UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
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| UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) |
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This document is being made available by the Population Information
Network (POPIN) Gopher of the United Nations Population Division,
Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis,
in collaboration with the European Association for Population
Studies and the IUSSP. For further information please contact
Professor G.C. Blangiardo, Local Organizer, EAPS Conference, Milan,
University of Milan, Istituto di Statistica, V. Visconti di Modrone
21, Milan, Italy.
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EUROPEAN POPULATION CONFERENCE
CONGRES EUROPEEN DE DEMOGRAPHE
Milano, 4-8 settembre 1995
Plenary I
Becoming a parent in Europe*
by John Hobcraft and Kathleen Kiernan
1. Introduction
A decision to become a parent is one of the most complex
lifetime judgements that individuals or couples are called upon
to make. Children cannot be traded in for different or
updated models, nor sold in times of difficulty. Becoming a
responsible parent involves a sustained commitment to economic,
social, and psychological support of the child for at least fifteen
and often more than twenty years. The choice to enter parenthood
thus involves the couple in assessing current and likely future
circumstances over a series of domains, including partnership,
employment and income, housing, and time commitments. Forecasting
future prospects is inevitably based upon imperfect information
and consequently errors in judgement often turn out to have been
made.
Becoming a parent arguably involves the most profound change
in an individual's life- course. The adjustment in adapting to
responsibility for a totally dependent being is substantial. The
biggest change in lifestyle usually occurs with the advent of the
first child (except when later children suffer from severe mental
or physical handicaps). And yet demographers rarely give the
special place and emphasis to the first birth that this transition
warrants. In modern, low fertility societies the few births that
couples or individuals have are usually tightly clustered in a
period of a very few years and the two most crucial decisions are
the timing of entry into parenthood and how many births to have
(the timing of later births is of only subsidiary importance).
Measures of period fertility are often profoundly affected by
changes in the timing of parenthood. For example, with no change in
the numbers of births that individuals ultimately have, a shift in
the timing of entry of two years over a period of ten years means
that effectively either eight years or twelve years worth of births
occur in that ten year period, distorting period fertility measures
by around 20 per cent. Thus, the timing of entry into parenthood or
remaining childless are of profound demographic significance as
well as being life-shaping events for the individuals concerned.
Since inadequate emphasis has been given to explaining (not
simply measuring) the occurrence and timing of first births as
compared with overall levels of fertility (but see the classic
recent accounts by van de Kaa, 1987, Lesthaeghe, 1991, and Cliquet,
1991), this paper initially lays out a broad theoretical discussion
of the issues involved in choices about becoming a parent. We draw
upon and contrast several disciplinary perspectives and elaborate
both pronatalist forces and a series of constraints on becoming a
parent, involving biology, time, money, ideas, and security.
Against this broad background a brief account of the main
demographic changes occurring in the transition to parenthood,
including timing, childlessness and partnership context is
provided.
We then return to a more concrete theoretical perspective, tied
to the normative or basic requirements involved in judgements about
whether and when to become a parent. The key elements discussed
here are partnership, education and training, employment, housing,
and security.
Parents are also adults who are simultaneously functioning in
other roles, both within the family, and in the wider society. This
implies that the way we act as parents is inevitably bound up with
other roles. Our next section focuses on differences in gender
roles and consequences of becoming a parent and discusses
employment careers and the domestic domain.
The final section of the paper applies the frameworks and ideas
developed in the earlier theoretical discussion to provide a bold
explanatory sketch of changing patterns of becoming a parent in
Europe since the 1930s and of current regional variations. This
account is intended to be provocative and does not attempt to deal
with more subtle, second order nuances. Our goal is to pick out, on
a preliminary basis, those elements that we perceive as being most
important.
Throughout this paper our discussion of becoming a parent
necessarily draws upon a range of disciplines, since no single
discipline can possibly account for the changes involved. This
reflects our profound belief that demography is not and cannot be
a discipline in its own right; demography ought properly to be an
interdisciplinary field. Too often multidisciplinarity is achieved
simply by sterile confrontations between scholars from different
disciplinary backgrounds, with little mutual attempted
understanding. For too long scholars involved in population studies
have taken refuge either in ®pure¯ demography, which makes no
attempt to understand, or in attempts to apply single disciplinary
perspectives, as in the debates concerning the roles of ideational
and economic change in understanding fertility transition. We do
not believe it is possible to understand human fertility behaviour,
including becoming a parent, without drawing on a wide range of
disciplines and perspectives.
Since this is our first attempt to provide such a synthesis, we
expect to learn much more and gradually to improve our own
understanding in the future. We make no apology for the bold
attempt, however flawed, and would hope to encourage more fellow
demographers to pay closer attention to a wider literature. Much of
the most interesting work currently being undertaken on the family
is by feminists and we have tried to pay closer attention to this
burgeoning literature than is common among demographers. The other
neglected area that we have begun to explore is that of
evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour. Demographers can no
longer afford to neglect either evolutionary or feminist
perspectives in studying reproductive behaviour. We may wish to
disagree profoundly with some interpretations and conclusions, but
we must no longer ignore them.
2. Why do people become parents?
2.1. Problems of disciplinary perspectives
Most demographers come from a social scientific background and
are thus concerned with choice under constraints (the realm of
economics), with why choice is constrained (sociologists), how
tastes, emotions and attitudes affect choice (psychologists), how
culture enables or more often restricts choice (anthropologists),
how choices have changed over time (historians), or how choice
varies over space (ethologists or geographers). Few of us pay much
attention to biology or evolution, although a recent synthesis on
®sex and the evolution of human nature¯ provides the following
arresting perspective:
Why sex? Surely there are other features of human nature than
this one overexposed and troublesome procreative pastime? True
enough, but reproduction is the sole goal for which human
beings are designed; everything else is a means to that
end. Human beings inherit tendencies to survive, to eat, to think,
to speak and so on. But above all, they inherit a
tendency to reproduce. Those of our ancestors that
reproduced passed on their characteristics to their offspring;
those that remained barren did not. Therefore, anything which
increased the chances of a person reproducing
successfully was passed on at the expense of everything else. We
can confidently assert that there is nothing in our natures that
was not carefully ®chosen¯ in this way for its ability to
contribute to eventual reproductive success (Ridley, 1994, p. 4).
Ridley goes on to acknowledge the importance of free will for
humans, but ®free will was not created for fun ... [it] is only
any good to the extent that it contributes to eventual
reproduction¯ (Ridley, 1994, p. 5). It may surprise many
demographers to realise that biology has been trying to explain
why we reproduce sexually (rather than asexually) for several
decades without fully resolving this issue (e.g. Jones, 1993, ch.
5; Ridley, 1993).
There are rapidly growing ®disciplines¯ of evolutionary
anthropology or evolutionary psychology which have developed
elaborate theories concerning mating, sexuality and
reproduction, deriving from this perspective of ®biological
determinism¯ (e.g. Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994; Ridley, 1993). These
theories are plausibly argued and are compatible with much of the
evidence on human behaviour. As is also the case for most social
science, much of the supporting evidence derives from studies
which demonstrate that the posited explanation is sufficient
rather than necessary. Partly because of
disciplinary compartmentalization and belief structures, the
crucial problem of testing alternative explanations for the same
phenomenon is rarely undertaken. Thus, an economist largely
believes that rational choice theory can account for most human
behaviour and automatically tends to couch all arguments,
measurement and testing within these standard belief
structures. Similarly, many sociologists or
anthropologists believe that social norms and culture play a vital
role in shaping all human behaviour. In Duesenbery's famous dictum
®economics is about choice; sociology is about lack of choice'.
To illustrate this dilemma further, let us take one very
stylized hypothetical example: beautiful women tend to marry rich
men and, to simplify discussion, females do the choosing. To an
economist this behaviour is likely to appear quite rational, since
she tends to choose a partner who will be better able to provide
for her (and their putative family's) needs. To a
sociologist she may be using her charms to achieve upward social
mobility or following social norms about desirable
characteristics for a husband. To a psychologist she may be
following emotions and desires bound up with early
socialization. To an evolutionary biologist, this might simply
represent her choosing a partner with ®good genes¯ (for
reproduction and survival), with richness being a signal (for
explicit discussion see Ridley, 1993). And so on. The point is that
all of these ®explanations¯ are plausible; but hypotheses are none
the less plausible when falsified and the key issue is to devise
critical tests that would discriminate among these
plausible hypotheses rather than to indulge in a war of
arguments. (Of course, there is also the issue as to whether the
key observable characteristics in determining this
outcome are indeed female beauty and male affluence; we largely
ignore this issue here for simplicity.) How do we begin to set
about discrimination among these competing .theories¯ in this over-
simplified example? (An extended presentation of competing (or
complementary?) social scientific theories of sexual
behaviour, encompassing scripting theory, rational choice, and
social networks, is given in chapter 1 of Laumann et
al.,1994).
