mr. Jolly asserted, "if it had been left to cost-
benefit analyses."
Third, he noted an ominous despair about the growing gap between
developed and the developing countries that is leading some
respectable health analysts to accept that people should be allowed
to die in order to enable Governments to exercise some measure of
control. He cited a note published to that effect in Lancet (1990).
In the general discussion that followed, Mr. Khusro noted that
family planning is recognized as a private decision, and said the
role of government should be to provide infrastructure for family
planning programmes, paying special attention to correcting
imbalances between urban and rural areas. Programmes must be
adequately funded to meet existing demand and to create demand
through female education, IEC efforts and improvements in women's
status. In light of the arguments advanced at the meeting concerning
population-development relationships at the micro-level, he said the
burden of proof rests with those who insist that the macro-
relationship is neutral.
Many participants felt that research to date into demographic-
economic relationships has been insufficiently focused. Studies are
needed to discover whether market forces will be sufficient to curb
rapid population growth in a timely manner.
In this regard, Mr. Stolnitz offered several topics for such a
research effort: "retrospective" studies of consequences of fertility
declines (for example, if fertility had declined from six to two
children per woman instead of to only five, what would have been the
demand for social-sector services?); a broader analysis of population
and labour-force growth, addressing not just absorptive capacities
but also quality of labour and productivity issues, noting the
limited supply of entrepreneurial expertise in developing countries;
studies of the impact on wage rates of changes in relative-factor
endowments and returns under a regime of rapid population growth; an
investigation of population-resource relationships; analyses of the
impact of rapid urbanization on investment capacities to increase the
supplies of housing, potable water and other social-sector needs;
studies that explain why economic development is not a sufficiently
timely initiator of contraceptive practice; an examination of the
effects of population dynamics on incentives to save, including age-
structure effects; and more-focused research into the effects of
population growth on the balance of payments, export capacities and
import needs.
Mr. Geurts urged that the meeting report also include consi-
deration of the relationship of population to agriculture. He
asserted that long-term population growth endangers sustainable
economic development, since it drives economic agents to adopt short-
term planning horizons. Disagreeing with Mr. Cassen, Mr. Geurts
expressed the opinion that high population growth drives people into
agriculture primarily because alternative employment opportunities
are lacking. He added that such demographic pressure on agriculture
impedes the intensification of agriculture, because it prevents the
sector from generating sufficient capital on its own.
In conclusion, Dr. Sadik thanked the participants for their
input, and said that the meeting had initiated a more coherent
process of addressing economic and population relationships. She
pledged that UNFPA would promote additional discussion on the topic,
including a meeting of policy makers.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH INTO THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN POPULATION GROWTH
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Background Paper Prepared by UNFPA
I. Introduction
Two contrasting schools of thought are discernible in post-World
War II research in the area of population and development. The first,
which one reviewer calls "orthodoxy", arose in the 1950s and is typi-
fied by the overall conclusion of the first U.S. National Academy of
Sciences report on population and development (National Research
Council, 1971): rapid population growth poses a serious, even in-
surmountable barrier to economic growth and social advancement. The
authors of the report summarized their conclusions as follows:
"Rapid population growth slows down the growth of per capita
incomes in less developed countries and tends to perpetuate
inequalities of income distribution. It holds down the
level of savings and capital investment in the means of
production and thereby limits the rate of growth of gross
domestic product. Food supplies and agricultural production
must be greatly increased to meet the needs of rapidly
growing populations, and this constrains the allocation of
resources to other economic and social sectors. The number
of persons entering the labour force grows very rapidly.
Because the number of people seeking employment is larger
than the number of available jobs, unemployment and
underemployment are increasingly serious problems. An ever
larger number of workers cannot be absorbed into the modern
(industrialized) sector. They are forced into unproductive
service occupations or back into the traditional
(agricultural) sector with its low productivity and bare
subsistence wage levels. ... Widespread poverty, the low
productivity of labour, the growing demands for food, and
slow industrialization distort and degrade the international
trade of the less developed countries."
The World Bank's World Development Report 1984 also embodied
this "orthodox" view. Other major research surveys that concluded
that population growth tends to slow development were those by R.
Cassen (1973), N. Birdsall (1977) and G. McNicoll (1984).
The second tendency, "revisionism", arose in the 1980s and is
typified by overall findings contained in the second NAS report
(National Research Council, 1986), namely, that rapid population
growth is only a secondary factor in economic development, and that
its deleterious effects will largely (though not necessarily
entirely) be countered by market reactions if markets are allowed to
function freely. A statement of the revisionist view is given by A.
Kelley (1988, p. 1715) in concluding his review of research in the
area of population and development:
"Economic growth (as measured by per capita output) in many
developing countries would have been more rapid in an
environment of slower population growth, although in a number
of countries the impact of population was probably negligible,
and in some it may have been positive. ... Because there is no
believable and generally accepted quantitative estimate of
population's effect on development, only a qualitative (a
direction-of-impact) assessment can be made. The assessment,
positive or negative, varies from country to country, over
time, and possibly with the rate of population growth. What
is clear is that an assessment of the impact of population
growth on economic development is highly complex, that
problems like unemployment, famine, and malnutrition are
caused by many factors (including rapid population growth),
and that an emphasis on policies of slowing population growth
without simultaneously confronting the other fundamental
causes of such problems may well lead to disappointing
results."
This marked a return to the earlier non-committal tone of
researchers such as Kuznets (1965) and R. Easterlin (1967), which has
been echoed in the declarations of the international population
conferences convened by the United Nations at 10-year intervals since
1954.
In this review, the focus is on research in the area of
population and development since the 1986 NAS report, the latest
major review of the subject. In cases where post-1986 research has
not modified the 1986 report because of the lack of new research
initiatives, this fact is simply noted. In these cases the
interested reader can find detailed citations either in the NAS
report or in the accompanying background papers (G. Johnson and R.
Lee, 1987).
Given this approach, it is worthwhile to sketch briefly the
major policy conclusions of the 1986 NAS review with respect to the
different effects of population growth:
Per worker capital, output and consumption: Slower population
growth has a net positive effect on the capital/labour ratio; and a
probable positive effect on the savings rate. While "capital
deepening" is a genuine consequence of reduced population growth, its
effect "may be relatively modest".
Technological innovation and economies of scale: In manufac-
turing, this is an urban question; economies of scale are exhausted
at moderate city size. Therefore, slower population growth has no
negative effect on productivity in manufacturing. In agriculture,
population density increases are positive (choice of technique,
infrastructure economies of scale). But this does not imply that net
productivity increases. Some evidence exists that after reaching 100
persons/sq km, overall productivity starts to fall due to diminishing
returns.
Per capita levels of schooling and health: In education, slower
population growth is associated with higher expenditure per pupil;
the same is true of per capita spending on health and nutrition
within households. In government health programmes, it is "unlikely
that rapid population growth is a major impediment" to their success.
Inequality in the distribution of income: In the short term,
slower population growth decreases inequality of income if family
planning is targeted at low-income groups. In the long term there
should also be a lessening of inequality, since labour is favoured
over other factors of production.
Absorption of workers into the modern sector; problems of urban
growth: Population growth has exacerbated some urban problems
(straining services and slowing the growth of the modern sector,
e.g.), but slower population growth "will probably not, by itself,
solve these problems". An urban bias of government policies is a
much more important cause of urban problems than population growth.
Externalities: Some externalities are the result of
population growth: congestion, over-rapid resource degradation, and
inter-generational costs, e.g. It is likely that there are net
negative externalities of child-bearing in most developing
countries. A minimum policy response should include subsidized
family planning programmes; a more ambitious response would involve
"alterations in incentive structures".
The conclusions of the 1986 NAS review are "revisionist", while
still pointing out many aspects of economic development that would
benefit from slower population growth and the population policies
that lead to slower growth. The present review of post-1986
research, while not suggesting radical departures from the NAS
findings, leads to a somewhat stronger conclusion regarding the
negative effects of population growth on development prospects in
developing countries.
II. General Considerations
The main conclusion that emerges from the neo-classical one-
sector model of economic growth is that an increase in the rate of
population growth will lead to a reduction in the long-term
equilibrium level of output per capita. Economists have long
expressed concern, however, that demographic factors may be
inadequately reflected in the simple model. For example, the rate
of population growth and resulting changes in the population's age
structure might change the savings rate, a crucial model parameter.
The rate of technical progress, taken as exogenous in the simple
model, might respond to population factors. The negative effects of
more rapid population growth might be ameliorated by economies of
scale arising from larger population size; on the other hand, labour
productivity might suffer if rapid population growth impedes the
formation of human capital.
The organization of this paper reflects this neo-classical
tradition of looking at the effects of rapid population growth in
terms of the sources of growth: accumulation of physical capital
(i.e., savings and investment); labour-force growth and absorption,
including the shift of labour from low- to high-productivity sectors;
the quality of human resources, which is closely related to the
accumulation of human cap-ital; and economies of scale and technical
and institutional change. Other sections look at research into the
effects of population growth on externalities and on income
distribution and poverty; a final section reviews the results of
recent correlation studies and modelling exercises.
The temporal focus is on the medium-term, that is, roughly 10
to 15 years. This is long enough for changes in fertility and
mortality to cause perceptible shifts in population size and age
structure, but short enough to be of practical interest to policy
makers.
It should be kept in mind that the effects of population growth
are likely to vary widely with national context. Among the
significant background factors may be population density, the
openness and trade orientation of the economy, and the nature and
role of the agricultural sector and the natural-resource base.
Perhaps most important of all is the question of whether local
conditions and institutions are conducive to the allocation of
economic resources through neo-classical market mechanisms.
III. Rapid Population Growth and Savings and Investment
The seminal work in the area of population growth and savings
is that of A. Coale and E. Hoover (1958), who reached an unequi-vocal
conclusion: "To postpone fertility reductions in low-income countries
is to shrink the potential growth in per capita income for the
indefinite future." These researchers hypothesized that fertility
reduction would have four effects:
(1) A straightforward denominator effect. A drop in
fertility would lead to fewer adult-equivalent
consumers in the population. This denominator
effect may, in turn, be decomposed into rate-of-
growth and age-structure effects. Both effects
arise from simple accounting identities and not from
any behavioural model.
(2) A household-level savings-rate effect. The ratio of
young net consumers to older net producers would
fall, resulting in the saving of a higher proportion
of household income.
(3) A national-level composition-of-investment effect.
The reduction in the ratio of children to adults
would allow the state to direct investment away from
schools and hospitals and into directly productive
plant and equipment. (Schools and hospitals,
whatever their beneficial effect on the quality of
the human-resource base over the long term, do not
contribute directly or immediately to production.)
(4) A female labour-force participation effect. In the
lower-fertility scenario, women would supply more
labour to the marketplace. This allowed Coale and
Hoover to assume that, at least for the first 30
years, lower fertility would make no significant
difference in the size of the labour force. In
point of fact, the importance of the labour-force
participation rate effect is marginal in the
simulations presented.
As the behavioural effects (2)-(4) affect the level of GDP in
the numerator of the chosen welfare index, income per adult-
equivalent consumer, we may refer to them as "numerator effects".
As Coale (1986) himself made clear, assumptions (2) and (3) þ which
have generated much debate and refinement þ were less important, in
terms of their contribution to the result of their simulation
analysis, than was (1), the simple denominator effect. Only one-
quarter of the increase in income per adult-equivalent consumer found
to arise from fertility reduction was due to numerator effects; the
rest was, essentially, pure accounting.
The household savings-rate effect (as well as the more complex
question of whether such an effect, if it exists, reduces the
aggregate supply of savings) has been among the most active areas of
research in the field of population and development. Despite the
large volume of research, however, not much has been found in the way
of hard conclusions. H. Leibenstein (1976, p. 618) wrote almost 20
years ago that the issue of whether population growth reduced the
availability of savings could not be answered based on then-available
research. McNicoll (1984, p. 206) concluded that "in general, rather
little" can be concluded on the savings-investment effect of rapid
population growth, and suggested that the phrase "based on presently
available research" could be deleted from Leibenstein's sentence.
A. Mason (1988) summarized his survey of research in the area as
follows:
"A succinct and uncritical reading of the evidence might be
summarized as follows: A high rate of saving is required to
maintain a level of investment necessary for rapid economic
growth. And in many countries, reduced population growth will
facilitate efforts to achieve higher rates of saving. Providing
accurate, rather than succinct, answers to these questions is
more difficult because the processes involved are complex and
because the circumstances vary widely from country to country."
The sources of theoretical difficulty are several. At the
household level, even a simple accounting model of saving behaviour
reveals that birth order, household size and income may influence a
family's reaction to a marginal birth. At the macroeconomic and
population-wide level, there are important age-composition effects
þ the ratio of young households accumulating savings to older
households drawing down savings is a crucial variable þ as well as
an interaction effect between the dependency ratio and the rate of
macroeconomic growth. Because of this interaction, the burden posed
by population growth should be most significant in dynamic, rapidly
growing economies.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the empirical relationship between
aggregate saving rates and the demographic characteristics of
populations is almost as problematic as that between population
growth and per capita economic growth (see the discussion in Section
IX). The basic article supporting an important dependency-ratio
effect is that of N. Leff (1969), which has been much criticized and
often rebutted (see Mason, 1988, for citations). The most-recent
regression analysis of the relationship between aggregate saving
rates and dependency rates leaves the reader with little confidence
that the matter will ever be resolved: parameter estimates are
insignificant and erratic (L. Schumaker and R. Clark, 1992). The
methodology used in this study, however, has been severely criticized
(see above). A model constructed by Mason (1987) suggested that even
a massive shift in the dependency ratio (population under age 15
divided by population over 15) from 0.4 to 0.8 might reduce the
saving rate in a typical developing country only from 22 to 19 per
cent.
A 1987 investigation by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, on the relationship between population and
savings/consumption, showed that, in Latin America, dependency-ratio
effects are statistically significant predictors of savings
behaviour. In areas with high population growth and young
populations, substantial rises in consumption occur as dependency
increases.
