1 Tuesday, 14 February 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, just

8 for your information, yesterday when we spoke about the warning of the JNA

9 of the 1st October 1991, Mr. Kostic said that he has seen a similar

10 document, and this morning when he came into the courtroom he provided the

11 B/C/S version to us. It will be copied and soon handed out to everyone.

12 It's exactly the document that I referred to that Mr. Kostic identified in

13 his collection.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, our thanks to Mr. Kostic and to you.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 WITNESS: BRANKO KOSTIC [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

19 Q. Mr. Kostic, yesterday we left talking about the Carrington Plan

20 and the events of the 17th of October, 1991, and you had mentioned already

21 during your testimony that you could not stay during the whole session of

22 the Assembly session in Montenegro but that you had to go to Belgrade to

23 attend a meeting in the SFRY Presidency. That's how it was; right?

24 A. That's right, yes.

25 Q. And who attended the meeting in the Presidency?

1 A. The meeting of the Presidency was held in its reduced composition.

2 Four members of the Presidency attended it: Mr. Borisav Jovic, Sejdo

3 Bajramovic, Jugoslav Kostic, and myself of all the members of the

4 Presidency. I think that perhaps someone from the federal organs was

5 there, but I'm not sure. The four of us were there, though.

6 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic take part in this meeting?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Was there another meeting on the Carrington Plan on that same day

9 involving many more people?

10 A. In connection with Lord Carrington's plan, I know only that the

11 Assembly of Montenegro had a session, and in the afternoon the Presidency

12 of the SFRY, which I have just mentioned, which I myself attended. I

13 don't know any other meetings in connection with Lord Carrington's plan

14 held on at that day.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

16 provide to Mr. Kostic and also everyone else a section from a book that

17 Ms. Smilja Avramovic wrote, and it's called "Post Heroic War of the West

18 Against Yugoslavia." Mr. Kostic, do you know that book? Avramov. It's

19 Avramov. Sorry. Smilja Avramov.

20 Mr. Kostic, do you know this book of Ms. Avramov?

21 A. No.

22 Q. If you look at --

23 A. I don't know it, no.

24 Q. Would you please have a look at page 274, the second last

25 paragraph, and I just quote a part of it. She speaks about the Carrington

1 Plan and then says: "Military leadership headed by General Kadijevic and

2 some individuals from expert teams as well as a group of independent

3 intellectuals being concerned about the fate of the country and offering

4 the help to President Milosevic were of the opinion that the Carrington

5 document should be turned down." And the last sentence of that paragraph,

6 it says: "Participating in the talks on the Carrington document were also

7 President Karadzic and President Babic. President Milosevic's speech in

8 The Hague the following day was the synthesis of the said opinions."

9 Mr. Kostic, that seems to me to indicate that on the 17th there

10 was quite a major meeting on the Carrington Plan with Mr. Milosevic,

11 Kadijevic, and experts, as is named here, and intellectuals.

12 Do you know about that meeting? Did you hear of it?

13 A. I really don't know anything at all about that meeting. This is

14 the first time I've heard of it. I have always been of the conviction

15 that on the day when the Assembly of Montenegro discussed the Carrington

16 Plan - and this was the 17th of October - the Assembly of Serbia discussed

17 the same plan. However, later on I learned that Mr. Jovic denied this

18 later and that the Serbia -- Serbian Assembly did not have a session on

19 that date. I did not check this. I didn't go into it any further, but I

20 don't know anything about this meeting you're mentioning, and I can say

21 nothing about it.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the Prosecution would like to

23 tender this page of the book.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

25 MR. KAY: Well, the witness did not recognise the document,

1 disagreed with the content, and Avramov gave evidence earlier in the

2 Defence case and it could have been dealt with by her cross-examination.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, do we know in fact whether it was dealt with

4 in her cross-examination?

5 MR. KAY: It wasn't, as far as I remember.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm not aware of this, Your Honour, but my

7 assumption would be that the book was not translated at that time. I see

8 Ms. Tromp is nodding. Obviously this book wasn't translated at that time.

9 Perhaps, could it be marked for identification, and it may be that we can

10 discuss it with another witness who may have participated.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay?

13 MR. KAY: I would say no, bring it in when it's the time to do so.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That's what we'll do, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

15 We'll not mark it for identification. If you can have it admitted at

16 another time, then so be it.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

18 Q. Mr. Kostic, I would like to refer you now to a press statement by

19 Lord Carrington of the 25th of October, 1991. It's not an exhibit yet,

20 and I would like to be -- this to be handed out.

21 Mr. Kostic, it's an English document because it's from Lord

22 Carrington and relates to the meeting that was held on the 25th of

23 October, 1991, and it says here on the first page: "Let me say that once

24 that the continuing -- let me say at once that the continuing attacks by

25 JNA on Dubrovnik and Vukovar are very worrying and threatening. These are

1 not besieged garrisons to be relieved, nor Serbian communities to protect.

2 "The leadership of the JNA is acting in a totally unjustified

3 fashion, bear a heavy responsibility, and are accountable for what they

4 are doing."

5 And he continues: "I would have wished to have said this to

6 him -" meaning Mr. Kadijevic, General Kadijevic - "him face-to-face. He

7 has always said that he would accept and abide by any agreed political

8 solution. But from his statements and actions this week, it is clear that

9 he is siding with one of the parties. General Kadijevic's assertion that

10 he derives his authority from those whose seizure of the Federal

11 Presidency in Yugoslavia on 3 October has been condemned internationally

12 (and who have declined to attend today's plenary), cannot be sustained."

13 Do you know about this press statement, this public statement of

14 Lord Carrington?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And is he -- he's correct when he says that the JNA is attacking

17 Dubrovnik and Vukovar, although there are no besieged garrisons and there

18 are no Serbian communities to protect. Is he right there? That was

19 what ...

20 A. Now, 15 years later, I wouldn't be able to recall every word from

21 Mr. Carrington's statement, but in principle he objected to the effect

22 that there were no Serb communities there or besieged garrisons. However,

23 we expressed our dissatisfaction with Mr. Carrington's assessment. We

24 felt it was extremely one-sided. Mr. Carrington attempted to leave us as

25 the reduced Presidency out of The Hague conference and only after we

1 protested did he invite us to the conference on the 18th and the 25th.

2 Also, on the 5th of November, Mr. Carrington started The Hague conference

3 by stating that the Croatian leadership had not respected the cease-fire

4 agreement --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, you have answered the question.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The Prosecution would like to tender

7 this document, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit 950.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11 Q. And I would like to put another document to you from the

12 Carrington documentation that was provided by the European -- It's also

13 not yet an exhibit. Can it be provided. It's a Declaration on the

14 Situation in Yugoslavia from the 28th of October, 1991, and it relates to

15 this session that took place on the 25th of October, 1991, and I just want

16 to quote one paragraph. It's the third -- or, rather, two paragraphs; the

17 third and fourth on that page. It says: "Notably, the principles of no

18 unilateral change of borders, protection of human rights, and rights of

19 ethnic and national groups constitute universal, objective standards,

20 which leave no room for compromise.

21 "The European Community and its member States are appalled at

22 constant violations of these principles. In this context they refer to

23 the Serbian position in the Conference, the coup d'etat of four members of

24 the Federal Presidency and their announcement of a plan aimed at the

25 establishment of a Greater Serbia. The statements and actions of JNA,

1 which were condemned in the Declaration on Dubrovnik of 27 October 1991,

2 should also be seen in this light."

3 Mr. Kostic, do you know this -- do you know this Declaration?

4 A. I don't recall this Declaration, but I can only say that this was

5 a time when the European Community was radically changing its standpoint

6 and its views on resolving the Yugoslav crisis, taking up an extremely

7 one-sided position, diverging from its previous standpoints that a

8 peaceful solution should be found, and so on.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the Prosecution would like to

10 tender this document as well.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit 951.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

14 Q. I would like now to leave, because we don't have much time, I want

15 to leave this Carrington Plan and now turn to the Vance Plan. Mr. Kostic,

16 in the examination-in-chief, you spoke about -- in detail about the Vance

17 Plan, and we have discussed it here already. You discussed it with

18 Mr. Milosevic when you addressed Exhibit D333, tab 64, which has the text

19 of the Vance Plan, more or less.

20 Mr. Jovic, when he spoke about the Vance Plan, he said that all

21 the work involved with the drafting of the Vance Plan was directed by

22 Mr. Milosevic on behalf of the Serb side. Is that also your recollection,

23 that he was basically the one?

24 A. I don't know who worked with Mr. Cyrus Vance on behalf of the

25 Serbian side. Probably those advocating the preservation of Yugoslavia.

1 Is that what you mean by the Serbian side? I don't know who talked to

2 Mr. Cyrus Vance. I only know that I did not have occasion to meet

3 Mr. Cyrus Vance except at a meeting in Podgorica when he was talking to

4 Mr. Bulatovic and Mr. Djukanovic. At that time, Mr. Cyrus Vance, although

5 he was a representative of the United Nations --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kostic. Next question, please.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

8 Q. Mr. Babic and the entire Croatian Serb leadership in Knin, when

9 they rejected or, rather, did not want to accept this plan, they got

10 pressure to agree. They were pressured to agree to it, right?

11 A. I don't know whether you can describe it as pressure, but in any

12 case, we invested a great deal of effort to get them to accept this plan.

13 We had a 40-hour meeting, then two six-hour meetings, and finally I went

14 to Glina to a meeting of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina,

15 where it was ultimately accepted. Because in our assessment, Mr. Cyrus

16 Vance's plan was a peaceful option, whereas what Mr. Babic was advocating

17 was a war option.

18 Q. Mr. Kostic, I would like to put to you what Mr. Jovic said in this

19 context, and we are discussing whether the Croatian Serb leadership was

20 pressured. Can you please be -- can this -- it's from Exhibit 596, tab 1.

21 That is the 89(F) statement of Mr. Jovic. And at paragraph 114, he said:

22 "... I spoke with Milan Babic and told him that the plan for the arrival

23 of peacekeeping forces will be adapted with or without him." And in that

24 same paragraph, the last sentence is: "I came to the conclusion that if

25 Babic continued to resist, then he will be replaced."

1 Mr. Kostic, as you took part in these discussions on the Vance

2 Plan, are you aware that Mr. Jovic actually threatened Mr. Babic with

3 replacement?

4 A. I never heard Mr. Jovic threatening Mr. Babic with replacement.

5 Had we had any intention to replace Mr. Babic or arrest him, we could have

6 done that very easily in Belgrade. We wouldn't have wasted so much time

7 trying to keep all the people there and trying to get their agreement to

8 the plan.

