UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
|
| UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) |
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This document is being made available by the Population Information
Network (POPIN) Gopher of the United Nations Population Division,
Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis,
in collaboration with the European Association for Population
Studies and the IUSSP. For further information please contact
Professor G.C. Blangiardo, Local Organizer, EAPS Conference, Milan,
University of Milan, Istituto di Statistica, V. Visconti di Modrone
21, Milan, Italy.
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EUROPEAN POPULATION CONFERENCE
CONGRES EUROPEEN DE DEMOGRAPHE
Milano, 4-8 settembre 1995
OPENING SESSION
Population issues in Europe
by Charlotte Hoe”hn
1. Population issues - the political flavour
This is the third European Population Conference jointly
organized by the European Association for Population Studies
(Eaps), the International Union for the Scientific Study of
Population (Iussp) and a national consortium of population
research institutions. The latter this time are our Italian
colleagues to whom we are particularly grateful for their
intellectual and organizational input including their successful
efforts to obtain the necessary funding.
This conference is not to be confounded with the European
Population Conference 1993 in Geneva which led to the International
Conference on Population and Development 1994 (Icpd) in Cairo.
These conferences were political-diplomatic, intergovernmental
conferences. There aim was not the scientific debate, the exchange
of recent findings or refined methodology.
Some demographers attended the European Population Conference
1993 in Geneva or the Icpd in Cairo as members of their national
delegation. Others represented the Eaps or the Iussp or other
nongovernmental organisations. But individual scholars were not
admitted, not even as observers.
Much to the regret of most of us attending the Icpd or the
European Population Conference in Geneva (though there were
scientific presentations as part of the official programme)
scientific findings were rather ignored, if not rejected. The
intergovernmental conferences deal with population issues from a
clearly political perspective.
Our conference here will be a forum for discussing population
studies in a strictly scientific way, that means without vested
interests or, as we say in scholarly Latin, sine ira et studio. The
terms in the names of the convening associations, that is
®population studies¯ and ®scientific study of population¯ are
programmatic. The organizing associations have only individual
members. Every participants is speaking here in her/his personal
capacity as a scholar.
Unlike the Icpd or the European Population Conference 1993 in
Geneva we do not aim at adopting recommendations, declarations or
a programme of action. We publish the plenary papers in this
volume, and we hope that many contributed papers to the sessions
will be published too.
The nature of our work is scientific, not political. And yet,
we have to be aware that our work, with very few exceptions, is
always close to politics. This results from our subject of study -
population. My introduction to this conference - at the same time
the presidential address of the outgoing President of Eaps - will
try to illuminate some aspects of this closeness of population
studies to politics. I will then comment on the main themes of the
conference, on the themes of the plenaries and sessions, by showing
how, where and why they became politically relevant as population
issues in Europe. In that sense this paper also intends to be an
introduction to this volume and to the conference.
2. The political underpinning of population
There will be few constitutions that explicitly mention
population or population- related objectives. But most certainly
most constitutions will mention the people. Presidents, prime
ministers and ministers give their solemn oath to promote the
wellbeing of their people.
Does ®people¯ mean the same as ®population¯? When the newly
elected German President Herzog said he wanted to be the president
of the entire German people he was suspected by parts of the media
to have excluded the non-German residents in Germany who are
covered by the constitution too, though with certain exceptions.
Perhaps the German word for ®people¯ (Volk) evokes more misgivings
than it does elsewhere - for obvious historical reasons. Herzog
ever thereafter is more precise by addressing all residents of
Germany, mentioning explicitly the foreigners.
Indeed, demographers usually believe to be very clear when
they use the word ®population¯ (all inhabitants of a given
territory, be it of the whole world, a country, or a specific
region, like lombardia). But the risk that the users of their
findings mix up ®population¯ with ®people¯, often understood as
national population, remains big. In population studies, and
incidentally also in the Icpd Programme of Action, ®people¯ refers
to indigenous people or ethnical homogeneous populations. If we
want to avoid one source of being labeled conservative or, worse,
nationalist we have to specify who are the members of the
population studied.