Finally, the literature on population growth and savings must
be placed in a broader sources-of-growth context. Studies have,
without exception, assigned a surprisingly small share of long-run
growth to accumulation of physical capital. The most-often cited of
these is that of E. Denison (1985), who apportioned U.S. economic
growth between 1929 and 1981 as follows: 25 per cent to labour-force
growth, holding education level and the distribution of labour force
across sectors constant; 16 per cent to the rising education level
of the labour force; 11 per cent to re-allocation of labour from low-
to high-productivity sectors; 12 per cent to capital growth; 11 per
cent to the reaping of economies of scale; 34 per cent to technical
progress; and -9 per cent to errors and omitted factors.
IV. Rapid Population Growth and Labour-Force Growth and Absorption
Demographic increase has both accounting and behavioural effects
on labour supply. The former is straightforward: a person born today
will represent a job-seeker some 15 to 20 years hence, subject to
prevailing rates of survival, school attendance and labour-force
participation. A particular characteristic of rapidly growing
populations is the preponderance of young persons of limited
experience. This may tend to diminish productivity and wages; on the
other hand, H. Leibenstein (1967) has suggested that the attitudes
of such workers may be particularly conducive to dynamic change, the
adoption of new technologies, etc. (see discussion of labour-embodied
technical change in Section VI).
Little work has been done since the 1986 NAS report on the
effect of fertility and household size on labour supply at the
household level. It has long been known (e.g., G. Standing, 1978)
that high fertility is correlated with low female labour-force
participation in the modern sector and high female labour-force
participation in the agricultural and informal sectors. Casual
observation indicates that high fertility is associated with the
participation of older children in the "household economy" þ
gardening, tending younger siblings, etc. þ which may, as one of its
effects, free up adults for extra-mural economic pursuits.
The "Chayanov effect" states that an extra birth may increase
the labour supply of the head of household, but this hypothesis has
never been tested in a developing country. It is worth remembering
that the male peasants studied by Chayanov were working something
like 700-800 hours per year on average; i.e., they were engaged in
highly seasonal agricultural activities which left free substantial
blocks of leisure time. Such conditions may be replicated in some
agricultural settings, but are unlikely to prevail in an urban
context.
At the national level, studies have revealed no correlation
between the rate of population growth and the rate of unemployment;
on the other hand, open unemployment rates are a notoriously
inadequate measure of labour-market conditions in developing
countries. Labour-force entrants who cannot be absorbed into the
modern sector will shift their labour supply to the household economy
and the informal sector, which act, in effect, as residual sectors.
They may also, if possible, defer searching for jobs and remain in
school.
The major survey of labour markets and employment in developing
countries is that of D. Bloom and R. Freeman (1987). While finding
scattered empirical support for the proposition that rapid population
growth lowers wages, these researchers admitted that the great
variation in local labour markets made it impossible to reach any
strong general conclusion. Some developing countries have succeeded
in absorbing their rapidly growing populations into productive
employment, but this is not necessarily grounds for optimism.
According to dual labour market theory, wages are rigid in the formal
sector but flexible in the informal sector. The effect of rapid
population growth should, therefore, be to (1) increase the absolute
number and proportion of workers in the informal sector, (2) drive
down wages in the informal sector, and thus (3) widen the gap between
formal and informal sectors and worsen the distribution of income
(H.R Hemmer and C. Mannel, 1989; T. Chaudhuri, 1989).
Informal-sector employment is productive and may result in the
accumulation of skills. On the other hand, there exists a hierarchy
of activities, running from the highly desirable to the most
marginal, within the informal sector itself (W. Cole and B. Fayissa,
1991). It may be the case that the "elite" sub-sector of the
informal sector þ auto repair, air-conditioner and refrigerator
maintenance and the like þ is only slightly more flexible than the
modern sector, in which case rapid labour-force growth simply pushes
more workers down the productivity ladder into marginal activities.
According to neo-classical theory, rapid labour-force growth,
by reducing the wage rate relative to the rate of return on capital
(see the discussion in Section VIII), should promote the adoption of
labour-intensive techniques of production. In agriculture (which is
outside the scope of this survey) there is a large body of scholar-
ship on how cultivators have reacted to population pressure by
adopting more labour-intensive production techniques.
There is little question that the neo-classical choice-of-
technique mechanism also flourishes in the informal sector, where
capital intensity is low and elasticity of substitution high.
Researchers have questioned the relevance of neo-classical factor
substitution in the formal sector, however. Here production
techniques may be: imported with little regard to local factor
availabilities; influenced by industrialists' "engineering bias"; or
bound to internationally accepted standards of quality control which
require capital-intensive production techniques (N. Egea, 1990; H.
Pack and L. Westphal, 1986).
V. Rapid Population Growth and Human-Resource Quality at the
Household and National Levels
As empirical work has failed to assign a dominant role to
physical capital formation, there has been a correspondingly strong
interest in human capital and the quality of the human-resource base.
In contrast to the ambiguous evidence regarding the effect of
demographic parameters on physical capital formation, there is rather
strong evidence that high fertility, close birth spacing and large
family size tend to reduce human capital formation by impairing child
development.
High fertility and unfavourable child development can co-occur
in one of three ways: (1) unfavourable overall economic conditions
may cause both; (2) high fertility may impede child development
directly (i.e., holding resources per child constant þ presumably the
impairment occurs via unspecified biological mechanisms or as a
result of reduced parental attention per child); or (3) indirectly
by reducing endowments of nutrition and education per child.
Many studies have found statistically significant associations.
Cross-household surveys have revealed an inverse relationship between
the number of offspring in a family and per-child educational
expenditure; there is also evidence that unwanted births, which are
likely to be higher-parity births, are associated with lower school
enrolment rates for all children in the family. A strong inverse
empirical relationship has been found between the number of children
in the household and child nutrition.
Though studies have not shown that large family size is
associated with low infant- and child-survival rates, there are
indications that large family size is inversely associated with
children's health. Large family size is generally associated with
short birth intervals, and many studies have concluded that closely
spaced children are subject to higher mortality. There are
substantial reductions in infant mortality to be gained from wider
birth spacing (see J. Potter, 1991, pp. 224-30, for references).
Evidence of causality in the area of fertility and child
development has been surveyed by M. Rosenzweig (1988 and 1990), who
drew attention to the deficiencies of available data in the area.
Relatively few studies have been able to go beyond correlations,
which may over-estimate the strength of hypothesized relationships.
Reviewing those which have done so, Rosenzweig (1988, p. 83)
concludes on a cautionary note: "Each assertion [points (1)-(3)
above] can be supported. But the quantitative evidence for any one
is not overwhelming; there are only a few studies in each case that
go beyond correlations, and the estimated magnitudes of the causal
relationships are small."
Data problems have also hampered researchers' ability to
establish the common-sense proposition that adverse childhood
conditions result in lowered adult productivity and earnings. The
individual and household-level evidence cited by G. Cornia (1989,
especially pp.179-80) is scattered and particularistic, but at least
consistent. Birdsall and C. Griffin (1988, pp. 49-50) found in their
survey "limited evidence" from household studies that the reduction
in resources per child associated with high fertility had adverse
long-run effects. They concluded, "The probable (though not well-
charted) result is slower per capita income growth."
Rapid population growth puts an undoubted strain on national
resources in the areas of education (Najafizadeh and Mennerick, 1988;
G. Jones, 1990) and health (Jones, 1990). Some cross-sectional
research has found that national indices of health and education are
positively associated with the rate of economic growth (E. Scholing
and V. Timmermann, 1988). I. Otani and D. Villanueva (1990) found
a significant positive growth effect of the share of government
expenditure on human-resource development, albeit less so than the
traditional "hard" variables such as the saving rate and the rate of
growth of exports. Neither of these studies goes, to use Rosenzweig's
terminology, "beyond correlations".
The lagged Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which should
be a fair index of "basic needs", shows a far stronger correlation
with current-period GDP per capita than does lagged GDP per capita
with the current-period PQLI (B. Newman and R. Thompson, 1989). The
simulation model of D. Wheeler (1984), which indicated that invest-
ment in education, nutrition and family planning could be more
productive in the long run than investment in physical capital, is
still highly regarded and often cited (see also the discussion in
Section IX).
J. Behrman (1990) examined the contribution of training and
indigenous research and development to economic growth and found
"surprisingly little systematic quantitative evidence" (pp. 89-90)
of a causal relationship at the national level. In the area of
health, there is no consistent statistical relationship between
aggregate health spending and measures of health outcomes such as the
infant mortality rate and life expectancy. There seems little doubt
that in most countries, demographic dilution is a secondary factor
when the mis-allocation of resources þ to secondary and post-
secondary education at the expense of primary education; to urban
hospital-based health care at the expense of primary health care in
rural areas and on the urban fringe, etc. þ is taken into account.
G. Becker (1988) elaborated a neo-classical growth model in
which fertility and endowment of children with human capital are both
endogenous decisions, and possibilities of inter-generational
transfers exist. The model's solution is characterized by two stable
equilibria: one with large family size and low human capital per
child, the other with small family size and high endowment of human
capital per child. The practical implication is that some exogenous
push may be required to displace low-income countries away from the
first of these steady states (low-level trap) to the second.
VI. Rapid Population Growth, Economies of Scale and Induced
Technical and Institutional Change
In the years leading up to 1986, a large volume of literature
addressed the relationship between population growth and economies
of scale and induced technical and institutional change; McNicoll
(1984) provides a good survey. This was occasioned, in part, by
publication of The Ultimate Resource (J. Simon, 1981), which argued
that population growth has a strong positive effect on economic
growth. Formal mechanisms by which density-dependent technical
change may lead to escape from near-term Malthusian constraints have
been incorporated into mathematical models of population and economic
growth over the very long term (G. Steinmann and J. Komlos, 1988;
Komlos and M. Artzrouni, 1990).
The assessment of scale economies and technical change has not
been substantially modified in recent writings. It may be summarized
as follows:
(1) Economies of scale in manufacturing tend to be exhausted
at moderate market sizes; besides, it is not the size of
the internal market but the extent to which countries
are able to exploit the global market which determines
whether they can be reaped. The same can be said for
agglomeration and urbanization economies, which tend to
be exhausted after a country has one city of moderate
size. On both accounts, rapid population growth is
unlikely to be a stimulus to industrial growth in most
low-income countries.
(2) Economies of scale in agriculture and the provision of
rural infrastructure may be substantial. These arise,
however, from population density, not the rate of
population growth.
(3) Induced innovation and technical change are a major
force in the area of agriculture; V. Ruttan and Y.
Hayami (1991) cite studies in which their effects may
be seen over a time-span of some 20 years. Their
relevance for manufacturing and the modern sector in
general is less-well established.
The embodiment of technical change in capital or, due to
improving standards of training and education, in workers, has long
been known to favour rapid population growth via "vintage" logic: a
more-rapidly growing population will have a younger labour force; a
more-rapidly expanding capital stock will consist, on average, of
newer machines. D. Blanchet (1988a) has noted that since the rate
of depreciation typically accelerates þ an old capital stock
depreciates more rapidly than a young one þ conventional fixed-
depreciation-rate models somewhat over-estimate the capital-dilution
effect of rapid population growth. The benefits arising from
technical advancement as embodied in the labour force have been
formally investigated by E. van Imroff (1988), who added to a neo-
classical growth model the assumption that only new workers employ
new technologies.
VII. Rapid Population Growth and Externalities
P. Demeny (1986) stated flatly that the possible negative
external effect of family fertility decisions was the single most
important concern in the economics of population. It is the
importance or non-importance of externalities which determines
whether Governments should "go beyond family planning", i.e., take
policy action to discourage or encourage fertility.
There has been considerable progress in theoretical models of
household fertility (Nerlove, Razin and Sadka, 1987), notably work
in the "new new home economics" tradition þ the second "new" refer-
ring to the introduction of overlapping generations into the
household utility maximization model. Some studies have demonstrated
that externalities are unlikely to arise in areas where they might
have been expected; e.g., T. Srinivasan (1988) has argued that it is
unlikely that fertility decisions will give rise to externalities in
the area of old-age support and social-security systems. In other
areas where externalities do arise þ e.g., provision of public goods
such as national defence and social services such as education þ it
should be possible to correct for them with a tax or user fee.
It has long been recognized that the most intuitively appealing
of externalities arising from child-bearing þ that individual
fertility decisions affect the wages not only of the additional child
but of all other workers as well þ represents a logical fallacy
because the same birth which depresses the wage rate will raise the
rate of profit; i.e., the birth is Pareto-neutral. On the other
hand, intriguing and, sometimes, counter-intuitive potential problem
areas have been identified. For example, Becker (1988) argued that
unless parents are assured by legal or institutional measures of
transfer payments from their children in old age, they will under-
invest in their children's education.
Up to the appearance of the 1986 NAS report, the subject of
externalities represented something of a theoretical curiosity
because no attempt had been made to quantify them. Lee addressed
this problem in a series of papers (Lee, 1991; Miller and Lee,
1990). The exercise is made difficult by two factors: (1) the wide
range of uncertainty surrounding point-estimates of the externality
in each of the areas addressed; and, especially, (2) the fact that
estimates of the total externality are dominated by prodigious
external dis-economies calculated to arise from dilution of national
mineral resources, including oil, and public lands.
Not surprisingly in view of the latter, Lee calculated
significant negative externalities to child-bearing only in countries
with substantial mineral or land resources; as he pointed out (Miller
and Lee, 1990, p. 295), including environmental amenities in the
exercise would probably lead to the estimation of significant
negative externalities across the board. The value of externalities
arising in areas other than common-property resources tends to be
small although, as mentioned above, there is a wide range of
uncertainty around the point-estimates.
VIII.Rapid Population Growth, Income Distribution and Poverty
One of the strongest predictions of neo-classical theory is that
rapid demographic increase, by increasing the supply of labour
relative to the capital stock, will reduce the wage rate relative to
the rate of return to capital, thereby worsening the distribution of
income.
