UNFPA COUNTRY SUPPORT TEAM Office of the South PacificDISCUSSION PAPER NO.2 |
September 1993
Table of Contents
Preface
A -
Conceptualisation of development
1 Enough food and other basic
goods and services
2
An employment opportunity
3
Income distribution
B - The measurement of development
C - Developed and less developed countries: how they differ
3 - Population and development: a conceptual framework
The UNFPA Country Support Team for the South Pacific, based in Suva, Fiji, is one of eight regional technical support teams established by the United Nations Population Fund to provide countries with technical backstopping to meet country needs in the population field. In fulfilling this function, apart from field missions, the Country Support Team aims to provide active and close backstopping to the local pool of national experts to promote a more holistic approach to population programmes.
This Discussion Papers series has been initiated by the CST (Suva) in an attempt to establish a dialogue among national population programme personnel on the integrated and coordinated multidisciplinary approach to population.
The present paper was originally prepared for presentation at a training workshop organised by the Cooperative Training Institute of Fiji in Suva. It has been extensively revised for distribution to a wider audience of development planners and population programme managers in the South Pacific region. As the title suggests, Dr William House examines the recent conceptualization of development and analyzes the interrelationships between population and socio-economic development.
Stephen Chee,
Team Leader
UNFPA CST,
Suva
The last two decades have seen dramatic changes in the way 'development' has been conceived by international agencies, planners and policy makers alike. Instead of concentrating solely on macro-economic growth, as reflected in measures of Gross National Product (GNP) and GNP per capita, attention has shifted to a broader-based set of social and economic indicators, which reflect a country or region's progress made in human development, such as in health and education, life expectancy, access to safe water and sanitation, infant and child mortality, food security, access to employment opportunities, income distribution and the level of poverty, and nutritional status. Concepts of freedom of expression and the strength of democratic institutions are also sometimes incorporated into these measures.
The first part of this paper surveys some of this recent literature which has promoted the broader conceptualization of 'development' and presents an extensive collection of data which compares the situation in so-called 'developed' and 'less developed' countries. Emphasis is given to recent World Bank data and to the most recent Human Development Index of the UNDP. Wherever possible, data from Pacific Island countries have been highlighted.
The second part of the paper argues that policies and programmes which are geared to shift these 'development' indicators in the desired direction must account for the complex set of interrelationships between population-related variables and socio-economic variables. One of the great challenges for development practitioners, however, is to specify these relationships and to test their significance by collecting the requisite data.
Until the 1970's, and perhaps even today in some quarters, 'development' was thought to be synonymous with economic growth. Then it became widely recognised and accepted that Gross National Product (GNP) indices are incomplete1. To assess a country's economic performance and its progress towards economic development we must supplement the growth rate of GNP by other, more micro-level socio-economic indicators.
In Section 2 I consider this more recent conceptualisation of social and economic development and some of the component parts. I attempt to give substance to my arguments by reporting data for various developed and less developed countries and illustrating the South Pacific countries' position in these scenarios, wherever possible. Section 3 examines a conceptual framework for illustrating the complex interrelationship between population factors and growth and socio-economic development.
Until fairly recently great reliance was placed on GNP per capita as a convenient index of development. It was useful as a compact indicator to politicians and provided a quantifiable measure for economists who were able to monitor its fluctuations and analyse changes due to movements in sectoral output, factor shares or categories of expenditure. Yet, experience has shown that increases in national income do not necessarily lead to the solution of social, economic and political problems. They remain, perhaps emerging in different forms and changing their dimension in countries with rising per capita income. Indeed, not only does economic growth often fail to resolve social, economic and political difficulties, certain types of inappropriate growth may actually initiate and promote them. For example, the Industrial Revolution in Europe produced rapid urbanisation and concomitant social problems resulting from new forms of labour use, overcrowding etc. More recently, further industrialisation has induced pollution and environmental degradation, much of which is not quantified nor costed to be set against the value of that production of goods and services which gave rise to that pollution. Examples abound in less developed countries e.g. what are the more immediate and longer run social costs of massive mining and excavation projects on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, or that which is about to commence in Fiji at Namosi, both of which will contribute to the countries' economic growth but may lead to social and political disruption? The degradation of Nauru through phosphate mining has led to that country having one of the highest levels of per capita income in the world, but who would suggest that such development is either sustainable or desirable?
It should be recognised that we cannot avoid making value judgments when it comes to defining a more comprehensive index of development. But whose value judgments are to be accepted? One approach would be to copy the path of industrial countries: but which of the currently rich and developed countries appear as really desirable modes? Some of the Western countries with seemingly high incomes cannot be recommended - witness the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; the damage to the ozone layer from the release of industrial gases into the atmosphere and the likely consequences through global warming for all of us, particularly in the Pacific; the widespread exposure to the modern diseases of cancer, coronary heart disease, partly resulting from sedentary life styles in the West, mental stress imposed by the highly competitive working environment leading to psychological disorders; and other health problems related to the high intakes of artificial foodstuffs. Over reliance on politically unstable countries for strategic raw materials (e.g. oil) can often contribute to the 1990/91 crisis in the Gulf with all its consequential costs. Can this be the way forward for presently underdeveloped countries?
Nor should public sector planners working in bureaucratic civil services be expected to know all the answers, or be allowed to impose their own perception of development on the people. 'Popular participation', whereby communities are helped to define their own development objectives, has emerged as a key concept in recent years. Yet, if we were to rely on a community's own set of personal development values, one universally acceptable objective of the target goal would be: the unleashing and realisation of the full potential of all human ability and personality. Who would dare to argue with this? From this unambiguously desirable objective a clear set of values are fairly obvious when we ask: what is the absolute necessity for this goal to be realised?
1. Enough food and other basic goods and services
Below certain levels of nutrition - about 2,200 calories of energy per day - the adult human being is deficient in bodily energy and good health and lacks interest in much else besides food. More significantly, a food deficient existence for a young child results in lasting impairment of both the body and mind. In addition, minimum levels of clothing, footwear and shelter are universally considered as core basic needs for the realisation of this principal objective.
Since these items of consumption have market prices it is possible to devise a poverty - level of income, below which a person would be considered to be in a state of poverty. Failure to attain such an income level which does not allow the consumption of the minimum nutritionally determined level of food intake would warrant the person begin considered to be destitute and in absolute poverty. In general, low income households consume at least 60% of their total real income on food alone.
Another basic necessity, and a precondition for gaining enough income to rise above the poverty line, is access to a job or some form of employment which may entail formal paid employment, unpaid work on a family farm or in a family business, or caring for children and members of the household i.e. unpaid household work. The lack of an income-generating opportunity implies labour market inactivity and unemployment, and may lead to poverty. Alternatively, many cannot find enough income-generating work, either in the family farm or business, or in the urban informal sector. Much low-productivity subsistence farming or temporary or part-time urban employment fails to provide full-time work and to generate adequate income levels. Meanwhile, many people work arduously and for very long hours but their productivity is so low that their incomes may still fail to rise above the poverty line. They would be classified as under-employed, a characteristic of large numbers of people in underdeveloped countries. Without better tools, equipment and improved technology they are doomed to a life of poverty.
Even when a country realises a high rate of economic growth it may fail to reduce poverty and underemployment, since the growth process it is following - e.g. urban-based, import-dependent industrialisation - is leaving the majority of the population untouched. Meanwhile, in some parts of Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and in sub-Saharan Africa, because population growth rates are so high, rates of economic growth and employment creation would need to be unprecedented to prevent rising numbers of households falling into poverty. In many Pacific island countries population growth rates exceed the recently attained rate of economic growth, and many households fail to realize any income growth.
The obvious direct link between per capita income and the numbers living in poverty is via the distribution of income. Clearly, poverty will be reduced much more rapidly where the fruits of economic growth are accompanied by their more equal distribution. Yet, some would argue that equality should be considered a development objective in its own right and that large scale inequality and massive poverty are objectionable by any religious or ethical consideration. Who could possibly defend the continuance of the existing situation whereby the average American is 117 times richer (in income terms) than the average African? In some Latin American, Asian and African countries, inter-household and inter-person income differences are extreme and cannot be defended on grounds of differences in productivity or economic efficiency. Fortunately, in Pacific Island countries, examples of such extreme inequalities in income distribution are severely limited.
Therefore, the prime questions to ask about a country's development performance are:
If all three indicators have become less severe in a particular country, then there has undoubtedly been a period of development for this country. Yet, even if one or more has become worse, it would be unacceptable to label the result 'development' even if income per capita had soared2. Similarly, an economic 'plan' with no targets for reducing poverty, inequality and underemployment can hardly be called a 'development plan'.
Yet, the true fulfillment of the human potential requires more than the above. In addition, a range of levels of basic needs, encompassed under the umbrella term 'social indicators', needs to be satisfactorily provided. They include adequate levels of education (especially literacy and numeracy), food security and nutrition (particularly of young children), mortality, life expectancy and morbidity, and access to a whole range of social services such as health, safe water, sanitation, transportation and housing. In addition, development requires a breakdown of traditional sex roles so that women can also realize their full human potential and gain the ability to freely determine - through access to family planning services - the number of children to which they give birth.