In the numerous speeches of politicians, and particularly
during election campaigns, they address programmes and measures for
the whole population or for specific population groups, like women,
the foreigners, children, the elderly, the poor, the farmers, the
unemployed, and so on and so forth. They indeed use the word
®population¯, and that cements the conviction that our demographic
analysis of such sub-populations is the analysis of political
target groups. This is not our intention, but we nevertheless
produce information on specific groups of population.
The results of our studies on fertility decline, changing
family structures, population ageing, or on the dynamics of the
foreign population are also used in political discourse. And we
demographers cannot stop certain politicians giving them a grim,
alarmist interpretation. We cannot avoid the political flavouring
of our research. But we should never encourage politization of our
studies by making value statements ourselves. Our own style should
be scientific and sober.
Finally, everybody in our own audience, whether policy-maker
or public at large, is a member of the population. Whether our
findings match with the personal experience, or are the opposite,
or are in sharp contradiction to their personal convictions, they
will either believe us or not. They believe to be experts based on
their own experience. If our findings hurt their convictions we
might be accused to persue political intentions. If we like it or
not: our work by its very subject is close to politics.
3. Population studies, demographers and population issues
It is usually not the prime purpose of demographic studies to
provide information for policy makers. Demographers rather want to
increase their understanding of demographic phenomena and their
dynamics and determinants. They want to test their methods,
theories and hypothesis.
There are however quite a number of demographers who are in
charge of advising policy-makers. These are working in national
demographic research institutes. Others are seeking government
support for their research and apply for funding of projects. It is
only natural that such projects should cover themes that are of
interest to the government, themes that are population issues.
Potential population issues usually are identified by
demographers. When they succeed to convince policy-makers that
there is a new demographic trend or phenomenon with a possible
impact on policies then perhaps policy-makers will promote this
population phenomenon to a population issue. The only exception in
the sequence seems to be the concept of reproductive health. It
emerged from fieldworkers and activists via a few governments to
all the government delegates preparing the Icpd. The lack of
scientific literature and studies made the negociations in New York
and in Cairo quite difficult. There can be no doubt that the new
reproductive health issue will command much government-sponsored
research.
Whatever research we demographers carry out, be it
commissioned by our government or international agencies or out of
pure scientific curiosity, we should always bear in mind that
population consists of human beings, that any demographic indicator
sums up individual experience, that we particularly abstain from
value judgements and political interpretation. Sine ira et studio
should be the spirit of any research. This is essential for all
population studies, and in particular when they are dealing with
population issues.
Even if some of us engage ®only¯ in methodological research,
developing models, they are not completely on the safe side. Unless
they do not just publish the formal aspects as pure mathematics but
demonstrate the merits of their model by applying them to certain
phenomena which are population issues they may encounter
misunderstandings. A model on the dynamics of the migrant
population might be labeled as xenophobic, a model on Hiv/Aids as
inhumane.
Those engaged in advising policy-makers should be strictly
objective and should only maintain what they can scientifically
prove. Advising in population matters is close to politics, but
such demographers are not and must not be policy-makers. Such
colleagues should bravely abstain from giving any ®recipees¯ on
measures to be taken.
There will be no success or progress in research without
theories and derived hypothesis to be tested. There is also no
meaningful advise to policy-makers without explaining determinants
of demographic change. It is then to them to decide whether they
are able and willing to address these determinants politically. Any
reasoning and empirical testing must be guided by theoretical
deliberations. In Plenary VI, Guillaume Wunsch will deal with ®"God
has chosen to give the easy problems to the physicists" or why
demographers need theory¯. This obviously is a rethoric question.
Theories are essential.