9 Q. But Mr. Babic was replaced, was he not?

10 A. Not then. Not at that time.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kostic, on what basis would he have been

12 arrested?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood that to be the

14 Prosecutor's question as regards replacement or arrest.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... said if you

16 had wanted, at any time you could have had him arrested because he was in

17 Belgrade. On what basis would you have arrested him?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me tell you, I don't know

19 whether I can give a proper interpretation. I'm not a lawyer, I'm an

20 economist, but I was in a very responsible government position.

21 We were in a situation of imminent threat of war. We felt that

22 part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was still part of the still

23 existing Yugoslavia. If --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you not give me a simple answer to the

25 question? Can you not just tell me the basis on which you would arrest

1 him? I don't need the history of Yugoslavia to tell me that, surely.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not talking about history,

3 Mr. Bonomy. I'm talking about a dramatic situation in which --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: If you can't answer the question, we'll just move

5 on. Thank you.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

7 Q. Yes. Mr. Kostic, on that same page that you have in front of you

8 there's also paragraph 115 of the Rule 89(F) statement of Mr. Jovic, and

9 he says here, and I quote from the middle of it: "After huge problems

10 with Milan Babic, Milosevic completely lost his nerve and issued a public

11 announcement stating that he was terminating all cooperation with the

12 current Krajina leadership and that he would resume it once the Serbs in

13 Krajina had elected a new leadership."

14 Do you remember that, that he made such a strong statement?

15 A. I don't know why you keep asking me about Mr. Jovic's book. Why

16 don't you ask me what I talked to Mr. Milosevic about. As regards Babic,

17 I never discussed him with Mr. Milosevic. During my examination-in-chief,

18 however, I did mention that there was an erroneous impression that

19 Mr. Milosevic had undivided influence on the leadership of the Serbs in

20 the Serbian Krajina. I also said that for this reason he asked me to

21 attend the Assembly session in Glina, and I also said that at that time

22 Mr. Milosevic sent an open letter to the leadership of the Serbian Krajina

23 and Mr. Babic, which caused a great deal of surprise in the general

24 public. That's what I can say about this.

25 Mr. Jovic here is talking about his conversation with

1 Mr. Milosevic, and I know nothing about it so I can't tell you anything

2 about it.

3 Q. Mr. Kostic, I was asking you not about Mr. Jovic but about the

4 public announcement of Mr. Milosevic that -- requesting that the

5 leadership in Knin would -- should be replaced. That was my question.

6 But I see you refer only to the letter.

7 Let us now hear what you said on two occasions in that context.

8 Can we please have in Sanction played the first clip.

9 A. That's better.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters have a reference, please.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you have a copy passed to the interpreters.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: They should have a copy. It's the clip

13 Exhibit 352, tab 88. Your Honour, I forgot to mention that it is actually

14 already an exhibit. It's 352, tab 88.

15 [Videotape played]

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We don't have any translation.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are we supposed to have a translation?

18 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, Your Honour. There are three excerpts in

19 the exhibit and tab 88 so we were trying to find the portion referred to.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The first what is played starts with

21 "Vice-president of the Presidency, Branko Kostic, describes the course of

22 the talks ..."

23 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Thank you. We've found it now.

24 [Videotape played]

25 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Vice-president of the Presidency

1 Branko Kostic described the course of the talks to detail accusing Milan

2 Babic of walking out of the conference and taking the representatives of

3 Serbian Krajina with him. Kostic told the press that Paspalj approached

4 them on his own initiative and offered to sign it after he consulted

5 municipality representatives, as he informed the Presidency members.

6 Kostic then said that Babic's request to amend Vance's plan practically

7 implied its refusal and that there was no justification for the request to

8 return to political topics either, as Vance's plan did not prejudice a

9 solution for the status of Krajinas. Kostic refuted the allegations about

10 a possible coup in Krajina and explained that an order was being prepared

11 on the organisation of life in the territories where the army was present.

12 He explained that nobody made any physical threats at the conference, as

13 Babic alleged, and that Blagoje Adzic had offered his apologies to those

14 present for his nervous behaviour. Kostic said that it was now crucial to

15 inform people in the Krajina correctly and show that Vance's plan did not

16 imply betrayal of Krajinas.

17 "If people in Krajina chose Mr. Babic's option, this will then

18 mean the option of war. That is certain. It will then mean that the

19 people of Krajina are neither willing ..."

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't know. It's still continuing in the

21 B/C/S.

22 THE INTERPRETER: There is no reception, no tape, sound.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But it's playing here. It's playing here on

24 the computer that Ms. Dicklich has, with tone and everything.

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are not receiving any tone.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the issue we are looking out for here?

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We are looking, actually, in particular this

3 part that's not coming. Actually, Mr. Kostic is repeating that same

4 threat, more or less, that Mr. Milosevic, according to Mr. Jovic, made.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why don't you just put it to him?

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

7 Q. Let me just read to you what actually is also on the video. It

8 says here, Branko Kostic speaking: "If the people of Krajina choose

9 Mr. Babic's option, this will then mean the option of war. That is

10 certain. It will then mean that the people of Krajina are neither willing

11 to share their fate with the rest of Yugoslavia nor to respect its organs.

12 I am telling you this as my personal opinion. This practically amounts to

13 refusal to participate in the work of federal organs or to respect their

14 decisions and consequently those of the Presidency as the Supreme Command,

15 just as Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Kucan did it. This practically means an act

16 of secession of that territory. It is difficult for me to believe that

17 might happen."

18 Mr. Kostic, did you say that on that occasion? We have it on the

19 tape, actually.

20 A. In the original, that is what I said, and I would repeat the same

21 thing given that situation today as well.

22 Q. But as I see it, Mr. Kostic, what you are saying here is

23 basically, "If you do not agree to the Vance Plan, then we cut off you.

24 You have to fend for yourself." That's at least how I understand it.

25 Would that be the correct --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Where do you read that?

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Here. It says: "It will then mean that the

3 people of Krajina are neither willing to share their fate with the rest of

4 Yugoslavia nor to respect its organs." That's actually saying -- and

5 particularly the next: "This practically amounts to a refusal to

6 participate in the work of the federal organs or to respect their

7 decisions and consequently those of the Presidency as the Supreme Command,

8 just as Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Kucan did. This practically means an act of

9 secession of that territory."

10 JUDGE BONOMY: That's --

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: That seems to be looking at it from the opposite

13 point of view; that they would be seceding by their conduct, rather than

14 he would be cutting them off, but it's for you to put the questions.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

16 Q. Mr. Kostic, what did you mean?

17 A. Precisely, Mr. Bonomy. That's it.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then I would like to right now the -- hear

19 now the second Sanction video related to Glina.

20 And for the interpreters, it is a section that starts with:

21 "Mr. Kostic, how are you? Welcome to Glina."

22 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for the reference. We've found it,

23 yes.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you want me to answer your first

25 question, what I meant by it? You asked me what I meant by it earlier on.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

2 Q. Yes, and I thought you had answered it.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. We covered that issue already. We are on to

4 Glina now.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

6 Q. Yes. You had answered that already, Mr. Kostic.

7 [Videotape played]

8 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Mr. Kostic, how are you, welcome to

9 Glina. You are here to attend the Krajina Assembly conference. What do

10 you expect from that meeting?

11 "Quite a large number of us arrived to participate in the work of

12 the Serbian Krajina Assembly after attending a fairly extensive discussion

13 at the Yugoslav Presidency. In order to, on the one hand, repudiate all

14 accusations that have been unfoundedly spread among these people that we

15 are leaving those people in the lurch. Also, to tell the Assemblymen of

16 the Serbian Krajina Assembly, as well as to all people, that that is a

17 crude lie, that we have been and are remaining by the side of these

18 people. In addition, to help inasmuch as we can for reason to prevail and

19 that these people, as well as the assemblymen, realise that that which has

20 been gained through war until now can be defended by peace in the best

21 possible way from now on, with the assurances of the Security Council, a

22 world organisation, and the engagement of the Blue Helmets.

23 "Thank very much on behalf of Novi Sad television.

24 "Thank you.

25 "Mr. Kostic, what is your message to the people of Glina and

1 Krajina?

2 "That we have stood by and are going to stand by these people.

3 However, choosing between the peace option and the war option, the time

4 has come to defend in peace what these people have gained by war. Not by

5 a continuation of a long and precarious war that might spread out to the

6 hinterland and Bosnia and sweep over entire Yugoslavia, or even wider, the

7 Balkans. That could obviously finally result in the loss of everything

8 these people gained by war so far."

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. Mr. Kostic, just one question to this. At that time when you made

11 this -- this speech, at that time, the Serb territories in Croatia, they

12 were under control of the Serbs; right?

13 A. At that point in time when I made that statement and when I was in

14 Glina myself, the Serbs in those areas who were involved and engaged and

15 stood up to all attempts on the part of the Croatian paramilitary to

16 impose their own power upon them, they were in control of the territory.

17 They had their freedom. They had their alphabet. They had everything

18 which they had as a constituent people and pursuant to the Croatian

19 constitution that was guaranteed to them on the basis of the constitution

20 previously. So that's why I said that as they succeeded in defending

21 themselves we should defend by means of peace and not by means of war.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kostic. Mr. Kostic, among the defence exhibits

23 that Mr. Milosevic proposed to you was Defence Exhibit D333, tab 2, and I

24 would like to -- you to turn to it now.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's an exhibit that was not

1 yet tendered by Mr. Milosevic, and I would like to address it with the

2 witness.

3 Q. It is a meeting with representatives that the Presidency held with

4 representatives from the Serbian Krajina, held on the 3rd of January,

5 1992. Do you recall that meeting?

6 A. I recall it extremely well.

7 Q. I would like you now first to turn to page 11 in the English where

8 Mr. Milan Martic is addressing you, and he says the following, it's about

9 disarming -- it's the talks about disarming the forces in Krajina, and

10 Mr. Martic says the following: "The solution to this problem is simple,

11 but what worries me most are, as we said, our local people who are

12 fighting and the local army; there is no other army except for commanding

13 officers. The weapons are a burning issue - the heavy weapons."

14 And this is what you talk about. And in relation to this, on that

15 same page, you say the following: "We said that all Territorial Defence

16 is also part --"

17 A. I apologise, but in the Serbian language, I haven't managed to

18 find that section, what you're just reading out.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's tab 2. They are the

21 stenographic notes from the meeting of the -- between members of the SFRY

22 Presidency and representatives of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24 Q. It's on page 16 in the -- in the B/C/S version, Mr. Kostic.

