1 Tuesday, 22 February 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, to continue your cross-examination.

7 And we want to move as quickly as possible. The Chamber will be

8 considering the whole question of time, use of time in relation to this

9 case, and we'll be saying something about that shortly.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I've already made my position clear on

11 this witness and generally.

12 WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC [Resumed]

13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, as foreign minister for five years and permanent

16 representative at the United Nations, my suggestion to you is you know

17 full well the responsibility that this accused has for events that

18 happened in Croatia and in Bosnia but that you haven't told us the full

19 truth. Do you understand? It's my suggestion to you.

20 A. I understand what you're saying, but at the same time, I would

21 like to say that your claim is all wrong. Mr. Milosevic had very limited

22 abilities to influence the development of events, both in Croatia and in

23 Bosnia, and a number of facts I mentioned point in that direction. One of

24 the facts being that he was among the first to insist that peace forces be

25 brought to Croatia. He also accepted immediately all five peace

1 proposals, and he was the key figure in the acceptance of the Dayton Peace

2 Accords.

3 Q. Before I move on to matters of substance I suggest that you've

4 completely misled us in your observations about the desire to have all

5 Serbs living in one area eventually, and that it is as clear as can be

6 from all the documents that I've provided to you - and we'll look at a few

7 of them, but not very many - it was as clear as can be that that was the

8 underlying objective of everyone on both sides of the Drina. Correct or

9 incorrect?

10 A. Mr. Nice, that's incorrect. What is correct is that the Serbs

11 across the Drina River, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,

12 insisted upon their constitutional right to self-determination, which was

13 equal for all constituent nations in Yugoslavia. That constituent right

14 of theirs was guaranteed both by the constitutions of Croatia and

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Exercising that right did not mean that they just wanted to annex

17 their state to Serbia but that they had a choice to remain in the state

18 that existed until that time. We supported their right just as we

19 supported the rights that were available to other peoples living in Bosnia

20 and Herzegovina, in Croatia and in Slovenia.

21 Q. Your suggestion, finally, of the matters I'm going to pick out,

22 your suggestion that you didn't know of the level of support given by

23 Serbia for the Krajina and also for the Serbs in Bosnia is simply absurd,

24 I will suggest to you. A person in your position had to know the

25 percentage and part of Serbia's income going to these interests, and you

1 haven't told us the truth about that.

2 A. Mr. Nice, you are drawing conclusions too quickly, and those

3 conclusions go against the facts. Let me reiterate that, in addition to

4 supporting the rights of the Serbs across the Drina, both in Croatia and

5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their right to self-determination, we supported

6 them financially and materially in order to ensure their continued

7 existence. We never concealed that fact. And it is true that certain

8 financial means of Yugoslavia were sent to those former republics so as to

9 ensure that those people would not starve to death.

10 Q. Are you aware of what Mladic said at the 50th session of the RS

11 Assembly in April 1995 about the percentage of support that he'd received

12 over the previous years from Belgrade? Yes or no.

13 A. I'm not aware of that.

14 Q. Were you aware of what the accused himself said when he was

15 arrested about the support he had provided for weapons and ammunitions and

16 other needs of the army of the Republika Srpska constituting a state

17 secret? That's what he said and was made publicly known. Are you aware

18 of that?

19 A. I read the statement given by Mr. Milosevic when he was in prison

20 in Belgrade, the statement relating to the financial assistance given to

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... did that come as a complete

23 surprise to you, foreign minister for five years, permanent representative

24 for five years, and were you at one stage also a Deputy Prime Minister?

25 A. For me it was quite a surprise, because I knew that we provided

1 material support, but I didn't know about the details. I wasn't involved

2 in any other discussions regarding that.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... direct evidence here from

4 Mr. Babic about direct funding provided at his request to this accused.

5 Were you entirely unaware of that? Is that what you're telling us?

6 A. I've already said to you that I was not involved in any

7 discussions concerning military support and military issues. I didn't

8 know any details about the material support that was provided to Serbs

9 across the Drina River.

10 Q. My suggestion to you is that it's simply unacceptable and

11 unrealistic --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a matter of the record. Direct

13 funding provided to this accused was provided by this accused?

14 MR. NICE: Yes.

15 Q. My suggestion to you is your answer is simply and completely

16 unrealistic. Let me remind you of a few facts: In the course of your

17 duties, Serbia had four different Prime Ministers, the federal republic

18 had three different Prime Ministers, there were four other foreign

19 ministers, just to name some of the office holders. So as people were

20 turning over, you remained a constant figure. Now, if things were being

21 kept from government ministers and representatives at the UN, who was

22 doing it; one of these other Prime Ministers, one of these other foreign

23 ministers? Who was doing it? Who was keeping it from you?

24 A. I don't know what they had to keep from me, but in every

25 government there is a division of tasks, and every minister is in charge

1 of his responsibilities. Within my domain, I had to deal with the

2 disintegration of Yugoslavia. I had to protect the reputation of the name

3 of Yugoslavia in the world.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... anyone, can you, who would

5 have kept this information from you?

6 A. I did not have an impression that anything is being concealed from

7 me. I did not have much time --

8 Q. What you're telling us is that everything that was done was

9 correct and above board and proper for one state to do in respect of the

10 affairs of neighbouring territories, therefore, there would be no need to

11 keep anything from you.

12 A. I've already stated what I know, and what I know is not something

13 that Yugoslavia or Serbia can be blamed for.

14 Q. Very well. The truth, Mr. Jovanovic, is this: That this accused,

15 who didn't have a platform of his own, or a philosophy, rose to power in

16 answer to the needs of others, the Serb intellectuals and probably also

17 the Kosovo Serbs. True or false in your analysis?

18 A. Not true, because you're neglecting the fact that the Serb people

19 to a great extent were dissatisfied with the status they had within the

20 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was constantly kept under

21 control by the leadership of Croatia and Slovenia, and Josip Broz Tito

22 constantly put in offices people who were obedient to him. Therefore, the

23 Serbian people felt oppressed, and it is not a great surprise that

24 Mr. Milosevic in the first free elections was elected by a great majority

25 of votes as the first Serbian President.

1 Q. And once in office, and you shared offices -- you shared office or

2 you had office for a long period of time, once in office, those of you

3 there realised that, to stay in office, the accused needed to serve the

4 interests of the constituencies that had supported him; nationalists,

5 Kosovo Serbs, and he did everything that was necessary to stay in office;

6 correct?

7 A. This is an opinion that originated from our former western

8 republics which wanted to portray Mr. Milosevic as a Serb nationalist. To

9 my knowledge, he was never a Serb nationalist because he acknowledged

10 equal rights to all peoples living in the former Yugoslavia.

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... you all knew that he had to

12 serve the interests of the nationalists to stay in office, and he did

13 whatever was necessary in support of the Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian

14 Serbs to achieve that end; correct?

15 A. No, not correct. Entirely incorrect. You have absolutely

16 accepted the thesis of the former secessionists, Tudjman and Kucan, who

17 launched that thesis in order to conceal their own secession which could

18 not have been recognised had there been not this attack against Serbian

19 leadership in Yugoslavia.

20 MR. NICE: Mr. Nort's assistance, very rapidly, tab 8 of the

21 defendant's documents on the overhead projector, the report of 30th of May

22 over which some time was spent. If we just look, please, at this. First

23 of all put it on the overhead projector for ease of reference. Page 3. I

24 beg your pardon. Page 2, please, Mr. Nort.

25 The overhead projector, please, technical booth. And page 3,

1 please, for the usher. Third page. Yes.

2 This report which we looked at included references in paragraph 8

3 to General Nedeljko Boskovic having conducted discussions with Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina Presidency, and the suggestion is that he was unable, I think,

5 to control Mladic. In fact, Boskovic did succeed in controlling Mladic on

6 one occasion and bragged about it, didn't he?

7 A. It is possible, but I'm telling you I was not kept abreast of

8 these military developments at all. I learned this from the report to the

9 Secretary-General of the UN.

10 Q. Paragraph 9. "Given the doubts that now exist about the ability

11 of the authorities in Belgrade to influence General Mladic ..." Then a

12 few lines down, just to remind the Court, "While it is my hope that the

13 shelling of the city will not be resumed, it is also clear that the

14 emergence of General Mladic and the forces under his command as

15 independent actors apparently beyond the control of JNA..."

