1 Wednesday, 8 February 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 WITNESS: BRANKO KOSTIC [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

11 Q. Mr. Kostic, just before we continue where we left off yesterday,

12 just one quick question on Sarvas and Aljmas. In those two villages there

13 were no military -- JNA facilities or barracks; right?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. You don't --

16 A. I told you yesterday I have never visited either Sarvas or Aljmas

17 or whatever those places are called, so don't ask me about things I have

18 no knowledge of. I really have no knowledge of any military facilities,

19 whether they were there or not, but I do know that these places were taken

20 by the paramilitary units of Croatia and that from those positions they

21 were threatening members of the JNA.

22 Q. We stopped yesterday, we had discussed the -- the Presidency

23 session of the 12th to 15th March 1991, and we had established and read

24 from Mr. Jovic's book that, except for Mr. Jovic himself and Mr. Jugoslav

25 Kostic, nobody agreed to declare a state of emergency, and the question

1 now was did they vote and for what did they vote? And I would like to

2 return to Mr. Jovic's book to clarify that situation.

3 It's again what we have already quoted from yesterday. It's from

4 his book, the entry of the 12th of March, 1991, and it says at the very

5 end of this remark in the book, it says: "The following voted for this

6 edited version of the decision without imposing of a state of emergency

7 and with raising the military combat readiness and additional

8 mobilisation," and that's the vote that they actually took. It's not

9 about state of emergency but raising the military combat readiness and

10 additional mobilisation. And it's actually here that Mr. Bucin,

11 Mr. Sapundzija, Jugoslav Kostic and Jovic voted for it, and Mr. Bogicevic,

12 Stjepan Mesic, and Vasil Tupurkovski against. So I think that clarifies

13 also the question of Judge Kwon and you, your own memory of that someone

14 voted; right?

15 A. By your leave, I have to correct you. Yesterday you did state

16 what you are saying today but I did not confirm it. All I said was that I

17 did not attend that session and that I watched the television footage of

18 that session several times. The vast majority of my people and I still

19 believe that at that session in March, Bogic Bogicevic voted for the

20 proclamation of a state of emergency, so that --

21 Q. Let me stop you here. I mean, we went through the book and you

22 have already said you weren't there, so we'll leave it at that. I will

23 now move on to the speech --

24 A. But you tried to say this as if I had confirmed it, and I did not

25 confirm it.

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Kostic. I said that it

2 was in the book.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, is there not a formal record of

4 the vote?

5 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is -- there is no formal record of the

6 vote. We actually -- as far as I know, there isn't, but I will check it

7 in the break. I don't think we have any.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. Mr. Kostic, yesterday you were already discussing with

11 Mr. Milosevic or, rather, a few days before you discussed with

12 Mr. Milosevic Exhibit 333, tab 51, the Politika article with the speech of

13 Mr. Milosevic that he gave on the 16th of March, 1991.

14 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, for your notice, it's also

15 Exhibit 328, tab 29. We had it already earlier as a video.

16 Q. And I would like to quote from that speech, and you can actually

17 use tab -- Mr. Kostic, you can use tab D -- tab 51 in your binders.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have page 2? We need page 2. Page 2.

19 THE WITNESS: Page 2.

20 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's -- the English translation is two pages,

21 the Serbian is just one page.

22 In the English, Your Honours, it's page 2, on top of this page.

23 Q. Mr. Kostic, we have here what Mr. Milosevic said, and I quote:

24 "Taking the newly emerged situation into consideration, I want to announce

25 that the Republic of Serbia will not recognise any decisions reached by

1 the SFRY Presidency because under existing circumstances any such decision

2 would be illegitimate. I will not accept any transfer of authority in

3 accordance with the constitution of Yugoslavia from Borisav Jovic to

4 myself in case of his resignation in the work of such Presidency that has

5 chosen to advocate disintegration of Yugoslavia. I expect that citizens

6 of Serbia, Yugoslavia, and world opinion will understand that no patriot

7 can accept the legitimacy of a president of a state who acts against his

8 own country and constitution.

9 "I demand that the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, in

10 accordance with the act on the takeover of authority from the Kosovo

11 Assembly, reach a decision on the release of Riza Sapundzija from his duty

12 as a member of the SFRY Presidency on their next session."

13 Mr. Kostic, and that did happen, did it? Mr. Riza Sapundzija was

14 dismissed by the Serbian Assembly; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And he continues, Mr. Milosevic continues: "Under existing

17 circumstances of attempts to set off violence in Sandzak and Kosovo and

18 Metohija, I have ordered a mobilisation of reserve Republic of Serbia MUP

19 security forces and urgent establishment of additional police forces of

20 the Republic of Serbia. I ask the government of the Republic of Serbia to

21 carry out necessary preparations for the establishment of the additional

22 forces in number that would guarantee protection of interest of the

23 Republic of Serbia and the Serbian people."

24 Mr. Kostic, that's what Mr. Milosevic said, and these additional

25 police forces, they were established, were they not?

1 A. Well, to tell you the truth, I can't give you any specific

2 details, but I do think that the numbers of police were increased in

3 Serbia. This was in the direct purview of the Ministry of the Interior

4 and therefore the president of the Republic of Serbia in this particular

5 case. These were the police forces of Serbia, not the federal police

6 force. The police force of Serbia. And it was the Ministry of the

7 Interior of Serbia as a federal unit that was in charge of that.

8 What you have just read, I will take the liberty of commenting

9 upon it. You see, all the members of the Presidency of the SFRY after the

10 session in March and the impossibility of accepting the decisions of the

11 General Staff, they all resigned. Only Mesic, Drnovsek, Bogicevic and

12 Tupurkovski remained.

13 Q. I thought you would comment on the question that I put but I see

14 you are commenting on something different, so I want you to return to my

15 question. You have to -- I have to tell you that because you have already

16 -- we have already discussed here, and Mr. Milosevic did, what happened

17 on that day. There's no need to repeat that.

18 My question was about the additional police forces, and my further

19 question in relation to that is: These additional police forces, they

20 were established and they had different names, such as 1st, then Frenki's

21 Red Berets, and finally Units for Special Operations. Isn't that so? Do

22 you know about that?

23 A. That's what you say. I don't know anything about this, either

24 about the names or anything.

25 Q. Thank you. You yourself were then elected to the Presidency, but

1 your election to the Presidency was not supported by your own party. They

2 didn't support you, did they?

3 A. I don't know where you got this information. It was my own party

4 that nominated me to the Presidency. And in the Assembly of Montenegro,

5 my party had a two-thirds majority, and it was the Assembly that elected

6 me to that post. I don't know where you get this information that my

7 party did not support me. Maybe you found a part in my book which says

8 that when nominations to the Presidency were being considered, the top

9 leadership of my party did not put my name forward at the time. But in

10 the Assembly of Montenegro, my party had a two-thirds majority, and I was

11 elected.

12 Q. I actually had asked you that you were not supported by your party

13 leadership and you just confirmed that. You wrote it in your book. You

14 just confirmed that; correct?

15 A. You said my party did not support me. I only said that the top

16 leadership, that is the Executive Board of my party, did not nominate me

17 at that time. They nominated me to some other post. But my party did

18 support me.

19 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to exhibit this

20 part of the book, and Ms. Dicklich is now bringing around -- handing out

21 the part of the book. It's from Mr. Kostic's book, "Not To Be Forgotten,"

22 and it's page 267, 268, 269, and 207.

23 Q. Mr. Kostic, as you know your book, I think I can continue with

24 what's written in the book.

25 A. Yes. Please go ahead.

1 Q. The Muslim Assembly member also protested, as you describe in the

2 book, against your nomination, and he actually does this because of, as he

3 says, an anti-Muslim statement of yours. That's in your book, too; right?

4 A. [No interpretation].

5 Q. And in relation to the Muslim nation, as we are at that, your

6 position was --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: There was no answer to that question. Is that in

8 your book?

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, he said actually yes.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's not on the transcript.

11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the answer.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please speak so that we can hear.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's in my book, but the lady did

14 not mention the explanation, that it was a complete misinterpretation of

15 my attitudes towards the Muslims. I think she should quote the entire

16 passage. It does say in the book that the Muslim representative opposed

17 my election, yes.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19 Q. Yes. And I -- the Judges can read these passages for themselves.

20 That's why I did not quote at all from the book, because you remembered it

21 very well.

22 And my question to you was --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, please. Excuse me.

24 Judges, may I intervene? If the representative of the Prosecution states

25 here in public that I have anti-Muslim stances, that's a serious

1 accusation and it's misinformation. If she quotes only a single book --

2 sentence from the book that I wrote without providing the explanation,

3 then it takes on a completely different meaning. That's why I ask --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... one of two

5 things. We can either decide to -- to have you provide the additional

6 information, or Mr. Milosevic can raise it in re-examination.

7 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour -- Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I also only quoted or referred to this Muslim

10 member saying that; I did not say that this was for a fact. I just

11 mentioned that the Muslim member said that.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Milosevic may take this up in

13 re-examination if he wishes.

14 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

15 Q. Mr. Kostic, I have --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just understand what I have said. Just

17 understand what I have said. This is -- I understand what you have said,

18 and Mr. Milosevic may raise it in re-examination. So the matter will be

19 dealt with. There's no need to continue the discussion.

20 Please continue. I have said that you are -- you are not to

21 interrupt.

22 Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

23 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

24 Q. Mr. Kostic, in relation to the Muslim nation, your position was

25 that the Muslims are not really a nation like the Serbs or the Croats.

1 Did you say that?

2 A. Madam, you are showing a total lack of knowledge in this area if

3 you can say something like that. You're quoting part of my book, so you

4 probably will have read what Their Honours would not allow me to read. If

5 you are now saying that I do not recognise the Muslims as a nation, then

6 you are either misinformed or malicious, because you fail to distinguish

7 between people and nation; "narod" and "nacija." When Their Honours asked

8 me who the constituent nations of Yugoslavia were, I said a few days ago

9 that these were Slovenians, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Serbs, and

10 so on, and then I said that after 1962 or 1965, I'm not exactly sure when,

11 my party, the League of Communists, which had a one-party monopoly,

12 recognised to the Muslims in Yugoslavia the name of a nation and

13 constituent nation based purely on religion. Anyone with any knowledge of

14 this area has to draw a distinction between the term "narod," or people,

15 and "nacija," nationality. Nations and nationalities.

16 Muslim people are very numerous in Montenegro. Ever since I was a

17 child I have associated with Muslims, but these are two completely

18 different concepts.

19 Q. We do not need that much detail. You were elected by the

20 Montenegrin government in April 1991 for this position in the Presidency,

21 but your post was only confirmed in mid-May. There was a problem in the

22 SFRY Assembly because of the fact that the Serbian Assembly had elected

23 Sejdo Bajramovic and the SFRY Assembly refused to ratify the new members

24 because of that fact. Is that so?

