1 Friday, 16 September 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice. Will you be concluding today?

7 MR. NICE: I certainly hope so. The position is that the answers

8 of the witness have taken, of course, a great deal of time, and despite

9 efforts to restrict them they've gone on longer than in some cases I would

10 have liked. In the circumstances, I will inevitably be just necessarily

11 selective about the topics I cover, but if I fail to cover every topic

12 it's not on the basis that I accept the accuracy of what the witness says

13 however I should point to most significant challenges.

14 WITNESS: VOJISLAV SESELJ [Resumed]

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

17 Q. Mr. Seselj, following yesterday's questions about Srebrenica, can

18 you now please tell us in simple, short, clear terms what is the evidence

19 that goes to show that the video we looked at one still from is a forgery?

20 A. The first evidence is the fact that it was carried out in Trnovo,

21 200 kilometres away from Srebrenica. Now, why did a group of

22 paramilitaries --

23 Q. What evidence have you --

24 A. But it is evidence.

25 Q. What evidence have you got that this is a forgery?

1 A. It is the members of the expert team from my Defence who have the

2 evidence, and I will bring it when my trial is on, and I don't have any

3 evidence in my cell.

4 Q. Can you tell us what the evidence is? Is it a witness? Is it a

5 document? What is it?

6 A. Judging by the content of that text, it's a complete videotape.

7 Q. Of what?

8 A. Well, it says there on that piece of paper. Videotape of the

9 staged execution.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you actually say that these apparent victims

11 were not executed as shown on the video?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The members of my expert team, to

13 assist my Defence, have information at their disposal that the victims

14 were not killed on that occasion. This was all acting for the purpose

15 filming an alleged execution.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, the answer to that question was yes,

17 wasn't it, because it was carefully phrased. But you've got to give us

18 about two or three sentences to use up the time apparently.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. You see, --

21 A. No, I'm not trying to use up the time, Mr. Bonomy. I'm only

22 trying to give a exhaustive and reliable response.

23 Q. Mr. Seselj, you see, evidence exists of DNA matching, statements

24 from parents and loved ones whose young male relations have been killed,

25 sightings of them in Srebrenica shortly before they were taken away, going

1 to show and the evidence may come before this Trial Chamber before the end

2 of the trial, and if you're really saying this is a forgery this may go

3 deeply to your credit. The options are -- not options, just think. Are

4 you actually saying that you have evidence to show that this is a forgery

5 in the form of some other videotape?

6 A. I told you what I have at my disposal. The key issue is where

7 their bodies were found. If so, were they found in Trnovo? Were they

8 taken somewhere else after the filming of the execution? If you say that

9 the corpses were found in Trnovo and you can prove that, then I will

10 accept that that's where they were shot, which doesn't mean that they were

11 shot at that point of time.

12 Q. Please stop shouting. Let me just tell you this: People have

13 been back to Trnovo. They have photographed and have filmed the precise

14 location which matches exactly with what can be seen -- can be shown to be

15 seen on the film. Now you raise the issue about why Trnovo and I'll ask

16 you a question since you've apparently made inquiries.

17 The significance of this film as you and this accused must know is

18 that it reveals taking bodies from Srebrenica -- sorry, taking -- taking

19 Muslims from Srebrenica to comparatively distant locations which may be

20 termed hubs, from which they were then parcelled out to be killed in small

21 numbers. Now, that, you see, I'm going to suggest to you, is what your

22 inquiries must have revealed and that shows a high level of prolonged

23 organisation in the killing of the victims of Srebrenica.

24 Do you know about, and I repeat the way I've expressed it, a high

25 level of prolonged organisation of the killing of victims from Srebrenica?

1 A. You're making this up. You're making up the killing of victims

2 from Srebrenica. This was not organised by the Serbian authorities,

3 whether civilian or the killing of the victims in Srebrenica was organised

4 by Western intelligence agencies. The purpose was to achieve something

5 that would upset the world public --

6 Q. Mr. Seselj, stop. The people who are filmed and who are now of

7 course detained in Belgrade were people filmed killing come from the

8 Skorpions which was a unit subordinated within Serbia, and you and the

9 accused know that.

10 Now, tell us this: Do you accept that the people like

11 Slobodan Medic shown on that film, members of the Skorpions, are

12 subordinated within Serbia to the SAJ?

13 A. No. That is your fabrication. The Skorpions have nothing to do

14 with Serbia. They were acting warriors who for your purposes shot

15 propaganda material with horrific scenes of crimes so that this could be

16 used against the Serbian state and the Serbian people. That's what I'm

17 saying.

18 Q. Let me understand your state of mind in light of that last answer

19 and your use of the word "your." Are you now suggesting that the film

20 that's been screened, and incidentally for the sake of the record the

21 assertion that it was provided to the Tribunal by Natasa Kandic is not, of

22 course, one that is adopted by the Prosecution and the matter will be

23 shown to the Chamber through other routes. For the sake of the record,

24 are you saying that in 1995, in July, for the purposes of this Tribunal,

25 Skorpions engaged in a propaganda exercise shooting or appearing to shoot

1 victims? Is that really what you're saying so we can judge your

2 credibility?

3 A. I am convinced of this, that this was done for your purposes and

4 for anti-Serb purposes, because what madman would agree to kill? Anyone

5 who did crimes in this war knows -- knew he was committing a crime. There

6 is no one who committed a crime who can say he didn't know that this was

7 prohibited and that it was a crime. All the crimes contained in the

8 Statute of this Tribunal existed in the legislation of the former

9 Yugoslavia.

10 Q. No. Pause, please. Your maintaining that it would be appropriate

11 at any cost to recover the territory of the Serbs, your rivers of blood

12 speeches? How does that fit with your assertion here that everybody knows

13 what they would be doing would be a crime if they killed someone?

14 A. First of all, these are two absolutely different matters. Rivers

15 of blood were already spilt, had already been spilt on several occasions

16 for Kosovo and Metohija, and what I said was that we would defend Kosovo

17 and Metohija again even if it meant spilling rivers of blood. But I was

18 referring to fighting on the battlefield. From 1382 until today many

19 rivers of blood have flown because of Kosovo.

20 Q. Why do you say, then, that this -- you say these killings filmed

21 would be a crime, yes, and how does that lead to your conviction that this

22 film is not genuine? Please tell us.

23 A. First of all, it's evident that those who actually did the

24 shooting or acted shooting were doing this because they were paid by

25 whoever was filming. Since this could not have been done in Srebrenica or

1 nearby, they collected a group of Muslims and drove them off 200

2 kilometres away. You have no other case of Muslim prisoners being taken

3 far away from Srebrenica. They were taken to Bratunac and other nearby

4 areas. This is 200 kilometres away. You have to go through Bratunac,

5 Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Pale, all of Mount Trbevic, Vukovica and

6 then arrive in Trnovo.

7 Q. As you know, the evidence in this case shows at least 4.000 dead,

8 that's on the most conservative estimate, and we all know that the public

9 assessments include seven and 8.000 dead of whom only a limited number, a

10 couple of thousand, may so far have been exhumed. Come back. Is the

11 reality that you with your access through government when you were a

12 deputy Prime Minister and through your contact with this accused know that

13 the organisation to kill the victims of Srebrenica was both wider and

14 longer in duration than might originally have been thought reflecting high

15 levels of government organisation within Bosnia and maybe within Serbia?

16 Is that what you've now discovered?

17 A. That is not true. You're fabricating this. You're falsifying the

18 information about the number of people who were executed. It's not true

19 that there were 4.000 of them. You don't have that number of bodies.

20 Among the bodies found were also bodies of Muslims killed three years

21 previously. I assert that.

22 According to information from Dutch officers, a thousand or maybe

23 1.200 were killed, maybe a little more. I assert categorically the number

24 was not 4.000. I also assert categorically that all this was organised by

25 Western intelligence agencies, primarily the French agency, because

1 Clinton needed --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have heard that already, Mr. Seselj.

3 MR. NICE: Incidentally, Your Honours, in the documents he

4 provided yesterday, his later publications, he does at certain places - I

5 haven't got them available - refer to the French intelligence account on

6 earlier occasions. I've got something else to say about that document

7 when I've got more detail to hand. Very well.

8 Q. I'm going to move on from that. The only -- the only -- the only

9 body you refer to as being involved is the 10th Sabotage Detachment and

10 you've suggested in some way that this was acting independently. Just

11 might like to have a look briefly at this, please.

12 And it's a Sanction for the booth, please.

13 I want to take it very briefly. You'll see what's going on here.

14 [Videotape played]

15 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Fighters of the Sabotage Detachment,

16 Serbian heroes, allow me to greet you on behalf of the Knin Corps and the

17 Main Staff and to congratulate you on the day of the formation of the

18 units.

19 "Thank you.

20 "Through your activities so far you have shown how a soldier of

21 the army of Republika Srpska should fight. Up to now you have completed

22 your assignments with great success, without any losses, which is to be

23 commended. We are in a situation when the actions you are taking in the

24 future have to be planned as operations of wider proportions. From this

25 arises the need that units at the corps level within the army of Republika

1 Srpska, similar units be formed. Right at this moment, we are working on

2 forming a sabotage unit within the Drina Corps. We have just discussed

3 this in your commander's office, and he said, 'Great, now we can have a

4 competition.' I told him, 'I accept the challenge and may we end up at

5 Bratilo as soon as possible and you know where that is.'"

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. Now, this is Krstic. It's October 1985 [sic]. It's after the

8 atrocities of Srebrenica and he's treating them, is he not, as a formal

9 unit, not as a mercenary unit. Can you explain that?

10 A. First of all, mercenaries fighting for money were also in a unit.

11 I never said that that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was an informal unit.

12 This was a detachment in the structure of the army of Republika Srpska.

13 It was made up of mercenaries. Secondly, you are giving me a speech made

14 by General Krstic. What have I to do with this? I have only met General

15 Krstic once in my life and that was here in the detention unit and that

16 was by accident.

17 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

18 A. The essence of response to your question is the following.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues]... you do understand what a

20 response is, don't you? Let's have it.

21 A. Why are you so nervous, Mr. Nice?

22 Q. [Previous translation continues]... don't credit me with qualities

23 that I don't have but answer the question, Mr. Seselj.