In a much-cited paper Lee (1980; cf. also 1987) found strong
evidence of this phenomenon in England and other European countries
between the 13th and 19th centuries. In fact, the evidence was much
too strong, as the average estimated elasticities of the real wage
with respect to population was -1.6, a result inconsistent with the
common assumption that the elasticity of substitution is around unity
(an elasticity on the order -0.5 would be expected). Lee skirted
this difficulty by proposing that the elasticity of substitution
between land and labour was, in fact, much less than unity in pre-
industrial Europe, and specifying a two-sector general equilibrium
model accordingly. Solution of the model yields an elasticity of
substitution of 0.16, far lower than other estimates.
Pooling time-series and cross-sectional data for six countries
between 1500 and 1800, D. Weir (1991) estimated a real wage-
population elasticity of -1.2: more reasonable than Lee's result but
still lower than expected. Thus, long-run historical data indicate
a very strong inverse relationship between the rate of population
growth and the welfare of the population. Whether this is Malthusian
in origin or arises from institutional arrangements, as Weir
suggests, is open to discussion.
Turning to poverty, the causal links between population growth
and absolute deprivation are not well understood. A large number of
stylized facts are known: historically, poor households have tended
to be small; currently, big households tend to be poor, but high-
status households still tend to have high fertility (M. Lipton,
1983). High-fertility poor households outnumber high-fertility elite
households. Thus, high fertility is concentrated among the poor and
tends, on compositional grounds alone, to worsen the distribution of
income.
On the other hand, research has not established a strong causal
link running from high fertility to poverty. G. Rodgers (1984, p.
169) concluded his survey of work in the area as follows:
"There seems to be one basic theme þ conclusion would be too
strong a word þ which recurs across many situations and levels
of analysis: that high fertility and high rates of population
growth tend to have adverse effects on the incidence and
evolution of poverty, but that these effects tend to be
relatively small."
Birdsall and Griffin (1988) found evidence that poverty
encourages large family size, but wrote (p. 49), "Regarding the link
in the other direction þ the impact of rapid population growth on
poverty þ there is some theory but much less evidence." They
concluded, nonetheless, that slower population growth would reduce
the cost and time necessary to eliminate poverty.
IX. Correlation Studies and Other Models
Lee (1983, p. 54) cautioned that correlation studies need to
take into account dynamic aspects or else they will be inaccurate:
"If national economies followed the trajectories described by the
neo-classical single-sector growth models, then we would expect, for
steady-state economies, no relation between population growth rates
and growth rates of per capita income. If such economies are out of
steady state, then we would expect a moderately strong negative
correlation between them; and if the economies had surplus labour,
we would expect a strong negative correlation."
The correlation between the rate of population growth and the
rate of growth of per capita income was for a long time notorious as
a non-relationship. That is, when researchers compared the
population growth rates of countries with their per capita economic
growth rates, either in informal graphical and tabular presentations
or in formal correlation analyses, there was generally no discernable
relationship. On the other hand, more recent correlation studies
have inferred a significant inverse relationship for the 1970s and
early 1980s (Blanchet, 1991b), although not for earlier years and not
always for the post-war decades combined.
The simplest explanation for this revolves around the second of
Lee's possibilities. During the "golden age" of the 1950s and 1960s,
benign economic conditions allowed countries to accommodate rapidly
growing populations along the lines suggested by the mainstream neo-
classical model. In the 1970s and early 1980s, by contrast,
economies were displaced from their growth paths by exogenous shocks,
in particular swings in primary commodity and energy prices and the
emergence of the debt crisis. Under ideal conditions, neo-classical
substitution processes would quickly return displaced economies to
their equilibrium growth paths, but these processes were hampered by
institutional rigidities which resulted in incomplete adjustment and
attendant unemployment, inflation, price distortions, protectionism,
etc. This in itself would be sufficient to lead to the emergence of
a negative correlation; it might furthermore be argued that countries
with rapid population growth found it more difficult to adjust than
did those with moderate demographic increase.
Part of the observed change may also be spurious. Say, for
example, that aggregate GDP growth rates remained unchanged, while
population growth rates fell in countries already characterized by
relatively slow population growth and remained fixed in countries
experiencing relatively rapid rates of demographic increase. Then
whatever the underlying model or absence thereof, the slope co-
efficient estimated by regressing the rate of per capita income
growth on that of population growth would become more negative in
arithmetic value.
An alternative explanation is that there actually is an
underlying "Malthusian" model which correlation analysis is only now
starting to reveal. Blanchet (1988b) has advanced an econometric
argument in furtherance of this view. The basic Malthusian model
should, according to Blanchet, consist of two equations and an
identity þ the rate of per capita GDP growth as a behavioural
function of the rate of population growth, the rate of population
growth as a behavioural function of the level of income, and the
level of income as last-year's level multiplied by one plus the
growth rate, an accounting identity. Blanchet argues that the
underlying model is of the error-components variety (R. Pindyck and
D. Rubinfeld, 1976, pp. 202-08). Simulation analysis with reasonable
parameter estimates shows that ordinary least squares estimates of
b will "cycle": Blanchet (1988b) illustrates the case where they
start off positive and insignificant for decade one, grow steadily
more positive through decade three, then suddenly turn negative and
significant in decade four.
Kelley (1986) expressed hope that the NAS report would stimulate
more activity in the area of multisectoral population-development
modelling, a hope which has not been borne out. Still worthy of
attention, however, is the model of Wheeler (1984), which is perhaps
the most credible simultaneous model of population growth, investment
and human-resource quality as measured by nutrition, literacy and
life expectancy.
The Wheeler model stands out because it is characterized not
only by strong simultaneous linkages þ for example, rising levels of
health raise per capita income, which in turn has a beneficial
feedback effect on health þ but also, and less commonly, by
econometric credibility in terms of the estimation techniques
employed. While finding that reduction of fertility via family
planning was a highly effective development policy, simulations with
the Wheeler model indicated that given even minimal investments in
education and family-planning, low-income countries were unlikely to
remain mired in a "low-level trap".
R. Barlow (1992) has estimated a single-equation reduced-form
model in which the growth rate of GDP is a function of current-period
and lagged birth rates, plus a range of variables reflecting the
external environment and socio-political factors. Stripped to its
essentials, the model is
Y'i(t) = a + b NBRi(t) + c NBRi(t-1) + d NBRi(t-2)
+ e NBRi(t-3) + Other variables + fi(t)
where
Y'i(t) = Average annual GDP growth rate in country i in period
t
NBRi(t) = Net birth rate (births minus infant deaths) in country
i in period t
Other variables = improvements in life expectancy, political
stability, terms of trade, etc.
fi(t) = country-specific random errors.
and the periods correspond to six-year intervals. The coefficients
on current and lagged fertility are hypothesized to reflect both
labour-force growth (negative in the current period because of
reduced female labour-force participation, positive for lagged
periods) and investment (negative in the current and near-lag periods
because of the household dependency-rate effect, positive in far-lag
periods because of the higher ratio of workers to retirees).
When estimated over a sample of developing and industrialized
countries observed between the mid-1970s and early 1980s,
coefficients indicate a large negative current-period fertility
effect and a positive lagged fertility effect. The current-period
elasticity of output with respect to the net birth rate is about
-3.0; after six years it is -1.5, after 12 years -0.2 and after 18
years 1.2. In one simulation comparing a country with a total
fertility rate (TFR) of 5.0 versus the same country with a TFR of
3.5, after 24 years GDP is 62 per cent higher, population 18 per cent
lower and per capita GDP a staggering 99 per cent higher in the low-
fertility scenario.
The outlines of the story told by the Barlow model may be
correct, but there is reason to believe that the estimated effects
may be too strong. Parameter estimates reflect not only differences
in actual fertility behaviour, but differences in the age structures
of populations. For example, the population of a country with a net
birth rate of, say, 15 per 1,000 is characterized by a lower
dependency ratio than a country with a net birth rate of, say, 40 per
1,000. There is evidence (some of which we have discussed above in
the context of saving rates) that the less-dependent age structure
may be more conducive to economic growth; arguments involving the
age-structure of the labour force may also be advanced.
Two other comments may be made regarding the Barlow model.
First, omitted variables are an ever-present difficulty in work of
this sort, and Barlow has included a wide range of socio-political
variables to mitigate the problem. Based on his parameter estimates,
the rapid growth of the East Asian "Dragons" should be attributed
mostly to their rapid fertility decline. Omitted variables may have
led to an overstating of the correlation in these cases. Second, the
results of the simulation exercise presented must be interpreted with
caution. For example, included among the ceteris paribus assumptions
is that a country with a total fertility rate of 5.0 and one with a
total fertility rate of 3.5 start off with identical age distri-
butions.
X. Conclusion
This survey has found a number of areas in which recent research
has provided further evidence that rapid population growth has a
negative impact on economic development (see summary below). Parti-
cularly noteworthy population-growth effects are the slower
absorption of labour into high-productivity sectors, and the adverse
consequences at the household level for child welfare and human-
capital formation. Recent research has found, however, that the
magnitudes of the latter effects are modest, and more work is
required to assess their long-run impacts. Further work is also
necessary to quantify the macroeconomic effects of strains placed by
rapidly growing populations on national health and education
resources.
Research in the areas of savings and investment and poverty has
not been conclusive, and little new work has been done in the areas
of scale economies and induced technical and institutional change.
Recent work has suggested the existence of large external dis-
economies to child-bearing in the area of common-property natural
resources in countries where these are substantial; the value of
externalities in other areas has been estimated to be small. The
existence of a strong negative correlation between wages and
population growth in pre-industrial Europe has been reaffirmed, and
recent work has found a statistically significant negative
correlation between the rate of economic growth and the rate of
population growth during the 1970s. Both correlations are open to
different interpretations.
In all, the recent research surveyed in this paper does not call
for substantial modification of the following summing up of the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences review:
(1) Rapid population growth has a negative effect on
development in many developing countries.
(2) This role is difficult to quantify due to the complexity
and multiplicity of relationships involved and the
variability of local circumstances.
(3) Because there exist possibilities for response and
substitution, the effect of population growth on
economic development is probably a modest one.
Nevertheless, recent evidence indicates that point (3) may be
too mild an appraisal.
In the years since 1986, population policy makers, including
policy advocates in international development institutions, have
become more concerned about the adverse effects of rapid population
growth on economic development. This trend, as has been seen, cannot
be explained by a pronounced shift in the results of economic
research in the area over the same period. In the face of the
uncertainties of research findings, it appears that policy makers
have acted in a prudent manner to implement population policies to
slow growth.
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POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: THE POLICY RESPONSE OF
GOVERNMENTS
Background Paper Prepared by UNFPA
I. Introduction
This report presents the concerns of Governments of developing
countries regarding the consequences for economic development of
rapid population growth. The focus is on the policy response of
Governments that view high rates of population growth as detrimental
to their development efforts. Other population issues, such as
migration and high rates of urbanization, are not addressed in this
report.
As of 1990, a little more than half of all developing-country
Governments viewed their population growth rates as too high and
therefore unsatisfactory (United Nations, 1990a and 1990b). These
perceptions corresponded largely with the Governments' perceptions
of high fertility rates. These dual perceptions will undoubtedly
influence policy prescriptions aimed at lowering population growth
rates. The perceptions and policy responses stem from the actual
levels of population growth and their functional relationships to
individual countries' distinctive social, economic, cultural and
environmental conditions.
Many Governments have adopted either implicit or explicit
policies to lower population growth rates. Explicit population
policies may include sections of development plans, legislation,
documents from government ministries or commissions, or statements
by high-level officials. They usually involve statements of
intention or planned activities with regard to reducing or
stabilizing current or anticipated population growth rates.
The rationale for policies aimed at lowering population growth
rates is in large measure derived from the view that rapid population
growth without a commensurate increase in production and productivity
impedes socio-economic development. Reductions in population growth
rates are sought to redress imbalances between available resources
and national goals, in turn facilitating socio-economic development.
Overwhelming support for this view has come from the Govern-
ments of both developing and the developed countries. In 1990, the
South Commission Report on Population and Population Policy declared:
"The present high rates of population growth increase the burden of
dependency and reduce the resources available for raising produc-
tivity to what is sufficient just to maintain subsistence levels. ...
It is therefore necessary that countries with high birth rates should
act without delay and adopt policies which will have an impact on
population growth in a reasonable period of time." (The Population
Council, 1990c). A similar view on this issue was issued by the OECD
countries in 1990 (see box above).
There are generally two competing perspectives on what
constitutes effective population strategies in the face of rapid
population growth rates. One view is that demographic variables are
an essential aspect of socio-economic development, and demographic
policies are as essential to overall development as economic
policies; consequently, specific attention has to be given to
population interventions.
The other perspective, expressed by many developing countries
at the World Population Conference of 1974, is that demographic
variables are wholly a function of social and economic development,
and overall social transformation will result in demographic adjust-
ments. The views of many Governments, however, have changed from
that extreme view (see Section IV). The latter view is still adhered
to by some Governments, notably Brazil's. At the 39th meeting of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Governing Council in
1992, the delegation of Brazil stated: "The provision of better
standards of living is fundamental for dealing with the issue of
population. It has been clearly demonstrated that the promotion of
economic development is the best tool to curb population pressures."
Policy makers and Governments of many developing countries have
increasingly adopted the former view, sometimes classified as
population-oriented development. The economic success of countries
where the reduction of fertility has been seen as an essential aspect
of development policy þ including Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and
Thailand þ has not gone unnoticed (see, for example, UNFPA, 1986,
1991 and 1992b). In addition, the social and economic malaise of
many developing countries where population growth is still high,
especially those of sub-Saharan Africa, may have given added impetus
to the policy trend towards reviewing dynamic and structural
demographic elements as integral parts of development planning
policies and models. The Kilimanjaro Plan of Action (1984) reflected
the individual and collective commitments by African Governments to
adopt and implement population-influencing policies.
II. Regional Focus
This section discusses the problems associated with rapid
population growth as seen from the standpoint of national Governments
in the regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and
the Pacific, and Western Asia. The views on the issue are mainly
those expressed by Governments in response to the Sixth Population
Inquiry conducted by the United Nations in 1988 (United Nations,
1990a).