It is clear that a Mengelian programme of experimental
research is out of the question. We are thus left with the usual
problems for the study of human populations; the options become:
quasi-experiments or comparative analysis of human populations;
inferences from other species; more general
qualitative argument; or abstract theorizing from computer
simulations, mathematical models or game theory.
We are confronted with the problematic nature-nurture
debate in one of its many guises. Many social scientists act as
though humans are a completely blank canvas at birth and
implicitly or less often explicitly deny that our
behaviour is conditioned or affected by our genetic
inheritance. This view is as absurd as one that suggests that our
behaviour is entirely conditioned by our intrinsic nature. It is,
of course, possible to argue that our biology has become
irrelevant in some areas of human behaviour because we have become
so successful at controlling basic instincts; even in such
circumstances it surely helps to understand the power of social
control if we know whether it is working with or against our innate
tendencies.
One arena where the differing explanations offered by various
disciplinary perspectives can begin to be distinguished is their
time horizon. An evolutionary perspective can be perceived as
requiring thousands of years for the innate characteristics to
emerge and might therefore be dismissed as irrelevant in the study
of current social change. While we have some sympathy with this
view, we are aware that biologists have developed models which
permit species, including humans, to switch between
monogamy and polygamy, for example. Thus, our genetic
inheritance may provide us with a range of adaptive options,
whereby we respond to current circumstances more automatically than
most of us would wish to accept. To accept some
contribution of this kind to the explanation of human behaviour
does not in any way deny an important role for other
explanations.
Many sociological, anthropological, and psychological
theories of human behaviour rest heavily on notions of long
lasting cultures and social norms, which are unlikely to
change rapidly and are thus more likely to retain explanatory
power as constraints on rapid change than as the agents of
change. In addition, considerable emphasis is often given to the
importance of early social or psychological development for later
in the life-course. To a lesser extent economics is concerned with
lifetime accumulation of wealth, and of human and social capital.
Such theories are better able to explain continuity of individual
behaviour, rather than rapid change (e.g. Ryder, 1965).
And yet we are increasingly confronted with the problem
of trying to explain change in human behaviour over quite short
periods. Examples include the shift away from the normative context
of marriage for entry into parenthood in several European
countries, changes in divorce patterns, and changes in levels of
childlessness. So where can we look for explanation of such
changes? Most economic theories and models are predominantly
concerned with the here and now or with short run change; in the
sociological and psychological domains we might single out the
rapid and effective diffusion of new ideas and the concomitant
importance of the mass media; another key realm may be
technological change, including more effective means of fertility
control.
Another element in distinguishing among competing
explanations for human behaviour may involve aspects of micro and
macro forces. Most evolutionary theory revolves around
individual advantages and competition with others in
reproduction, although the more controversial sociobiological
approaches to explanation of altruism and social behaviour deal
with macro-level factors (Wilson, 1975 and 1978; see Kitcher, 1985,
for a closely argued critique). The interplay of macro and micro
level forces in social behaviour has been ably discussed in a
fairly rigorous context by Blalock and Wilken (1979) using
subjective expected utility as a framework and by Coleman (1990) in
a rational choice perspective; in order to introduce theoretical
rigour both adopted much of the language and structure of
economics. Much of sociology, while less rigorous, is concerned
with the interplay of micro and macro level forces in shaping
human behaviour. In economics these interplays are encapsulated in
notions such as public goods, the tragedy of the commons, and
externalities. In most disciplines much work focuses on either the
individual or the macro-level separately without adequate attention
to these often subtle and complex interplays.
2.2. Pronatalist pressures
Returning now to our main theme of entry into parenthood, we can
discuss the putative roles of a variety of perspectives in
explaining recent changes and variations in the timing and extent
of entry into parenthood in Europe. We begin with the forces likely
to be ranged against change and then move on to discuss some of the
plausible agents of change.
If evolutionary perspectives have any validity, we ought
to ®inherit a tendency to reproduce¯ (Ridley, 1993). Low levels of
fertility and a failure to become parents at all ought to be in
tension with our nature. And yet, to over-simplify somewhat, we
may have inherited alleles which predispose us towards sex rather
than reproduction per se; in our evolutionary past either would
have been equally effective in ensuring that we reproduce. The
modern emergence of effective means of birth control,
enabling the separation of sex and reproduction, may have
permitted a break with our biological past without inevitable
tensions. Alternatively, we may be having to overcome
deep-seated innate tendencies to reproduce. We are not aware of
this issue receiving much attention in the literature on human
evolution and yet the distinction might be critical in
determining the strength of opposing forces required to achieve low
fertility levels or to avoid becoming a parent altogether.
There are strong and long-standing social norms urging entry into
parenthood (see for example McLaren, 1984, on England). Even
today, when we seem to be moving towards high levels of
childlessness in several European societies, very few respondents
in surveys are prepared to say they wish to remain childless. Many
organized religions developed strong pronatalist stances. An
intriguing question is the origin and need for organized
pronatalist stances. If humans were intrinsically driven ®to be
fruitful and multiply¯ through their genetic inheritance,
why was it so necessary to erect institutional pressures to ensure
that this happened? Was there a widespread tendency to attempt to
control fertility, which had to be continually resisted, or was
organized religion simply opportunistic in including universally
desirable goals in its programme as a clever marketing ploy? There
is some evidence that fertility control has ancient origins (see
Himes, 1936, for the classic account and McLaren, 1984 and 1990).
There is a long-standing tradition of delayed entry into
childbearing (and marriage) in most of western Europe (see the
classic statement by Hajnal, 1965). Thus the notion of altering the
timing of entry into childbearing is of much longer standing than
in other regions of the world, although this kind of history does
not stretch back beyond medieval times.
Once social structures exist, children are likely to be of value
to society beyond their immediate family; in other words children
are public goods. The reasons for such value can include children
as potential mates, warriors, workers, and citizens. Exogamy
requires reciprocal reproduction; fighting tribal wars and
protecting territory used to be helped by numbers; especially with
emergence of modern industrial society, which separated work from
home, society has needed workers and increasingly such workers have
to be well- trained; and modern complex political and social
structures often have a vested interest in the development of
sufficient quality citizens. One distinguished economist
encapsulated some of these issues thus:
At the aggregate level, human reproduction is the ultimate source
of an economic system's labour input and of the consumers who
constitute the principal destination of the economy's output. At
the individual level, children are an important source of
satisfaction that compete with alternatives for the limited
parental resources of time, energy and money available. Despite
this, reproductive behaviour has traditionally been omitted from
economic theorizing, and even in the past three decades has gained
only a marginal foothold. (Easterlin, 1989).
It is perhaps no surprise that so many pronatalist pressures
emerged over time. These concerns dominated reactions to the low
levels of fertility in Europe in the 1930s and played an important
part in the establishment of the modern welfare state. A recent and
vitriolic debate over pronatalist perspectives among demographers
took place in France (e.g. Keyfitz, 1993), perhaps the country with
the most prolonged and persistent state attachment to pronatalism
following its very early demographic transition.
There may also be strong psychological pressures to reproduce.
The ideal of a well- nurtured childhood in a loving family, when
achieved, may shape innate desires to reproduce and to experience
once again the reciprocation involved (Acock and Demo, 1994). Our
attitudes and beliefs are also coloured by the reification of
children which occurs to an extent in all societies (e.g. Aries,
1979; Badinter, 1981). One of the few micro-economic arguments
favouring parenthood is the notion of children as a positional
good: the bundle of satisfactions to be derived from parenthood is
relatively unique and this adds to the attraction of ®ownership¯ of
children (Becker, 1981).
2.3. Constraints on parenthood
Having outlined the potentially formidable array of forces
acting to promote parenthood, we now turn to constraining forces.