24 A. The main people in this detachment are Dominik Petrusic and

25 Milorad Pelemis. For your interests, they abducted Stevan Todorovic at

1 Zlatibor and transferred him to Bosnia in order to hand him over to the

2 Americans. You never issued an arrest warrant for Milorad Pelemis and

3 Dominik Petrusic, nor are you requesting that the national courts

4 prosecute them.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not clear about the answer at all. Did you say

6 at the beginning of that answer that you accepted that the 10th Sabotage

7 Detachment was formally a part of the army?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know. I can't prove

9 that now but I assume that formally it was part of the army. It was part

10 of the structure.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... did you say,

12 that it was formally part of the army?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assume it was formally. I don't

14 have any evidence for that.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. NICE: As a relevant part of the evidence, please.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be 917.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was not clear of what

22 army.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The army of Republika Srpska. That

24 was its official title. The 10th Sabotage Detachment of the army of

25 Republika Srpska. It was not part of any corps.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: The answer was clear to me. Thank you.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. All right. Let's just move on. I've given you many opportunities

4 and I'm going to give you a last one to tell us of anything you know, not

5 guess or work out, anything you know in evidence that you've seen or

6 indeed people you've spoken to that reveals concern by the Serb

7 authorities, inquiries by the Serb authorities between July 1995 and

8 February and March of 1996. Any document, any report showing an inquiry

9 into Srebrenica?

10 A. You don't have any evidence that the authorities in Serbia at that

11 time even knew about the shootings in Srebrenica.

12 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

13 A. Information about that execution arrived later on, but I don't

14 know where or to whom.

15 Q. You really saying that you -- were you unaware of the degree to

16 which Srebrenica was publicised in the United Nations? Were you unaware

17 of the indictment against Mladic? Are you seriously saying that?

18 A. Well, we heard about indictments against Mladic and Karadzic.

19 When the indictment was issued, I was convinced that anything that was

20 being ascribed to them in the indictment was fabricated, and I abide by

21 that today. The reasons for the indictment were political, but some kind

22 of grounds had to be constructed, and this was done artificially --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. You see, before I move on very briefly to Erdemovic again just to

1 tidy that up, and of course though you were not in Srebrenica at the time,

2 and although, of course, Mr. Seselj, you're not charged in relation to

3 Srebrenica which makes your bringing the film about the Skorpions a little

4 hard to understand, you know that the environment in which these crimes

5 were committed was an environment you had created in part by your

6 engagement of innocent civilians in hate. You knew that, didn't you?

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, what's the --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's not true. You're making that

9 up.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: What's to be gained by that question at this stage

11 in this cross-examination when we know exactly what the answer will be?

12 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I wish to establish why he's -- oh,

13 very well. If Your Honour doesn't find it helpful, I'm going to move on.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: It may just be me, but I -- [Microphone not

15 activated]. It may just be me, but I feel we've been over and over it so

16 often that it's pointless going over it again.

17 MR. NICE: Let me just make it plain, because I don't wish to fall

18 out with the Court. The significance for the Prosecution of the mechanics

19 whereby these crimes were committed, mechanics that included the

20 environment created by people like this witness with the consent or

21 without the resistance of the accused is something that is of central

22 importance. That's why I've concentrated on it. I've -- and I wanted to

23 give this witness the opportunity in relation to this most serious crime

24 where I will be asking the Court to say in due course that his answers are

25 not only nonsensical but wickedly dishonest. I want him to have an

1 opportunity to know exactly the basis upon which I'm putting it to him.

2 But I will move on. And my last questions in relation to

3 Srebrenica are rounding up what I've said before and that is that the

4 account of the inquiry -- or not the inquiry, the proceedings that were

5 launched in the spring of 1996 are, I suggest to you, an account that

6 reflects -- doesn't reflect but if the inquiry was more deep, Mr. Seselj,

7 would have shown or would show that the authorities only acted because

8 journalists were about to reveal what Erdemovic had told them. Can you

9 counter that? Can you say that's incorrect?

10 A. As everything we have been hearing from you for days, years, and

11 months is untrue, Mr. Nice, I'm convinced that this, too, is untrue. But

12 you're asking me to talk in detail about something in which I did not

13 participate because I was not in the government in 1996. All I know is

14 that our police immediately arrested Erdemovic as soon as they heard that

15 he was involved in the execution, as soon as that came to light. How it

16 came to light, that is something that has to do with the methodology of

17 policework.

18 You are now insinuating and asking me to confirm your

19 insinuations.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... in any sense counter to the

21 proposition that I made. Let's move on, then, to Kosovo.

22 A. As for your assertion, I'll respond at once, Mr. Nice. As for

23 your assertion, it is also a pure fabrication, because neither I nor any

24 other politician from Serbia ever advocated the killing of prisoners of

25 war, the killing of civilians, looting, robbing, and all the rest.

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1 Q. The --

2 A. And anyone who committed crimes in this war knew he was committing

3 crimes.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, can you comment on Mr. Nice's

5 suggestion that the authorities only acted because they knew that

6 journalists were about to reveal what Erdemovic had told them?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't believe that assertion of

8 Mr. Nice's. I think the authorities responded because they came by

9 information that one man was involved in a mass execution, and they

10 responded immediately.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks. We have your response.

12 Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Staying briefly with the Skorpions, the Skorpions were based, by

15 the time of the start of the Kosovo conflict, in Sid, were they not?

16 A. That's the first time I hear that, that the Skorpions had a base

17 anywhere in Serbia. I don't believe they did. And the Skorpions in

18 Kosovo did not take part as the Skorpions but they came forward as

19 volunteers in regular units. Some of them, not all of them.

20 Q. See, and I only wanted your help with this because there is an

21 entry in Stevanovic's diary dealing with the men from Sid are coming in

22 PJP uniforms, and I want you to confirm if you can that the men from Sid

23 is and must be known to be the Skorpions. You say you don't know that?

24 A. No. And I don't believe it either.

25 Q. Don't you? Very well. Next thing, then.

1 A. I really don't believe that.

2 Q. So far as Kosovo is concerned, how intimate with all government

3 matters were you as a deputy Prime Minister? Do you say you would have

4 known everything that happened concerning Kosovo or did you only get

5 privilege to learn of certain things?

6 A. In principle, I knew everything that was essential. I received

7 daily reports, special daily reports, in fact, about the war actions as

8 deputy Prime Minister, which means every day in the government of Serbia I

9 would receive such information, where combat operations took place, what

10 the results of combat operations were for our side and the adversary.

11 Q. Racak, then. One of the things the Court has been looking for, or

12 at least the Prosecution has been looking for, is a comprehensive account

13 in written form from those who went into Racak and who, as you would have

14 it, killed terrorists. Where is there such a report?

15 A. Well, the report on the operation in Racak must be in existence in

16 the MUP, because the report was tabled, filed, and on the day that this

17 battle in Racak took place, I was in Pristina attending a meeting of the

18 government of Serbia.

19 Q. I just want to know where the report is. Tell us, please, since

20 you're so intimate with all these matters, for an event like Racak,

21 properly conducted, would you expect to find the commanding officer or the

22 officer in charge producing a detailed report where 30 or so KLA activists

23 have been killed?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you already have the answer that there was a

25 report tabled and filed. That's what the witness has said. So it's

1 finding it that's the thing. It's -- we're already past the stage of

2 establishing it exists.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Where is it, then, Mr. Seselj? Can you help us? Who wrote it and

5 have you seen it?

6 A. Perhaps at my cell at the Scheveningen prison. I can't imagine a

7 more nonsensical question, asking me where the report is. The way the

8 police worked it was quite normal that after every operation a report was

9 compiled. Now, as this was an operation of the greatest importance, that

10 report must have been sent up to the minister. As far as us members of

11 the government are concerned, while we were at Pristina we were informed

12 of that orally.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Pavlovic on the same "Death of

14 Yugoslavia" programme in which you participated says in terms to the

15 camera that it was a joint action in involving the military as well as the

16 police. Can you tell us, please, about the police involvement -- about

17 the army involvement. I beg your pardon.

18 A. As far as I know, in the operation itself it was just the police

19 that took part. Now, that the army was close by and that it assumed

20 certain tactical positions in the rear, to the rear of the police, that is

21 quite probable but I can't tell you anything more precise on that score.

22 But to the best of my information, it was the police that engaged in that

23 action.

24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... shells into Racak?

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Will you repeat --

1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear you.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Repeat the question. We didn't --

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Did they fire shells into Racak, the army?

5 A. This is the first time that I hear of any such thing. I don't

6 think so, no.

7 Q. You haven't seen a report from the army?

8 A. No. I hear that for the first time and I don't believe it.

9 Q. Is there any reason that you can think of for the representatives

10 of the military or the police on the ground on the day to deny the

11 involvement of the army in a joint exercise of this kind?

12 A. There's no reason. Had there been a necessity for the army, the

13 army would have been deployed. According to our constitutional system,

14 the army can be deployed against an outside enemy and against internal

15 rebels and terrorists. That is without any doubt. So any use of the army

16 in that sense would have been legal and lawful. But I'm hearing from you

17 for the first time that there was -- there were suspicions that the army

18 took part.

19 Q. Moving on after the bombing began, we've had great deal of

20 evidence - so I'm not going to go through it with you in any detail - from

21 people who give accounts of being driven from their homes, people being

22 killed, people being expelled by military and police forces. Do you say

23 all that evidence is false, or do you say there was some driving of people

24 from their homes by the processing of killing them, or killing some of

25 them first, and then driving the others out? What do you say?

1 A. The witnesses which you produced are more or less all false

2 witnesses. There was no systematic expulsion of the Albanian population

3 by the authorities, and I state that quite categorically. There were

4 individual crimes, individual killings, beatings, and looting. And our

5 military and police forces had strict orders to take the necessary steps

6 in cases of that kind and prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes, and

7 that is what I state.

8 Q. Sorry, go on, yes. The --

9 A. And that was the policy of the republican government of Serbia as

10 indeed the federal government.

11 Q. Whether accounts of really substantial killings these must be all

12 entirely fabricated, must they? Suva Reka, all that sort of stuff, just

13 entirely made up?

