1 Thursday, 7 July 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

7 WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General. Yesterday, we went

11 through a number of documents in an accelerated manner. I assume that we

12 can continue the same way in this stage too.

13 What is the content of the order on the engagement of forces in

14 destroying Siptar terrorist groups in the broader area of Tusus that you

15 adopted on the 14th of May 1999, and which is contained in tab 562?

16 A. This is an order, a classical one, if I can put it that way.

17 Excuse me, could the map please be placed on the ELMO? Excuse me?

18 Q. The map that is contained in document 563 should be placed on the

19 easel, the one that pertains to this particular engagement of forces.

20 So the order is in document 562, and the map is in 563. Is that

21 right, General?

22 A. That's right, Mr. Milosevic. In paragraph 1 of this order, in the

23 first three lines we can practically see the reason for engaging the

24 forces. "From the beginning of aggressor NATO aviation's aggression

25 against our country a group of Siptar terrorists are constantly operating

1 from the Tusus sector locates around 15 to 20 terrorists, as printed. The

2 Siptar terrorist group headquarters in Tusus is intensively carrying out a

3 forceful mobilisation of the Siptar population from the neighbouring

4 villages."

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please be asked to slow down.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the general, you just heard the

7 interpreters asking you to slow down.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the town of Prizren. Tusus

9 is a suburb, basically, of Prizren.

10 From the beginning of the aggression up to that particular day on

11 this road that leads from the village of Hoca Zagradska via the village of

12 Leskovac to Prizren, about ten members of my unit got killed, as well as

13 MUP members. These were columns that were bringing supplies, and all

14 these attacks were carried out by this group of terrorists. And in order

15 to neutralise this group of terrorists, this combat action was carried out

16 and the order pertains to that combat action.

17 Q. Let us just clarify this. Your supplies columns are moving there

18 in the vicinity of Prizren. Ten men got killed in these attacks and you

19 are now intervening vis-a-vis the group that did that. That is the

20 content of this order.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I would like to draw your attention to 8.5 of your order. You

23 say: "In all situations, consistently honour the provisions of

24 international law of war." That is, after all, contained in every one of

25 your orders.

1 A. In every one of my orders, yes.

2 Q. All right. You've explained the map. In document 564, in

3 accordance with the same procedure that was seen in other situations

4 whenever the army was engaged, you wrote an analysis?

5 A. Yes, this is a detailed analysis of this particular action.

6 Q. In this analysis we see what your estimate is; namely, that four

7 persons were killed.

8 A. We assume that they got two more out. Our forces had three men

9 killed and two wounded, whereas the MUP had two policemen killed and one

10 wounded.

11 Q. Yes. That is written here at the beginning of the last third of

12 this analysis. That is the entirety of this particular engagement in this

13 stage.

14 Now, General, if you agree, if there is no special reason for us

15 to dwell on these tabs, in the meantime I wanted us to look at tab 574.

16 A. Mr. Milosevic, I would just like to read one sentence from tab

17 566.

18 Q. Please go ahead.

19 A. This is an intelligence information that is sent from the brigade

20 to the 2nd Motorised Battalion in Djakovica. "On the basis of information

21 collected by intelligence and reconnaissance organs in the border zone ...

22 "A movement of the Albanian army forward defence line and the

23 allied forces on the border was carried out along the axis from the

24 Republic of Albania to Kosovo and Metohija, with populated places as

25 support points, between three and five kilometres in depth;.

1 "In the sector of the Kosare border post, they committed

2 aggression against the FRY territory ..." and I'm asking for particular

3 vigilance because the aggression may start any day. That is what I wish

4 to say about this particular tab.

5 Q. Very well, General. Then there was a massive attack on our

6 territory that you managed to repel successfully. That's what you talked

7 about yesterday?

8 MR. NICE: I can't actually find that quotation. I saw part of it

9 but the bit about every day I couldn't find, or I missed it.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you point us to the particular section,

11 Mr. Milosevic or the witness?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a very short document, 566, the

13 one that was just quoted by General Delic now. At the very beginning, in

14 line four of the text, it says: "A movement of the Albanian army and

15 allied forces on the border was carried out along the axis from the

16 Republic of Albania to Kosovo and Metohija, with populated places as

17 support points, between three and five kilometres in depth." And then:

18 "In the sector of the Kosare border post, they committed aggression

19 against the FRY territory."

20 MR. NICE: It may be at line 4.12 that what sounded like quotation

21 was a change from recitation to narration by the witness, but that's the

22 problem with going at this sort of speed on passages that he's reading

23 from.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Let us just briefly deal with document 574. If you have something

3 that is exceptionally important in these documents that we are skipping,

4 please draw my attention to that, General.

5 So document 574. What does it pertain to? Have you found it?

6 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. That is a document or, rather, an order in

7 view of what was obtained in the previous document, this is an order

8 consisting of eight paragraphs to subordinate units to carry out all

9 preparations for organising battle, combat action, and every other

10 tactical operation, to set up firing systems and coordinate them with the

11 barrier systems, and ensure and facilitate effective attacks on enemy

12 forces in the foreground at the combat support position in front of the

13 forward line as well as in-depth defence during combat. Also ensure that

14 each individual knows his place and that of his unit in the combat

15 disposition of a higher-ranking unit of the last detail, et cetera. That

16 is the essence of this document.

17 Q. In all possible aspects it has to do with the defence of the

18 territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, let us look at document 580. This is a warning that has to

21 do with crime control in units, and I just wish to quote part of it. The

22 third subparagraph in terms of what individuals do, as you say. That is:

23 "Violent behaviour manifested so far in threats with weapons, random

24 shooting at residential buildings, physical and sexual abuse, harassment."

25 And then you give an example, too.

1 So you constantly bear in mind what is going on in practice, and

2 you caution that measures should be taken in order to eradicate this by

3 all means. Is that the essence of this order of yours?

4 A. That is the essence, because orders are received from superior

5 commands and then one draws on all this experience preventing such things

6 from happening in one's own unit.

7 Q. That's precisely what I wanted to say. You indicate the example

8 of another brigade, and you inform your own unit about this. So although

9 such a thing did not happen in your unit, you're telling them that that

10 kind of thing should not happen, should not be repeated or, rather, not

11 repeated but never happen.

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. Very well, General. Now, in document 589 there's a criminal

14 report regarding terrorism, and here we have an individual example of a

15 KLA member who claims that he fled from the KLA and was captured bearing

16 arms, with weapons on him, and how he has treated. Was he treated in the

17 proper manner as prescribed?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, you said 589 tab, I believe.

19 Q. Yes. No, I apologise. No. I meant 583.

20 A. Yes, I remember this particular case. It took place on the 22nd

21 of May. It is indeed a criminal report against an individual, and that

22 individual was linked up to the operations of the 17th of May and the

23 events that took place there. And in the close vicinity of the unit, in

24 the town itself where the logistics unit was located, he appeared armed,

25 wearing a black uniform. And when the person encountered the security

1 forces, it was night-time, they threw away their rifle. They were

2 arrested, and the person was treated pursuant to the rules.

3 Q. So this was an individual member of the KLA that was found wearing

4 a black uniform, an automatic rifle, and everything else that it says

5 here. You have his statement, you have the statement of your men from

6 your unit, and we can see that this took place on the 22nd of May - that

7 is the date of the document - that is to say, two months after the start

8 of the NATO aggression. And this is an individual case.

9 Is this, then, an example of conduct and proceedings with an

10 arrested member of the KLA?

11 A. Yes. Proceedings were taken. He was taken to a military court,

12 put before a military court.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Now, if I omit something that you consider to

14 be very important, please stop me, but I'm doing my best to use my time as

15 best as possible. And I'd now like to ask you to take a look at the

16 following document, which is tab 589. Let's see what that one's about.

17 A. This is once again a military recruit and a criminal report

18 against him. It is a person from my unit based in Djakovica.

19 Q. All right. Fine. Now, here we can see, among other things --

20 we're not going to go through this particular criminal report and what

21 happened because it's a document that everybody can read, all of us can

22 read through it, but I would just like to point out that we can see here

23 that the citizens who were mistreated and abused reported the incident to

24 the military police.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And the military police intervened. The perpetrator was arrested,

2 a criminal report was filed, and medical assistance given to the injured

3 parties.

4 A. All the reports were collected, from the Official Note of MUP, the

5 Official Note by the security organs, the statements of all persons

6 involved, and a photo documentation about the event, and this person was

7 court-martialed forthwith.

8 Q. Thank you. Now, you also drew up a piece of information which is,

9 in fact, the next document, about some crimes and negative events, and the

10 date of that is the 27th of May.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. It is to be found in tab 590.

13 A. Yes. And in that piece of information we focus on the previous

14 case in particular, the one we discussed a moment ago, that is to say the

15 particular individual we discussed. And this was information sent out to

16 all units, all the forces, so that all the members of the brigade could

17 become acquainted with the case.

18 The report briefly goes through what happened. Their attention is

19 drawn to the fact that this was the perpetration of a crime under Article

20 3 of the Criminal Code of Serbia, that it was perpetrated in a demeaning

21 manner and a brutal manner and that the sentence for crimes of that kind

22 ranges between 3 and 15 [Realtime transcript read in error "4"] years in

23 prison for the perpetrator, and for anybody else present and involved in

24 aiding and abetting, they too will be held responsible and they will

25 suffer the same sentence as in the previous case.

1 Q. And here it is noted that these persons were arrested by the

2 military police and handed over to the military court in Pristina; is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And at the end of this report, all the commanders and leaders are

6 required energetically to stop such acts from taking place. So you have a

7 concrete event and you are informing all the members, all the men, that is

8 to say several thousand men, members of your brigade, your forces, and at

9 that time, at the time of you doing so, the perpetrators had already been

10 arrested. Is that what we can learn from this document, deduce and

11 conclude?

