1. What is the origin of the United Nations involvement in East Timor?
East Timor has been on the international agenda since 1960, when the United Nations General Assembly placed the territory on its list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. At that time, East Timor was administered by Portugal. In 1974, Portugal sought to establish a provisional government and a popular assembly which would determine the status of East Timor. Civil war broke out between those who favoured independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia. Unable to control the situation, Portugal withdrew. Shortly thereafter, Indonesia intervened militarily and later integrated East Timor as its 27th province. The United Nations never recognised the integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal. Beginning in 1982, at the request of the Assembly, successive Secretaries-General have held regular talks with the two countries aimed at resolving the status of the territory.
In 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated his resolve to give new impetus to the talks. Sustained efforts by the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker (Pakistan), culminated in a major breakthrough. In June 1998, the new President of Indonesia, Mr. B. J. Habibie, proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. He also noted in a later statement that, if the East Timorese rejected his proposal, Indonesia might be faced with losing the territory. In light of this proposal, the revitalised talks, under the auspices of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, made rapid progress and resulted in a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal, signed in New York on 5 May 1999. On that date, the Secretary-General announced that the two Governments had reached agreement to entrust him with organizing and conducting a "popular consultation" in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people-both inside and outside the territory-accepted or rejected a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.
2. Why did the Security Council establish UNAMET?
In the Agreements signed on 5 May, Indonesia and Portugal asked the United Nations Secretary-General to set up a field mission to conduct a consultation in which the people of East Timor would be asked, by means of a secret ballot, whether they accepted or rejected an Indonesian proposal for special autonomy. The Secretary-General reported on the Agreements to the Security Council, which established UNAMET on 11 June 1999. The mission deployed some 900 international staff to carry out duties related to the popular consultation. UNAMET also employed local staff, their number rising to 4,000 during the period of the consultation itself.
3. What did UNAMET accomplish?
UNAMET provided the East Timorese people the opportunity freely to choose their future status on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot. This consultation, organised and conducted by UNAMET, took place on 30 August 1999. Under the direction of Ian Martin (United Kingdom) the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Popular Consultation in East Timor, UNAMET deployed some 480 international electoral personnel, over 3,000 local electoral personnel, and more than 200 staff in various other UNAMET offices-including Political Affairs, Administration, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Affairs-as well as 275 civilian police and 50 military liaison officers to support the consultation process in all its aspects. UNAMET conducted a mass public information campaign to reach East Timorese throughout the Territory and East Timorese communities abroad. Despite an extremely tight timetable set out in the main 5 May Agreement, and difficult conditions in the territory itself-mountainous terrain, poor roads and communications-UNAMET registered 451,792 potential voters among the population of over 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. For the vote on 30 August 1999, it set up 850 polling stations at 200 sites throughout the territory. Additional stations were set up for East Timorese outside the territory.
The result of the consultation was decisive. Some 98 per cent of registered voters went to the polls. East Timorese voters decided by a margin of 94,388 (21.5 per cent) to 344,580 (78.5 per cent) to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence. This result was validated by the Independent Electoral Commission and communicated by the Secretary-General simultaneously to the Security Council in New York and the people of East Timor on 3 September (4 September in East Timor). UNAMET then began to undertake its next task, preparing to implement the result of the consultation.
4. Why did law and order break down?
In the new atmosphere leading up to the 5 May Agreements, the signatories agreed that a violence-free environment was essential for a free and fair consultation process. The 5 May Agreements squarely placed responsibility for security in the hands of the Indonesian authorities, in particular the Indonesian police. Even as UNAMET deployed, however, tension in the territory remained high and there were widespread reports that elements of the Indonesian military in East Timor were arming and training pro-independence militias. Throughout the entire mission, the Security Council, the Secretary-General and UNAMET repeatedly brought to the attention of the Indonesian authorities their responsibility to maintain law and order, particularly in light of the impunity with which the local pro-autonomy militias were allowed to carry out violent activity. Indonesian officials repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to carry out their responsibilities under the 5 May Agreements and issued orders to this effect. These assurances did not, however, translate into effective action on the ground. A report by the Security Council mission despatched to Indonesia and East Timor from 8 to 12 September supported the view that large elements of the military and police had supported the militia.
5. Why did the UN agree to have Indonesia responsible for security?
During the discussions and negotiations leading to the 5 May Agreements, Indonesia made it clear that it would only go ahead with the consultation on the condition that it have sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, and security in East Timor. The UN felt that, despite the risks, the historic opportunity had to be seized. Along with Portugal, therefore, the UN agreed to the condition but also alerted Indonesia to certain key aspects of the security situation. These included, among other points, the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control and the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incited or threatened to use violence, and a ban on rallies by armed groups. The separate agreement on security emphasised the that the "absolute neutrality of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Indonesia Police is essential" in creating conditions for a free and fair vote. The Security Council endorsed the 5 May Agreements, including their security aspects. Throughout the popular consultation process, the Secretary-General repeatedly informed the Indonesian authorities of problems in the security situation in East Timor. He also reported on them to the Security Council, which in turn issued statements and resolutions supporting the Secretary-General and encouraging Indonesia to respond to the concerns of the international community.
Every UN operation has contingency plans if things do not go as planned. This was also the case with UNAMET. However, even the worst case scenario projections designed by the UN and its partners did not foresee the level of violence and the "scorched earth" policy which followed the announcement of the results of the ballot. While UNAMET was, from the outset, concerned that there would be violence after the ballot, the scale and the extreme, organised nature of the violence that actually took place was wholly unanticipated by the UN and others in the international community.
Throughout the popular consultation process UNAMET, the Secretary-General and the Security Council repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities in Indonesia that the security situation needed improvement. While at certain periods remedial action was initiated by the authorities, the problem persisted, but Indonesia insisted that it would make good on its commitments in the 5 May Agreements.
7. Why didn't UNAMET civilian police and military liaison officers stop the violence?
The civilian police and military liaison officers deployed with UNAMET had neither the authority nor the means to stop the violence. There are several reasons for this:
Responsibility for maintaining law and order lay squarely with the Indonesian Government, first because Indonesia was the de facto authority in East Timor and second because Indonesia stated in the 5 May Agreements that it would do so. UNAMET was deployed in East Timor in accordance with the Agreements signed on 5 May by Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN Secretary-General. These documents spelled out the nature of the popular consultation, the wording of the question to be put to the East Timorese, and how the process would be conducted.
One of the 5 May Agreements specifically assigned to Indonesia responsibility for maintaining "a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation" as well as general law and order in the territory. The agreement also spelled out the limited role to be played by UNAMET's civilian police, who were to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the consultation, and to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites. UNAMET military liaison officers, deployed after consultations with the Indonesian Government, were to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces in a further effort to facilitate the security role of the Indonesian authorities.
The Security Council authorised deployment of UNAMET based on these understandings. UNAMET civilian police and military personnel were therefore few in number--275 civilian police and 50 military observers. They were also unarmed. The UN has no standing military or civilian police personnel, ready for immediate deployment. Each time a deployment is authorised, the Secretary-General must ask Governments to make available the necessary personnel. Governments offered civilian police and military officers for service in East Timor to perform the duties--and only the duties--authorized by the Security Council.
8. Why did the United Nations proceed with the consultation when security conditions were unstable?
The agreed time frame for the consultation was very tight. The prospect of achieving greater security through delaying the process-or halting it-had to be weighed carefully against the risk of depriving the people of East Timor of a historic opportunity which might never be repeated. The desire of the East Timorese to continue was evident. Despite violence and intimidation, they had shown their determination to go on with the process by turning out in massive numbers to register. In their contacts with UNAMET and other UN representatives, East Timorese leaders and people in communities indicated their support for continuing the process; and leaders of opposing East Timorese groups had made progress in reconciliation efforts.
The Security Council and Member States of the United Nations, while condemning acts of violence and intimidation by armed pro-autonomy militias and calling on the Indonesian authorities to fulfil their duty, endorsed the Secretary-General's decision to continue. For their part, the Indonesian authorities repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to ensure a secure environment. At no time did the Indonesian or Portuguese Governments--the Parties to the 5 May Agreements--call for a halt to the consultation process.
Speaking at a press conference at UN Headquarters in New York on 28 September, the leader of the Revolutionary Front for East Timor's Independence (Fretilin), Xanana Gusmao, said he "fully supported" the Secretary-General Kofi Annan's decision to proceed with the referendum. For 23 years, Mr. Gusmao said, the people of East Timor had lived in danger and suffered a huge death toll to gain the right to self-determination. The risk was taken by them, and they were determined to continue in order to achieve their sacred goal. He added that no one had expected the violence to reach the level it did.
9. Did the United Nations abandon East Timor?
Throughout the entire consultation process, and in spite of the violence unleashed afterwards, the United Nations has remained determined to continue its work in East Timor and to fulfil its commitments. UNAMET staff demonstrated this determination by organizing and conducting a logistically difficult ballot despite a volatile and often uncertain atmosphere. In the wake of the orchestrated attacks after the vote, the UN has been pivotal in organizing the international community's response to the violence, and in channelling humanitarian assistance to those affected.
With tensions mounting after the vote, UNAMET personnel in East Timor carried on with the job of reconciling the number of ballots cast with the recorded number of voters, and tallying the results. As the situation spun out of control after the results were announced, a core group of some 100 UNAMET international staff remained at the mission's headquarters in Dili, where hundreds of displaced East Timorese and a number of journalists sought refuge. The UNAMET personnel insisted on remaining until some 1,400 East Timorese could be temporarily moved with them to Australia on 14 September. A dozen UN personnel maintained a presence in Dili after the departure of the other UNAMET staff on 14 September. The mission began reinforcing its numbers with the arrival of INTERFET on 19 September.
In New York, Secretary-General Annan continued to press Indonesia to meet its responsibility to maintain security and order in the territory. He pressed Indonesia publicly and privately to arrest and punish those responsible for the violence. In the days following announcement of the results, the Secretary-General "worked the phones" virtually round-the-clock to rally support from governments for a multinational force authorised by the Security Council and commanded by a lead nation to bring the situation under control. He encouraged the Security Council delegation dispatched to the region to drive home to Indonesia the need for a rapid improvement in the situation, and finally pressed Indonesia's Government to accept the deployment of an international security force, which it did on 12 September. After days of round-the-clock negotiations, the Security Council voted unanimously to authorise creation of a multinational force, as requested by the Government of Indonesia, to "take all necessary measures" to restore peace and security in East Timor.
In addition to organizing the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance, the UN is focusing on completing the task of providing for the transition of East Timor to independence, as foreseen by the 5 May Agreements. A major UN deployment of civilian personnel and military personnel is being prepared to help the East Timorese through this crucial period, once the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) has restored security in the territory.
10. What is the extent of the humanitarian disaster in East Timor? What is the UN doing about it?
Exact figures are not yet available, but it is believed that when law and order broke down completely in September, as many as 500,000 people-nearly two-thirds of the population of East Timor-fled their homes. In some areas, it is estimated that 80 per cent of structures have been destroyed. It is impossible to say yet just how many have died.
200,000 people are believed to have fled into the hills and jungles of East Timor. An estimated 100,000 to 150,000 refugees are in West Timor. An initial estimate by UN agencies, issued on 28 September, put the cost of assistance and protection to displaced persons in East and West Timor at some $135.5 million for the coming six months. Humanitarian agencies are concerned about the threat of a malaria outbreak during the coming rainy season and the lack of medical supplies and personnel. The lack of security, which prevents assistance from reaching people in the countryside, and the presence of militia preventing internally displaced persons from returning home are also major concerns. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 740,000 East Timorese will require food aid in the next six months.
Even before the outbreak of widespread violence, the UN had been assisting people who had been forced from their homes by the deteriorating security situation. During the registration period, for example, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees organised aid convoys for an estimated 60,000 displaced persons in various locations.
Although humanitarian agencies were forced to halt their activities for a few days after the outbreak of widespread violence, they immediately undertook to assess the extent of the need. To direct this effort, a high-level UN interagency team travelled to Jakarta and Dili. Members of the team remained in Dili as part of the core UNAMET presence to negotiate with the Indonesian military authorities and the militias so that they could resume relief convoys to displaced persons. In addition, airdrops of food began on 17 September. Relief workers, relief supplies and, in some cases, the means to deliver the supplies are being deployed to East Timor incrementally as security conditions allow.
Relief operations are being coordinated by sector: the UN's World Food Programme focuses on delivery of emergency food supplies and logistics; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for shelter and protection for internally displaced persons; the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), assisted by the non-governmental organisations Médecins du monde and Médecins sans frontières, are addressing health and medical needs. UNICEF also has responsibility for education, children and other vulnerable groups. To coordinate the participation of these and other entities, the Secretary-General named the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator Ross Mountain as overall coordinator of the humanitarian relief effort.
11. Why didn't the United Nations immediately send military forces to East Timor?
In fact, the United Nations has played a crucial role in organizing the international response to the East Timor crisis, including the formation of a multinational force. The Security Council provided the forum for governments to consult on what should be done, and for authorising joint military action by States to restore peace and security in East Timor. The Secretary-General personally contacted Heads of State and other leaders and impressed on them the need to assemble a rapidly deployable multinational force. He pressed Indonesia to bring the situation under control or accept deployment of an international security force within a specific time frame.