16 And then over the page, please, Mr. Nort, to paragraph 13: "The

17 anomalous position of General Mladic and the forces under his command, who

18 are subject neither to the authority of Belgrade nor to that of the

19 government of Bosnia ..."

20 Now, at the time of this report the JNA was just on the process of

21 disintegrating and the VRS was just in the process of being formed;

22 correct?

23 A. The army of Republika Srpska, as I understood, based on this

24 report and other sources, was created by the Serbs in Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina who were in the JNA forces and deployed to Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina located in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.

2 Q. At the changeover or the change of forces from being JNA to

3 becoming in large part VRS, this document reflects some uncertainty as to

4 the ability of either the JNA, as it makes clear, or Belgrade itself to

5 influence him, but it's only expressing uncertainty, isn't it?

6 A. As far as I understood it, the JNA had great difficulties in

7 withdrawing from Bosnia and Herzegovina their formations which had

8 soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro in it because those soldiers were --

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... short, this document is

10 expressing uncertainty about the ability at that stage, and that's all.

11 And this is the changeover stage, expressing uncertainty about the ability

12 to control Mladic.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, where in the document do the -- does

14 the document cite that as the basis of the --

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, paragraph 9 says "... doubts about the

16 ability ..."

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but your thesis is that this was due to the

18 changeover and you need to have a factual basis for that in the document

19 itself if you're putting it to the witness.

20 MR. NICE: It's a question of time. Paragraph 5: "The bulk of

21 the JNA personnel who were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were citizens of

22 that republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authority's

23 decision of 4 May to withdraw the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of

24 them appear to have joined the army of the so-called 'Serbian Republic of

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina.'"

1 It goes on to deal with the statistics on all that.

2 Q. I'm asking the witness: It's right, isn't it, this was at the

3 time of the establishment of that army, that new army, and the changeover

4 of authority, and all that this document is expressing is doubts about the

5 ability of the JNA or Belgrade to control him, correct?

6 A. The doubts are no proof at all. Anybody can have doubts. The JNA

7 did have great difficulties in ensuring that they withdrew their forces

8 from Bosnia and Herzegovina safely. The army of Alija Izetbegovic

9 obstructed them in that endeavour. There were many victims in

10 Dobrovoljacka street and Tuzla and so on. Therefore, the withdrawal of

11 the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina was obstructed on purpose by Alija

12 Izetbegovic in order to use it in their campaign against Serbia and

13 Yugoslavia.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... move on. You can just help

15 us with this: We know, and we're going to look at it very briefly, that

16 immediately following this report there was a further Resolution of the

17 Security Council, effectively condemning that the Serbs -- Security

18 Council Resolutions are based on the totality of information coming to

19 various members who are party to the Resolutions; correct?

20 A. I don't know what Resolution you have in mind. There was a

21 Resolution where that was condemned and withdrawal was requested, but

22 there was also a report of the Secretary-General confirming that the units

23 of the JNA had withdrawn from the barracks from which withdrawal was

24 obstructed by Alija Izetbegovic. As far as I know, the Presidency, on the

25 5th of June, officially informed the last soldier of the JNA had

1 withdrawn.

2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... procedural one which you as a

3 permanent representative know, Resolutions are made on the totality of

4 information coming to those engaged in drafting and approving the

5 Resolution; correct?

6 A. I don't know whether that is correct or not. Rather, I know that

7 based on that information, they adopted certain documents. I don't know

8 whether that information was complete, whether they also took into account

9 information coming from Belgrade and Yugoslavia in general.

10 Q. The first of the three topics I said I would speak to you about,

11 namely the authority of the accused, I have only time for one other

12 question this morning, and it's this: You told us about the development

13 of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Serbia.

14 Both those ministries, set up under the 1990 act, I think, were abolished

15 in 1993 while the third ministry established, the Ministry for Serbs

16 Overseas, continued in effect. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry

17 of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry, were abolished in 1993 because by

18 then the accused had sufficient and adequate control over the FRY as not

19 to need such ministries for Serbia. Would that be correct?

20 A. It is correct that they were abolished, but the explanation you

21 provided is incorrect, because in the meantime, the former Yugoslavia was

22 reconstituted and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created.

23 Therefore, one year was needed in order for the organs to establish mutual

24 links and relations, and when that was done it was decided those two

25 ministries should be abolished because there was no purpose in their

1 further existence.

2 Q. You understand the Prosecution's position on this, don't you, Mr.

3 Jovanovic: There was in fact never a need for a Foreign Ministry for the

4 Republic of Serbia nor a need for a Ministry of Defence in a country that

5 claims it has no army. Those ministries were set up for a practical and

6 -- for a practical purpose in 1990, and by 1993 the accused could get

7 everything he wanted through the FRY. That is the reality, isn't it?

8 A. No, that is not the reality, because in 1990, or in the former

9 Yugoslavia, the state was in a very difficult situation. We didn't know

10 how things were going to develop. Therefore, that constitution in 1990,

11 as a measure of precaution, decided to establish these two ministries, and

12 the Ministry of Defence existed practically only on paper.

13 Q. Third topic that I was going to discuss to you, the prevailing

14 ambition of all of you to achieve a state where all the Serbs could live

15 together. There is one existing telephone intercept transcript -- no, I

16 beg your pardon. I'm looking at the wrong document. My mistake.

17 Can you look at this document, please. It's a new document, it's

18 been referred to before, it comes from a book of documents. It's the

19 declaration concerning the conditions for recognition of new states.

20 Dated the 16th of December. If the usher would be good enough to put the

21 second page on -- there it is. 16th of December, 1991, where the European

22 Community, and we can look at the foot of that page, inviting all Yugoslav

23 republics to state by the 23rd of December whether they wish to be

24 recognised as independent. Do you remember this declaration and indeed

25 this document?

1 A. Certainly. And I replied to this declaration. I spoke about that

2 on the first day I gave testimony.

3 Q. What this -- what this document did, what this invitation did was

4 to render forever obsolete the Belgrade initiative which sought the

5 inclusion of Bosnia because Bosnia was bound to accept the invitation and

6 apply for independence. It heralded the new departure of the third

7 Yugoslavia which itself failed in the following year and it gave rise to

8 the inevitability of war if the accused and those he represented were to

9 have their way; correct?

10 A. Your approach is entirely wrong. It is prejudicial and selective.

11 You're basically supporting the policy of European Community secessionist

12 republics. The European Community supported from the beginning the

13 secessionist policy which led to all the problems that ensued later. The

14 Belgrade initiative wanted to continue the struggle for preserving the

15 former Yugoslavia in which everybody lived together in prosperity. If a

16 -- if an appeal was sent to Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was

17 done precisely in order to reconstitute the new state and to turn it into

18 a stable state where everybody would be guaranteed equality.

19 Unfortunately, this initiative was not successful because it was

20 undermined from elsewhere and because these republics were encouraged to

21 proceed with their secession. Previously, it had already been decided to

22 inflict a deadly blow upon Yugoslavia and to render it obsolete with the

23 stroke of a pen. This was a crime against humanity and peace.

24 Q. I see. May tab 5 be produced, please. You're saying, are you,

25 that the -- no, never mind.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 May tab 5 be produced.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Tab 8, please, next, from the Prosecution proposed exhibits.

5 This, Mr. Jovanovic, is quite an extensive intercepted telephone

6 conversation between yourself involving Karadzic and Koljevic. It's

7 already been produced, you've had an opportunity to look at it, and I see

8 I think you took the documents away with you over the weekend and I'm glad

9 you did so.

10 Can I just look at two passages, please, Mr. Nort. In the English

11 version at page 5, and I'm afraid I haven't checked -- it's already an

12 exhibit. I haven't checked the parallel for page 5. I don't know if --

13 it's my mistake for not having that in hand. At page 5 -- page 5 has you

14 saying in your conversation with Karadzic the only thing that is not

15 mentioned here -- you were talking at this time - this is February of 1992

16 - is the unchangedness of borders, but you have no borders yet

17 established. Now, have you found that passage? It will be about page 6

18 or 7.