Both during the 1930s and in the past two decades there have been
significant fractions of the population in many western European
countries who have either significantly delayed childbearing or
have remained childless. In an idealised conceptual model people
are able to choose whether or not to become parents at any time
during their reproductive life-span; few take a conscious and
immutable decision to remain childless; rather childlessness is
often the outcome of a series of decisions not to have a child at
the present time. In our discussion of constraints on becoming a
parent we shall focus mainly on the micro- level, since most
institutional forces appear to be pronatalist. However, we shall
indicate some macro-level forces which operate to alter perceptions
of the relative merits of parenthood or childlessness. Since
institutions and norms are ®sticky¯ we will also pay attention to
the role of the accumulation of behaviour across individuals in
shaping the macro-level environment. For example, we believe that
the accumulation of choices by individuals to control fertility,
which was at variance with the pronatalist stance of much organized
religion, played a considerable role in the genesis of
secularization; this is at variance with the reverse causal role
elaborated by Lesthaeghe and Wilson (1986). Our discussion will
be structured around five main groups of constraining forces:
time, money, ideas, security, and biology. It will become clear
that these forces interact. An interesting and carefully argued
alternative structure for examining the issue of childbearing is
given by Folbre (1994).
a. Biology
We begin with biology, since this is in many ways the
clearest and most self- contained element. Historically,
parenthood was only possible during the period when both
partners were fecund. When either partner was pathologically
incapable of conceiving (primary sterility), parenthood was
impossible, although adultery could provide a route for
overcoming male infecundity within a partnership and for the male
to become the biological but probably not social or economic
parent when his partner was infecund. Otherwise, aggregate
fecundability of women increased steadily into their twenties and
then began an initially slow and subsequently more rapid decline
until the ®onset¯ of menopause. For men the reproductive span is
considerably longer. It was thus through this biological ®clock',
particularly for women, that a series of decisions to postpone
entry into parenthood would ultimately result in permanent
childlessness ( see Menken, 1985; Rahman and Menken, 1993).
Undoubtedly, recognition of this constraint played a considerable
part in the rise in fertility during the 1939-45 War (see Hajnal,
1950, for a careful and insightful discussion of this issue for
England and Wales).
Couples today are differently placed in terms of ability to
combat sterility. The development and continual improvement in
accessibility and effectiveness of Artificial Insemination by
Donor (AID) and of in-vitro fertilization (IVF), along with
relevant drugs, has considerably altered the prospects for
infertility treatment. From the occurrence of the first ®test-tube¯
baby in 1978, we have now moved to the situation where IVF is
relatively commonplace and is sometimes available free (chapters 14
to 16 in Gray et al., 1993; te Velde, 1994). There have recently
been instances of births to post-menopausal women through such
procedures. As a consequence, the lottery of postponement of entry
into parenthood turning into permanent but involuntary
childlessness has at least had its odds altered. It is thus likely
that some couples feel enabled to delay childbearing longer than
they might otherwise have done.
The final biological developments that enable achievement of
childlessness whilst enjoying an active sex life are those in
contraceptive technology and safe abortion. The contraceptive
pill, the modern intra- uterine device, depoprovera, and NORPLANT
have all transformed our ability to separate sex from reproduction.
Moreover, vasectomy and tubal ligation have become commonplace
methods of terminating reproductive, but not sexual, careers and
can be used as a means to achieve permanent childlessness, although
there is resistance to such usage from the medical profession. The
availability of simple, safe methods of induced abortion, such as
vacuum aspiration, along with the attitudinal changes that
increased the legality of induced abortion, has also transformed
reproductive choice. Compared with earlier times, the 1990s see us
much closer to a situation corresponding to the Cairo principle
that ®All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and
to have the information, education and means to do so¯ (United
Nations, 1994). Most of the problems in realizing this goal are now
ones of access and information rather than technology, although
further developments in acceptable non-intrusive methods of
fertility regulation are required.
b. Time
A universal human constraint is availability of time (see e.g.
Michael, 1994). There are only 24 hours in a day in which to carry
out all of our activities. Apart from sleep, most of our activities
in a modern industrial society revolve around the triad of work,
family, and leisure. Traditionally, a woman would cease or curtail
her participation in paid employment upon entry into parenthood so
as to make available the time for childcare; sometimes the
cessation was involuntary. In some occupations men used to be able
to persuade employers to give them a salary increase on marriage
and again on becoming a parent; such increases were also automatic
in some occupations. We are gradually moving towards a more
egalitarian structure of work and pleasure associated with the
family, although there is much variation in Europe in the extent
of the shift from the traditional ®male bread-winner/ female
homemaker¯ pattern to more egalitarian attitudes and division of
labour (see Kiernan, 1992). Women are today much more likely to be
in paid employment than in the past, often through positive choice
but sometimes through perceived necessity for economic reasons
(just as has long been the case for men).
This greater female attachment to the labour force makes the
large amounts of time required for childrearing much more
difficult to find than before. Where both partners work, joint
responsibility for parenting places very considerable strain on
time available for leisure. Solutions which involve the couple
being employed at different hours, often with the woman shifting
to part-time work, impose severe strains on interaction between
the couple and on time for leisure. Substitute child- care is
expensive and many couples adopt expedient, affordable solutions
which may involve care by other relatives or care which is bought
but possibly sub-optimal for the development of the child. Thus,
modern solutions to parenthood involve much greater burdens on time
availability for both parents, but often especially the mother.
Even greater pressures of time burden, again usually on the mother,
are associated with the increasing incidence of lone-parenthood.
The egalitarian model, to which we subscribe, thus involves a
®high-pressure¯ time allocation compared with the traditional
gender division of labour.
But a return to the traditional pattern is increasingly
unlikely. When female labour force participation rates were low,
consumer expenditure patterns were predominantly geared to living
on one income (with female earnings often disparagingly referred to
as ®pin-money¯), although two incomes were an economic necessity
for some. Once two-earner couples become the usual behaviour,
adjustment to loss of one income becomes harder and maintenance of
two jobs (where not precluded by unemployment) more of an
imperative. Moreover, increased female labour force participation
is associated with an increase in total labour force, and thus
reduces male and female earnings compared with a situation of
smaller labour supply. Once again this serves to reinforce the
desires or needs of mothers to maintain paid employment and thus
reduces the time available for other activities including
parenting. This kind of unintended consequence of aggregated
individual choices for other individuals is important, but often
neglected.
c. Money
Children are expensive to rear and involve a long term investment
of money as well as time. Since time and money often involve
complex trade-offs, we have already touched on some of the
relevant issues above. Somehow, the parents need to take
responsibility for both the developmental and economic upkeep of
a child. With the increasing complexity of the economy and of
society in European countries, the level of investment required in
order to meet society's needs for productive workers and engaged
citizens has steadily increased. Moreover, as standards of living
rise, expenditure on these investments in children and on competing
goods, activities and services typically increases. Thus, some of
the demand for ®quality¯ children derives from macro-level forces.
But, of course, most parents also have aspirations for their
children which involve trying to achieve better than minimal
standards of nurture and development, so as to improve the life
chances of their children.
Economic theory typically assumes a gender asymmetry which
corresponds to the more traditional male breadwinner/ female
homemaker roles. Thus, enhanced male earnings are seen as
enabling higher fertility, whilst increased female earnings are
seen as generating higher opportunity costs associated with
complete or partial withdrawal from the labour force to enable the
social or time costs of parenting (Becker, 1981). As female labour
force participation becomes regarded as a necessity (whether for
economic or psychic reasons) and society moves towards a more
egalitarian model of gender division of household labour, this
conceptual framework loses such analytic force as it may have. In
a still-awaited world of gender equity men and women's attachment
to paid work would probably be similar. Either or both might have
to forego some earning opportunities in order to make time for
parenting; alternatively, either or both might have to increase
earnings or forego other consumption to fund the money costs of
child rearing and possibly child care. Both would forego other
leisure activities. A new gender contract within the family would
have emerged and a ®new¯ new home economics would be required.
We have emphasized that children are ®public goods¯. This was
perhaps most clearly recognized in the development of the modern
welfare state. Although the exact package differed between
societies, the role of the state in providing floor levels for
children has been widely recognized and institutionalized,
especially since 1945. Benefits which directly affect the costs of
being a parent often include free universal access to education
and health services, child benefits and tax allowances, and
parental leave. Many discretionary or means tested allowances, such
as unemployment, sickness and disability benefits, and housing
subsidy have had indirect impact upon ensuring that children were
protected from the full impact of poverty. Discretionary
allowances also often include extra support for lone parents,
although there have been recent attempts to shift economic
responsibility back to the parents.