25 A. I've found it. Thank you.

1 Q. And I was reading from the lower part of that, and you say:

2 "... we said that all Territorial Defence is also part of the JNA, but the

3 disarming of the Territorial Defence has been planned. I am asking you:

4 Do the UN and the group that will carry out control on the basis of the

5 talks they had with you, have a summary and list of equipment - how many

6 of these tanks, mortars, howitzers, artillery, and so on belongs to the

7 Territorial Defence and how many to the Knin Corps. Do they have it?"

8 And you give the answer "No."

9 And then you continue: "Therefore, we will create conditions -

10 you will not have to transport things from Banija down to Knin - we will

11 deposit the equipment where it may be used in need. You practically have

12 an already formed unit, which is convenient when so many men are from this

13 area. You had units even before you publicly declared them organised.

14 So, you will continue to have them organised. You can increase police

15 units. You have the Army in the background if they need to intervene."

16 Mr. Kostic, that is actually circumventing the Vance Plan, is it

17 not?

18 A. No, that's not correct. That's not correct, because the Vance

19 Plan provided for the fact that on the territory where the Blue Helmets

20 would be deployed in the operative political sense, nothing be changed,

21 that everything should remain the same, including the organs of power and

22 authority, the Territorial Defence, and everything else. But what it did

23 provide for was that the weapons of the Territorial Defence, both light

24 and heavy weapons, must be stored under a double key, and only when the

25 Blue Helmets take up their positions in the territory and take on the

1 physical protection of the Serb people there, only then would the Yugoslav

2 People's Army withdraw, and that's what we did.

3 Q. Mr. Kostic, when you say that -- when you stress here that the UN

4 wouldn't have lists of materials, that's actually -- is that not basically

5 saying, "We can cheat them"? "They wouldn't know how many material

6 belongs to the TO and what to the JNA"? Or why do you say that here?

7 A. Well, the United Nations did not have a list of equipment and

8 weaponry for the simple reason that they didn't ask for it. As far as the

9 United Nations were concerned, the most important thing was that light and

10 heavy weaponry should be deposited in certain storehouses, that it be

11 under lock and key and under control, among other things, of the United

12 Nations, so that when the Blue Helmets appear, the Yugoslav People's Army

13 would withdraw completely from that area.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: That wasn't the question. The question was

15 whether --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question was whether, when you say that the

18 UN would not have a list of materials, whether you were not in effect

19 saying that "We can cheat them."

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not what I meant. Cheat

21 them how? How would we cheat them?

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23 Q. Mr. Kostic, you referred to the fact that the UN wouldn't know

24 which material, heavy equipment, would belong to the TO and which belongs

25 to the JNA, meaning you could leave the JNA stuff behind, claiming it were

1 TO stuff. That's what actually is meant here, isn't it?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Short answer, please.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply thought that the United

4 Nations were absolutely not interested in what belonged to whom, that the

5 United Nations were interested in the weaponry being deposited, that it be

6 placed under their control, and that the JNA be withdrawn from that

7 territory, and that's what was done.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

9 Q. Mr. Kostic, continuing in the text we have further questions. It

10 probably should be two pages further on. And Milan Martic, actually,

11 asked you: "If we must be wise with all this --" and it's on page 13 in

12 the English, Your Honours. And page 19 in the Serbian language,

13 Mr. Kostic.

14 A. I found it. I found it, yes.

15 Q. Mr. Martic says: "If we must be wise with all this, you ought to

16 help us. You know that there are 50.000 soldiers in Krajina now. You

17 print money here and send it to them. They are used to that money and

18 they live somehow. The economy is not functioning, money is being

19 printed."

20 And your answer to this is: "They must understand that we print

21 money here not only for them but also for these whom we send from here.

22 This money printing cannot last indefinitely. This must be kept in mind."

23 Mr. Kostic, was this how the Serb soldiers from the Krajina were

24 financed, through money printing in Belgrade? Was that how it went?

25 A. Well, please, take into account the fact that we're talking about

1 Yugoslavia still, and there still were no internationally recognised

2 republics. It was a united territory, the territory of Yugoslavia, and on

3 that territory we had the strongest corpus or, rather, corps. It was the

4 Knin Corps. And we had people there from all parts of Yugoslavia making

5 up that Knin Corps, both the soldiers and the others. And the people

6 lived there and they lived on money, and the Yugoslav People's Army

7 financed that. So those are the people we're talking about here. I don't

8 know which other people you mean. Who else would we send? Well, the

9 Yugoslav People's Army was there. The man from Macedonia was there. The

10 Split soldier who lost his life was there.

11 Q. Mr. Kostic, the TO members from Krajina, were they paid by the

12 money being printed in Belgrade, before -- during this conflict and also

13 after the Vance Plan?

14 A. I really couldn't give you a precise answer to that question,

15 whether all the members of the Territorial Defence did, or were, but in

16 view of the fact that we were dealing with wartime conditions, the

17 Territorial Defence units shared the fate of the units of the Yugoslav

18 People's Army. They come under the same command and so on and so forth,

19 so it would be realistic to suppose that they were financed too. So

20 that's why I say that we cannot keep it up that long, that the people who

21 were engaged at the front should come back home and carry on making a

22 living and living off that. So I can't give you a precise answer.

23 Q. I would like to continue now, go a little bit further in the text.

24 We are now -- in the English it's page 21, and in the Serbian -- it's an

25 exchange with Mile Paspalj.

1 A. I find Mile Paspalj in the Serbian version on page 28, the middle

2 of page 28. That's where he appears, Mile Paspalj. But I can tell you

3 something --

4 Q. It's actually a little bit further, I think. It's where Mile

5 Paspalj says: "First the period of three, four, or five months of pushing

6 permanent conflict between prominent Krajina figures in the territory of

7 Krajina, this did not come from the Republic of Croatia or Bosnia but

8 precisely from the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia."

9 And you answer to this: "I would appreciate it, Mr. Paspalj, if

10 you discussed the issues concerning Serbia with the leadership of Serbia."

11 It's on page 31, actually, in the Serbian language.

12 Do you know what Mr. Paspalj is referring here to when he says

13 "Serbia pushing permanent conflict between prominent Krajina figures"?

14 Do you know what he means?

15 A. When he said that, I said, and during the examination-in-chief I

16 also said, that one of the reasons for the tragedy that the Serb people in

17 the Republic of Serb Krajina suffered was on a political and ideological

18 basis, that that was the grounds for that, and that Babic joined the

19 Chetnik emigration and Bujic [phoen], and that the divisions in Serbia

20 were highly present, both among the leadership and among the people, and

21 that in all the contacts I had I insisted upon leaving behind ideology and

22 politics but that they should see to their survival in the area first.

23 And I know that certain opposition parties sent people there, their

24 volunteers. And some people thought that they would start out from there

25 towards Belgrade, under arms and things like that.

1 Q. Mr. Kostic, I would like now to go a bit further. It's on page 23

2 of the English, and it's -- in the B/C/S, it's where you refer to the

3 forces in the Krajina. And you say the following: "We are now, with this

4 engagement of the peacekeeping forces, ensuring that you continue to have

5 your own police and authorities in that territory, and for the 93 per cent

6 men who are now on the front to take off their uniforms and return to work

7 for a living, leaving all the weapons here and not grouping it in one

8 place."

9 And if you're looking, Mr. Kostic, it's page 55 in the Serbian.

10 And you say: "I said, if need be, we will make new hangars and we will

11 deposit these weapons there where they will be most accessible for use; 93

12 per cent of the troops remain here where they can be mobilised and engaged

13 at any moment, and use those weapons. You can triple your police forces

14 and you have mechanised units at the border of Krajina and Bosnia, which

15 can reach the other end of the border within two hours."

16 Mr. Kostic, that's another move against the Vance Plan, the

17 demilitarisation, is it not, tripling the police? That was not what the

18 Vance Plan foresaw; right?

19 A. But let me tell you this: First of all, the storing of weapons

20 was agreed upon with Mr. Vance, that is to say Marek Goulding, who came

21 here as an envoy of Mr. Cyrus Vance, and we specifically agreed about

22 that, both the leadership of the Serbian Krajina with Marek Goulding, and

23 we in the Presidency of the SFRY. That's one thing.

24 Second thing is to -- the increase in the member -- numbers of the

25 police was not something they were averse to because they felt that the

1 Croatian authorities could infiltrate sabotage units and then blame the

2 Serb people of having risen up against the Blue Helmets and things like

3 that. So the peace forces, the UN peace forces, were also interested in

4 having more policemen there to provide better security for themselves and

5 the population as a whole.

6 Q. On the next page there in that same section, the next page in the

7 English, page 24, you say the following: "Why were we in the situation

8 where we had to accept many of these truces? Because we had enormous

9 problems with the supply of manpower and replenishing the army. You must

10 understand how much defeatism, rejection, and disorientation there is; to

11 date 80.000 men have deserted or left the front. Also, the units that

12 have been formed instead of setting out for the front simply disband and

13 go home."

14 And just my question to this, that you accepted the Vance Plan was

15 basically a military necessity, was it not? You couldn't continue to

16 fight. You didn't have the resources. Is that so?

17 A. No, that's not a good conclusion on your part. We could have

18 mobilised had we declared a state of war. We could have mobilised a

19 million people, whereas the top military echelons only asked for 150.000,

20 this additional mobilisation. However, had we not gone before the

21 Security Council and brought in the Blue Helmets in Serbian Krajina, we

22 would ultimately have had to declare a state of war, and we did not

23 declare a state of war.

24 The situation that you're talking about and these quotes from you,

25 that is a situation where there was no state of war proclaimed, and when

1 the army, to all intents and purposes, was working according to peacetime

2 laws and not wartime laws. It was a very difficult situation because of

3 which the army complained to us a great deal systematically and

4 persistently.

5 Q. Mr. Kostic, it's not my quote, it's your quote. I'm quoting you

6 about what you said at that meeting with the Croatian Serbs. A paragraph

7 below that you say the following --

8 A. You drew the wrong conclusion out of this. You drew the erroneous

9 conclusion.

10 Q. You say the following, and it's on the same page, just the next

11 paragraph: "I'm very sure that Serbia and Montenegro could have easily

12 proclaimed themselves a state union, a sovereign state, and so on. But

13 the moment this was done and accepted, every Yugoslav People's Army

14 soldier would be an occupying soldier on the territory of Herzegovina, the

15 Knin Krajina, and Western and Eastern Slavonia."

16 And a little bit further down, you say: "This is why we promote

17 the continuity of Yugoslavia, because of the international community, the

18 legitimacy of the Yugoslav People's Army, and possibly to engage this

19 force on the whole territory."

20 That was the motivation; right?

21 A. You see, had we promulgated a state of Serbia and Montenegro, we

22 would have gone against the valid constitution of Yugoslavia, and we were

23 attempting to preserve this constitution and comply with it until the 27th

24 of April, 1992. In other words, we didn't want to behave in the same way

25 as the secessionist republics which rejected the Yugoslav constitution and

1 declared independence. We were acting in accordance with the then valid

2 constitution. It was the constitution of the only legitimate state that

3 existed at the time.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kostic, this may sound as though I'm going back

5 to earlier questions, but it's in this context I want to ask you this.