14 A. There were no really substantial killings. If you look at the

15 overall number of victims of casualties in the three months of bombing,

16 for example, and if you were to compare how many people -- how many

17 Albanian died and how many Serbs died and members of other ethnic groups,

18 you will actually see that the real killing in the form of repressive

19 measures did not exist.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... being organised to take people

21 across the border into Albania or Macedonia, all false, is it? No such

22 trains were organised? What was your take on that as the deputy Prime

23 Minister?

24 A. I have information as vice-Premier that our authorities in a

25 local -- at a local and regional level tried to convince the Albanians not

1 to leave. When it was not able to convince them not to leave, then it

2 may -- it facilitated their departure by supplying them with water, bread,

3 some more basics, possibly medical material and sometimes transport. I

4 can't go into the details. I don't know them all now.

5 Q. So as the Prime Minister you might know this. Special trains were

6 laid on, were they, to take them out because they wanted to go?

7 A. I don't believe there were special trains laid on, but that the

8 authorities did make an effort to facilitate their departure and their

9 position generally; that is true. But no trains which would force them to

10 leave. And there was no forcible expulsion. That's what I'm claiming.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, I take it that you were against this

12 policy of trying to convince the Albanians not to leave.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, that was the uniform,

14 united policy of the government. You're now bringing, linking up one of

15 my speeches dating back to 1991 which could be called in a sense

16 anti-Albanian in character with my conduct in the government of Serbia in

17 1999. The government was united. All three parties in the government as

18 coalition partners were united in their positions on all key issues, and

19 we were united in being against the Albanians leaving Kosovo. What we

20 wanted to do was to ensure protection for them to stay on.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: So your policy had changed.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I told you what the policy was

23 of the Serbian Radical Party in 1991 as well. One of my excursions caused

24 by certain events which had happened prior to that did not mean even in

25 1991 that the general orientation of the party stand had been changed, but

1 here we paid particular attention to the fact that the mass exodus of

2 Albanians would be made use of by the Western powers against Serbia. It

3 would be used as a pretext for aggression and justification for

4 aggression, and that is why we did everything in your power to prevent a

5 mass exodus, not to give the Western powers an ace up their sleeves. I

6 don't want to say that I like Albanians, but I want to convince you that

7 our behaviour and conduct was rational from the aspects of national

8 interests and from the aspects of state interests of Serbia. It was in

9 Serbia's interest that the Albanian population remain in Kosovo and

10 Metohija, to thwart the terrorists and to stand up to the aggression.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean that at heart your policy remained

12 the same, your view remained the same that the Albanians should leave but

13 for pragmatic political reasons you supported the idea that they should

14 stay just in case the West made use of their departure for propaganda

15 purposes?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My permanent idea and desire is that

17 the Albanian immigrants should leave, those of them who do not have our

18 citizenship and who caused the worst ills to befall Kosovo and Metohija.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I see. Thanks.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. But just to follow on from His Honour Judge Bonomy's point. In

22 the short time, you would have even preferred the illegal immigrants

23 dating back to the Second World War to stay; is that right?

24 A. Yes. Because the situation had not been settled and ordered. It

25 was difficult to identify who was a citizen and who was not. It was our

1 aim to have the peaceful Albanians to stay in Kosovo, in peace, not to

2 rise in rebellion, to convince them to stay, to remain, so as to avoid

3 having two wars, because NATO used the Albanian terrorists as their

4 infantrymen. So we prevailed upon the Albanians and wanted to convince

5 them. We even gave out weapons to certain Albanians in villages that were

6 not in favour of the terrorists to be able to defend themselves. You had

7 talks with people like that who took part in things like that.

8 So what we wanted to do was to get the Albanians on our side and

9 to convince them that the Western powers were not their friends and that

10 they were just going to use them and abuse them for their own purposes

11 which were anti-Serb.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems to follow from what you've said that if

13 there hadn't been the threat of war, you would actually now, 1999, have

14 got to the position that you wanted Albanians to stay. I'm now confused.

15 You seem to describe them all as peaceful Albanians apart from the

16 terrorists, and we know that they are a fairly small proportion. How do

17 you distinguish?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the overall policy of the

19 government throughout 1998, which was prior to the bombing, was that we

20 should find a peaceful, democratic solution together with the Albanians,

21 to reach an agreement, and thence we had this initiative on the part of

22 Serbia for talks, and in these talks and agreements I would even give up

23 my stand for the immigrants to return to Albanian if that would have meant

24 a peaceful, democratic solution could be found in which the interests of

25 other ethnic groups in Kosovo would be protected. And in your system,

1 too, for example, a politician, once he's in the opposition, can support

2 certain stands, but when he gets into power he behaves far more

3 realistically. So what I was preoccupied at the time as vice-Premier was

4 a peaceful solution for the Kosovo issue and a normalisation of the

5 situation, that is, to bring life back to normal.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. What you're telling us is not --

8 A. And of course to avoid interference on the part of the Western

9 powers.

10 Q. What you're telling us is not true. You all knew from 1998 at the

11 very latest with things like Lord Ashdown catching you, the army out

12 shelling houses, that you descended into a gross illegality in your

13 treatment of Kosovar Albanians and that with the bombing there was a

14 chance to kick them out in huge numbers, and that's exactly what you went

15 about and did, isn't it?

16 A. Lord Paddy Ashdown is an ordinary liar, and recently information

17 was -- has been published that he worked as an agent of the British

18 intelligence service throughout. And he showed himself to be a liar in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was an anti-Serb politician who tried in all ways

20 to abolish Republika Srpska. And that Lord Paddy Ashdown of yours as a

21 liar and as a criminal does not deserve any confidence to be placed in

22 him.

23 Q. You see, we note your observations about Lord Ashdown, but we

24 still have to come through Racak which predates the bombing. Now, you've

25 given a generalised account. I wasn't going to descend into particulars,

1 but apart from the military involvement, just help us with this in respect

2 of Racak: You suggested that bodies were repositioned so as to make it

3 look like a massacre. Do you have any evidence, Mr. Seselj, do you have

4 your hands on a piece of paper, a document, a film, that can explain how

5 it was in respect of the largest number of people killed there that where

6 they died there were bullets in and around them but on the banks

7 surrounding where they died there were the shell casings consistent with

8 them simply being mowed down in a prepared way? Can you point us to any

9 evidence you've got that explains that forensic, scientific fact?

10 A. All that was extremely well explained by the prominent Austrian

11 publicist, Austrian marquis, who lives in Vienna, and his name is Malte

12 Olsevski, in his book "The War for Kosovo." And in that book he explains

13 that Racak was supposed to be a trigger event, too, to justify the

14 intervention. And those things have been cleared up in world -- by the

15 world publicist. Look at Olsevski's book, "The War for Kosovo." Well,

16 you're asking me about the traces of shells.

17 Q. Come on, descend to details, because this Court will not be making

18 its decision on generalities but on evidence. Help us with the details.

19 How can it be that all these bodies are lined up with bullets where they

20 died -- or where they lay, sometimes under their bodies, sometimes under

21 the ground with teeth and all sorts of things like that, and the shell

22 casings are at the placements round about where they died consistent with

23 them having been mowed down in an execution? Tell us, please. Or if this

24 is something on which you don't have evidence, you can always say so.

25 A. Neither the team of Finnish pathologists could have confirmed that

1 lie of yours.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Mr. Milosevic has a point, I

3 believe.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is

5 consciously and intentionally asking a question that is not truthful and

6 correct, because we heard one of the best forensic experts here, Professor

7 Slavisa Dobricanin was his name, and he precisely proved through material

8 fact that what Mr. Nice is claiming could never have happened. So

9 Mr. Nice is once again asking the question in this way and asking it of a

10 witness who is not placed to answer that question.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I must say that I don't see that this

12 witness is in a position to help very much with these matters.

13 MR. NICE: Very detailed accounts on general information and I

14 think the position is clear. My last question to him on this topic at

15 this stage is this:

16 Q. Have you seen or read either of these books "Under Orders" or "As

17 Seen, As Told"? We certainly know that one of them is in Serbian or

18 B/C/S or however we should describe it.

19 A. First of all, there is no language which is called B/C/S. There

20 is no such language. And in that language, B/C/S, I have never read

21 anything nor do I understand that language.

22 Secondly, if you're asking me about some books, you have to tell

23 me the authors.

24 Q. Have you read these books? If not, I'm going to move on.

25 A. Which books?

1 Q. OSCE "As Seen, As Told." Human Rights Watch, "Under Orders."

2 Have you read them?

3 A. I absolutely place no confidence in the OSCE or that so-called

4 non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch.

5 Mr. Bonomy asked me earlier on whether I have any evidence and

6 proof that non-governmental organisations, NGOs of a humanitarian nature,

7 took part in spy and subversive operations. At that time I wasn't able to

8 tell you something specific, but I am able to do so now, Mr. Bonomy, if

9 you're interested in hearing it. The non-governmental organisation

10 Medecins sans Frontieres took an old Albanian man - his name was Osman -

11 and instructed him in how to provide false statements for the Paris

12 Le Monde to the effect that the Serbs were slaughtering Albanians.

13 Secondly, Natasa Kandic who was mentioned here bandied about a

14 conjured up diary of a conjured up colonel, Vojislav Antic of Yugoslavia,

15 and gave false information to a journalist the US Today paper and he

16 published that. The editorial offices launched an investigation. The

17 evidence was seen to be false and that journalist was dismissed. And I

18 sent in a report on the work of Natasa Kandic to the OTP waging their case

19 against me.

20 The OSCE mission was William Walker, missionary was William

21 Walker. William Walker was trained in intelligence, spy business, dirty

22 business, subversive business, and was shown to have his hands involved in

23 dirty business in South America, Salvador, et cetera, and what he did

24 there he repeated in Kosovo.

25 Q. The question on details in respect of Kosovo concerns Dubrava

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1 prison.

2 THE INTERPRETER: And Nicaragua, the interpreter adds.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. You as deputy Prime Minister owe a special -- well, not

5 particularly you but a government generally of course owes a special duty

6 to those it detains to care for them and to look after their safety. As

7 you know, many men died at Dubrava prison. You haven't told us about

8 that. Just tell us, what do you know about that?

9 A. You never asked me about that. The Dubrava prison was attacked by

10 NATO planes. The prison was hit and a certain number of people were

11 killed as a result. I don't know how many. Some of the detainees stayed,

12 some used this NATO targeting of the prison to escape. That is what I

13 know about that.