19 A. I have read this. I've read it over the weekend.

20 Q. Very well, then.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see this on the transcript of the

24 conversation. It's on page 3 of the Serbian text. The last line on page

25 3, but --

1 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

2 Q. Have you got that on page 3? You've read this in any event over

3 the weekend. This makes it quite clear, doesn't it, that you were

4 determined there should be no changing of the then-borders created in

5 Bosnia. Would that be right?

6 A. No, it wouldn't be right. If you read the entire conversation,

7 and you should look at it as a whole and not extract a sentence out of

8 context, this had to do with the preparations for the delegation of Bosnia

9 and Herzegovina, for negotiations with Ambassador Cutileiro in order to

10 establish a cantonal Bosnia. Mr. Karadzic wanted to check some of his

11 thoughts and clarify some concepts because he wasn't clear about some

12 legal concepts. I said here something that's correct, and that is that

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina were yet to be constituted as an independent state

14 on the basis of a cantonal order, and this process was under way, and they

15 were to negotiate and reach a joint conclusion. I did not say that there

16 would be no change of borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what is before us is not what you are

18 talking about.

19 MR. NICE: I'm so sorry if it isn't. That's my mistake for not

20 checking. But in any event, Your Honours, because of the length of the

21 document, because the witness has now read it and because I had to ask the

22 interpretation of the document to be a matter for the Chamber in due

23 course, and I put my case, if the usher would be good enough to put page 6

24 on it, it picks up at page 6 and goes on to page 7, the passage I'm

25 referring to him. The only thing that is not mentioned here is

1 unchangedness of the borders. "You have no borders yet established..."

2 and it's that passage that follows that I was referring the witness to.

3 But, Your Honour, may I finish with this document in this way:

4 Q. The cantonal approach of this, which is the Cutileiro plan, also

5 found at our tab 25, was appealing to you and to the Serb leadership

6 because it did indeed have ethnic borders. Isn't that correct?

7 A. It was acceptable for the entire Conference on Yugoslavia, and all

8 the participants, including Mr. Izetbegovic. Later he withdrew from this

9 position, and he was persuaded to do so by America.

10 Q. My case on that particular -- or my proposition on that particular

11 intercept in mind, can we look briefly at tab 25, an existing exhibit,

12 Exhibit 810, and to remind you of --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, does that last one have an exhibit

14 number?

15 MR. NICE: Sorry, it's an existing exhibit.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have the number?

17 MR. NICE: I certainly do. It is 613, tab 243.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. And again, it's a document we've looked at before but not with

21 you, Mr. Jovanovic. It's a Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs document.

22 You have seen it, you've gone through it over the weekend, I have no

23 doubt, and without taking time on it, because it's available to the Court,

24 the last paragraph that comes from your Ministry of Foreign Affairs, says

25 this -- second page, please, Mr. Nort, last paragraph: "Value of the

1 Cutileiro's Plan rested with that the International Community already at

2 that time showed its readiness to legalise and verify internationally and

3 legally the borders of Serbian territories in BiH."

4 Now, these were ethnical borders and this was the value to you,

5 wasn't it?

6 A. Ethnical borders also exist in the Dayton Accord, and that has

7 been accepted by the whole world. It was the only way to calm down

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent it from rushing into war.

9 Q. I'm dealing with things chronologically, trying to enable the

10 Court to have a chronological picture. This is the Cutileiro plan.

11 You're writing about it after the event in 1994 but it's a 1992 event.

12 And at that stage the attraction of this plan, and you've gone on about

13 how you say every peace plan was accepted, the actual attraction of this

14 plan was its ethnical borders which were going to be recognised

15 internationally; correct?

16 A. In all the other plans the internal ethnic borders were

17 recognised. This was an expression of the right to self-determination of

18 the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I see nothing

19 bad or terrible about it. That's why it was accepted by the international

20 community.

21 Q. The next document is tab 12, which is the stenographic record of

22 the Council for Harmonisation that met on the 11th of August. Just while

23 it's coming up, to remind the Court, the Council for Harmonisation, wider

24 than the SDC, with representations from the RS and the RSK.

25 Again you will have gone through this over the weekend so we can

1 deal with it all very swiftly, but at page 23 in the English --

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice's question contains a

5 substantive error. He can see that in the stenogram. This Council for

6 Harmonisation was drawn up by members of the council established by the

7 then president of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic. The members of the council

8 are listed, and it can clearly be seen that the representatives of the RS

9 and the RSK were not members of that council, and they were invited by the

10 chairman to participate. Therefore, there were no representatives outside

11 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this council, but --

12 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... cut into my time.

13 I have no time to afford to give to the accused, I'm afraid.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: What he's saying is you have made a

15 misrepresentation.

16 MR. NICE: It's wider than the SDC.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: There was no representation from the RS and RSK.

18 MR. NICE: If the composition is not the representation, he can

19 deal with it in re-examination, but I'm grateful for the intervention and

20 if I may deal with it in a question, it's in this way:

21 Q. This is for a council -- Perhaps Mr. Nort would put the first

22 page of the document on the overhead projector, since the accused raises

23 it. As translated this embodies the Council for Coordination of points of

24 view on state policy. Incidentally, you can see it was actually held in

25 Dobanovci. I asked you about that, you didn't recall it; never mind.

1 Coordination of whose points of view, Mr. Jovanovic? Whose points

2 of view were to be coordinated? If it wasn't the RS and the RSK who were

3 invited along, whose points of view were to be coordinated?

4 A. The points of view of the federal organs and the organs of the

5 republic were to be harmonised with the new president, Milan Panic, who

6 frequently acted very independently without a thorough understanding of

7 the problems and issues involved. In order to protect him from his

8 embarking on facts which were not familiar to him, he was to be

9 familiarised with these issues and conclusions.

10 Q. Was there to be coordination with those coming along, if not as

11 representatives of the council nevertheless coming along on, I think, all

12 the occasions we've looked at from the RS and the RSK, was there to be

13 coordination with them? Was that what it was about?

14 A. These meetings were convened by the president of the Republic of

15 Yugoslavia, Mr. Cosic, and with reference to the representatives of the

16 Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were only consultative. They were

17 to be given advice or clarifications with respect to previous meetings;

18 for example, the London conference.

19 Q. Page 23 in the English, please, and 23 at the bottom. I hope it's

20 the same pagination as mine. It's not the same as mine.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I became alert yesterday to the fact that

22 there was a marginal difference of pagination between my pages and -- can

23 I have the document back? Thank you very much. No, top of page 23 it

24 will be.

25 Right. The top of page 23 -- top of page 23, please. Top. Right

1 at the top. Right.

2 Q. We see a passage - this is you speaking - and it says this:

3 "However, I am really afraid that the other side, the opponents' side

4 doesn't want that because it wants clear and clean discontinuity, that

5 psychological second to set in. That's important for them because of

6 their strategic aspirations for the Balkans and because they want to deny

7 us the position of Piedmont, that is the possibility that tomorrow or in

8 ten or fifty years we become a new centre which will bring Yugoslav

9 peoples together."

10 Pausing there, Piedmont is a reference to the province of Italy

11 that occupied a broadly similar position to Serbia at the unification of

12 Italy in the 19th century.

13 It goes on: "That is something that the previous generations have

14 put into our hands. We have no right to throw it away. We may choose not

15 to use it at the time when conditions are unfavourable, but we should

16 still preserve it, because if it were not so important, it would not

17 brother our opponents so much."

18 This, Mr. Jovanovic, is another clear announcement by you of the

19 desirability of leaving the situation so that all Serbs could live in one

20 state, and it was the underlining purpose and it was as plain as could be.

21 A. That's not what was said. What was said was that all the southern

22 Slavs have the right to a common state. This was their dream for

23 centuries, and it was realised in 1918. Unfortunately, the European

24 Community managed to turn it into dust and ashes. If Serbia was Piedmont

25 for the southern Slavs, this a historical fact. This is why

1 Austria-Hungary waged the First World War against Serbia, so as to prevent

2 that. The shedding of large quantities of blood in these unfortunate wars

3 was a pledge that nothing like that would happen again in the future. The

4 noble desire of all the southern Slavs are something that no other

5 southern Slav would give up.

6 MR. NICE: Would the usher please bring me the papers and I'll

7 just have a look for one other short passage from this document, because

8 it may not be the same page number and I can just about afford the time to

9 do it. Thank you very much.

10 Q. You know that, probably from reading the transcript of this trial,

11 that an issue is whether there was equality of approach to the Serbs in

12 Bosnia and Croatia and the Serbs -- and the Kosovo Albanians. You know

13 about that, don't you?

14 A. Yes, I know that. There was not and could not have been a single

15 approach because these were constituent peoples, and this was guaranteed

16 by the constitutions of these peoples in the former Yugoslavia.