At that time, 53 per cent of the developing-country Governments
viewed their population growth rates as too high, and approximately
80 per cent of the Governments with this view had policies aimed at
reducing their population growth rates.
A. Africa
The Africa region is characterized by some of the highest
population growth rates (over 3 per cent per year) in the world.
Nevertheless, many Governments have not given high priority to the
issue of rapid population growth until recently. In the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, only Mauritius, Ghana and Kenya had
adopted population policies before the 1974 International Conference
on Population. Today, however, many countries of the region have
begun to formulate and/or implement population policies.
In response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, 30 out of 52
African Governments responded that they viewed their population
growth rates as too high. These Governments generally agreed that
rapid population growth is detrimental to socio-economic development.
They identified some common concerns relating to rapid population
growth; these included the high dependency ratio resulting from a
young population, and the difficulties in raising or even maintaining
current living standards. A number of the Governments expressed
concern about the strains placed on farm land, food, energy, employ-
ment opportunities, and health and education services.
The response of the Government of Kenya to the Sixth Population
Inquiry typifies these concerns. The Government stated that Kenya's
population growth rate, "currently estimated at 3.8 per cent, places
considerable constraints on social and economic development goals.
Some of the effects of this population growth have already manifested
themselves in social problems such as high and growing dependency
burden, unemployment, unplanned parenthood and increasing demand on
basic services such as health, education, nutrition and shelter."
Policies to lower population growth rates usually include
integrating maternal and child health with family planning; this is
the case, for example, in Egypt, Niger and Rwanda. A number of
Governments have instituted public-sector family planning systems,
while some support private family planning organizations. Some
emphasize enhancing the status of women; Nigeria, for example, estab-
lished a commission for women's affairs. An increasing number of
Governments (for example, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia) are
adopting specific goals both in terms of population growth rates and
fertility rates. In addition, many countries have adopted rural
development strategies to stem rural-urban migration. Some have made
efforts to integrate population policies into development plans.
There are also ongoing efforts to improve laws on such issues as age
at marriage, sale and distribution of contraceptives, and women's
rights of ownership.
In many countries of the region, the implementation of
population activities is hindered by the limited availability of
financial and technical resources. Population programmes are still
in their infancy in much of sub-Saharan Africa. In many countries
the demand for family planning is still low. However, as the
detrimental impacts on development of a rapidly growing population
become more and more pronounced, there is a concomitant strengthening
of political commit-ment to adopt population policies aimed at
stabilizing and reducing population growth rates.
B. Latin America and the Caribbean
In Latin America, population variables are gradually being
incorporated into the development plans of Governments. In the
interim, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played
a key role in bringing down fertility rates and slowing overall
population growth rates. With the rise of "population consciousness"
in the region, Latin American Governments are increasingly adopting
the view that a linkage between population programmes and develop-
mental programmes on health, education and employment is essential
for sustained and sustainable development (UNFPA, 1990a).
In response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, 17 out of 33
Governments in the region considered their population growth rates
too high and reported interventionist policies to lower them. In the
Caribbean subregion, 10 of 13 Governments viewed their population
growth rates as too high. In Central America, most Governments (for
example, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras)
shared a similar view.
In South America, in contrast to Central America and the
Caribbean, only Ecuador and Peru viewed their population growth rates
as too high and reported interventionist policies. Peru has
incorporated the principles of its population policies in its laws.
In a similar manner, the population policy of Ecuador is embodied in
its Constitution. The federal Government of Brazil does not
intervene to lower fertility or population growth. Instead, the
Government views social and economic development as a solution to
demographic problems. Nevertheless, fertility rates are declining
substantially in Brazil, and also in Costa Rica and Panama. This is
mainly due to the active involvement of many NGOs in family planning,
and to state-sponsored family planning activities for health-related
reasons.
As in Africa, many Latin American and Caribbean countries are
concerned about their high dependency ratios resulting from a young
population, and the impact this has had on socio-economic develop-
ment. This is evident from Mexico's response to the Sixth Population
Inquiry:
"The Government of Mexico considers the rate of growth and the
age structure of the population to be very important factors for
economic and social development. ... While population growth has
decreased significantly, it is still rapid and the age structure
remains young (about 50 per cent of the population is under 15),
which will lead to an increasing demand for employment, housing,
and other benefits in the coming decades." (United Nations,
1990a)
The Caribbean Governments, while sharing many of the concerns
common to Governments in the region, also have concerns that are
specific to small island nations. Although population growth rates
are comparatively low (1.5 per cent for the subregion during
1985-1990), the Governments view them as high because population
densities are relatively high and natural resources are limited.
There is also concern about the impact of population growth on the
growing problems of degradation of coastal regions, deforestation,
silting up of streams and rivers, water pollution and waste disposal.
In policy measures, most Governments have been promoting family
planning and population education and, at the same time attempting
to ease their dependency on primary products and tourism by
encouraging greater economic diversification. Many Governments
(Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago,
for example) have adopted formal population policies and are engaged
in efforts to integrate population factors into development planning
(UNDP, 1991b).
Few countries in the region have explicit targets for population
growth. (Among those that do are Mexico, with a target of 1.9 per
cent growth by 1998; and Peru, 2 per cent by 2000.) Policies aimed
at modifying demographic variables are combined with those aimed at
creating employment opportunities, particularly for women, and
economic restructuring policies. Some Governments (including those
of Honduras, Mexico and Peru) are increasingly concerned about the
roles and status of women and their impact on the development
process, and have adopted education and employment policies to
improve the status of women in their societies.
During the past decade, family planning has won acceptance among
growing segments of the populations of Latin American countries.
This is especially true in urban areas where family planning
programmes tend to be concentrated. In many countries of the region,
however, family planning services are not easily available in rural
areas.
Although some Governments have started to incorporate population
issues into development plans and important legislation, others still
resist linking population goals with national development strategies,
for both ideological and technical reasons (see, for example, the
position of Brazilian President Fernando Collor at the time of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Collor,
1992).
C. Asia and the Pacific
The Asian and Pacific countries have had a head start over
Africa and Latin America in confronting the issue of rapid population
growth. Governmental commitments to adopt and implement population
policies are generally strong. Asian countries (e.g., India,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) have largely succeeded in
integrating family planning with national maternal and child care and
primary health services (UNFPA, 1992b).
The largest countries of the Asia and the Pacific region
(Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan) have all set
explicit population targets and goals in their development plans, and
agree on the aim of reducing population growth rates through rapid
reductions of fertility. Their Governments see population growth as
a major development-related problem and largely agree that the
reduction of population growth rates will impact positively on socio-
economic development and living standards.
In response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, 18 Governments out
of 35 reported that they considered their population growth rates too
high, and 16 reported governmental intervention aimed at lowering
population growth rates.
China and India, for example, have policies to control
population growth through the promotion of family planning. The
Chinese Government has stepped up efforts to reduce fertility in the
wake of a recent surge which surpassed official targets and caused
concern about its impact on gains due to economic reforms. Thus,
there is a renewed emphasis on the "one couple, one child" policy,
public education for family planning, stricter enforcement of laws
relating to the age of marriage, and the integration of family
planning programmes with maternal and child health care.
The Government of India also has an extensive family planning
programme aimed at curbing population growth rates and fostering
smaller and healthier families. For over three decades, the
Government has recognized the negative consequences of India's
population growth rate on economic development efforts. This
recognition has influenced the incorporation of comprehensive
population policies as well as support for family welfare programmes
in successive development plans (United Nations, 1992a).
In Bangladesh, population is seen not just a high-priority issue
but as a matter of national survival. One of the Government's major
goals is to increase contraceptive prevalence from the current level
of about 33 per cent to 66 per cent by the mid-1990s. The Govern-
ment's response to the Sixth Population Inquiry indicates its
fertility objectives and the consequences of not achieving these
objectives.
"Planners, demographers and friendly donors pointed out that a
10-year delay in achieving an NRR [net reproduction rate] = 1
from 1990 would result in an increase of 12 million people by
the turn of the century; an additional 2.1 million tons of food
grains to maintain the current meagre average per capita intake
of 16 ounces per day; an additional work force of 3.1 million;
an increase in the number of children of school-going age by
about 8 million. The social and economic cost of absorbing this
addition would be enormous. Being fully aware of the social and
economic costs and consequences of accelerated growth of
population, the Government declared population as the number one
problem and the population control programme as a high-priority
programme, and commits itself to bring down the rate of growth
of population to 1.8 per cent by 1990 with a view of achieving
NRR = 1 by 2000 at the latest". (United Nations, 1990a)
The Government of Pakistan also maintains that a reduction of
its population growth rates is extremely critical for socio-economic
development. Unless it succeeds in reducing the country's population
growth rate, the Government foresees rising unemployment, illiteracy,
overcrowded cities, strained social services and over-stretched basic
facilities. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke of the dire
consequences of rapid population growth and the reasons for previous
failures of population policies, in his address to the National
Population Conference in Islamabad on 11 July 1991:
"Population growth has a direct impact on national progress and
development and indeed on the well-being of the people. Popu-
lation in Pakistan is growing at a rate of 3.1 per cent. At the
current rate of growth, it would double in 23 years. It means
that even if we succeed in doubling our food output, our schools
and colleges, our hospitals and clinics, our roads and highways
and the number of housing units, the standard of living of our
people would not have improved a bit at the end of the year
2014. ... It is indeed regrettable that despite a run of 40
years, this programme has produced no results. ... I believe
success has eluded this programme so far because of the lack of
proper liaison between the people and those who had to carry the
programme to the nooks and corners of Pakistan".
Indonesia's Population Policy aims at promoting smaller and more
prosperous families. Efforts are being made to increase community
participation in the management and implementation of family planning
services. Although free family planning services are available at
government health centres and hospitals, campaigns have been launched
to motivate and encourage couples to buy their family planning
supplies from private medical sources. Tax-disincentives, income-
generating activities for acceptors of family planning, and efforts
to improve the status of women are some of the strategies intended
to reduce the country's population growth rate to 1.9 per cent per
year by 1994 (Government of Indonesia, 1990).
In addition to the various policies of directly regulating
population growth, many Asian countries have built incentives and
disincentives into their family planning programmes to influence the
choices of the number and the spacing of children in each family.
In China, for example, those who sign the one-child pledge receive
cash awards (UNDP, 1989). The Government of India offers additional
retirement benefits for families having a limited number of children.
In Bangladesh, female participants in family planning programmes
receive a new sari (UNFPA, 1990b). Some countries such as
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Thailand have used community-based
schemes to promote social responsibility. Rewards in the form of
employment projects are given to communities on the basis of their
family planning records.
Population growth rates have moderated in many countries in East
and South-east Asia. However, growth rates are still high in a
number of South Asian countries, partly as a result of pervasive
poverty, illiteracy, especially among women, and limited access to
family planning.
D. Western Asia
With few exceptions, the population growth rates of countries
in the Western Asia region average about 3 per cent per year.
However, in contrast to the other regions, nearly all the countries
of Western Asia, with the exception of Turkey and Jordan, view their
population growth rates as either satisfactory or too low.
High fertility rates in the region (women are likely to bear six
to eight children during their reproductive years) are usually
attributed to a combination of sociocultural factors. These include
early marriage, pro-natalist attitudes, non-availability or non-
acceptance of contraception, and low participation of women in the
labour force (UNFPA, 1984).
The health hazards of excessive fertility and the young age
structure of the population have recently led to wider acceptance of
the health rationale for family planning. There is also increased
awareness of the need to bring population growth rates under control.
In response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, Cyprus, Iraq,
Israel, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia expressed strong pro-natalist
sentiments. Several pro-natalist countries of the region encourage
population growth through a combination of policies aimed at
encouraging fertility, reducing mortality and affecting immigration.
Four Governments (Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen) reported
that they view their population growth rates as satisfactory. Yemen
and Syria have indirect policies to influence fertility as well as
population growth. These include providing educational opportunities
for women and improving access to health and educational services.
Although Turkey and Jordan view their population growth rates
as too high, only Turkey has implemented population policies aimed
at reducing growth rates. When compared with the other countries of
the region, Turkey's population growth rate of about 2 per cent per
year is relatively low. Nevertheless, the Government has adopted
population policies aimed at reducing the growth rate to 1.8 per cent
by the year 2000 (United Nations, 1991).
III. Policy Responses to Sectoral Issues
A. Health
Governments generally view expenditures on health as major
investments in human-capital formation. Human capital, they believe,
is an indispensable factor in the attainment of sustained socio-
economic development. In light of this, many Governments have
endorsed the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration that called for "Health for
All by the year 2000."
India's Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-1997) (Government of India,
1992) reflects this view: "Health of the people is not only a
desirable goal but also an essential investment in human resources.
The National Health Policy reiterated India's commitment to attaining
Health for All by 2000 A.D. Primary health care has been accepted
as the main instrument for achieving this goal."
Governments tend to see enormous difficulties in attaining the
goal of "Health for All" in the face of rapid population growth,
however. A case in point is the view on this issue expressed in
Sierra Leone's National Population Policy Document adopted in 1989:
"Continuously rapid population growth makes the achievement of
this goal much more difficult at least on two scores. First,
the number of high-health-risk persons such as women in their
reproductive span and children below five will increase rapidly.
Second, the growth in the total population, taking into account
the existing shortfalls in health-care coverage, will stretch
to the utmost resources: financial; qualified staff; equipment;
etc." (Government of Sierra Leone, 1989)
A number of other Governments (for example, Lesotho, Nigeria,
Ghana and India) have similarly noted that rapid population growth
will adversely affect health and, consequently, the quality of human
capital through household and sectoral effects. At the household
level, women will be restricted from furthering their education and
accepting employment outside the home due to the detrimental effects
of frequent and excessive child-bearing. Moreover, too-closely
spaced children tend to have health problems which may impact
negatively on their educational and skills development.
A similar view is endorsed by the Government of the Philippines
(1990): "Continued high fertility is thus expected to worsen
malnutrition, maternal, infant and child mortality, and poor
performance in school. Such conditions combine to lower the quality
of family life in the short run and the quality of human resources
in the long run."