14 Q. And that's all you know, is it?

15 A. That's what I know.

16 Q. Never seen any reports coming to government of any detail of what

17 happened? You see, we've got evidence in written form from documents

18 provided in part by the accused's own witnesses that a special group of

19 police went in at 5.15 in the morning of the 22nd of May, and according to

20 evidence before this Court, which had no knowledge that this material,

21 this written material existed, it was at half past 5.00 that the bulk of

22 the prisoners were subject to attempts to execute them and many were

23 executed. What do you know as a government official about sending in a

24 special group of police at 5.15 on the morning of the 22nd to Dubrava

25 prison? You seem to know a great deal about other things. Tell us about

1 this.

2 A. This is the first time that I hear --

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the witness who was vice-Premier

6 at that time is asked by Mr. Nice mentioning a government document, then

7 he is duty-bound to show him that document and not to construct things on

8 the basis of that document, to construe things that cannot be deduced from

9 the actual document. Let him show the witness the document and ask the

10 witness to explain, to say whether he's seen the document, what he knows

11 about what it says in the document, but he has to show the witness the

12 document.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think you should reconsider this --

14 this line of questioning. You don't have to put the length and breadth of

15 the Prosecution's case to this witness.

16 MR. NICE: I don't. I have a particular reason for putting this

17 part of the case and it will become clear in my next question.

18 Q. You see, at the moment, Mr. Seselj, we have evidence going to show

19 what I've just suggested to you and it came in several documents from the

20 accused. There may be evidence to show that this -- and this has been

21 raised before, that this deployment was known to the assistant minister

22 Stevanovic. That's not Obrad Stevanovic, it's the other assistant

23 minister, on the 21st. Do you know anything about the deployment of these

24 police being dealt with at the level of ministers on the 21st?

25 A. This is the first time that I'm hearing of something like that.

1 And bearing in mind just how many lies you have uttered over the past few

2 days, I don't believe any of that either.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, that is not an appropriate response.

4 You must respond to the Prosecutor's question in a manner other than

5 suggesting that he's lying, and we have been through that before. He is

6 putting his case to you.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, he has responded. He knows nothing about it.

8 MR. NICE: Very well. Let's move on. Your Honours, I make it

9 clear from the questions I've asked that this is a matter I will be

10 pursuing wherever possible, and it will become clear why I give everyone a

11 chance to deal with it a little later.

12 To help the Chamber a little bit with the issue of Greater Serbia,

13 we've touched on it. Let's touch on it briefly again.

14 Q. And I want brief answers if possible. The terminology or the

15 term "Greater Serbia" applied in the way that you apply it, can be traced

16 back at least to the middle of the 19th century; correct?

17 A. Even before that. But the first time it was explicitly registered

18 as a term was in 1803. It was written by or Arsenije Gagovic to the

19 Russian emperor. Stevan Stratimirevic from Srem also mentions a Greater

20 Serbia in his memorandum to the Russian emperor, later on.

21 Q. The development of the notion of Greater Serbia, this is the

22 formal use of the word "Greater Serbia," can be traced through various

23 events and movements. The term changes from time to time in detail, but

24 one could track it through Nacertanije, is that right, in the mid-19th

25 century?

1 A. No. The term Greater Serbia is not mentioned in Nacertanije.

2 Nacertanije is a document that primarily pertains to the liberation of the

3 southern Serb lands. There is no mention of the northern Serb lands.

4 Garasanin wrote it under the influence of a Czech called Zha [phoen], as

5 far as I remember, and he lived as an immigrant in Belgrade.

6 Q. Nacertanije of Greater Serbia find itself reflected in Nacertanije

7 or not? Just yes or no.

8 A. Not in the exact sense of the word.

9 Q. The concept then in the 20th century finds itself expressed does

10 it, through the Black Hand? Would that be right? Perhaps through the

11 Balkan wars? What do you say?

12 A. No. You've skipped the most important by the from the 19th

13 century, and that is the great Serbian poet, Stevan Knicanin, and the

14 association called Greater Serbia. This association called Greater Serbia

15 explained in detail what the concept itself meant. In the 19th century,

16 from 1888 until 1893, a weekly paper was published entitled "Greater

17 Serbia." We, the Serb Radicals, have collected all the copies of that

18 newspaper, and we published it as a reprint edition. You can get a copy

19 if you want.

20 Q. Then before the Second World War, moving very quickly --

21 A. As for the Black Hand organisation, there is no reference

22 whatsoever to a Greater Serbia, not in a single one of their documents.

23 This is a secret organisation of military officers that led to the top

24 link of the Obrenovic dynasty in 1903, and there is no reference to a

25 Greater Serbia in their documents.

1 Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevic in 1914 at the beginning of the

2 First World War refers to a Greater Serbia. After that comes the

3 declaration of Nis. The National Assembly of Serbia met in Nis and

4 proclaimed that the objective of the struggle of the Serb people was the

5 liberation of all our Slav brothers and --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, in a sense you have set yourself up for

7 a lecture from the witness.

8 MR. NICE: I'm trying to --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is his favourite topic.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you -- can you help me because --

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My most favourite subject. I do not

12 have a subject that I like better, Mr. Robinson.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, can you help me, what is the point of

14 this?

15 MR. NICE: The Court was concerned about the terminology "Greater

16 Serbia." It is actually quite important, and I'm desiring through this

17 witness to put in a very succinct way what our position is reflected in

18 the pleadings and in the evidence we've led. If the Court doesn't --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, so for most of the questions have got the

20 answer that you were wrong, but if you think it's going somewhere useful,

21 then please carry on.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: But, Mr. Nice, do you accept the more

23 pragmatic -- suggested a more pragmatic term extended Serbia, I think.

24 "Expanded Serbia"?

25 MR. NICE: Our pleadings, our filings make the position clear and

1 my questions make the position clear, but it may be that I can make things

2 helpfully clearer for the Chamber now in a few minutes. But if I can't,

3 then it's unfortunate. But I'd like to just ask a couple more questions

4 because I'm interested in the development of the concept until it comes to

5 the time when, as you say, you and the accused were at ideological

6 opposite ends, as you've said that, you were ideologically different. So

7 that other events we've heard, which I am going to ask of you very shortly

8 as to whether they encompass in some way the Greater Serbia notion, the

9 writings of Cubrilovic in -- shortly before the second war, and then the

10 maps of Moljevic at and after the Second World War. Do those writings and

11 those maps and so on reflect the Greater Serbia concept of which you were

12 now the inheritor, as you would have it?

13 A. No. First of all, the answer has to be an exhaustive one. Vasa

14 Cubrilovic held a lecture at the Serbian cultural club before the Second

15 World War about the Albanians moving out. This was a wondrous

16 intellectual speech and it was referred to very often after that. There

17 was a great deal of mystification involved, but we in our newspaper,

18 Greater Serbia, actually published the text of that lecture. Vasa

19 Cubrilovic is one of the few Serbian academicians who at the Assembly of

20 the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that was devoted to the famous

21 memorandum opposed the writers of the memorandum. It was only him and

22 Pale Savic and perhaps only another person or two.

23 So a Greater Serbia cannot be linked to Vasa Cubrilovic in any

24 way.

25 As for Stevan Moljevic, he did not belong to the Serbian

1 intellectual elite. I know a lot about him. I can't say that I know

2 everything about anybody, but I know a lot about him. Stevan Moljevic,

3 though, was not among the top officials of the Ravno Gora movement of

4 General Draza Mihajlovic. He had some ideas that proceeded from the

5 concept of Greater Serbia, but he also gave these ideas a personal touch

6 which we found unacceptable.

7 After the Second World War, Stevan Moljevic was sentenced to a

8 prison term and perhaps even died in the Sremska Mitrovica prison.

9 However, the main ideologist of Draza Mihajlovic's movement was Dragica

10 Vasic. The Ravno Gora movement included Catholics and Muslims too.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obviously you find this subject

13 boring but --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, regrettably we cannot allow you to

15 give an exhaustive an answer as you would wish.

16 Mr. Nice.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. Yes. Now, there are a few points that I want -- you've given your

19 account as to whether the Greater Serbia concept exists in these various

20 events of which we've heard largely through witnesses of the accused but

21 sometimes through the evidence of the Prosecution expert, are

22 characteristic of some of the things I've mentioned, for example,

23 Nacertanije and Cubrilovic, and even the Black Hand is that they were

24 secret either documents or ideas or movements because whatever concept

25 they reflected it was known that it could only be reflected by violence,

1 by killing, and that's why these -- I'm not suggesting Nacertanije itself

2 was a proposer of violence, but to adhere to the ideas of Nacertanije and

3 the Black Hand or the ideas of Cubrilovic they were known to be violent in

4 their consequences, yes?

5 A. That's not the true. In the 19th century, the association Greater

6 Serbia functioned publicly and legally. For five years a newspaper called

7 "Greater Serbia" was published.

8 At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1903, Dragutin Ilic, a

9 writer again started this newspaper. In 1914, there were two different

10 editions of Greater Serbia, one in Valjevo, the other one in Nis. At the

11 Salonica front, where the Serbian army was getting ready for its

12 victorious break through, it was published as a daily newspaper in 1916,

13 1917, and 1918. In the 1920s the newspaper Velika Srbija, Greater Serbia

14 was published two times in Belgrade. So the concept of a Greater Serbia

15 was never a secret project. And what are you doing? Secret organisations

16 that were never explicitly in favour of a Greater Serbia. You're trying

17 to say that they were an advocate of a Greater Serbia. You cannot find a

18 Greater Serbia anywhere in Nacertanije, in Garasanin's writings, or in the

19 Black Hand organisation and its documents.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... is this: After the Second

21 World War and under communism, espousing Greater Serbia would have been

22 almost unlawful. It would have been unacceptable. And the reason it

23 would have been unacceptable is, amongst other things, because I must

24 suggest to you, it would be known to be something that would bring

25 violence. Is that right?

1 A. No. That was unacceptable as they opposed the communist ideology

2 and communism could not tolerate any other view of the world. Every other

3 ideology was banned. Every attempt to advocate a multi-party system took

4 people to prison. Every attempt to advocate the freedom of speech and

5 thought took people directly to prison. Communists executed tens of

6 thousands of intellectuals when they took over in order to establish their

7 ideological monopoly. And what are you saying here? You are speaking of

8 the categories of the Communist Party which was totalitarian by its very

9 nature.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, you seem to agree with Mr. Nice's

11 proposition that after the Second World War any idea of a Greater Serbia

12 would have been unacceptable, or perhaps for different reasons.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. It was based on violence, the question.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All ideas that competed or, rather,

15 those that were rivals of the Communist Party were banned regardless of

16 whether they would generate violence or not. I have another piece of

17 information.