Many demographers are disappointed that their findings are not
appreciated or even ignored by policy-makers. Population studies
are fascinating enough, even if they are ®only¯ noticed by the
scientific community. We demographers do not determine what
population issues are. This depends on the perception of
governments.
I will now discuss the emergence and ®career¯ of population
issues in Europe. This will have a certain personal angle, many
examples will start in Germany. But I will do my best to expand it
as far as I am able to do to Europe.
4. Fertility decline
When I entered the world of population studies in 1970 as a
research assistant in statistics at the University of
Frankfurt/Main my professor felt it timely to study the recent
phenomenon of fertility decline in West-Germany. It was for
scientific curiosity and for teaching purposes of my professor.
At that time, I had not had the opportunity to study
demography. So my first step was to read the only two available
books in the library of the Institute of Statistics: Pressat's
Analyse Demographique and Mackenroth's sociological manual, a kind
of German version of the demographic transition theory, and at the
same time a clear refutation of the so-called race theories and
eugenics of the Nazi period. Lateron I, of course, read many other
influential books and articles on demography.
But I also followed the newspapers on the topic of birth
decline, which the journalists called ®Pillenknick¯ (the pill
bend), thus trying to ®explain¯ the decline by the increased use of
the contraceptive pill since the mid-sixties.
Later when working in the statistical office and assisting in
advising our government we could not only show that such a
fertility decline had occured in many other comparable countries,
but also, and this was even more relevant, that we experienced a
second fertility decline, and that the first one was much bigger.
Our policy-makers in that period of social- liberal government
were relieved to hear that double message. They could refer to
statistical evidence which freed them of the reproach of the
christian-democrat opposition to be responsible for that decline in
fertility.
For us demographers it opened the horizon for our search for
the determinants of fertility decline. It clearly was not just a
German phenomenon.
The phenomenon of the second fertility decline was one of the
reasons to establish the BiB, the Federal Institute on Population
Research, in Wiesbaden in 1973.
In France, the first fertility decline since the turn of the
19th century was the rationale to found the Ined in 1945. We are
celebrating the 5oth anniversary of the Ined this year.
The determinants and consequences of the first and the second
fertility decline remained the leading subject of research in most
western, northern and eastern European countries at least until the
end of the seventies. Questions whether the fertility decline was
only a fluctuation or a change in timing were hotly debated
whenever demographers met. I remember that some waited for the
realization of postponed birth until the late seventies. Other
colleagues firmly believed that the ®extremely low¯ fertility of
1.5 in West- Germany were the ultimate lowest level, and that
Germans were too pessimistic to assume the continuation of this
extremely low level in their population projections.
No demographer had predicted the low fertility, and virtually
every demographer was taken by surprise that fertility in southern
Europe would ever follow, not to mention surpass the German low
level.
One of the possible explanations I have of this incredulity of
some demographers was their firm believe in the existence of a
lower barrier, and in the necessary redressment of fertility to the
somehow magical replacement level. It has its origin in the then
leading paradigm of the model of demographic transition, based on
historical experience in Europe what concerns the onset, but based
on a non-empirical trust in a new equilibrium.
As we all know by now there is no such new equilibrium at
replacement level. It is amazing to note that the colleagues from
the UN Population Division in their latest 1994 round of population
projections in the medium variant bring back Europe's fertility to
replacement level. Did they overlook not only persistent trends but
also theoretical approaches (and I mention only a few published in
English) like Westhoff's article on the irreversibility of low
fertility, Schmid's report for the Council of Europe on the
background of fertility decline in Europe, van de Kaa's publication
on Europe's second demographic transition or Mackensen's thesis on
continuous transition?
From these and other analysis on the determinants of low
fertility we have learnt a lot:
a) that there is no single determinant of fertility but a
syndrom of determinants with varying importance regionally and over
time;
b) that the big majority of these determinants cannot be
easily influenced by policy-makers, unless one could create a
completely new society;
c) that this theoretically feasible new society would clash
with other more important goals and values of society;
d) that the advanced societies with their individual-centered
economies and policies are blind to the needs of children and
families;
e) that this ®blindness¯ or ®ruthlessness¯ is largely
unintended;
f) and, dear colleagues, that the population issue of low
fertility is far from being in the center of political interest.