6 When you assessed that there was an imminent state of war in October, who

7 was that war between?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the time we declared an imminent

9 threat of war --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, imminent threat of war, yes. Yes. Who was

11 the imminent threat of war between?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When an imminent threat of war was

13 declared, the war was between armed paramilitary formations of Croatia and

14 the JNA, which is the armed forces of the SFRY.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The paramilitary of Croatia had

17 armed men.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: It was for the avoidance of doubt that I asked the

19 question. That's a sufficient answer. Thank you.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21 Q. Mr. Kostic, a bit further down now in the text -- in the English,

22 Your Honours, it's page 39; and in the B/C/S, it's 56. And it's actually

23 an exchange between you and Mr. Risto Matkovic, and you say here: "We

24 don't know where we will be tomorrow, but we should start from this:

25 Whether there is a Yugoslavia or a Serbia in this shape or another, it is

1 more than certain in my assessment that there is no government in Serbia

2 that can survive and be prepared to sacrifice these people. It does not

3 exist."

4 And a little bit further down in relation to Montenegro, you also

5 say: "However, the situation in Montenegro is such that there is no

6 authority that would survive for 24 hours if they were prepared to betray

7 the interest of those people."

8 Mr. Kostic, that is actually what you are saying here. That's

9 what I put to you when we spoke about Mr. Jovic's book, that the Serbian

10 leadership and the Montenegrin leadership could not survive without

11 supporting the Krajina Serbs. That's how I understood that -- your remark

12 here. Is that so?

13 A. This is not about the need for those in authority to survive in

14 power. It's about the fact that the people of Serbia and Montenegro were

15 convinced that physical protection had to be provided to other parts of

16 the people that were under threat in other parts of Yugoslavia until a

17 solution was found. The issue was not bare survival.

18 Q. But it says here no government in Serbia can survive. It's about

19 power.

20 A. Madam, it was the government that was democratically elected by

21 the people in Serbia. And you should also mention Montenegro. At

22 democratic multi-party elections, the people elected the government, both

23 in Serbia and Montenegro. It was given the support of two-thirds of the

24 people, and this support was owing to the programme, the platform. A

25 large part of this was to try to preserve Yugoslavia, to try to find a

1 peaceful solution, and to prevent the part of the people that was under

2 threat in any part of Yugoslavia.

3 Q. I would like to move on now, and we go to the English page 52, and

4 in the Serbian it's page 74. It's an exchange between you and Mr. Martic,

5 Milan Martic, about, I would say, concrete terms.

6 "I agree with what President Babic said, that we would observe the

7 Presidency decision and that we ought to agree on concrete issues. Their

8 troops on our territory - about 50.000 for whom money is being printed.

9 According to our plan, we should transfer 20.000 men to the police. Are

10 you prepared to provide for these 20.000 men; are you prepared for Adzic

11 and Kadijevic not to order them to pull out the tanks, because we won't

12 give them; nobody needs to convince us of that."

13 And your answer is: "These are all concrete issues; it is cheaper

14 to both Serbia and Montenegro to do this than to finance a war."

15 And Martic: "Are you prepared to leave me a number of officers

16 that we are requesting, who want to lead these units as police units. We

17 need to specify all these details and stand behind it. This is what I am

18 interested in."

19 And your answer is: "I completely agree, these are the issues

20 about which we have to sit down and talk. Those who are responsible for

21 the portfolios should talk with the relevant portfolio minister, and this

22 ought to have an appropriate form instead of us having reservations again

23 each other."

24 Mr. Kostic, these concrete arrangements for the payment of these

25 20.000 police people and what else Mr. Martic needed, these arrangements

1 were made, were they not?

2 A. I can't say that. The possibility is left open for an agreement

3 of this. I really cannot tell you what was implemented and to what

4 extent, referring to what was discussed here. It wasn't only about 20.000

5 policemen. It was also about how various services could function, such as

6 the post office, the telephone communications, the public auditing

7 service, and so on and so forth. The -- bringing in the peace forces of

8 the UN implied that as far as the political situation went, nothing would

9 change in the area. Those people on that territory had to abide by the

10 laws --

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

12 A. -- throughout this time.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry. Sorry. You'll need to help me on this one.

14 You're in charge of the army at this point, and you don't know if this is

15 what actually happened. I find that strange. Perhaps you could clarify

16 it.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were discussing the adoption of

18 the Vance Plan here. As regards to specific issues referring not only to

19 the army but to the entire economy, we agreed that this should all be

20 regulated --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't divert attention from the issue. The

22 issue's the army. That's what the question's about. It's not about

23 anything else. It's not about anything else. And the question's very

24 specific. It's described by you as a concrete issue. And the question is

25 about transferring 20.000 men to the police, and were you prepared for

1 Adzic and Kadijevic not to order and to pull out the tanks, because "we

2 won't give them," and you say that would be cheaper for Serbia and

3 Montenegro as an option. You're in charge of the army. Are you saying

4 you don't know whether that actually happened or not?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, what we were discussing

6 here, we said that these issues would be solved by the relevant

7 ministries. So what was mentioned regarding the army had to be resolved

8 with the Ministry of Defence. Whether 20.000 men were left there or not,

9 I don't know, but as regards tanks and artillery, I can tell you that we

10 didn't manage to pull out a single piece of weaponry from the Muslim

11 territories in Bosnia or from the Croatian territories simply because it

12 was the people, the Muslim and the Croat people respectively that stood in

13 front of those weapons and we couldn't run over the people. That's my

14 response to you.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but the anxiety for me, Mr. Kostic, is if you

16 don't know the answer to this sort of question, I have to ask myself

17 whether, when you do give detailed answers about the behaviour of the

18 army, you're actually speaking from genuine knowledge or not, because this

19 seems quite an important matter and one on which I would have thought the

20 member of the Presidency with responsibility for the army would have

21 known.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And what can I tell you now,

23 Mr. Bonomy? You can doubt the truthfulness of my testimony, that's all.

24 After 15 years -- maybe if I had time I could find out.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: No --

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And learn how many policemen were

2 left in Krajina, how many were funded, but I can't answer that question

3 now.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps the question could be put a different way:

5 Did you know at the time, and have you now forgotten? Is that what you're

6 saying?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Had I known then and forgotten in

8 the meantime, well, I'd probably still know it today had I known then.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, what's the point in pointing out to me

10 that it's 15 years ago? I'm not following this reaction to this line of

11 questioning. But anyway, let's let the Prosecutor continue.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. Mr. Kostic --

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I cannot remember that right

15 now. I can't answer that question, quite simply.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

18 Q. Are you aware that after -- after the Vance Plan was actually --

19 after the Vance Plan was agreed upon, that afterwards the -- there was a

20 strong cooperation between the JNA and the later army of the RSK? Are you

21 aware of the strong cooperation financially, in staffing and the like?

22 A. I really don't know what you're referring to now. I only know

23 that when the peace forces of the UN arrived, we withdrew the JNA

24 completely from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender this --

2 this document. Mr. Milosevic didn't, but I would like to tender it as a

3 Prosecution exhibit.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

6 Q. Yes. Mr. Kostic, in relation to the Vance Plan and violations of

7 the Vance Plan, Mr. Milosevic asked you about violations of the Vance

8 Plan, and you said actually that exclusively the paramilitary formations

9 of Croatia violated the agreement, and I would like to put to you now a

10 report of the Security Council on that situation of the 27th of July,

11 1992, and it's Defence Exhibit -- it's D94, Your Honour.

12 A. Madam, don't try. On the 15th I withdrew from political life and

13 from the government, and you're saying this was on the 27th of July, 1992.

14 I won't be able to answer your question.

15 Q. This report relates to actually the period passing -- that passed

16 since the establishment of the Vance Plan. It's not something that

17 happens on the 27th of July, Mr. Kostic, but it's a report about the time

18 period that has passed since February 1992. Therefore, I think you will

19 be able to answer my questions. But let me put this to you and -- first

20 of all --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have this report?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be passed to the accused.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It is Defence Exhibit D94, and of course we

1 have a copy for you -- for Mr. Milosevic.

2 Q. And I quote first from paragraph 5 here, point 5. It says here:

3 "Prior to the UNPROFOR's assumption of responsibility in the UNPAs, it

4 had become apparent that the JNA was transferring many of its heavy

5 weapons to local Territorial Defence units and paramilitary militias

6 established in these areas. The Force Commander has informed me that all

7 TO units in Sectors East and West have handed over their heavy weapons and

8 that these weapons, which include tanks, artillery, mortars, and

9 anti-aircraft weapons systems, have been stored ..." and so on and so

10 forth.

11 Mr. Kostic, what the UNPROFOR commanders found out is exactly what

12 you were talking about with the Croatian Serbs that we just talked about;

13 right?

14 A. What you read at the end is what I keep saying. The JNA complied

15 with the Vance Plan completely. All heavy weapons were stored in depots.

16 You can see that for yourselves now.

17 Q. Mr. Kostic, I've just read to you the opposite. The commander of

18 the UNPROFOR found out that before they came, JNA transferred heavy

19 weapons to the TO. That's just what we --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And paramilitary militias, according to this.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes.

22 Q. They found out, although they didn't have a list, obviously. They

23 found out.

24 A. Do you have anywhere in these UN reports that this was misused, or

25 were these weapons stored quite properly?

1 Q. You don't -- so you -- I understand you don't want to answer my

2 question. It's a very simple question. I read to you what the UNPROFOR

3 commanders found out, and that's what really happened; right? Before they

4 came, weapons were transferred from the JNA to the TO so that they could

5 stay in the region.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's your answer to that?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wouldn't be able to give you a

8 specific answer. I don't exclude the possibility, because we had a lot of

9 problems trying to convince the people there to accept the Blue Helmets.

10 All the weapons left for them were left for their protection and for their

11 security. I was not informed of any complaints that these weapons which

12 were stored there were misused by members of the Territorial Defence or

13 the police on the territory of Serbian Krajina. The depots were opened

14 only when the paramilitary formations of Croatia attempted to penetrate

15 into these protected areas again.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17 Q. I move on to paragraph 7. In paragraph 7 of this same report it

18 says the following: "However, the process of demobilisation of the TO

19 forces in the sectors has been complicated by the parallel emergence of

20 strengthened police and militia organisations. These groups, designed as

21 'Special police,' 'Border police' and so on are equipped with automatic

22 rifles and, in some cases, with machine-guns, in violation of the

23 provisions of the plan which require that the police be equipped only with

24 sidearms. In many cases these groups have taken over from the JNA or the

25 Serb Territorial Defence force's responsibility for manning the front

1 lines; they will have to be withdrawn and disbanded. These matters have

2 been repeatedly taken up with the local authorities, but so far without

3 satisfactory results."