12 A. Yes, that is the substance of the document.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: General, what was the range of possible sentences

15 that you gave?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The lowest sentence was 3 years -- 3

17 to 15 years.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought so. The transcript says 3 to 4 years.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general did say that in the

20 report the sentence provided for by law range between 3 and 15 years.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, in the intelligence report by Colonel Vladimir

23 Stojiljkovic, dated the 4th of June, mention is made among other things

24 that at a border crossing there were cases that took -- there were events

25 that took place --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab number, Mr. Milosevic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's tab 595.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Just briefly, please, General, would you tell us what that was

5 about, what was happening.

6 A. The date was the 4th of June, and that was already the time when

7 the greatest ground offensive was under way, and its name was Arrow from

8 -- coming from Albanian territory into the territory of the Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia. And in that offensive we had taking part on the

10 one side the terrorist forces, the forces of the Republic of Albania, and

11 the NATO forces on the one side; and on the other side you had our own

12 army, and this is intelligence, an intelligence report where the Chief of

13 Staff, through his organs, defined and set out the four basic axes of

14 attack via Pastrik -- Mount Pastrik. Otherwise, the operation was

15 launched on the 27th of May.

16 Q. Thank you, General.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: General, do you claim that at any stage NATO forces

18 actually entered the territory of Yugoslavia from the ground?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO forces supported and

20 reinforced, both from the ground and especially from the air, the forces

21 of the terrorists who were attacking and who entered the territory.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you answer my question. Do you say that the

23 NATO forces at any stage entered the territory of Yugoslavia?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They did not enter directly. NATO

25 forces did not enter directly. The terrorist forces did enter, and they

1 were supported and reinforced by NATO forces.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 JUDGE KWON: General Delic, could you locate the location of Mount

4 Pastrik on that map, please.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Pastrik. Mount Pastrik is

6 here, to the west of Prizren. This is the valley of the Drim River. Here

7 we have Vrbnik lake, and this is Pastrik mountain. This is the peak. It

8 is 1.998 metres above sea level. And this ranged from the top, from the

9 watchtower of Lika to Vrbnik lake. And that was the front. It ranged a

10 distance of ten kilometres, and that's where the Operation Arrow started

11 from Albania. The object was to reach the valley as soon as possible, the

12 Beli Drim River valley, and to take control of Prizren as soon as

13 possible. And the BBC, CNN reported on this constantly. There were

14 constant news reports. And on the 30th or 31st of May, even, they

15 informed the public that the forces had already reached the Drim valley,

16 Drim River valley, and that on that day our army suffered 700 casualties.

17 That is to say, they destroyed a battalion of 700 men.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. In connection to Mr. Bonomy's question as to whether the NATO

21 forces actually entered the territory, the forces that were attacking the

22 border were part of the overall forces which were supported by NATO, and

23 they were the forces of the Republic of Albania, were they not?

24 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed. It's so hopeless to approach the

1 examination of a witness in chief in this way.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Whose planes were the B52 fighters who bombed all your positions

4 simultaneously? Whose planes were they?

5 A. They were US planes, B52s, and they took off from Great Britain.

6 Q. This activity, the bombing of your positions at the same time as

7 this attack was being launched, was that a unified activity that was being

8 carried out on our territory?

9 A. From the viewpoint of the deployment of strategic aviation, of a

10 strategic air force, that is to say strategic planes were used to target

11 tactical targets, and there was blanket bombing, as it's called, that is

12 to say 20 -- carpet bombing. Twenty times between the 27th of May to the

13 8 was carpet bombing took place on the part of strategic B52 bombers.

14 They bombed 25 times.

15 Q. And was this this united attack on our territory, including the

16 ground aggression that was going on at the same time?

17 A. Yes, absolutely. This was direct support and reinforcement to

18 terrorist forces.

19 Q. And of course to the forces of the Republic of Albania?

20 A. Yes, the forces of the Republic of Albania who used their own

21 artillery, their own tanks, and everything else they had at their disposal

22 - artillery divisions - to act against our forces.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Two points, General, just -- as you will appreciate

24 -- thank you for that further information, but as you will appreciate, my

25 question was a very simple question about who actually penetrated on the

1 ground, and now we've had clarification of certain other aspects which

2 doesn't add to the answer you've already given.

3 The other matter I want to ask you is this: You referred to news

4 reports of 700 casualties. Are you saying these are inaccurate news

5 reports?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The figure is incorrect. It

7 is true that in one day, on one day from my unit 125 people were out of

8 combat. Of that number, ten were killed and 115 wounded, but they were

9 placed out of action, they were not able to take part in the fighting any

10 more. But together with the bombing of these positions and in all that

11 together, I think 28 people were killed. So the information, the piece of

12 news that 700 people were killed is not correct, in a single day. That

13 was not the right figure.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: And I think you were also saying that the report

15 was inaccurate in relation to the amount of progress that the forces had

16 made. That's the invading forces.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And our radio television,

20 Radio-Television Serbia, that is, filmed the spot, the watchtower at

21 Gorozur, and showed the whole world that that piece of information put out

22 by CNN was completely incorrect.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. All right. That was a surprise because CNN -- that was a

25 surprise, I suppose, because CNN is well known for its correct

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1 information, is it not?

2 General --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that a question or a comment? Because if it's a

4 question, we have haven't got the answer yet.

5 Do you have an answer to that question, General?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think that Mr. Jamie Shea,

7 as the "portparole" of NATO, celebrated the NATO pact during the

8 aggression against our country and the whole world was able to hear his

9 reports, which were full of lies.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, you've now described the situation. We have a ground

12 operation going on, strategic planes bombing our forces in the area in

13 depth, away from the border into Yugoslavia, and now in document 607, for

14 example, your organs of the military police, your -- of your Prizren

15 garrison, were filing a criminal report, and we see the date there. It is

16 the 5th of June, that is to say the period of time when the worst attacks

17 were being launched precisely against your units, and in your unit -- yet

18 in your unit a criminal report was being filed on that particular date,

19 the 5th of June, against a perpetrator who was killing and wounding an

20 enemy contrary to the Criminal Code and Article 146 of that Criminal Code.

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. So this was a member of your unit involved.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you happen to know, in view of the fact that you are a teacher,

25 a professor and a military man yourself, that this level of efficiency for

1 organs when they are engaged in high level operations, very difficult

2 operations, were they efficient in filing that criminal report?

3 A. Yes, they were, because the -- in these very difficult times it

4 was their duty not to allow any unlawful acts from being committed. No

5 defeatism, no panic. And so in this particular case, they were very

6 efficient in taking steps to stop the perpetrators, and in this case it

7 was one of their members. So they arrested one of their own men.

8 Q. They arrested a member of the military police who had killed an

9 Albanian; is that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: What happened to him, General?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it says here in this criminal

13 report. Now, as far as the soldier is concerned, the soldier was arrested

14 straight away.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it's him -- it's what happened to the soldier

16 is what I would like to know.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The soldier was taken into custody

18 and court-martialed straight away, sent to the military court in Pristina.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: But what happened at the military court?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the following tabs, you will find

21 that. We can see -- actually, it's in tab 626.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Just tell me.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In tab 626, as I said, we find that

24 the proceedings were undertaken. The court undertook the appropriate

25 proceedings, but I have to find this particular individual now in the

1 files. Slavoljub Topalovic was his name, soldier. The case was handed

2 over to the municipal public prosecutor in Prizren.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: And what happened there?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. It was a civil court.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: This is one of a number of occasions we've run into

6 this difficulty, that we get so far in the -- in the account of what

7 happened in relation to something, and then we end up up a close, as we

8 say, up a side street that leads to a dead end. Anyway, if you don't have

9 the information, we'll no doubt hear from someone else.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: That accords with the view expressed by

11 Mr. Milosevic, that the responsibility under Article 7(3) ends with

12 arrest, and that is certainly not the case. The question of punishment

13 also arises, which means that the trial is important, what happened at the

14 trial is significant. But consistently you don't provide information

15 beyond arrest.

16 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we look at this tab, it shows

18 also the sentences meted out to the members of my unit.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, if it is necessary to

21 follow through all the cases that were processed further up the line, it's

22 possible, but I thought it would be rational for me to deal with that.

23 The constitution of Yugoslavia and the constitution of Serbia very clearly

24 stipulate, as in every democratic country, a distribution of power between

25 executive, legislative, and judiciary authorities, and the executive

1 authorities have finished their job when they refer a case to the

2 judiciary.

3 I am not saying by any means that the judiciary did not perform

4 their functions. I'm certain they did, and people who committed crimes

5 were convicted. And we can also get hold of that information as well.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Never mind what the constitutional position

7 is in your country. Criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) relates

8 both to the prevention and punishment of crime, which means that the trial

9 is also important. Proceed.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I personally am not aware of a

11 single case where somebody who perpetrated a crime and was convicted would

12 have been released or acquitted. But we will look into that.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you're not giving evidence.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Let us just have a look here. There are a couple of additional

17 things that relate to -- could you please look at the document under 616.

18 My copy is very poor.

19 What is this all about?

20 A. This is an intelligence report under tab 616, saying that the

21 activities of Siptar terrorist forces are being intensified, as well as

22 the activities of the NATO aviation, so that from 6.00 to -- 6.00 a.m. [as

23 interpreted] to 8.00 p.m., aviation acted against Planeja village, Sinaj,

24 and towards the top of the mountain Pastrik, with frequent use of cluster

25 bombs.