More recently, the element of self-reliance and independence has been added to the concept of development emanating from the two oil crises in the 1970s and early 1980s, and topically, from the impact that the 1990/91 Gulf crisis had on poor nations. They starkly reveal the continued economic and technological dependence of most countries and the limits placed on poor countries to sustain past economic growth of the conventional type. Greater self-reliance can be induced by reduced dependence on imported necessities, especially staple food, petroleum and its products, capital equipment and expertise. Cultural independence is also important.
Dissatisfaction with GNP as an indicator of development has led to an interest in alternative indices of the 'quality of life'. A 'physical quality of life index' (PQLI) is usually composed of a composite of three indicators: life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy. It is often presented as a measure of how effectively various development strategies distribute the benefits of progress to the various component parts of society. The latest version of a PQLI is that of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which was unveiled in 1990. It argues that 'human development is a process of enlarging people's choices'. These critical choices concern a long and healthy life, education and access to scarce resources. More will be said about this index in the following sections.
The World Bank's publication World Development Report 1990 claims: "Reducing poverty is the fundamental objective of economic development". It estimates that in 1985 more than one billion people in the developing world lived in absolute poverty i.e. about one person in every five of all mankind. In controversally, lifting these people across the poverty threshold is the greatest challenge to those of us who are development practitioners. However, the World Bank points out that poverty is not the same as inequality. Whereas poverty is concerned with the absolute standard of living of a group in society - the poor- inequality refers to relative living standards across the whole society. The World Bank defines poverty as "the inability to attain a minimum standard of living" (World Bank, 1990, p.26). But how do we measure the standard of living? And what is a minimum standard of living? How can we express the overall severity of poverty in a single measure or index?
The Poverty Line
A start to measuring the size of the challenge to development planners or the numbers in poverty begins with an examination of households' income and expenditure per capita, as long as some imputation is made for home-produced goods and services. Yet, as we have argued above, this consumption-based poverty measure must be supplemented with other indicators such as nutrition levels, life expectancy, under-five mortality and rates of school enrolment.
A consumption-based poverty line consists of two elements: the expenditure necessary to buy a minimum standard of nutrition and other basic essentials (the absolute poverty line); and a second part which varies from country to country, reflecting the cost of participating in the day-to-day life of society. The first is more straight forward, simply being the money cost of a minimally adequate coloric intake and other essentials consumed by the poor. The second is much more subjective e.g. TV., vacations, indoor plumbing, refrigeration and car ownership would all be considered as luxuries in Fiji, but they are thought of a necessities in Western countries.
The World Bank takes two arbitrary values as its global poverty line; $275 per person per year to distinguish the extremely poor, and $370 per person per year to demarcate the poor. Both are measured in constant 1985 prices and span the poverty lines estimated in recent studies for a number of countries with low average incomes. The lower limit coincides with the poverty line used for India; both are exceeded by the per capita GNPs of all the countries in the Pacific. Yet, there are some households in the Pacific Region who are, no doubt, poor according to these criteria. Unfortunately, research has been very limited and we know very little about the nature and composition of such households, nor the causes of their predicament.
Having distinguished the poor, the simplest way to measure poverty is to express the number of poor people as a proportion of the total population. Yet, while the head count index is useful, it ignores the extent to which the poor fall below the poverty line. The 'Poverty Gap' measures the transfer that would bring the income of every poor person exactly up to the poverty line, so eliminating the problem.
Table 1 illustrates the challenge to development world wide. In 1985 1116 million persons - about 1 in every 3 - in the developing countries were estimated to be living in poverty. Of these 633 million - or 1 in every 5 - were extremely poor with an annual income of less than $275. Yet, the aggregate poverty gap - the transfer needed to lift everyone above the poverty line - was only 3% of developing countries' total consumption. To lift everyone out of extreme poverty was only 1% of developing countries' total consumption. Table 1 shows how the poverty problem in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by the head count index and the poverty gap, is significantly greater than elsewhere.
Table 1: The Poverty Situation or Development Challenge in 1985
Region |
Extremely Poor |
Poor (including Extremely Poor) |
Social Indicators |
||||||
Headcount |
Headcount | ||||||||
| Number (mil.) |
Index (%) |
Poverty Gap (%) |
Number (mil.) |
Index (%) |
Poverty Gap (%) |
Under 5 |
Life Expectancy | Net Primary Enrolment (%) | |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 120 | 300 | 4 | 180 | 47 | 11 | 196 | 50 | 56 |
| East Asia | 120 | 9 | 0.4 | 280 | 20 | 1 | 96 | 67 | 96 |
| China | 80 | 8 | 1 | 210 | 20 | 3 | 58 | 69 | 93 |
| South Asia | 300 | 29 | 3 | 520 | 51 | 10 | 172 | 56 | 74 |
| India | 250 | 33 | 4 | 420 | 55 | 12 | 199 | 57 | 81 |
| Eastern Europe | 3 | 4 | 0.2 | 6 | 8 | 0.5 | 23 | 71 | 90 |
| Middle East & North Africa | 40 | 21 | 1 | 60 | 31 | 2 | 148 | 61 | 75 |
| Latin America & the Caribbean | 50 | 12 | 1 | 70 | 19 | 1 | 75 | 66 | 92 |
| All developing countries | 633 | 18 | 1 | 1116 | 33 | 3 | 121 | 62 | 83 |
Note:
The poverty line in 1985 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars is $275 per capita a year for the extremely poor and $370 per capita a year for the poor. The head count index is defined as the percentage of the population below the poverty line. The poverty gap is defined as the aggregate income shortfall of the poor as a percentage of aggregate consumption. Under 5 mortality rates are for 1980-85, except for China and South Asia, where the period is 1975-80.If governments, NGOs and international development agencies are to monitor how their development policies affect the nature and extent of poverty, they need to know more about their target populations. For example, knowing how the poor derive and spend their incomes will guide policy-makers to assess how changes in the relative prices of various goods and services will impact on real incomes. In Pacific Island countries, what do we know about the characteristics of the poor? I would suggest that the subject has received less than adequate attention in this part of the world4.
Poverty, as measured by low income, and often according to the social indicators, is its worst in rural areas. Problems of malnutrition, lack of education, low life expectancy and sub-standard housing are very often more severe in the country side. Variation within rural areas can also be wide. Where are the poorest people in countries of the Pacific located? We simply do not know because we do not yet have the requisite information. In many other countries, urban poverty is much greater because of overcrowded slums and squatter settlements, bad sanitation and contaminated drinking water. In the Pacific countries, however, urbanisation is relatively low, although increasing, and poverty may not be so easily associated with capital cities and large towns.
What are the demographic characteristics of the poor? Households with the lowest incomes per capita are often large, containing many children and other dependents. The lack of a male or a healthy working male, often leads the household directly into its poverty status. Yet, the decision to have many children may be a rational response to poverty. Infant mortality is higher in destitute families, and in order to ensure that some children survive to support parents in old age, it is necessary to produce a large number of births. Indeed, parents often 'over-replace' dead children. Yet, survey data suggest that many poor mothers wish to bear no more children and that the last born child was not wanted. These are the couples who lack access to family planning services and should be the prime focus of UNFPA's efforts at IEC and awareness raising, as well as initiatives to improve the accessibility to, and the quality of, service and distribution outlets.
However, in poor, rural underdeveloped countries the value of many children is realised through their contribution to household income via their participation in labour market activities. This contribution negates the future benefits of attending school (especially for girls), ensuring that the net flow of resources is from children to parents and inducing large family sizes. In contrast, in developed countries, the future benefits of education are large and outweigh any possible income derived from child labour force activities, and the net flow of resources is clearly from parents to children. The outcome is that parents prefer few 'quality' children over 'quantity', particularly where the need to anticipate that a large proportion of births will die, is negligible.
Are women poorer than men? Available social indicators on health, nutrition, education, labour force participation and income often show that sex differentials are large and women are severely disadvantaged. They face all manner of cultural, social, legal and economic obstacles that men do not. Female-headed households have often been shown to be amongst the poorest, in the sense of having the smallest plots of land, greater food insecurity, lower farm output (partly because they are less likely to get access to fertilizer) and lower incomes. What is the condition of female-headed households in the Pacific countries? Again, prevailing data and knowledge gaps are prevalent and indicate the urgent need for well-designed household surveys to gather the requisite information.
Apart from being deficient in their access to land, the poor invariably lack other assets, including education and other marketable skills. Without much land and little human capital the poor are restricted to irregular, low-skilled wage employment. With rapid population growth and high population densities on land, as in some Pacific Island countries, we would expect the absolute and relative size of this group of poor to grow in the future. The implications for development policies are that, without an increase in assets, broadly defined, that are owned by the poor, especially education, labour market skills, health and access to land, the plight of this already vulnerable group - the group that needs development the most - will deteriorate further.