The state's role in protecting children is by no means only
economic. Social services impose societal standards of care and try
to overcome consequences of parental shortcomings for the
child, through counselling and, ultimately, removal of the child
from some parents. The standard- setting and regulatory roles in
the training of new citizens in schools is also important, as is
the effort to shape curriculum content. Provision of
contraceptive and medical services helps to achieve informed
reproductive choice and thus plays a role in determining entry into
parenthood. The entire legal framework surrounding partnership
and parent-child rights and obligations is also important.
d. Time and money costs
Studies in the United States which have grappled with the
difficult problems of estimating and of comparing the cash and
time costs of rearing children suggest that time costs are at least
half of the total costs (Michael, 1994). For convenience, we label
the cash costs as economic costs and the time costs as social
costs of rearing children.
In recent decades a number of countries have enacted child
support legislation which tries to ensure that biological fathers
make a reasonable contribution to the economic costs of rearing
their children; such legislation has been motivated by a number of
considerations, including the shift of the burden of responsibility
away from the state to the individual and the difficulties of
dealing with the feminization of poverty. But lone parents,
usually mothers, still disproportionately carry the social costs of
child-rearing and legislation to equalize or compensate for such
social costs (see Michael, 1994) in a new ®parenthood contract¯
may emerge.
Difficult issues are emerging in this field in addition to
handling social costs. There are some moves to make sperm donors
liable for economic support of their genetic offspring (e.g. in the
Netherlands, see te Velde, 1994) and to allocate part of the
pension rights of fathers to mothers in recompense for foregone
earning opportunities (e.g. in the United Kingdom).
We note that the current debate is concerned predominantly with
the (oft- neglected) rights of the mother and the (equally oft-
neglected) obligations of the father. As we get to a more
symmetrical gender view of parenting, it is to be hoped that the
rights and obligations of both partners will be of increasing
concern in a new parenthood contract; in particular, biological
fathers have rights as well as responsibilities.
e. Ideas
Ideas, tastes, and preferences are partially constrained by rules
or norms, as well as by a host of other biological, social,
economic and psychological factors. However, in the study of
social change, it is also clear that ideas, tastes and preferences
sometimes break away from the imposed constraints and can lead to
changes in these constraints (e.g. legislation often has to catch
up with changed behaviour, itself often an evanescence of changing
ideas: an example is the need to redefine family law to protect the
rights of children and partners in cohabitational
relationships). It is equally evident that changes in the
constraining forces can help to reshape ideas, albeit often
imperfectly (an example would be equal opportunities legislation).
We do not wish to argue for dominance of ideational change in
achieving social change, but regard any explanation which leaves
out ideational components as being deficient.
In the realm of entry into parenthood we have already touched
upon the strong pronatalist pressures, perhaps particularly for
motherhood, in modern European societies from sources as diverse
as the state, religion and putative grandparents (e.g. Thurer,
1994, and Berry, 1993). Childless couples often experience intense
pressures to conform, being labelled selfish, incomplete,
abnormal, immoral, or irresponsible (see Marshal,l 1993; Bartlett,
1994; Morell, 1994). There are also pressures as to when it is
seemly to have a child in the life course, with early childbearing
widely regarded as being disadvantageous and late childbearing
discouraged because it may be ®too late¯ biologically.
In the European (and North American) context several authors
have emphasized increasing ®assertive individualism¯ as playing
a role in changing fertility patterns (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn,
1988, and Preston, 1986). This could be characterised as ®I have
rights, you have obligations'. In the late twentieth century the
most important shifts in this domain, covering the internal
dynamics of the family, the domestic division of labour, and rights
and responsibilities for childrearing, have been concerned with
gender relations. The ®second wave¯ feminist movements throughout
Europe (see Kaplan, 1992, for a useful synthesis) have, since the
1960s and with varying degrees of success, challenged the asymmetry
in gender roles and responsibilities for social reproduction. Women
have asserted their individual rights and have also emphasized the
responsibilities of men. Responsible parenthood is made extremely
difficult if both partners are predominantly concerned with their
rights and no-one is prepared to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood. It is perhaps a patriarchal device to label such
changes as a rise of assertive individualism which militates
against parenthood, since men had long enjoyed greater freedom to
exercise their rights. In the ®traditional breadwinner/homemaker¯
family the woman had the responsibility for the nurture of the
child whilst the man had the responsibility for economic
maintenance. It is not surprising that the prolonged struggle to
alter these traditional roles towards a more egalitarian structure
places considerable extra strains on entry into parenthood.
f. Security
While the decision to have a child can be executed fairly quickly
by most couples, it is clear that parenthood is a much more
sustained state. Thus, decisions to become a parent require complex
judgements, not just about current circumstances, but also about
the likely circumstances for the development and nurture of the
child over the ever extending period until full adulthood. Even the
implausible ®rational economic man¯ could never have full
information concerning the future and yet children are unlike other
®investments or expenditures on consumer durables¯ in that they
cannot be sold when circumstances change (unlike another major
investment in housing, for example). Thus, entry into parenthood is
one of the most complex lifetime judgements that individuals or
couples make. Is it any surprise that difficulties occur? One of
the rationales for the welfare state (and for women's involvement
in its promotion - see Koven and Michel, 1993) was to provide a
®security blanket¯ which could smooth out the consequences of
changed circumstances and compensate for inequities over the life-
course for parents (for an interesting recent study see Falkingham
and Hills, 1995).
Concerns with security partially underlie the pressures to avoid
becoming a parent early. Early parenthood can interrupt education
and training (accumulation of human capital), thus narrowing and
reducing the range of options later in life. A decision to bear a
child early is often taken under greater uncertainty about future
prospects for employment and partnership continuity. It is also
probable that young parents apply a higher discount rate on the
future. Whether or not those who become young parents bring
judgements about greater insecurity of their partnerships
(objectively they experience a much higher incidence of partnership
breakdown) and their employment and broader economic prospects into
choices (or accidental outcomes) regarding entry into parenthood is
not well established. But the pressure to delay childbearing until
meeting the normative requirements for parenthood is substantial
and partially justified by security considerations.
Related to this is the issue of how well prospective parents are
informed about the protracted costs of parenthood. The more
privileged groups in society are likely to have higher expectations
for the ®quality¯ of their children and the prospective increase
in costs and duration of nurture and training for these children
may require further delays.
3. Transition to parenthood - the demographics
The three major and recent themes in the transition to parenthood
are later entry into parenthood, lower probabilities of parenthood
and greater probabilities of having a child outside marriage.
3.1. Older parenthood
Across most Western European countries in recent decades there
has been a movement to a later age at entry into motherhood. Data
on entry into fatherhood are rare but we assume that trends have
followed the same general direction as that observed for
motherhood. The move to a later age pattern of becoming a parent is
less clear in Eastern European countries. In 1970, across Western
European nations average ages at first birth amongst women were
predominantly in the 23 to 24 years age range; in 1992 the average
was typically in the 26 to 27 years age range (Council of Europe,
1994). As yet there are few signs of stabilisation in the movement
to a later age pattern of childbearing. Further movements to an
older age pattern of childbearing are anticipated. For example,
Eurostat projections carried out in 1991 for the 12 member states
of the European Community (Eurostat, 1991) show a projected
increase in the average age of childbearing (all births) from 27
years amongst women born in 1955 to 29.3 years amongst women to be
born in the year 2000. Analysis of the timing of parenthood is
hampered by problems of comparability in statistics on birth order
and increasing remarriage and extra-marital childbearing exacerbate
this problem.
3.2. Childlessness
Very few couples expect to remain childless. For example, in
1989, fewer than 5 per cent of European Community citizens regarded
being childless as ideal: the only country where the proportion
exceeded 5 per cent was West Germany at 7 per cent (Eurobarometer
32, 1991). Comparisons with analogous data collected in 1979 showed
there to have been little change in the proportions stating that no
children were ideal. The fertility expectations of young men and
women aged 15 to 24 years in these surveys did not differ markedly
from those of older people. However, these expectations are on the
low side. Even amongst the generation born during the 1940s, who in
many countries had the most youthful fertility pattern and lowest
proportions remaining childless of women born during the twentieth
century, the level of childlessness was around 10 per cent.