At the macro level, some Governments foresee increasing
pressures on the quantity and quality of health-care systems arising
from rapid population growth. Maintaining quantity and improving
quality generally require diverting resources needed for investment
in agriculture and industry. This difficulty is further magnified
in countries with structural adjustment programmes and huge debt-
servicing requirements. Thus, in some cases, the net effect of rapid
population growth would be a decline in per capita health
expenditure, with adverse impact on human-capital development.
In terms of policy orientation, many Governments have integrated
family planning into their primary health-care systems. Family
planning information and services are thus provided not only to
improve maternal and infant health and well-being but also to
influence the number and spacing of births.
B. Education
In the context of socio-economic development, Governments view
education, like health, as an investment of human-capital formation.
The quality and amounts of education provided largely determine the
skills and productivity of the labour force. More importantly,
Governments see the educational level of the labour force as a major
determinant of a country's capability to utilize and develop new and
cost-effective technologies for the development of physical and
technical infrastructure. They also see education as a key component
in strategies for reducing population growth rates. Literate people,
they recognize, take better advantage of family planning, and
educated women tend to have fewer children. Thus, providing
educational opportunities for women may not only promote greater
productivity, but may also help reduce population growth rates.
President Soeharto of Indonesia stressed the impact of education
in his country (Soeharto, 1989): "One of the results of development,
namely the rising level of education, has had a substantial impact
on the decline of the population growth rate. In general, wider and
higher education has broadened the community's horizon for further
advance and acceptance of new ideas and innovations, including a
perception of the future, the motivation to have only a small family,
responsibility towards children, marriage at a more mature age, and
so forth."
Against this background, most Government development plans
include policies aimed at reducing illiteracy, increasing primary
enrolment, and developing a pool of scientific and technical talent
to achieve rapid technical progress in a number of fields. Many
Govern-ments, however, see rapid population growth as seriously
hindering their ability to attain these targets. Many see
difficulties in maintaining current levels of their educational
systems; indeed, most actually foresee an overall deterioration.
A typical reaction to the negative consequences of population
growth for education is that of the Government of Lesotho, which
projects its population will double in less than three decades:
"The existing number of 171 secondary schools and 1,181 primary
schools needs to be doubled simply to maintain current levels
of educational facilities, but the resources needed for these
will be enormous, which will be difficult to ensure under the
prevailing economic situation. At present in primary and
secondary schools, student-teacher ratios are respectively 56:1
and 26:1. This situation is bound to deteriorate if needed
resources to appoint more teachers and build more schools
commensurate with the growing number of school-age population
cannot be provided. Whatever progress so far achieved in the
education sector cannot be sustained, rather it will
deteriorate. Per capita educational expenditure will be less
and less, and thus, the quality of education cannot be ensured."
(Government of Lesotho, 1992)
Most Governments contend that primary education must necessarily
compete for resources with other priority sectors of the education
system, such as vocational and technical schools, education pro-
grammes for women, and adult literacy programmes. Rapidly rising
primary school enrolment due to rapid population growth will pose
difficult choices in terms of priority and funding in the overall
education budget. In many instances, resources that might have been
directed towards primary education are diverted to technical and
vocational education. These decisions usually have adverse long-term
implications for the quality of primary education, ultimately leading
to a reduction in the quality of human capital and a further
exacerbation of income inequalities.
To counter these detrimental effects on education, Governments
pursue population policies that focus on fertility declines through
family planning, together with mutually reinforcing programmes to
provide health care, adult literacy, and career opportunities for
women independent of child-bearing.
C. Labour Force and Employment
For most Governments, rising unemployment and widespread
underemployment have been seen as a major cause of poverty and
underdevelopment. Thus, one of the key objectives of Government
plans is to generate a sufficient number of productive and
remunerative jobs. India's Eighth Five-Year Plan expresses a common
concern:
"The phenomenon of growing unemployment has of late emerged as
a major problem and therefore the expansion of employment
opportunities has to be the central objective of the planning
effort. An accelerated expansion of employment opportunities is
necessary both for poverty alleviation and the effective
utilization of human resources for economic and social
development of the country." (Government of India, 1992)
Governments generally share the view of the Philippines that
rapid population growth is further aggravating the problems of
unemployment (Government of the Philippines, 1992): "A continued
rapid population growth rate also means more people entering the
labour force, exerting even greater pressure on employment
generation, given the already large number of unemployed and
underemployed." Some Governments foresee not only pressure on the
unemployment situation but also a concomitant rise in social and
political unrest, which in turn would make demands for non-productive
investment in security forces or in disguised unemployment
programmes.
In policy orientation, most Governments view a reduction in the
population growth rate through fertility reduction as a way of
alleviating the problem. They are aware, however, that policies to
reduce population growth may not exert a significant short-term
impact on unemployment problems in the short run, since most of the
expected entrants into the labour force have already been born.
Nevertheless, in the long term, they see a decline in fertility as
having a positive impact on the employment situation. This view has
been put forward by a number of Governments, including Kenya, Nigeria
and Thailand. Sierra Leone's National Population Policy Document
(Government of Sierra Leone, 1989) states, "A fall in fertility can
help to provide the future labour force entrants with better health,
nutrition, education and training, etc., and extra matching
productive investment to brighten the employment aspects."
Many Governments (India, Nigeria and Thailand, for example) have
made projections of future employment prospects based on targets of
fertility declines. The Nigerian Government offered this rationale
for its present population policy aimed at reducing the total
fertility rate:
"With a decline in the total fertility rate to four children,
the population over the same period of 20 years will be 80
million less than when total fertility is placed between six and
seven. Given the present rate of our economic development via
the ongoing Structural Adjustment Programme and with an average
number of children by a family kept at four, full employment can
be envisaged." (New Nigeria, 1992)
In their attempt to lower fertility rates, Governments generally
pursue policies and programmes aimed at reducing mortality and
increasing life expectancy through integrated family planning and
primary health care. Emphasis is usually placed on improving the
status of women through a combination of education, health and
employment programmes. This tends to produce improvements in life
expectancy and the status of women, and reductions in mortality
(especially at the youngest ages), inducing lower fertility. This
in turn impacts positively on employment through reductions in labour
supply and by improving the quality of the new entrants to the labour
force.
Many Governments note that a larger labour force can be an asset
if it is well trained, well educated and healthy and if it is
equipped with capital equipment and infrastructure. However,
Governments of countries with continuing high population growth rates
see a large labour force as a liability.
D. Income distribution
Some Governments (for example, Botswana, India and Thailand)
have noted that rapid population growth exacerbates income
inequality.
In Thailand, the Government recognizes that declines in
fertility have helped to accelerate a more equitable distribution of
health, education and employment opportunities, all of which tend to
impact positively on income distribution. In its Seventh National
Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996), the Government
outlined its income distribution targets by focusing on the poor and
disadvantaged groups, and noted that its ability to improve income
distribution by 1996 will depend largely on whether the population
growth rate can be reduced to 1.2 per cent by that year. Fertility
is a major concern of Thailand's development policy. To achieve
fertility reduction, Thailand has relied on a government-sponsored
and -implemented national family planning programme (Government of
Thailand, 1992).
Botswana, with a very rapid population growth rate of over 3 per
cent per year, dealt with income distribution in its Seventh National
Development Plan (1991-1996). The issue is to be addressed through
creating income-earning opportunities, in combination with a compre-
hensive population policy that calls for reducing the rate of
population growth and improving family planning and education
Government of Botswana, 1991, and UNFPA, 1992a).
E. Savings
Several Governments (for example, India, Namibia, the
Philippines, Turkey and Yemen) have expressed alarm over the
detrimental effects of rapid population growth on the generation of
savings for productive investment. High fertility reduces the
ability of families to accumulate private savings that would finance
development efforts. From a societal point of view, high fertility,
which usually means a high proportion of population under age 15,
leads to a diversion of resources from productive capital investments
to expansion of less-productive services such as health care and
education.
These perceptions were endorsed in India's Seventh Five-Year
Development Plan, which proposed a target net reproduction rate (NRR)
of 1 by the year 2001, together with policies aimed at reducing
mortality rates considerably in order to encourage the intended
decline in fertility (United Nations, 1992a).
A similar view is contained in Yemen's National Population
Strategy 1990-2000: "At the national level, the growing numbers of
births burden the Government with increasing budgetary demands for
education, health, public housing and other essentials of life, and
thereby limit its ability to direct sufficient financial resources
to capital formation" (Government of Yemen, 1992). The strategy
calls for choosing family planning policies and programmes that help
to reduce population growth rates to "safe" levels, using all
available resources and channels without explicit fertility targets.
IV. Some Changing Perceptions
This section focuses on countries where Governments have
hitherto viewed their population growth rates as satisfactory, and
considered population as an issue that could be dealt with through
social and economic changes. Recently, a combination of environmental
and socio-economic factors has led them to take a fresh look at rapid
pop-ulation growth and its implications for sustainable development.
Some countries have come to the view that population issues,
particularly population growth, may be addressed directly and should
not be viewed exclusively as a consequence of socio-economic policies
and changes.
Tables 1 and 2 show the changes in perception over the period
1976-1991. Below, some examples are given of changes in the views
of individual Governments (United Nations, 1992b and 1990a, and
UNFPA, 1991).
Malawi: In its response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, the
Government emphasized the right of families to have as many children
as they wish. Nevertheless, the Government acknowledged that rapid
population growth is making it increasingly difficult to provide
adequate social services, especially for the younger age groups.
There also are growing concerns about the detrimental impacts of
rapid population growth on food production, the availability of
arable land, literacy and employment.
The Government does not have a specific population policy at
present. However, it has been providing child-spacing services in
an effort to improve the health of mothers and children. The
Government is also using a variety of population education programmes
to inform its people of the implications of a rapidly growing
population for economic development (Marshall, A., 1989, and Republic
of Malawi, 1992, pp. 7-10 and p. 17).
Zambia: The Government previously dismissed the importance of
population to development. Recently, however, there has been a
change of perception regarding the role of population in the develop-
ment process (see box above), stemming from a growing realization
that Zambia's present population growth rate of about 3.8 per cent
per year would imply a doubling of its population in less than 20
years. In light of this, the Government announced details of a
population policy as part of its Fourth National Development Plan.
The policy is comprehensive in response to nationally perceived
developmental problems. It also calls for a reduction in total
fertility rate of about seven per woman to six by the year 2000 and
to four by 2015.
Syrian Arab Republic: The Government has expressed concern about
the relatively young age structure of the country's population. In
the past, it took the view that the population problem could be
solved through social and economic development. However, the
pressure of population growth on social services has led to a gradual
change in perception regarding the role of population in the
development process. Increasingly, policies aimed at influencing
population growth directly are considered a viable option (UNFPA,
1992c, and UNDP, 1990).
Jordan: The Government is concerned about the age structure of
Jordan's population: about 40 per cent of the population is under age
15. Although it has no official policy statement on population
growth, the Government is attempting to lower the population growth
rate by focusing on measures that would have an impact on fertility
and limit immigration.
Congo: Although the official position of the Government is still
pro-natalist, the detrimental effects of rapid population growth on
overall economic development have become a major concern.
Specifically, concerns about the employment situation, the
availability of food and increased rural-urban migration are now
changing the Government's perception of its rapidly growing
population.
Recently, the Government began to draft a population policy
aimed at confronting rapid population growth on many fronts:
improving health services for mothers and children; improving women's
status by providing them with educational and employment
opportunities; and improving education, health and nutrition services
for the population as a whole. In addition, a number of rural
development projects have been proposed to stem rural-urban migration
and environmental degradation (Government of the Congo, 1992, and
UNDP, 1991a).
Bhutan: In its response to the Sixth Population Inquiry, the
Government reported that it viewed its population growth rate as too
low. The number of people was seen to be relatively small in
relation to the country's development objectives. The Government
foresaw population growth as helping to increase the labour supply,
thus reducing reliance on foreign workers.
In the past three years, however, the Government's perception
of Bhutan's population growth rate has changed, as a result of the
increasing pressure of population growth on arable land and the
environment. Although the population is sparse and small, its
density in terms of arable land is comparable to the most-populated
areas in South Asia. Faced with an annual population growth rate of
about 2.3 per cent, the Government has recognized family planning as
a tool for reducing fertility and maternal and infant mortality
(UNFPA, 1992b).
V. Concluding Remarks
That rapid population growth puts enormous pressures on many
aspects of a nation's economy has been the common perception of
Governments of most developing countries. In policy orientation with
respect to population growth and economic development, Governments,
with few exceptions, share the view that a comprehensive population
policy must be integrated with development planning.
Increasingly, many Governments are incorporating into their
population policies and programmes the key factors that determine
family size. These include, women's role and status in society,
maternal and child health care, information about and access to
family planning services, family income, and education for women.
There is also a growing awareness that all these factors tend to be
mutually reinforcing if they are introduced simultaneously.
Moreover, Governments of developing countries largely agree that
a reduction in family size can make a direct contribution to better
health, education and nutrition at both the household and national
levels. They are aware that the benefits for economic development
derive not just from slower population growth itself, but from all
the factors associated with it.
Governments of many developing countries are increasingly con-
cerned about the challenges rapid population growth poses for
sustained and sustainable development and prosperity in the coming
decades. In the face of rapid population growth, many developing
countries are struggling to keep pace with the basic needs of their
people. A large share of investment is required merely to maintain
the same level of capital investment per person. The inability to
increase capital investment per person, in turn, impedes development
of human resources.
The successes of some population programmes (e.g., in China,
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand
and Tunisia) in slowing national population growth rates have not
gone unnoticed. Countries with slower population growth tend to have
higher savings and investment ratios and faster-growing per capita
income than countries with rapid population growth. In addition,
several countries not only have managed to slow their population
growth rates, but in the process have also achieved improvements in
education, health and availability of female labour. This has placed
them in a better position to attract foreign investment and to move
up the ladder of industrial development.
In light of this, Governments of developing countries are
placing a high priority on addressing rapid population growth and its
interconnection with socio-economic development. The successful
implementation of population programmes, however, will largely depend
on political commitment and the coordination of efforts between
government agencies and NGOs.