Other characteristics of the poor in less developed countries include an over reliance on agriculture as a source of income, either as subsistence farmers or as seasonal wage labourers. In towns they tend to be concentrated in low-paid informal sector jobs. Their incomes tend to fluctuate significantly over the agricultural season, particularly due to the seasonality in the availability of wage labour opportunities, yet capital markets are grossly underdeveloped to allow them to borrow when the crops are in the ground and to repay the loans when the harvest is sold. In any case, they often lack any form of collateral against which to borrow. The result is that the potentially 'hungry' season - when food stocks are low and food prices high - coincides with the busy season, which entails heavy agricultural work and when under-nutrition and illnesses are more common, particularly amongst the more vulnerable women and children.
One very well documented behavioural relationship of the poor is contained in the so-called Engel curve; the poor typically spend 60% or more of their low incomes on food and the rest on other basic essentials. As incomes rise, however, this proportion drops, allowing larger absolute and relative amounts to be spent on such human capital enhancing investments as education, health and labour market skills.
This portrait of the poorest members of the population in countries which are themselves classified as underdeveloped and poor indicates the direction in which they must move. To attain the status of being developed they need to expand the production of food by raising the productivity of land and labour in the farm sector. As farm incomes rise, the supply price of labour to the non-farm economy rises and demands are created for other essential goods and services to satisfy basic needs as well as for products considered to be not so essential.
As new lines of production are created - often in rural, non-farm activities - and a wider spectrum of job opportunities are created necessitating a better trained and more flexible labour force, the demand for education is raised. New types of manufacturing and service jobs are created, the relative importance of agriculture declines, and labour productivity grows as capital accumulation occurs in these more dynamic sectors. An expanding wage labour force, often more urban-based, receives higher wages and income inequality declines. As a result, the incidence of poverty, unemployment and underemployment are all likely to become less widespread as the economy attains the elusive 'developed' status. Its social indicators - literacy, the rates of primary and secondary school enrolment, nutritional status, infant mortality, life expectancy, morbidity, access to health facilities, safe water, sanitation etc. - should all improve. All kinds of new choices - education, occupation, residence, life - style - are made available to a much larger proportion of the population as a result. In addition, wider demographic choices are likely to be made resulting in a lower level of desired and achieved fertility. The development criterion mentioned earlier - the realisation of the human potential embodied in each individual has a much greater likelihood of coming to fruition.
In order to substantiate some of these hypotheses it is worthwhile to examine some relevant data recently collated by the World Bank and the UNDP and presented in Table 2. The data compare the affluent developed countries with the poorest in Africa. I have also presented data from four Pacific Island countries, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which were incorporated in the most recent Human Development Report of the UNDP.
The table shows that the rich OECD countries have very significantly higher levels of incomes than the poor, sub-Saharan African countries. The economies of the former are much more diversified, with much less reliance on agriculture and greater emphasis on the industrial and service sectors where productivity and incomes are higher. They save and invest more of their much larger incomes so assuring their future growth. Yet, countries in Africa have much higher fertility and population growth so that their slowly growing GDPs need to be shared amongst much larger numbers, allowing for little advance in per capita income. In addition, African investment in human resources, as reflected in primary and secondary school enrolment rates are relatively low. Using the pupil-teacher ratio as an index of education quality, there are over three times as many pupils for each primary teacher in Africa than in Belgium.
Health and demographic indicators are also very low in Africa. Each physician has 50 times more patients on average to cater for, the IMR is 13 times greater and the maternal mortality rate is 16 times greater than in western countries.
In general, the four Pacific Island countries lie somewhere between the extremes of these development indicators. However, there is considerable differentiation between these four countries, with Fiji invariably performing better from the viewpoint of human development. Yet all four exhibit some of the characteristics of least developed countries in having high fertility and rapid population growth, relatively high mortality, low domestic saving and a heavy reliance on agriculture to generate employment and income.
Table 2 - Indicators of Development in Developed and Less Developed Regins
| Indicators Income | OECD Countries |
Sub- Saharan | PNG | Fiji | Solomon Islands | Vanuatu |
| GNP per capita ($ per year 1988) Av. annual growth GNP per capita (1965-88) GDP growth p.a. (1980-88) |
17470 |
330 |
890 0.6 -0.7 |
1650 4.2 -1.5 |
580 4.2 3.7 |
860 - -2.0 |
| Economic | ||||||
| % Shares in GDP in 1988 of: Agriculture Industry Services |
5 40 55 |
34 27 39 |
76.3 10.2 13.5 |
44.1 8.1 47.8 |
- - - |
61.1 1.3 37.6 |
| Av. annual growth Gross Domestic Investment (1980-1988) GDI as % of GDP (1988) GD Savings as % of GPD (1988) Energy Consumption per capita (Kgs of oil equiv. 1988) |
3.7 22 22 5181 |
-7.3 15 12 95 |
- 23 11 231 |
- 16 15 - |
- 39 -3 - |
- 31 10 - |
| % of Central Govt. Expenditure in 1988 on: Education Health Social Security and Welfare Av. index of food production per capita (1979-81 = 100) Fertilizer use (Kgs per hectare) % of household consumption on food |
5 13 37 102 1.2 (UK) 12 |
(Kenya) 22 (Kenya) 6 (Kenya)4 94 0.1 (Kenya)39 |
- - - 97 - - |
- - - 60 - - |
- - - 82 - - |
- - - 77 - - |
| Education | ||||||
| Gross Primary enrolment rate (%) 1987: Total 1987: Females Net primary enrolment rate (%) 1987 Secondary enrolment rate 1987 Tertiary enrolment rate 1987 Primary pupil-teacher ratio 1987 Female adult literacy rate 1987 |
103 103 (UK) 97 94 39 (Belgium)10 95+ |
68 57 (Tanzania)50 17 1 (Tanzania)33 35 |
- - 73 13 2 32 38 |
- - 98 52 4 30 - |
- - - - - 21 - |
- - - - - - 24 |
| Health | ||||||
| Population per physician | 470 | 23850 | 6070 | 2200 | - | 5500 |
| Demographic | ||||||
| Av. annual population growth (1980-88) Projected population growth (1988-2025) % p.a. % population under 14 (1988) % population under 14 projected (2025) Crude Birth Rate (CBR) Crude Death Rate (CDR) Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) %Urban population Maternal mortality per 100,00 live births |
0.6 0.3 19.9 16.8 13 9 1.7 8 77 (UK) 7 |
3.2 2.8 46.9 38.0 47 16 6.7 108 28 (Zambia)110 |
2.4 2.3 - - 34 11 5.0 56 16 700 |
2.2 1.5 - - 26 7 3.0 26 39 150 |
3.3 - - - - - - 30 19 - |
3.1 - - - 13 12 - 69 21 - |
Note : Where data for sub-Saharan Africa or the OECD
countries are not available, individual country level data have been reported:
PNG=Papua New Guinea
S.I.= Solomon Islands
Van. = Vanuatu
Source : World Bank (1990), World Bank Report 1990, Washington, D.C. and
UNDP 1992, Human Development Report 1992, New York
Many would argue that the principal contributing cause of these discrepancies is found in differences in population growth. Fertility has remained very high in Africa and some of the Melanesian countries included in table 2. Mortality has declined so that population is growing at an unprecedented 3% per annum, or more, in Africa and over 2% per annum in most of Melanesia, so that population will double in 25-30 years. This situation is reflected in the large proportion of the population that is under 14 years of age - 47% in Africa but only 20% in the rich western counties. These dependents impose a heavy burden on the working population aged 15 to 64 years. On the other hand, it might be argued that the line of causation is reversed i.e. the state of underdevelopment induces high fertility and rapid population growth because individual households perceive their own large family size to be in their own interest. No doubt, both lines of causation are at work and contribute to poor income growth and rapid population growth.
Although they are not nearly so poor, most of the countries in the Pacific experience very high natural rates of population growth which are only partly mitigated by international out-migration. The result is a retardation in the potential to undergo economic development.
An alternative approach has recently been created by UNDP with their Human Development Index (HDI) focussed on measures of health, life expectancy, education and access to resources. Human development is defined as:
"The process of enlarging the range of people's choices-increasing their opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and covering the full range of human choices from a sound physical environment to economic and political freedoms. Human development is concerned both with developing human capabilities and with using them productively. The former requires investments in people, the latter that people contribute to GNP growth and employment. Both sides of the equation are essential"
(UNDP, 1992,p.2).
For each of 160 countries the index combines purchasing power, life expectancy and literacy. Table 3 sets out the numbers. Sri Lankans have an official GNP of about $400 per head, but purchasing power of more than $2,000 per head because goods are cheap; their life expectancy is 71 years, 88% of them are literate. That gives them an HDI - rank of 76. Brazilians (GNP per head of about $2,000) have purchasing power of $4,900,can expect to live 66 years, and 81% of them are literate. They attain an HDI-rank of 59. Saudi Arabia (GNP per head of over $6,000) scores purchasing power of $10,330, life expectancy of 65 years and 62% literacy, for an HDI rank of 67. That order reverses the conventional ranking by GNP per head.
The strength of the HDI is in reminding us that there is more to life than GNP. Its big weakness, inevitably, is that it is subjective. The implicit weighting of purchasing power, life expectancy and literacy is arbitrary. Because the index is intended to ensure the absence of deprivation, it gives little credit for income growth beyond an 'adequate' income level of just under $5,000. This helps to explain some peculiar results.
How many would agree, for instance, that Singapore (line 40) deserves to be ranked five places lower than Bulgaria, or Italy no fewer than 20 places lower than top-placed Canada (and three lower than Israel)? Oddities become absurdities in the case of and newly ex-communist countries, whose underlying GNP figures are worthless. Hands up everybody who thinks that the former USSR (33) has reached a higher place of development than Malta or Argentina, or Yugoslavia (37) than Portugal (39).
Still, students of development will study promotion and relegation in the HDI league with interest. Among the more surprising promotions is that of India (121). By raw GNP per head, only 22 countries are poorer. On the HDI, India moves in front of another 17.
Most Arab nations, with high incomes but also high death rates and low literacy, are relegated en bloc by the HDI. Several social-democratic countries in and around Latin America - such as Costa Rica (42), Argentina (43) and Jamaica (63) - win promotion; so do some 'progressive' Asian countries such as Sri Lanka (76), China (79) and Thailand (69). Bravely the UNDP opines that this may have something to do with freedom, even with democracy. Unfortunately, one of the best of all Latin America performers has been Chile (36) - not exactly free or democratic in recent years!
It is of interest to review the situation of the five Pacific Island countries included in table 3. Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are all promoted in terms of their HDI index compared with their relative position in GNP per capita. Their performances in life expectancy are very respectable although there is a wide variation between these countries in educational attainments, with adult literacy ranging from 92% in Samoa to 24% in Solomon Islands, and in Real GDP per capita (PPP$), ranging from $4192 in Fiji to $1981 in Samoa. Papua New Guinea provides a stark contrast because it is the only PIC of the five which is relegated according to the HDI, despite its already poor showing in terms of real GDP per capita of $1,834. The result is a reflection of its poor social indicators, whereby its levels of life expectancy, literacy and mean years of schooling are comparable to those in some of the least developed sub-Saharan countries. The result is that Fiji ranks at 64 in the Human Development Index, followed by Samoa (84), Vanuatu (93), Solomon Islands (105) and Papua New Guinea (116).
Wishful thinking aside, the UNDP report has little to say about why some countries have been so much better than others at translating growth in GNP into "development'': more guidance on policy is promised by UNDP in the future. Not long ago, the UNDP might have argued that growth hardly matters, but attitudes have changed. Growth is good, it now affirms. What is needed is more of the right sort of public spending, especially on primary education and health and less of the wrong sort - e.g. on armies.
The UNDP adds to the literature on military waste with figures on soldiers in relation to teachers. In the rich world, Japan's armed forces enlist 25 people for every 1000 employed in teaching. In the United States there are almost as many soldiers as teachers; France has more soldiers than teachers. In other big West European countries with conscription, the armed forces are often slightly larger than the teaching profession. Britain, with no conscription, has 62 soldiers per 100 teachers.
Table 3 - Human Development Index - All Countries
| Life Expectancy at birth (years) 1990 |
Adult literacy rate (%) 1990 |
Mean years of schooling 1990 |
Literacy rate index |
Mean years index |
Educational attainment |
Real GDP per capita (PPP$) 1989 |
Adjusted real GDP |
Human development index |
GNP rank minus HDI rank |
|
| High human development | ||||||||||
| 1 Canada 2 Japan 3 Norway 4 Switzerland 5 Sweden |
77.0 78.6 77.1 77.4 77.4 |
99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 |
12.1 10.7 11.6 11.1 11.1 |
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 |
0.98 0.87 0.94 0.90 0.90 |
2.98 2.87 2.94 2.90 2.90 |
18,635 14,311 16,838 18,590 14,817 |
5,051 5,018 5,047 5,051 5,036 |
0.982 0.981 0.978 0.977 0.976 |
10 1 1 -3 1 |
| 6 USA 7 Australia 8 France 9 Netherlands 10 United Kingdom |
75.9 76.5 76.4 77.2 75.7 |
99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 |
12.3 11.5 11.6 10.6 11.5 |
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 |
1.00 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.94 |
3.00 2.93 2.94 2.86 2.94 |
20,998 15,266 14,164 13,351 13,732 |
5,074 5,040 5,018 5,014 5,016 |
0.976 0.971 0.969 0.968 0.962 |
2 15 5 8 11 |
| 11 Iceland 12 Germany 13 Denmark 14 Finland 15 Austria |
77.8 75.2 75.8 75.5 74.8 |
99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.0 |
8.9 11.1 10.4 10.6 11.1 |
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 |
0.72 0.90 0.84 0.86 0.90 |
2.72 2.90 2.84 2.86 2.90 |
14,210 14,507 13,751 14,598 13,063 |
5,018 5,027 5,016 5,032 5,013 |
0.958 0.955 0.953 0.953 0.950 |
-4 -2 -4 -9 -1 |
| 16 Belgium 17 New Zealand 18 Israel 19 Luxembourg 20 Barbados |
75.2 75.2 75.9 74.9 75.1 |
99.0 99.0 95.8 99.0 98.8 |
10.7 10.4 10.0 8.4 8.9 |
1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 |
0.87 0.84 0.81 0.68 0.72 |
2.87 2.84 2.73 2.68 2.72 |
13,316 11,155 10,448 16,537 8,351 |
5,014 5,002 4,996 5,046 4,948 |
0.950 0.947 0.939 0.929 0.927 |
-1 6 9 -17 11 |
| 21 Italy 22 Ireland 23 Spain 24 Hong Kong 25 Cyprus |
76.0 74.6 77.0 77.3 76.2 |
97.1 99.0 95.4 99.0 94.0 |
7.3 8.7 6.8 7.0 7.4 |
0.98 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.94 |
0.59 0.70 0.54 0.57 0.60 |
2.54 2.70 2.46 2.34 2.48 |
13,608 7,481 8,723 15,180 9,368 |
5,015 4,932 4,954 5,039 4,964 |
0.922 0.921 0.916 0.913 0.912 |
-1 7 5 2 5 |
| 26 Greece 27 Czechoslovakia 28 Hungary 29 Uruguay 30 Trinidad & Tobago |
76.1 71.8 70.9 72.2 71.6 |
93.2 99.0 99.0 96.2 96.0 |
6.9 8.9 9.6 7.8 8.0 |
0.93 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.96 |
0.56 0.72 0.78 0.63 0.65 |
2.41 2.72 2.78 2.56 2.58 |
6,764 7,420 6,245 5,805 6,266 |
4,917 4,931 4,904 4,891 4,905 |
0.901 0.897 0.893 0.880 0.876 |
9 16 24 22 14 |
| 31 Bahamas 32 Poland 33 USSR 34 Korea, Rep of 35 Bulgaria |
71.5 71.8 70.6 70.1 72.6 |
99.0 98.0 99.0 96.3 93.0 |
6.2 8.0 7.6 8.8 7.0 |
1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.93 |
0.50 0.65 0.62 0.72 0.57 |
2.50 2.62 2.62 2.65 2.42 |
11,293 4,770 6,270 6,117 5,064 |
5,003 4,770 4,905 4,901 4,860 |
0.875 0.874 0.873 0.871 0.865 |
-7 34 5 5 22 |
| 36 Chile 37 Yugoslavia 38 Malta 39 Portugal 40 Singapore |
71.8 72.6 73.4 74.0 74.0 |
93.4 92.7 87.0 85.0 88.0 |
7.5 6.2 6.1 6.0 3.9 |
0.93 0.92 0.85 0.83 0.86 |
0.61 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.31 |
2.47 2.34 2.20 2.13 2.04 |
4,987 5,095 8,231 6,259 15,108 |
4,854 4,862 4,946 4,905 5,039 |
0.863 0.857 0.854 0.850 0.848 |
32 12 -4 1 15 |