25 A. Madam, first of all, it was not the government of Montenegro that

1 elected me but the parliament of Montenegro, to my position in the

2 Presidency. It's true that in the Assembly of the SFRY there was a

3 problem in verifying the election of Sejdo Bajramovic and Mr. Jugoslav

4 Kostic, both of them, because they were elected by the Assembly of Serbia,

5 as far as I know in accordance with the constitution of Serbia, but the

6 separatist leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia were already attempting to

7 disrupt and to support every measure taken in the provinces that would

8 make it easier for them to carry out their secession.

9 Q. Mr. Kostic, it's a fact that there was a problem in particular

10 with Mr. Sejdo Bajramovic, because he did not represent the interest of

11 the Kosovo Assembly but the interest of the Serbian Assembly; right? That

12 was the point that was made in relation to him. Is that --

13 A. Madam, Mr. Sejdo Bajramovic and Mr. Jugoslav Kostic were in the

14 same position. There was no reason --

15 Q. That's enough. Thank you. Mr. Kostic, from mid-May until June

16 1992 onwards, you participated not only in the work of the SFRY Presidency

17 but in addition you also met with members of the Serbian and Montenegrin

18 leadership and the leadership of the JNA outside of Presidency meetings;

19 correct?

20 A. Yes. Yes, to be sure. Not just with them. I met with many

21 people with whom I had a common stance to preserve Yugoslavia.

22 Q. I would like to hand to the parties and to Mr. Kostic a table

23 produced by the Office of the Prosecutor. So that's easier for us to have

24 now further questions. This is actually an overview of meetings between

25 the SFRY Presidency and military between May 1991 and May 1992, and it's

1 actually based on Mr. Jovic's book "Last Days of the SFRY."

2 Mr. Kostic, these are, of course, only those meetings that

3 Mr. Jovic mentioned in the book. I assume that in addition to that you

4 probably had a lot more meetings.

5 A. And what am I supposed to say about this table? Do you think I

6 can remember every meeting?

7 Q. No, no. You're not expected to remember them all. We will go

8 through a very few. But it just mentions here, when you look at the total

9 figures, that, in the book of Mr. Jovic, you participate in 21 of these

10 meetings with the military and Mr. Bulatovic actually 15 times. And as I

11 said, I assume you probably met much more often than Mr. Jovic mentioned.

12 Could that be right?

13 A. I doubt it. I would rather believe that you added something than

14 took away, but we had daily meetings, madam. The situation was dramatic.

15 The country was falling apart. There were clashes. There was a war on.

16 We sat at meetings all day long. So don't expect me to confirm for each

17 and every one of these that that was exactly when the meeting was held.

18 You can see that Mr. Jovic attended most of these. Well, of course. He

19 was in the Presidency before I was appointed to the Presidency and elected

20 vice-president of the Presidency.

21 You mention meetings with a Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Jovic. Well, of

22 course. I've already said that I can't know to what extent Mr. Jovic

23 communicated with Mr. Milosevic, but I assume it was very often, which is

24 only natural because he was representing Serbia in the highest state

25 organ.

1 Q. Mr. Jovic, I --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: These are meant to demonstrate meetings which

3 involved the military; is that correct?

4 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. It's --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: What significance, then, has a meeting where

6 neither the military representatives mentioned was present?

7 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, this chart does not only refer

8 to meetings with the military. It also - and you will hear from further

9 questions - it relates actually to a group of people that would meet

10 frequently.

11 Q. And Mr. Kostic, as you have read Mr. Jovic's book, Mr. Jovic

12 refers to a group of six people or, rather, he says the six men, and he

13 means he himself, Mr. Jovic, Milosevic, Bulatovic, the Generals Kadijevic

14 and Adzic, and actually you yourself. Do you -- are you aware that he is

15 speaking of these six men?

16 A. I didn't notice the term "group" used, but according to the names

17 you've just read out of those people, it was a team. That was the

18 composition of the people who at the time represented the top-most

19 representatives of Serbia and Montenegro in the republics in the SFRY

20 Presidency and the top representatives of the General Staff. But I didn't

21 ever notice the term "group" used. Perhaps what you keep saying in the

22 indictment as a joint criminal enterprise, perhaps you're alluding to

23 something like that?

24 Q. Mr. Kostic, I just said that Mr. Jovic didn't use the word "the

25 group." I use it. He says the six men, and we can also stick to this

1 word.

2 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, just to your question, we

3 actually have looked at these six men, and this chart relates to the six

4 men and shows meetings.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: The title, then, is misleading,

6 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, because it only speaks of meetings between the

7 Presidency and the military.

8 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes. The title is -- yes.

9 Q. Mr. Kostic, I just want to refer to one of these meetings, and

10 this is actually a meeting of the 14th of August, 1991, and it's mentioned

11 in Exhibit 596, tab 1, the 89(F) statement of Mr. Jovic.

12 If you look at paragraph 87, it says here: "A meeting took place

13 at Kadijevic's on 14 August 1991. The meeting was attended by Kadijevic,

14 Adzic, Milosevic, Bulatovic, Kostic and I." "I," that's Mr. Jovic. "We

15 received information on the military situation in the field on, inter

16 alia, the Krajina and Slavonia. Kadijevic told us about the discord among

17 the Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia in both the political and military

18 sense. Individuals like Kostic were giving statements without

19 consultation in opposition to the views of the military," and so on and so

20 forth. "Coordination was urgently necessary among the six. Kadijevic

21 proposed the idea of an expert staff (larger group than the six). The

22 idea of systematic consultation by the six was accepted but not the idea

23 of Mr. Kadijevic."

24 Do you remember that meeting?

25 A. Well, to tell you the truth, the meeting held by Mr. Jovic I don't

1 remember in particular because we had many similar meeting of that kind,

2 but what you've just read out here, I have no reason to challenge it. All

3 I can say is that it is quite possibly correct. I know that at times I

4 was -- my name came up in the mass media fairly often, and my statements

5 did, too, but there was a complete disorientation among the people at the

6 time, and that's what I say in my book; that Mr. Milosevic, for example,

7 on one occasion when we talked over the telephone said, "Well, Branko,

8 you're in the media too much. Your name appears there too much." And I

9 said, "Well, thank you, Mr. Milosevic, I think you crop up in the media

10 perhaps too fewer times."

11 But any way, I said during my present testimony that we didn't

12 think alike on all matters, and in the previous days testifying here, I

13 mentioned my divergencies with Mr. Jovic, for example, and --

14 Q. Just let me lead you back to what we are actually talking about.

15 The meeting of the 14th of August of 1991, you say you don't remember it.

16 However, it seems, at least according to what Mr. Jovic remembered, that

17 you, and I think it's meant probably you, "Individuals like Kostic were

18 giving statements without consultation in opposition to the views of the

19 military."

20 This criticism, was that because of what you said in your visit in

21 Borovo Selo? Do you remember the criticism that was voiced here?

22 A. No. I think - as far as I know, at least - that I did not have a

23 single criticism coming at me from the most responsible people in the army

24 right up until the pensioning off of the second group of generals in May

25 1992. So there were no criticisms either from Mr. Veljko Kadijevic or

1 Mr. Blagoje Adzic either in the sense of saying that my public statements

2 differed from the positions taken by the army. I never had any criticisms

3 of that nature. That's one point.

4 Now, secondly, as far as my visit to Borovo Selo goes, that could

5 have certainly not been a reason for Jovic's statement, because I visited

6 Borovo Selo after having consulted the other members of the Presidency of

7 the SFRY, and I considered that I, as a representative of Montenegro in

8 the Presidency, was better placed to go to Borovo Selo than a

9 representative of Serbia, for example, the Serbian representative in the

10 Presidency to go to Borovo Selo, because we didn't view that as Serbia's

11 problem but as a problem for the whole of Yugoslavia. And our

12 divergencies and parting of ways over certain other questions related to

13 the involvement and engagement of the Yugoslav People's Army to deblock

14 the barracks in Croatia under siege --

15 Q. Let me stop you here. We was talking about the Borovo Selo visit.

16 When you were in Borovo Selo, you actually spoke to the local Serb

17 audience and you did mention "an army of ours" when you spoke to the

18 Serbs. You were asking for "an army of ours," didn't you?

19 A. Our army. That's what I'm saying now, our army, the Yugoslav

20 People's Army. And I was the vice-president and member of the Supreme

21 Command, the Supreme Command in charge of the army. It was our army. And

22 I have to say it was the best and -- best organised army --

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... let me interrupt you here.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we come to what was said in

25 Borovo Selo a little bit later.

1 Q. Mr. Bulatovic also wrote a book and in his book about the meeting

2 of the 14th of August, 1991. Do you know Mr. Bulatovic's book "Rules of

3 Silence"? Mr. Kostic, do you know that book?

4 A. Yes, I do know that book. And I read the first 114 pages of the

5 book by Momir Bulatovic, because they relate to the time when we worked

6 together on -- holding various political and public functions. And in my

7 new book that is called "Records," I give a critical appraisal -- I

8 believe you have that book of mine -- but I gave a critical appraisal of

9 that portion of Momir Bulatovic's book.

10 Q. I -- I want to quote here about the meeting of the 14th of -- 14th

11 October -- no. No, it says here -- oh, no, sorry. It's 14th October.

12 A. That's quite another matter altogether.

13 Q. I would like to quote, nevertheless, because it's a similar

14 meeting to the one that Mr. Jovic is talking about, and I would like to

15 have it in front of everyone.

16 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think we have to put it on the ELMO. I

17 just hear that we don't have it available for everyone. I would like to

18 have the English on the ELMO, and for Mr. Jovic the Serbian language.

19 Q. He speaks here in his book about the meeting of the 14th of

20 October and Mr. Milosevic is present, Mr. Jovic is present, a member of

21 the SFRY Presidency, Montenegrin side, Branko Kostic, Mile Djukanovic, and

22 he says the following: "All of our talks, especially my numerous meetings

23 with Slobodan Milosevic before this and in all the coming years, went by

24 the same atmosphere. The meetings were intimate with completely open

25 conversation. One used ordinary vocabulary and discussed every problem,

1 including the hardest, while making references to various affairs and

2 current jokes. In other words, one could feel that we were on the same

3 team and sharing the same fate, regardless of all the differences ..."

4 And it also continues then a little bit further down: "The

5 meetings were almost never recorded (or it was not done in a way that I

6 could notice). Official notes were rarely taken. Statements were issued

7 in connection with certain meetings. The statements would be prepared by

8 Mr. -- by Milosevic's chef de cabinet. By default, it was Milosevic and

9 me who would edit the text of such a statement, or rewrite it."