Some developing countries with high population growth rates must
devote a large share of export earnings towards interest payments on
external debts. In addition, many of these countries have
implemented Structural Adjustment Programmes. Against this
background, these Governments are finding it increasingly difficult
to allocate resources for policy measures aimed at reducing
population growth rates.
In general, many developing countries are aware that
developmental processes take time, but time is not on their side.
Many believe success will depend on action to reduce family size in
the very near future. Finally, rapid urbanization and increasing
rural-urban migration, together with deforestation, soil erosion and
other ecological and environmental concerns, have also become a part
of the population-growth issue. There is a growing recognition that
attention to population issues can help to achieve not only balanced
economic growth but also ecological balance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1:Perceptions and Interventions of Governments with Respect to
Population Growth
=====================================================================
Third Population Inquiry,
1976(111 countries)
=====================================================================
Perception: Africa Asia & Pacific
Growth too Camercoon Bhutan
low; C.A.R. Cambodia
Intervention Cote d'Ivoire Laos
to raise Eq. Guinea DPR Korea
rate Gabon Mongolia
Libya Nauru
L. Am. & Carrib. W. Asia
Argentina Kuwait
Bahamas Oman
Paraguay Qatar
Uruguay S. Arabia
U.A.R.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 21]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa L. Am. & Carriib.
Growth Algeria Bolivia
satisfactory Benin Brazil
Burkina Faso Chile
Burundi Cuba
Cape Verde Guyana
Chad Honduras
Ethiopia Panama
Gambia Peru
Guinea Surinam
Mali Venezuela
Malawi
Mauritania Asia & Pacific
Niger Afghanisan
Rwanda Maldives
Sao Tome Myanmar
Somalia Singapore
Sudan
Tanzania W. Asia
Togo Bahrain
Zaire Iraq
Zambia Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
Yemen
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 42]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Guatemala
Growth too high; Botswana Haiti
Intervention Comoros Jamaica
to lower rate Egypt Mexico
Ghana Nicaragua
Kenya Trin. & Tob.
Lesotho
Liberia Asia & Pacific
Mauritius Bangladesh
Madagascar China
Morocco Fiji
Senegal India
Seychelles Indonesia
Sierra Leone Iran
Swaziland Rep. of Korea
Tunisia Malaysia
Uganda Nepal
Pakistan
L. Am. & Carrib. Papua N.G.
Barbados Philippines
Colombia Sri Lanka
Costa rica Thailand
Dominican Rep. Tonga
Ecuador Viet Nam
El Salvador W. Samoa
Grenada
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total 46]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Other perceptions Africa
and/or Congo
intervention Guinea-Bissau
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total 2]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
Sixth Population Inquiry
1988(129 countries)
=====================================================================
Perception: Africa Loas
Growth too Eq. Guinea DPR Korea
low; Gabon Nauru
Intervention
to raise rate L. Am. & Carrib. W. Asia
Uruguay Iraq
Oman
Asia & Pacific Qatar
Cambodia S. Arabia
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 11]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Colombia
Growth Angola Cuba
satisfactory Benin Guatemala
Burkina Faso Guyana
Chad Panama
Djibouti Paraguay
Guinea Suriname
Libya Venezuela
Mali
Mauritania Asia & Pacific
Mauritius Brunei
Namibia Fiji
Sao Tome Maldives
Somalia Myanmar
Sudan Vanuatu
Togo
Zaire W. Asia
Bahrain
L. Am. & Carrib. Kuwait
Antigua Lebanon
Bahamas Syrian
Belize Yemen
Brazil
Chile
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 39]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Haiti
Growth too high; Algeria Honduras
Intervention Botswana Jamaica
to lower rate Burundi Mexico
Cameroon Nicaragua
Cape Verde Peru
Comoros Saint Kitts
Egypt Saint Lucia
Gambia Saint Vincent
Ghana Trin. & Tob.
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya Asia & Pacific
Lesotho Bangladesh
Liberia China
Madagascar India
Morocco Indonesia
Niger Iran
Nigeria Kiribati
Rwanda Rep. of Korea
Senegal Marshall Is.
Seychelles Micronesia
Swaziland Mongolia
Tunisia Nepal
Uganda Pakistan
Zambia Philippines
Zimbabwe Samoa
Solomon Is.
L. Am. & Carrib. Sri Lanka
Barbados Thailand
Costa Rica Tonga
Dominica Tuvalu
Dom. Rep. Viet Nam
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 62]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Other perceptions Africa Asia & Pacific
and/or C.A.R. Afghanistan
intervention Congo Bhutan
Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia
Ethiopia Papua N.G.
Malawi Singapore
Mozambique
Sierra Leone W. Asia
Tanzania Jordan
U.A.R.
L. Am. & Carrib.
Argentina
Bolivia
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 17]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2: Perceptions and Interventions of Governments with Respect
to Fertility Levels
=====================================================================
Third Population Inquiry
1976(112 countries)
=====================================================================
Perception: Africa Uruguay
Fertility too Gabon
low; Intervention Libya Asia & Pacific
to raise rate Cambodia
L. Am. & Carrib.
Argentina
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 5]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Bolivia
Fertility Algeria Cuba
satisfactory Benin Guyana
Burkina Faso Paraguay
Cape Verde Peru
Chad Surinam
Congo Venezuela
Cote d'Ivoire Asia Pacific
Ethiopia Bhutan
Gambia Laos
Guinea DPR Korea
Guinea-Bissau Maldives
Mali Mongolia
Malawi Myanmar
Mauritania Nauru
Mozambique Singapore
Niger
Nigeria W. Asia
Sao Tome Iraq
Somalia Kuwait
Sudan Lebanon
Tanzania Oman
Togo Qatar
Zaire S. Arabia
Zambia Syria
U.A.R.
L. Am. & Carrib. Yemen
Bahamas
Brazil
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 51]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Papua N.G.
Fertility too Botswana Phlippines
high; Egypt Nepal
Intervention Ghana Sri Lanka
to lower rate Kenya Thailand
Lesotho Tonga
Mauritius Viet Nam
Morocco W. Samoa
Seychelles
Swaziland
Tunisia
Uganda
L. Am. & Carrib.
Barbados
Colombia
Dominican Rep.
El Salvador
Grenada
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Trin. & Tob.
Asia & Pacific
Bangladesh
China
Fiji
India
Iran
Indonesia
Rep. of Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 38]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Other perceptions Africa Ecuador
and/or C.A.R. Guatemala
interventions Cameroon Nicaragua
Comoros Panama
Eq. Guinea
Liberia Asia Pacific
Madagascar Afghanistan
Rwanda
Senegal W. Asia
Sierra Leone Bahrain
Jordan
L. Am. & Carrib.
Chile
Costa Rica
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 38]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Perceptions Africa Ecuador
and/or C.A.R. Guatemala
interventions Cameroon Nicaragua
Eq. Guinea Panama
Liberia
Madagascar Asia & Pacific
Rwanda Afghanistan
Senegal
Sierra Leone W. Asia
Bahrain
L. Am. & Carrib. Jordan
Chile
costa Rica
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 18]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
=====================================================================
Sixth Population Inquiry
1988 (129 countries)
=====================================================================
Perception: Africa
Fertility too low; Eq. Guinea
Intervention Gabon
to raise rate
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 2]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Asia & Pacific
Fertility Benin Bhutan
satisfactory Chad Brunei
Djibouti DPR Korea
Libya Laos
Mali Maldives
Mauritania Myanmar
Namibia Nauru
Sao Tome Vanuatu
Somalia
Sudan W Asia
Togo Bahrain
Zaire Lebanon
Oman
L. Am. & Carrib. Qatar
Antigua S. Arabia
Argentina Syria
Bahamas U.A.R.
Barbados
Belize
Brazil
Chile
Cuba
Guyana
Panama
Paraguay
Suriname
Venezuela
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 41]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Perception: Africa Haiti
Fertility too Algeria Honduras
high; Angola Jamaica
Intervention Botswana Mexico
to lower rate Burkina Faso Nicaragua
Burundi Peru
Cameroon Saint Kitts
Cape Verde Saint Vincent
Comoros Trin. & Tob.
Egypt
Gambia Asia & Pacific
Ghana Bangladesh
Guinea-Bissau China
Kenya Fiji
Lesotho India
Liberia Indonesia
Madagascar Iran
Morocco Kiribati
Niger Malaysia
Nigeria Marshall Is.
Rwanda Micronesia
Senegal Mongolia
Seychelles Pakistan
Swaziland Philippines
Tunisia Nepal
Uganda Samoa
Zambia Solomon Is.
Zimbabwe Sri Lanka
Thailand
L. Am. & Carrib. Tonga
Costa Rica Tuvalu
Dominica Viet Nam
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador W. Asia
El Salvador Jordan
Grenada Yemen
Guatemala
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 66]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Other perceptions Africa Saint Lucia
and/or C.A.R. Uruguay
intervention Congo
Cote d'Ivoire Asia & Pacific
Ethiopia Afghanistan
Guinea Cambodia
Malawi Rep. of Korea
Mozambique Papua N.G.
Sierra Leone Singapore
Tanzania
W. Asia
L. Am. & Carrib. Iraq
Bolivia Kuwait
Colombia
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[Total: 20]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT ON POPULATION GROWTH AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Adopted by Consultative Meeting
Participants by Consensus
I. Policy and Research Challenges in the 1990s
During the 1980s, a number of economists (many occupying key
positions as policy advisers) have asserted that population is either
a neutral factor vis-…-vis economic growth and development, or that
its importance is being overplayed by aid donors and family planning
advocates.
At the same time, leaders in a growing number of developing
countries have become even more convinced of the need to slow rapid
population growth. In part, this is a result of more open,
responsive governance in many countries. Leaders see immediate
problems associated with high population growth. They are convinced
that organized interventions can do something to slow population
growth and that such a slow-down brings benefits to individuals and
society; also that the community wants and is responsive to family
planning programmes.
The important question thus arises: How to bridge this gap,
actual or perceived, between current research findings and the policy
community's need for guidance for action in the population field.
In our view, the answer is to broaden the population debate, to get
beyond the narrow focus on population and growth of income per capita
that one finds in heuristic models and economists' rejection of them,
and to focus on problems associated with population pressures that
are both specific and tractable.
There is a need to increase recognition among researcher-
advisers that policy makers must make decisions now þ in the face of
probable (though still, in some instances, unconfirmed) consequences
of further delays in checking demographic momentum. Demographers
make a compelling case that the time for action is now, even if it
is unlikely that fully satisfying knowledge about adverse
consequences is possible in the near term. How can we apply the
precautionary principle? How can we use an imperfect knowledge base
to inform decisions that have to be made under uncertainty?
To start with, it is important to understand the history of the
population debate.
II. Origins of Consensus and Commitment to Action on Population
A. The Nature of the Consensus Formed in the 1960s
The consensus of the 1960s was based on recognition of the
health and welfare benefits of family planning for individuals; and
of the human rights aspect as reflected in access to safe, effective
contraceptive methods.
It drew on growing concern about the acceleration of population
growth in developing countries (that resulted from rapid decline in
mortality while fertility remained high), occurring at a time when
these countries were also beginning efforts to raise living
standards; in particular, there was concern that rapid population
growth would inhibit the development required to bring down birth
rates.
There were limitations in the knowledge base of that period. It
was felt, for example, that the European experience of "demographic
transition" would be too onerous if repeated in developing countries.
Moreover, discussion of macroeconomic consequences relied on
heuristic models, using 1950s-vintage economic-growth models, to show
that the young age distribution associated with high fertility would
lower investments needed to boost production for the increasing
number of consumers.
Despite lack of definitive research evidence to support
interventions to slow population growth rates, there was policy-level
consensus of a strong presumptive case for intervention justified by
indisputable benefits to individuals and probable benefits to
society.
B. Mobilization of Political and Financial Support for
Population Interventions in the 1970s
Most research during the 1970s was focused on understanding
reproductive behaviour and how interventions might accelerate
fertility decline. Few questioned the premise that fertility decline
was necess-ary; most agreed that research was needed to help find out
how to do this more effectively.
There was surprisingly little research on consequences of rapid
population growth, except replication of heuristic exercises aimed
at expanding political support. Some theoretical work took place,
such as refinements of growth models, but little empirical work was
undertaken to expand the knowledge base about population/development
links or macroeconomic consequences.
III. Revisionist View of Macroeconomic Consequences in 1980s
During the early 1980s, there was renewed interest by research
community in macroeconomic effects of population growth, in part a
response to the strong counter-attacks by Professor Julian Simon.
This struck a chord of sympathy from mainstream economists who had
been sceptical all along about the arguments used to justify the
earlier consensus. Also, many economists rejected the rigid
structural-growth models of 1950s, being more interested in market
responses and "getting the prices right". The 1986 report of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences played a catalytic role in
legitimizing this "revisionist" view. Even though the report
acknowledged that rapid population growth could cause problems for
developing countries, its very cautious review of the evidence on
adverse economic effect of rapid population growth was generally seen
as a rejection of the earlier consensus.
Concurrently, research findings continued to be positive about
the benefits for health, education, welfare and women's status to be
gained by improving access to safe, effective family planning. The
few economists who focused on population issues mainly took a
laissez-faire or "agnostic" position on macro issues but supported
interventions on individual welfare grounds. Some granted that rapid
population growth could aggravate development problems, but noted
that population fell fairly low on the list of causes of those
problems. Other causes (poor management, distorted incentives, etc.)
need to be attacked directly. These economists were also open to
interventions to correct market failure due to poor information,
distorted prices and externalities. Family planning intervention to
enhance societal equity was also seen by them as justified.
IV. Status of Current Knowledge Base and Implications for Population
Policy
Nothing in economic-demographic research contradicts the
proposition that in low-income countries with considerable backlogs
in human development, living standards and infrastructure, population
growth in excess of 2 per cent per year is among the structural
factors inhibiting the achievement of a wide range of development
objectives.