17 Q. Very well --

18 A. The Albanians in Kosovo were an ethnic minority.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... let's look at this passage

20 where the accused is speaking in the same meeting. He recognised full

21 well - top of the page, please. That's fine. He recognised, we can see

22 it at the top of the page, the validity or the problem of that argument,

23 because he says this: "I didn't have any reservations with regards to

24 this, but an explanation how to avoid with what arguments that the same

25 right is requested for the Albanians, that is the problem. This is the

1 thorn in our argumentation. We know what our arguments are, we have to

2 see what arguments will be acceptable to them."

3 The inconsistency of approach between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians

4 was always recognised, wasn't it?

5 A. No. In this case, as far as I understand, Mr. Milosevic pointed

6 out that we have a constitution which differentiates between minorities

7 and constituent peoples. However, the international community, or rather,

8 its western part, did not recognise this distinction. It also forcibly

9 demoted the Serbs in Bosnia and in Croatia to the status of minorities.

10 This led to conflicts and ultimately it was recognised that the Serbs in

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina are a constituent people. This was not the case in

12 Croatia where they were reduced to the status of a minority.

13 MR. NICE: Next exhibit, please, is tab 15, which is the shorthand

14 notes for the meeting on the 9th of January. I've got a few rather more

15 references to look at in this one but the page numbering won't be a

16 problem. If the page -- if the usher could have the English, and it's

17 page 25 at the bottom -- beg your pardon, it's page -- page 25, at the

18 bottom of the page. Usher, that's the big page 25, in the middle, not the

19 page on the right-hand side.

20 Q. This is Dobrica -- this is yourself speaking, and it's at the top

21 of the page, Usher, please. Thank you. Top of the page. No, next page,

22 please. It's 25 at the bottom. It's the big page number 25.

23 This is you speaking, and you said this: "We have to make a

24 conclusion from it that the community and conditions do not allow the ages

25 old dream on union of all Serbs in one Serbian country to become true. We

1 have to move in phases towards that goal."

2 Mr. Jovanovic, it couldn't be clearer from all the passages I'm

3 putting to you that this was your underlying intention and it was shared

4 by everyone else. "Move in phases towards that goal." Tell me what that

5 means.

6 A. Your conclusion is not correct. What I said here and repeated

7 later on was that all the Serbs did live in one state, Yugoslavia, and

8 they were expelled from it against their will. The discussion now was

9 about their wish to remain in one state, and I told them that this was no

10 longer realistic and possible. In one of the texts you put to me, I said

11 expressly that the right to self-determination of the Serbs in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not include the right to secession --

13 Q. Very well --

14 A. -- and that's what I said.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... next is page 43 of --

16 A. That was the standpoint I put forward.

17 MR. NICE: Bottom right-hand corner, page 43 of 1167. And middle

18 of the page, of that page. Not that one. It's page 43 of 1167. Further

19 on. No. Page -- sorry. If you look at the bottom right-hand corner,

20 Mr. Nort, you'll see figures 43. Bottom right-hand corner, please.

21 Your Honours will know that these pages have been helpfully

22 compiled so that one can cross refer to the Serbian, but that makes it

23 more difficult for Mr. Nort and I'm sorry about that. No. Page 43 at the

24 bottom right-hand corner, please. Can I have the papers back?

25 Q. This is the accused speaking in this meeting. Couldn't be

1 clearer: "The name of the state is not important," he said, "the essence

2 is important. What matters here is that the ethnical division is fully

3 accepted and that the constitutive people is accepted. These are the two

4 elements that Alija tried to avoid by all means. There could be no

5 unitary state with these two elements."

6 Now, this is dealing with the division of Bosnia along ethnical

7 division, and it was ethnical division that was uppermost in the accused's

8 mind; correct?

9 A. No. This is about the Vance-Owen Plan that the Serbs in Bosnia

10 accepted in principle but they rejected the maps. Mr. Milosevic made an

11 effort to convince them to accept the maps to which they had numerous

12 objections. This was a way of having them accept a rational way of

13 thinking and accept the maps --

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

15 A. -- it was not a plea for ethnic purity.

16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... bottom right-hand corner.

17 The same figures we've been looking at.

18 Mr. Jovanovic, in my respectful submission, you are denying what

19 is absolutely obvious and you're doing it because you know that this lay

20 behind the support of the Bosnian Serbs and it lay behind the crimes that

21 were committed. And if you look at this, this is Dobrica Cosic talking.

22 Further up the page, please.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, let him answer that.

24 MR. NICE: Certainly.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think, Mr. Nice, that you are

1 getting involved in your own expectations about the outcome and coming

2 into conflict with the facts. Before the declaration and after that we

3 kept stressing that we had no territorial pretensions, that all we wanted

4 was the freedom and equality of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 That's the reason Mr. Milosevic immediately accepted the Cutileiro plan.

6 He said that two or three weeks after that he would recognise Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina. Why was this not done? Why was this plan toppled and Bosnia

8 and Herzegovina led into war?

9 MR. NICE:

10 Q. Please look at this passage from Dobrica Cosic presiding over the

11 meeting: "In my opinion, we have to reconcile ourselves and finally

12 agree that the achievement of our main political goal, living in one state

13 or in the federation of states, is the long-term aim which could be

14 achieved only step-by-step or gradually. I think that any other kind of a

15 national and state politics would be an adventure."

16 What does that mean if it doesn't mean what I'm suggesting?

17 A. It means quieting the frustrated leaders of the Bosnian Serbs who

18 were afraid of their own shadows. They were afraid of being tricked by

19 Alija Izetbegovic, and they persistently refused to accept the maps. Both

20 President Cosic and President Milosevic tried to calm their fears and to

21 convince them that what they would gain would guarantee their freedom and

22 equality. This is the rhetoric they used which was not foreign to any

23 real southern Slav because we used to live in a single state and we are

24 all nostalgic and wish that state had continued.

25 Q. Let's see what the accused said about this. Two pages on, please,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Mr. Nort, at page 73, starting at the top of the page, a passage we've

2 looked at before. And Mr. Jovanovic, you will have looked at this. This

3 is the passage where the accused says, and it's at the top of the page:

4 "How can we --" five lines down -- "how to turn the situation which de

5 facto exists --" no, top of the page, please. Yep. Five lines down.

6 "How to turn the situation which de facto exists and which could

7 not be de facto endangered into being de facto and de jure," and he deals

8 with the small labyrinth and says how long it will take to get there.

9 There had been achieved by force what it was now the desire of the accused

10 to turn, by passage of time, by negotiations, into law; correct?

11 A. All this is part of the methodology of quieting the fears of the

12 leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and convincing them to accept the maps.

13 Q. I haven't got time to go into it but let's go over four pages to

14 page 76.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honours, this is a passage I would press the

16 Chamber to read in great detail at some stage, but at page 76, at the

17 bottom right-hand corner, middle of that page, where we see about

18 something called cutting the boat loose. That relates to -- in fact,

19 let's pick it up at the top of the page, please, Usher.

20 Radovan Karadzic deals with, first of all, the assassination the

21 previous day of the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying

22 that they'd punish the man. They never did. It's right, isn't it, they

23 never punished the man who -- Karadzic never punished the man who

24 assassinated Irfan Turalic [phoen], did he? As a matter of fact --

25 A. I don't know. Every murderer has to be tried.

1 Q. We go on, on a new topic, and Karadzic says: "We would act the

2 way we agree, especially if we would be in a situation to endanger the

3 position of the mother country ... We would 'cut our boat loose' ...

4 The accused: "We're not speaking about 'cutting the boat loose.'"

5 Cosic: "Who could sacrifice you? Who is entitled to make a decision to

6 sacrifice the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina?" Karadzic: "I

7 would like to say we are deluding ourselves by thinking that in a later

8 phase we would be able to trick them." The accused: "They would already

9 be tricked after we get the issue to the later phase. We have already

10 'led them up to the garden path.' That is the matter."

11 Had they been led up the garden path, please? How had they been

12 led up the garden path, Mr. Jovanovic?

13 A. Mr. Nice, this entire text has to be read in its entirety to

14 understand the real meaning of this. The entirety says that the Bosnian

15 leaders, the Serb Bosnian leaders were so terrified that they kept saying

16 things that were not rational, and at this meeting everyone, especially

17 Presidents Cosic and Milosevic, took a great deal of trouble to get them

18 to see reason. If they used words to pacify them, it was only in order to

19 get them to accept the maps. That was the only meaning of all this.