10 Do you recall this meeting or these kind of meetings?

11 A. I remember that particular meeting extremely well, and what

12 Mr. Bulatovic said was correct.

13 Now, as far as the other observations are concerned by

14 Mr. Bulatovic, I really don't wish to comment on them because the comments

15 about that meeting you could also find in my book. And I do believe you

16 have it, I don't suppose you've skipped it over. It was a consultation

17 that we held right before The Hague Conference was due to take place,

18 which met at the -- on the 18th of October, and this was on the 14th of

19 October.

20 Now, the simple question arose of what we should do faced with a

21 situation of that kind, because we were dissatisfied with the proposal

22 that had been made, the draft Hague document. And at this point in time,

23 all I can tell you is -- and I don't wish, madam, either Mr. Bulatovic --

24 to criticise or denounce any of my fellow citizens or Mr. Bulatovic in any

25 way, but you have had a chance to talk to Mr. Bulatovic, or can have one,

1 and I wrote a critical appraisal about the book of Mr. Bulatovic. In my

2 new book called "Records" or "Zapisnik," you will be able to find that

3 critical appraisal in my book, and I say at the end of it that that

4 critical appraisal of the book I am writing for the sole reason that I

5 want to say that certain statements by Mr. Bulatovic have to be taken with

6 a pinch of salt, or with reservations, because they're not all correct.

7 Q. Mr. Kostic, I am -- I will speak with you about this particular

8 meeting and in particular the October situation and the Carrington Plan

9 later in the cross-examination, so we don't need to go into details of

10 that meeting from the substance, but what Mr. Bulatovic is actually

11 speaking about is a group of people sharing the same fate - that's how he

12 puts it - "sharing the same fate regardless of differences."

13 This sharing the same fate, does that relate to the political

14 survival of the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership?

15 A. I can't give a comment here and an interpretation of what

16 Mr. Bulatovic meant when he said that. I can just assume that

17 Mr. Bulatovic meant that we shared the same convictions and that we're

18 making the same efforts and had the same desire to preserve Yugoslavia,

19 because in my testimony so far, I have said that although we had

20 differences, what united us, the basic fact that united us and kept us

21 rallied together was this desire to preserve Yugoslavia and to resolve our

22 political crisis in a peaceful manner.

23 Now, the fact that he mentions these six people, I've already said

24 they were the most responsible leaders of Serbia and Montenegro. One was

25 the Prime Minister, the other one was the president of the state, one in

1 Serbia, one in Montenegro, and both Jovic and I were members of the

2 Yugoslav state Presidency from those two republics. Kadijevic and Adzic

3 were the two most responsible men in the army, the top leaders. And of

4 all the institutions in Yugoslavia, the army was most fervently in favour

5 of the preservation of Yugoslavia. So I think that Mr. Bulatovic meant

6 that, the preservation of Yugoslavia, not the preservation of power.

7 Q. From March onwards, the political survival of the leaderships in

8 Serbia and Montenegro and also the JNA, but closely linked to the fate of

9 the Serbs in Croatia, was it is not? Assisting the Serbs in Croatia

10 assisted the survival of these leaderships; correct?

11 A. I have to correct you on that point. Through force of

12 circumstance, it was all about the Serbs in Croatia. However, in all our

13 statements, both in my statements and the statements of all the other six

14 people that you mention in this context, you'll always find our readiness

15 and duty to perform our constitutional functions pursuant to the

16 constitution, letter of the constitution, and if necessary, with the

17 Yugoslav People's Army to give physical protection to every nation or part

18 of a nation that could physically be under jeopardy. I said that in

19 Borovo Selo, and you have what I said there. I said that the units of the

20 Yugoslav People's Army would be deployed the same way to provide defence

21 and protection to our Muslims and Albanians and our Macedonians had they

22 been under threat as the Serbs in Croatia were. So it was through force

23 of circumstance in this instance it was the Serbs in Croatia that were

24 physically under jeopardy, so I think that your interpretation of that is

25 erroneous.

1 Q. Mr. --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was going to ask you what is your specific

3 answer to the question, but you have now given it here.

4 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

5 Q. Let me now turn again to Exhibit -- the exhibit, statement of

6 Mr. Jovic. That is Exhibit 596, tab 1, 89(F) statement of Mr. Jovic, and

7 it's now paragraph 74 and 75. And it relates to April 1991 in his book.

8 And 75 I just quote from so you get the context. It's Mr. Milosevic,

9 Kadijevic, and Adzic and Jovic actually talking about the situation in

10 Croatia and the JNA involvement.

11 It says here, and I quote, rather, from the end of paragraph 74:

12 "We asked them whether the military would allow the Croatian police to

13 occupy Knin and other Serb cities, which are now under Serb control. The

14 response was very clear; no."

15 And I continue with paragraph 75: "It was decided that in the

16 event that the Croats attack them, they would take armed action and notify

17 me and I would then convene the Presidency and simply inform them of the

18 fact. I was not prepared to seek any decision or consent. Milosevic and

19 I drew their attention to the fact that only -- that only other approach

20 would be betrayal, and that in this case betrayal means the fall of the

21 Serbian leadership and the collapse of the JNA."

22 This is what Mr. Jovic says. He connects the fate of the Serbian

23 leadership very closely with the actions to be taken to assess the Serbs

24 in Croatia. Would you agree with that?

25 A. Madam, I think you are wasting time without purpose. The

1 conversation that you mentioned was taking place at the time that I wasn't

2 in the Presidency, and I sincerely hope that I and my position you are not

3 taking as being the same as the position of the Serb government and Serb

4 leadership. I was the Montenegrin representative there and I am a

5 Montenegrin.

6 Now, with respect to your last question, I have already given you

7 an answer when I answered your last question. As far as I'm concerned, it

8 was a constitutional duty both of the Yugoslav People's Army and the

9 entire Presidency and not only Mr. Jovic or Branko Kostic, but it was the

10 duty of all Presidency members, the constitutional duty to take into

11 account the interests of all the citizens of the SFRY. We weren't

12 representatives of only our own republics, and that was one of the main

13 criticisms of having Mesic elected as president of the Presidency, because

14 it was our duty --

15 Q. Mr. Kostic, let me interrupt you. You answered my question, and

16 it was very specific.

17 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Can I ask Professor

18 Kostic at this moment the role of the president of Serbia and Montenegro

19 in terms of -- in relation to the matters of the federal state. You

20 referred to the six men as a team. Why should Mr. Milosevic and

21 Mr. Bulatovic participate in those talks? Once you said that

22 Mr. Milosevic has nothing to do with the -- Mr. Jovic. He has no

23 influence over Mr. Jovic, as Mr. Bulatovic has none over you. Why should

24 they participate?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ah, that's not what I said.

1 JUDGE KWON: If you could clarify, explain that matter to me.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, first of all, I have to

3 correct you. I never said - and not here either - that Mr. Jovic did not

4 have any communication with Mr. Milosevic. I never said that. What I

5 said was that I don't know how far those communications were frequent

6 ones, but that I can assume that because Jovic held the most responsible

7 post in the federal state and Milosevic was the president of Serbia, then

8 I can only assume that their communication was frequent. I never said

9 that they didn't communicate between themselves. That's one point.

10 Secondly, in the same way, you could put the following question,

11 but yes, I'll answer your direct question in just a moment. Do you really

12 think, Mr. Kwon, that Mr. Mesic, for example, and Mr. Tudjman and

13 Mr. Kucan and Mr. Drnovsek and Mr. Izetbegovic, wasn't that a team? Do

14 you really think they didn't communicate amongst themselves and decide

15 what they were going to do? Well, Mesic in his book writes about this

16 very fact. He says that after the 1st of October meeting of the

17 Presidency at which we assess that the country was in a situation of

18 imminent threat of war, directly criticised Bogicevic and Tupurkovski for

19 having come to the meeting at all, for having been present at the

20 meeting. And he didn't dwell there. He sent a letter to Alija

21 Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov and asked them not to attend any Presidency

22 meetings further, that is to say Tupurkovski and Bogicevic, that they

23 shouldn't attend any other meetings. Milosevic as president of Serbia and

24 Bulatovic as president of the Montenegrin state Presidency didn't arrive

25 at that post and function drop out from the sky. They were elected by the

1 people democratically at legitimate elections. And those people were --

2 the people were represented through their government, through the

3 parliament, through their state functionaries, and those people expressed

4 the constant desire to preserve Yugoslavia. So it was quite natural that

5 they had to be interested in preserving and protecting the interests of

6 the people they represent.

7 I don't know whether that answers your question.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. As at the beginning of your testimony in the context of changes in

11 Montenegro in 1988, you said that Mr. Milosevic was regarded as a person

12 who would be able to make things move.

13 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's at T-47614 to 47615 in

14 the transcript.

15 Q. Mr. Milosevic was a charismatic leader, was he not?

16 A. Undoubtedly.

17 Q. And people would look up to him and expect leadership from him;

18 right?

19 A. Well, if we're going to portray the atmosphere amongst the people

20 at that time, I have to say that Mr. Milosevic was given broad support

21 from all the social strata of society down to the last worker and cleaner

22 on the street. His pictures were carried everywhere, posters of him were

23 put up everywhere, although at that same time when people publicly

24 acclaimed him most, I as president of the Presidency of Montenegro said

25 publicly that I don't like that kind of iconography, and I stated publicly

1 when they asked me as president of Montenegro what I thought about the

2 fact that from the city buses they had removed pictures of Slobodan

3 Milosevic from the buses going to Malesija, which is the Albanian national

4 minority in Montenegro in Podgorica, I said that that was quite normal, as

5 far as I'm concerned, if those pictures and photographs created disquiet

6 among those people then, then it was quite normal that they would be taken

7 off the buses, the pictures.

8 Q. Mr. Kostic, people saw in Mr. Milosevic the protector of the Serbs

9 in Kosovo and Serbs outside Serbia; right?

10 A. Not only that. Not only that. I -- well, all right. Let me give

11 you my intimate thoughts and how I view this matter subjectively. Many

12 attempted to attack Mr. Milosevic at the time, and they do so today, as

13 being a nationalist, an extreme nationalist. Now, I think that was quite

14 wrong, if I might state my opinions. I think that Mr. President Milosevic

15 for a long time, and I think has retained those communist convictions to

16 the present day, according to which from a rather quagmire atmosphere that

17 existed in the 1990s throughout the Yugoslav territory if we take into

18 account and add to that the very difficult economic situation and the

19 crisis that I talked about at the beginning of my testimony here, then I

20 feel that many people, a large number of people saw in Milosevic a young,

21 dynamic politician who would introduce a breath of fresh air into the

22 country and a more dynamic process in the country. That is my personal

23 opinion and conviction.

24 Q. Yes. You just --

25 A. And if I might be allowed to add this: From that vast majority of

1 people who at that time gave their undivided support to Milosevic, already

2 at that time in my interview to the newspaper Borba - and I assume you

3 have that because you've already quoted certain portions from that as

4 president of the Presidency of Montenegro - I said there was a very broad

5 spectrum and circle of people who give Milosevic their undivided support

6 but time would tell very soon that there would be a stratification in that

7 same corpus of men supporting Milosevic at that time.

8 Q. As you already mentioned now the communist convictions, the

9 military leadership saw in Mr. Milosevic the keeper of the socialists, the

10 SFRY; right?

11 A. Madam, you would have to ask the military leadership about that.

12 I can tell you by the same token that, regardless of all that we've been

13 through, as an intellectual and a university professor, I have also

14 preserved some of my socialist convictions because I believe some of that,

15 some elements of that teaching is good for the entire humanity.

16 Q. Mr. Kostic, would you agree that in every sense Mr. Milosevic was

17 the key figure and main actor in Serbia and among the Serbs outside of

18 Serbia?

19 A. I can say that Mr. Milosevic was the strongest political authority

20 and had the greatest political influence, but I can say that about the

21 territory of Serbia, and partly Montenegro. However, it would be

22 completely wrong to say -- and I'm saying that with full responsibility:

23 It is completely wrong to say that Mr. Milosevic had unfettered influence

24 on the leaderships of Serbs outside Serbia. And if you want specific

25 examples to illustrate this, I can provide them.

1 Q. We come to these examples later on. Just some more questions

2 about Mr. Milosevic. Would you agree that he made decisions at times

3 without consulting those who would usually be involved in decision-making?

4 A. I was never in a position to feel that personally, because I was

5 never part of any leadership that included Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic

6 was a leader of his own party in Serbia, which enjoyed the support of

7 two-thirds of the parliament. He was the president of Serbia and held the

8 highest post, and I was not in a position to feel it directly. But if you

9 want my sincere and honest opinion, when at a debate in Pancevo that was

10 organised by the opposition parties - and Pancevo is a small town near

11 Belgrade - I was invited to that debate. As I used to do, I responded to

12 such invitations from all parties, and that was in March 1992. They asked

13 me what I thought about Milosevic. So at that time when Milosevic

14 indubitably had the greatest authority, I didn't mince words. I said

15 every tree has branches and every person has failings.

16 Now, to answer your question directly: It is true that some

17 people were replaced from the leadership overnight, and that is one of my

18 main objections towards Mr. Milosevic. Although the later course of

19 events in what is happening on the political arena of Serbia, what has

20 been happening ever since Mr. Milosevic is not president, convinces me

21 evermore that in territories that had not had democracy for a long time,

22 democracy cannot flourish overnight.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Kostic, let me interrupt

24 you.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kostic, you do tend to go on too long. You

1 are the kind of witness that has to be reined in and that has to be done

2 either by the person questioning you or by me.

3 If Mr. Milosevic was not the key figure among Serbs outside

4 Serbia, then can you tell me who was in relation to each of the republics,

5 starting with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if we took it in chronology,

7 we should start with Knin Krajina, but if you want me to start with

8 Bosnia, I'll do that. I think the key political figure in Bosnia was

9 Mr. Radovan Karadzic. In the military sense, the key figure was General

10 Ratko Mladic. That's indisputable. Although I personally think that the

11 leadership of Bosnian Serbs, ideologically and politically speaking, was a

12 very diverse group, but they put the interests of the Serbian people first

13 and put on the back burner all their political and ideological

14 differences. They worked as team, and I think Mrs. Plavsic was an

15 exception, because in many situations she was very extreme, especially in

16 some situations when peaceful solutions were sought.

17 In the Knin Krajina, there were two key political figures, and

18 that is where we should look for a reason that caused eventually the

19 tragedy of the Serb people in the Krajinas. The people were divided

20 politically and ideologically at the time -- at a time when they should

21 have been busy defending their homes.

22 Mr. Robinson, I'm sorry, but these questions cannot be answered in

23 one sentence. If you wanted an explanation, then I would appreciate it if

24 you could --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... very short

1 explanation after you were given the names. In the Knin Krajina, you said

2 there were two key political figures.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The most influential two persons in

4 the Knin Krajina in the period when I was in the Presidency of the SFRY,

5 1991 and the first half of 1992, were Milan Babic and Milan Martic.

6 Before that the most influential person was Dr. Jovan Raskovic. However,

7 this rift between Babic and Martic was not based on their personal

8 differences. It was an ideological rift. The followers of Babic were

9 practically supporters of the Chetnik ideology.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which next republic? I said the

12 Republic of Serbian Krajina, I said about the Serb Republic in Bosnia.

13 Which other republic?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, you have covered them.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I see that as part of one

16 whole.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you. Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

19 Q. Would you agree that Mr. Milosevic personally decided on the

20 elections for people for official positions? He took great interest and

21 great influence there?

22 A. I don't know. I can't confirm that. I can assume that he did

23 have influence, at least on some of those people if not all. But I cannot

24 confirm one way or another.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff

3 did not explain where. She didn't specify where I had influence, and

4 Mr. Kostic is giving an answer thinking of Serbia, whereas she has been

5 talking for a while implying Krajina and Bosnia, in which case the answers

6 would be different.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a fair point, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Where

8 specifically are you speaking of?

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I was first speaking, actually, of Serbia.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Serbia.

11 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

12 Q. But I would like to put something to you from a book that

13 Mr. Jovic wrote, and that's the book on -- he simply calls it "Book On

14 Milosevic."

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put something from this, and

16 Your Honour, it's Exhibit 596, tab 3, it is page 29 in the English.

17 Q. I quote now from Mr. Jovic's book. By the way, do you know this

18 book, Mr. Kostic?

19 A. I know there is a book about Milosevic. I haven't read it.

20 Q. "Milosevic's pretensions to conduct an absolutist policy

21 concerning the cadre were not constrained only within the borders of

22 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in other words, to its

23 organs. It included anyone who was not obedient enough and whose

24 political destiny he could influence in any, even the slightest, degree.

25 In order to suppress Milan Babic, the then president of the Government

1 of --"

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interpreter said absolutist

4 policy. I think "policija," meaning "police," instead of "policy." The

5 interpretation heard on the broadcast was that I was leading some sort of

6 absolutist police, whereas it should be absolutist policy.

7 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the English -- yes.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe that's what I heard, "policy."

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's what we actually said, Mr. Milosevic.

10 The word we said here is "the absolutist policy concerning the cadre."

11 That's what I was quoting.

12 Q. And I continue: "In order to suppress Milan Babic, the then

13 president of the government of the RSK, who opposed his views, he publicly

14 announced that he was severing any cooperation with the RSK until it

15 elected another leadership, and then, via various forms of political

16 malpractice, he made it happen."

17 Mr. Kostic, that indeed is correct, what Mr. Jovic wrote here.

18 That's what happened when Mr. Babic did not want to accept the Vance Plan;

19 right?

20 A. Madam, I advise you to talk to Mr. Jovic about those things as

21 long as you are quoting him. My views are completely different. It is my

22 conviction --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think there are issues of fact there. I mean,

24 can you confirm that Mr. Milosevic publicly announced that he was severing

25 cooperation with Republic of the Serbian Krajina until it elected another

1 leadership?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm not sure that that was

3 definitively communicated that way, but I know that Mr. Milosevic did

4 write a public, open letter to Milan Babic at the time, and its very sharp

5 tone came as a surprise to the general public. However, I see that quite

6 differently from Mr. Jovic. Mr. Babic was a supporter of a policy

7 oriented to war, and he thought that all parts of Yugoslavia should get

8 implicated in a war in Croatia and face the Croatian army, which was by

9 that time much stronger and numerous than our Yugoslav People's Army,

10 rather than negotiate with Europe, whereas we advocated the peace option,

11 and we said the Vance Plan is the peace option. And that was the main

12 reason for the disagreements and differences not only between Babic and

13 Milosevic but also between me and Babic. I didn't agree with him either.

14 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

15 Q. Mr. Kostic, I was not talking about a letter, this exchange of

16 letters between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Babic. I was actually asking you

17 whether you were aware that he made an announcement that he was severing

18 -- a public announcement that he was severing any cooperation with the

19 RSK until it elected another leadership. And you actually should know

20 that, because it's about the Vance Plan at that time, and you were very

21 much involved at that time in Glina, were you not?

22 A. To be quite honest, of course I was involved, among other reasons

23 because Mr. Milosevic was unable to communicate with him. He asked me to

24 go there and talk to the representative of the Krajina leadership. But to

25 be quite honest, I don't think Mr. Milosevic knows about all the

1 statements I made and all the letters I wrote, just as I don't know about

2 all of his.

3 For instance, this thing that you are quoting now, later on when I

4 retired from politics and severed all ties with Republika Srpska because

5 of their rejection of peace plans, I did something similar maybe, but I

6 don't know anything about this statement that Mr. Milosevic allegedly made

7 about severing all the ties with Serbian Krajina. I know about the

8 Bosnian leadership.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Where is this statement made? Is it a speech or

10 what?

11 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I will -- when we speak about

12 the Vance Plan a little bit later on, I will actually put it again to

13 Mr. Kostic, because we actually do have a reference in Mr. Jovic's book

14 about what was said, and we also have a -- an article dealing with this.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but where was it said?

16 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was actually said in Belgrade. It was not

17 said in --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Was it in a meeting, in a speech, or what?

19 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was a public announcement.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: But that's a meaningless expression. The witness

21 has already said that there was an open letter written in --

22 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was a speech.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: It was a speech.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That is at least my understanding, and I will

25 come back to it when we discuss the Vance Plan. I will go through several

1 documents in relation to that, including this one.

2 Q. Mr. Kostic, given Mr. Milosevic's powerful position in Serbia,

3 within this group of six or the six men, Mr. Milosevic was the most

4 powerful, was he not?

5 A. Well, you're not going to think that I, from Montenegro with only

6 600.000 population, was more influential than Mr. Milosevic who was

7 representing 10 million people in Serbia.

8 Q. I would like now to quote from a -- from talks, and it's an

9 interview that you had with Monitor, the magazine in Montenegro, but I

10 first would like to have it distributed to everybody.

11 Mr. Kostic, do you remember that you gave this interview or talks

12 on the 21st of October, 1994? Do you remember that?

13 A. Like it was yesterday.

14 Q. It's a long interview, and I don't want to actually go through all

15 of it, just the passages that concern us at the moment.

16 A. In three instalments.

17 Q. Uh-huh, yes. First of all, at the very beginning --

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, in the English it's on

19 page 3.

20 Q. -- you're asked about your contacts with Mr. Milosevic, and you

21 say -- you say here: "... when I held office, I could say that we had

22 been in contact and we communicated on a daily basis."

23 It's in the beginning. I remember -- is that so, that you had --

24 while you were in the office and the Presidency that you had contacts on a

25 daily basis?

1 A. Well, I couldn't say it was on a daily basis, but I can say that

2 we communicated very frequently, because the times were very dramatic, and

3 both he and I spent our days in our offices from dusk till dawn. We often

4 had lunch in his office or in mine, but I never visited him at home. I

5 never had any occasion to meet anyone from his family. But it was quite a

6 normal communication.

7 Q. And a little bit further down, and it actually should be marked on

8 your copy --

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, it's on page 4 in the

10 English.

11 Q. -- you say or, rather, it's put here: "Milosevic, who is

12 incidentally rather distrustful, suspicious, for a long time had

13 incomparably more trust in Bulatovic and the whole group of the young

14 Montenegrin leadership than in me. That is how it was until The Hague."

15 So after The Hague he had more trust in you?

16 A. Maybe that was not expressed in the most fortunate way. I can't

17 say that he suddenly had more trust in me after The Hague, but as for the

18 young Montenegrin leadership, whom I didn't know mainly before 1989,

19 Bulatovic and others, they were aged 25 or around that, it's a rather

20 large team. They succeeded in convincing the public of Montenegro that I

21 was infiltrated somehow among them as an old-timer who was there to look

22 after the interests of the old guard, and that was the image that followed

23 me. I believe not only in the eye of -- eyes of Mr. Milosevic and the

24 Serbian leadership, but also because the Montegnegrin leadership was

25 viewed as separatist, and the people who were in power during the war are

1 now the most vociferous advocates of Montenegro separating from Serbia.

2 Q. Mr. Kostic, but really refrain yourself to answer just the

3 question. It was actually a simple one.

4 A little bit further down on page 5 in the English, you are

5 actually asked about the party of Mr. Seselj, and you say - it's on the

6 bottom - you say --

7 A. Could you help me? Which instalment is that? Because there were

8 three instalments in the Monitor magazine. Is that the first, second, or

9 third?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think Seselj is mentioned in the

11 second one. It's quite funny, this interview. I'd like to read it.

12 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. I just want to ask you one -- one point in that interview. I

14 don't want to go into relationships that -- actually, when you look --

15 when you look at the ERN number on top, it says 0424-7290. That's --

16 that's --

17 A. Yes, I see it.

18 Q. And I actually want to refer to one remark in this. It should be

19 at the end of it. You say the following: "The question was the radicals

20 now aggressively accuse the Montegnegrin leaders of being criminals," and

21 so on. That's the question. And then you say: "That has nothing to do

22 with it. I'm not denying that within my ruling party there are those who

23 spread such rumours." And then you say: "I claim even today that Seselj

24 and his radicals helped Milosevic a lot in his quarrel with Draskovic and

25 Micunovic." And my question to you is does this refer to 1991 or to which

1 period?

2 A. Well, I was talking about 1991. That's the time when I was in

3 Belgrade, and I was very well -- very knowledgeable about the situation.

4 And as for --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much for that answer.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- Draskovic and --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

8 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

9 Q. And if you now continue a bit further down, and it's when you

10 speak about the power in parties --

11 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's page 6, Your Honour, in the English, the

12 very last paragraph.

13 Q. The Monitor magazine asked you -- and you actually have it marked,

14 you have that passage marked on the page 0424-7290, and it's marked here.

15 On the last column, it says: "At that time you were neglected as the head

16 of the Montenegrin state," and it says here, your answer, that is: "That

17 is right. Power was primarily concentrated in the party, not the

18 institutions."

19 Mr. Kostic, was that the same in Serbia, that the power was with

20 the party and not so much with the institutions?

21 A. I couldn't say that reliably about Serbia, but I know about

22 Montenegro for the simple reason that -- and I may be partially to blame,

23 although I don't think I made a mistake, I was simply abiding by the

24 constitution. I was president of the Presidency of Montenegro, and

25 according to the Montenegrin constitution, the president of the Presidency

1 was, let me not say English Queen, but it was quite --

2 Q. I think you have answered the question. You said you can't say

3 that for Serbia because you don't know that.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not clear to me, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, what is

5 meant by "the institutions." Parliamentary institutions?

6 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Actually, not only -- well, I think we

7 have to ask him.

8 Q. When you said that, Mr. Kostic, when you said that is right, power

9 was primarily concentrated in the party, not the institutions, what

10 institutions do you mean, all the parliamentary institutions or even the

11 ministries?

12 A. At that time in the ruling party, which was also my party -- right

13 now I don't belong to any party --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Answer the question.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- I will have to be a little --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is not -- this is not a university. We

17 don't need the introduction. Just answer the question.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I said very clearly: In the

19 party rather than the institutions. I meant the institutions of the

20 system, but I had wanted to explain that my party then also had a

21 two-third majority in the parliament. So what the inner circle of the

22 party agreed as the policy, that was implemented everywhere, including

23 institutions. I think that's clear.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: So by "institutions" you mean all institutions;

25 parliamentary and otherwise.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The institutions of the system; the

2 parliament, the government, various ministries, and that was a cause of

3 great disappointment to me, because in all those transformations that took

4 place at the time --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I was expecting to see a move

7 towards democracy.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. And just one more quote from this series of instalments that you

11 speak, and in the English it's on page 10, the upper answer that

12 Mr. Kostic gives to a question; and for you, Mr. Kostic, it's on page

13 0424-7293 on the very top left. And Monitor asked you: "Who was in

14 favour of peace then?" And your answer is: "It is true that both

15 Milosevic and Bulatovic used to claim: 'Montenegro is not at war,'

16 'Serbia is not at war.' I never said that. I was always saying: 'Both

17 Serbia and Montenegro were at war as well as this part of Yugoslavia.'

18 They were, through their JNA. That army never broke up and I assert that

19 every other army would break up in such circumstances. Mr. Mesic's

20 departure and with the switch to operations in circumstances of imminent

21 threat of war, as the vice-president of the country's Presidency, I

22 practically became the head of state. I held then, as I hold today, that

23 the greatest responsibility still lay with Milosevic as the President of

24 Serbia, the man with the strongest influence and with the greatest

25 pedigree of a statesman, according to his decisions and conduct."

1 This is what you said in 1994 about responsibilities. Yes, and

2 it's --

3 A. Are you awaiting a response?

4 Q. Yes. That's what you said and that's what you meant and that's

5 what you observed.

6 A. Of course. Quite naturally. Milosevic had the greatest political

7 authority and influence.

8 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I think it's time for the

9 break.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's time for the --

11 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, just one -- I would like to tender this

12 article.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it's admitted.

14 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I also -- I forgot to tender the

15 Bulatovic book, the passage that I quoted from.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, the passage quoted will be admitted.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the extract from Kostic Bulatovic's

18 book "Rules of Silence" will be Exhibit 942, and interview given be Branko

19 Kostic to the Monitor magazine will be Exhibit 943.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll break for 20 minutes.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. Mr. Kostic, during the examination-in-chief you spoke about the

1 downfall of the Montenegrin government of Mr. Vukadinovic in 1988. We do

2 not need to go into details, just this question: The protesters that

3 actually were asking in the rallies that some of the members of the

4 government should resign, these protesters did not really -- did not ask

5 for your resignation; right? They asked for the resignation of others.

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. And unlike these other members of the government of

8 Mr. Vukadinovic, you survived the fall of the then political leadership;

9 right?

10 A. Yes. I was the one from that government that continued in

11 politics. Others continued as well, but in other political parties and

12 other posts.

13 Q. And you managed to survive politically in 1988 because you shared

14 Mr. Milosevic's views at that time and his policies and the demands that

15 the protesters had; correct?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: As brief as possible, Professor.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what Mr. Milosevic's

18 expectations were, but I said during my examination-in-chief what I

19 expected from those changes.

20 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21 Q. And the new Montegnegrin leaders, Mr. Bulatovic and

22 Mr. Djukanovic, they also came in power in that same wave of changes that

23 Mr. Milosevic headed; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you should press him to answer that

1 question that you asked previously, whether he survived politically

2 because he shared Mr. Milosevic's views at that time and his policies.

3 What is your answer to that?

4 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think he said yes.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You said yes?

6 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. That's at least --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: I didn't see that.

8 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then I need to repeat, because I think I

9 heard him say "Da," and I didn't look to the transcript.

10 Q. Mr. Kostic, I asked you before we spoke about Djukanovic and

11 Bulatovic, you shared Mr. Milosevic's view or, rather, the wave of demands

12 by the Serbs and the Montenegrins that he headed as well; right?

13 A. I told you that I didn't know what Mr. Milosevic's views and

14 standpoints were at the time in their entirety because I hadn't met him

15 since we were students. But I have already stated in my testimony so far

16 what my expectations were. If you want a more detailed answer, I'll tell

17 you that I don't know what contributed to my political survival at the

18 time, but I do know that my nomination was put forward by the Republican

19 Conference of the Socialist League of the Working People of Montenegro,

20 which had the same composition as previously, before these events.

21 Perhaps it was my participation in extinguishing the flames in Rozaje,

22 Plavno, Niksic and other places in Montenegro and my successful speeches

23 to those rallies where I managed to calm down the passions of the crowd

24 and got the crowd to disperse probably influenced that.

25 Q. To be specific, more specific, your position at that time was that

1 Montenegro and Serbia were disadvantaged in Yugoslavia compared to other

2 republics and that's just what also Mr. Milosevic felt; right?

3 A. My standpoint never referred to Serbia, because there were others

4 taking care of Serbia. But at the time I felt that Montenegro was badly

5 neglected in economic terms, first of all. And secondly, I supported the

6 motives of the crowds that gathered, and I demanded that the policy of

7 expelling Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo be halted. This had been

8 taking place for decades. Also, I advocated that the Serbian people in

9 Croatia be protected.

10 Q. And like Mr. Milosevic, you were also dissatisfied with

11 Mr. Markovic's measures in relation to Yugoslavia; right?

12 A. Initially I even expressed public support to Mr. Ante Markovic's

13 economic programme. However, when he, as the federal Prime Minister, was

14 not prepared for a full year to deal with the issue of foreign exchange

15 differences in -- differentials in Montenegro, and when he agreed to

16 establish a political party with a rally at Kosare, I turned my back on

17 him because of the economic problems in Montenegro and his unwillingness

18 to deal with them.

19 Q. And just like Mr. Milosevic, you were -- you were in favour of the

20 amendments to the Serbian constitution regarding Vojvodina and Kosovo.

21 That was you agreed to that?

22 A. Yes. Yes.

23 Q. In relation to the last issue, you said during the

24 examination-in-chief, and I refer here to transcript T-47612, you said:

25 "The leaderships in Kosovo and Metohija on one hand and the Vojvodina on

1 the other hand had secessionist or, rather, autonomous leanings and only a

2 popular movement could contribute to bringing about a change in these

3 leaderships as well."

4 Mr. Kostic, you know that the Vojvodina authorities or populations

5 at no time were secessionist; right? At that time there was no movement

6 there that wanted to sever Vojvodina from Serbia; right?

7 A. Perhaps you know that better than I do.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You must answer the question.

9 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. You have to answer this question. You have said it actually here.