4 Mr. Kostic, what the UN is complaining about is that the Serb side

5 violated the Vance Plan. That's correct, is it not?

6 A. I can tell you that what you are reading out, some parallel units

7 taking over something from the JNA means that the JNA was no longer there.

8 If it's correct that the JNA was no longer there, then our responsibility

9 in those territories no longer existed. Those were territories where

10 there was neither Yugoslav authority nor Croatian authority. The areas

11 were under the control of the United Nations. If such things did occur,

12 it was up to the UN to intervene. We were no longer competent. We were

13 no longer responsible.

14 Q. Mr. Kostic, when you talked with Mr. Milosevic, you said that only

15 the Croats violated the Vance Plan agreement, and I'm putting to you now

16 complaints by the UN that the Serb side violated the agreement, and do I

17 have to understand you didn't know that?

18 A. Madam, you should not assume. I'm telling you you're reading a UN

19 report of the 27th of July when I had already completely withdrawn from

20 political life. This is the first time I've heard this report. On the

21 15th of June, I handed over the duty of president to Dobrica Cosic,

22 president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I retired.

23 Q. I'll stop you. I read now paragraph 14 of that report, only part

24 of it about expulsion, coercion, and intimidation, and this is what is in

25 the report: "In earlier cases, especially before an UNPROFOR assumption

1 of responsibility, these expulsions were carried out in a blatant manner."

2 It's hard to read. "Families were, under physical threat, gathered from

3 their houses in buses and trucks and transported to areas outside the

4 UNPAs. This had been most evident in Sector East. Since assuming its

5 responsibilities, UNPROFOR has been able, as a result of intense

6 patrolling and control of checkpoints, to put a stop to mass expulsions.

7 Individual cases of intimidation resulting in the forced departure of

8 persons from their homes have, however, continued to occur ..."

9 Mr. Kostic, they are speaking here from a time period in which

10 UNPROFOR wasn't there yet and you were still in the Presidency. What do

11 you say to this, the mass expulsion of non-Serbs?

12 A. I've already told you, madam. As regards mass expulsion, I can

13 assert with certainty that the JNA, that we were responsible for, expelled

14 no one. There was an inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict there.

15 Wherever there are such conflicts, the population of both ethnicities and

16 religious affiliations flees and goes to places where they will feel

17 physically more secure.

18 You're saying that even after UNPROFOR took over there were

19 individual threats and so on. But even if this was the case and even if

20 it had been the case before UNPROFOR arrived, could I have been informed

21 of everything that happened on that territory between those people who

22 were waging a civil war? That's why I'm asking you, when will you start

23 indicting Mr. Blair for all the murders and rapes that happened in London

24 last night?

25 Q. I would like to move on now to an entirely different issue, and

1 it's just one question that I have to you in relation to the retiring --

2 retiring of officers. And we have heard a great deal about this, and I

3 don't want to go into any details. I just want to refer to your book,

4 actually, your book "1991, Not To Be Forgotten." This is Defence Exhibit

5 D333, tab 72. And I would like to have this provided to everyone. It's

6 page 108 in your book, and we have a translation.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, when are you proposing to

8 conclude?

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the next session, Your Honour. Sometime

10 in the next session. I have actually only two more complex items.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: As much as I do not like the time counting, you

12 are beyond the two-thirds limit.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, he is very -- and at this point

14 I agree with Mr. Milosevic: Mr. Kostic is a very important witness in

15 this case. He's actually the one who was at the head of the state at that

16 time, and therefore I would like to cover a few more aspects, and it would

17 -- I assume that there will be some redirect, and I assume that this will

18 -- by the end of that, it will be the two-thirds.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, but be as brief as possible in the

20 next session.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.

22 Q. In relation to the retiring of officers, I would like to refer you

23 to your book, and it says here on page 108 --

24 A. Will you tell me the page number again, please.

25 Q. 108. 108, and it's actually marked also in the document provided

1 to you by the usher. I don't want to read the whole conversation, what

2 you have mentioned here, but the only thing I would like to quote is you

3 say here: "That same evening, a little while after Adzic's telephone

4 call, Slobodan Milosevic called me. He was angry. He specifically

5 criticised me because General Marko Negovanovic's name was included in the

6 list of retired generals," and then in brackets there is the sentence:

7 "Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic did not have insight into the

8 whole list." And my question is what do you mean by saying they "did not

9 have insight into the whole list"? What does that refer to?

10 A. This means that several months previously, the Federal Secretariat

11 for National Defence had provided us with a complete list of all the

12 generals of the JNA, classified into several groups. Two groups were of

13 special interest and the reason we asked for the list was that we wanted

14 to know which were the generals which, pursuant to the law, either because

15 their years of service or because of their age, fulfilled the conditions

16 for retirement.

17 As I've already said, we had a huge number of generals. It was

18 too big even for the old Yugoslavia, the entire Yugoslavia. Now that

19 Yugoslavia was reduced in size by half, the number of generals was far too

20 large and had to be reduced.

21 Q. We do not need to have it all repeated. I only asked you was

22 there a list that Mr. Milosevic should have had but didn't have? This is

23 how I would read your remark, "insight into the whole list."

24 A. The Presidency had the list. Neither Mr. Milosevic nor

25 Mr. Bulatovic had it. It was the Presidency that had the list. This was

1 taking place when Mr. Jovic was going to China. We consulted everyone we

2 had to consult. We were not doing anything simply on our own initiative,

3 although Mr. Jovic said that this was impudence on my part. I never asked

4 him why he described it in this way, nor will I, but I have explained why

5 Mr. Milosevic should have known about Mr. Marko Negovanovic. Mr. Marko

6 Negovanovic was not pensioned off as the Serbian minister of defence but

7 only as a general.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we're going to take the break

9 for 20 minutes. We are adjourned.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Perhaps could that be admitted?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.

12 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

13 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. I would like to have now a bit from Mr. Kostic's book put in front

17 of him, and the page is 47 and 48. It's Defence Exhibit 333, tab 72.

18 Mr. Kostic, you have already addressed the Belgrade Initiative

19 with Mr. Milosevic, and I do not want to go into any details of that.

20 Only one question, and that relates to the page 47 in your book, and the

21 chapter is marked.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's on the first page of the

23 translation that you should have in front of you.

24 Q. You say here: "This is because Momir Bulatovic and Slobodan

25 Milosevic were the co-authors of the so-called Belgrade Initiative."

1 Is that so? Were they the co-authors of the Belgrade Initiative?

2 Just a yes or no answer.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And a little bit further down on that same page in your book, you

5 say the following: "Therefore, I expressed my opinion that despite

6 all --"

7 A. I'm not receiving the interpretation. No interpretation.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's try again.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

10 Q. In your book, a little bit further down, just a few lines further

11 down, it says --

12 A. It's all right now.

13 Q. -- "Therefore, I expressed my opinion that despite all, Momir

14 Bulatovic should be kept on because I feared that with his dismissal the

15 conflict might spread into Montenegro."

16 Mr. Kostic, does that mean at that time when Mr. Bulatovic had

17 actually agreed to the Carrington Plan and also had made an attempt to

18 withdraw Montenegrin soldiers from the front line, that Mr. Milosevic,

19 Jovic, and you discussed his dismissal?

20 A. We didn't discuss his dismissal at all. What it was about was

21 that I, as representative of Montenegro and vice-president of the Yugoslav

22 state Presidency, assumed one position and Mr. Momir Bulatovic, as

23 president of Montenegro, quite another position at The Hague conference.

24 And knowing the mood prevailing in Montenegro, that the population was

25 even then fiercely divided in two different polls over those options, I

1 knew that there would be a great deal of reaction amongst the population.

2 And in that sense, I told Jovic and Mr. Milosevic -- we travelled

3 together, we sat together and talked -- I expressed the view that

4 everything should be done to keep Momir Bulatovic, that is to say not to

5 open a new conflict between me and him in Montenegro because we had a lot

6 of difficulties to deal with of a difficult nature.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, just one thing in relation to

8 the Belgrade Initiative. Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Kostic had discussed it

9 alongside the Defence Exhibit D333, tab 84, and it was then not admitted

10 because Judge -- His Honour Judge Kwon pointed out that the Belgrade

11 Initiative document was already admitted under another exhibit number,

12 namely 338, tab 9. However, 338, tab 9, was only a basic proposal with a

13 few points, and the provisions discussed between Mr. Kostic and

14 Mr. Milosevic are actually quite complex, and they are not yet in

15 evidence. So --

16 JUDGE KWON: I think I mentioned another tab number, didn't I?

17 D272.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then my --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff --

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then my information is incorrect.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I was informed that tab 84 was not yet --

23 this document was not yet admitted. Okay. Thank you.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're a brave person, anyhow, to take on Judge

25 Kwon on the matter.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. I don't know how this comes about.

2 We have already in evidence, and I would like to put this to Mr. Kostic,

3 the article, Epoha article dealing with the convention on the new

4 Yugoslavia, and it's Exhibit 808. And could that be put to Mr. Kostic.

5 Q. It's the convention on new Yugoslavia held in the SFRY parliament

6 on the 3rd of January, 1992. And, Mr. Kostic, was that an initiative by

7 the SFRY Presidency, this convention?

8 A. No. In the text here that is before us, it says that the

9 initiative for holding the convention on a third Yugoslavia came from

10 several political parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the initiative

11 board made up of, I think, nine political parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina

12 came to the Yugoslav state Presidency. We agreed to hold a meeting. They

13 came, and we in the Presidency accepted being the sponsors of the meeting.

14 So it was the -- under the auspices of the SFRY Presidency that that

15 convention was held.

16 Q. And on page 4 of the English translation, there is a reference

17 to: "The process of building a new Yugoslavia will definitely depend on

18 the will of the nation, citizens, and republics that want to join it."

19 And it says -- it lists here those who want to join. "So far, Serbia and

20 Montenegro, Republic of Serbian Krajina, and Serbian Republic of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that includes autonomous regions -" they're listed

22 then here - "have declared one way or another that they want to stay in

23 the new federal state."

24 The representatives of these entities, they were all present;

25 right?

1 A. Yes, but mostly they were from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vast

2 majority, in fact, was from Bosnia-Herzegovina. But there were

3 representatives of political parties, associations, movements from other

4 parts of Yugoslavia as well who had expressed the desire to stay within

5 Yugoslavia. And in tab 72 in my book, you will find a comprehensive list

6 of all the participants in the convention, and there were 109 of them.