20 Q. Who had been led up the garden path?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I know from which page Mr. Nice

24 is quoting? I can't find the passage, or perhaps I misheard the page

25 number. He said page 76.

1 MR. NICE: 76 in the English, and in the Serbian it's page 71.

2 Q. And the people who were led up the garden path were the

3 international community, weren't they, Mr. Jovanovic?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find it in Serbian, no.

5 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... page 72 in the

6 Serbian.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, not on page 71.

8 MR. NICE: End of page 72.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Jovanovic?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have the English text in front of

11 me. However, the page is not marked in the English version. I have it

12 somewhere here too.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this expression, to

14 trick.

15 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me tell you, in Serbian it says

17 that I said that we have already been able to deal with them. I didn't

18 say to trick. I said to deal with them, to better them. This is a

19 substantial difference, because I'm referring to tactics here and to

20 persuasion, as Mr. Jovanovic has explained. To deal with somebody and to

21 trick somebody are two different things.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And then Karadzic says: "Had we

24 realised this on time, then this border -- or we would have been in a

25 different situation. And I responded with a joke, saying this is as

1 though Pero had gone to the police. And only somebody who understands the

2 language truly can understand what this is all about. This is just all

3 excerpted from the context.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we have the Serbian put on the ELMO so we can

5 have it translated.

6 MR. NICE: Would Your Honour just give me one minute.

7 [Prosecution counsel confer]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice may at a later stage have occasion to

9 ask you about this, Mr. Milosevic, depending on the course you take.

10 MR. NICE: Beg your pardon.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I said at a later stage in the proceedings you

12 may have an opportunity to put that question to Mr. Milosevic himself,

13 depending on the course he takes.

14 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. Here it is. On the overhead

15 projector, please, Mr. Nort. Bottom of the page. And if the interpreters

16 please could read out the answer starting the accused.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Slobodan Milosevic: "We have beat them at their

18 game. We have outwitted them if we put the matters to a later phase.

19 What we have here is that we have managed to outwit them. This is what

20 this is all about."

21 MR. NICE: Thank you. Your Honour, I must move on. The time is

22 so --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

24 MR. NICE: -- short. If I could have that page back, please,

25 Usher. I'm going to abandoned the rest of my questions on this topic and

1 I'm going to move to the second topic -- I'm going to go to the second

2 topic, crimes and knowledge of crimes. Tab 3, please.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, in that -- I'm sorry to go back to that

4 passage. There was nothing in it about leading them up the garden path,

5 from the translation.

6 MR. NICE: No, not from the translation. The outwitted. If we

7 put the matter, I think it's outwitted them. I'll try and get some detail

8 of the translation --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is a very poor translation then, because

10 that has a specific connotation in English.

11 MR. NICE: I'll try to deal with that in more detail later.

12 Q. Tab 3 is an existing intercept. You've had a chance to look at

13 this, have you, over the weekend, Mr. Jovanovic?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. NICE: If we look at the English, please, on Exhibit 613, tab

16 101. Two things, remind the Chamber. If the usher would put page 4,

17 looking at the bottom, on the overhead projector. We see a discussion

18 between Karadzic and the accused about the London agreement triggered by

19 discussion with the previous witness, Smilja Avramov.

20 Q. Were you involved in any discussions about going back to the

21 London agreement of 1915 which would have given Serbia so much more

22 territory?

23 A. I don't think that I attended that meeting, if my memory serves me

24 right.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... please, Mr. Nort. You're

1 aware of the London agreement and the maps that were discussed in London

2 in 1915, are you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you accept the view that another witness called by the accused

5 has given that to discuss the London agreement maps would constitute

6 embracing the notion of Greater Serbia? Do you agree with that?

7 A. First of all, that was not the notion of Greater Serbia. Rather,

8 an offer of Western allies extended to the Serbs during the war, namely

9 to --

10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... next question was to discuss

11 those maps. Would it be right that to discuss those maps would be to

12 embrace the notion of a Greater Serbia?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. Mr. Milosevic, yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to say, Mr. Robinson, that

16 this is way too much. Mr. Nice is putting questions as though I discussed

17 the London agreement here, although he can see clearly for himself that I

18 -- that Karadzic said that the meeting ought to be prepared --

19 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let Mr. Nice -- put the question

21 again, Mr. Nice.

22 MR. NICE: I'm going to move on, Your Honour, if I may. It's

23 dealt with already in other evidence and another intercept. Page 5,

24 please, Usher.

25 Q. The accused here deals with --

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is being done in a wrong way,

2 Mr. Robinson. This is a manipulative way. Mr. Nice --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... manipulative

4 -- if it is manipulative, we will deal with that. We haven't found it

5 that way.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. This is the accused speaking, on page 5, halfway down. Karadzic

8 says: "The problem are these idiots." And then expletive. "I see now

9 they are bringing the Presidency into question." The accused says: "If

10 they start that, then disturbances will start down there and they will be

11 gone. We have to likewise secure Herzegovina down there up to Dubrovnik.

12 That's what we should go for. The de facto situation in Yugoslavia is

13 defending its territory."

14 That's a contemporaneous 26th of October, 1991, intercept. You

15 were foreign minister at the time. What you were doing in Dubrovnik,

16 attacking it?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is probably not an error of

20 Mr. Nice but an error made by somebody who prepared this, because

21 everything is turned upside down here. Where it should be Karadzic, it

22 says Milosevic, and vice versa. So this is one great confusion. It says

23 here Slobodan Milosevic says: "Very well, President, we will certainly

24 get --" and then the person speaks in Ekavian and that's not the dialect I

25 use, and I certainly wouldn't address Karadzic as Mr. President. So this

1 is attributed to the wrong person. What Mr. Karadzic -- what Mr. Nice is

2 reading out are not words uttered by me. So this is turned upside down,

3 and does not reflect the conversation at all.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you saying that the passage

5 attributed to you, which reads in English, "Yes, if they start that then

6 disturbances will start down there and they will be gone," et cetera,

7 that's not something that you said?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I'm saying.

9 This is reflected in a different way in Serbian language, and this is

10 something I didn't utter either. "Yes, and if we do that, then unrest

11 will break out down there. However, we also have to deal with

12 Herzegovina, whereas --"

13 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- "Dubrovnik --" and then another

15 word in the Ekavian. So these are not my words. This has been put upside

16 down.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We understand the point. Mr. Nice, if that

18 is so, then I don't see how you can work on this basis.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the swapping of names has been dealt with

20 in the report of Mrs. Tromp. It's before you in the report. I'll deal

21 with it after the break so I can explain exactly but my understanding is

22 that these words are the accused's --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: The words that I just --

24 MR. NICE: Yes, the words --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- quoted.

1 MR. NICE: The words -- it doesn't matter. Just for the avoidance

2 of any doubt, Mr. Jovanovic -- even if they're not his words he's being

3 seized of information.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.

5 MR. KAY: I think we need clarification of all this. We're trying

6 to trace the exhibits and how this arose. We think this is an exhibit

7 that came in through Mr. Lilic, and reference we have in the Prosecution

8 exhibit witness list doesn't seem to tie up with the tab that we've got in

9 the Prosecution schedule here. There's plainly an issue over the

10 translation, as the Court will see the question mark next to the reported

11 speech. So whoever translated it had an issue as to who was the

12 appropriate speaker.

13 If my memory serves me correct, Mrs. Tromp was not a witness in

14 the case, in the end, and so any report by her on this issue is an

15 internal matter for Mr. Nice, but in terms of exhibits in the case, I

16 don't think there is any explanation about this and it is an issue that

17 has not been resolved. We're concerned that there seem to be material

18 inaccuracies. I don't know who has translated this document, where it

19 originates from, and whether it has been checked by the translation

20 department in this building.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Which tab number is it, Mr. Kay?

22 MR. KAY: It's 469, tab 40.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: On the Prosecution's --

24 MR. NICE: Tab 3.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: It's tab 3.

1 MR. KAY: Oh, right. I've got a --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That's 613 then.

3 MR. KAY: Oh, right.

4 MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I come back to that, because the time

5 that's being taken will take me over the break.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is tab 3. This is tab 3, which

9 I received within this binder from Mr. Nice. However, please take a look

10 at this. Let me just prove to you that everything has been put upside

11 down. On page 1, it says as though Karadzic said to me, "Tomorrow, here

12 -" meaning in Belgrade - "in Sava centre, there is a large gathering of

13 Montenegrins." And then I reply to that, "Is it really?" as though I

14 didn't know about that.