| 41 Brunei Darussalam 42 Costa Rica 43 Argentina 44 Venezuela 45 Kuwaits |
73.5 74.9 71.0 70.0 73.4 |
86.0 92.8 87.0 85.0 88.0 |
5.0 5.7 8.7 6.3 5.4 |
0.84 0.92 0.95 0.87 0.68 |
0.40 0.46 0.71 0.51 0.43 |
2.08 2.31 2.61 2.24 1.79 |
14,590 4,413 4,310 5,908 15,984 |
5,031 4,413 4,310 5,908 5,044 |
0.848 0.842 0.833 0.824 0.815 |
-22 25 16 12 -29 |
| 46 Mexico 47 Qatar |
69.7 69.2 |
83.7 82.0 |
4.7 5.6 |
0.86 0.79 |
0.38 0.45 |
2.09 2.03 |
5,691 11,800 |
4,888 5,007 |
0.804 0.802 |
15 -29 |
| Medium human development | ||||||||||
| 48 Mauritius 49 Albania 50 Bahrain 51 Malaysia 52 Dominica |
69.6 72.2 71.0 70.1 76.0 |
86.0 85.0 77.4 78.4 97.0 |
4.1 6.3 3.9 5.3 4.7 |
0.84 0.83 0.73 0.75 0.98 |
0.33 0.50 0.31 0.43 0.38 |
2.00 2.16 1.78 4.92 2.33 |
5,375 4,270 10,804 5,649 3,399 |
4,876 4,270 4,999 4,886 3,399 |
0.793 0.791 0.790 0.789 0.783 |
15 31 -18 9 19 |
| 53 Antigua & Barbuda 54 Grenada 55 Colombia 56 Suriname 57 United Arab Emirates |
72.0 71.5 68.8 69.5 70.5 |
96.0 96.0 86.7 94.9 55.0 |
4.6 4.7 7.1 4.2 5.1 |
0.96 0.96 0.85 0.95 0.46 |
0.37 0.38 0.58 0.33 0.41 |
2.29 2.30 2.27 2.23 1.32 |
3,940 3,673 4,068 3,907 23,789 |
3,940 3,3673 4,068 3,907 5,079 |
0.781 0.758 0.758 0.749 0.740 |
-11 10 26 -9 -45 |
| 58 Seychelless 59 Brazil 60 Romania 61 Cuba 62 Panama |
70.0 65.6 70.8 75.4 72.4 |
89.0 81.1 96.0 94.0 88.1 |
4.6 3.9 7.8 7.6 6.7 |
0.88 0.78 0.96 0.94 0.87 |
0.37 0.31 0.63 0.62 0.54 |
2.12 1.87 2.56 2.49 2.27 |
3,892 4,951 3,000 2,500 2,231 |
3,892 4,851 3,000 2,500 3,231 |
0.740 0.739 0.733 0.732 0.731 |
-17 -5 -7 1 7 |
| 63 Jamaica 64 Fiji 65 Saint Lucia 66 Saint Vincent |
73.1 64.8 70.5 70.0. |
98.4 87.0 93.0 84.0 |
5.3 5.1 3.9 4.6 |
0.99 0.85 0.93 0.81 |
0.42 0.41 0.31 0.37 |
2.41 2.11 2.16 2.00 |
2,787 4,192 3,361 3,420 |
2,787 4,192 3,361 3,420 |
0.722 0.713 0.712 0.693 |
13 8 0 16 |
| 67 Saudi Arabia 68 Saint Kitts & Nevis 69 Thailand 70 South Africa 71 Turkey 72 Syrian Arab Rep. |
64.5 67.5 66.1 61.7 65.1 66.1 |
62.4 92.0 93.0 70.0 80.7 64.5 |
3.7 6.0 3.8 3.9 3.5 4.2 |
0.55 0.91 0.93 0.64 0.77 0.57 |
0.30 0.48 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.33 |
1.39 2.31 2.16 1.59 1.82 1.48 |
10,330 3,150 3,569 4,958 4,002 4,348 |
4,998 3,150 3,569 4,852 4,002 4,348 |
0.687 0.686 0.685 0.674 0.671 0.665 |
-34 -18 10 -15 4 17 |
| 73 Belize 74 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 75 Korea, Dem. Rep. of 76 Sri Lanka 77 Ecuador |
69.5 68.1 70.4 70.9 66.0 |
95.0 63.8 96.0 88.4 85.8 |
4.6 3.4 6.0 6.9 5.6 |
0.95 0.56 0.96 0.87 0.84 |
0.37 0.27 0.48 0.56 0.45 |
2.27 1.40 2.41 2.29 2.12 |
2,662 7,250 2,172 2,253 3,012 |
2,662 7,250 2,172 2,253 3,012 |
0.665 0.659 0.654 0.651 0.641 |
-3 -38 3 44 9 |
| 78 Paraguay 79 China 80 Philippines 81 Peru 82 Oman |
67.1 70.1 64.2 63.0 65.9 |
90.1 73.3 89.7 85.1 35.0 |
4.9 4.8 7.4 6.4 0.9 |
0.89 0.68 0.88 0.83 0.21 |
0.39 0.38 0.60 0.52 0.06 |
2.17 1.75 2.37 2.17 0.48 |
2,742 2,656 2,269 2,731 10,573 |
2,742 2,656 2,269 2,731 4,997 |
0.637 0.612 0.600 0.600 0.598 |
7 51 23 6 -45 |
| 83 Dominican Rep. 84 Samoa 85 Iraq 86 Jordan 87 Tunisia |
66.7 66.5 65.0 66.9 66.7 |
83.3 92.0 59.7 80.1 65.3 |
4.3 5.7 4.8 5.0 2.1 |
0.81 0.91 0.51 0.77 0.58 |
0.34 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.16 |
1.96 2.29 1.41 1.93 1.33 |
2,537 1,981 3,510 2,415 3,329 |
2,537 1,981 3,510 2,415 3,329 |
0.595 0.591 0.589 0.586 0.582 |
18 20 -39 -13 -10 |
| 88 Mongolia 89 Lebanon 90 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 91 Gabon 92 Guyana |
62.5 66.1 66.2 52.5 64.2 |
93.0 80.1 54.0 60.7 96.4 |
7.4 4.4 3.9 2.6 5.1 |
0.93 0.77 0.44 0.53 0.97 |
0.60 0.35 0.31 0.21 0.41 |
2.45 1.88 1.19 1.26 2.35 |
2,000 2,250 3,120 4,735 1,453 |
2,000 2,250 3,120 4,735 1,453 |
2,000 2,250 3,120 4,735 1,453 |
8 6 -45 -43 39 |
| 93 Vanuatu 94 Botswana 95 Algeria |
69.5 59.8 65.1 |
67.0 73.6 57.4 |
3.7 2.4 2.6 |
0.60 0.69 0.49 |
0.29 0.19 0.20 |
1.50 1.56 1.17 |
2, 054 3,180 3,088 |
2, 054 3,180 3,088 |
0.536 0.534 0.533 |
5 -20 -37 |
| Low human development | ||||||||||
| 96 El Salvador 97 Nicaragua 98 Indonesia 99 Maldives 100 Guatemala |
64.4 64.8 61.5 62.5 63.4 |
73.0 81.0 77.0 95.0 55.1 |
4.1 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.1 |
0.68 0.78 0.73 0.95 0.46 |
0.33 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.33 |
1.68 1.90 1.77 2.26 1.24 |
1,897 1,463 2,034 1,118 2,531 |
1,897 1,463 2,034 1,118 2,531 |
0.498 0.496 0.491 0.490 0.485 |
-13 2 14 22 -9 |
| 101 Honduras 102 Viet Nam 103 Swaziland 104 Cape Verde 105 Solomon Islands |
64.9 62.7 56.8 67.0 69.5 |
73.1 87.6 72.0 53.0 24.0 |
3.9 4.6 3.7 2.2 1.0 |
0.68 0.86 0.67 0.43 0.07 |
0.31 0.37 0.29 0.17 0.07 |
1.67 2.09 1.62 1.04 0.22 |
1,504 1,000 2,405 1,717 2,626 |
1,504 1,000 2,405 1,717 2,626 |
0.473 0.464 0.458 0.437 0.434 |
-9 44 -10 -2 6 |
| 106 Morocco 107 Lesotho 108 Zimbabwe 109 Bolivia 110 Egypt |
62.0 57.3 59.6 54.5 60.3 |
49.5 78.0 66.9 77.5 48.4 |
2.8 3.4 2.9 4.0 2.8 |
0.39 0.74 0.60 0.53 0.97 |
0.22 0.27 0.23 0.32 0.22 |
1.00 1.75 1.44 1.79 0.97 |
2,298 1,646 1,469 1,531 1,934 |
2,298 1,646 1,469 1,531 1,934 |
0.429 0.423 0.397 0.394 0.385 |
-9 9 -1 0 -2 |
| 111 Myanmar 112 Sao Tome and Principe 113 Congo 114 Kenya 115 Madagascar |
61.3 65.5 53.7 59.7 54.5 |
80.6 63.0 56.6 69.0 80.2 |
2.5 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.2 |
0.77 0.55 0.48 0.63 0.77 |
0.20 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 |
1.74 1.29 1.11 1.43 1.70 |
595 616 2,382 1,023 690 |
595 616 2,382 1,023 690 |
0.385 0.374 0.372 0.366 0.325 |
-9 9 -1 0 -2 |
| 116 Papua New Guinea 117 Zambia 118 Cameroon 119 Ghana 120 Pakistan |
54.9 54.4 53.7 55.0 57.7 |
52.0 72.8 54.1 60.3 34.8 |
0.9 2.7 1.6 3.5 1.9 |
0.42 0.68 0.44 0.52 0.21 |
0.07 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.14 |
0.90 1.57 1.01 1.32 0.55 |
1,834 767 1,699 1,005 1,789 |
1,834 767 1,699 1,005 1,789 |
0.321 0.315 0.313 0.310 0.305 |
-22 8 -30 4 7 |
| 121 India 122 Namibia 123 Cote d'Ivoire 124 Haiti 125 Comoros |
59.1 57.5 53.4 55.7 55.0 |
48.2 40.0 53.8 53.0 61.0 |
2.4 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.0 |
0.37 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.53 |
0.18 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.07 |
0.93 0.67 1.03 0.99 1.13 |
910 1,500 1,381 962 732 |
910 1,500 1,381 962 732 |
0.297 0.295 0.289 0.276 0.269 |
11 -38 -23 4 -8 |
| 126 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 127 Zaire 128 Nigeria 129 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 130 Yemen |
54.0 63.0 51.5 49.7 51.5 |
65.0 71.8 50.7 54.0 38.6 |
2.0 1.6 1.2 2.9 0.8 |
0.58 0.66 0.40 0.44 0.25 |
0.16 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.06 |
1.32 1.45 0.89 1.11 0.56 |
557 380 1,160 1,025 1,560 |
557 380 1,160 1,025 1,560 |
0.268 0.262 0.241 0.240 0.232 |
32 12 12 24 -24 |
| 131 Liberia 132 Togo 133 Uganda 134 Rwanda 135 Bangladesh |
54.2 54.0 52.0 49.5 51.8 |
39.5 43.3 48.3 50.2 35.3 |
2.0 1.6 1.1 1.1 2.0 |
0.26 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.21 |
0.16 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.16 |
0.68 0.74 0.83 0.87 0.58 |
937 7520 499 680 820 |
937 7520 499 680 820 |
0.227 0.218 0.192 0.186 0.185 |
-13 -8 8 2 15 |
| 136 Cambodia 137 Senegal 138 Ethiopia 139 Angola 140 Nepal |
49.7 48.3 45.5 45.5 52.2 |
35.2 38.3 66.0 41.7 25.6 |
2.0 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.1 |
0.21 0.25 0.59 0.29 0.09 |
0.16 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.16 |
0.58 0.56 1.26 0.70 0.35 |
1,000 1,208 392 1,225 896 |
1,000 1,208 392 1,225 896 |
2,000 2,250 3,120 4,735 1,453 |
21 -32 21 -29 15 |
| 141 Malawi 142 Burundi 143 Equatorial Guinea 144 Central African Rep. 145 Sudan |
48.1 48.5 47.0 49.5 50.8 |
47.0 50.0 50.2 37.7 27.1 |
1.7 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.8 |
0.36 0.39 0.40 0.24 0.11 |
0.13 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.05 |
0.85 0.80 0.85 0.56 0.27 |
620 611 706 770 1,042 |
620 611 706 770 1,042 |
0.166 0.165 0.163 0.159 0.157 |
13 2 -9 -22 -30 |
| 146 Mozambique 147 Bhutan 148 Mauritania 149 Benin 150 Chad |
47.5 48.9 47.0 47.0 46.5 |
32.9 38.4 34.0 23.4 29.8 |
1.6 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 |
0.18 0.25 0.20 0.06 0.14 |
0.13 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 |
0.49 0.51 0.41 0.18 0.30 |
1,060 750 1,092 1,030 582 |
1,060 750 1,092 1,030 582 |
0.153 0.146 0.141 0.111 0.088 |
14 4 -35 -23 -1 |
| 151 Somalia 152 Guinea-Bissau 153 Djibouti 154 Gambia 155 Mali |
46.1 42.5 48.0 44.0 45.0 |
24.1 36.5 19.0 27.2 32.0 |
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 |
0.07 0.23 0.01 0.011 0.17 |
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 |
0.16 0.47 0.04 0.26 0.36 |
861 820 730 886 576 |
861 820 730 886 576 |
0.088 0.088 0.084 0.083 0.081 |
5 0 -39 -12 -17 |
| 156 Niger 157 Burkina Faso 158 Afghanistan 159 Sierra Leone 160 Guinea |
45.5 48.2 42.5 42.0 43.5 |
28.4 18.2 29.4 20.7 24.0 |
0.1 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 |
0.13 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.07 |
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.06 |
0.25 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.20 |
634 617 710 1,061 602 |
634 617 710 1,061 602 |
0.078 0.074 0.065 0.062 0.052 |
-19 -22 -11 -14 -41 |
For income, the HDI is based on the premise of diminishing returns from income for human development using an explicit formulation for the diminishing return. A well known and frequently used form is the Atkinson formulation for the utility of income :
W(y) = 1/1-Î X y1-ÎHere, W(y) is the utility or well-being derived from income, and the parameter measures the extent of diminishing returns. It is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income. If x=0 there are no diminishing returns. As approaches 1, the equation becomes :
W(y) = log y
The value of Î rises slowly in the HDI as income rises. For this purpose, the full range of income is divided into multiples of the poverty line y*. Thus, most countries between 0 and y*, some between y* and 2y*, even fewer between 2y* and 3y* and so on. For all countries for which y < y* - that is, poor countries - Î is set = 0. There are no diminishing returns here. For income between y* and 2y*, Î is set equal to 1/2. For income between 2y* and 3y*, Î is set at 2/3. In general if a y* £ y £ (a+1)y*, then Î = a/(a+1). This gives:
So, the higher the income relative to the poverty level, the more sharply the diminishing returns affect the contribution of income to human development. Income above the poverty line thus has a marginal effect, but not a full dollar-for-dollar effect. This marginal effect is enough, however, to differentiate significantly among industrial countries. This method does not take Î = 1, but allows it to vary between 0 and 1.
For example, Singapore has a real GDP per capita of $15,108. With the poverty line set at $4,829, there are four terms in the equation to determine the well-being of Singapore :
W(y) = y + (2y*) 1/2 + 3(y - 2y*)1/3 + 4(y - 3y*)1/4
= 4,829 + 2 (4,829) 1/2 + 3 (4,829) 1/3 + 4 (15,108 - 14,487) 1/4
= 4,829 + 139 + 51 + 20 = $5,039
In calculating the HDI of Singapore using the improved variables and applying the methods described here, the following steps are taken :
Maximum country life expectancy = 78.6
Minimum country life expectancy = 42.0
Maximum country educational attainment = 3.00
Minimum country educational attainment = 0.00
Maximum country adjusted real GDP per capita = 5,079
Minimum country adjusted real GDP per capita = 380
Singapore life expectancy = 74.0
Singapore educational attainment = 2.04
Singapore adjusted real GDP per capita = 5.039
Singapore life expectancy deprivation = (78.6 - 74.0) / (78.6 - 42.0) = 0.126
Singapore educational attainment deprivation = (3.00 - 2.04) / (3.00 - 0.00) = 0.320
Singapore GDP deprivation = (5,079 - 5,039) / (5,079 - 380) = 0.009
Singapore average deprivation = (0.126 + 0.320 + 0.009) / 3 = 0.152
Singapore human development index = 1 - 0.152 = 0.848
It is widely recognized that population and development are closely interrelated: population-related factors influence development variables and are also influenced by them. Furthermore, population goals and policies must be considered to be integral parts of social, economic and cultural development, aiming at improving the quality of life of people.
In order to ensure that population variables are fully integrated into the development planning process, many governments, with ILO and UNFPA assistance, have established a population unit in their planning ministries to be responsible for integrating population policies and programmes with related social and economic development policies and programmes. Because of the small size of most Pacific Island countries the 'Population Focal Point' or 'Unit' might consist of only one or two professionals. However, it is very important that such a contact point is established, to play an advocacy role for the importance of population-related variables in the various sectoral ministries engaged in the development effort, as well as to serve as a source of information about population-related matters. Where the country is attempting to implement an explicit population policy, the Population Unit should be the overall co-ordinator of programmes and be earmarked to monitor and evaluate their implementation via the chairing of an inter-sectoral National Population Co-ordinating Committee.
Socio-economic and demographic interrelationships must be fully considered, or integrated, in the formulation of development policies and programmes in order to achieve a country's development goals and objectives. These may be expressed in its Development Plan in terms of sustained economic growth, human resources development, including such concerns as employment promotion, education and health expansion, and adequate nutrition, etc and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of development among individuals, social groups, geographic areas, etc. These objectives may be ultimately specified in terms of both socio-economic and demographic outcomes during the plan period e.g. a target growth rate of the economy of 5% p.a., a reduction in the IMR from 50 to 30, a reduction in the TFR from 5.6 to 3.6, and a decline in the rate of population growth from, say 2.4% p.a. to 1.8% p.a.; and a reduction in the annual rate of urbanisation from 6% to 3%. The role of development planning is then to formulate policies and programmes to achieve these goals and objectives. A more explicit statement about demographic-related goals, targets and programmes might be incorporated in a formal Population Policy.