18 After the Second World War, a group of Serb intellectuals,

19 including the late academician Miodrag Jovicic, illegally published a

20 paper called Greater Serbia but only on a Xerox. This was after the

21 Second World War. It was only 18 copies but they could go to prison for

22 that. Even Freemasons were involved, but they were all of a democratic

23 orientation. So it's not true that the communists, because of this threat

24 of violence --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Now, separately, and this is why the background is important or

3 may be important, but separately from those who carried in their hearts

4 and minds the idea of Greater Serbia, there was from, say, 1966 at least

5 with the removal of Rankovic, there was in the former Yugoslavia a

6 movement of Serbs who were concerned to achieve certain things for Serbs

7 but different from that which was reflected in the motion of the Greater

8 Serbia; correct?

9 A. No, that's not correct. There was no Serbian movement after

10 Rankovic fell. And Rankovic could not have been a symbol of Serbian

11 nationalism in any way. There were only individual Serb dissidents who

12 were arrested by the regime. Some were tolerated a bit, others were used

13 to treading gently. They didn't dare overstep and go to prison. But I

14 claim that there was no organisation all the way until the end of 1989 or

15 1990. Under communism there was no Serbian movement in Serbia, because

16 the repressive measures of the regime were such that it was absolutely

17 impossible. There could not have been even a trade unions movement

18 outside the regime's control.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues]... and tendencies don't have to

20 be fully organised, but I'm going to suggest to you that the movement that

21 the accused came to manage or maybe to lead in 1987, more particularly in

22 1989, is the movement that can be traced, and it's separate from a Greater

23 Serbia movement, starting perhaps in 1966 going through 1968 to 1971 and

24 1974, the constitutional changes which made Yugoslavia much more

25 confederal, going through the blue book, coming to Tito's death when

1 things were more easily spoken about, and then coming in 1986 to the

2 memorandum which had features of the SANU memorandum. That's the sort of

3 movement -- that's, I'm suggesting to you, separate from the Greater

4 Serbia movement or tendency. Do you accept that?

5 A. It's not true that anything such thing existed. The blue book was

6 made within the leadership of the Communist Party of Serbia. It had

7 nothing to do with any kind of opposition or a dissident movement. You

8 cannot artificially link up such things. The initiative of the Academy of

9 Sciences and Arts was derived from the academy itself. The academicians

10 were concerned over the situation in the state. They were trying to

11 formulate their own opinions. I have a great deal of criticism as far as

12 the memorandum is concerned, but it wasn't even completed, that text. The

13 police got hold of it, they published it in a Belgrade daily newspaper,

14 and it was never completed. The unfinished version was published, and I

15 have a great deal of criticism with regard to that text.

16 You know, many of the authors spoke from the positions of a

17 communist ideology, even in that text, that there was a great deal of

18 dissatisfaction in Serbia because of Serbia's constitutional position,

19 that is true. I can agree with that. But that something was organised

20 formally or informally by way of opposition, that is not correct.

21 There was a circle of dissidents in Belgrade and for a while I

22 belonged to it too. It had contacts with the dissidents in Zagreb and

23 Ljubljana. However, these people had completely different ideologies.

24 There was just one single thing that in a way brought us together, the

25 fact that we were all opposed to the regime and nothing else. As soon as

1 a multi-party system was established, everyone was dispersed in different

2 parties.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to spoke

4 slower. Thank you.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have to ask you to speak more slowly. The

6 interpreters are asking you to speak more slowly.

7 Mr. Nice, I think I see where you are going and you consider it to

8 be necessary for your case.

9 MR. NICE: I think it may be helpful, as a matter of fact, for the

10 Chamber because it has had all this material in bits and pieces, and it

11 hasn't had an opportunity of seeing it together. Now, the witness doesn't

12 accept the propositions I'm putting but I've come nearly to the point

13 where I can start to draw some conclusions.

14 Q. We're having to move very fast, Mr. Seselj, because of the time

15 that questioning and answer takes, but before we look at the difference in

16 practical terms between your concept of Greater Serbia and whatever if was

17 the accused was aiming at, we can certainly identify these essential

18 matters of difference between the Greater Serbia concept and his thinking.

19 He, for example, never claimed a connection between his politics and the

20 Greater Serbian history, did he?

21 A. It's not only that he claimed that it never existed. It actually

22 did not. I think that in those 1980s Mr. Milosevic did not even know what

23 this concept actually meant. He was not involved in that at all. He was

24 dealing with other things. I don't want to offend him in any way, but I

25 assumed that he had other things on his mind and that he didn't even know

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1 what this was.

2 Q. And the movement he managed or led starting in 1960 -- 1987, 8, 9,

3 was concerned at those stages to centralise power within Serbia initially

4 by taking away the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Would that be right?

5 A. No. Regrettably Mr. Milosevic's government never took away the

6 autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Had I come to power then, we, the Serb

7 Radicals, would have abolished both provinces, because we oppose that

8 concept of breaking up of a state. The Serb Radical Party is a centralist

9 and unitarian party from that point of view. Regrettably Mr. Milosevic

10 was not and perhaps that created additional difficulties for us later on.

11 Had I been in his position and my party in 1990 when the new

12 constitution was adopted, we would have completely done away with the

13 autonomous provinces because there was no point in having them exist.

14 However, we would have given a high degree of national rights to the

15 national minorities.

16 Q. He never pursued the line that you pursue and pursued here of

17 asserting that everyone who spoke the Shtokavian dialect, one of the three

18 or four dialects in the region with which we might be concerned, was a

19 Serb. He never took that position. He accepted that Croats existed

20 separately from Serbs, didn't he?

21 A. First of all, towards the end of the 1980s Mr. Milosevic was not

22 only a communist but the president of the League of Communists of Serbia.

23 As far as I can remember, he even recognised the Montenegrin nation as a

24 separate nation. He recognised the Muslim nation. He recognised that

25 Shtokavians were Catholic Croats. He never brought that into question.

1 Absolutely. I'm not even sure that to this day he's given up on this idea

2 that all of them are different nations, but I didn't really have the time

3 to discuss that matter with him.

4 Q. And you see, and I'm going to go very quickly because at one stage

5 His Honour Judge Bonomy was interested to know whether the geographical

6 aspirations of those of Greater Serbia were identical with or similar to

7 those of the accused or whether they were different. The aspirations were

8 always different because your aspirations, the Greater Serbia aspirations,

9 are rigidly fixed at the Karlobag-Virovitica line at one end and rigidly

10 and still envisaging encompassing parts of Macedonia at the other. And

11 that has not been the accused's position at all times, has it?

12 A. No. First of all, it does not mean that parts of Macedonia would

13 be included. All of Macedonia would be included. You see, the present

14 day Macedonians have nothing to do with the Macedonians of Alexander the

15 Great.

16 Q. Stick with the last point we can do it with a map, if necessary,

17 but I'll try and do it by words. The nearest that the accused's

18 aspirations in territorial terms ever reached to the territorial

19 aspirations of the Greater Serbians was probably when he launched the

20 Belgrade initiative in the summer of 1991, it eventually failing by the

21 beginning of 1992. But to remind the Court, Mr. Seselj, the Belgrade

22 initiative was a plan whereby there would be a unit that encompassed

23 Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia by consent, and the territories taken in

24 Croatia, Knin, Vukovar, and it was hoped Dubrovnik.

25 Now, that part of the Belgrade initiative plan of the accused was

1 as near as geographical aspirations he had would have matched the

2 Karlobag-Virovitica line that you planned. Would that be about right?

3 A. That's not true. The Belgrade initiative was based on the

4 following: If the secession of Slovenia and Croatia cannot be prevented,

5 then the remaining four federal units should remain in a different

6 Yugoslavia. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; that was the

7 essence of the Belgrade initiative. As for the Serbs, they would not

8 opposed to having the Serb Krajina join in as well, but Izetbegovic didn't

9 like that idea. And the authorities in Serbia thought that the Western

10 powers would oppose that.

11 Therefore, the governments -- the government in Serbia helped the

12 Serbs in Krajina to establish a certain degree of autonomy either in

13 Croatia, if it were to secede, or in Yugoslavia in order to have their

14 rights protected. That is the essence of the Belgrade initiative.

15 Izetbegovic would never agree to a Greater Serbia, but he did agree to a

16 smaller version of Yugoslavia, and then the Americans later on persuaded

17 him to break up this project and to declare independence and that is what

18 caused a civil war.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document of the Belgrade

22 initiative was admitted into evidence here. I can't remember now whether

23 it was me or Mr. Nice who did it, but I think it would be a good thing if

24 it could be shown to the witness.

25 Mr. Nice is asking something about the Belgrade initiative that is

1 a total fabrication.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness seems to be very familiar with the

3 document. If he needs it, it can be shown to him.

4 MR. NICE: We can find it --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure that I'm familiar with

6 it. I'm presenting my opinion. I do not know anything about a particular

7 paper. I am speaking from memory about things that happened in 1991 and

8 1992. So please bear that in mind, Mr. Robinson.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you're going to pursue this, then, Mr. Nice,

10 it may be as well to have the document shown to them.

11 MR. NICE: There's only one more question I want to ask because

12 I'm trying to clarify through the witness, although he don't necessarily

13 accept the propositions, the reason for the approach that the Prosecution

14 has taken throughout.

15 Q. And I think your last answer, Mr. Seselj, does actually to some

16 degree confirm what I'm saying, if Bosnia by consent stayed with Serbia

17 and the other countries, so that's a large chunk, and if the Serbs in

18 Krajina and indeed the Serbs in Vukovar and in Dubrovnik had been

19 established as Serbian territories, then although not everything of --

20 south and east of the Karlobag-Virovitica line would have been

21 incorporated in that state, a lot of it would have been, and it would have

22 been, comparatively speaking, similar to your Greater Serbia.