15 JUDGE KWON: Put the page 1 on the ELMO.

16 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

17 JUDGE KWON: Wait, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to compare that to what comes

19 later. It says here, "Here in Sava centre there is a large gathering of

20 Montenegrins." And then Slobodan Milosevic says --

21 JUDGE KWON: Okay. We'll deal with it later.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice will not put any more questions on that.

23 MR. NICE: -- put any more questions --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the basis of that tab. We'll move on.

25 MR. NICE: Tab 4, please. Tab 4 is a new exhibit. It's another

1 of The Hague document exhibits of the kind introduced by the accused when

2 leading this witness. If the usher would lay -- the Chamber therefore has

3 it in its own papers. It's dated the 15th of November of 1991. And if

4 the usher would take us to the third page now.

5 Q. You've told us that there was nothing going on in Dubrovnik. When

6 pressed in November of 1991, Mr. Jovanovic, "both Mr. Milosevic and

7 Foreign Minister Jovanovic stressed that Serbia was not involved in the

8 siege of Dubrovnik in any way. They did, however, defend JNA actions

9 there, claiming that the JNA would deblock Dubrovnik only when mercenaries

10 sheltering there in violation of a 1955 declaration," and so on, had been

11 withdrawn.

12 What was the action of the JNA, please, that you were defending?

13 Was it the attack on Dubrovnik Old Town?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The JNA -- I cannot say that the JNA

16 was at sea and remained there in order to block the city. I suppose that

17 Croatian units were on the ramparts and were shooting from there at the

18 valley belonging to the Serbs in Croatia.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues]... that. What's your evidence

20 for that?

21 A. But they were -- Dubrovnik was declared to be under UNESCO's

22 protection and no armed forces were allowed to be deployed in that city.

23 As far as I know, that was violated and the JNA said that it would deblock

24 the city once Croatia abided by the status of Dubrovnik.

25 Q. What JNA action were you defending, Mr. Jovanovic? That's what I

1 want to know. Because you know that by this time the evidence shows that

2 Dubrovnik had been attacked by the JNA. Now, tell us, what were you

3 defending?

4 A. I did not defend the attack on Dubrovnik. To the contrary. In

5 one of the interviews given to Spiegel, I stated that we did not have any

6 claims to any cities on Croatian coast, including Dubrovnik and any other

7 city. What this refers to is that the status of Dubrovnik was abused and

8 there were armed units there endangering Serbs' positions in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the JNA was at sea and said that it would deblock

10 the city once Croatia withdrew its forces.

11 Q. Please tell us, as the foreign minister, did you then or have you

12 at any time since come to appreciate that Dubrovnik was attacked by the

13 JNA as indeed two trials in this very court have covered? Were you aware

14 of that, Mr. Jovanovic?

15 A. Later on, I learned --

16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

17 A. -- including from the trial ---

18 Q. How did you learn about it?

19 A. I learned first at the conference in The Hague, when President

20 Tudjman complained that there had been attacks on Dubrovnik that was

21 denied by the then-representative of the JNA. That's all I knew at the

22 time. There was a claim and a denial.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

24 A. Later on, I learned something more.

25 Q. I must take the most interesting question I can. Can you help the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Judges, please, looking back, with how it could conceivably be that you,

2 the foreign minister, with such a world famous problem as the alleged

3 attack on Dubrovnik, covered by the world's press, can have been unaware

4 of the fact that the JNA was attacking it? Just explain what happened in

5 government that you could have been kept out of knowledge.

6 A. At the time in Croatia there was a conflict between Croatian

7 forces and the JNA. Croatian forces blocked the JNA barracks, and it was

8 difficult to ensure that they were deblocked without casualties. There

9 were -- there were a number of hot spots in the entire territory of

10 Croatia. Dubrovnik was one of them. We were waiting for a peaceful

11 resolution. We worked on a peaceful resolution. I never followed the

12 developments in Dubrovnik closely.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, the question is a fairly simple

14 one. It is: How could Dubrovnik be attacked by the JNA and you as the

15 foreign minister would not have been aware of that?

16 THE WITNESS: I knew as much as everybody else in Yugoslavia knew.

17 I did not ever receive any special information about what was happening

18 there.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic -- if His Honour is finished?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. -- I am going to make it quite clear to you that my suggestion to

24 you is that that answer by you is absolutely ridiculous. To say that you,

25 the foreign minister, one of the only long-time serving associates of this

1 accused for a ten-year period, because this is admittedly at an early

2 part, a trusted associate of this accused, it is ridiculous for you to say

3 you had no more knowledge of the JNA attack on Dubrovnik than the members

4 of the public, and it reflects your need on behalf of this accused to deny

5 the obvious.

6 A. This is your conclusion, Mr. Nice. It may sound absurd, but it is

7 true. I've sworn to say only the truth here, and that's what I did. Now,

8 as to how logical and acceptable it is to somebody else, that's another

9 matter, but this is truth.

10 Q. Let's look at tab 12 --

11 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Jovanovic, then can I ask this way: When

12 did you come to know that Dubrovnik was attacked and shelled?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say that accurately, but I

14 think it was the first time here, at the conference in The Hague when

15 President Tudjman complained. He was quite angry and spoke in an agitated

16 way. I think that General Kadijevic was there as well, if my memory

17 serves me right. He denied that, and he linked it to the blocking of the

18 barracks throughout Croatia. He asked that that action be ceased and the

19 JNA units be allowed to withdraw in peace without harassment.

20 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us what you did after you heard the

21 news of shelling Dubrovnik.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was nothing else I could do.

23 I simply heard the explanation given by the JNA representative. We never

24 discussed that matter. For me, Dubrovnik was an unknown, although that

25 looks perhaps illogical. I never understood why Dubrovnik would be

1 attacked, therefore, I never justified that.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Nice.

3 MR. NICE: May we look briefly at tab 12, the shorthand notes for

4 the Council of Coordination of Points of View on State Policy of the 11th

5 of August, at page 12 on the bottom right-hand corner, Usher, middle of

6 the page.

7 Q. See now this -- that's fine, thank you very much. This is one

8 that you attended in August 1992 with, amongst others, Milo Djukanovic,

9 who was at that time, oscillating as he does between president and Prime

10 Minister, Prime Minister of the Republic of Montenegro, and this is what

11 he had to say, in the middle of the page. You see it at the top of the

12 screen: "I think that we should start from the judgement, if you agree,

13 which has also its continuation in comparison with the judgement given by

14 Mr. Panic, our federal Prime Minister. It is true that we did a lot of

15 bad things during the previous period; a bad picture was created ..."

16 What were the bad things that Mr. Djukanovic of Montenegro was talking

17 about? Because you know that Montenegro was involved in the attacks on

18 that part of Croatia, don't you? What was he talking about? What were

19 these bad things?

20 A. Probably volunteers from Montenegro who went there and behaved

21 rather badly, if I can say so, in moderate terms, and that probably

22 embittered him.

23 Q. Having access to all the top brass of the army, to the presidents

24 and Prime Minister of Montenegro, to this accused, and with the world

25 outcry amongst -- about, amongst other things, Dubrovnik, did you ever ask

1 anybody if they'd attacked Dubrovnik or did you just not bother?

2 A. I asked and was told that we did not attack and that Serbia had

3 nothing to do with that --

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

5 A. -- that was a conflict --

6 Q. Who did you ask?

7 A. I asked President Milosevic, among others, and was given a clear

8 answer that Serbia had nothing to do with it.

9 Q. And was any explanation given for how the world could have been

10 looking at the videos it was on television and seeing these attacks? Was

11 any explanation given for that? Who was it said was firing the guns?

12 A. We didn't go into details. What I know and what was discussed is

13 that the Croats themselves in Dubrovnik, that's what was said and was

14 written, set tyres on fire and that produced a lot of smoke and the

15 international TV crews declared that to be explosions of shells fired by

16 the JNA. I did not go into details, but this is what was presented in the

17 press.

18 Q. Somebody else's fault and the Serbs entirely innocent again; is

19 that right?