7 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kostic. And on page 5 of the English

8 translation there, it says in the middle of this page: "Pursuant to the

9 convention on new Yugoslavia, the SFRY Assembly has to bring decisions

10 that will enable overall solution of the Yugoslav political crisis,

11 including decisions on conditions and procedure for realisation of the

12 right of a nation to self-determination and decisions on criteria and

13 principles that would be a base for a just, territorial, and material

14 separation between new Yugoslavia and the parts of the former SFRY where

15 the peoples want to create independent and sovereign states outside of

16 Serbia."

17 Mr. Kostic, does that mean territorial separation and drawing new

18 borders between those new independent states and the new Yugoslavia?

19 A. Well, you would have to ask the authors of this Declaration, of

20 this Declaration on the New Yugoslavia, the third Yugoslavia that was

21 adopted at that meeting. There were representatives from all over. And

22 at the convention, we also discussed the protectorate, UN protectorate of

23 the Serbian Krajinas in Croatia and to seek solutions for the position of

24 that nation over there.

25 Now, as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, and this is the 3rd of

1 January, those of us who really did strive to preserve Yugoslavia from the

2 very first day, even in a reduced form, that is to say without Slovenia

3 and Croatia, at the time we still believed, and I particularly believed,

4 that we would succeed in keeping Bosnia within the frameworks of the

5 reduced Yugoslavia. And all our thoughts went along those lines. We

6 didn't expect the Muslims in Bosnia to turn against the Serbs and that a

7 civil war should break out there, although that was always a concern.

8 Q. When you now say that you were still considering Bosnia to be part

9 of this, I would like to put the map that was actually related to the

10 convention of the new Yugoslavia on the ELMO.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, you have it also. It's

12 part of this Epoha article, but it's in black and white. Yes. I would

13 like you to have the coloured version of this map. And it's -- but I have

14 to tell you that it's only in B/C/S here. The coloured version, we have

15 the B/C/S names of all the territories.

16 Q. But I think we do not need to concern ourself with that,

17 Mr. Kostic. This map attached to the new Yugoslavia, the convention of

18 Yugoslavia of the 3rd of January, that's not including the entire Bosnia.

19 It's actually including the Serb territories only; correct?

20 A. Well, I have to say first of all that this is the first time that

21 I see this map. I didn't see this map at the Convention on Yugoslavia.

22 And here what I can notice is that in the explanations given, it wasn't a

23 map of the new Yugoslavia but what it says here is that they were the

24 regions whose population had already declared themselves in favour of

25 staying in Yugoslavia. That's what it says in the map as well. The map

1 whose population has already declared itself willing to remain within

2 Yugoslavia.

3 As far as I remember, the Muslims and Croats later on, after the

4 convention on the new Yugoslavia, organised a referendum, and it was at

5 the referendum that they came out contrary to the constitution and

6 contrary to the law, that they wanted a sovereign state, that is to say

7 without the participation of the Serb people and without the participation

8 of deputies in the Serbian Assembly and members of the Presidency of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Q. Mr. Kostic, I would like to --

11 A. As you can see here, Macedonia, too, is in the shaded area. So it

12 was still not the option to remain within Yugoslavia. All we have here is

13 the territories whose population said they wanted to remain within

14 Yugoslavia.

15 Q. Yes. Thank you. Mr. --

16 A. However, the fact is that this wasn't a component part of the

17 convention, this map.

18 Q. Thank you. I would like to put to you now a map, and it's another

19 map. It's Exhibit 809A. It's a coloured map. And just very briefly,

20 Mr. Kostic, it's a coloured map indicating the Serb-held territories in

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1992. And just have a look at it. And

22 would you agree that those little blue dots along the -- this blue -- this

23 blue separate sections along the border with Serbia, Srebrenica, Zepa, and

24 Gorazde, where the Muslims were in the majority, and would you agree to

25 this? Can you read that map this way?

1 A. First of all, I see this map for the first time, just like the one

2 you showed us the previous time. You say the 30th of December, 1992. I

3 don't know. From the aspects of how far I am acquainted with the relief

4 and the map of the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I can only

5 assume that the blue areas near the border with Serbia are areas --

6 represent areas which might be Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. That is

7 possible. That's where they should be, somewhere in that area.

8 Q. Yes. And in the middle of the actually Serb-controlled areas,

9 more to the Croatian border, there is also a dark blue Muslim area

10 indicated. That's Bihac; right?

11 A. I don't think that is Bihac, but let me state again this is the

12 first time that I see this map, and dating back to those times I really

13 can't tell you anything. I can't be of assistance here. But once again,

14 from the aspects of the geography of the former Yugoslavia, I would say

15 that that area was the Muslim part where Mr. Fikret Abdic was and where he

16 had formed his autonomous Muslim region. But I don't think that is the

17 area of Bihac. I think it is more to the north-west of Bihac.

18 Q. And we see something --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff is asking the

21 witness about things that she has not established in the first place. She

22 hasn't said what they are. He said that it wasn't a document that was

23 used at the convention in Yugoslavia, and it was indeed not. If it is a

24 map taken from some newspaper, then I'm wondering what sense there is in

25 asking the witness that, because different newspapers wrote different

1 things, all sorts of things. So what is the sense of asking the witness

2 about a map that was drawn perhaps by some newspaper? Or she can tell us

3 what the document is. Whose document it is, the provenance the document,

4 and then go ahead and ask the witness about it.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, are you still on the map?

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm not on the map from the newspaper,

7 actually. I have said that this is a map used as Exhibit 89 -- 809, and

8 it is actually, as it says here, it's from the UNPROFOR map. It says

9 here: "Source: Front lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina are from an

10 UNPROFOR map and shows status as of 30 December 1992."

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And what is your next question?

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. My next question was related to that small corridor that is here

14 between the areas along the Drina and the other Serb areas, and my

15 question to you was: When these areas were actually inhabited by mostly

16 Muslims, and in relation to the corridor, mostly Muslims and Croats, why

17 did the Serbs try to get it? Why was all this fighting about in the years

18 from 1992 to 1995? Can you help us with that?

19 A. Well, I could give you my opinion in answer to your question in

20 the extent in which an average citizen slightly better informed about it

21 or in view of the positions I held could tell you, but I don't know

22 whether there's any sense of giving you my opinion here in view of the

23 fact that --

24 Q. I just want to -- wanted to know from you if you can help us with

25 this in relation to your -- you were in a position -- you were in a very

1 important position until mid of 1992, and the question is: Do you -- can

2 you give us any facts that could actually answer this question that I was

3 addressing: Why did the Serbs try to capture these areas where the

4 Muslims and the Croats were in the majority? That was my question. Do

5 you know? Can you help us with facts in relation to that?

6 A. Well, madam, you yourself said that it was the period from 1992 to

7 1995, and in June 1992 I'd already left all my positions and posts, and I

8 can just tell you what I said in the examination-in-chief: That the

9 overall civil war, which was a very bloody civil war in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was waged between all three ethnic groups, was a

11 war for territory between all those three nations.

12 Q. Mr. Jovic -- Mr. Kostic, sorry. I was looking at the book of

13 Mr. Jovic. Sorry.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: First of all, Your Honour, I forgot - and

15 that's a reminder from Ms. Dicklich - I forgot to ask you to admit the

16 Kostic book, pages 47 to 48 that were previously discussed.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you. And could the witness

19 please be given from Exhibit 596, tab 2, the Jovic book on "The End of the

20 SFRY," the entry of the 30th of April, 1992.

21 Q. Mr. Kostic, it's from the book, and it refers to a meeting, a

22 conversation with the Serb leadership from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the

23 30th of April, 1992, and according to Mr. Jovic's note, you were also

24 present as was Mr. Milosevic. And it says here in this entry, which is a

25 short one: "It is being demanded that we withdraw the JNA from Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina. Slobodan and I both expected and predicted this."

2 And a little bit further down, it says: "The problem is that

3 Branko Kostic recently stated recklessly that he, as vice-president of the

4 SFRY Presidency, would never sign an order on withdrawing the JNA --"

5 JUDGE KWON: We're not following.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's in this entry of 30 April 1992, and it's

7 in the third paragraph or, rather, on page 400; and the translation it's

8 the second paragraph. The paragraph starts: "With the withdrawal of the

9 10 to 15 per cent ..." but I had skipped that and just moved on to the

10 next sentence.

11 Q. "The problem is that Branko Kostic ..."

12 "The problem is that Branko Kostic recently stated recklessly that

13 he, as vice-president of the SFRY Presidency, will never sign an order on

14 withdrawing the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also that Milan Panic

15 stated that the military will not be withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina for

16 five to seven years ..."

17 Mr. Kostic, do you recall this meeting with the Bosnian Serbs

18 attending where you were basically --

19 A. I do remember that, yes. I remember that. But what you've just

20 quoted from Mr. Jovic's book, I have to say that that is once again

21 something that Mr. Jovic has fabricated. It seems that he was following

22 what my political opponents in Montenegro were saying and what they were

23 criticising me for rather than what we were discussing.

24 My exact words, which are quoted here erroneously, was that never

25 as vice-president of Yugoslav state Presidency would I sign the withdrawal

1 of the Yugoslav People's Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina until the leadership

2 of all three ethnic groups agreed to that. So that is the comprehensive

3 statement that I made.

4 My political components made use of the first part of that

5 statement and omitted the second part of that statement, just like

6 Mr. Jovic omitted the second part of the statement. In my book I go on to

7 explain this, and I say that the Muslim and Croatian leaderships in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina had already ceased sending young men to the JNA. They

9 had set up their own paramilitary units, and the leadership of the Serbian

10 people in Bosnia accused us of --

11 Q. Let me interrupt you. I was actually --

12 A. May I just complete my thought, with your permission?

13 Q. I would like only to discuss this meeting with you, and you have

14 already explained that Mr. Jovic has not cited you fully, and we can leave

15 it at that. But the meeting, you remember it, I understand from your

16 answer. And Mr. Jovic wrote about this meeting, and it's further -- a few

17 lines down, the next paragraph, Your Honours. He says: "Independently of

18 Kostic's and Panic's statements, we discussed the need to withdraw the

19 remainder of soldiers who are FRY citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even

20 without them, there remain around 90.000 JNA soldiers in that republic,

21 mostly of Serb nationality, over whom the Serb leadership from

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina can resume political command."

23 And then it says: "Karadzic agrees. Krajisnik raises a series of

24 questions: How will that military be financed, who will pay its wages,

25 who will provide its pensions -" and so on and so forth - "all of which

1 are indeed problems, but are not critical to our discussion."