Additionally, available cross-national extrapolations suggest that,
for example, amongst women born in 1955 between 15 and 20 per cent
of Dutch (20%), English and Welsh (18%), Italian (17%), Danish
(16-17%), and Swedish (16%) women would remain childless and 11% of
French and 10% of Portuguese women of this generation would remain
childless (Prioux, 1987). Whether such levels will come to pass
depends on the speed at which this generation reproduces at ages
over 30 years. It is clear that most people desire children
(notwithstanding that discrepancies between espoused attitudes and
behaviour are not uncommon) but there may be incipient changes
under way such that higher levels of childlessness than were common
in the recent past increasingly challenge the fundamental tenet to
reproduce.
How do people decide not to have children? The consensus on this
issue is that men and women delay having their first child and then
after a number of years decide not to have children. Childlessness
emerges from series of decisions to postpone having children
(Veevers, 1980; Baum and Cope, 1980) - in Lee's (1980) formulation
of fertility behaviour ®aiming at a moving target¯ rather than a
fixed one. That is not say that some couples or individuals may
decide at a young age never to have children and actively pursue
that goal, although it is always possible for such couples to
change their minds. As couples grow older opportunities to engage
in work, community and leisure activities may compete with
parenthood. An interesting and unexplored question is who is in the
driving seat in this development: women, men or is there dual
control by the couple. Much of the current literature assumes that
women are in the driving seat and in the main argues that as women
have become increasingly attached to the labour market the
potential incompatibilities between motherhood and work have become
more apparent (this will be discussed in more detail below).
Undoubtedly, whatever the mechanism behind the growth in
childlessness, the perceived advantages of remaining childless have
increased since the 1970s, whilst the perceived disadvantages have
declined.
3.3. Partnership context and parenthood
Across Europe more and more children are being born outside first
marriage, the conventional locus for the transition to parenthood.
In the majority of countries, the pre-eminent setting for the
bearing and rearing of children continues to be the married couple.
Nevertheless, there is a good deal of cross-national variation in
partnership behaviour, perhaps more so than in fertility behaviour
(Kiernan, 1993). For example, cohabitation, divorce and extra-
marital childbearing are most common in the Nordic countries of
Sweden and Denmark and relatively rare in, for example, Italy,
Spain and Ireland. In some countries such as France and Great
Britain children are increasingly being born to cohabiting couples
whereas in West Germany and Belgium cohabitation is primarily a
childless phase and the vast majority of children are born within
marriage. With the rise in divorce and the greater fragility of
cohabiting unions, more couples are likely to include partners
where one or both may have children from a previous union.
Increasingly, one partner may be making the transition to
parenthood whilst the other partner is having a second or later
child. Whether the transition to parenthood differs in terms of
adaptation and stressors between couples where both are novices to
parenthood and couples where one or other is already a parent
remains an open question.
Whether changes in partnership behaviour have had any significant
effect on the timing of childbearing is as yet unknown and it is
increasingly difficult to understand what is happening. This
emanates not only from the diversity of behaviour patterns, but
primarily from the lack of standardised information which may well
be redressed when the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Family and Fertility surveys become available for analysis (Macura,
1995). However, it is still the case that the propensity to become
a parent is generally higher amongst married women than among
unmarried women (Hoem and Hoem, 1988) but it is also the case that
marriage frequency is a weaker proximate determinant of fertility
behaviour than in times past (Preston, 1986).
4. Basic requirements for whether to have a child now
From a biological perspective the transition to motherhood can be
made anywhere between menarche and menopause - a span of some 30 to
35 years - with men having an even longer period within which to
effect the transition to fatherhood. At what point do men, women or
couples make the decision to have children? Are the impetuses that
lie behind the decision to have a child at specific point in time
to a large extent the flip side of the decision to remain childless
at that point in time? A possible exception is involuntary
childlessness but even here the case is not clear cut, as what may
have commenced as voluntary may have become involuntary
childlessness as a consequence of delaying childbearing to a late
age.
The timing of transitions in people's lives are to a major
extent, but not entirely, individually determined in most Western
European societies. Simultaneously, the location of the timing of
a transition in the life course is by and large socially
constructed and embedded within the prevailing institutional
frameworks. There are contexts within which people are more or less
likely to decide whether to have children or not, perhaps embedded
in the notion of the ®appropriate time¯ to become a parent rather
than the ®proper time¯ to marry as in times past. Marriage is no
longer the critical marker for parenthood as was more clearly the
case for much of the twentieth century. We enumerate five contexts
or pre-conditions that in our view have been and continue to be of
importance for the transition to parenthood. These are: being in a
partnership; having completed full-time education and training;
having a home of one's own; being in employment with an adequate
income, and less concretely a sense of security. We elaborate on
each of these in turn as well as discussing recent developments in
these domains.
4.1. A partner
We noted above the growing proportion of children born outside
marriage but still the vast majority of children are born to a
mother and father who are living together either in a de facto or
de jure union. On a day to day basis there is probably little to
distinguish between parents in cohabiting and marital unions.
Nevertheless, the propensity to make the transition to parenthood
is currently still likely to be greater amongst married than
cohabiting couples. Europeans also place great importance on the
stability of a couple's relationship in the decision to have
children. In a recent Ece survey (Malpas and Lambert, 1993) one in
two non-parents aged under and over 25 years put the ®stability of
the couple's relationship¯ at the top of the list of factors that
may influence the number of children. The next two important
influences were availability of suitable accommodation and the
economic crisis and unemployment which we discuss below.
The emphasis on stability of the couple's relationship may
reflect a response to the growth in divorce rates that has occurred
throughout European nations over the last few decades. It was
noteworthy that Danish and British respondents, countries with
amongst the highest divorce rates in Europe, were more likely to
put this factor at the top of their list: 2 out of 3 did so. In the
light of this we might modify our basic requirement for the
transition to parenthood to being in a stable partnership.
4.2. Education and training
The vast majority of young people do not become parents before
completing their full- time education and training. Across Europe
there is a good deal of variation in the proportions of under 25s
in full-time education (Eurostat, 1991; Oecd, 1993). But there have
been pervasive changes in recent decades. Over the last two decades
increasing proportions of young people have been staying on in
education or training to a later age and the erstwhile sex
difference in the proportions of men and women in third level
education (universities and all other types of higher educational
institutions) has been eroded and even eliminated in many European
countries.
The upward revision in the educational completion age of young
people and the concomitant corollary of later entry into the labour
market are two important and inter-dependent structural factors
that lie behind the upward revision in the demographic timetables
of young people - namely later ages at marriage and entry into
parenthood (see Blossfeld, 1995, for a detailed analysis of this
subject across a range of European countries).
4.3. Employment
Recently there have been seemingly contradictory developments in
the European labour market for young people: on the one hand there
has been increased demand for highly skilled labour to meet the
restructuring associated with the transitions from industrial to
service economies and on the other a substantial rise in youth
unemployment (Jones, 1992). Demand for skilled labour has increased
the time required to obtain the necessary qualifications and skills
for employment and those without the necessary skills and
qualifications are either unemployed or relegated to poorly paid
jobs in the service sector. In the opinion of 20-24 year olds in
the European Community in 1990 two out of the top three major
problems facing European youth related to employment and education:
at the top was unemployment; in third place was ®education does not
prepare young people properly for life¯ with drugs taking second
place (Commission of European Communities, 1991). The same
questions put to adults on what they saw to be the main problems
facing young people today elicited the same hierarchy of responses.
This reflects reality, as generally speaking those hardest hit by
unemployment have been the young. A substantial minority of these
young persons are seeking to start their working lives after
leaving school, further or higher education or an apprenticeship
(Eurostat, 1991). Across Europe there is variation in the rate of
youth unemployment both between nations and among regions within
nations. Across European Community countries there has been a
general increase in the extent of youth unemployment but levels are
noticeably higher in Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland and parts of
France and Belgium. Additionally, there has been a growth in the
numbers of long-term unemployed (Eurostat, 1991).
The economic restructuring that has occurred in western economies
in recent decades and its ramifications have contributed to the
extension of financial dependence on the family or State into the
third decade of life and as a consequence has pushed up the age at
which young people have an adequate income that would allow them to
underwrite their demographic transitions.