20 A. That's not what I said. I simply said about what I had heard and

21 read in the press. I couldn't take it for granted, but I had no other

22 reliable information from other sources and therefore I awaited the day

23 when the full truth would come out.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, could you remind me, please, were

25 you at that time foreign minister of Yugoslavia or of Serbia?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If this was in October of 1991 - I

2 think that's what we said - then I was the minister of Serbia, until July

3 of 1992.

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. Tab 13, please, the meeting on the 18th of August, 1992. At the

6 bottom, right-hand corner it will be page 18. Now, here we see Milan

7 Panic speaking. He had yet to be dismissed or removed by the accused.

8 Milan Panic: "We are already in that position. The problem is that we've

9 been accused for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that we support the

10 war in Bosnia, and that we left weapons for them to fight; that we support

11 Karadzic financially. We spoke here about the ethnic cleansing."

12 Now, the first thing is everybody understood, didn't they,

13 Mr. Jovanovic, the allegations being made against Serbia and the FRY by

14 the international community; correct?

15 A. Mr. Panic simply conveyed what was said by the part of the

16 international community against Serbia. These are not his claims.

17 Q. No. I accept that. Now let's look at the bottom of the page,

18 please. Having set out the general allegations, he says: "We cannot get

19 rid of it. This afternoon I received the following information - ethnic

20 cleansing has begun: 15.000 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight

21 hours to leave their homes and make twenty kilometres to Jajce in order to

22 reach the Muslims. This information was received from the United Nations.

23 They asked me and said that I should stop it."

24 You told us a couple of days ago that you reacted against any

25 suggestions of and condemned any ethnic cleansing. Where are we going to

1 find - help us, please - the public condemnation of the ethnic cleansing

2 of Sanski Most by this body or by its leaders?

3 A. I can't say with certainty whether we spoke about this, but the

4 republican government and the federal government in their declarations,

5 statements, frequently condemned ethnic cleansing, urged that there be a

6 cease-fire and that all camps be disbanded if they existed. I don't know

7 whether Sanski Most was mentioned specifically, but in this text and in

8 other texts we saw here, we could see that I always condemned ethnic

9 cleansing and insisted that humanitarian efforts be stepped up, that all

10 camps be disbanded, that there be a cease-fire and end of hostilities, and

11 we appealed to the other side to do the same.

12 Q. My suggestion to you is that when the Chamber looks at this record

13 of the meeting as a whole, and you were there, you will not find surprise,

14 shock, and revulsion at the ethnic cleansing but tolerance of it.

15 A. Not on our side, no.

16 Q. Very well.

17 A. You can't say that.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I hope to finish. I've got a few more

19 things to deal with and I must complete the exercise that took a lot of

20 time on the last occasion of producing the notice documents which are

21 extremely important, not least because they cover the period of the

22 aftermath of Srebrenica. I will ask the accused again, through the Court,

23 whether the balance of those documents which the witness will have had an

24 opportunity to consider simply be admitted en masse. I understand I

25 didn't ask for tab 4 to be admitted and should have done.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it will be admitted. We will take the break

2 now for 20 minutes.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honours, two matters to tidy up. First of all,

7 the intercept transcript at tab 3. The accused is correct. At that

8 particular point, the names should be reversed. In fact, it was covered

9 in -- there's no reason for anybody to know this: It was covered in an

10 electronic filing and a filing, an electronic filing that came to the

11 Court on the 19th of January, 2004, where the particular point the

12 transcript having speakers reversed towards the end was made, and I think

13 the particular speakers were also reversed. So my error to have read it

14 out the way I did. My point would remain the same, whether the knowledge

15 -- or substantially the same, whether the knowledge going to the accused

16 or going from him.

17 The second point to deal with is the challenged translation, of

18 course coming from the CLSS, that led to the phrase "up the garden path."

19 The phrase that was actually used and is, in inverted commas, I believe

20 translates to the effect of saying you take someone across the water and

21 he remains thirsty on the other side. And it may be that it is itself a

22 strong phrase, along the lines of leading up the garden path. So that's

23 that.

24 If I can now turn back to the questions of this witness and go

25 back in time for one purpose only, because I should have -- although I've

1 admitted many things, there's one thing I have to deal with just to put it

2 in context. If we could go to tab 11, please, which is an existing

3 exhibit, just simply to remind the Trial Chamber of the chronology of

4 events when it was concerned about tab 8 of the accused's bundle.

5 Q. It's right, isn't it, Mr. Jovanovic, that this exhibit, tab 11,

6 which you will have had a chance to review -- I beg your pardon.

7 A. Yes, but I don't have it before me right now.

8 Q. The usher will put it on the overhead projector. This is the

9 Security Council Resolution that was made on the day of the report that

10 you've been referring to, and we can see that it reaffirms its

11 Resolutions, it reaffirms its support for the Conference on Yugoslavia.

12 It deplores the fact that the demands have not been complied with, and it

13 goes on to make the recommendations that it does. This led to sanctions.

14 And as I suggested to you earlier on, the reality is that those

15 making this Resolution would be relying on a whole range of sources of

16 information, including the report had it, you say, not been delayed in its

17 delivery, but they in fact have a whole range of information to rely on

18 before making their Resolution; correct?

19 A. I don't know what it is based on, but the report that was delayed

20 in arriving as the Resolution had already been adopted was the basis for

21 this Resolution. Had the report arrived, the Resolution would not have

22 been adopted and sanctions would certainly not have been introduced

23 against Yugoslavia.

24 Q. That is a matter of conjecture, I suggest to you. You suggested

25 to the Chamber that somebody intentionally kept it back. Do you want to

1 name that person for me, please, so I can investigate it?

2 A. According to what I read, this was some Austrian clerk. I don't

3 know what his name was.

4 Q. So an Austrian -- on your understanding, an Austrian clerk took

5 the initiative to hold back a report for political reasons. Is that what

6 you're suggesting? And may we have his name, if you want to make

7 allegations like this.

8 A. I don't know what his name is, but the press said it was some sort

9 of Austrian clerk or official. Whether he did this on his own initiative

10 or pursuant to a suggestion from someone, I can't say. As all this is

11 very unclear, all I can say is that the delay in the report's arrival was

12 intentional.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: The press in what country, Mr. Jovanovic?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Austria. An Austrian official.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I asked -- you said the press said that

16 it was an Austrian official, and I was asking the press from what country

17 made that allegation?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found this in the Yugoslav press,

19 but they were relying to sources from the foreign press. I don't know

20 what sources. It's a long time ago.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. You see, Mr. Jovanovic, the report is completely out of line with

23 all the other Resolutions and reports, I must suggest to you, and of

24 course it's possible sometimes for the Yugoslav interest to persuade some

25 reporting person from an embassy here or there to take a different view,

1 but the vast majority of the reporting was all to the same effect over

2 this period, wasn't it? And that's why the various Resolutions were made.

3 A. I don't understand your question quite well. Generally speaking,

4 yes, but this Resolution depended to a great extent on this report. And

5 had the report been submitted, the sanctions would not have been

6 introduced, at least not at that time.

7 Q. Tab 16, please, which is the council meeting for the 21st of

8 January of 1993. And if the usher would take us straight away to page 30,

9 bottom right-hand corner. Apparently it's the same in the B/C/S.

10 Here we're looking at something that Zivota Panic said. So no

11 doubt about his military authority, could there be -- his knowledge of

12 military matters, could there be, Mr. Jovanovic?

13 A. I think at that time he was the Chief of the General Staff of the

14 Yugoslav army.

15 Q. Okay. Let's see what he had to say. "Next: What should now be

16 done in Bosnia and Herzegovina? As far as I can estimate, Serbs in Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina are losing both the territory and certain important

18 facilities. We should agree here what is to be done regarding this issue.

19 Things happening on the left bank of the Drina River, around Srebrenica,

20 Bajina Basta, Bratunac, et cetera, are very bad, and you should know,

21 Mr. President, that this is a disgrace for the Serbian people. They are

22 running away, leaving everything. The help we are giving in weapons,

23 ammunition, is located in some houses in villages. We could not pull it

24 out. We are preparing to destroy it."