2 Do you recall this being discussed and these questions that

3 Mr. Krajisnik raised?

4 A. Well, I really don't remember what it was that Mr. Krajisnik

5 actually said, but I do remember the meeting very well. And as you can

6 see, it was a meeting of the 30th of April when the Security Council had

7 already recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this meeting was on the 30th of

8 April when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had already been

9 constituted. And we then met with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs

10 because previously it had accused us of keeping back or retaining a large

11 number of Serb representatives in the JNA and said that they were weakened

12 by this because, as opposed to the Muslim and Croatian paramilitaries in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the JNA was rather restrained. And so it was quite

14 natural that --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. I believe the Prosecutor was

16 interested in whether you remembered any questions about the financing and

17 who will pay the wages of the soldiers, who will provide pensions and so

18 on. Do you have any recollection of that kind of discussion?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't recollect that part

20 of the discussion, but I do remember very well what we agreed on at the

21 time and what we actually did and undertook, and that was to finally

22 withdraw the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina, although four days

23 previously Mr. Adzic and I had had a meeting with Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in

24 Skopje. At that meeting, he told us that the army could stay for five

25 years, if need be.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

3 Q. Yes. Mr. Kostic, I would like to put part of your book to you in

4 relation to the JNA withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everyone

5 should get the English translation. And I would actually only like to

6 quote the footnote 85 to pages -- to these pages that you have in front of

7 you, and the footnote is as follows: "At that moment, the Decision of the

8 Presidency of SFRY ... was fully completed in regard to the withdrawal of

9 the units of the JNA from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 "When in December 1991, immediately after Vatican, also Germany,

11 recognised without waiting 15 January 1992 as the date agreed in the

12 European Community, it was clear to us that Germany would do everything to

13 get recognition of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In such

14 anticipated situation, the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be treated

15 by the international community as an aggressor army on the territory of a

16 foreign state.

17 "That is why, in February 1992, the Supreme Command ordered the

18 General Staff to redeploy military conscripts serving with the Yugoslav

19 People's Army in the shortest possible period by bringing all the military

20 conscripts from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were serving

21 in the Yugoslav People's Army in the territories of Serbia, Macedonia, and

22 Montenegro back to their home republics. We did not have any legal basis

23 to force JNA officers and non-commissioned officers originally from Bosnia

24 and Herzegovina to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina ... However, we left

25 the possibility open of allowing all these military officers who

1 volunteered to be deployed in the JNA in the territory of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina to do it. This measure was implemented swiftly. Therefore,

3 in April 1992, when the Presidency took the Decision on the JNA withdrawal

4 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, it only had to withdraw, from Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina, 15 per cent of the total number of troops ..." and so forth.

6 This was how it was; is that right? This is what you wrote here.

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. And do you know and were you involved in solving the matters that

9 Mr. Krajisnik raised, that is the payment of the JNA officers that

10 remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Do you know that they were paid,

11 continued to be paid through the JNA?

12 A. I assume that this was regulated with the responsible Secretariat

13 for National Defence and that the JNA was duty-bound to pay pensions to

14 its employees who had done their years of service in the JNA. However,

15 the interview you are quoting from is an interview from May 1992. At this

16 meeting that you mentioned on the 13th of April, Mr. Krajisnik raised this

17 issue. I can only assume what happened, but I'm really not informed. I

18 assume that this was regulated with the Federal Secretariat for National

19 Defence, which was responsible for this.

20 Q. Do you know about a 30th Personnel Centre in relation to the

21 payment of the officers that remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22 A. I'm hearing this for the first time. I don't really know anything

23 about this.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this

25 footnote admitted as part of this tab 72.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

3 Q. Mr. Kostic, you have discussed crime bases with Mr. Milosevic

4 during the examination-in-chief, and you basically more or less said that

5 you wouldn't know those kind of things. However, you, in a position as

6 the member of the Presidency, you received information from the JNA, did

7 you not, about what was going on in the territories?

8 A. We did receive information. I think the staff of the Supreme

9 Command or the General Staff of the JNA frequently issued public

10 communiques, mentioning the number of men killed, the number of truces

11 broken, and so on and so forth. But these communiques had to do with the

12 involvement and the activities of the paramilitary formations of Croatia

13 and the activities of the JNA.

14 Q. Mr. Kostic, you said actually in the examination-in-chief - and

15 that is at transcript page 48054 to 56 - you actually said that you had

16 regular briefings by the JNA and you toured the war zones and thus knew

17 about all the activities of the JNA. Is that -- do you stand by that?

18 A. If you say that's what I said verbatim, it's possible. I may have

19 been incautious, but I don't think I said we knew everything. But it's

20 true that we did receive information and that we did tour the areas. I

21 don't think I was so incautious as to say that. If I was, I have to

22 correct myself. Of course I wasn't able to know everything.

23 Q. I actually had quoted you as you said it. In relation to the

24 crimes of which you say you didn't know about it, I just wanted to refer

25 you to some documents that definitely must have reached you, because

1 they're basically addressed to you or the Presidency.

2 And first of all I refer here to Exhibit 330, tab 68. And it's a

3 strong protest by the government of the Republic of Croatia to, inter

4 alia, the Presidency of the SFRY, of the 25th of July, 1991. And in this

5 document, they complain about an event on the 25th of July, 1991, in which

6 members of the JNA opened artillery and tank fire on the villages of Erdut

7 and Bogojevci in the Republic of Croatia. What did you do about it,

8 Mr. Kostic, when you received this?

9 A. I have to say that at that time in that one-year period, there

10 were quite a few protests by the government of the Republic of Croatia and

11 that we had different information respecting many of these from the staff

12 of the General Command. I really don't remember this specific case, but

13 if I were to go through the documents carefully, I might remember.

14 However, at present I can't say anything specific about it.

15 I see that they are mentioning Erdut and Bogojevci. If I'm not

16 mistaken - I don't know if this is the period of the Ohrid Declaration -

17 it might be that this is when we were in Ohrid, but I can't be sure. I do

18 know that there was a lot of provocation, ways and means of a sort for

19 Mr. President Tudjman to walk out of the Ohrid meeting so that we had the

20 Ohrid Declaration practically without him. But I can't tell you more

21 about this without going through the documents in greater detail.

22 Q. But it's a fact that you -- that Mr. Mesic and the Croats, in

23 writing and also during Presidency session, would talk about what they

24 call attacks by the JNA and by those local forces. That's -- so you had

25 some information to this effect, didn't you?

1 A. Madam, Mr. Mesic publicly attacked his own army, the one of which

2 he was the Commander-in-Chief, saying that they were using --

3 Q. Mr. Kostic --

4 A. -- toxic materials and poisons.

5 Q. Mr. Kostic, it was a simple question. I just asked you, you got

6 this information from Mr. Mesic and through letters from the Croatian

7 government, and you -- do I have to understand your answer to mean you

8 didn't deal with it because you didn't believe it, or what position did

9 you take?

10 A. A large proportion of this information was incorrect, madam. When

11 we received information, we usually tasked a working group. Usually it

12 was Mr. Vasil Tupurkovski and Bogic Bogicevic who were tasked with

13 investigating. And a large proportion of this information was incorrect.

14 I can't tell you anything specific about this particular instance without

15 going through all the documents and seeing what this is actually all

16 about. I would even have to look at these reports drawn up by these

17 working groups tasked to investigate whether a crime had or had not been

18 committed somewhere. You can't expect me to know about each specific

19 instance now, 15 years after these events.

20 Q. Mr. Kostic, we also have here, and that's at tab -- Exhibit 359,

21 tab 3, that is a letter of Helsinki Watch of the 21st of January, 1992.

22 It's a letter to Mr. Milosevic and General Adzic in which they list

23 various crimes that had been committed in these conflict areas in Croatia,

24 and my question to you is, as it goes to General Adzic, did -- do you know

25 this letter?

1 A. Have you got a copy in Serbian?

2 Q. It's actually an English -- it's a letter written by Helsinki

3 Watch, and it's in English. It's from the committee in New York. So do

4 you know the letter?

5 A. No. But as for the Helsinki Watch, I can say throughout the time

6 I was holding government posts they had already decided in advance who

7 were the good guys and who were the bad guys in the Yugoslav crisis.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have a copy of the letter,

9 Mr. Robinson?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

12 Q. But I didn't intend to go now into details. As you said, you do

13 not know this letter, and even if you had got it, you wouldn't really

14 believe it to be correct. Is that what you say, Mr. Kostic?

15 A. Please don't interpret my ideas in your own way. All I said was

16 that at the time while I was holding government posts in Belgrade for a

17 year, the Helsinki Watch was prominent among those who had already decided

18 in advance who were going to be the good guys and who the bad guys in the

19 Yugoslav war. However, I'm not familiar with the content of this letter,

20 so I can't talk about it in advance.

21 Q. Mr. Kostic, now another letter, and that's tab -- Exhibit 643.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this exhibit that I now will put

23 to him, it's a letter from UNESCO to Mr. Kostic, and it was addressed in

24 Exhibit 643, tab 1. That's the report of Mr. Theunens, but this document

25 was not admitted -- it was not tendered separately with the report. And I

1 would like to have Mr. Kostic look at it.

2 Q. Mr. Kostic, it's a letter of the 25th October 1991. It's about

3 concerns that UNESCO has in relation to old city -- inter alia, the Old

4 City of Dubrovnik. Do you -- did you receive this letter?

5 A. At present I don't remember receiving this letter, but as it's

6 addressed to me and in view of its contents and in view of our involvement

7 at the time in October in securing and protecting Dubrovnik and other

8 national and cultural heritage sites, I assume that it did reach me, but I

9 don't really remember this particular letter. I do know, however, that at

10 the time we were paying a lot of attention to protecting cultural

11 monuments and the national heritage, especially with respect to Dubrovnik.

12 Q. What did you do? This is just a very general remark. What did

13 you instruct the JNA in relation to -- to do in relation to Dubrovnik?

14 A. Well, you can see that in the documentation. On more than one

15 occasion, as the Presidency, we drew the fact that the cultural heritage

16 had to be protected. I even visited the Dubrovnik. To be sure, I

17 couldn't visit the Old Town at the time, but I did visit in mid-October,

18 even before the arrival of this letter, and I also know that the staff of

19 the Supreme Command issued warnings to lower-ranking commands and units,

20 saying that the Old Town in Dubrovnik had to be preserved and not

21 destroyed. I think the Old Town was preserved.

22 As for damage in Dubrovnik, which wasn't very serious, it occurred

23 on those buildings which were used as firing points threatening the JNA.

24 Dubrovnik was used by the media.

25 Q. Mr. Kostic --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I --

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you the source of your information that

4 there were firing points within the Old Town?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had occasion to see some footage

6 about the destruction in the Old Town and reports from the diplomatic

7 corps which toured the Old Town. I was also able to see some original

8 film footage of an archival nature. This was original footage from --

9 from the territory where the JNA units were. A journalist was asking a

10 private, who was in a trench, why they weren't advancing - and you can see

11 that this is not staged - and he says, "Well, we would advance but there

12 is some kind of botanical garden down there and they're not allowing us to

13 shoot at it."