The formulation of policies and programmes must be based on a comprehensive understanding of the real world in the form of a conceptual framework which takes account of various socio-economic and demographic interrelationships. Figure 1 illustrates the concept of integration at the macro level and incorporates three constituent elements:
As stated above, development objectives in the Development Plan will be specified in concrete, quantitative targets, as socio-economic and demographic outcomes. For example, a principal objective may be to raise the overall level of employment (the demand for labour) as well as to increase the activity rates of women (the supply of labour), in addition to diversifying the occupational or sectoral distribution of women's employment. Educated youth unemployment may be another problem area such that a development objective may be to raise the growth of employment of teenagers, particularly those found outside of the main urban centres. Clearly, the success of such targeted employment goals to raise the activity rates of vulnerable social and demographic groups will enhance the goal of increased equality in the overall distribution of income in the economy.
Figure 1:
Framework for viewing the integration of population and development planning at the
macro level
| Development Policies | Behavioural model | Development Objectives |
Economic Policies
Demographic Policies (Y)
|
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Desired socio- |
DO = Demographic outcomes
EP = Socio-economic
processes
DP = Demographic processes
EO = Socio-economic
outcomes
Source: Herrin, Parkdoko, Tan Boon Ann and Hongladorom (1986)
The next or second stage of integrating population factors in development planning is the behavioural model which serves as a framework for viewing such socio-economic and demographic interrelationships at the broad general or macro level. This framework is described in figure 2.
The demographic processes of fertility, mortality and migration in the bottom left box (DP) determine the size, structure and spacial distribution of the population. The resulting demographic outcomes in the top left box in turn affect the operation of socio-economic processes and help to determine the level of savings, investment, land and labour utilisation and productivity, the level of consumption of goods and services, public expenditures and the amount of international trade and finance. For example, where fertility is high and population growth rapid, the resulting high rate of dependency is likely to lead to low savings and investment, particularly in the more productive sectors which will be shut out by the need to invest in the social sectors. Population pressure on land and a rapidly growing labour force imply low land and labour productivity and low wages. These, in turn, will help to determine the nature of the country's comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods for export and its need to import essential capital goods and equipment. These socio-economic processes then determine the socio-economic outcomes in terms of the level and type of output of goods and services, the level of remuneration and size of employment, education enrolments and health and nutrition statuses, environmental quality etc. And the circle is completed by these socio-economic outcomes in turn affecting and determining the basic demographic processes where we started. For example, low female education and participation in the modern urban sector of the economy suggest women's roles may remain traditional in some contexts, a situation conducive to continuing high fertility and low female status in society.
The detailed investigation of these complex population-development inter- relationships via theoretical and empirical research is an expanding and exciting area of endeavour and constitutes the core of development studies in general and development economics in particular. Population economics is an eclectic field of study drawing on demography, labour and household economics, survey design and analysis, and applied econometrics to test a whole range of hypotheses relating to expanding the essential knowledge to further the integration of population-related variables into development planning.
If demographic variables and outcomes are to be integrated in the planning process a 5-year development planning horizon is far too short. The responsiveness of the demographic processes to changes in socio-economic outcomes is necessarily, for the most part, longer term. Alternatively, the shorter plans can simply take some of the demographic factors as exogenous, which no doubt is the approach many planners currently utilise. But this negates the integration process since it abstracts from the way population variables are influenced by socio-economic processes and outcomes.
Migration and the spatial distribution of the population are a demographic process and outcome which can show an immediate and short-term response to economic policies, as for example, when rapid rural-urban migration is induced by a concentration of income and employment opportunities in towns and cities. Or when recession in Australia and New Zealand induces the return of Pacific Islanders to their home countries.
The integration process must entail a planning approach whereby a long-term perspective plan is first formulated which takes full account of broadly defined socio-economic - demographic interrelationships (as in Figure 1), and then formulates short to medium term plans consistent with the overall long-term perspective. Short-to-medium gains could then be assessed in terms of their long-term impact on the likely attainment of the development objectives.
The third element of the integration process is the identification and implementation of the set of development policies, both socio-economic and demographic, which jointly affect the development outcome. Thus, both sets of policies must be formulated and implemented in a comprehensive and consistent, and not isolated, manner. Either of the policies pursued in isolation, addressed to different economic and demographic outcomes, will reduce the chances of achieving the country's overall long-run development objectives 5 . For example, policies to reduce mortality 40 or more years ago were successful in the short-term, yet resulted in rapid population growth in the decades that followed. This made it difficult for governments to meet the social needs of a burgeoning population for more schools, teachers, hospitals, drugs and medical personnel, thus making the early gains in life expectancy and mortality reduction difficult to sustain over the longer term. Post-Independence industrialization policies focused new activities in the capital cities of many African countries, leading to continued rural-urban migration, urban squatter settlements, growing urban unemployment and underemployment and concomitant social problems. In Pacific Island countries many of these problems are being encountered, particularly that of rural-urban migration, resulting in the breakdown of traditional values which have yet to be replaced by an appropriate set of modern ones. Often, the result is wholesale out-migration to Australia and New Zealand and the loss of some of the better educated and highly trained professionals. This loss is only partially compensated by a reverse flow of remittance incomes to the PICs.
Figure 2: Simplified framework of population-development interrelationships
Source: Herrin, Pardoko, Tan Boon Ann and Hongladorom (1986)
Sectoral Planning
The concept of population integration can be easily applied to the concept of sectoral planning which addresses such specific sectoral concerns as employment promotion, educational expansion and nutrition and health improvement. To this end, what is needed is a more specific formulation of the sectoral objectives and correspondingly, a more detailed quantified specification of socio-economic-demographic interrelationships as they relate to the determination of the target sectoral outcomes. In the Pacific context, the consequences of socio-economic developments and demographic change for the Region's fragile environment need to be fully evaluated. The implications of large-scale excavation projects or tourist developments for the socio-economic and demographic situation, including the consequences for the natural environment, must be considered and set in some form of the conceptual framework which has been described above. In this way, some of the more deleterious effects of 'development', as exemplified by large-scale logging and copper mining in PNG, the introduction of goats in Tuvalu, and phosphate mining in Nauru, may be avoided.
As an example of one application, consider the policy objective of employment promotion by examining a more detailed behavioural model derived from the previously described general macro model. The determination of employment by size, age-sex composition and spatial distribution can be simulated with the aid of figure 3, in which the demographic blocks have been collapsed into a single block called "Demographic factors". For each of these broad blocks, specific elements are supplied that are crucial in the determination of employment. A major determinant of labour supply is the size of the population of working age, and the age-sex specific labour force participation rates, which in turn depend on such demographic factors as fertility and on such socio-economic factors as levels of household income, educational attainment and health status. Since males normally tend to exhibit uniformly high rates of labour force participation over a broad age range, a dynamic element in labour supply is the participation of females. In general, labour supply can expand rapidly as more women decide to participate in the labour force. Declining fertility, which may moderate the size of the working age population after a time lag, may not proportionately reduce labour supply if declining fertility also leads to a higher rate of labour force participation of women.
As for labour demand, a whole range of economic policies will affect its determination via the level, structure (agriculture vs. industry) and spatial (rural vs. urban) pattern of investment. Furthermore, the choice of technology (labour-biased vs. capital-biased) will help to determine the level and distribution of labour demand. Economic policies that have the long-term effect of limiting the growth of employment to only a few sectors and areas in the face of the rapid growth of the working age population will obviously exacerbate problems of unemployment and underemployment in other sectors and areas. Likewise, demographic policies that have the effect of reducing the growth of the population of working ages in the intermediate run may not adequately solve the employment problem in the face of the increasing rate of labour force participation of women resulting from fertility decline in the current period, and in the face of slow growth of employment opportunities generated by inappropriate economic policies. The need to synchronize demographic and economic policies with regard to employment objectives, therefore, becomes paramount. In addition, the attainment of a more equitable distribution of income is closely related to the employment goals. The kinds of jobs that are generated - for whom and where, at which occupation and skill levels, at what income levels - will determine the extent to which economic and employment growth filters down to ameliorate the situation of the more vulnerable groups in society.
The Micro-Level: Programme and Project Planning
How can the concept of population integration be applied at the programme or project planning level? Such integration of population and development planning at the micro level requires consideration of the same three basic elements mentioned previously in connection with macro or sectoral planning: namely, the development objectives, the population-development interactions, and the socio-economic and demographic-related programmes designed to achieve those objectives. The objectives of any programme or project form a subset of the overall development objectives, and these can be specified to address a particular subgroup of the population, e.g. poor farmers, urban youth, female-headed household, older persons, on which the programme or project is expected to have an impact. In designing programmes to achieve certain objectives, various assumptions are made as to the behaviour of the target population, i.e. households or individuals. This framework makes it possible to analyse the impact of the programme on the target population. Integration then implies that economic and demographic interrelationships are taken into account at the macro, household or individual level in the formulation and design of programmes to achieve the desired behavioural outcomes.
A simple framework for viewing socio-economic and demographic interactions at the household or individual level is depicted in Figure 4. This framework may be described in terms of four basic components: namely (a) a model of household or individual decision-making, (b) the physical, social and economic environment of the community, (c) autonomous changes in this environment, and (d) changes in the environment arising from population and development activities.