25 How about that?

1 A. Is this a question?

2 Q. Yes. Leaving weapons behind for the Serbs, were you?

3 A. Yes. That's what General Panic said, as can be seen from the

4 text. This is what he knew. I did not have this knowledge. I had the

5 opportunity of hearing it at that time meeting. The meeting was an

6 exchange of opinions about this topic, the topic of preparations for the

7 London conference, if I remember correctly, and different views were

8 expressed. Everyone expressed their own views. He was providing a

9 military view of the situation.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what are you saying?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this. On page 30,

13 somebody else is speaking. It has nothing to do with Panic. And then

14 later on I can see Panic speaking but I can't find the words quoted by

15 Mr. Nice. What page is this, please?

16 I've found it now. I do apologise. It's page 34.

17 MR. NICE: Thank you.

18 Q. And at the end of this page we also see this, if the usher would

19 move the page up a little bit: "People are leaving the territory on the

20 left bank of the Drina River. They are leaving everything and running

21 away. The map most probably caused this. They saw that this was not

22 their territory and wanted to leave the area as soon as possible. That

23 should be explained to them.

24 "I think that somebody should come to Mt. Tara on Saturday. I

25 will go and arrange what we should do and how. We must not lose control

1 over that territory."

2 Mount Tara guards the Drina from the east. This is your general

3 saying "We must not lose that territory," territory in another state. Why

4 was he saying that without your objecting to it? You as the foreign

5 secretary, you should be objecting, saying you can't interfere in somebody

6 else's business. Why didn't you object, Mr. Jovanovic?

7 A. First of all, I think that General Panic was referring to the

8 Serbs in Bosnia, that they were not keeping this under control. Secondly,

9 I did keep saying at that meeting that all hostilities were to cease, that

10 there should be no ethnic cleansing, that refugees should return, and that

11 self-determination did not mean secession. I kept repeating our political

12 standpoint, that we had no pretensions on the territory of the

13 neighbouring republic but that we would support the Serbs in Bosnia in

14 claiming equal rights to the other two ethnic groups in Bosnia. What the

15 general had in mind was that the Serbs in Bosnia were not controlling this

16 territory.

17 Q. Page 34, please. And I'll try and find it for the accused. Page

18 34, middle of the page, the accused speaking. I think it's probably on

19 the accused's page 39, I think.

20 And we just see this sentence halfway down the page: "It suits us

21 very much that they have accepted the principle of demarcation according

22 to the ethnic criteria. We should not 'befog' that principle a lot with

23 some big story on economy ..." And then the matter goes back to the point

24 that they would create some political mixers which would mix all that.

25 The accused's pre-concern or preoccupation Mr. Jovanovic, just

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 like everybody else's, was to keep ethnic demarcation lines in order to

2 lay the plan for ultimate union of Serb territory. Isn't this obvious

3 from all these meetings?

4 A. The conclusion is not only not obvious, it's not correct. At the

5 same meeting, I recommended to the Serbs in Bosnia that they should not

6 pay a great deal of attention to the national issue but the economic

7 issue. If they could not survive economically, they would all want to

8 join third countries in order to survive. This is only confirmation. The

9 international representatives had already offered maps divided along

10 ethnic lines. If this was acceptable to the international community, why

11 should it not be acceptable to President Milosevic? There were no plans

12 for unification because we did say that we had no designs on the territory

13 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Milosevic confirmed this because

14 this plan is a plan for the future joint state of all the three nations

15 living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Q. Very rapidly and in a few more documents. First of all, as a

17 matter of fact you've had a chance to review it and I don't need to go

18 into it, Belgrade and Serbs generally were given the greatest possible

19 warning of the views of the world as to what was happening in Bosnia by

20 the interim decision, or however it was described, of the International

21 Court of Justice on the 8th of April, 1993, wasn't it? You've had a

22 chance to look at it. It's at tab 17. I'm not going to take the Court

23 through it again.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Because that report specified as an interim order prevention of

1 genocide. What was the reaction of your leadership? You were there.

2 What was the reaction of your leadership to such an extraordinarily grave

3 interim order being made against you, to do nothing?

4 A. This was in 1993. It was within the competence of the Federal

5 Ministry of Justice and the judiciary. This was a complaint that Muslim

6 Bosnia sent to the International Court against Yugoslavia, naming

7 Yugoslavia as an aggressor, and these were temporary measures issued by

8 the ICJ which informed the federal organs. I don't know what was done

9 further about this issue, but I know that this case is still pending

10 before that court and has been for the past ten years or so.

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... cut across you. We've heard

12 from Mr. Jovic. You know Mr. Jovic. He's explained to us in terms, both

13 in his written statement and in his book, how the plan to develop the VRS

14 as an army and the SPK army came from this accused because he recognised

15 that leaving the JNA would expose Yugoslavia or the FRY to difficulties.

16 Did he -- we've heard that.

17 Did the accused not even raise the possibility of withdrawing

18 support of funds from the Bosnian Serbs when an allegation of the kind

19 made before the International Criminal -- Court of Justice was made?

20 A. These allegations were put forward by the Bosnian Muslim

21 leadership and the court then issued a temporary measure.

22 Q. I must focus you on the question. We've heard --

23 A. I want to answer your question.

24 Q. Well, did the accused raise with his government the possibility of

25 withdrawing funds from the Bosnian Serbs? Yes or no.

1 A. He did this a year later, when very severe measures were

2 introduced and relations broken off. In the meantime, he waged a Titanic

3 struggle with them to get them to accept each of the plans of the Contact

4 Group; the first, second, and then the third plan. He had a lot of

5 problems in convincing them, and from time to time he told them that

6 Yugoslavia would not be a hostage to their irrational policies, and he

7 told them about the aid that was being provided.

8 Q. He carried on financing the offices, as we all know now, through

9 the 30th and 40th personnel centres and carried on with the policy until

10 he was arrested, of paying Mladic. Did he not even discuss stopping the

11 crimes that were being committed, reported and reaching the level of

12 interim orders about genocide from the International Court of Justice, did

13 he not even discuss withdrawing funds?

14 A. In that three-sided civil war, each side had its supporters,

15 financially and otherwise, and they were all to a greater or lesser extent

16 involved in a series of crimes. The fact that attention was being focused

17 on the crimes of only one side and --

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... stop you there for a minute.

19 Each side had its supporters, and you knew that you were supporting one

20 side, didn't you?

21 A. Politically, financially, and diplomatically, yes. They were our

22 people.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... militarily through finance,

24 if nothing more.

25 A. I do not know about that part because, as I told you, I knew

1 nothing of military matters.

2 Q. But you know because you --

3 A. That's true.

4 Q. -- referred to crimes by all three sides. You knew that the side

5 you were supporting was committing crimes.

6 A. We constantly condemned ethnic cleansing, the use of violence and

7 the shelling of those towns, and we persistently demanded that they accept

8 a cease-fire and even to declare a unilateral cease-fire. Our resistance

9 to violence was continuous. We did not push Bosnia and Herzegovina into

10 war. Those who pushed Bosnia and Herzegovina into war were those who

11 would not accept Cutileiro's plan.

12 Q. You and all of you working with this accused accepted the crimes

13 that you knew were being committed and that you were funding, because you

14 were working according to the accused's plan, that if you waited long

15 enough, it would all fall in, by law or by negotiation, in the same way as

16 it had fallen in by fighting and by killing in 1992; correct? And that's

17 what this case is about, you see. Is that correct?

18 A. No, it's not correct. You have to take a broader view. Serbia

19 received the largest number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina; about

20 half a million. These people were not fleeing from something good. They

21 were fleeing from something bad. The crimes that were committed were not

22 just against Muslims, it was against the Serbs as well. We condemned all

23 crimes and the forcible takeover of territory by all sides. We kept

24 stressing that and we said that in our talks with the Serbs from Bosnia

25 and Herzegovina. You cannot accuse us of supporting crime. We

1 financially supported our people there, but we did not support crimes.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I must move very rapidly, if I can. Can

3 I just summarise the position to the witness because he's had a chance to

4 look at some documents.

5 Q. It's right, isn't it, that you've been able to review, over the

6 weekend, I hope, documents to which I will not be taking you, but the

7 Security Council Resolution 819 of the 16th of April, 1993; the Resolution

8 820 of the 17th of April, 1993? Just yes or no, you've reviewed those?

9 A. Yes. Yes, I have.

10 Q. Incidentally, the Council of Harmonisation records for the 20th of

11 April, we've only been provided by the authorities with something called a

12 minute, a short document. We have not been provided by the authorities

13 with the long version of the document. Can you point us to -- they say

14 that they -- the authorities say that they don't have it. