This is a near verbatim transcript of the briefing given at UNAMET Headquarters, Dili, East Timor, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for East Timor, Mr. Ian Martin.

Ian Martin: I went to Maliana, Suai and Viqueque both on Sunday with Ambassador Marker and then again yesterday with Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, Chairman of the Indonesian Task Force, Brigadier General Sitorus, senior Polri Officer in East Timor and other senior officials. We went to those three places because, although they are far from being the only places where we have very serious security concerns at the moment, they are places of the most concern to us.

In Viqueque, where it had seemed there had been a great deal of success in creating conditions conducive for the consultation, not only with the success of registration there but with reconciliation efforts amongst the different parties, we suffered an extremely serious setback with the events there in which two young people were killed. There was serious disorder in the town and as a result a large number of people have fled again and have become internally displaced, after many of the IDPs in Viqueque had returned to the town. That is a situation that urgently needs addressing. There has been a change of Dandim, the military commander in Viqueque. We met the new Dandim who has been there for a couple of days, as well as the police chief.

In Suai our concerns are the continued activities of the Laksaur and Mahidi militia groups in different sub-districts. Again, their continued operation has led to some increase in the number of IDPs in the church compound in Suai, which I visited both on Sunday and yesterday. It is not a very large increase, but some increase. Our discussion focussed on the need to take action to rein in the activity of those militia groups.

In Maliana, as you well know, our arrival followed serious disorder on Tuesday night in a village called Ritabou, just outside of Maliana town. Then yesterday in Maliana town itself, there was considerable violence and militia activity throughout. There were clashes between the pro-integration militia and pro-independence supporters, and some of you saw that for yourselves. I cannot give you a detailed blow-by-blow account at this stage at what exactly happened either the previous night or during yesterday. We are still investigating that further.

What I do want to say is that the fundamental problem in Bobonaro has been, from the beginning, the refusal of senior officials to recognize their obligation to allow political space for pro-independence activity in that district.
There have been repeated statements from the Bupati resistant to any activity by the CNRT in Bobonaro district. Finally, an agreement was reached locally, which on paper allowed for some CNRT activity. This only allocated one quarter of the campaigning time to the CNRT and three-quarters to three different pro-autonomy groups, which is not satisfactory and is in contrast to every other district where at least the formal agreements reached have provided for equal campaigning opportunities by the two sides. There has been great resistance to the opening of the CNRT office there and it was the centre opened by pro-independence students that was sacked in effect yesterday.
That problem in Bobonaro has been well known to the Indonesian authorities for a substantial period of time. I believe they have been concerned about it and have attempted to bring some pressure to bear on the authorities but not sufficient pressure. It is the most serious example in any district of resistance, not just to UNAMET, although one of our concerns there is the repeated threats that have been made to our staff and accusations of an alleged lack of neutrality which result any time you insist upon the equal rights of both sides to campaign in this consultation. The resistance, in my opinion, is not only to UNAMET's role but, indeed, to the Indonesian Government's policy of allowing a free choice in a popular consultation. It is clearly the responsibility of the Indonesian Government to address that.

Having said that, the three districts I have referred to are not the only districts where we have serious concerns of a similar nature. In Liquica, Ainaro and Manufahi, we have many of the same concerns. The pattern is that despite an encouraging degree of cooperation between the political leadership on the two sides - the pro-autonomy and the pro-independence side - reflected in the code of conduct for campaign, and by and large their own campaigning, there is still resistance by pro-integration militia to pro-independence campaigning. It is often alleged that that is provocative, but there is no excuse for violent action being taken against those who are campaigning peacefully.

I said, and Ambassador Marker said, when we came back from Jakarta that we believe that the policy of Jakarta was to ensure that the popular consultation was completed peacefully. As I said, I was accompanied yesterday by the Chairman of the Task Force and senior officials. I understand that senior military members of the Task Force have gone to Maliana today. We now expect to see strong action taken in Bobonaro and in other places. The two forms of action which I think would be the clearest indication that Jakarta's policy is being applied on the ground would be that the police arrest anybody who is found with weapons outside the designated cantonment areas.
We have attended militia cantonment events, as you know, one just outside Maliana and the second in Cassa yesterday. Those are the two and the only two designated cantonment sites by the militia in the western part of the Territory. If that exercise is serious, that should mean that there are no militia with arms in the west outside those cantonments sites. Of course, yesterday in Maliana we saw that militia were still carrying arms. If that militia commitment to cantonment is to be taken seriously then we have to see that there are no weapons carried anywhere else and immediate action taken by the police when people are reported to be carrying weapons.

The second form of action that would be an indication of seriousness would be the removal of members of the TNI who have been most closely and obviously associated with militia activities in these districts. We have repeatedly given to different levels of the chain of command the names of serving TNI officers who are clearly, not only supportive of, but also engaged in militia activities. We expect to see action taken to remove them from being able to continue those activities.

Question & Answer:

Q: How do you expect Polri to take action against the militia when Polri was in fact manning one of the roadblocks yesterday...?
IM: The conduct of Polri differs in different places at different times. We expect to see a consistent policy ordered now by senior police officials that action is taken against militia who are engaged in any illegal activities.

Q: The Task Force obviously had a firsthand look at the problem in Maliana. What was their reaction, did they agree there was a problem?
IM: Yes, I believe they did very clearly. They promised some action on the spot in terms of strengthening of policing and the provision of additional police personnel to accompany our own UNAMET District Electoral Officers and others. They also made clear that they would then be having high-level discussions here in Dili and reporting to Jakarta. As I have said, I have just been informed that senior military members of the Task Force have gone to Maliana today, but I would certainly encourage you to ask that question of the Task Force.

Q: This is the first time you have actually publicly called for the removal of TNI officers. What made you change that policy and go public with that?
IM: I have actually said previously when I discussed the security conditions that we made known to the Indonesian authorities that it included the removal of TNI officers most obviously involved with militia activities. That was one of the requirements that was previously communicated to the Indonesian authorities, so that is not new. Clearly, the urgency with which I am expressing it now relates to the urgency of the situation.

Q: How many people were injured in Maliana yesterday?
IM: I can't tell you that. We don't yet know the answer to that. One or two people came to the UNAMET compound with injuries and were directed on to where they could get medical attention. I can't give you a definite answer to that yet

Q: There were also reports of two deaths. What do you know about that?
IM: There were reports but not ones that we were able, at least during my visit, or so far since, to confirm. So, I don't whether that is true or not.

Q: The fact that the militias took over the streets yesterday in Maliana and have made things difficult for UNAMET there..[inaudible]..do you think this was a message from the militia to the Indonesians..[inaudible]..?
IM: I don't think the timing of what happened in Maliana was related to our visit. I think it was a sequence of events. There has been trouble in Ritabou for several days and we made a short visit there on Sunday for that reason. I have no reason to think that it was deliberately timed in order to coincide with the visit of the Task Force or our visit.

Q: If the situation that you saw yesterday doesn't improve how hard are you going to hammer this, and if it doesn't work..[inaudible]..?
IM: Certainly, I am going to go on pressing the Indonesian authorities very hard and I am sure I am not going to be the only one who will be doing so. There is going to be considerable concern from the governments that are supportive of this process at this resurgence of militia activity at a crucial stage in the process. I can't define at what point it may be necessary to respond in other ways.

Q: You have brought up the question of names of TNI officers involved, what about the names of leaders of militia who have conducted violations of the code of conduct yesterday. These names are well known. Have you considered also proposing to the Indonesian Task Force that these authorities be arrested?
IM: Yes. We have persistently raised the failure to carry out arrests of people who are well known to have been involved in violent activities. I think it is extremely important before polling day that it is clear that the known local leaders of violent activity are already not able to operate.

Q: Is UNAMET prepared to say, you have given some names of TNI officers who have been identified, have you also identified the leaders of the militia..[inaudible}..?
IM: We have repeatedly done that on all local levels, yes.

Q: Can you give us the names of the senior TNI officers you have asked to be removed?
IM: No, I am not going to give any names. You assume that I am talking about officers. It includes officers, but in many cases it is lower TNI ranks who are actually directly involved as members of militia groups.

Q: What was the reaction of these officers when you confronted them in Maliana, Suai and Viqueque yesterday?
IM: In all three cases the Dandims were present. The one in Viqueque, like I said, has only just assumed his responsibilities. I think they understood in front of the Task Force that it was going to be necessary for action to be taken.

Q: What about the incident in Maliana when the Indonesian police stood by and did nothing. Will you be asking for the removal of police commanders as well?
IM: Certainly, the Commissioner [Chief of UNAMET CivPol, Alan Mills] has made clear that he feels that where individual police commanders are not able to maintain law and order changes, should be considered. In Liquica, the replacement of the local police chief had at least some significant effect. Again, one has to be cautious in identifying where problems rest in terms of individuals. Part of the problem of the police is the extent to which they are constrained locally by the nature of links between the TNI and the militia.

Q: How can you handle an election if people in districts, for example in Maliana, can't campaign freely?
IM: What constraints there turn out to have been on the campaign is something that will be taken into account by the Electoral Commission and by the Secretary-General in interpreting the outcome of the ballot.

Q: [inaudible]
IM: Certainly, there are extreme limits on pro-independence activity at Bobonaro at the moment, and it is the most extreme example of the lack of a level playing field.

Q: Are there any areas in East Timor where you have similar or serious limits on pro-integrationists to campaign?
IM: There have been some individual cases of pro-autonomy activity being prevented. For example, some people interpret the sequence of events in Viqueque as beginning with young people preventing the arrival of the leader of the BRTT, Ambassador Lopes Da Cruz, when he was planning to go there to campaign. In general, I don't think there are major limitations on pro-autonomy activity.

Q: When we drove up to Viqueque yesterday, we drove through six militia checkpoints. Two months ago the Indonesian side promised you the removal of these illegal checkpoints, yet nothing has happened. Do you have any comment?
IM: It is not really that nothing happened because we had for a while considerable success in getting the police to act against illegal roadblocks where we have reported that to them. This is another way in which the situation has been allowed to degenerate. Again, we are reminding the Indonesian police and authorities of their clear committments that illegal roadblocks would not be permitted.

Q: ..[inaudible]..what does that mean about the Secretary-General's current position on the security conditions and going ahead with the referendum?
IM: The security criteria have clearly not been fulfilled or indeed each of them individually met fully. That is something that the Secretary-General will have to take into account in his interpretation of the outcome of the ballot. We are still ten days away from the ballot and we are insisting that we expect to see some of the action that has not yet been taken being taken between now and then.