The issue of fertility decline in Europe existed for a few
years in western, central and eastern Europe. But the UN/Council of
Europe/Unfpa European Population Conference 1993 in Geneva does not
reflect any serious concern on low fertility any longer.
Politically it has lost importance, with a few exeptions perhaps in
countries where the phenomenon occured only recently. But the
spectacular fall to very low fertility in East Germany is not a
major concern in German political circles. And German demographers
only speculate how long it will take to recover and to which level.
One of the present tasks of German demographers is it to draw the
political and public attention to the fact that fertility has
stabilized in West Germany since roughly 20 years, and that is no
longer justified to speak of fertility decline but of a persistent
low fertility level there and in a number of other European
countries.
Since we still do not fully understand the determinants of
fertility change (and perhaps never will) the Ece has launched a
new round of internationally comparable Family and Fertility
Surveys (Ffs) in the nineties. We will have a session on the Ffs
results in this conference. The subject is still fascinating, and
we want to increase our insights. It will remain on our research
agenda even if it is no longer the population issue number one.
In Plenary I, John Hobcraft and Kathleen Kiernan will give us
an assessment of the state of art on fertility under the title
®Becoming a parent in Europe¯.
5. Population ageing
Already in the seventies, the issue of fertility decline gave
way to the issue of population ageing. These issues are of course
related to each other, an aspect that I will comment after a few
introductory remarks.
It is remarkable that the gradual increase in the percentage
of elderly persons ever since fertility started to decline in
Europe did not attract very much attention, neither of
demographers, nor of policy-makers, until the first population
projections revealed a decline in population. A decline of
population was something really new, and since new developments are
perceived with a certain shock it is not surprising that Teitelbaum
and Winters titled their book ®The fear of population decline¯.
Again it was the task of demographers to explain that not
population decline as such was the challenge but rather the
concommittant change in the age structure: population ageing. The
other task was to show where the possible consequences of this
change require attention, and to point out whether this population
ageing was inevitable or not.
When the first population projections in West Germany showed
that the German population would age more and more, that was in
1974, the German government established an interministerial working
group to study the consequences. The report of this group was
published in two parts in 1980 and 1984. The main consequences were
seen in the securing of the pension system. Later in 1989 a reform
of the pension system passed parliament, changing the adaption of
the pension level from the gross to the net incomes of the active
population, and increasing after 2000 the age at retirement.
The reliance on the flexibility of the market economy to the
changing age structure, both concerning shifts in demand and
production and concerning the ageing labour force, were
underscored. In the 90s a parliamentary committee published a
futher report, in which the ageing and declining labour force was
envisaged to become relevant only after one or two more decades and
then to be overcome by a mix of options like increasing female
labour force participation, an expansion of age at retirement,
rationalization to more capital- intensive production including
the possibilities of new technologies, and a recruitment of
foreigners.
At any of such working group activities with government
officials or parliamentarians we demographers are asked what can
be done to stop population ageing. This is first of all the
occasion for a crash course in demography. We will have to remind
policy-makers that a given age structure is historically grown and
shaped by fertility, mortality and international migration in the
past century. This age structure determines to a non negligible
degree the future numbers of births and deaths.
The next remarks relate to the speed and duration of
demographic change in the past. The longer fertility decline
occurred, the slowlier population ages. But pronatalist efforts, if
successful at all, would require a likewise long time until
population ageing would stop.
Nobody would desire a fall in life expectancy, and yet, it
enhances population ageing. It is interesting to note that
mortality-related ageing from the top of the age pyramid was
®discovered¯ as an ageing determinant rather late. In many of the
older manuals and articles on ageing one can still read that only
falling and low fertility determines population ageing. This is
true until life expectancy passes the threshold of 70 years, as
Myers demonstrated the surprised colleagues at the Iussp General
Conference in 1981. Gains in further life expectancy largely are
due to declines of the mortality of the elderly. The old old hence
increase in number more rapidly than the young old.
The third factor, international migration with typically young
immigrants can juvenate the population in the medium term. But
immigrants age too, and if they acquire the same pension rights as
the native population they in the long run contribute to the ageing
of the population. Only large-scale, continous immigration can stop
the ageing process while the percentage of immigrant or
foreign-born population rises considerably.
The message in the end is that the issue of population ageing
has to be tackeled with adaptation policies to unavoidable
demographic change.
All these messages of demographers rely on model calculations
with more or less realistic assumptions on fertility, mortality and
international migration. The crucial point is that the already
living population with its historically grown age structure can not
be changed. It has its own dynamics.
This is also true for household projections were a number of
additional assumptions on nuptiality and divorce, living informally
together and separation, on the timing of children leaving the
parental household have to be made. For good reasons - because such
models are still a methodological challenge - we have a special
session on population and household projections on our conference
programme.
But model calculations with additional characteristics, like
level of education or acquired pension rights, can also show that
the future elderly will be quite different from the elderly today.
They will have a higher level of education and therefore will more
competent. More future older women will be financially more
independent having a more complete working history than older women
today. Longer spells of unemployment, particularly in the countries
in transition, might counteract this slightly brighter picture of
the elderly of the future. Nevertheless, the message on the
difference between the elderly of today and in the future is
particularly important to convey to policy-makers.
The increasing number of the elderly, often living in
one-person households, has given rise to new research challenges,
namely on ageing and generational solidarity. Official data usually
only enumerate households, that is strictly coresident persons. But
does the number and percentage of one-person households really
indicate that the different generations of family members do not
communicate? In political discourse we often must hear the warnings
of the increasing isolation and loneliness of the elderly. Under
theme IV Giovanni Sgritta will speak to us on ®New forms of social
organizations and interpersonal relationships in ageing societies¯.
Though the ageing issue with all its thinkable consequences
and aspects is still high on the political agenda it seems to have
less priority among researchers. The organizing committee had to
merge the planned three sessions on ageing into two, much to our
surprise. But then, quantity must not been confounded with quality.
6. International migration
There can be no doubt that immigration and emigration has
demographic effects on the age structure, regional distribution and
socio-economic structure of a population. Migrant populations show
differences in the level of fertility, nuptiality and mortality,
and their own age structure is younger than that of the receiving
population. All these differences are since long subject of
population studies. One of the obstacle encountered is the lack of
data both on flows and stocks of migrants in many countries. The
session on ®Demographic data for comparative studies¯ will
certainly discuss these lacunae.
International migration and, in particular, immigration is
also a political issue in many southern, western, and northern
European countries. But at present, it is not a population issue.
Policy-makers are concerned about the capability of their country
to integrate immigrants into the labour market in times of
wide-spread unemployment, to provide adequate housing and support,
and to avoid xenophobic reactions of the receiving population.
It is therefore very pertinent that in Plenary III Rainer Mnz
will address the issue of ®Where did they all come from? Typology
and geography of European mass migration in the twentieth century¯.
These are the political issues at stake. And since they are very
controversial political issues it is highly desirable that
population studies are provided to give a sound and objective basis
to the assessment and perception of the situation and to the
formulation and implementation of policies.
The sessions on ®Demographic and socio- economic indicators
of the assimilation/integration of migrants¯, ®Changing migration
strategies and migration networks¯ and on ®The demography of
religious and ethnic groups, refugees and asylum seekers¯ will deal
with this sensitive issue as well.
The issue of international migration, I just said, is not a
population issue at present. When discussing the ageing issue I,
however, mentioned that immigration in the long run might be one of
the political options to augment and juvenate the labour force. The
demographic dimensions will then blend with economic and social
ones.
Concerning the assertion that immigration at present is not a
population issue I have to add a serious comment. Most of us will
have heard the argument in public debates that immigrants are
attracted by the ®demographic vacuum¯ in Europe. The authors of
such erroneous messages want to encourage the populations concerned
to fill the alleged ®demographic vacuum¯ with babies instead of
immigrants. They are alarmist and unwilling to understand the
determinants of international migration.
We demographers should do much more than to date indeed to
investigate the determinants of international migration. Concerning
the silly and dangerous ®vacuum¯- argument, I already said at other
occasions that, most likely, immigrants do not read population
statistics or studies. And if they did they would easily discern
that in their age groups there is no ®vacuum¯, but rather high
unemployment. No, they are not attracted by our demographic
situation. They want to have part of the prosperity of wealthy
economies and of the security of democracies and welfare states.
They want to escape poverty and/or war and persecution.
It is not impossible that they also are pushed by rapid
population growth in their countries, which entails limited
opportunities for education, jobs and career. There might be a
demographic push factor of international migration, but there
certainly is not a demographic pull factor.
The study of the root causes of emigration in the different
regions of the world should have top priority. We must know much
more about the different economic, social, environmental,
political, and demographic reasons of emigration and their
interrelationships.
7. Mortality decline and differentials
When I was a young demographer in the early 70s it was taken
for granted that everywhere in the world mortality would decline
and nothing else. In Europe, there were a few speculations on the
upper limit of life expectancy, there was the competition for the
lowest infant mortality rate, there were discussions on how to
smooth death probabilities. Mortality specialist worked on this or
that sophisticated methodological problem. But, to sum it up,
mortality was neither at the forefront of demographic research - it
was in the shadow of fertility analysts - nor a population issue.
It was only consequent with that state of the art that the
population projections in the 70s in Germany would keep mortality
constant to show the dominant effect of fertility decline. One of
the prices of this ®didactic¯ neglection of mortality decline
(which we took for granted, but less influential than fertility
decline) was a considerable underestimation of the number of the
old old, and in the already mentioned government report the
complete absence of discussion on costs of health care due to
ageing and on the issue of long term care. The remarkable decline
of mortality of the elderly in the 80s and more pertinent
population projections cured that demographic blindness.
The so-called theory of demographic transition also claimed
that in the pretransitional period there are no differentials, that
these widen during the transitional period, and finally disappear.
It was convincingly shown that these features of demographic
transition indeed applied to fertility differentials. So, why not
also to mortality differentials? At the first joint Eaps/Iussp
conference, co-organized with our Finnish colleagues in Jyv„skyl„
in 1987 the organizing committee invited a plenary paper with the
somewhat lyric title ®Inequalities in the face of death¯. At that
time I was deeply convinced that such differentials by education or
social class would be negligible and about to disappear as
fertility differentials did. Much to my surprise Tapani Valkonen,
the author of that paper, presented enormous differentials.
Whatever I have read and heard in the meantime confirms the
persistence of these indeed unpleasant and undesirable mortality
differentials. This conference also devotes a session to
®Socioeconomic inequalities in morbidity and mortality¯.
The other shock in the 80s was to learn that in a number of
East European countries and in the former Soviet Union mortality
did not decline, did not obey to what had been considered a natural
development, but that mortality stagnated and in some cases, mainly
for middle aged men, even increased. It is only obvious that in
these countries, and particularly now that they are countries in
transition, this issue of health, morbidity and mortality has
become a major population issue. We will receive ample illustration
on this issue by Jerzy Z. Holzer in his Plenary II paper entitled
®From state to market economy: the population dimension¯. A
discussion on the implications and causes can also be expected from
the session on ®Health, working conditions and environmental
stress¯.
But even in circumstances of increasing longevity it is timely
to investigate healthy ageing. It is likewise a political issue, to
what age the old and the old old can live independently or with the
help of family and friends or to what degree specialized hospitals
and nursing institutions have to be provided. Jacques Vallin will
address these themes in his Plenary paper ®Life expectancy and
health: what quantity for what quality of life?¯.
The relatively late interest of demographers in health and
morbidity studies confronts them with a dearth or complete absence
of data and trends. The sessions on ®Health and mortality:
concepts, levels and trends¯ and on ®Demographic data for
comparative studies¯ will show examples of surveys necessary to
increase our knowledge.
8. The demographic impact of policies
®Which policies have a demographic impact?¯ is the title of
Plenary VIII chaired by Massimo Livi Bacci. I am sure it will be a
most interesting debate. Since this is a panel discussion I, of
course, have no idea what the answers will be. So let me try to
present you my personal assessment (H”hn, 1987 and 1989).
The question which policies have a demographic impact is both
a classic topic of population research and a political issue.
During the 25 years I follow the debate I notice a gradual
expansion of the concept from population policy to population-
related policies,or, as I prefer to say, population-relevant
policies.
Population policy in its precise definition comprises all
those policies which are directed, more or less explicitly, to
influence fertility, nuptiality, mortality, and internal and
international migration.
In a more narrow and often polemic view population policy is
seen reduced to either pronatalist policy, typically suspected to
exist in low fertility countries, or to antinatalist policy,
typically feared to be imposed on women of the Third World.
There can be no doubt that the pronatalist policy in Nazi
Germany was racist and hence to be condemned. It also is obvious
that forced sterilisations or forced abortions in some countries of
the Third World are inacceptable, coercive measures. Any coercion
rightly has to be refused. It also is no consolation or excuse if
demographers point out that such policies did have only a small
demographic impact. Any violation of the human right to decide
freely, responsibly and informed on the number and spacing of
births must be avoided.
The issue of population policy is particularly sensitive and
requires the observation of high ethical principles.
As I said in the beginning population policy is not just
fertility-related policy. It also comprises policies to reduce
morbidity and mortality, and to increase health and quality of
life. There will be no country in the world without such health
policies, though some will need an improvement of their health
system and infrastructure, others better and more pertinent
education and information on healthy life styles. It remains a
fascinating research topic to measure the impact of such policies
and measures on morbidity and mortality.
There will be no country in Europe without any laws on the
minimum age at marriage, on divorce or the rights and obligations
of married and unmarried couples and their children. A number of
studies have been carried out to measure the demographic impact of
such laws, and the problem is still unsolved whether such laws are
normative or whether they follow and ®legalize¯ changed patterns of
behaviour.
There are measures and policies to influence the regional
distribution of the population, most of them by making certain
regions more attractive than others. And even the administrative
distribution of immigrants exist, e.g of arriving ethnic Germans
and asylum-seekers in Germany. During and after the Second World
War there were imposed numerous waves of large-scale forced
resettlements. Another, alas, actual example of forced migration
happens on the territory of former Jugoslavia.
There are also policies and regulations on international
migration and on immigrants. One of the sharpest controlls of
emigration was effectuated by the Iron Curtain. It has disappeared,
and emigration could start. While the right to leave a country is
a human right, sovereign countries have the right to controll
immigration, there is no corresponding right of immigration.
Demographers show the surprised policy- makers that free movement
within the European Union has not resulted in more migration, and
that migratory streams from the countries in transition turn out to
be less dramatic than feared after the opening of the Iron Curtain.
It does not matter that the policies I briefly discussed
usally are not called population policies but health policy, family
law policies, regional development policies, or immigration and/or
integration policies. Not the label interests here but the possible
demographic impact.
Likewise it does not matter if pronatalist policies are called
population policy, or family policy or social policy. As long as
these policies are tailored to encourage the birth of a child, or
more particularly the birth of the demographically crucial third
child, policy-makers and demographers want to know the impact of
such policies. Pertinent studies show that even generous measures
have only a limited long-term effect, that is an increase of final
family size. After a short-term increase of fertility, fertility
falls again unless measures are improved. It seems proven that a
stabilisation of cohort fertility can be achieved or fertility
decline slowed down.
Why are pronatalist policies not more successful? The
explanation is to be found by other more forceful determinants of
reproductive behaviour.
One set of determinants that largely escape political
influence are changing values. With their Plenary paper on ®Is
there a new conservatism that will bring back the old family?
Ideational trends and the stages of family formation in Germany,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1981-1990¯ R. Lesthaeghe and
G. Moors will shed some light on this important factor.
Other important influences on reproductive behaviour emanate
from policies that have completely different objectives than
demographic ones. Since they are not related to population I prefer
to call them population-relevant policies. I will give a few
examples.
We all know from numerous studies in the Third World that
empowerment of women and education, particularly for girls and
women, and gainful employment are the most essential determinants
of desiring a smaller number of children. The same is true for
Europe during the last century. Ecomomic policies to expand the
industrial sector and later services where combined with education
policies from compulsory schooling to the enhancement of higher
education. Female emancipation mouvement was sooner or later
established in ministries for women's affairs. Nobody would dream
or dare to abolish these highly cherished and important policies.
But they are not pronatalist by nature.
Social policies with old-age pension, health insurance and
unemployment support schemes transfered family functions to state
and society. Children lost their economic value. Nobody would call
for abolishing these blessings of the welfare state.
Working hours, shift work, length of holidays are designed for
the individual and her/his personal achievement. Mobility is
required to make a career. Personal achievement is the parameter of
income. Part- time jobs are not available in sufficient number. Our
modern economies are blind to the needs of families with children.
The redistribution of incomes via taxation or child benefits
are not of the magnitude to compensate for children- and family-
related expenditures. Children have become an economic burden. They
also bind the time budget of parents.
Availability, accessability and opening hours of child-
minding facilities are not easily combined with having a job and
children.
The housing policies, particularly in the former socialist
countries, but not only there, have made sufficiently big and
affordable accomodation of families a big problem. And yet, houses
have a long life time, they are not easily changed.
We demographers should invest more effort to measure the
demographic impact of these powerful policies that have no
demographic intention, of these population-relevant policies. We
will have to test new models empirically.
As I said earlier low fertility is not the population issue
number one in Europe. Immigration and the properties of multi-
ethnic societies stand higher on the agenda in Western countries,
health and environment are more topical in many Central/East
European countries.
In order to offer studies pertinent to the more complex
population issues, population research has to widen its scope
theretically and empirically to other disciplines. Pure demographic
analysis is not ®out¯, it is still essential, but it has to be
enlarged to an interdisciplinary approach, particularly, if we
want to understand the demographic impact of policies. I think this
conference reflects this pertinent and promising broader approach.
9. References
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Population Decline. Sosiale og okonomiske
konsekvenser av stagnasjon og nedgang i
folketallet, Navf, Oslo, p. 18-37.
H”hn C. (1987b), Population Policies in
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Migration Strategies, European Journal of
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H”hn C. (1989), Policies Affecting Families
and the Population. The Family in Crisis:
A Population Crisis?, in J. L‚gar‚, Royal
Society of Canada, Ottawa, p. 385-394.
Mackensen R. (1982), Social Change and
Reproductive Behaviour - on Continuous
Transition, in C. H”hn, R.Mackensen,
Determinants of Fertility Trends: Theories
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Schmid J. (1984), The Background of Recent
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the Council of Europe, Population Studies,
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Teitelbaum M. S. (1985), The Fear of
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Orlando.
Valkonen T. (1987), Social Inequality in the
Face of Death, European Population
Conference 1987, Plenaries Iussp/Eaps,
Helsinki, p. 201-261.
van de Kaa D. J. (1987), Europe's Second
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Westoff C. F. (1978), The Predictability of
Fertility in Developed Countries,
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