14 I know for certain that the General Staff issued a special order

15 that JNA units should not approach Dubrovnik and the Old Town close enough

16 to be threatened from the Old Town. But I also know that, under those

17 conditions, when a state of war had not been declared, there certainly was

18 lack of discipline among individual lower-ranking units approaching the

19 town and so on.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't really think you've answered my question,

21 have you? What was the source of your information that there were firing

22 points within the Old Town? Forget facility for answering a different

23 question from the one that's actually asked.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One of the sources was the archive

25 film on the Dubrovnik operation, which I have with me if you're

1 interested. It will show you. It's the Arkitel [phoen] film on the

2 Dubrovnik operation, where seven or eight inhabitants of Dubrovnik speak,

3 among them the commander of the defence of Dubrovnik and a Croatian

4 journalist. I am the only interlocutor in the film on our side. And the

5 film shows very clearly, first of all, that the army did not have the

6 intention of taking the town; secondly, that the artillery pieces used

7 were not heavy pieces, they were light mortars. Furthermore, that the

8 town was not that badly damaged. It was just misused in the media to

9 accuse the JNA and so on and so forth.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So you don't have an answer to my question. Is

11 that the position?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The same film I'm telling you about

13 shows that several palazzos in the Old Town were destroyed but the Old

14 Town is very big, you know.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, Mr. Kostic, you're constantly telling me

16 about how little firing was done at Dubrovnik, and I understand your

17 position on that. What I'm trying to find out is the source of your

18 information that parts of the Old Town of Dubrovnik were the source of

19 firing at the JNA.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I've just told you is knowledge

21 I gained later on, looking at this archive film, for example, on the

22 Dubrovnik operation.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you very much. I've taken up

24 enough time on this unproductive exercise.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

1 Q. Mr. Kostic, we have heard here in this court a lot of evidence

2 that on the 6th of December, 1991, Dubrovnik, the Old Town, was heavily

3 shelled and actually that there was heavy damage, in particular on certain

4 palazzi, as you say, and in particular the roofs. Do you dispute that?

5 Are you still now, after so many years of information, do you still claim

6 Dubrovnik wasn't really attacked on that day? Old Town.

7 A. I have stated this in public more than once, and I say so in

8 Arkitel's film on the Dubrovnik operation. It's only when I heard the

9 testimonies at this Tribunal when individual citizens of Dubrovnik

10 testified that I learned about the 6th of December as something special,

11 when there was especially heavy shelling by the JNA. But until that time,

12 I really knew nothing about it. I have had occasion to hear information

13 from the staff of the naval district denying such claims made by Croatian

14 propaganda, and it was only during the trials here that I was able to hear

15 about these details. And pursuant to what I learnt, I don't deny those.

16 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kostic.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I forgot to ask for the admission of this

18 UNESCO letter to Mr. Kostic.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit 952.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And in Sanction, I would like to play now a

22 video. And the interpreters should know that it is Exhibit 365. It's

23 already admitted, Your Honours, but I would like to put this to

24 Mr. Kostic.

25 [Videotape played]

1 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Distinguished viewers, good

2 evening. And Montenegrin President Milan Djukanovic expressed his

3 commiserations to the Croatian --"

4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but we are unable to

5 find the transcript.

6 [Videotape played]

7 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] ... the afternoon the Cavtat

8 meeting of Stipe Mesic and Mile Djukanovic, which was a tete-a-tete

9 meeting, is the first high level meeting since the aggression on Croatia.

10 It is the result of both sides' initiatives. The talks went on for about

11 an hour. And as President Mesic said, many questions were opened but also

12 closed.

13 "I should like to take this opportunity in my own name and also

14 on behalf of the citizens of Montenegro, especially those citizens who

15 share my moral and political convictions, to say that I deeply regret, and

16 my sympathies with all the citizens of the Republic of Croatia, especially

17 the citizens of Konavle, Dubrovnik, for all the pain and all the suffering

18 and all the material losses and damages that were inflicted on them by any

19 representative of the Montenegrin people within the Yugoslav People's

20 Army.

21 "Mesic and Djukanovic assess today's meeting as ..."

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's enough.

23 Q. Mr. Kostic, why did Mr. Djukanovic -- why did he actually

24 apologise? I mean, would you join this apology?

25 A. First of all, why Mr. Djukanovic apologised, you'd have to ask him

1 that, the reason for that. Now, what I would have done - and I can say

2 this quite openly and frankly - is this: I'm very sorry for all the

3 sufferings and casualties during that tragic 1991/1992 year on all sides,

4 and I have -- feel great pain because of all these casualties and

5 sufferings. But if there was somebody who would be best placed to

6 apologise, it would be Mr. Stjepan Mesic, without counting the other two

7 men who would have to apologise to the Serb people for the mass exodus

8 that took place, the largest exodus of the Serb people after World War II,

9 in fact.

10 So that's my political opinion, you know. Mr. Demikalis [phoen]

11 once asked me, in saying that his greatest contribution was that Mr.

12 Bulatovic had accepted The Hague document, also assessed him as being a

13 stubborn politician, not ready to enter into --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kostic. Let's move on.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let's, yes. Your Honour, I would like to put

16 a map to the witness that actually was produced in the Office of the

17 Prosecutor, and it is actually depicting the crime bases in the Croatia

18 indictment. Only -- we have listed here only the murders and the killings

19 -- the killings in red, and the detention facilities in blue.

20 Q. But, Mr. Kostic, you have already mentioned that you wouldn't know

21 about the details of the detention facilities, so we would not have to

22 deal with this.

23 In relation to the killing incidents that you see here shown in

24 this map, I would like you first of all to look at the left -- the

25 right-hand corner with this huge group of incidents, the red boxes, and it

1 all relates to Eastern Slavonia around the Erdut region. And this high

2 concentration of killings, they're actually always involving Arkan and his

3 men, and Vukovar, Lovas, and a few other crimes. Do you claim that you

4 don't know any of these -- anything about these crimes committed by Arkan?

5 A. First of all, let me correct you on one point. As far as these

6 facilities are concerned where the people were gathered or detained, the

7 prisoners, in the examination-in-chief I just took note of what it said in

8 the indictment, that where those facilities were mentioned you can see

9 that they were military facilities.

10 Q. Mr. Kostic, I didn't ask you -- I actually said that I'm not

11 addressing the detention facilities because you have already mentioned

12 that you couldn't help us with this. But I ask you about these killing

13 counts that we have here related to Erdut, Dalj, and I would -- I put to

14 you whether you really claim and uphold today that you know nothing about

15 Arkan killing people in that area. Do you stand by that?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Give us a short answer, Mr. Kostic. Don't

17 digress.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I've already said during the

19 examination-in-chief that these details about killings and crimes that

20 took place, I don't know. I can't speak about them. I don't know about

21 them. And I already said, as far as Arkan's forces are concerned, I don't

22 know where they were located or if they were present. All I knew was that

23 Seselj and the radicals provided volunteers who made up the JNA and

24 Territorial Defence units.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put to the witness now a

1 document from the 1st Military District that is addressed to the military

2 command, and it's of the 18th of October, 1991. And it should be provided

3 to everyone.

4 Q. Mr. Kostic, this is now a military commander, Major General Mile

5 Babic. He is writing to Mr. Kadijevic's office, speaking of unauthorised

6 killings of arrested ZNG members and other individuals, and he in

7 particular refers to killings from October 1991 committed by Raznjatovic

8 Arkan and the special police in Dalj commanded by Stricevic Milorad, and

9 they are committing unauthorised killings of arrested ZNG members,

10 arresting Croatian individuals, and committing certain acts against the

11 same.

12 Now that it is -- and they refer to a particular killing of a

13 certain Stjepan Pap. And as this is going to the security administration

14 of the SSNO, I wonder whether you know this, this document or the

15 allegations that are in this document.

16 A. Well, please, this is the first time that I see this. I said that

17 the counter-intelligence service and KOS was subordinate to the Federal

18 Secretariat of National Defence, that it was under that and not the

19 Presidency as the Supreme Command, and this is the first time I see this

20 document and I am quite certain that it never reached the Presidency. But

21 these kinds of reports probably exist on the Croatian side as well and on

22 the Yugoslav side, and there were tonnes of things like that.

23 Q. I just asked you whether you got information, this information,

24 and your answer is no.

25 I could put now many more of similar documents to you where the

1 security services actually are addressing crimes committed by Serbs, Serb

2 units, or Arkan or similar groups in the territory of the former --

3 territory of Croatia, and your answer would be you never -- did you never

4 receive any of those information? Did it never reach you?

5 A. Well, the most responsible officers, the top officers from the

6 staff did inform us that there were paramilitaries, that there were

7 individual crimes that were happening over there, and so on the basis of

8 that kind of report to the effect that there were paramilitaries there,

9 paramilitary armies, that nobody was controlling, that didn't listen to

10 anyone, we at the Supreme Command would make special conclusions and tell

11 the staff of the Supreme Command that all the armed formations on those

12 territories should be placed under its control and that paramilitaries

13 should be disbanded and sent home, disarmed and sent home. But detailed

14 information of this kind, as I've already said, you would probably find

15 tonnes of documents like this on both sides. So I neither have them nor

16 did I receive them.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I don't think I need to put

18 more. I have an abundance of documents to put to the witness of that

19 similar nature where information actually was presented, but I -- as I

20 see, I have no time to do this.

21 Can this document --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was this the first one that you put?

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, it's the first one.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put one more.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And this one is not actually yet an

1 exhibit, Your Honour. I would like to have this admitted.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Oh, he didn't -- he didn't acknowledge --

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, he didn't.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- your proposition.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, he didn't. Thank you, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We can't admit it.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, I withdraw this request.

8 Q. Let me put to you the documents Exhibit 686.

9 JUDGE KWON: I am of the opinion that if the Defence is not

10 opposed to it, we can admit it. We can ask him.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you in opposition to the

12 admission of this document?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot get accustomed to switching

15 my own microphone on and not having somebody else switch it on for me.

16 But I am against it, opposed to it, for reasons of principle. Professor

17 Kostic, who was the vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's ends it, Mr. Milosevic. If you're opposed

19 to it, we will not admit it because the witness didn't support the

20 propositions put by the Prosecutor.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you. Your Honour, one more of

22 these documents. It's already an exhibit, 686, and it is a letter of the

23 chief of security, Milenko Djokovic [phoen], and it's also going to the

24 SSNO security administration, and it's from the 13th of October, 1991.

25 Q. And in that letter, in the English it's on the second page, there

1 is mentioning of Serbian guard. "According to our confirmed operational

2 information, a paramilitary formation called 'Serbian Guard' is taking

3 part in combat operations against Ustasha Soldiery carried out in many

4 places in the territory of Sl