In many countries and circumstances, the longer-run implications
of rapid population growth, particularly pressure on renewable
resources, are severe. Environmental pressures vary in the extent
to which they are driven by population growth as opposed to other
factors such as technology, income growth, policies, etc. But the
food-soil-water relationship is strongly related to population and
individual countries which face these problems already are likely to
be acutely affected in the future. In such circumstances, a
difference of a decade in the onset of the transition to lower
population growth can make a considerable, even essential difference.
Rapid growth in labour-force entrants is a source of stress in
capital-poor economies; in countries where rapid growth of the
school-age population has also contributed to the erosion of
investments in human resources, the potential gains that might have
accrued from having a rapidly growing stock of younger workers are
offset by lower productivity of workers and reduced competitiveness
in a global economy where gains from trade depend primarily on
productivity. When low productivity is coupled with low earnings,
efforts to alleviate poverty are undercut. It is easy to recommend
more investment in social sectors as a remedy to poverty, but
difficult to do that if productivity is so low that neither workers
nor Governments are likely to accumulate the surpluses required to
make such investments.
New evidence from 1980s data shows a negative correlation of
high rates of population growth and the growth of per capita income.
We urge, however, that findings be interpreted cautiously, as
indicative of problems associated with rapid population growth in
countries that have not done well. Countries that have slowed
population growth rates and are now doing comparatively better should
also be examined. Attention should be focused on specific issues:
falling behind in human resource investments; poor governance in face
of population pressures; unsustainable efforts to increase food
production; strains on water resources; other issues that are of
immediate concern to policy makers þ as well as long-run issues
associated with lower versus higher population stabilization.
We also note that recognition of the adverse effects of rapid
population growth does not mean that acceleration of the transition
to lower growth will by itself solve all developmental problems; at
best it may buy time to deal with those problems or keep them from
getting even worse. Most of the immediate benefits to slowing
population growth through increasing access to family planning accrue
to individuals through the welfare and equity benefits of being able
to time and space births more effectively and with less risk to
health. Subsidized family planning services may also help to bring
the individual costs of an added birth better into line with societal
costs thus reducing externalities (costs of children borne by society
at large, but not by individual families). When interventions are
motivated by both individual and societal objectives, respect for the
reproductive rights and health of individuals should be an added
focus of attention.
V. Recommendations
The research community should continue to broaden and deepen the
knowledge base for population policy. Research efforts should focus
on problems in countries where population pressures appear serious
and on the specific aspects of the problem that particularly affect
those countries. An examination of economic benefits in countries
that have successfully slowed population growth should also be given
priority. Further, research should probe specific under-served
groups in countries where market failures may be depriving such
groups from obtaining benefits from family planning and reproductive
health services. The research community should also strive to make
progress in estimating costs and resource
requirements for population interventions.
Analysis of the impact of population on a broad range of
development issues has not received the serious attention it should
have. Implications for poverty alleviation þ particularly in rural
areas þ and infrastructure investment, as well as other issues, stand
out in this regard. An enormous increase in the population of
developing countries over the next three to four decades is
inevitable. Understanding the impacts of this increase is not just
a matter of defending or rebutting the assertions that have dominated
the population debate during the 1980s: it is a matter of great
policy relevance.
Those actions that make sense on micro-level grounds, including
benefits for human rights, equity and women's status, (whether or not
a strong macroeconomic rationale can be established) should be taken
immediately. This list certainly includes striving to meet the
existing and growing unmet need for quality family planning and
reproductive health services and to expand educational and other
opportunities for women. Also, we recognize that government can play
an important role in legitimizing family planning as well as
providing information and services.
Ways should be explored for the research community to do a
better job at informing the policy process about rationales for
intervention and help policy makers deal with complexities of
population-development links. Agnosticism may be safe for
researchers, but it is not helpful at the policy level. Do
researchers really intend to deny the validity of interventions? Do
they want to limit themselves to debunking naive, alarmist approaches
to consequences? A more constructive approach would be to help
decision makers to weigh risks, benefits and costs of
actions/inaction and to make enlightened decisions on the basis of
knowledge that we now possess, however imperfect it is.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
A DISSENTING STATEMENT
By George J. Stolnitz
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Indiana University
The Statement, even as it stands, could serve usefully towards
making a needed "counter-revisionist" statement. However, the
Statement's value and persuasiveness could be enhanced by
incorporating many or all of the themes below. Obviously, the themes
as presented here are not adapted to being incorporated into a
recommendations document. However, some of the substance and a good
deal of tone could be adapted to the eventual document's purposes and
message. Below I give my dissenting statement:
Adverse population pressures clearly associated with rapid
growth (over 2 to 2 1/4 per cent) are both numerous and of prime
significance from both individual welfare and societal development
points of view. Among such pressures, the following stand out:
* Heavy costs of educating the young in the NDCs (for
"newly developing countries") is an obvious and major case in
point. Pronounced inadequacies with respect to both elemental
qualitative criteria (teachers' training, physical facilities,
instructional aids) and quantitative standards (rising numbers
of school-age children not in school, despite impressively large
increases in published primary and secondary enrolment rates,
as well as large enrolment-attendance discrepancies) continue
to persist in nearly all of the Third World.
* Below-standard housing in nearly all NDC urban areas and
even lower quality of accommodations in their rural areas are
at levels which cannot be overcome in any foreseeable planning
period, even with present populations, much less with rapidly
increasing numbers.
* Elemental food intake standards are infrequently met in
most of the Third World, or are met in unstable, highly
vulnerable ways. This is true even with respect to the minimum
criterion of adequate caloric intake, especially among the
economically disadvantaged majorities of NDC populations.
Frequent declines and downtrends of domestic
production/consumption and food import ratios are tell-tale
indicators of insufficient intake/domestic production and
resulting balance-of-trade effects in large parts of the
developing world. Such tendencies have been further aggravated
by seemingly entrenched adverse trends in NDC terms-of-trade
patterns; such trends have beset Third World developmental
prospects during much of the post-World War II era.
* Sustained and major degrees of labour force under-
utilization encountered practically everywhere in the NDCs,
whether in the forms of open urban unemployment, submarginal
urban informal sectors, rural disguised unemployment,
proliferating landlessness, or excessive agrarian population
densities, are typical. They make it obvious by now that
expansions of secondary (manufacturing plus construction)
sectors remain insufficient, even when dynamic, to absorb
today's available labour supplies, much less those clearly in
prospect during the decades just ahead and beyond. (The
counter-example of South Korea is proving to be especially rare
and even this has been associated with both strongly enforced
constraints against migrants entering Seoul and spectacular
declines in fertility, to a TFR of 1.73 in 1985-1990.)
* The abundant evidence, everywhere in NDC primate and
other large main cities, that especially rapid population
growth, fed by relatively high natural increase plus major
additions from internal migration (in Bombay, Seoul, Sao Paulo,
Cairo, etc.), have far outstripped municipal and national
capacities to provide needed sanitary, health, housing, crime
prevention, fire protection and traffic control services.
* Strong presumptions and widely accepted theory both
support the expectation that relative factor returns are
inversely related to relative factor proportion sizes.
Effectively, this implies relatively reduced labour returns and
increasingly unequal distributions of income. This last is
further backed by the familiar empirical finding by Kuznets that
early or intermediate levels of development and per capita
incomes may well imply increasingly unequal, rather than
equalizing, redistributions of income, a situation similar to
that of many NDCs with still high TFRs (of about 3.5 to 5.5).
Rapid increases of the labour force under conditions of scarce
capital and limited supplies of entrepreneurial and middle-
management skills necessarily pose added obstacles to the early
absorption and subsequent boosting of productivity of newcomer
job seekers. With modifications of details only, such adverse
tendencies cross-cut urban and rural areas as well as agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sectors. In all of these labour
markets, therefore, job seekers outweigh and indeed typically
swamp available job opportunities, cooperant factors of
production and available capacities for providing needed
infrastructure and household amenities.
* The evidence, repeatedly confirmed by the literature
(since, for example, the Joe Wray paper in the 1971 NAS study,
Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications),
that high rates of child-bearing in the NDCs, a main source of
their continued rapid rates of population increase, do serious
damage to maternal and child health, to educational performance
of children, to the social roles, statuses and career prospects
of women, and to mobility opportunities affecting families. All
of these adverse micro-familial consequences of high
reproductivity patterns are typical components of widespread
micro-level welfare conditions: typically, too, they are also
"beyond" GDP recognition, an important omission often overlooked
by development statisticians and therefore analysts as well.
* Not least is the fact that prospective population growth
continues to be the greatest in the very "least developed"
areas, where demographic impediments to socio-economic
development and its hoped-for individual and social welfare
consequences are actually and potentially most serious as well
as probably most resistant to change.
* As to the World Bank's widely cited estimate of a
doubling of NDC per capita incomes in the post-war decades, two
obvious and sufficient rebuttals of its presumably main
implications come immediately to mind even if one assumes
accuracy þ a not small leap of faith. First, the developmental
and welfare significances of this statistic are both much
diminished by the vastly expanding dualisms, hence statistical
variances, separating the successful, economically leading NDCs
from those developmentally still faltering (the Pacific Rim
versus sub-Saharan African regions, for example). And secondly,
rise in the growth rates of NDC average incomes per capita would
surely have been far larger had the Third World as a whole and
its subregional population growth rates been more reduced
through fertility decreases than has in fact been the case. Or
conversely, how would the estimated per capita income gain cited
by the World Bank have been affected if the Third World's
average TFR had not fallen by about one third, hence had its
population size been several hundred millions higher than the
one actually observed? Without World Bank estimates to
accompany the one cited by its economists, it remains incapable
of making an informed judgement of the relative priorities to
be assigned to population versus other development policies.
In sum, today's NDCs, both individually and in aggregate, are
demonstrably incapable of feeding, sheltering, educating, employing
or servicing the great majority of their populations even today,
despite claiming a doubling of income. Why, then, should further
rapid population growth be expected to have equal developmental and
welfare implications than would considerably lower rates of such
growth? And what realistic programme efforts should be allocated by
development planners to the goal of decelerating population growth
to the extent possible by fostering expanded fertility control
behaviour?
Claims that the need to distinguish between population growth
alternatives are secondary, or that rapid growth can reliably be
resolved in a timely manner by market (or for that matter any
foreseeable non-market) forces calls to mind a favourite observation
of a great economist (Jacob Viner) that experts can make mistakes
which the man in the street couldn't dream of.
To investigate whether the above-cited counter-revisionist views
are justified, UNFPA should undertake as soon as possible
(particularly if it wishes to build upon 1974 World Population
Conference recommendations) a series of some 10-15 studies authored
by foremost, non-United Nations and "non-sectarian" analysts on
topics such as "Rapid Population Growth and Education in the Third
World: Developmental Needs and Accommodative Capacities," plus
similar studies for food, municipal and rural community services,
micro-familial welfare statuses, changed roles of women, educational
goals, reduced labour underutilization, and so on. In each case, the
studies should cover main facts and prevailing theories, should
provide empirical assessments of need/demand and accommodation/supply
matches, and should point to ways in which alternative rates of
population growth could affect policy or programme targets and likely
behavioural patterns. Optimally, each study should be undertaken by
authors who could combine expertise on questions of population change
with similar competence in the area of developmental and welfare
consequences being considered as well as in expected linkages between
the two. Balance-of-payments linkages, for example could involve a
foreign-trade analyst working together with an economic demographer;
food linkages, an agricultural economist and economic demographer;
fiscal aspects, a public-finance specialist and economic demographer;
schooling by an educator and sociologist demographer; and so on.
Such relatively concrete, period-specific and sector-specific
reviews would appear to be an especially promising approach to
documenting how population growth has been affecting and will
continue to affect developmental patterns and their welfare
concomitants.
The "gap actual or perceived between current research findings
and the policy community's need for guidance in the population field"
in the important third paragraph of the Statement should in my
opinion be substantially elaborated upon, along the following lines:
Revisionist views on population-development interrelationships,
or population-economic interfaces more generally, can be fairly
summarized as focusing on the effects of aggregate demographic size,
growth and structure on entire-economy change prospects over
macroeconomic (say, within about 10-15 year) time intervals and
longer-run periods. In large part, their attacks during the post-war
decades on "Malthusian orthodoxy" have emphasized findings and
judgements that overall population trends do not pose dominant
obstacles to development even when rapid; that such trends are
neither necessary nor sufficient cause for predicting development
failures; that observed NDC trends appear according to economic and
statistical models to be more nearly neutral than primary
determinants of intermediate-period or long-run economy-wide
development transitions, and added numbers may have positive as well
as negative consequences when viewed developmentally. As an
illustration of the first of these points, the World Bank has
recently been emphasizing that per capita income in the NDCs is
estimated to have doubled during the post-World War II decades,
despite unprecedentedly rapid rates of population expansion.
Such judgements are in part needless updated versions of
empirical propositions long widely accepted and in part conclusions
based on highly suspect analytic approaches.
To begin with the first of these two parts, revisionist efforts
to show that rapid population growth need not prevent long-term
economic development reconfirms what has been progressively
demonstrated for over a century, initially for today's most
industrialized regions and, most recently for a still small but
expanding group of developing countries. High rates of added numbers
even when sustained over considerable periods, it has been readily
observed, have not prevented long-run development and have not been
either necessary or sufficient reasons for explaining cases of
developmental failure. And the possibility that large added numbers
may have positive developmental implications for development, in
particular when such numbers occur in regional situations calling for
enhanced economies of scale and specializations, has been emphasized
ever since Adam Smith. In effect, neither of these generalizations
is "revisionist" and, much more importantly, neither one denies, or
needs even be regarded as seeking to deny, the finding from both
abundant direct observations and widely documented statistical
evidence that sustained rapid population growth has been associated
with outstandingly negative net effects in sectoral connections of
major importance.
In a different category are the recent revisionist claims that
population is likely to be, or may be, a relatively "neutral" factor
with respect to its effects on development. Here the contrary point
to be emphasized is that such claims appear to be based upon various
analytic shortcomings, hence upon numerous bases for scepticism.