4.4. Housing
A major distinguishing feature of the Western European family has
been that it is nuclear, confined to parents and their children
(Laslett, 1977). There is a seemingly a long-standing and implicit
rule that there should be not more than one cohabiting couple per
family. As portrayed in the Eurobarometer surveys (Malpas and
Lambert, 1993) suitable accommodation is regarded as a important
pre-requisite for family life. There is considerable variation
across nations and within nations in the costs and quality of
housing. According to one estimate for the European Community
countries average expenditure on housing represents between 15 and
25 per cent of the family budget (European Observatory on National
Family Policies, 1990). Family housing in the owner occupation or
rental sectors of the housing market is likely to require more
resources than accommodation suitable for living on one's own or as
a childless couple.
4.5. Security
As well as these more concrete basic requirements, having a child
is likely to involve some assessment of prospects at least into the
medium term. This is likely to include a judgment of whether one
can provide the resources to nurture a child adequately from
infancy to young adulthood and whether society (through its agent
government) will also make provision for the rising generation of
young people. Men and women are likely to evaluate whether becoming
a parent is sustainable under the prevailing and probable future
social and economic regimes. Young people may well be more insecure
nowadays than other generations reaching adulthood in the post- war
period. In the decades following the World War Two, Europe
succeeded in two major and quite complementary objectives: full
employment on the one hand and a high level of social protection
from birth to death on the other. The addition of a social
component to market wages and the provision of a minimum income
replacement when wages were not forthcoming engendered an ethos of
security that has been recently eroded. In recent decades the
labour market and the welfare state have come into conflict as high
social expenditures have raised labour costs. Throughout Europe
welfare systems are under pressure and being rolled back under
market forces. This, together with industrial restructuring and its
attendant unemployment is generating a climate of insecurity that
cross-cuts all social classes - a situation that is more
reminiscent of the 1930s than the ensuing decades.
5. His and her transitions to parenthood
Across a range of domains the implications of becoming a parent
are markedly different for men and women. In this next section we
discuss parenthood in the context of work and home.
5.1. Employment careers
Women working prior to motherhood has been commonplace for a
relatively long time. Women's increasing attachment to the labour
market during motherhood is a more recent development. Mothers are
tending to return to the labour market sooner after the birth of
their babies and are increasingly unlikely to take extensive
periods out of the labour market to care for their children on a
full-time basis. This key and long term trend is having a
fundamental effect on the roles of men and women and the
organisation of society. Nevertheless, there continue to be
differences in labour market experiences of men and women which
primarily arise from the advent of parenthood and its
repercussions. A typical employment age profile for men could be
described as arch- shaped: employment rates rise as young men
complete their full-time education and enter the labour force.
Having entered the labour force most men remain there more or less
continuously (in the absence of unemployment and sickness) until
they retire. Across Europe age-patterns of male employment tend to
be very similar, with differences between countries arising in the
main from variation in educational participation at the entry point
to labour market careers and patterns of retirement at the exit
point. In contrast the employment profiles of women are more varied
after they have entered the labour market. To simplify, two main
patterns dominate in Europe. One where the age pattern of
employment is similar to the men's but at a lower level, with the
level of female participation varying between countries - high in
Denmark and Sweden, lower in France, West Germany and the United
Kingdom - and a second pattern in which participation tends to be
high at young ages and then falls from the twenties onwards, a
pattern common in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Southern
European countries.
Women, in the main mothers, compared with men (fathers) have
lower participation rates, are less likely to have continuous
employment careers and are also more likely to work part-time.
Part-time working is rare amongst men. For example, in most EC
countries the proportion of male employees working part time is
less than 5 per cent (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, 1994). In
contrast, for women it is typically much higher and varies a good
deal across European States. For example, the average across the
E12 member states was 30 per cent with a high of 58 per cent in the
Netherlands and levels of around 10 per cent in the Southern
European countries.
The different employment careers of men and women emanate
directly from the advent of motherhood and even from the prospect
of motherhood. Women may choose careers that are better suited to,
or are perceived to be better suited to, combining the roles of
worker and parent. On becoming mothers, women may also gravitate to
occupations or employment sectors that facilitate the combining of
the two roles. Downward occupational mobility or loss of seniority
is a common feature of women's career profiles following motherhood
(Commission of the European Communities and Eurostat, 1991).
Certain sectors, often the public sector, have more progressive
schemes and are better placed to facilitate the combining of family
and work roles. For example, in Sweden women are more likely to
transfer from private to public sector employment after they become
mothers, as the climate in the latter tends to be more family
friendly than in the former, where the companies may be smaller,
have less flexibility and fewer substitution possibilities than
public sector employers (Hoem, 1995).
Potential fatherhood is less likely to enter the decision
making process in men's choice of career, and becoming a father has
less of an impact on men's working lives than it has on women's.
That is not to say that men's employment patterns are unaffected by
their role as fathers; there is evidence that fathers are more
likely to work longer hours on average than non- fathers (Marsh,
1991), which may be necessary in order to compensate for a wife's
loss of earnings combined with the extra financial responsibilities
incurred with the arrival of a child. However this is not
invariably the case. For example, in Sweden where there are
established and relatively generous state provided parental leave
schemes, there is some evidence that fathers are working shorter
hours than non- fathers (Bernhardt, 1992). Undoubtedly, the major
change in the economic role of fathers has come with the employment
of mothers, which has altered their economic role from one of sole
provider to one of major co- provider.
Extensive sex segregation in the labour market, emanating from
the dual roles of women as workers and mothers, lies at the centre
of the income inequality between men and women (Gerson, 1985). Even
with controls for age, experience, educational attainment, and
hours worked, women's earnings remain below men's across the range
of occupational categories. Given earnings differentials between
men and women, it is unlikely that many families could afford to
substitute ®homemaker father¯ for ®homemaker mother¯. Thus women,
on making the transition to motherhood, will continue for some time
to be caught between the demands of home and workplace. However,
the proportion of women who earn more than their spouses is slowly
increasing, driven by two diametric forces. At one extreme, the
increased participation of women in higher education is reducing
salary differentials in the knowledge based, professional
occupations and at the other end employed women are increasingly
supporting unemployed husbands who are the casualties of industrial
re-structuring. Women are for whatever reason (choice, constraint
or tradition) more likely to take up lowly paid service jobs than
their male counterparts and in areas of high ®male¯ unemployment
take on the role of family provider (Machin and Waldfogel, 1994).
5.2. The domestic domain
Across Europe espoused attitudes and preferences for the roles
that men and women occupy within and without the home have become
more equitable over the last two decades but some marked variation
between nations persists (Kiernan, 1992). As we have discussed,
women have been increasingly participating in the paid labour
market and yet the division of labour in the domestic domain has
been slow to respond to this change. The growing literature and
surveys in this arena (Hochschild, 1990; Kempeneers and Lelievre,
1992) show that the division of labour, whether measured by number
of tasks or time budgets, is such that spouses who work outside the
home do not share equally in child-care and household tasks. Women
typically have responsibility for the daily organisation of the
household, household work, and do most of the routine tasks such as
meal preparation, cleaning and laundry. Households where both
parents work full-time are relatively more likely to share
responsibility for domestic tasks than household where partners
work part-time but even in these households the sharing of domestic
tasks remains a minority practice (Kiernan, 1992a).
Looking after children is a more popular activity amongst fathers
than the more routine housekeeping tasks and more men than in the
past may be taking an active role in the care of their children.
The forces that lie behind a later entry into motherhood - the rise
in women's educational attainment, increased attachment to the
labour market, occupational status and relative income - are also
the forces that have led women and children to want and need
fathers to be more involved at home. However, Lamb (1987) in his
review of large scale quantitative studies on fathering,
distinguished between three levels of interaction: engagement (for
example, feeding a child, playing); accessibility (cooking whilst
the child plays nearby); and responsibility (being the one who
makes sure the child gets what they need). Lamb noted that men
become more engaged and accessible but not more responsible for
their children if they have working wives.
Doubtless, the transition to parenthood increases the domestic
burden on both men and women but the burden still falls
disproportionately on the mother even if she is in full-time
employment. European economic, political and social structures may
have undergone major changes, yet somewhat surprisingly relations
within the domestic economy, where it is a matter of private
negotiation between men and women, have seemingly changed very
little.