11 You mentioned Vojvodina in this context, and I put to you that there was

12 no secessionist movement.

13 A. Because you keep asserting that. That's why I said perhaps you

14 know that better than I do, but I don't agree with you. Don't try to put

15 your opinions in my mouth. On the contrary --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: She is putting perfectly proper questions to you,

17 and you must answer them.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19 Q. Mr. Kostic, the population --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered that I disagreed with

21 what the lady's saying. The leaderships both in Kosovo and Vojvodina

22 advocated --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

25 Q. The people in Vojvodina did not pose any threats to Serbs or

1 Serbia, and they did not give any reason to revoke their autonomy. Isn't

2 that correct?

3 A. Where are you reading this from?

4 Q. I'm not reading it. I'm putting this to you. I'm not reading it.

5 I'm just putting this to you. Do you claim -- do you claim that the

6 people from Vojvodina did pose a threat to Serbs or Serbia?

7 A. I don't know where you get these claims from. I mentioned the

8 leaderships in Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija. I wasn't referring to

9 the people but to the leaderships. It was the leaderships that were

10 replaced through the mass rallies, not the people.

11 I cannot tell you what you want me to say in my testimony. There

12 was no threat to Serbia and Serbs from the people of Vojvodina, but the

13 leaderships in both Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina had separatist

14 tendencies and leanings, and the masses wanted the leaderships to be

15 replaced.

16 Q. Mr. Kostic, who -- and you speak to Vojvodina. Can you give us

17 the names of the movements or the people that wanted to separate or secede

18 from Serbia?

19 A. Well, to tell you the truth, it was 15 years ago, and to give you

20 a list of names, it would be very hard to do that even in the case of

21 Montenegro let alone Vojvodina. And I come from Montenegro. But I do

22 remember vividly that individuals from the leaderships of Vojvodina and

23 from Kosovo and Metohija were more willing to support the standpoints of

24 the Slovenians or the Croats than their own republic.

25 Q. Following the ousting of the Vojvodina government in the course of

1 1989 and 1990, the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina were removed.

2 That's correct?

3 A. That's not correct.

4 Q. That's not correct?

5 A. No, that's not correct. Only those provisions whereby the

6 autonomous provinces had been given the right to pass legislation without

7 the approval of the Assembly of Serbia, but the Assembly of Serbia could

8 pass no legislation without the approval of the autonomous provinces. It

9 was this provision that was abolished. I felt that this put Serbia into

10 an unequal footing as compared to all the other Yugoslav republics.

11 Q. Mr. Kostic, a few moments ago we had discussed that the Serbian

12 Assembly actually replaced the member in the Federal Presidency from

13 Kosovo. So there was quite a different change there, isn't it? Based on

14 the changes in 1998 and 1990, the Serbian Assembly could simply replace

15 the member of the Kosovo -- the representative of Kosovo and Metohija in

16 the Federal Presidency. So the change was quite a different one than you

17 say.

18 A. I don't know whether I mentioned this during my testimony, but the

19 constitution of 1974 included many confederal elements, and the autonomous

20 provinces were even given a constituent character within the Yugoslav

21 federation. I'm not aware of the details concerning the changes in the

22 constitution of Serbia, but I assert with confidence that the autonomy of

23 neither of these provinces was abolished but certain provisions were

24 abolished which put Serbia in -- onto an unequal footing with other

25 republics because of the confederal nature of those provisions.

1 Q. Mr. Kostic, you just said that the Yugoslav constitution of 1974

2 for Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, both were constituent elements of

3 that federation, and the autonomous provinces had a representative in the

4 SFRY Presidency and they had their own delegations in both Chambers in the

5 federal parliament. That's correct; right?

6 A. Yes, that's correct. That's correct.

7 Q. Therefore, the changes in the constitutional status of the

8 autonomous provinces immediately impacted on the balance of power in the

9 federal -- on the federal level, isn't it?

10 A. No, because in spite of the changes introduced by Serbia into its

11 constitution, the provinces continued to be represented in the Yugoslav

12 Presidency and the Yugoslav parliament. They retained their

13 representatives in the parliament.

14 Q. Yes. Yes. I have probably formulated too vaguely, but what we

15 have seen is that the Serbian Assembly, according to the changes that were

16 made in 1990, could elect certainly the member of the Presidency for

17 Kosovo and Metohija, and they could do the same and did the same for

18 Vojvodina. So how can that not be a power change? If the Serbian

19 Assembly can basically decide who represents Kosovo and Metohija and who

20 represents Vojvodina, that's definitely a much more powerful position than

21 the Croats had, the Slovenes, the Macedonians, or the Bosnians. You would

22 agree to that? You must, actually.

23 A. But, madam, it was not changes in government. It was changes in

24 competency. Changes in competency occurred, because some issues that were

25 within the purview of the autonomous provinces, according to the previous

1 constitution, were transferred to the republic, but the autonomous

2 provinces continued. And I can tell you that were you at the head of a

3 state or a territory, you as the person responsible for the entire

4 territory of that state would certainly take care to influence what was

5 happening there. But Serbia, until those changes, did not have the power

6 to do this.

7 Q. Yes. Thank you. We heard, actually -- Mr. Kostic, we heard quite

8 some evidence on this point from the historian Ms. Budding, from Petar

9 Kriste - Your Honour, that's at T-14891 - by Nikola Samardzic, that is

10 T-11165; Milan Kucan, and I do not want to quote them here, but I just

11 want to refer you to the person that you actually have mentioned as being

12 a reliable one, and that is Aleksandar Vasiljevic. He was also talking of

13 -- about this situation, and he actually said the following -- and, Your

14 Honours, it's at transcript 15859 to 60. This is what he said about this:

15 "Real power at that time resided in the republican leaders, while the

16 members of the Presidency were, if I can express myself metaphorically,

17 ambassadors representing their own republics and provinces in the

18 Presidency."

19 And a little bit further down: "I don't think he -" and he refers

20 here to Mr. Milosevic - "his position was any different than that of the

21 presidents of the other republics, but there is no doubt that he was a

22 very strong political leader, that he was very authoritative and that

23 because of this he was in reality able to influence four of the members of

24 the Presidency." And he is referring then to these four members.

25 I just wanted to remind you to what Mr. Vasiljevic said on that.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the question you're putting in relation to

2 this?

3 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

4 Q. According to -- my question to you is that Mr. Milosevic, or the

5 Serbian leadership, rather, controlled the votes of four members of the

6 SFRY Presidency.

7 A. First I have to correct you. In my previous testimony, I did not

8 say that Mr. Vasiljevic was a reliable witness, because I don't want to

9 take it upon myself to evaluate the character of any individual, including

10 Mr. Vasiljevic. I only said on one occasion that what Mr. Vasiljevic said

11 concerning some communications and so on and so forth would probably know

12 about that better than I do, in view of his position.

13 As to what you have just asked me now, I think there is no doubt

14 that at the time when I was part of the Presidency of the SFRY the

15 presidents of the republics had taken it upon themselves to try and find

16 solutions to the Yugoslav crisis. And if I had any objection to the work

17 of Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Bulatovic, it was precisely that they had taken on

18 this role.

19 Your claim that Mr. Milosevic exerted a direct influence or

20 control over me is completely incorrect. I am a mature, grown-up person,

21 and I made decisions based on my own thoughts. And as I have already

22 said, there were many issues on which Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Jovic, and I did

23 not agree and took different standpoints. But I have said that, yes,

24 Mr. Milosevic was an influential person with a lot of political authority.

25 Q. Mr. Kostic, to go back to this table that was produced according

1 to the book of Mr. Jovic, you can see easily when comparing the columns

2 where Mr. Milosevic is mentioned and Mr. Kadijevic and Mr. Jovic are

3 mentioned. If you look at these columns, you can easily see that although

4 Mr. Milosevic was not a member of the SFRY Presidency, he and Mr. Jovic

5 met with the military more often than you did in the period that we are

6 concerned with. You can see that it's obvious, in particular, from the

7 first page. You can easily see that and it continues to be like this

8 until the end of October 1991.

9 That means, at least as I read it, that he de facto as the

10 President of Serbia was much more important for the JNA leadership than

11 you, despite your position. That's what I read from this chart. Would

12 you agree to that?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question is based on a

16 misrepresentation that these are sessions of the Presidency of the SFRY.

17 These are not sessions of the Presidency. This has been constructed from

18 various notes in the book, and it puts together various meetings of a

19 diverse nature.

20 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, what do you say to that?

22 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I didn't say, and it doesn't say

23 on this sheet that it was meetings between -- it's meetings. I have

24 already mentioned it, and Judge Bonomy has corrected it as well. The

25 headline can be ignored. What I said when we spoke about this sheet is

1 that it's referring to meetings within the Presidency and outside the

2 Presidency. That's what I have already corrected, with the help of Judge

3 Bonomy who noticed that the headline is incorrect.

4 JUDGE KWON: What do you mean by "within the Presidency"? You put

5 a footnote that this overview does not include Presidency sessions.

6 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I must admit at the moment I'm at a loss what

7 this means. My understanding is it is the meetings between members of the

8 Rump Presidency and the military and these other people belonging to the

9 group of six, no matter where they took place. That's at least my

10 understanding of the situation. It's the meetings of --

11 JUDGE KWON: So meetings of one party. The group of six on the

12 one end --

13 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's the meetings of the group of six,

14 including the military. That's what I refer here to in this sheet. The

15 members of the Office of the Prosecutor went through the book of Mr. Jovic

16 and has actually -- have actually listed who -- who met in that period we

17 are concerned with and in particular Mr. Kostic is concerned with. It's

18 just the period that Mr. Kostic is actually involved here. And we have

19 noted from all his entries in the book when they met.

20 JUDGE KWON: But, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, in earlier session you

21 clarified in a question to the Presiding Judge that it means the meeting

22 of the group of six people, on the one hand, and military on the other

23 hand. So could you check it out, please.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you repeat the question.

1 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, please.

2 Q. The point I'm actually making, Mr. Kostic, and my question to you

3 was that although Mr. Milosevic was not a member of the Presidency, he and

4 Mr. Jovic met with the military outside of the Presidency, meeting, of

5 course, more often than you did in that period. And my --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let him --

7 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: According to that sheet, it actually looks

8 like it, and you just see it's very obvious --

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think you cannot allow such

10 nonsense. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff herself said that this is exacted from

11 Jovic's book based on his notes. Her question sounds as if she had a

12 document showing when the witness met with the military leadership. Even

13 Jovic in his book does not deal with Kostic's meetings, and I think that

14 this is not even correct. If it's from the book, it's not correct. There

15 couldn't have been six meetings in May, six or seven in June. Nobody

16 would have been doing anything else then. It's impossible. Whether they

17 met, that's a different issue. But there's nothing about meetings between

18 the witness and the military leadership that can be compared to this.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Never mind -- never mind the source. What's to

20 prevent her from putting that you met with the military leadership more

21 than this witness. Never mind the source. I think the question can be

22 put and it's for the witness to say yes or no.

23 Just put the question again.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

25 Q. Mr. Kostic, did -- according to that sheet here, according to

1 Mr. Milosevic --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Never mind the sheet. Never mind the sheet.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

4 Q. Okay. According to the book of Mr. Jovic, it seems that he and

5 Milosevic met the military leadership more often than you did. Is that

6 the correct view or not? Did they meet more often with Milosevic and

7 Jovic?

8 A. During the examination-in-chief, I said quite decidedly I did not

9 keep tabs on this. Who Mr. Jovic or who Mr. Milosevic were meeting,

10 that's something I can't say, especially on the basis of this information

11 that you say comes from Jovic's book. During the examination-in-chief, I

12 said, I said that some information from Jovic's book should be taken with

13 reservations.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness says he's not in a position to

15 answer.

16 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, just to be correct and be

17 specific about the sheet -- the table, the remark here on the bottom,

18 "This overview does not include regular Presidency sessions," that's

19 correct. It includes only meetings out of -- outside the former framework

20 of the Presidency. So the footnote was correct.

21 Q. In -- we will go into quite some details a little bit later on on

22 political conflicts that Mr. Milosevic had with the Montenegrin president,

23 Mr. Bulatovic. When those conflicts arose - and I refer here in

24 particular to the Carrington Plan, the withdrawal of Montenegrin soldiers

25 from the front lines in Croatia and others that I will speak to you about

1 - you usually would take Mr. Milosevic's point of view and not support

2 Bulatovic; is that correct?

3 A. I did not support Milosevic by that, but I assessed at the time,

4 and I think that later developments prove me right, that in that period,

5 that is say from October 1991 onwards, the immediate --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- state leadership --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- you can answer that question more directly

9 than you are doing. The question is relatively simple, and it is whether

10 in relation to the conflicts, in particular the Carrington Plan, the

11 withdrawal of Montenegrin soldiers from the front lines in Croatia, that

12 generally you supported Mr. Milosevic's point of view as distinct from the

13 position of Mr. Bulatovic. What is your answer to that?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, quite simply I don't want to

15 answer a question put that way. All I want to say with respect to The

16 Hague document --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not for you to determine whether the

18 question is permissible. That's for the Trial Chamber.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I can answer

20 specifically. As far as The Hague document is concerned, Mr. Milosevic

21 and I had the same position, as opposed to Mr. Bulatovic with respect to

22 the withdrawal of part of the army from Montenegro, from Banija, and I

23 state that quite clearly in my book, and I'm sure the Prosecution has that

24 portion.

25 Mr. Bulatovic, as president of the Presidency of Montenegro,

1 called me in Podgorica to attend a meeting of the Presidency of

2 Montenegro, and they offered that I sign a request for fighters to return

3 from Banija. I refused to do that categorically and told them that even

4 if I didn't think the opposite, I couldn't do that because it wasn't part

5 of my purview as vice-president of the Yugoslav state Presidency, that it

6 was up to the General Staff or, rather, the Staff of the Supreme Command,

7 and I also told him that pursuant to the constitution it was even less up

8 to him to sign this request that the fighters return from the front,

9 because this came under the purview of federal organs and federal

10 institutions, and I think that's a complete answer.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

12 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. In February 1992, there was a dispute between Mr. Milosevic and

14 Mr. Bulatovic regarding the command of the new army of the new Yugoslavia,

15 put it that simple. Do you recall that?

16 A. Well, you must be more specific, what you have in mind. Do you

17 mean when the constitutional foundations for the new Yugoslavia were

18 established?

19 Q. No, but I think it's easier -- I will put to you from the book

20 "Rules of Silence" of Mr. Bulatovic, I will put a quote to you.

21 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can this please be provided to everyone.

22 Q. And as you say, it's indeed about the new Yugoslavia that you

23 discussed in February and also even starting in January 1992 and who would

24 command the army.

25 A. Yes. Those are the constitutional foundations.

1 Q. Yes. And I would like to quote to you from page 2. And you have

2 only one page, and it's here actually indicated with a frame on your page.

3 "From your perspective, the things stood as follows: Branko

4 Kostic --" "From our perspective, the things stood as follows: Branko

5 Kostic had much more understanding for Slobodan Milosevic's proposal than

6 he had for my counter-arguments, and he justified that with federal

7 functions."

8 And I drop now a part that's not so relevant.

9 "During the discussion about the Supreme Defence Council and the

10 command over the Yugoslav army, Milosevic and I could not -- could in no

11 way find a solution. He requested that the president of the state be

12 given the command, and I wanted it to be a collective decision of all

13 three members of the Council; that is, the presidents of the republics and

14 that it be established by consensus."

15 And now I drop also a little part, and then it continues: "As far

16 as I was concerned, we could have done it for 44 hours, for I did not want

17 to give in because of a recent experience of life importance. I did not

18 want any president of Montenegro or Serbia to experience in the future the

19 things I had experienced when helplessly watching soldiers from Montenegro

20 being sent to Banija. Responsibility for their lives was objectively my

21 due, and my influence on that decision was equal to zero. I deemed

22 necessary that these two things be coordinated, and that responsibility

23 not be valid only after the fact, but also prior to the decision being

24 reached."

25 And he also refers then to, let's say, a little bit of forth and

1 back about formulations.

2 Do you recall that; and if so, is it true that you took

3 Mr. Milosevic's view?

4 A. I don't think you formulated the question properly. I did not

5 join in Mr. Milosevic's views, but in that discussion I demonstrated

6 profound disagreement with the position expressed by Mr. Momir Bulatovic.

7 Now, these discrepancies between us began earlier, because what Mr. Momir

8 Bulatovic advocated at the time when he says that he debated it for four

9 hours, he was in fact advocating in that new Yugoslavia once again some

10 sort of confederal element and some sort of collective leadership,

11 collective management of the army, with a general consensus and so on and

12 so forth.

13 Now, I came out in favour of another option that the new Federal

14 Republic of Yugoslavia should be a modern, functional federation, and

15 that's where we didn't see eye-to-eye and clashed in our party organs. I

16 was still in the party then, and Mr. Bulatovic was president of the party.

17 So our views clashed there and at the Assembly. In the Montenegrin

18 Assembly I came out publicly in defending the position that Montenegro

19 could not in that new Yugoslavia insist on having 50 per cent of the share

20 in the Yugoslav People's Army. And if that were the case, then it would

21 have to accept 50 per cent of the costs, and 50 per cent of the diplomats

22 in the diplomatic service, and then it would have to cover 50 per cent of

23 the costs and expenditure for those services. I assumed that in

24 establishing these constitutional foundations - and that's what we're

25 talking about, madam, the constitutional foundations - we should not be

1 allowed in Montenegro to take a position or to take any rigid, rigorous

2 positions which could later on lead Serbia not to accept those principles

3 for a common state.

4 Q. Mr. --

5 A. And I have to say -- may I just be allowed to say one more

6 sentence? I have to say that in that connection there were serious

7 manipulations in the leadership of my won party at the Main Board of the

8 Democratic Party of Socialists. We discussed this at much greater length,

9 but Mr. Bulatovic doesn't write about any of that in this book of his. So

10 in order to --

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

12 A. -- marry the two --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I ask, what was your view about how the army

14 should be commanded?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My view was that the command of the

16 army in that state should belong not to the presidents of the republics

17 but to the institution at the level of the federal state. Mr. Bonomy, I

18 considered that --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: How did that differ from Mr. Milosevic's view?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I didn't say that it was

21 opposed to his view, but I didn't join in Milosevic's view but defended

22 this as my own view. But I strongly stood up against the position

23 expressed by Mr. Bulatovic.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: But, you see, that is a very unhelpful way of

25 approaching virtually every question that you're asked, because it seems

1 to me that the actual answer to the question is that you and Mr. Milosevic

2 agreed, and disagreed with Mr. Bulatovic. Simple answer. And if I've got

3 that wrong, if I've got that basic position wrong, please correct me now.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think you have got it wrong.

5 First, I'm not a child to join in anybody else's opinion. I am somebody

6 with my own integrity and I have my own position.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: That is such a childish attitude. Everything has

8 to come from your perspective: Me, me, me. Why can't you just think

9 about the question you're being asked and answer it in a straightforward

10 way?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, what Mr. Milosevic's --

12 what Mr. Milosevic accepted during our joint discussions I would never

13 have accepted. I would have stood firm on the position that that new

14 state should be a modern, functional federation and that under its

15 competency and purview and power it has four or five basic functions; that

16 it have defence under its remit, that it has customs policies, the

17 monetary system, and so on, and at the level of that federal state to have

18 its own institutions through which it would realise those powers of it.

19 Now, Mr. Milosevic accepted something I would never have accepted,

20 in the quest for a compromise solution, probably, or for reaching an

21 agreement; I don't know that. He'll be best placed to answer that

22 himself.

23 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to tender the --

24 this section of Bulatovic's book as part of Exhibit 942.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit it.

1 JUDGE KWON: How about keeping the same number as the one we have

2 already admitted. So all as parts of Mr. Bulatovic's book "Rules of

3 Silence."

4 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, that's the proposal.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Just to complete this, the question that was asked

6 some time ago was: "In February 1992 there was a dispute between

7 Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Bulatovic regarding the command of the new army of

8 the new Yugoslavia, put it that simple."

9 So that, Mr. Kostic, was the issue, not the overall general

10 structure of the institutions of the new state.

11 Please carry on, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

12 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

13 Q. But, Mr. Kostic --

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to explain,

15 Mr. Bonomy?

16 JUDGE BONOMY: No. The Prosecutor will ask you what questions she

17 wishes and Mr. Milosevic can re-examine on it if he wishes.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19 Q. Mr. Kostic, you in the Presidency, in the Federal Presidency, was

20 the one to represent the Montenegrin interest in -- on the federal level,

21 but you do not support your own president, Mr. Bulatovic, on this

22 important issue where it really goes to the heart of the influence that

23 the Montenegrin leadership can have on this federal level. That's --

24 don't you think that's strange that you do not represent the Montenegrin

25 interest?

1 A. It was precisely through my desire to represent the interests of

2 Montenegro to the end that I firmly adhere to the position I expounded a

3 moment ago, because I consider and I think that time did tell that the

4 confederal elements as a collective command, a collective leadership and

5 so on and so forth, do not give the prospects of that common state having

6 a life. And from the very first day I did everything in my power to

7 retain and preserve that state. A compromise solution was found and then

8 it was said in the constitutional groundworks they refer -- what was

9 referred to was a united armed forces and united command; however, the

10 leadership of Montenegro - that is to say my colleagues from the top

11 political echelons of Montenegro - manipulated the matter at the time as

12 well, and instead of expanding on -- and saying "united," they put

13 "joint."