23 A. That is not true. Several times the Serbs from the Serb Krajina

24 and Slavonia, Baranja, and eastern Srem and from Baranja in general

25 adopted resolutions, documents, laws, to join Serbia to remain in

1 Yugoslavia, et cetera. Mr. Milosevic's government kept refusing all of

2 that. In the National Assembly when I spoke from the rostrum I asked to

3 have these initiatives accepted, but the authorities in Serbia did not

4 want to accept that, and Mr. Milosevic's party had an absolute majority in

5 the Assembly and they were not in favour of that. The Western Serbs

6 wanted that. Mr. Milosevic did not agree. Mr. Milosevic did support the

7 Serbs in Krajina from the point of view of protecting their existential

8 rights, including their right to be a constituent people. However, he did

9 not accept their initiatives that the Krajina be annexed to Serbia.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... will grant me that before it

11 takes the course it often takes at half past 10.00.

12 Once it became clear in 1992 that there was no prospect of Bosnia

13 linking up with Serbia consensually, then the plan of the accused changed,

14 I must suggest, moving from just support for the regions in Croatia to

15 support for the regions that could be Serb-dominated in Bosnia, and from

16 that moment on, going back to the inquiry that had come from the Court at

17 an earlier stage in these proceedings, from that moment on there was no

18 chance of the state that the accused wanted to match in any particular --

19 in any way the Greater Serbia map because it couldn't include all of

20 Bosnia. It could only ever include part of Bosnia. Would that be right?

21 A. No, that's not true either. You're fabricating again. The plan

22 was not to link up Bosnia with Serbia but for Bosnia to remain within

23 Yugoslavia as an equal federal unit, and Alija Izetbegovic was even

24 supposed to be the first president of this Rump Yugoslavia. It's one

25 thing to link up with Serbia and another to remain within Yugoslavia. At

1 that point, Yugoslavia was the only legal internationally recognised state

2 in the whole area. That is the essence of the matter. And those who

3 wanted to separate Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia must have known

4 in advance that this could not be done without a war. That's a fact too.

5 Q. Finally I want you to listen to two sentences in which the words

6 "Greater Serbia" are not used in the way you used them but just in a

7 factual way for a larger or an enlarged Serbia but I'll quote

8 specifically, is this the truth: "As the accused never used words to the

9 effect of conducting the policy of Greater Serbia, what he did between

10 1987 and 1999, 1999, amounted de facto to planning for a Greater Serbia,"

11 an enlarged Serbia, I paraphrase. "There was not a single fully

12 articulated plan from the outset, and the plan changed with changing

13 circumstances, mostly responding to external forces."

14 Now, in summary and looking at the influence of Greater Serbia,

15 does that accord with your understanding of events? He never used the

16 words. What he did amounted to planning for an enlarged or a Greater

17 Serbia, and he was conditioned by external events.

18 A. Never did Mr. Milosevic have any kind of plan, either for a

19 Greater Serbia or an enlarged Serbia. Absolutely never.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, what's the source of these sentences?

21 MR. NICE: That's the 98 bis submission that I was putting to the

22 witness because it was one of the documents on which the Court had relied.

23 And, Your Honour -- sorry. I may have other questions to ask about it,

24 but I've probably come to the end of this, but I wanted the Court to have,

25 first of all --

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Whose statement is that? Why don't

2 you tell me.

3 MR. NICE: I am addressing the Court.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Nice, the question is an appropriate one.

5 You mean the statement which Mr. Nice just read to you?

6 MR. NICE: Yes, he is entitled to the answer to that.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He read something. I don't know

8 what it was.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, he told the Court what it was. It was part

10 of the submission of the Prosecution under Rule 98 bis.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, Mr. Robinson,

12 under Rule 98 bis it is statements that are not directly charging the

13 accused. Am I mixing this up with another Rule?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you're mixing it up. It's the Rule 98 bis,

15 the motion for acquittal by the accused at the end of the Prosecution's

16 case, and this would have been part of the Prosecution's response.

17 MR. NICE: Your Honours, if that's a convenient moment, may I

18 conclude in this way, I have a few more questions but I hope very few, in

19 light of this witness being the present-day --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't hear the interpreters.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just let --

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't hear anything.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let us take -- Mr. Nice, are you going to

24 finish?

25 MR. NICE: No. I was just going to explain things then move on

1 possibly to something else after the break and very shortly. I was simply

2 saying that in light of the interests of the Court --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness is not hearing so --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear now, yes.

5 MR. NICE: In light of the interest the Court has shown in the

6 Greater Serbia issue, in light of the fact that you haven't had these

7 matters put together before in any comprehensive way, and in light of fact

8 that this is the witness who would claim to know all about Greater Serbia,

9 it seemed appropriate ahead of the submissions you'll receive of course in

10 writing or maybe orally at the end of the case to give him an opportunity

11 to comment on the main themes that I will be eliciting from the evidence

12 and that's one of the ways for dealing with this.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

14 We'll take the break for 20 minutes.

15 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. Just one matter of detail about Kosovo that I wanted assistance

20 on, Mr. Seselj, because I found your answers hard to follow. The movement

21 of bodies to Batajnica. Now, please, first of all, tell us what you are

22 saying as a basis -- on the basis of your investigations happened. What

23 happened?

24 A. Based on the efforts I made to get information, on orders from

25 Western intelligence agencies, certain political factors in Serbia

1 collected a number of Albanian bodies, transported them to Batajnica,

2 buried them there so that at a suitable moment they might be discovered so

3 that the public might be horrified and thus accept more easily first the

4 arrest and then the extradition of Mr. Milosevic to The Hague Tribunal.

5 So everything was calculated to achieve that end.

6 Q. Just a bit more detail. Which were the political factors in

7 Serbia?

8 A. I said police factors.

9 Q. Sorry. The transcript. Certain police factors.

10 A. Those were -- I cannot name them, but they were among the people

11 who took part in the 5th of October Mafia putsch and whom the new

12 authorities retained at high-ranking positions in the police. I could

13 give you a lot of names of police functionaries who retained their high

14 positions because they were trusted by the new government, but I could not

15 tell you which of them in particular organised the transfer of bodies.

16 Q. I wanted to know if you're saying you can't name the policemen or

17 you won't name them. Are you -- can you -- do you know the name of the

18 policemen who engaged in this scheme?

19 A. I cannot specify any particular policemen because I am not certain

20 of their names. I have never yet said, Mr. Nice, that I refuse to answer

21 any question of yours, but in this case I cannot be sure that it's

22 so-and-so precisely.

23 Among the people who remained at high-ranking positions in the

24 police after the change of government certainly some of them organised the

25 transport of bodies. Nobody else could have done it.

1 Q. Which were the Western intelligence agencies involved?

2 A. I told you what I know in general. I cannot tell you specifically

3 which intelligence agencies, but the Americans used AWACS to follow and

4 film every event on every square foot of Serbia, and they can tell you who

5 did this and how.

6 Q. Finally on this part of this questioning, what was the source of

7 your information about this plan or scheme?

8 A. Well, I made inquiries. I'm a very communicative man. After the

9 putsch of the 5th of October, I was both a federal and a republican

10 deputy. I was in the centre of political life.

11 Q. Mr. Seselj, if you spoke to Mr. X and Mr. X told us, please say

12 so. If you read a document in an archive, please tell us. What were your

13 sources of information about this scheme?

14 A. I couldn't tell you precisely. Not because I don't want to but

15 because I truly cannot. But as soon as the news was published that the

16 bodies had been found, I started dealing with this matter intensively. At

17 first I didn't believe it. I thought maybe they had unearthed some bodies

18 from World War II. I thought maybe -- jokingly I said maybe even from the

19 time of Attila the Hun.

20 Q. So you made some inquiries. You're a man who has been educated,

21 and you've written a lot of books. You must have made some notes about

22 these inquiries. Where are the notes?

23 A. No, I didn't make any notes.

24 Q. Forgive my suggesting, but it would be a little surprising that

25 this is something you haven't published or have you published it?

1 A. It's not impossible that some details could be found in my books

2 which were published after my arrival in The Hague where I published some

3 police or semi-police information. You know, on two occasions I formed a

4 certain kind of intelligence service. The first time in 1993, if you want

5 a detailed response to that question. I don't want to take up your time.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues]... you published anything about

7 this ever so that we can go to that and find out, trigger your memory or

8 read what triggered your memory if you can't point me to a publication.

9 A. Not as a reliable document, but I spoke about this in public more

10 than once.

11 Q. Next question --

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Seselj, if that had been done by some police

13 factor, as you put it, then Mr. Radomir Markovic should have known about

14 the fact, shouldn't he?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether he would have

16 known about it or not. He was not trusted by the new government. He was

17 retained at his post for a while, but had he done this, he would not have

18 gone to prison. This was done by someone whom the new government in

19 Serbia trusted. I assume he must have had the rank of general. But

20 because I don't have any reliable facts, I cannot identify the person. I

21 may have named some people in public, maybe Goran Radosavljevic or Sreten

22 Lukic or somebody else. It's possible I named them in public, but my

23 public suspicions are one thing and testimony in court is another. So I

24 cannot assert that I know who in particular did this. Perhaps Mr. Nice

25 has a public speech of mine where I do name names, but that was simply

1 guesswork really.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Can you tell us, please, when your inquiries revealed that these

4 bodies had been removed?

5 A. Well, you know, to begin with, I doubt it that they had been moved

6 at all. I thought these were old bodies from a previous time. When it

7 was confirmed that they really were the bodies of Albanians, when their

8 identification started, well, I can't be precise about the time when. The

9 government changed on the 5th of October, 2000. I arrived here in 2003.

10 Q. Mr. Seselj, you made some inquiries of either a human resource or

11 a documentary resource. Now, one or other of those or both is going to

12 reveal that the bodies were moved either, A, in the course of the bombing

13 and before Kosovo was the subject of international military oversight, or

14 after the time when it was the subject of international oversight. Tell

15 us, please, which it was. Were the bodies moved before or after the end

16 of hostilities?

17 A. It's much more probable that they were moved after the 5th of

18 October, 2000. Much more probable, but this is not reliable information.

19 I can't tell you exactly when.

20 Q. Mr. Seselj --

21 A. How can I tell you that?

22 Q. Let's -- if you've got the picture clearly, the whole plan,

23 probably, was to move the bodies after the end of hostilities. So there

24 can be simply no significance whatsoever in the evidence you gave about

25 the bombing or non-bombing of Batajnica, can there? I just wanted to know

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1 with you'd mentioned it.

2 A. I said that Batajnica was bombed every night, but the location

3 where the special anti-terrorist unit was, the so-called SAJ, in the yard

4 of which the bodies were buried, was never targeted during the war.

5 That's what I said.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues]... this to be very significant or

7 are you saying that the international community had already targeted its

8 grave site so that it was leaving it unbombed? You do understand the

9 illogicality of your own evidence on this, don't you? If their bodies

10 are moved after the bomb, then unless they -- unless they planned to use

11 Batajnica --

12 A. First of all, it wasn't the international community who bombed, it

13 was NATO. NATO is not equal to the international community, although it

14 often has the international community under it's control. Secondly, what

15 I presented were indicia. I didn't say that's the reason they didn't want

16 to bomb. I was just pointing out something that's very impressive and

17 serves as indicia.

18 Q. You see, we've had evidence here in open court about the

19 refrigerator truck and about the inquiries that were made by Mr. Karleusa.

20 We've seen statements that were produced by Rade Markovic, by Slobodan

21 Borisavljevic. We've seen the notebook of Obrad Stevanovic which will

22 fall for determination whatever interpretation he puts on it. We've heard

23 of statements made by Ilic. All going to show that there was a plan

24 launched in March of 1999 by this accused to move the bodies. Are you

25 saying that all those pieces of evidence are just made up? Or may it be,

1 Mr. Seselj, that the accused didn't inform you of this part of his

2 planning? Which is it?

3 A. Anyone who claims that Mr. Milosevic had a plan to transfer

4 Albanian bodies from Kosovo to the interior of Serbia is lying. I'm

5 absolutely sure of that. I can guarantee that with my life. I gave you

6 the example of an Albanian called Dibran Dibrani who was killed in Kosovo

7 and was given a proper burial there. His grave was marked. And then

8 somebody dug up his body so that it could be found in a place on the

9 Danube. What it's name? The Mackov Kamen, I think. So what I assert is

10 that Mr. Milosevic had no reason to order the transfer of Albanian corpses

11 from Kosovo to the interior of Serbia. It's completely irrational to even

12 think such a thing. Why?

13 Q. Finally you do understand this, don't you, that on your evidence

14 everything that happened, apart from a limited number of random and

15 independent crimes, everything that happened in Kosovo was lawful at the

16 hands of the Serbs, and I am going to suggest to you that you are lying

17 throughout your evidence on this and many other topics, because you know

18 that there were civilians killed in Kosovo and you know that the accused

19 organised a no bodies-no crimes cover-up, and that's why you're giving the

20 utterly ridiculous account you've treated us to.

21 A. That is absolutely not true. As evidence to support my thesis, I

22 say that today's government certainly had the possibility of investigating

23 exactly which police officer organised the transfer of bodies and today's

24 pro-Western government of Serbia has never done this. Had they wanted the

25 truth to come to light, it would have come to light, but it's not in their

1 interest for the truth to come to light, which is why it's all being swept

2 up the carpet. These bodies were sent there during Mr. Milosevic's time,

3 then they were sent back, but the investigation never discovered the names

4 of the people who participated in the transport. So it's your case that's

5 incorrect, not my testimony.

6 Q. The last matters of detail concern one but only one --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, that's a proper way of putting it. His

8 case is incorrect.

9 Yes, Mr. Nice.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. My last matters of detail concern, I think, three questions in

12 respect of one only of the many people who you have said adverse things

13 about, and I've dealt with the generality of that, but for just one of

14 them I'm going to deal with the detail, a little bit of detail, and that's

15 General Vasiljevic who gave evidence here. You said an enormous number of

16 things, or a large number of things about him, one of which was about the

17 theft of money there Vukovar.

18 Now, of course Vasiljevic was investigated and indeed detained for

19 a time.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In respect of that investigation, the question of money from

22 Vukovar was never raise the at all, was it?

23 A. The proceedings against General Vasiljevic have been suppressed by

24 the highest command structures of the General Staff. It's been covered

25 up.

1 Q. This was in -- this was in rather earlier days, wasn't it, that he

2 was dealt with for Vukovar? At the time --

3 A. I can't remember exactly when he was in prison, whether it was

4 1992 or 1993. I know he was in prison under investigation for a time, but

5 I know that after that nothing came of it, and he was given a symbolic

6 sentence or no sentence at all. I can't remember the details in order to

7 account for the time he spent in prison, and he was rehabilitated in a

8 while after a time.

9 Q. And indeed, he was reappointed by this accused at one stage. But

10 still, at the time it was established that the money from Vukovar had gone

11 into the Serbian public auditing service, and that was a source of money

12 available to this accused, and there was no question of investigating

13 money that landed up there. Would that be right on your experience of

14 things?

15 A. That case is false. The money could not have been taken to the

16 SDK because the SDK had nothing to do with the financial affairs of the

17 JNA. The money had to be handed over to the military service of the

18 National Bank of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, General Vasiljevic's crimes were

19 covered up. Previously, he had been the chief of the military security

20 service. I don't know who he had information against to get him to

21 participate in the cover-up. I don't know. But General Vasiljevic stole

22 the money from the Vukovar bank.

23 Q. Your suggestion that he was involved in some way in crimes

24 committed at Vukovar, do you have any piece of evidence to show that he

25 was present at any of the places where crimes were committed at Vukovar?

1 A piece of evidence, someone who has spoken to you, statement, document?

2 It's very easy to say -- do you?

3 A. You're asking for a document. It's impossible to find a document

4 of that kind. I know for certain that he was in Vukovar during the crime

5 in Ovcara and that he was in Western Slavonia when Western Slavonia fell.

6 Q. You see, you make these terrible allegations against people,

7 Mr. Seselj, in the same way as you lied as a propagandist. Now, you tell

8 us where the evidence is. Will you do that? Will you?

9 A. That is my information and I'm -- it is not I who is lying. It is

10 you who are lying, Mr. Nice. Why didn't you investigate the question of

11 the mining of the Jewish cemetery in Zagreb, for instance, and the

12 municipal -- the Jewish municipal building in Zagreb. Do you have any

13 evidence there that the main organiser was General Vasiljevic perhaps?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, you have demonstrated that you know

15 how to speak properly to the Prosecutor when you said his case was

16 incorrect.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. I'll give you one last chance --

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, a moment ago the

20 Prosecutor's conduct was very proper. It is one thing when the Prosecutor

21 says that my testimony was not correct and it's quite another thing when

22 he tells me that I'm lying.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not for you to determine.

24 Mr. Nice.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. Mr. Seselj, you give rise to two questions where there was going

2 to be one. But the first one is this: This is one example, you see, of

3 many terrible things you've said about witnesses who gave evidence against

4 this accused, and I'm asking you simply to point us to the evidence on the

5 basis of which you tried to implicate General Vasiljevic in crimes against

6 Vukovar. Can you tell us what the evidence is?

7 A. You should ask General Mrksic. You should ask General Nedjo

8 Boskovic who came to head the military security service after Vasiljevic

9 and so on. Whereas my knowledge and information is based on talks with a

10 large number of competent individuals as opposed to your witnesses who 15

11 years on can remember every single conversation in detail. I can't

12 remember any conversation in detail after all that time.

13 Q. Please, then, name us one person, will you do that, one person who

14 for this one allegation against one of the many people you've said adverse

15 things about, just give us the name of one person who named General

16 Vasiljevic on this topic, please.

17 A. I cannot name names now, because they were conversations that took

18 place 10 and 15 years ago. But the overall knowledge on the basis of a

19 number of conversations, and I did talk to General Mrksic, and I did talk

20 to General Nedjo Boskovic, I even had quite close relations with General

21 Boskovic at a time, in 1992 for example, we were on close terms. But I

22 cannot say -- tell you now so-and-so told you that. It is only your

23 witnesses that can do that, the ones you instruct about how they are to

24 testify, and now you expect me to remember exactly who told me what. How

25 can anybody do that, any human being.

1 MR. NICE: Yes. I don't think I need trouble this witness any

2 longer.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

4 Mr. Milosevic, how long will you been in re-examination?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I don't think I'll be able to

6 complete it today, the re-examination today. I see that we have about two

7 more hours left to go, which won't suffice, I'm afraid.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am very disappointed to hear that,

9 Mr. Milosevic, but commence.

10 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, I'm going to try to save as time as

12 possible, yours and mine. I'm going to ask you just those questions which

13 have to do with the cross-examination conducted by Mr. Nice. I'm not

14 going to open up any new topics.

15 Somewhere at the beginning, I can't say whether it was one of the

16 first questions or not, but amongst the first questions anyway, Mr. Nice

17 asked you whether you recognised this Tribunal. To tell me now, please,

18 whether you explain the reasons for which your answer to that question was

19 negative.

20 A. Well, I didn't explain my reasons in full. When the so-called

21 Hague Tribunal was first established for dealing with the crimes committed

22 in the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General himself of the United

23 Nations, in his address to the Security Council, in writing recognised the

24 fact that this court and Tribunal was not being formed pursuant to

25 international law, that it was -- had it been formed pursuant to

1 international law, then it would have been formed and established in the

2 same way in which the permanent criminal Tribunal was formed with its

3 so-called statute of Rome. So there the establishment procedure was fully

4 followed. This Tribunal has not followed it. It was set up as an ad hoc

5 Tribunal, which is contrary to the basic principles of criminal law.

6 Third, this court was given the authority to prosecute crimes

7 which took place before its establishment, which is also unlawful.

8 Fourthly, this Tribunal, at the very outset, began to violate one

9 of the elemental legal principles which reads as follows: Nullum crimen

10 sine lege, that is to say, there is no crime and punishment provided for

11 by the law as such and in the quantity it is provided for. Now what does

12 that mean? Every perpetrator of a crime, of a war crime in fact --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have given the explanation. Next question.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't stayed this and it's an

15 important point and that will be my final explanation.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have had the explanation.

17 Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Seselj, in answering questions put to you by Mr. Nice, you

21 spoke about false witnesses. On the basis of what knowledge were you able

22 to speak about false witnesses? And I set aside at this moment the series

23 of witnesses which I quoted during the examination-in-chief, my

24 examination-in-chief of you, for whom you testified and said that they

25 were not telling the truth. So how were you able to speak about false

1 witnesses in general?