6. Becoming a parent in Europe since the 1930s - a bold explanatory
sketch
In this section we outline the factors that seem most important
in explaining the movements in childlessness and in the timing of
entry into parenthood in Western Europe since the 1930s. This
sketch must be regarded as preliminary and does not do justice to
the nuances and interplays involved. We believe it is crucial to
try to see the wood rather than the trees. In the available space
we are unable to give the many qualifications regarding the factors
that we judge to be of secondary importance; nor are we able to pay
close attention to the diversity of timing and magnitude of the
major changes in different countries of Western Europe. We intend
to provide a fuller account elsewhere.
6.1. The 1930s
In many countries of Western Europe entry into parenthood was at
unprecedentedly low levels during the 1930s. To an extent, this was
the end of the first wave of the demographic transition in these
countries, but it is only in the past twenty years that such levels
of childlessness have been approached again, which suggests that
the levels were atypical. Indeed, the subsequent rise in entry into
parenthood in several countries during the 1939-45 War indicates
the attachment to parenthood of the generations involved. We
maintain that few couples had a serious and prolonged attachment to
childlessness; rather they were continually postponing becoming
parents because of the uncertainties involved.
Thus the key element in understanding the low rates of entry into
parenthood in several European countries during the 1930s is that
times were hard. The prolonged economic depression, with insecurity
of employment and often related difficulties in obtaining adequate
housing, was a critical factor. The insecurities involved in
becoming a parent during the 1930s were of course much greater than
today, owing to the poor development of the welfare state as a
means of ameliorating and smoothing the costs and chance variations
in the prolonged process of childrearing. A secondary factor was
that the generations of potential mothers were much larger than the
corresponding supply of men, largely as a result of the sex
differentials in mortality resulting from the 1914-18 War.
The low levels of entry into childhood through successful
postponement of the 1930s are all the more remarkable in the
context of the relatively ineffective methods of fertility control
available at that time. There must have been many more couples than
those who succeeded in avoiding entry into parenthood who
experienced accidental pregnancies through inability to control
fertility.
6.2. The 1939-45 War and its immediate aftermath
A surprising feature of the 1939-45 War is that entry into
parenthood increased in several European countries during a period
that might objectively be regarded as unpropitious. Not only did
War severely disrupt normal economic and social life. It also led
to widespread and often prolonged spousal separation. Why was there
nevertheless a rise in fertility?
A key factor (documented well for England and Wales in Hajnal's
(1950) careful and insightful work for the Royal Commission on
Population) was simply a consequence of the delayed entry into
parenthood of the 1930s. Many couples had reached a point where
biology was beginning to become of critical importance and further
delays would have meant permanent childlessness which was still
widely regarded as unacceptable. However, we believe that there was
more to the story and illustrate with reference to two of the main
protagonists. In Germany there was considerable pronatalist
pressure for Aryans to breed for the fatherland (e.g. Weindling,
1988). In Britain there was widespread nursery provision in order
to enable mothers to be employed for the war effort (Riley, 1983;
Soloway, 1990). In both countries there had been widespread concern
and public debate about unprecedentedly low levels of fertility
during the late 1930s. In both countries the War provided income
and employment for the soldiers and for women on a wide scale. War
also engenders greater fluidity of opportunity for sex outside
marriage and may have encouraged some couples to have a child in
case the father did not survive (an understandable cognitive
dissonance). Taken overall, these changes in income, relative costs
of rearing young children and related factors are non- trivial
factors in understanding the rises of fertility observed during the
1939-45 War.
Immediately after the War a post-war baby boom occurred. This was
the confluence of further postponed parenthood along with a flood
of new marriages. The return of peace, reestablishment of a more
normal economic and social life, the reunification of separated
couples and an intensification of earlier marriage (beginning
before the onset of War in many places) all led to a short term
surge in fertility and entry into parenthood.
6.3. The 1950s and 1960s
During this period those countries which had reached
unprecedentedly low levels of fertility before the 1939-45 War
experienced a prolonged rise in fertility, which saw an earlier
entry into parenthood and an increased propensity to become
parents. This post-war baby boom was widespread although differing
in extent; it was more muted in those countries where fertility had
remained higher (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988). This period saw
perhaps the final fling of the traditional breadwinner/homemaker
model for couples and yet it was during this time that the seeds of
the gradual destruction of this model were also emerging.
The modern welfare state was established predominantly in the
period following the 1939-45 War. This clearly changed the costs of
childbearing in substantial ways. The costs of education, health,
and welfare of children were increasingly covered by the state
rather than directly by the parents themselves. The provision of a
security blanket also considerably reduced the uncertainties
surrounding the future ability to provide for children.
The 1950s and 1960s were also a period of unprecedented economic
growth and real wages increased substantially. The advent of
Keynesian macroeconomic policies appeared to have created an era of
sustained permanent employment, thereby adding to the anticipated
security for parenthood. Moreover, the massive reconstruction of
housing following the War ultimately improved quality and access.
In the realm of ideas, we would see the widespread continuation
of compulsory conscription for males as breaking the nexus of home
attachment to their families of origin. This almost certainly
played a part in accelerating the establishment of independent
living, which usually involved marriage. In turn, this contributed
to earlier entry into parenthood.
6.4. The 1970s to today
If trends in entry into parenthood during the 1950s and 1960s
were driven predominantly by changes affecting men (wages,
conscription etc), we see changes concerning women as being a
critical element in the subsequent baby bust. Current period
estimates of levels of childlessness are approaching or exceed 30
per cent in many European countries (derived from Eurostat, 1994a).
The origins of some of these key changes can be traced back to
the 1939-45 War (and have roots even further back). During the War
women experienced unprecedented levels of employment and were then
returned to more traditional roles of motherhood and homemaking.
But throughout the post-war period female labour force
participation has been increasing. The (stylised) traditional
parenthood and domestic contract was based upon a sexual division
of labour whereby the man engaged in the labour force and the woman
maintained the home and nurtured the family. With increased female
labour force participation the pressure on the work- family-leisure
nexus for women became increasingly unequal. The renegotiation of
the domestic and parenthood contracts has been a prolonged and
difficult task, which is by no means yet complete. Of course,
increased attachment and participation in the labour force by women
also involved substantial, gradual and again incomplete changes in
attitudes and opportunity structures. The costs of an (as yet
unachieved) egalitarian structure are considerable. If both
partners have a substantial investment in and attachment to the
labour force then the time available for household maintenance and
childrearing is reduced considerably. Small wonder that modern
couples find the pressures of becoming parents more daunting than
earlier generations, despite the advent of the small domestic
engine (e.g. washing machines and vacuum cleaners) and a few other
changes which have reduced time required for household maintenance
tasks.
Another key factor in delayed parenthood has been the advent of
reliable means of fertility control. Since the mid-1960s we have
seen widespread availability and resort to the contraceptive pill,
the IUD, surgical sterilization, and safe, legal abortion. Probably
at least a third of the rapid fertility reduction that occurred in
the decade from the mid-1960s was directly attributable to improved
means of fertility control (see estimates for England and Wales in
Hobcraft, 1990, and Murphy, 1993, and for the US in Preston, 1986).
This breaking of the intimate connection between sex and
reproduction had asymmetrical gender consequences. Women were much
more likely to bear the consequences of an unwanted birth than men
and the ability to avoid this helped women in particular to explore
their sexuality better and also reduced the occurrence of ®shotgun¯
marriages following accidental pregnancy. It also became much
easier effectively to delay becoming a parent and this period
witnessed a considerable lengthening of the interval from marriage
to birth.
A further major change during this era has been the changing
patterns of partnership. Marriage has become a more fragile
institution, with increasing resort to divorce. Cohabitation has
become much more widespread and in parts of Europe it has become
increasingly common and acceptable for children to be born and, to
a lesser extent, reared outside marriage. Thus any couple deciding
whether to enter parenthood is faced with greater uncertainty about
the security of the partnership than ever before. The consequences
for the parenthood contract, following partnership breakdown or
where childbearing occurs outside formal marriage, are
considerable. Legislative and attitudinal changes are happening in
a piecemeal fashion to ensure inheritance rights for children and
to reduce gender inequities in the responsibilities for financing
and rearing children.