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... here. Now let me interrupt

15 you here.

16 A. You've asked me a question and not given me the opportunity of

17 answering it. Mr. Robinson --

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the answer, and it didn't

19 really go to the issue.

20 A. But you didn't let me finish.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please proceed.

22 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

23 Q. Mr. Kostic, in 1990 -- in the spring of 1992, it was agreed that

24 the first president of the new Yugoslavia should be nominated by

25 Montenegro. That's correct, isn't it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And the -- your party, the Democratic Party of Socialists

3 nominated Mr. Svetozar Marovic. Remember that?

4 A. I remember it well.

5 Q. That's your party. They want him in this position.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. However, you also then can -- became a candidate, didn't you?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Let's put it this way: You were asked to -- for candidature on

10 this point. You were asked.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Who asked you?

13 A. Specifically, five minutes before the Federal Assembly went into

14 session, it was Mr. Seselj that asked for a meeting and told me that his

15 rather numerous group of deputies in the parliament would like to put

16 forward my name as candidate. And I said that my party had proposed a

17 candidate already on behalf of the Democratic Party of Socialists of

18 Montenegro, and that I couldn't accept it without having consulted my

19 party first.

20 We held those consultations, and my party did not lend its support

21 but went through with its original proposal and I did not accept myself

22 being put forward as a candidate.

23 Q. Mr. Milosevic proposed that you should -- should have a

24 candidature for the Presidency, for the president of the new Yugoslavia.

25 Isn't that what happened?

1 A. That's the first time I've heard of it. I think that I found

2 somewhere -- I do apologise, but I think there's somewhere in Boro Jovic's

3 book I did find a passage -- or once again from his notes, an assertion to

4 the effect that he and Milosevic talked to me. Mr. Milosevic just in one

5 talk offered me the post of defence minister, and I said to him on that

6 occasion if Mr. Bulatovic as president of Montenegro and president of the

7 ruling party in Montenegro, and you Mr. Milosevic as President of Serbia

8 and president of the ruling party in Serbia take it upon yourselves, the

9 two most important posts in that new state, that in that case I would be

10 prepared to continue my political engagement and take up political

11 functions. As that did not happen, I thanked them and returned to the

12 university because I considered that at the outset it was the two most

13 prominent figures should assume those two most prominent posts, functions

14 in the federal state, all the more so as all the international deputies

15 and representatives had communicated with them previously as presidents of

16 the republics.

17 Q. Let me quote from Exhibit 596, tab 3. It's Mr. Jovic's book on

18 Milosevic and I refer to the pages 87 and 88. Yes. We can put this on

19 the ELMO, but I have actually -- I quote first from page -- quote 87, 88:

20 "It is obvious --" and it's about -- in this relation he speaks

21 first about Mr. Marovic not being known to -- on the federal level and to

22 Mr. Milosevic, and it says here: "It is obvious that it influenced

23 Milosevic, who was pulling all strings and making personnel and other

24 decisions in that transitive situation, to try to impose his own candidate

25 for Montenegro, one that he could trust. Milosevic wanted Branko Kostic

1 ... nominate himself for the FRY president ... He was extremely

2 cooperative and loyal in the period of the efforts for preserving

3 Yugoslavia and the defence of the Serbian people's interest. In the

4 critical moments, he was even more on the side of Serbian than the

5 Montenegrin interests"

6 Then a little bit further down: "Slobodan's idea is that Branko

7 Kostic found certain support in Montenegro, if he is not able in his party

8 then out of it, and we will elect him regardless of the will of the

9 Montenegro Democratic Party of Socialists. He says he already got consent

10 for he --" that's Mr. Milosevic. "He says he already got consent from

11 Vojislav Seselj and he believes that the other parties will prefer to vote

12 for Branko Kostic than for Marovic. He suggests that I organise a meeting

13 with Branko Kostic and persuade him to accept that proposal of his."

14 And you agreed to this proposal, did you not, Mr. Kostic?

15 A. It is correct that what you've just read out is what it says

16 there, but none of it is correct. None of what Mr. Borisav Jovic says is

17 correct. And I've already said that you should take some of his

18 assertions with reservations. Nor did he write that as a diary. In that

19 book of his he says that on the 14th of July we made the decision to

20 withdraw the army from Slovenia, whereas we did that on the 18th of July.

21 So what Mr. Jovic says here is incorrect. And there are many other things

22 that are not correct in books that I've read on subjects that I've talked

23 about, and it's also incorrect that I ever proclaimed that I would put

24 myself forth as a candidate, and Mr. Jovic goes on in the text to discuss

25 my fate and my destiny and an attitude towards me linked to Dobrica

1 Cosic's orientation, and so on. The full truth is that we had three

2 consultations about cadre solutions for the post of the president of the

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At two of these consultations nobody

4 except for me made any mention of a single name, and at the first and at

5 the second and at the third meeting I persisted in repeating that the two

6 most responsible posts in the federal state must be taken over by the two

7 most prominent men, that is to say Mr. Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic,

8 without entering in who will be Prime Minister and who would be president

9 of the state, of the country. So those strivings of mine --

10 Q. Let me interrupt you here. Mr. Jovic wouldn't have any reason to

11 make something like this up, would he? There is no reason for him to just

12 make this up.

13 A. Madam, let me tell you, Mr. Bulatovic in his book said that we

14 drank coffee at Batajnica airport before we took off in the plane. Quite

15 incorrect. So this is incorrect too. I can't say anything else but that

16 it is incorrect, not true. I have no other choice. And I can also add

17 that we were the last people at the -- or, rather, that Mr. Bulatovic be

18 proposed as candidate and that that had been already decided in the party

19 leadership.

20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, before you ask the witness

21 whether he agreed to the suggestion of Milosevic and Jovic, why don't you

22 put the passage where he described a meeting in a villa in Dedinje. It's

23 the last paragraph of 88.

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. "We met in a villa in Dedinje where Branko Kostic lived. Slobodan

1 was avoiding starting the conversation because certain master of the house

2 was bustling around and serving coffee and other drinks and he felt

3 unpleasant to ask him to leave. All three of us went out and started the

4 conversation in the garden. Slobodan was explaining to Branko the whole

5 idea and the ways of implementing.

6 "Branko agreed. He was convinced that this move was good for the

7 future of Yugoslavia because he was, similarly like us, very critical

8 about the behaviour of Montenegrin leadership in the period of Yugoslav

9 partition."

10 He is very precise about what is actually discussed and where.

11 And actually, I think I even continue here: "Soon he announced -" he,

12 that's you - "announced that he would run for office, and this caused even

13 more considerable distrust and suspicion among the republic leadership and

14 especially a storm of resistance in the official Montenegro leadership."

15 So he's very precise.

16 A. Very convincing, I have to say. Perhaps that's something

17 Mr. Jovic dreamt of. But the description is very convincing, and it's

18 almost -- it's very difficult for one not to believe it, but all I can say

19 is that this whole story about the running for office and all this time

20 that nothing was known was just two days; it was the weekend. And

21 Mr. Seselj, when prior to the Assembly session suggested that his party,

22 his deputies would put me forward as candidate and I said that I would

23 consult my own party, that is why the election was put off for two days.

24 I think it was left to Monday or the following week, the Wednesday.

25 So there couldn't have been much discussion or dilemma on that

1 point. And ultimately, why would I accept it in that conversation of

2 running for office? It was highly unreasonable, Mr. Seselj putting me

3 forward, bypassing the support from my party and my party's supporters,

4 and why Mr. Milosevic and Jovic wouldn't have put my name forward

5 themselves as candidate.

6 Q. Let me interrupt you, Mr. Kostic.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kostic, did Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Jovic visit

8 your villa?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I lived in two villas. I mostly

10 lived in Uzicka Street number 16, and for the last month I lived in what

11 was known as the Vojvodina villa. And as far as I know, as far as I

12 remember, Milosevic and Jovic never visited me in that villa. I really

13 don't remember them ever having come there.

14 JUDGE KWON: What --

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Milosevic did visit me once. I

16 don't know whether it was April or May. He visited me in this villa, and

17 that was the only villa, the villa in Uzicka number 16. But the villa was

18 supposed to be adapted, reconstructed, whatever. So there was discussion

19 over --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't need all these details, Mr. Kostic. I knew

21 it wouldn't be simple. There's bound to be more than one villa for a

22 start. The villa in Dedinje is the one referred to in the question. Now,

23 which of the villas is that?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was official accommodation,

25 Mr. Bonomy, both of them. Mr. Bonomy, it was official accommodation. I

1 had an apartment, one apartment in one of those villas. For a time I was

2 in one, for a time I was in another, when I moved.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: In that one that is referred to in that book, did

4 Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Jovic visit you there?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said no. No. I can't

6 remember.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, is it "no" or is it "I can't remember"?

8 Which?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

11 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

12 Q. Mr. Kostic, what benefit would Mr. Jovic have to make up such a

13 lie?

14 A. That's something you would have to ask him. I really can't answer

15 that question. Why would he do that? Why can you find very bad lies in

16 some other books? You can ask that question as well.

17 Q. Mr. Kostic --

18 A. We found Mr. Mesic in his book telling so many untruthful things

19 already.

20 Q. You are evading, actually, to answer. I asked you what benefit

21 would there be in for Mr. Jovic and your answer would actually have to be

22 "There is no benefit in making up this lie."

23 MR. KAY: Well, he's answered the question: "Ask Mr. Jovic."

24 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He hasn't answered the question, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us move on, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

1 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

2 Q. But I want to quote still from the book how this concluded, and

3 it's on page 89 at the bottom and the following page:

4 "Slobodan Milosevic called me to inform me about the definite

5 proposal of the FRY president, just like nothing has happened, like we had

6 not talked with Branko Kostic. He told me that we would go for Dobrica

7 Cosic, that we wouldn't nominate him or probably that we would vote for

8 him. He said he had talked with Dobrica and that he had agreed."

9 And, Mr. Kostic, that was the reason why you withdrew your

10 nomination for president; right?

11 A. That's not how it was, ma'am. That's your conclusion. Please

12 don't expect me to confirm your conclusion. I'm saying this is a

13 fabrication. It's made up. There are many things that are made up, in

14 that book and in many others you've quoted from.

15 Q. At the beginning of your testimony, you said that in June 1992,

16 you withdrew from political life. Mr. Kostic, you were expelled from your

17 own party; isn't that right?

18 A. End 1992. But in mid-1992, I withdrew from political life,

19 because it was my personal decision. And in end 1992, the leadership of

20 my party expelled me from the party.

21 Q. Your remark that you withdrew from political life is not entirely

22 true, because you campaigned against Momir Bulatovic for the president

23 position in Montenegro in December 1992, did you not?

24 A. Madam, on the 15th of June, I stopped being vice-president of the

25 Presidency of the SFRY, and by December I had withdrawn from political

1 l