2 A. On the basis of my own personal knowledge, when those false

3 witnesses happened to mention my own name, for example. For example,

4 Milan Babic, during his testimony mentioned my name on several occasions

5 in a completely false context. And I'm conscious of it being a false

6 context. For example, that he -- that the minister of defence of --

7 General Marko Negovanovic provided me with helicopter, whereas I know for

8 certain that he wasn't the defence minister of the republic at that time.

9 So that was my own experience that was highly valuable to me in assessing

10 that.

11 Secondly, I was an eyewitness in the prison of The Hague Tribunal

12 as to how Miroslav Deronjic was broken down by The Hague Tribunal, how

13 they blackmailed him and the process of breaking him down. I was on good

14 terms with him to begin with. He told me how he was arrested, how he was

15 beaten, how they put him in a barrel of water and so on and so forth. He

16 confided in me, and they -- it took months to break him down. And they

17 didn't succeed in breaking him down until Momir Nikolic, in his testimony

18 before the Prosecution said that Deronjic was present at a conversation

19 where an execution was agreed.

20 Well, then Deronjic broke down completely and agreed to testify on

21 any subject whatsoever and against anybody whatsoever. He agreed to

22 falsely testify against Karadzic. It was then that he said that Karadzic

23 spoke about the execution of prisoners, that at Pale he called him aside

24 to whisper that to him in his ear. He said you know those people should

25 be executed and things like that. And at the beginning -- Miroslav

1 Deronjic told me that they were asking him to give false testimony. He

2 confided that in me and said that he would not agree to testify falsely.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will not be allowed to answer ad infinitum.

4 So next question, Mr. --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I just ask one thing. Where was it these

6 various things were done it him?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While he was arrested. He was

8 arrested somewhere in Bratunac. Although previously he had contacts with

9 The Hague investigators. He had talked with them on several occasions,

10 and he promised that if they called him he would be ready to come at all

11 times. Despite that, they beat him up when -- in the process of arresting

12 him to expert pressure and to exert fear and they immersed him in a barrel

13 full of water apparently.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: And that all happened where?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Bratunac, I assume. He was

16 arrested by members of the international force.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And can you specify who -- so you say this was

18 soldiers who do this to him?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That's how I understood the

20 gist of his story.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 MR. NICE: Your Honours, for the record, the question that gave

23 rise to this answer was general. I don't think I asked a question about

24 Deronjic myself in the course of cross-examination.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. In answering Mr. Nice's questions, you mentioned bargaining [no

3 interpretation]?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not having any translation, any

5 interpretation.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Shall I repeat my question?

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Seselj, in response to Mr. Nice's questions, you mentioned

10 plea agreements. Can you tell us something about your knowledge with

11 respect to the plea agreements and what you base them on?

12 A. Yes. Up till now, I have read almost all the judgements passed by

13 The Hague Tribunal. I just did not read the Prijedor group second

14 instance judgement and the Kordic one, perhaps one or two others, but

15 otherwise I've read all the other judgements and I learnt a lot from

16 them. And I read some of the plea agreements that people happened to show

17 me. And from reading that, I gained the knowledge that most often the

18 Prosecution looked at notorious criminals, that is to say, people who were

19 undoubtedly criminals --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this line of questioning is not

21 helpful. His view of the plea agreements is neither here nor there. Move

22 on to another question.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm not asking the

24 witness's his position on the issue but his knowledge of it, and my

25 question is quite legitimate because it emerges from the cross-examination

1 conducted by Mr. Nice.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: What aspects of his knowledge are you seeking to

3 ascertain?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to hear from him how he

5 is able to speak about plea agreements, what the basis and knowledge of

6 that is. He said he read a lot of material on the subject.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relevance to this case?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the relevance is in view of

9 the overall credibility of the other side and the way in which the

10 opposite side works and construes indictments and charges. That is highly

11 relevant because the question of credibility arises in that kind of work.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The credibility of the Prosecution? That's not

13 an issue --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: The credibility of the Prosecution is not an

16 issue in the case. Ask another question, Mr. Milosevic.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Very well, Mr. Seselj. So in answering the initial questions put

19 to you by Mr. Nice, you indicated that this particular institution here,

20 in addition to being an illegal and unlawful one, has an expressly

21 anti-Serb character. What were the grounds for you to say that?

22 A. Because of two Serbs brought to trial --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Please stop.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please stop. When I start speaking you must

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1 stop. I'm not allowing that question. It's not relevant. And,

2 Mr. Milosevic, you very well know if you are going to use your time in

3 re-examination in this way I will terminate it. The line of questioning

4 is improper. You're using it for non-forensic purposes, and I will not

5 allow that. So you determine whether you wish to continue or not. You

6 have a number of matters on which you can re-examine properly. So far you

7 have wasted the time of the Court.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. Fine.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Seselj, let's now deal with questions put to you by Mr. Nice

11 by placing before you certain documents. You expressed the wish when you

12 were shown a document from your book the Serbian Chetnik Movement, the

13 title of that is, Mr. Nice asked you to read out one sentence from

14 page 346. I hope you have that. Do you?

15 A. Page 346?

16 Q. Yes, the Serbian Chetnik Movement, page 346. He asked you to read

17 out one particular sentence from that page --

18 JUDGE KWON: You should give us the --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the number, Mr. Milosevic, the exhibit

20 number, so we can find it?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have the tab number here

22 unfortunately. I'm looking at the English translation of it as well and

23 the Serbian original. But it is 03482217, the ERN number.

24 MR. NICE: 882.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: 882.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Have you found it, Mr. Seselj?

2 A. Unfortunately not yet.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before going on to that, if I can go back to a

4 matter that was dealt with earlier in this -- at the start of this

5 re-examination in relation to the reasons given by Mr. Seselj for not

6 recognising the Tribunal, and I'm looking at the moment at the

7 Secretary-General's report prior to its establishment in which he says

8 that the appointment by a decision of the Security Council would be

9 legally justified.

10 You suggested to us that the Secretary-General had reported in

11 writing that it was contrary to international law. Can you tell me where

12 that -- where I will find that written statement by the Secretary-General?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You will find it in the UN

14 Secretary-General's address to the Security Council, perhaps in that same

15 text where he says that it would be best if the Tribunal were to be

16 established by first --

17 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not my question. My question is where would

18 you find this straightforward statement that would assert the

19 establishment was contrary to international law?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You will find that in the material

21 of the UN Secretary-General where he explains how that ought to be done

22 under normal conditions, and then ultimately he interprets it as being

23 reliant on Article 7 of the UN charter. You have that in the UN

24 Secretary-General's address. And he goes into the political reasons why

25 the following steps should be taken rather than something which would be

1 most align with international law. I read that personally, and I'm sure

2 he has that. It is contained in his address.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, your answer is certainly not consistent with

4 what I've read, and if Mr. Milosevic wants to explore it further, he may

5 wish to consider the position for that.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Have you found the page, Mr. Seselj? 346.

8 A. Yes, I have it here before me on the monitor, but I haven't taken

9 all the documents with me, but I've got it on the monitor anyway now.

10 Q. Mr. Nice quoted one sentence, and you asked to read the whole

11 speech. Mr. Robinson then said that this could be done in the

12 re-examination. So you can do that now. Because on page 346, it is very

13 brief, can you read it and explain to us why you insisted on reading the

14 entire paragraph and not just the paragraph that Mr. Nice wanted?

15 A. Because from my whole speech held at the funeral of Radomir

16 Stojakovic, the first volunteer to be killed of the Serb Radical Party,

17 you can see the sense of it and not only on the basis of what was

18 highlighted and emphasised here by Mr. Nice. So that I would like to read

19 out the portions which Mr. Nice didn't read out here.

20 Q. Yes, please go ahead.

21 A. It says: "Serbian brothers and sisters --"

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Let us look at the speech that

23 you are planning to read. How long is this? This is one page?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Less. Just half a page. Just a

25 little more than half page, on 3 -- page 346.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you wish me to read the

2 introductory part and then the highlighted part highlighted by Mr. Nice?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was what Mr. Robinson's

4 instructions were when you asked to read the whole passage out.

5 A. Yes, I see. So just the portion above the highlighted portion.

6 Q. Yes. It's a third of the page.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: I will allow you to read just the portion above

8 the highlighted portion.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. That will be sufficient,

10 I hope.

11 "Serbian brothers and sisters, today we take our leave of our

12 brother, Gradimir Pesic, who died a hero's death defending Serbia and

13 Slavonia. Many other Serbian sons have fallen. Serbia today laments its

14 dead. Serbia today is once again in flames, and our brother Gradimir left

15 his village and went off to distant Slavonia to defend Serbian homes,

16 Serbian women, and Serbian children there, and he died a hero, victim of

17 the treacherous Ustasha hand while taking down the Ustasha flag that had

18 been stuck up in a Serbian village."

19 And this is how he died: The Ustashas stormed the village by

20 night and set up their own flag on a silo which was located in the

21 village, and the next day when he saw the flag he got up to take the flag

22 down and a Ustasha sniper hit him. So there was no fighting. It was a

23 sniper hit that hit him while he was trying to take down the flag.

24 "Yet another of our bravest sons have fallen. The bravest always

25 fall. The bravest always die. Those who are worth the most always die.

1 Gradimir waited 15 days in Belgrade before being sent to Slavonia. He was

2 waiting for his group, waiting for his journey without return.

3 Serbian brothers and sisters, Serb fell during centuries past,

4 always dying like men, always heroically, and today our brother Gradimir

5 has shown through his death that Serbian mothers have not ceased to bear

6 heroes."

7 So that is a farewell at the graveside of the fallen hero.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Seselj, is the point of all this, of what you have been

10 saying --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... question

12 coming?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, reformulate.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay, I'll reformulate.

15 Q. What is the significance of the fact that you say here, "Our

16 brother Gradimir went to defend Serb houses, Serb families, Serb

17 children," and so on and so forth? He went to defend, Serb women,

18 children, and so on.

19 A. The point is that Gradimir and the other volunteers did not go out

20 there to attack. They did not go to loot other people's homes, to

21 jeopardise other people's children. They went there to defend Serb homes,

22 Serb women, Serb children. That is the core of the matter. He went there

23 to defend his brothers who were imperiled. He Did not go there to

24 jeopardise others, and he did not go because he simply felt like it.