The Security Council dispatched a special mission to explore with Indonesia concrete steps to stop the violence and peacefully implement the 5 May Agreements. On 12 September, at the conclusion of the mission sent by the Council to Jakarta and Dili, President Habibie called the Secretary-General to tell him he would be announcing that his Government would invite an international force to restore peace and security in East Timor. On 15 September, the Council authorised the force, and the first elements were deployed in Dili on 19 September.
It's important to bear in mind that the United Nations does not have any standing military force or assets. There is no UN navy or air force; military resources are provided by Governments, and the UN itself has no standing capacity to move troops and equipment rapidly. When the United Nations does deploy military personnel--in a peacekeeping operation, for example--the operation is assembled "from scratch". It can take months to persuade Governments to provide personnel, organise transport and logistical support, and work out contracts for supplies and services needed to run the operation.
It's also necessary to make the distinction between UN peacekeeping forces, and multinational forces authorised by the Security Council. UN peacekeeping operations-the so-called "blue helmets"-are under the operational control of the UN itself (although national contingents remain under the command of their own national commanders) and are deployed where the parties involved in a conflict have demonstrated a commitment to peace, and where there is peace to keep. The costs of UN peacekeeping operations are shared among the entire UN membership.
Multinational forces authorised by the Security Council, such as INTERFET in East Timor, are made up of military units from countries willing to engage in enforcement action. These "coalitions of the willing" are entirely voluntary, usually under the command of a lead nation-not the United Nations. In the case of INTERFET, the Security Council and participating countries have acknowledged the lead role played by Australia. Countries participating voluntarily undertake to provide, at their own cost, troops and the full range of airlift, sealift and other support necessary to carry out the operation.
Finally, it is essential to recall that, until the Government of Indonesia invited an international force into East Timor, no government in the world was prepared to offer troops for an early UN intervention.
12. What is the job of the multinational force authorised by the Security Council?
In unanimously adopting resolution 1264 (1999), the Security Council authorised the force to perform the following tasks: (a) restore peace and security in East Timor; (b) protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, (c) facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, within its capabilities. The Council also authorised the force to use all necessary measures to carry out these tasks.
13. Who leads the multinational force and who pays for it?
Australia indicated that it was willing to assume command of the force--the International Force East Timor (INTERFET)--and appointed Major General Peter Cosgrove as commander. More than 15 countries are expected to volunteer troops and provide logistical support. Each participating country assumes responsibility for its own costs. There is no United Nations budget covering the expenses of the force. Some nations, however, may wish to contribute personnel to INTERFET but do not have the financial means to support their participation. For this reason, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to set up a trust fund. Contributions by donor States could then be channelled to contributing States to help defray costs.
14. Will those who unleashed the violence be punished?
The final decision will have to be taken by Member States. There have already been a number of recommendations in that regard. For his part, the Secretary-General has noted that events in East Timor "may well fall into various categories of international crime" and that "individuals who have ordered and carried out these crimes must be held accountable." The Security Council has demanded that those responsible for the violence be brought to justice. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has recommended the establishment of a commission of inquiry to gather and analyse evidence. The commission would make recommendations on how to establish accountability, including the possible creation of a special tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity.
The Commission on Human Rights, at the conclusion of a special session on the situation in East Timor on 27 September, requested the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in the territory. The resolution also directed the international investigative panel, once created, to work in cooperation with a fact-finding body already appointed by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission. The Secretary-General has asked the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to institute the Commission of Inquiry on his behalf.
15. Will the United Nations have a role in East Timor's future?
Yes. The next phase of United Nations activity will be the implementation of the result of the consultation. Because the East Timorese people decided to reject autonomy, the United Nations will oversee the transition of East Timor to independence. The Security Council has invited the Secretary-General to plan and prepare for the implementation phase, which is expected to last for two or more years. During that time, the United Nations will deploy a peacekeeping force, including troops, military observers and civilian police. It is expected that, in consultation with the East Timorese, the UN will assume wide executive and administrative authority as it prepares East Timor for independence. Among other things, the UN will help rebuild the infrastructure and set up new civil institutions. It will train a new police force. And it will conduct elections. The date for the beginning of the implementation phase will be determined by the Security Council, which will also set out the new mandate. In the meantime, UNAMET will continue preparations and planning for the transition phase, while maintaining close contact with INTERFET and facilitating humanitarian assistance.
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