1 Q. This is an intelligence report that in fact corroborates what you

2 just said about the ground invasion and the use of strategic aviation

3 against our forces at the time.

4 A. Yes. And those three villages that I mentioned were completely

5 destroyed.

6 Q. But I understood that the carpet bombing covered the entire area

7 of these villages where our forces were located.

8 A. Carpet bombing implies that an entire territory is constantly

9 bombed with aircraft acting in pairs, and each plane carries around 50

10 225-kilo bombs.

11 Q. Thank you, General. Could we now look at another document, which

12 is an excerpt from an annual intelligence report on electronic

13 surveillance and counter-electronic operations for 1999. It's under tab

14 618.

15 Could you please point out the highlights, the most important

16 points made in this document. Have you found it?

17 A. Yes, I have. For instance, on page 43 [as interpreted], the

18 beginning of that page, this is actually a report received by Siptar

19 terrorist forces via radio, namely an order that on the 3rd of March,

20 beginning with 8.00 a.m., they should be in the highest level of combat

21 readiness, take up their positions, and be in constant mutual contact. At

22 2300 hours, the Siptar terrorist forces located in this area --

23 MR. NICE: My mistake, no doubt -- oh, yes, I've found it now.

24 Top of the page 3. There's a reference to page 43.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: You previously took objection to a similar

1 document, Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I have taken objection to this sort of

3 document. I'm not sure what the ruling was --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: The reason I'm interested in is that it was a

5 majority ruling at the time.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I take the same objection, of course, to

7 documents of this kind because the raw material won't be made available to

8 us, unless the witness has brought it with him, and I'm unable, therefore,

9 to deal with it at all.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: It also doesn't indicate exactly what it is. It's

11 an incomplete document and one which the -- it's not clear that the

12 general has direct knowledge of, or one which contains material of which

13 he has direct knowledge.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I certainly repeat my objection, and I'll

15 take the matter further in cross-examination, if I have time.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. So, General, you read from their report on electronic surveillance

19 and listening in to enemy communications.

20 A. Yes. It was the 52nd Company for electronic surveillance of the

21 Pristina Corps.

22 Q. Can we find something here that was not directly overheard during

23 their work of listening in to enemy communications?

24 A. No. No. This is an annual report, the report for 1999. Last

25 year we discussed another annual report for 1998, and from that report we

1 received this extract that relates to terrorism.

2 Q. Very well. So this is the beginning of March, dealing with

3 terrorist activities.

4 Look at the entry for the 14th of May: "By intercepting Siptar

5 terrorist radio communications for the Pastrik operation zone at 0200

6 hours on 14 May, 1999, we found out --"

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. "... we found out that NATO aviation dropped cluster bombs along

10 the axis of Dulje village --"

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: The interpreters are asking you to slow down.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will slow down.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. "-- Blace village - Budakovo village - and Jezerske mountain,

15 which resulted in a large number of dead and wounded refugees and Siptar

16 terrorist forces members."

17 A. Yes. This is information received through interception.

18 Q. So we see from these intercepts that they were discussing their

19 own casualties resulting from NATO bombing.

20 A. Yes. It happened on the 14th of May. I mentioned it yesterday.

21 In the night of the 13th, the heaviest bombing of Prizren happened, the

22 heaviest for the entire war, and they were reporting their own losses.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: General, can I take it that for that information

24 the fact that for that information you refer to this document means that

25 it wasn't intelligence which you reported on in any other form or

1 incorporated into any order that you issued or analysis that you

2 provided. This is, as far as your documents are concerned, the only

3 source of this information?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are many sources of

5 intelligence. This is only one of them. It's not my unit but part of

6 this unit located --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: I haven't expressed that very well. This piece of

8 intelligence here doesn't appear in any of the other documents you've

9 referred us to. Does that mean that this intercepted information - and I

10 confine the point to this piece of intercepted information - was something

11 that you did not actually make use of at the time? It's not in any of

12 your analyses or any of your orders.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no need to. I used this

14 information directly on the ground. If we take, for instance, this last

15 specific information of the 14th of May, I had that information already.

16 The bombing of the refugee column near Korisa happened around 8.00 p.m.,

17 twenty-five past eight. I had that information within minutes. And this

18 report from this agency arrived only on the next day, so it was not

19 relevant at the time, this specific piece of information, I mean. This is

20 a unit of the superior command, so in my reports towards the superior

21 command, there was no need for me to report to them what their own unit

22 was doing and what kind of information it gave me.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, indeed. That makes me wonder why on earth

24 we're looking at this rather than your own personal experience of what

25 actually happened on the ground, which is really what I'm interested in.

1 What was the immediate source of your knowledge of the bombing of the

2 refugee group?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we dealt with it in detail

4 yesterday, and we even watched video footage filmed by Radio-Television

5 Serbia. So what we discussed yesterday and what we saw on the film, that

6 same subject is discussed by terrorists via radio. It's the same event.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But what I'm trying to understand is what was the

8 first information you got that there had been -- that a group of refugees

9 had been bombed? Who reported that to you?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received a report, of course, by

11 my operations duty officer. I personally heard the sound of bombing, but

12 I didn't know which area was being bombed, and my operations duty officer

13 told me that it was the area of Korisa village. Because throughout the

14 territory we had our units, but at that moment I didn't know that there

15 were refugees there as well. I thought they were bombing an empty space

16 because there were no units of mine there. And it was only around 3.00,

17 3.00 a.m., when the wounded started coming into the hospital, that I found

18 out that there were casualties there, people killed, that the column of

19 people on their way home had been hit. That's when I ordered my medical

20 corps to be sent there to give assistance to these people. And my

21 military hospital worked to take care of these wounded all the time.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. On the 28th of May we see another intercept. It says: "By

25 intercepting Siptar terrorist radio communications we found out that they

1 were setting up obstacles wherever they could and blew up roads used by

2 our forces. The rest of their communications consisted of an exchange of

3 short encoded notifications and open information related to the movement

4 of our forces. We found out that from the Brestovac village - Samodreza

5 village - Studencane line they control the movement of our forces along

6 the Prizren-Orahovac and Prizren-Suva Reka axes, and that they are

7 gathering their forces in the above-mentioned belt.

8 "We found out that in the Kosare sector the Siptar terrorist

9 forces have a lot of men wounded and killed and that they have been

10 instructed to keep a low profile in the forthcoming period and not to

11 carry out any attacks until they notice the movement of our forces."

12 Now, what we see from these intercepts caught by this electronic

13 surveillance company, does that coincide with the information you

14 collected on the ground? That's my -- one question.

15 And second, the information and reports you got from this company

16 on a daily basis, in succession, although this was a company of your

17 superior command, was it one of the sources of intelligence that you

18 needed in order to make decisions on the ground?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, can I make it clear that that is the most

20 blatant of leading questions, and really the answer to it is devalued as a

21 result. Putting the answer to the witness and then asking the question is

22 a pointless exercise in examination-in-chief.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you continue to violate the rule

24 against leading questions. You'll have to proceed to another question.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I did not think it was a

1 leading question if I was quoting what was written in the report and if I

2 asked the witness whether that corresponds with --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: When you formulate your questions in this

4 double-barrelled manner, ending up with, "Was it one of the sources of

5 intelligence that you needed in order to make decisions on the ground?"

6 you are in effect telling the witness the answer. We have been through

7 this many times.

8 Proceed to ask another question.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, let's just have a look at the conclusion, at the end,

11 from this document that has to do with electronic surveillance. Look at

12 the conclusion. Look at what it says here.

13 A. At the very end of all these reports, the company for electronic

14 surveillance deals with the entire year, and it practically defines what

15 the operation zones were that the terrorists mentioned, and they say here

16 that it is six operation zones, that their division is not definite, and

17 then that on the basis of their information they also have sub-zones.

18 That by intercepting their communications, they practically identified 13

19 brigades of the KLA, that they assume they have a battalion system and

20 their units are subdivided into companies and platoons. That is the

21 conclusion.

22 Q. All right.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: When you say, General, they're dealing with the

24 whole year, what do you mean by the "year"?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The war period of 1999. I misspoke.

1 I misspoke saying the entire year. It's from the beginning of 1999 until

2 the end of the war.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Or is it until the 13th of June, which is the date

4 immediately before the conclusion?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, our units stayed on all the

6 way up to the 26th of June. Although they were relocated from the

7 territory of Kosovo and Metohija, it was only on the 26th of June that

8 demobilisation was carried out of personnel from these units.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, could you please look at the general schematic. You

11 mentioned what the conclusion was of this report and how the forces were

12 organised of the KLA. Next page this same company gives a general scheme

13 of the organisation, the Dragobilje staff, and then the operations zones.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. That can be seen on the ELMO.

16 A. Yes, that can be seen on the ELMO. This is a general scheme that

17 was compiled by the 52nd Company in its analysis on the basis of its

18 six-month work in 1999, what the operations zones are and what brigades

19 are linked to which one of these zones.

20 Q. All right. An integral part of these -- this document is a survey

21 of found officers and forces in 1999. What does this document speak of?

22 That document is contained in tab 619.

23 A. It speaks of the command structure of the KLA, which was confirmed

24 through radio surveillance and radio goniometry.

25 Q. With all their information?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Including when they were selected, who got killed where and when,

3 et cetera?

4 A. Yes, all the information required.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: When was that compiled, General?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Like the report for 1998. As I

7 said, it was compiled in January 1999. This report was compiled after the

8 end of 1999, that is to say in January 2000.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Who compiled it?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was compiled by the commander of

11 the 52nd Company for electronic surveillance, together with his officers.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, since --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Tab 619 is part of the report which we were looking

15 at in 618?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, an integral part.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, when you say "annual report," you explained that annual

19 reports are compiled in January for the preceding year. In the meantime,

20 until the annual report is compiled, all this intelligence, as it is

21 received, is it made available to you and to other command structures that

22 may find them useful?