Economic circumstances have also changed dramatically. Throughout
Europe there is now considerable structural unemployment. Entry
into the paid labour force and subsequent asset accumulation is
delayed both by extended training and by youth unemployment.
Employment security is no longer able to be taken for granted.
Economic growth is equally not to be presumed. These factors both
delay achievement of the ®basic requirements¯ for becoming a parent
and increase the levels of uncertainty about future security.
Related to the economic downturns and also to the emergence in
several countries of a ®new right¯ has been widespread reduction in
the attachment to the welfare state, although this is variable.
Since we have argued that the welfare state played a significant
role in reducing both direct costs and levels of uncertainty for
potential parent during the 1950s and 1960s, any rolling back of
the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s can only serve to inhibit
parenthood further.
6.5. Current regional variations in Western Europe
For convenience of exposition, we shall divide Western European
countries into two broad groups determined by their levels of
fertility in 1992. Those countries with a total fertility rate
below 1.7 births per woman (from lowest to higher fertility levels
comprising: Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece, Austria, Portugal,
Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) will be
labelled ®Southeastern'. The remaining countries, with higher total
fertility (France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway,
Ireland, Sweden, and Iceland in increasing order of TFR) will be
labelled ®Northwestern'. We use levels of total fertility since
estimates of period levels of childlessness are not easily
available, although there is some evidence to suggest that the rank
ordering would be similar. The contrasts are most extreme between
southern Europe and Scandinavia.
With a few exceptions and some blurring at the arbitrary dividing
line, these two broad groups of countries can be characterised as
having important differences in several of the key factors that we
have earlier identified as affecting the choice to become parents.
Becoming a parent outside formal marriage is much more widespread
in Northwestern Europe, with over 30 per cent of all births
occurring outside formal marriage (with Ireland being an exception,
although rapidly moving towards conformity); in Southeastern Europe
this proportion is 16 per cent or below (with Austria being a
partial exception and having a long history of marriage following
very shortly after a birth - Prinz, 1995). In terms of partnership
patterns, cohabitation levels are higher in Northwestern Europe and
divorce levels are also somewhat higher, although this differential
is narrowing. Thus, the Southeastern countries are still more
traditional in that childbearing and childrearing are more likely
to take place within formal marriage and with both parents present;
concomitantly levels of lone parenthood are much higher in
Northwestern Europe. It is probably not at all surprising that
breakdown of traditional norms regarding partnership stability and
childbearing within marriage have changed least in predominantly
Catholic southern European countries and most in the social
democratic Scandinavian countries.
The Southeastern countries are also more traditional in that
female labour force participation upon becoming a parent tends to
be lower, as outlined above. Thus the opportunity costs of
motherhood are greater and the family is more commonly supported
from a single income. Moreover, overall levels of unemployment,
especially for youths, are higher in southern European countries,
making the establishment of the requirements for economic security
and adequate housing more difficult to achieve.
At the state level, the Northwestern countries typically provide
more generous parental leave and have a higher level of commitment
to the welfare state (again strongest in Scandinavia and weakest in
southern Europe) in terms of a huge range of parental and social
security benefits, although there is much individual variation here
(see Snyder, 1992, for a useful compilation). Thus, it is made
easier to become a parent in the Northwestern countries, since time
and economic costs are more likely to be met or smoothed out by the
state. We make no causal statement about the direction of linkage
between more generous state provision for parents, including that
for lone parents, and levels of extra marital childbearing; there
are probably mutual reciprocities here.
Thus, in Southeastern Europe, becoming a parent involves a
greater commitment to marriage and its security, a lesser
attachment to female labour force participation, a greater
insecurity of employment prospects (especially in southern Europe)
and less state support for parenthood. The low resulting entry into
parenthood is hardly surprising.
In Northwestern Europe, legislation, state provision and
behaviour has come to terms with greater fluidity of partnership
patterns and increased incidence of childbearing outside marriage
and of entry into lone parenthood following divorce and other
partnership breakdown. Women are more likely to remain attached to
the labour force after becoming mothers and there is often more
opportunity for part-time employment. Although structural
unemployment exists, it is at lower levels than in southern Europe,
and state provision is typically but not always more generous than
in Southeastern Europe. Thus childbearing occurs in an environment
where security of employment is somewhat greater and the state
makes a greater contribution to easing the costs of parenthood
either directly or through legislative constraints on employers
(e.g. to meet costs of parental leave).
This sketch thus draws upon patterns of ideas (commitment to
parenting within marriage), on direct and opportunity costs of
childbearing (for the individual and the state), on differences in
time available for parenting (parental leave and female labour
force behaviour), and upon issues of medium- term security
(employment prospects, partnership stability, and welfare state
smoothing of risks).
It is arguable that southern Catholic countries are stronger on
ideational pronatalist support, but that Scandinavian countries are
stronger on practical state support for parenthood; the harsh
realities of today's situation means that tangible help has more
pronatalist force than rhetoric.
We have also partially linked our sketch to the basic
requirements for becoming a parent outlined above. There are clear
differences in the levels of attachment to long term partnership
required in the two broad regions. The patterns of education and
training in modern, complex societies are less clearly structured
across Europe. Housing markets and provision also differ widely
around Europe.
The other key aspect is gender equity. In Southeastern Europe
women have to make a sharper choice upon becoming a parent, since
there are greater expectations that they will withdraw from the
labour force on becoming a mother. This certainly makes the
decision to become a mother harder, both because of the loss of
income and attachment to her career. In contrast, women of
Northwestern Europe face difficult consequences in time
allocation. Commitment to the labour force is greater and leisure
is thus more likely to be foregone. It is possible that the
opportunity costs of foregone income and consumption (as in
Southeastern Europe) are regarded as more difficult to cope with
than the opportunity costs of foregone time and leisure (as in
Northwestern Europe).
There is some evidence that men in Northwestern Europe play a
greater role in domestic tasks. This might be a response to two
income families having to renegotiate the domestic division of
labour more extensively. There are once again interesting contrasts
between the rhetoric and the actuality. For example, Spain has an
inegalitarian domestic division of labour (Kempeneers and Lelievre,
1992), but a shows a relatively strong attitudinal commitment to
egalitarian roles (Kiernan, 1992).
6.6. The next millennium?
The formidable array of factors operating to inhibit entry into
parenthood throughout Europe at the moment poses difficult issues
for the social, political and economic reproduction of Europe. Will
current generations ultimately decide that becoming a parent is
essential, despite not being ideal? Or will we see sustained and
long term childlessness, which becomes ever more acceptable?
The series of important constraints outlined above certainly act
to inhibit parenthood. A major problem, especially for those
couples who both wish or need to remain active in the labour force,
is finding the time to nurture children or generating the income to
enable purchase of substitute childcare. Parenthood is easier to
achieve in those European countries which provide most generous
state support to parents, including parental leave and other forms
of support. The higher rates of entry into parenthood and the
consequent higher levels of fertility in Scandinavian countries
probably partly result from this more generous provision. We see
little prospect of the constraints on becoming parents for
individual couples reducing in the near future without societal
intervention. Since children are widely regarded as important
public goods it is possible that the intense public debates of the
1930s will reemerge and lead to a shift towards greater state
effort to smooth out the problems of time or expenditure through
enhanced welfare and leave entitlements. But we are mindful of the
view of Glass (1940), who put the problem thus: ®However urgently
governments may have declared their desire to increase the supply
of births, they have nevertheless persistently tried to buy babies
at bargain prices¯. Even with the modern welfare state it is not
clear that the populace are prepared to have babies at the price
paid by the state (though few policies are as explicitly
pronatalist as this might be taken to imply). With long-term
structural unemployment and the increasing numbers of older people,
there are other foci of electoral demand for increased state
expenditures on social security, pensions and health services.
Unless a much stronger commitment to the need for more children as
future citizens and workers emerges than seems currently likely we
see little prospect of a resurgence in parenthood. But we may
thereby be underestimating the power of biological and social
pressures to reproduce.
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_______________________________
* This paper has benefitted from our many
stimulating discussions with Bob Michael and
our colleagues in the Department of Social
Policy and Administration at LSE. Only the
authors can be held responsible for any
flaws.
We also wish to acknowledge support
provided to Kathleen Kiernan by the Economic
and Social Research Council of the United
Kingdom under grant number L315 25 3015.