Thus, comprehensively formulated entire-economy models used by
revisionists for focusing on demographic change consequences have not
proven themselves to be either reliable predictors of events to come
or to provide satisfactory explanations of interrelations, whether
over macroeconomic time intervals or, especially, over the longer
periods when demographic growth and their determinants acquire large
quantitative dimensions. Thus too, their not-infrequent use of
simplistic single-equation regression models to relate cross-national
GDP or GDP per capita growth rates to population size or change can
be shown to involve large statistical biases, major modelling
specification errors and even possibilities of incorrect slope-sign
indicators. (One reason may well be effects of simultaneity biases,
since income affects population even while population affects income.
Further biases to be expected stem from the fact that population
levels or changes are likely correlated with omitted main causal
variables of income changes. Further biases are associated with
failures to allow for the indirect effects of population on income
via its effects on individual non-demographic variables influencing
income, for example, educational opportunities in poor economies,
their urban-rural distributions, their age-related consumption-demand
patterns and their labour-force supply characteristics.) These
biases are all quite apart from recently increasing factual
regression-type indications (themselves subject to analogous biases),
that statistically significant inverse (negative) income-population
relations have begun to appear since 1970s, for the first time since
the end of World War II.
A third variant of revisionist claims revolves about the finding
that demographic influences appear to be weakly or indeterminately
related to savings and investment and hence to productivity and
output. Somehow lost in such often-emphasized claims are the facts
that national savings levels and trends are aggregates of household,
non-household and government saving components plus a foreign savings
component (likely to be especially significant for NDC economies),
and that only the first of these four is relatively directly related
to demographic size, growth or structural characteristics. Yet
specific empirical household savings connections to national
population determinants in the Third World have just begun to
explored according to World Bank economists, who have recently issued
what they describe as the first such study.
Judgemental conclusions based on such weak conceptual and
analytic foundations fall into deep shadow when confronted with the
fact that the 1-to-2 billions (depending on definitions) who live
under minimal developmental conditions in the NDCs are increasing at
rates more than twice as high as rates existing among the early
industrializing population of the 19th century in Europe.
Finally, a number of emerging economic and demographic trends
could turn out to imply increasingly negative impacts of rapidly
rising numbers on welfare levels in the NDCs. One is that the Third
World's economic growth rates have been diminishing at the same time
that setbacks in national production and employment have become more
frequent, comparing the years before and after the early 1970s.
Continuation of such patterns would almost surely lead to reduced
welfare improvement potentials or more frequent welfare downturns in
the NDCs, the more so since their mortality and population-growth
rates have become much less closely linked to income levels and
fluctuations, due to greatly expanded death and disease controls by
Governments. A second potentially ominous element is that average
population growth rates in the NDCs, excluding China, have stopped
declining, or changed very little on average since about 1960. A
third is that the Third World's numbers of aged likely to become
dependent on public-sector support programmes appear certain to rise
at very rapid rates in future, judging from recent decadal trends,
from available United Nations projections concerning upper-age
survival chances even under relatively conservative assumptions, and
from the prospect that rates of urbanization are likely to remain
high for at least another generation. A fourth prospect no longer
to be discounted is that severe fiscal constraints in the
industrialized regions are likely to continue; if so, this could have
ominous implications for the amounts of international economic,
health and family planning forms of assistance made available to
Third World aid recipients. Meanwhile, a fifth surely negative
factor is that heavy foreign debt overhangs in large parts of the
developing world continue to constrain national fiscal capacities for
coping with both traditional and newly emerging social policy
shortcomings.
In sum, I am in favour of much more assertive and less bookish
approach to the Statement's contents and expository tone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Robin Barlow
Department of Population Planning and International Health
School of Public Health
University of Michigan, USA
Mr. Tommy Bengtsson
Department of Economic History
Lund University, Sweden
Mr. Stan Bernstein
Technical Adviser, Population Data, Policy and Research Branch
Technical and Evaluation Division, UNFPA
Mr. John P. Bongaarts
Vice-President and Director, Research Division
The Population Council
New York
Mr. Robert Cassen
Professor of the Economics of Development
Oxford University, U.K.
Mr. John Cleland
Department of Epidemiology and Population Sciences
Centre for Population Sciences
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
University of London, U.K.
Mr. Ben Geurts
Long-Term Division
Central Planning Bureau
Government of the Netherlands
The Hague
Mr. Richard Hooley
Professor of Economics,
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh, USA
Ms. Helen Hughes
Executive Director
National Centre for Development Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra
Mr. Nurul Islam
International Food Policy Research Institute
Washington
Mr. Maphion M. Jambwa
Deputy Director, Central Statistical Office
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and
Development Government of Zimbabwe
Harare
Ms. Barbara Janowitz
Director
Economics of Family Planning Unit
Family Health International
Research Triangle Park, N.C.,
USA
Mr. Richard Jolly
Deputy Executive Director
Office of the Executive Director
United Nations Children's Fund
New York
Mr. A.M. Khusro
Editor, Financial Express
New Delhi
Mr. Bill McGreevey
The World Bank
Washington
Mr. Thomas W. Merrick
Senior Population Adviser
PHRDR, The World Bank
Washington
Mr. Njuguna Mwangi
Chief Economist, Ministry of Planning and National Development
Government of Kenya
Nairobi
Mr. M. Nizamuddin
Chief, Population Data, Policy and Research Branch
and Deputy-Director
Technical and Evaluation Division, UNFPA
Mr. John I. Nwankwo
Development Planning and Management and Human
Resources Development Department of Educational
Management
University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Mr. Naohiro Ogawa
Deputy Director
Population Research Institute
Nihon University
Tokyo
Mr. Paul Robertson
Officer-in-Charge
Interdependence and Development Perspectives Programme
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Geneva
Mr. George Stolnitz
Professor of Economics, Population Institute for Research and
Training
Indiana University, USA
Ms. Pawadee Tonguthai
Associate Professor
Faculty of Economics
Thammasat University,
Thailand
Mr. Carlos Urz£a
Profesor en Economia
Colegio de M‚xico
Mexico City
Mr. Michael Vlassoff
Senior Technical Officer, Population Data, Policy and Research Branch
Technical and Evaluation Division, UNFPA
OBSERVERS:
Mr. Fred Campano
Chief, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development
New York
Mr. Shunichi Inoue
Director, Population Division
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development
New York
Mr. Landis Mackellar
UNFPA Consultant
New York
Rampersaud Rameshwar
UNFPA Consultant
New York
Mr. Steven W. Sinding
The Rockefeller Foundation
New York
Mr. S. Michael Teitelbaum
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
New York
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
INDEX
abortion(s) 17,23, 25
access 1-3, 11, 27, 29, 31, 67, 68, 79, 86, 87, 89
Africa 1, 3, 16, 28, 29, 61-63, 65, 81-84, 107
agnostic(ism) 2, 5, 7, 87, 90
agriculture(al) 11, 12, 19, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 44, 48, 71, 96, 98
anti-natalist 25
Asia 1, 3, 20, 26, 61, 65, 67, 68, 78, 81-84, 107, 108
Asian Development Bank 19
Bangladesh 6, 65-67, 82, 84, 108
Barlow 7, 10, 14, 20, 53, 55, 98
Bengtsson 7, 9, 10, 19, 98
Birdsall 21, 37, 46, 47, 51, 101
birth control 24, 27
birth spacing 24, 27, 45
Bongaarts 28, 98
Boulding 5
Brazil(ian) 2, 6, 13, 23, 60, 63, 65, 81, 83
Cassen 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 20, 27, 35, 37, 98, 101
census 30, 31
child mortality 71
child spacing 106
Cleland 19, 23, 24, 26-28, 98
Coale 9, 40, 41, 102
coercion 26, 27
Colombia 24, 81, 82, 84
constraint(s) 8, 11, 18, 48, 62, 92, 97
consumption 12, 16, 29, 38, 42, 69, 91, 96
contraceptive(ion) 3, 5, 10, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 33, 35, 62, 66, 68,
86
correlation iii, 7, 10, 12, 21, 39, 43, 47, 51, 52, 55-57, 88
culture(al) 25, 27, 58, 60, 69, 106
debt 22, 33, 52, 71, 97
demographic data 29, 30
demographic transition 9, 12, 13, 86
desired family size 24, 25, 28
diminishing returns 38
dynamism 28, 34
Eastern Europe 12, 16
ecological 10, 80
econometric 9, 14, 31, 52, 53, 105
economies of scale iii, 7, 38, 39, 42, 47, 48, 95
England 9, 50, 104, 108
enrolment 3, 25, 45, 72, 91
Europe 10, 12, 16, 24, 50, 56, 57, 97
externality(ies)iii, 7, 17, 21, 22, 39, 49, 50, 56, 57, 87, 89, 104
female 10, 17, 30, 33, 34, 67, 80
GDP 10, 13, 16, 33, 41, 47, 52-54, 77, 93, 96
Geurts 7, 10, 11, 14, 35, 98
Ghana 30, 61, 70, 82, 84
Hooley 14, 19, 22, 98
housing 23, 35, 64, 67, 69, 76, 91, 92
Hughes 12, 15, 98
IEC 28, 34
income distribution iii, 2, 7, 36, 39, 50, 75
India 13, 27, 30, 31, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73-75, 82, 84, 102, 104, 107
Indonesia 6, 13, 23, 25, 65, 67, 71, 80, 82, 84, 102
industry(ies) 19, 21, 24, 33, 71
inequality 38, 69, 75
infant mortality 34, 45, 47, 78
instability 11
inter-generational 20, 39, 47
irrigation 11, 12, 19, 31
Islam 7, 11, 12, 17, 98
Jamaica 23, 64, 82, 84, 102
Jambwa 29, 98
Janowitz 19, 23, 24, 26, 99
Japan 24, 25
Jolly 34, 99
Kenya 18, 25, 27, 30, 31, 61, 62, 73, 82, 84, 99
Kerala 2, 6
Khusro 13, 27, 29-31, 34, 99
Knodel 19
Kuznets 9, 12, 37, 92, 103
laissez-faire 2, 6, 17, 87
land 9, 11, 49, 50, 62, 76, 78
Latin America 1, 16, 28, 42, 61, 63, 65, 108
leaders 28, 69, 85
least developed 3, 10, 93, 107
life cycle 16, 20
life expectancy 47, 53, 54, 74
literacy 27, 31, 53, 72, 73, 76
Mackellar 18, 45, 100, 103
macro i, 18, 34, 71, 87, 101
Malthus 9
market 6, 12, 13, 17, 24, 34, 37, 40, 43, 44, 48, 87, 89, 94
marriage 9, 62, 65, 68, 72
Mason 25, 41, 42, 104
maternal and child health 23, 24, 26, 62, 65, 79, 93
McGreevey 20, 21, 26, 99
Merrick 13, 15, 17, 26, 99
Mexico 14, 23, 26, 33, 60, 63, 64, 80, 82, 84, 99
micro 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 34, 90, 93, 94
micro-economic 22
micro-level 18, 20, 25, 26, 34, 90, 93
migration 12, 21, 22, 29, 32, 33, 58, 62, 78-80, 96
Mwangi 18, 29, 31, 90
Myanmar 24, 81, 83
NAS 1, 5, 7, 12-13, 17, 22, 36-39, 43, 45, 49, 53, 56-57, 87, 92
neo-classical 22, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 50-52, 101
Nerlove 21, 49, 105
Netherlands 10, 98, 107
Nigeria 30, 62, 70, 73, 74, 81-84, 99, 102, 108
Nizamuddin 18, 29, 99
Non-Aligned Movement 1, 6, 70
Nortman 23, 26, 105
nutrition 19, 21, 38, 45-47, 53, 62, 74, 78, 79, 102
Nwankwo 14, 29, 30, 99
OECD 16, 20, 59, 105
Ogawa 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 99
opportunity costs 23, 32
Pakistan 24, 27, 65-67, 82, 84
Philippines 19, 23, 71, 73, 75, 82, 84, 102
population assistance 4, 6
population programme(s) 5, 17, 26, 28, 62, 63, 79, 80
private 3, 16, 17, 20, 24, 31, 34, 62, 67, 75
privatization 25
pro-natalist 25, 68, 78
property rights 9, 12
psychological 27, 28
public 16, 27, 31, 62, 65, 76, 94, 97, 98, 101
regression 10, 23, 42, 96
revisionist iii, 8, 37, 39, 87, 94-96
Robertson 15, 16, 18, 22, 99
Sadik 5, 6, 35
savings rate 33, 38, 39, 106
Schofield 9, 108
Schumaker 20, 42, 106
Simon 9, 47, 87, 106
Singh 6
South Korea 3, 24, 25, 61, 92
Sri Lanka 23, 82, 84, 103, 108
status of women 12, 13, 15, 22, 32, 62, 64, 67, 74
Stolnitz i, 14, 15, 20, 21, 27, 33, 35, 91, 99
structural adjustment 18, 30, 31, 71, 74, 80
subsidized 32, 39, 89
survey(s) 21, 25, 28, 32, 36, 41, 43-47, 51, 55
Sweden(ish) 9, 98
technology(ical) 7, 8, 11, 38, 88
Thailand 3,6, 18-19, 23-25, 28,32, 61, 65-67, 73-75, 80-84, 99, 101
Tonguthai 18, 19, 29, 32, 99
transition 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 86, 88, 89
UNCTAD 15, 16
underemployment 3, 36, 73
unemployment 3, 36, 37, 43, 52, 62, 66, 73, 92
UNFPA i, 1, 3, 5-7, 18, 35-36, 58, 61-65, 67-68, 75-79, 94, 98-100,
107
UNICEF 34
unmet demand 17
Urz£a 14, 21, 29, 33, 99
vintage effect 18
Vlassoff 7, 100
wage(s) 19, 21, 35, 36, 43, 44, 49, 50, 56, 57
water 8, 11, 12, 19, 35, 64, 88, 89
wealth 20
women's status 17, 34, 78, 87, 90
World Bank 8, 13, 17, 20, 26, 36, 93, 95, 96, 99, 102, 104, 108
Wrigley 9, 108
young 9, 40-43, 48, 62-64, 68, 78, 86, 91
youth 3, 29
Zambia 29, 62, 77, 81-84
Zimbabwe 13, 29, 82, 84, 98, 103, 107
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