23 A. Yes. They would be pointless if they would not be sent on to the

24 units that they pertain to momentarily in order to be of assistance, so

25 they were sent on to the units immediately.

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1 Q. So at the end of the year there is only a compilation that is made

2 which was in realtime sent to the units at the time when the information

3 and intelligence was gathered. Is that what you're saying?

4 A. Yes. This is an analysis that is compiled at the end of the year

5 that pertains to the overall activity for the previous year.

6 Q. All right. Let us deal briefly with this cooperation between NATO

7 and the KLA. Was there intensive cooperation between NATO and the KLA?

8 A. Yes, there was intensive cooperation, especially intensive --

9 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... not in any

10 expectation that there will be any response to an order of the Court that

11 the accused should apply his mind to the rulings it's been making for a

12 year or so, but that was a monstrous leading question and therefore it

13 brings an answer of no value.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Nonetheless, I'm interested in the question of

15 cooperation between NATO and the KLA, so I'd like the question to be

16 answered.

17 General, answer the question. Never mind the leading question by

18 Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During the war, there was incessant

20 and two-way cooperation between the KLA and NATO. The KLA gave NATO

21 intelligence as to the location of our forces. NATO used this information

22 in preparing to bomb certain positions. On the other hand, NATO supported

23 combat actions of the terrorist forces.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, when you say supported --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, is it any part of your case that

2 any of the acts attributed to Serb forces, and therefore to you, as crimes

3 in the indictment were committed in response to a combined attack by NATO

4 and the KLA or NATO acting in concert with the KLA or the KLA acting in

5 concert with NATO?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson. I hope that

7 throughout the testimony of General Delic you were able to see each and

8 every concrete situation; when there was movement of forces, when there

9 was activity by our forces, and that in every concrete situation there --

10 this is actually a response to behaviour by the enemy, something the enemy

11 did.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we need to be -- to be more

13 specific. We have an indictment with charges, and I'm asking whether it

14 is part of your case that any of the crimes that the indictment alleges

15 were committed by you through your forces were committed in response to

16 the KLA acting in concert with -- with NATO.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would not put it that way, whether

18 something was committed in response. What is certain is that a large

19 number of KLA members were killed in clashes with our forces. There's no

20 doubt about that.

21 Since you're talking about the indictment, if you look at that,

22 it's some kind of civilians that are referred to. Although they are on

23 various lists and they're all men, but they are all claimed to be

24 civilians. This is what they launched here through Mr. Nice, together

25 with Mr. Nice; that our forces first shelled settlements, surrounded them,

1 arrested, killed, which is a pure lie. You saw over a year and a half

2 what it looked like -- what the movement of a big unit looked like.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I didn't invite to you make a

4 speech. It really is a question that has fundamental legal implications

5 for the case, because if that is so, the nature of the conflict is

6 changed. You have a group of states whom you say are acting with

7 terrorist forces, and in my view, if you are responding to that attack,

8 that implicates Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and that's why

9 -- that's the importance of that question, but proceed.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think that you put it right.

11 It is self-defence, and that is the only thing that is allowed according

12 to international law, use of force in self-defence. Our country fought

13 against aggression.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the facts

15 substantiate that.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And how, Mr. Robinson. Nobody can

17 deny these facts.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, let's look at some documents since I asked you about

20 cooperation between NATO and the KLA. In tab 620, you have a list of

21 discovered targets of the 4 -- of the 549th Brigade, your brigade. There

22 is a map of these targets here too.

23 A. The map was something that my intelligence officer was in charge

24 of. This is a survey of targets of my units, and the Siptar terrorists

25 submitted this to NATO. That's about 35 to 40 targets.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: How did you get hold of it?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was also received through radio

3 intercepts when the observers of terrorists reported to their commands,

4 which again had satellite telephones for communicating with NATO where

5 different parts of my units were.

6 I think this has been translated and that you can see this.

7 That's the way in which these people operated, those who were observing,

8 in view of their military knowledge, and they were informing on where

9 which part of my unit was. And as soon as I learned about this, I moved

10 my forces elsewhere so that they would not be threatened or jeopardised.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Of course. From a military point of view, establishing a target

13 and hitting a target, is this part of one and the same activity or are

14 these independent activities?

15 A. This is absolutely one and the same activity. In order to get to

16 a target, there has to be information.

17 Q. General, when you use the word "support" of the NATO forces to the

18 Siptar terrorists, are you referring to political support or are you

19 talking about fire support, the use of air force, cruising missiles and so

20 on and so forth? What are you referring to when you say "support"?

21 A. Yesterday and today I have primarily been speaking about this

22 support that we call military support. That is to say fire support

23 directly through means of combat.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: General, you distinguish between opportunism, that

25 is the KLA taking advantage of the fact that there was NATO bombing, and

1 coordination, the actual meeting or arrangement between NATO and KLA to

2 act together.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This arrangement was not made when

4 the bombing started or during the course of the war. This arrangement was

5 made considerably earlier. It is clear this is a Court of the United

6 Nations. The aggression was not carried out with the permission of the

7 United Nations. The UN was side-stepped by NATO.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, that's not the question which Judge

9 Bonomy asked. What he was seeking was whether -- seeking to find out

10 whether you have specific evidence, more concrete evidence of coordination

11 between NATO and the KLA, as distinct from mere speculation.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's absolutely what I've been

13 speaking about for the past two days. So there was a synchronised attack

14 of terrorists somewhere in the territory, on the state border, and it was

15 supported by NATO Air Force. Not only by B52s but also with A10 aircraft

16 and other types of aircraft. There cannot be more tangible and specific

17 cooperation than that.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So what you're saying is, and it may be a perfectly

19 reasonable proposition, I'm not being critical of it, I'm just trying to

20 find out the facts that you're aware of, but what you're saying is that

21 you draw the conclusion from the fact that these things happened

22 simultaneously that they must have been deliberately coordinated. Now, I

23 was really hoping that you would be able to be a bit more -- or to draw

24 our attention to something more concrete as indicating direct agreement

25 between them to act together.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And there are certainly things like

2 that as well, but really, I don't know. You were thousands of kilometres

3 away from the spot.

4 For 78 days the bombing of my country went on. For 78 days there

5 were synchronised attacks of NATO in concert with KLA operations.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, you saw on the video

7 footage as well that Clark, the commander of NATO at the time, is called

8 by the Albanians a KLA veteran. They themselves give him this kind of

9 tribute.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So I emphasise, General, I understand the point you

11 make entirely, but just so that we are clear about what the evidence --

12 there is no direct evidence that you're presenting to us of communications

13 between NATO and the KLA in relation to coordinating their activities.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. Absolutely. We'll

15 probably come across this in the next tabs.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. All right. Now we'll come across the next tabs, but you have been

18 testifying here for a few days now. General, we saw video footage of

19 oath-taking, where reference is made to unification with Albania, and on

20 the same day a meeting between the man who was reading out the oath with

21 Holbrooke and his team as far as back as 1998. Did we not see that here

22 on the videotape?

23 A. I think it was the first and second video that we saw.

24 Q. So there is an alliance. Although before that they said it was a

25 terrorist organisation, there is an alliance precisely with those who are

1 proclaiming the secession of Kosovo and unification with Albania, at state

2 level. Unprecedented. Do you think that that is evidence or not?

3 General --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I did not have the

5 possibility of communicating with the general, however, apart from this

6 tab 620 where we have a review of the targets and the map, I have received

7 in the meantime a list of targets and information sent in to the 3rd Army

8 during the war. So I would like the general to take a look at this now,

9 this document which is very similar --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is not included in the tabs, what you're

11 seeking now to present?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In tab 620, we do have one list of

13 targets. However, in the meantime, as I say, I received a document of

14 lists of targets and other information of electronic surveillance which

15 was sent in to the 3rd Army of the Pristina Corps for the period ranging

16 from the 6th of April to the 15th of June, as they came across them, and

17 the general explained to us that this was done as quickly as possible.

18 The units were sent in this information as speedily as possible to be able

19 to move from the points and positions at which they were located as

20 targets. And this was done in collaboration with NATO and the KLA

21 throughout.

22 The general can take a look at the document. It can be placed on

23 the overhead projector.

24 In the meantime, as I say, I received this document, and I

25 consider that it would be very beneficial for us to see it and to hear the

1 general's comments. I can hand it over to you straight away.

2 That's tab 620 now. All right. Fine. We can discuss those

3 targets as well. Could you hand this document over to the general.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Look at the title page, General, please, and the list itself, the

6 structure.

7 MR. NICE: Nothing has been said about where this document came

8 from, apart from the fact that the accused says he got it. Unless the

9 document in some way identifies its origin.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'll ask the general.

11 General, tell us about the origin, the source of this document.

12 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we deal with 620 first and then let's come

13 to that document later.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, Judge Kwon is suggesting we deal

15 with 620 first, since that's in the tab, and we'll follow that procedure.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. Yes, indeed. I think

17 that the proposal is a very good one.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, take a look at tab 620 now, please. You have it before

20 you, you have it on the map, and you have a list there as well. Just take

21 the targets one by one and tell us what this is about, because I can see

22 you have the region, then you have the coordinates, then you have the

23 units and the activity.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, deal with the provenance of the

25 document first of all.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, would you please be so kind as to tell us the provenance

3 of this document. Where does this survey of discovered targets of the

4 549th Motorised Brigade come from?