In this conceptual framework, the household or other micro unit, in an attempt to improve its welfare, is assumed to make various types of decisions based on a set of opportunities and constraints defined by its household resources (physical and human capital as well as by the size and age-sex composition of its members) and by the community environment. This environment includes the community's natural resource endowments; the prevailing structure of markets and prices for factors of production and products; and the prevailing social structure and social organisation which define, for example, land tenure status, crop sharing arrangements, patterns of family and non-family labour utilization, and social, economic and political alliances which influence cooperative behaviour and community participation. Antonomous changes in the community environment include changes in international prices for agricultural export crops, national trends in the prices of inputs and outputs, technology changes etc.
Figure 3: Simplified framework for analyzing the socio-economic and demographic determinants of employment

Source: Herrin, Pardoko, Tan Boon Ann and Hongladorom (1986)
Figure 4: Simplified framework for analysing the impact of population and development activities on household behaviour
Source: Herrin, Pardoko, Tan Boon Ann and Hongladorom (1986)
The final source of change in the environment is the set of population and development programmes. These include: (a) provision of the physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation, flood control and electrification; (b) the provision of social infrastructure and services in the areas of education, health, nutrition, environmental sanitation and family planning; (c) agricultural programmes such as land reform, development of cooperatives, provision of extension services and credit, and of various input subsidies and price supports; and (d) industrial development programmes involving the provision of credit and various subsidies to small and large-scale enterprises.
In this framework, demographic and socio-economic development programmes are expected to affect the structure of opportunities and constraints facing the households either directly by increasing household resources and access to basic economic and social services, or indirectly through the community, by increasing community resources available to the households. The households are then expected to respond to these changes in a manner they perceive will improve their present economic and social welfare. Depending upon the nature of the emerging structure of opportunities and constraints, a multiphase response may be expected from those households in terms of decisions regarding savings/consumption, investment in physical and human capital, labour force participation of their members, fertility behavioural changes and migration decisions.
An important feature of this simple framework is the recognition that individual or household decisions on any particular aspect of behaviour are not independent of other decisions in the sense that major decisions are all jointly influenced and ultimately determined by individual, household and community-level factors which can be influenced, in turn, by various types of development activities and policy interventions.
The implication of this feature for sectoral planning is that programmes formulated to achieve a small subset of development targets may not achieve such objectives if formulated in isolation. For example, projects to increase agricultural production through the provision of irrigation facilities may not lead to significant increases in household net incomes if corresponding prices of complementary agricultural inputs are kept high and prices of outputs are kept low directly or indirectly as a result of policies and programmes to support modern industry (i.e. policies to keep urban prices of foodstuffs low in order to support a low wage policy in industry, or import controls and tariffs to protect local manufacturing industries producing agricultural inputs). Furthermore, infrastructure programmes in education, health and electrification may fail to achieve their immediate objectives if account is not taken of low household incomes and their corresponding ability to pay that tend to reduce effective access to such programmes.
Finally, family planning programmes may not achieve more than moderate success in situations where the economic value of children is high as a result of limited opportunities for current income generation and old age support or where the opportunity cost of women's time in child-bearing and child-raising is low because of their low educational attainments, corresponding limited off-farm employment opportunities and because their present work activities are compatible with child care. This does not imply that any particular development programme must be designed to be all-encompassing of the various factors identified; this surely would not be feasible and it is not necessary for achieving integration. Rather, what the framework implies is that given the specified interrelationships among various household and community determinants of behaviour, the planner should design various programme interventions with the view that their combined and complementary impacts all lead to the desired behavioural outcomes.
To illustrate this last point, it might be helpful to consider the impacts of development programmes and projects on fertility behaviour. Without going into detail, one can conceptualise the determinants of fertility behaviour as shown in figure 5. Individual, household and community characteristics determine the desired demand for and number of surviving children. In the case of demand, these include the level and source of income and the desire for children relative to other goods, the latter being determined by community norms, and household and individual background characteristics. An increase in income generally makes the household wealthier and able to afford to buy more goods and to support more children. However, increased income may also increase the opportunity cost of children, or lower the relative cost of alternative investment opportunities to support future consumption streams and the old age security of parents. Both factors will tend to reduce the desire for children. Furthermore, higher income should improve health and nutrition, and therefore, reduce infant and child mortality, thus leading to lower demand for births for a given level of desired number of surviving children. Better education and health and high income could also improve maternal health, nutrition and prenatal care, leading to higher fecundity and a higher potential number of births. Lower infant and child mortality results in a larger number of surviving children. The motivation for fertility control arises if the potential supply of children exceeds the desired number demanded. Actual fertility is then determined by the degree to which perfect fertility control is achieved so that the desired demand and the potential supply of children are equated. This degree of fertility control depends on the cost, psychic as well as monetary, of contraception which is determined in turn by individual, household and community characteristics that increase effective knowledge of and access to contraceptive techniques.
Development policies and programmes influence fertility outcomes indirectly through their effect on the determinants of supply and demand for children and on the cost of contraception. A family planning programme may directly affect tastes for children through information, education and communication (IEC) campaigns, and the cost of practicing contraception by providing better services at low cost. Health programmes can affect infant and child mortality as well as the health of mothers, thus affecting the demand for children and the number of surviving children. Interventions which succeed in increasing and diversifying income and employment opportunities for women will tend to reduce the desire for child bearing by raising the opportunity cost of staying at home to care for children. Perhaps the demand for a smaller number of higher quality, better educated children will replace the desire for large numbers of offspring.
In all these examples, it may be seen that various programmes, while seemingly pursued independently in the administrative sense, can have potentially conflicting impacts on fertility. What is needed from a consistent and integrated approach, however, is to see that each programme will have the desired impact on individual, household and community variables that help to determine the pattern and desired direction of fertility change. As a result of the evaluation, it may be resolved to strengthen some programmes or modify others. In any case, an integrated approach does not mean establishing a new set of programmes to deal with all the determinants of fertility; many development programmes were already in place long before government family planning programmes came into being.
A family planning programme need not be tied to an existing development programme; it can be administratively implemented independently of other programmes without compromising the concept of integration. Likewise, a family planning programme need not adopt "entry points" to be acceptable to the potential target population; a whole range of programmes is already being implemented in the community. It can be brought to the attention of potential clientele that the programme is yet another community undertaking to improve the people's standard of living and quality of life. The entire information strategy of the family planning programme could point to development programmes already in place in order to improve motivational efforts.
Figure 5: A simple framework for analysing the impact of development programmes on fertility behaviour
This paper has had the limited objective of illustrating how the concept of 'development' has expanded in recent years to entail much more than purely economic growth. Much greater attention is now given to social development, largely reflected in a country's social indicators - life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, school enrolments, food security and income distribution. Recent efforts by the UNDP to incorporate some of these indicators in a quantifiable index of human development is commendable.
The second part of the paper has taken this expanded concept of 'development' and illustrated the need to account for the complex set of interrelationships between population-related factors and socio-economic variables. It has shown that an integration of demographic variables into the whole socio-economic development planning process, which also includes environmental issues, is essential to ensure that broad-based sustainable development outcomes are attained.
References
The Economist, 26 May 1990, London
Fields, G.S. (1980), Poverty, inequality and development Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Herrin, A.N. Pardoko, H., Tan Boon Ann and Hongladorom, C., (1986), "Integrating
population and development planning", Asia-Pacific Population Journal, Vol. 1,
No. 1
Population Reference Bureau (1990), 1990 World Population Data Sheet, Washington,
D.C.
Seers, D. (1979), "The meaning of development" in Lehmann, D. (Ed.), Development
Theory: Four Critical Essays, Frank Cass, London.
World Bank (1986), Population growth and policies in sub-Saharan Africa,
Washington, D.C.
World Bank (1990) World development report 1990, Washington D.C.
United Nations Development Programme (1992), Human Development Report 1992, UNDP,
New York
Footnotes
1. Gross National product measures the value of all goods and services produced in a country within a year, plus or minus net remittances overseas. It is gross of the depreciation of the capital stock used in this product.
2.
For example, during the 1980s the UK economy attained a respectable rate of growth (2.8%p.a.) which matched the mean of other high income economies, but saw the rate of unemployment rise to a level unprecedented in the post-World War II period. The result was rising poverty and homelessness.3. However, if income is transferred from a poor person to someone who is even poorer, neither the poverty index nor the poverty gap are changed. Both measures are insensitive to the extent inequality among the poor.
4.
One recently announced innovative approach is that of the UNDP's which seeks to ... 5. The current situation in China is illustrative. The country's long term development objective is to raise living standards and incomes partly by a demographic policy which is anti-natalist and partly by an economic polic which promotes economic growth. The latter is being pursued by recently allowing peasants to sell their surplus farm produce from their small land plots in order to boost agricultural output; but farmers believe that they need additinal family labour on their farms to do this, so inducing higher fertility in direct contradiction to the national demographic objective.