5 A. As this is my brigade, this is a review of my intelligence

6 officer, and this is a map compiled by my intelligence officer; and what

7 it says here on this list and the coordinates given, he introduced those

8 onto the map and placed numbers by these points. They were targets which

9 were pinpointed, discovered, and sent out to NATO to be bombed.

10 Q. Are they exact targets as they were discovered and sent out to

11 NATO to be bombed?

12 A. In the first column, you have the region, the locations, the

13 spots, and they are more or less accurate. Yes, it is accurate. My units

14 were in those locations at that period of time.

15 Now, in the other column, the coordinates are also accurate and

16 correct. Now, the third column, the person who identified the units very

17 frequently did not do this in detail, or he wasn't precise enough. But,

18 yes, it is correct and accurate that when this was reported the army was

19 there, the forces -- our forces were there. And I also said that upon

20 learning this, our units, the units who were at these locations, at these

21 coordinates, were moved. We moved them to other locations. And it was

22 our assessment that what was needed was from the time this information was

23 learnt to NATO bombing, that a space of about three to four days elapsed.

24 So we had three to four days during which to act, because I assume that

25 NATO with their surveillance planes would check out the information they

1 were given by the KLA. So as soon as we heard this information, that they

2 had learnt of our -- where our -- where we were, we were able to move our

3 units from the general area, and so we did not suffer any losses thanks to

4 this system that we put in place.

5 Q. All right. Fine. May we now take a look at the document that I

6 received in the meantime, this additional document. Could you explain it

7 to us, General. Have you ever seen this document before, anything like

8 it?

9 A. Yes, I have seen this document before. It -- I am aware and

10 acquainted with the document. It is in fact a report after the war of all

11 the information and intelligence that came into us during the war at the

12 time we learnt of them. The source here is the 280th Centre of Electronic

13 Surveillance. It is the electronic surveillance centre attached to the

14 air force and anti-air defence. And so the source of this information is

15 communication between NATO planes with their command posts in the air. So

16 it is surveillance plane communication and the AVAX [phoen], which were

17 the command posts in the air or communication between the aircraft

18 themselves, or communication between combat planes and planes for

19 electronic jamming.

20 Q. Let's look at the ELMO, and could you comment, point this out to

21 us.

22 A. This comprises several thousand pieces of information. So during

23 one single day, if you look at any of these pages, you will see that

24 Prizren is mentioned, for instance.

25 Q. So this gives us the dates, the coordinates, and all the targets.

1 Tell us, please, General, in your assessment in the area of Kosovo and

2 Metohija, how many projectiles were launched, were used? What would you

3 say, during these 78 days of bombing?

4 A. Well, the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, of course, is a large

5 territory, but on my unit alone -- well, we looked at a tab where it says

6 that on an average on a single day, about 100 projectiles were launched,

7 on average.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there a difference between this as being a

9 record of advance information and noting the locations where the attacks

10 actually took place, or is it a combination of both or what?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is information -- it says

12 here "Report." So according to the locations, not all of them, NATO was

13 active. Now, these reports came in to us. You can see that each of the

14 reports has the exact time noted - the hour, the minute, and perhaps even

15 the second, I don't know - so when that piece of information was received.

16 And that piece of information, through the operative on duty, was

17 immediately sent out to the unit concerned, to the unit that was in

18 jeopardy. There was a computer programme set up according to which when

19 these data are introduced about the coordinates, the computer programme

20 would straight away tell you where the point to be bombed was, where the

21 target on the territory was, and the operations duty officer would

22 immediately inform the unit concerned, the unit in -- that was threatened,

23 the region where the NATO bombing was going to take place.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the information in the right-hand column?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The information in the right-hand

1 column are remarks. It says "Remarks." First of all you have the time,

2 then the latitude, et cetera, and then the remarks, longitude and

3 latitude, and then where the actual target is located within those

4 coordinates.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Remarks include references to -- well, they appear

6 to include references to types of aircraft. If you could look at one of

7 them. There's a word "Pozicija."

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Pozicija," "position," B-52.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: What does that mean?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That means where that particular

11 plane is located at that point in time. When communication has been

12 established with the air command centre, for example, if it is a fighter

13 bomber or a bomber, when it has established contact with AVAX, it was at

14 that position.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So that's information about what actually happened

16 rather than advance information.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is information which came

18 in before something happened, because if you give information that a B-52

19 bomber was at such-and-such location in my area, that, for me, is a signal

20 that I must tell my units and sound the alarm and that they should --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Help me a little more. Mr. Prendergast, can you

22 move the ELMO out a little and you see there -- just a little further.

23 These figures which precede the reference to "Pozicija B-52," what

24 are these figures?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They are figures denoting the

1 position. It is the geographic longitude and latitude at the point at

2 which the plane is at the time it is reporting.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... or is it in the

4 air or what?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's all on the territory of our

6 country.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: So it's in the air.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course in the air. An aircraft

9 in the air. Hostile enemy aircraft in the air.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So it does reflect what actually happened, rather

11 than advance information, which is what I asked you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's what is happening at that point

13 in time in the air, and the consequence of that, what comes next, is the

14 actual bombing.

15 JUDGE KWON: Without translation, it's very difficult to follow,

16 so I would ask the general to take, for example, two or three lines and

17 explain it to us in full after the break.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will do that after the break. We will adjourn

19 for 20 minutes.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. To use our time as rationally as possible and to put things very

25 clearly, in keeping with the suggestions made by Mr. Kwon we looked at tab

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1 620 first.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, this electronic surveillance that we keep coming up against,

4 in layman's terms does that mean interception, listening in, tapping in?

5 A. Yes, that's it.

6 Q. So in tab 620, do we have what the KLA is reporting to NATO about

7 your targets on the ground? Is that it?

8 A. Yes, that's quite clear. It's what they are reporting about my

9 unit.

10 Q. All right. Fine. Now, I already asked you this question, but

11 this reporting and bombing, is it part of one and the same operation?

12 A. It is the beginning and the end of one and the same operation.

13 Q. All right. Fine. Great. Now, you've provided us with a map

14 about that. Now, as I've given you this long document, the big document

15 with the times, the longitude and latitude, et cetera, I'd like to draw

16 your attention to this: In tab 621, to all intents and purposes you have

17 extracts from the document we've already provided. We didn't have the

18 entire document at the time that I've handed over now, but tab 621

19 contains extracts, excerpts from that document.

20 A. Yes, I found it on the big document as well.

21 Q. All right, fine. Now, since the long document hasn't been

22 translated and as 621 has been translated, I'm going to draw your

23 attention to the following: Look at tab 621 first, please. We have the

24 title page first, and then it says NATO aggression against the FRY, and

25 all the air forces are listed; how many British, American, French, Danish,

1 Turkish, Dutch, Spanish, German, Italian, et cetera, aircraft. And then

2 we have what I provided you with, that excerpt, on the following page of

3 tab 621. That is what that shows.

4 Now, take a look at, for example, number 1661, 1661 where are they

5 issuing warnings. What does it say in the remarks?

6 A. It says: "KLA zone warned that in a circle of three nautical

7 miles they should not --"

8 JUDGE KWON: Could you put the English version on the ELMO.

9 That's the second page, 1661. Yes, that's it. Could we see the number.

10 Yes. 1661. Time 2252, yes.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Yes. Then you have the longitude and latitude. I don't want to

13 read that out. The degrees, then we have the minutes, the hours, et

14 cetera. Then it says: "KLA zone warned not to be active in the area of

15 three nautical miles. It is no-fly zone." So they should take care not

16 to target their own forces.

17 A. Yes. And on that same page, higher up, this is mentioned twice.

18 Q. Yes, 1648 and 1649. "KLA active at 3 nautical miles from the

19 centre of this point." And then at 1650, "KLA active at 3 nautical miles

20 around this point."

21 So what do these remarks actually mean?

22 A. They are warnings to planes up in the air that at 3 nautical miles

23 from that point all around, that they should not be active because that's

24 where the KLA is located.

25 Q. All right, fine. Now take a look at the following page. I just

1 have the last three or, rather, three numbers, three digits printed out.

2 The first digit is missing, or the first two digits is missing, but it is

3 nine lines from the top. 1930 -- from the bottom. 1933, where we have

4 the longitude and latitude, and it says: "E-8 warned E-2C to call back

5 the men from the target because the KLA members are there. This region is

6 in the south-eastern quadrant of A-38."

7 So, General, tell us, please, what does this data tell us and this

8 evidence? What does it tell us?

9 A. This latest is an aircraft for electronic surveillance and they

10 are warning that they're at the command centre to call back the planes

11 back in that region so that they should not act against the terrorists.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Therefore, Mr. Robinson, what you

13 say or, rather, the question you asked as to whether the army had

14 perpetrated any crimes in order to react and respond to this, that that's

15 not how it was. The army did not commit any crimes. That's the first

16 point.

17 The army, throughout the presentation of General Delic, performed

18 activities and went into action to repel an unlawful attack simultaneously

19 by NATO and the KLA. It was a simultaneous, unlawful attack on the part

20 of NATO and the KLA together, and all the activities and movements of the

21 army were to repel this simultaneous attack by NATO and KLA forces. I

22 hope that's clear now.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... repelling

24 that attack the crimes in the indictment were committed? Is that your

25 case? Because that is the only way that it becomes relevant.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is my opinion that it is not the

2 case that crimes were committed. Those who were killed were killed in

3 combat activities. Of course, war in itself is a crime, especially an

4 aggression is, but defence and self-defence cannot be a crime. It is not

5 us who attacked any NATO member country. NATO attacked us on our

6 territory in coordinated action with the unlawful forces of the terrorists

7 in that territory. I believe this is fundamental to the legal definition

8 of what happened. A state has a legitimate right to defend itself from

9 aggression and from terrorism. What we have here are terrorist forces and

10 the NATO acting in league. That is completely clear.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there's really no charge against

12 NATO, and the NATO attack only becomes relevant if you can relate it in

13 some way to the acts that are charged in the indictment, and the evidence

14 will have to substantiate that.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, you've produced a document in a

16 table form, a tabular form, with these remarks on the right-hand side, and

17 the general's giving evidence about his understanding of these remarks,

18 and as far as I'm concerned this material could be of some importance in

19 relation to the point you're making about coordination or joint activity

20 between NATO and the KLA, but as I've indicated before when you referred

21 to the annual report of the surveillance information obtained, I find the

22 form in which it's presented very unsatisfactory. There must be something

23 better to substantiate these remarks which the witness is endeavouring to

24 interpret for us. There must be the notes that were originally made from

25 which this record has been compiled. There must be a better basis. And

1 you yourself surely -- you yourself must appreciate that this sort of

2 compilation, which is obviously open to interpretation, which relies on a

3 summary being put together, is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with

4 something as important as this.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, this is not a

6 compilation. This is an agglomerated, comprehensive report, an

7 agglomeration of all reports that were made throughout the year in

8 realtime and the conclusions drawn from them in realtime. So the annual

9 report only gathers all the information in one place, all the intercepts

10 that were made throughout the year through electronic surveillance.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: But some of the remarks are comments that are said

12 to have been overheard and recorded, and you've just led some evidence

13 about these, but there are other remarks here which could be anything.

14 You know, if says "target 10.4 kilometres south-east of Prizren," that

15 could be anything. It doesn't give us any real indication of the source

16 of that information, and it certainly would be helpful to me if at some

17 stage you were able to demonstrate what was behind some of the important

18 remarks that are made in this document.

19 MR. KAY: Can I just raise a matter in relation to Judge

20 Robinson's question to the accused, because there is an issue here which

21 hasn't been raised by the accused this morning but it's something that I

22 raised yesterday and on several previous occasions. He's charged with the

23 crimes of forcible transfer and deportation, and all those events, as

24 you'll see from the indictment, are on the 25th of March onwards, largely

25 from that date onwards. The combined activities of the KLA and NATO

1 delivering, as the general said in his area, 100 bombs a day, that

2 activity leads to the force -- leads to the transfer, the migration, if

3 you like, leads to the forcible transfer issue in this case. Is it

4 migration? Is it forcible transfer? And the people leaving, uprising

5 almost, if you like, from the state of Kosovo, from the -- not the state

6 of Kosovo, from the Kosovo region, the territory, the migration of those

7 people in relation to the response of the KLA and NATO is very important

8 in relation to Defence issues in this trial.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. So that's another -- that's

10 another area in which the NATO attack is related to the charges.

11 MR. KAY: Yes. And consistently the accused has put that element

12 in his case. He hasn't mentioned it today, but it is something that's

13 been a material feature.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: And we've had some evidence of that from

15 witnesses? Through the general, I think.

16 MR. KAY: Yes. And from other witnesses. It's been a consistent

17 thread.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go on?

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General, here in tab 624 you gave a list of commanders -- sorry, a

24 list of VJ members who were killed in the area of responsibility of the

25 549th Motorised Brigade in 1998 and 1999.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. On page 1, ending with number 31, is a list of our soldiers,

3 members of the army, who were killed before the start of NATO aggression.

4 Starting with number 32 until 230 are members of the VJ who were killed

5 during the NATO aggression.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. A certain number of soldiers or, rather, the overwhelming majority

8 of soldiers were killed in combat with terrorist forces, and a number of

9 them were killed as a result of NATO airstrikes. So these two causes of

10 death, basically combat with terrorists and NATO airstrikes, account for

11 the death of all these soldiers.

12 In view of this very large number, 200 soldiers killed during the

13 aggression by the NATO alliance, most of them killed by Siptar terrorist

14 forces, what would you say this evidence shows?

15 A. This evidence or, rather, this fact that 230 soldiers were killed

16 in the zone of responsibility that covers primarily the territory of

17 Kosovo and Metohija and the border belt with Albania, speaks to the

18 intensity of the fighting with terrorist forces in 1998 and especially in

19 1999.

20 Q. Could the conclusion be drawn from this in any way that those

21 people killed were killed by the army in various places?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it is leading.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, did any of these soldiers get killed by civilians?

1 A. Of course they couldn't have been killed by civilians. All of

2 them were killed by terrorists or by bombs or NATO action.

3 Q. Thank you, General. At the same time in 625, you provide a list

4 of MUP members of the Republic of Serbia who were killed in the zone of

5 responsibility of the 549th Motorised Brigade.

6 A. Yes. These are policemen who were killed also in the same area.

7 Q. And a number -- up to number 29 are those killed before the NATO

8 aggression, and after number 29 are those killed during the NATO

9 aggression?

10 A. Yes, from 29 to 72.

11 Q. Did any of these policemen get killed by civilians or in combat

12 with KLA?

13 A. They were killed either by mines laid by the KLA along roads and

14 by NATO airstrikes, by the bombing. And in both categories you should add

15 about three times more people who were wounded in the same way.

16 Q. All right, General. I think this suffices.

17 I would now like to move on to 626, which you already referred to

18 on an earlier occasion. What does this document contain? It is entitled

19 "A survey of criminal proceedings initiated against perpetrators of

20 criminal offences in the zone of the 549th Motorised Brigade in May 1998

21 to July 1999." Could you give us your briefest comment.

22 A. There is a total of 132 items. Most of these people are members

23 of my units, but a certain number are terrorists, members of the KLA who

24 were caught on the border, disarmed, and in 1998 were sent to the military

25 court and in 1999 were sent to the war court. Under one of these columns

1 you can see which -- with which crimes they were charged, and another

2 column shows the verdicts, at least those that were known at the time of

3 -- when this document was developed.

4 Q. Since Mr. Nice pointed out --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that in English? Where are the verdicts that

6 are mentioned?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In fact, it says "Decision of the

8 Court." The one but last column. One but last.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Decisions of the court are indicated

10 in those cases where they were made by the time the document was created.

11 In other cases the indication says that the case is ongoing or that the

12 case was referred to the competent court for the relevant territory.

13 For instance, under item 39 we have a soldier charged with murder,

14 sentenced to five years in prison. Then in number -- under number 103 we

15 have another case.

16 Mr. Nice says that officers were not prosecuted, but here under

17 number 103 we have a major charged with war crime against civilian

18 population, place of perpetration Prizren, sentenced to seven years in

19 prison, and after appeal by the prosecutor, 14 years.

20 Then three lines down there is a captain charged with war crime

21 against civilian population, five years in prison, and that was changed to

22 nine years after appeal by prosecutor.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Now, General --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you continue, let me just

1 find the section of the indictment that deals with Article 7(3). Perhaps

2 Mr. Kay or Mr. Nice -- on page 6, yes.

3 Mr. Nice or Mr. Kay, are the acts or omissions of the subordinates

4 referred to confined to the crimes that are charged in the indictment or

5 are they referable to other crimes that were committed by those

6 subordinates?

7 MR. KAY: Well, the way the indictment is framed, the indictment

8 alleges specific counts against the accused, and this trial is based on

9 those counts within the indictment. So the issues relating to those

10 counts are those that are applied to the Article 7(3) issues, and that's

11 what the Tribunal is specifically looking at in this case.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because the evidence which the accused has been

13 bringing in relation to this matter do not specifically relate to the

14 counts, it appears to me.

15 MR. KAY: No. He's not been incident specific to the counts in

16 the indictment, so what's being brought to the Court's attention are other

17 incidents where there has been due process within the proceedings.

18 One's got to remember this is 1999. The question was asked

19 earlier as to, well, what happened further on? Well, of course, he was

20 brought to this Tribunal in 2001, and the cases having been referred to a

21 military court and on to a civilian court inevitably have a temporal

22 factor involved, and one's got to consider that issue in relation to

23 drawing any conclusions against this accused upon such -- such matters if

24 cases are going through the appropriate procedures within the FRY

25 jurisdiction.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the significance of this evidence is that it

2 shows a culture of due process.

3 MR. KAY: There was, contrary to the Prosecution allegations that

4 this was a police state, that the defendant connived and created the

5 conditions that were in existence at the time, that he actually had in

6 place, constitutionally as well as factually, processes within the FRY

7 system, and warnings having been given to citizens, those involved in

8 public duty such as the army, the police, which he's --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: They would not by themselves serve -- this

10 evidence would not by itself serve to contradict the allegation of a

11 breach of Article 7(3) in relation to the crimes charged, and in a sense

12 it would be contradictory if Mr. Milosevic were to try to do that, because

13 his case, as I understand it, is that he's not responsible for those

14 crimes.

15 MR. KAY: Yes. He's not responsible for those crimes and he's

16 able to show that there were procedures in existence for dealing with

17 those crimes. The issue of knew or ought to have known whether the acts

18 of subordinates were such that they were committing crimes requires a

19 balance and judgement as to what is exactly expected of a head of state.

20 It's not an issue of negligence here and it's not an issue of absolute

21 strict liability. If a crime is proven to have been committed, it can't

22 be said that he has a 7(3) responsibility. What's got to be considered is

23 what were the mechanisms in place and were these mechanisms applied to

24 instances such as this. It would be far too high a standard to say that

25 any crime that was committed, because of 7(3) responsibility, was

1 something for which he was criminally liable. This is a matter that

2 ultimately has to be judged to see what steps were taken and if they were

3 reasonable and if he was in a position to have dealt with certain of the

4 crimes that are alleged to have been committed.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Thank you, Mr. Kay.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: General, can you find in that list that we're now

7 looking at the case we looked at earlier, which was, I think, Topalovic?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Which one is it?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 60.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: We don't have a translation of this document. What

12 has happened?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The details of this soldier, it has

14 to do with Article 146 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of

15 Yugoslavia, that is unlawful killing and wounding of the enemy. The place

16 where the crime was perpetrated is Prizren and its surroundings, and the

17 case was referred to the municipal prosecutor's office in Prizren.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: And then would you say that on the information we

19 had earlier there was a basis for describing the victim as the enemy?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The victim was a civilian. All of

21 this was compiled by the official organs. So I'm reading what was

22 written.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Why would he be described as the enemy in what

24 you've just read to us?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm saying that that's the way it

1 has been written in this report --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm asking you --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- of the professional organs.

4 Probably because this was considered to be a crime, a war crime where

5 higher sentences are envisaged for the perpetrator.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, I don't understand on what basis this

7 person could be described as the enemy.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, he's not described as

9 the enemy. What is mentioned here is Article 146 of the Criminal Code of

10 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is to say unlawful killing and

11 wounding of the enemy. That was the basis that was used to indict him for

12 murder.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because that is an article that is

14 valid in wartime, as far as I know.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: What happens if you kill a friend?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a more serious

17 qualification. The killing of a friend would be qualified as a killing, a

18 murder, whereas Article 146 is a very grave crime.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General, with all due apologies, due to the fact that my documents

22 are incomplete, probably through some technical error, I have nothing in

23 tab 623. When speaking of the NATO operations, could you please just say

24 something about this map. Through the kindness of the liaison officer I

25 have the map now. This is a map of locations bombed using depleted

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7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 uranium in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Could you please explain

2 this map in the briefest possible terms.

3 A. In the briefest possible terms, the first map is a NATO map.

4 Q. The one that's in English?

5 A. Yes. It's a NATO map. They submitted it, and it shows the

6 regions where they used depleted uranium in their attacks.

7 Q. Is that map on the overhead projector now?

8 A. It's not on the overhead projector. It's up here.

9 Q. Can you explain this map in the briefest possible terms.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we could please ask the technical

11 people to show the map that's on the easel.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. So this is a NATO map. It says "NATO K4, unclass."

14 A. This map shows the territory that was targeted using cluster

15 bombs, and especially those where depleted uranium was used.

16 When looking at this map, we can see that part of Metohija just by

17 the Albanian border was targeted very frequently, that is to say using

18 large quantities of such ammunition. In other parts of Kosovo there is

19 very little or, rather, considerably less. And then there is the area of

20 Bujanovac and Presevo. In that area, Bujanovac-Presevo-Vranje, there were

21 also attacks with depleted uranium. It was used 8/10s and seven barrel

22 guns gatling were used for this depleted uranium.

23 Q. General, did you look at this using proper expertise, what this

24 use of depleted uranium meant and the time required for the danger of

25 radiation from this depleted uranium to be over?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, first if he can explain the relevance of

2 this.

3 MR. KAY: Again it goes to the fear factor, the general climate of

4 what was covering this region at the time.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: And so might be related to the question --

6 MR. KAY: The forcible transfer, the migration of people. The

7 conditions and climate created by NATO and the KLA, the manner of the

8 bombardment, the weapons used, the missiles used, the fear that was

9 engendered into the population caused them to migrate.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Have you heard my question, General?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Tell me in the briefest possible terms what you know about that.

15 A. Anybody with at least a bit of knowledge in physics knows that

16 depleted uranium, that is uranium 238, is highly radioactive, and 3.7

17 billion years is the time it takes to decompose. So practically it is

18 limitless. It is very dangerous. If I can say a lethal dose or, rather,

19 a person who takes a particle of --

20 MR. NICE: Frankly, I'm taken by surprise by so much of this

21 material that another dose of expertise of this kind is perhaps neither

22 here nor there but it is expert matter and I can't be expected to --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, I think you have shown me up, because I

24 didn't know that. What kind of background would you have that would

25 enable you to give this kind of evidence?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Any officer knows this, I believe of

2 any army in the world. As far as my army is concerned, with the training

3 we've had, any officer who completed the military academy has to know

4 about that, those who did not undergo additional training. It is simply

5 ridiculous to say there is a lack of knowledge or, rather, that we would

6 have a lack of knowledge of atomic weapons and their radioactivity. That

7 is something that we learn at the military academy, as far as back as

8 that. After all, this is something that is studied in physics.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, tell us in the briefest possible terms what it is that

12 you know. We have established that you have the right kind of education

13 for answering this because you have completed the proper schools. You

14 studied this, and you took tests in this field.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So tell us briefly what you know about this.

17 A. This territory of Kosovo and Metohija, which was targeted with

18 depleted uranium, is practically polluted forever because 3.7 billion

19 years is such a long period. Scientists probably cannot prove even that

20 the earth has been that -- in existence for that long and will it continue

21 to exist for another 4.7 billion years. So forever this territory will

22 continue to be dangerous.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not on the transcript. I was asking whether

1 there were refugees in that area. What's the answer?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already said that that

3 population had left the area. It had fled. As for my army that was in

4 that territory and, generally speaking, the army of Yugoslavia, there is

5 already a number of professionals and soldiers who have died of leukaemia

6 and cancer. Some died soon after the war, others are still being treated.

7 Also among the reserve soldiers, there is a large number of those who are

8 sick.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. What quantity of uranium was dispersed through this area, General?

11 A. Since this is where the thrust of the attack came, a total of 30

12 and 40 -- between 30 and 40 tons of uranium was thrown there. That is our

13 estimate. My zone and the zone of the 125th Brigade was targeted most of

14 all.

15 Q. How much depleted uranium does one particular charge contain, do

16 you know that?

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... evidence now

18 on this matter insofar as it is relevant. I rule we have had enough

19 evidence. Move on to another question.

20 JUDGE KWON: The minefields in this map, are those mines the ones

21 planted by the Serb army?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Serb army set up minefields only

23 by the border. If there are some minefields depicted, they're along the

24 border with Albania or facing the Republic of Macedonia. Those could be

25 our minefields except that we gave KFOR total records for each and every

1 one of these minefields. If we are looking at the territory in-depth,

2 then these are mines and minefields that were placed by the KLA.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Does this include areas where cluster bombs were thrown that can

5 also be considered to be mines?

6 A. Yes. NATO probably depicted that too. They actually showed areas

7 where they used cluster bombs. That is practically throughout the

8 territory of the state but particularly in the territory of Kosovo and

9 Metohija.

10 Q. So these are dispersed mines throughout the territory.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you, General. Could you please explain very briefly the

13 organisational structure of the army in war and peace, then the schematic

14 pertaining to the army command and of the 3rd Army. We have all of that

15 in tab 628 -- or, rather, 626. And the diagram of the Pristina Corps. In

16 the briefest possible terms. And finally you have the diagram of your

17 brigade.

18 So you're a general, and you have the diagram of the structure

19 from the top to the bottom.

20 A. If we start with the schematic of the General Staff of the army of

21 Yugoslavia in peacetime, it is headed by the Chief of General Staff, who

22 has his own office.

23 Q. Can we speed things up, because -- by putting it on the overhead

24 projector, please.

25 MR. NICE: We can have these on the overhead projector because

1 they're not translated, unless the Court has got translations.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you're quite right. We must have it on the

3 ELMO.

4 JUDGE KWON: Tab number should be 628, I assume.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, one by one could you explain these schematics briefly so

7 we know what it's about. You have the army of Yugoslavia as a whole in

8 wartime and in peacetime, then the command diagram in war and peacetime.

9 A. Yes. The Chief of General Staff, with his office and his deputy.

10 Then the department for communications with foreign military

11 representatives is there, and also the security department. Then also the

12 sectors.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Again, Mr. Milosevic and the general, if you look

15 at the transcript, you'll see that the interpreters are asking you to slow

16 down. Please observe a pause between question and answer.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, I'm going to ask you not to read out abbreviations but to

19 say the entire wording. Don't say "Cov," for example, say "land forces."

20 A. Let's move on from the beginning. The sector for operational and

21 staff activities. Then the sector for the army, the land forces. The

22 sector for the air force and anti-aircraft defence. The sector for the

23 navy. The sector for communications, electronic surveillance and

24 reconnaissance. The sector for mobilisation and manning. The sector for

25 training. The sector for logistics and the inspection of the army of

1 Yugoslavia.

2 And then we have the independent departments linked directly to

3 the Chief of the General Staff, the department for information and moral

4 guidance, information department, security department, and administration

5 for housing, or department for housing.

6 The sectors that I have mentioned have within their composition

7 certain departments or administrations, depending on what the sector is.

8 I don't think we need go into those details.

9 Q. No, we don't.

10 A. So that is the General Staff in peace. Now we come to the General

11 Staff in wartime, the next one.

12 So the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Chief of the General

13 Staff. That part is the same as in peacetime. And then where we had the

14 sector for operations and staff affairs, it has two administrations now

15 and two departments. It is subdivided into those four. Instead of the

16 sector for the land forces, we have the administration for the land

17 forces. Instead of the sector for RV and PVO, or rather air defence, et

18 cetera, we have the administration for air defence, the air force and air

19 defence. Instead of the sector for the navy, we now have the

20 administration for the navy. Then we also have the administration for

21 electronic surveillance and anti-electronic defence systems; the

22 administration for mobilisation, replenishment of cadres and systemic

23 questions; the administration for information and moral guidance. We have

24 the logistics sector that remains a sector. Then we have the

25 administration for security and the inspection of the army of Yugoslavia.

1 And directly linked to the administration of replenishment of

2 cadres, mobilisation and systemic questions is the supreme military court

3 and supreme military prosecutor, whereas for the sector for operations and

4 staff affairs we have the centre for intelligence and surveillance linked

5 to that one. And the administration security is linked or, rather, the

6 counter-intelligence centre of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia

7 is linked to the security administration. The other smaller departments I

8 don't think we need go into at this point.

9 Q. Thank you. Now, on the next page is the schematic for commanding

10 the Yugoslav army in peacetime and in war once again.

11 A. These direct lines, or chains of command down the line, denote the

12 chain of command and management and command. The interrupted line, dotted

13 line, denotes coordination and cooperation.

14 Q. But could you put your pointer to the dotted line so we can see

15 what that means, because on the overhead projector you can't really see

16 this properly or clearly.

17 A. This full line is the line of command and control. The

18 interrupted line, the dotted line, shows the line of coordination and

19 cooperation.

20 Q. So we have the Supreme Defence Council at the top there, and if

21 you go down the line, the uninterrupted arrow, the full line.

22 A. Yes, here, the Supreme Defence Council, then we have the president

23 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then the General Staff of the army

24 of Yugoslavia, and then this goes further, further down towards the units

25 and the individual commands. That's the chain of command from top to

1 bottom.

2 Then we have the dotted line towards the federal government, the

3 line of coordination and cooperation, and from the General Staff the

4 dotted line going towards the Federal Ministry of Defence. Coordination

5 and cooperation once again, that's the line.

6 Q. Now we have the schematic for wartime commanding.

7 A. Let's take it from the top. Here we can see that chain of

8 command: The Supreme Defence Council is at the top, the president of the

9 FRY, with his military cabinet or officers to which we have the Guards

10 Brigade linked, and then the Chief of the General Staff with their

11 cabinets and deputies. Then we come to the sectors of administration,

12 which we saw previously and explained, and directly for the Chief of the

13 General Staff we have the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies linked to him, the air

14 defence systems and air force, the navy and the three smaller units; the

15 46th Motorised Brigade, the 72nd Special Brigade, and the Anti-terrorist

16 Brigade, detachment. Kobra is its name.

17 Q. Now, General, since this is very important for the chain of

18 command, could you show us the levels of command of the army of

19 Yugoslavia, that schematic, which is the next schematic that we come to,

20 the next diagram. We have groups here, groupings, and when you go down to

21 the concrete specific units, we have six levels of command down that

22 chain, lower down.

23 A. Yes. We have the Supreme Defence Council at the top once again.

24 That is the supreme organ, the supreme body and supreme level of command,

25 the top-most level. Then we have the president who is the -- presides

1 over the supreme council of command.

2 Q. All right. And then those squares or -- we have the President of

3 the FRY there, and to him we have the General Staff linked, and then after

4 the General Staff, what are the levels? Could you show this, could you

5 indicate this to us on the overhead projector. We can't see it.

6 A. Linked to the General Staff, we have the armies, the army level:

7 Three armies, the air force and anti-air defence, and the navy.

8 Q. Right. So underneath the armies, we have the corps.

9 A. Yes, the corps.

10 Q. And then we come to the brigades and regiments.

11 A. We had the division, one division there. The division level is

12 the first level, then the second level is the brigades level, then the

13 third level is the battalion level, then the fourth level is the company

14 level or battery level. Level five is the platoon level, and level six is

15 [indiscernible] level.

16 Q. Right, General. That's that one. Now, let's take a specific

17 example. The 3rd Army, for example, which the Pristina Corps came under,

18 and your brigade specifically. Let's take a look at what that was like.

19 I'd like to look at the schematic for the 3rd Army structure in wartime to

20 save time. Not to go through the peacetime one but through the war

21 diagram.

22 A. So this is the organisational structure the 3rd Army in wartime.

23 The commander of the 3rd Army is at the top there, and then that is his

24 command, and it is composed of a staff and headquarters.

25 Do you want me to go down the line there, what the staff comprises

1 of and the headquarters?

2 Q. No, you needn't go into those details.

3 A. Then we come to the box next door. It is the department for

4 information and psychological and propaganda effects, the security

5 department, the legal department, the personnel department, and the

6 logistics department, and then linked to the commander directly we have

7 two corps linked to him the Nis Corps and the Pristina Corps. Then once

8 again the individual units at lower level linked to the army command. The

9 Nis Corps has its brigades and regiments. Do you want me to go through

10 that?

11 Q. No need. Let's look at the Pristina Corps.

12 A. The Pristina Corps has its own units there and they are the

13 independent units within the composition of the 3rd Army, which means that

14 we're now going down the Pristina -- the Pristina Corps. The commander.

15 Q. We have the direct link of the brigades linked to the commander.

16 Let's go further down. The 78th Brigade, for example, and lower down we

17 have its battalions, so I won't mention them, just the brigades. The 78th

18 Brigade, the 125th Brigade, the 549th Brigade, the 354th, the 52nd Mixed

19 Artillery Brigade, the 159th Artillery Brigade, PVO, the 15th Armoured

20 Brigade, the 243rd Mechanised Brigade, and the 352nd Engineers Regiment.

21 And the corps had independent battalions as well: The 52nd Battalion for

22 special purposes, the 52nd Battalion for communications, the 54 for the

23 medical corps, the 54 Battalion of the BHO, the 52nd Additional Battalion,

24 and the 49th Pontoon Company, and some other units.

25 Q. All right. Fine. Now, we've seen where the brigades come in.

1 Now look at the 549th Motorised Brigade of yours in wartime; the commander

2 and then down the line, down the chain.

3 A. It is my 549th Motorised Brigade. I am the commander in that one.

4 I have my staff, I have assistant commander for moral guidance, I have the

5 organ for security and the organ for logistics. They are directly linked

6 to me. Then we have directly linked to me three motorised battalions; the

7 armoured battalion, the howitzer artillery battalion 122 millimetres,

8 mixed anti-armoured artillery battalion, a light artillery battalion PVO,

9 and Engineers Battalion or company. And then we have the subordinated

10 units: The 40 Bofors millimetre unit, the Prizren unit with the 108th and

11 68th Detachment, the 354th Detachment, the 55th Border Battalion, the 3rd

12 company from the 53rd Border Battalion, two batteries 128 millimetres,

13 they are called Oganj, and one battery 155 millimetres from the corps

14 artillery brigade.

15 Q. General, thank you for those explanations. Now would you go back

16 for a moment to the schematic of the level of command of the army of

17 Yugoslavia that we had previously, the command level where we can see the

18 chain of command from the Supreme Defence Council, the president of the

19 FRY, and the General Staff, the level of the armies, the corps level, the

20 division level, brigades, battalions, companies, batteries, squads, et

21 cetera.

22 Now, my question to you is this: At any point in time -- and this

23 is also the chain of command, is it not?

24 A. Yes, that's right.

25 Q. At any point in time was the chain of command disrupted in that

1 one and a half years about which you are testifying?

2 A. The chain of command was never interrupted or disrupted in any

3 way. It always had three levels; strategic, strategic operative, and

4 tactical, those three levels. The strategic level is that one, the

5 strategic operations level at the level of the army and the corps, whereas

6 the other six levels down the line are tactical levels; divisions,

7 brigades, battalions, companies, regiments and squads, and the chain of

8 command always went down that chain. That was the chain, those were the

9 links towards the subordinate units or, rather, reporting from the ground

10 roots level, subordinate level, up to the command level, and vice versa.

11 Q. At the second tactical level of command is where you were; is that

12 right?

13 A. Yes. It was the tactical level is the second tactical level, just

14 after the division level.

15 Q. Right. Fine. Now, since you have just the corps above you in

16 your specific situation, you were, practically speaking, at the first

17 level of tactical command; is that right?

18 A. Yes. Between us and the corps, that was the direct link, the

19 direct chain line.

20 Q. Right. Fine. Now, you had from top to bottom and from bottom to

21 top reporting and communication throughout that chain of command. During

22 those -- that communication, did you have any orders, or coming down from

23 your subordinates levels did you have any reports coming from top to

24 bottom or from bottom to top about -- reports about any specific order or

25 any kind of decision which can be tied up with any kind of war crime?

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1 A. No, absolutely not.

2 Q. Very well, General. Now let's move on. Just a few more

3 questions. You have explained to us all the movements of units, what you

4 did throughout the material time. Now, what was the relationship between

5 the members of the army of Yugoslavia towards civilians and Albanian

6 civilians? What was their attitude?

7 A. Speaking in general terms, globally, that attitude and

8 relationship can be termed to be proper, correct, and professional, with

9 exceptional -- with exceptions as individual cases.

10 Q. All right. The individual cases that we mentioned, for the ones

11 you learned about, was -- were they sanctioned in keeping with the law?

12 A. Yes. Regardless of how we reached information, through which

13 chain of command, security chain, or other state organs, each individual

14 case was dealt with. Precisely because of the morale of the unit and

15 combat readiness of the unit, it was sanctioned forthwith.

16 Q. Right. You said that the attitude of the members of the army

17 towards Albanian civilians was professional, did you not? Proper and

18 correct; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, can we take a look at the DVD that we have and can we see

21 some of that on the footage?

22 A. As there are quite a number of DVDs, a lot of footage, we've

23 already seen some of those excerpts. We saw the army. We saw soldiers

24 and -- and their relationship with other state organs and civilians, how

25 they dealt with the problem of bombing, of the bombardment. We saw that,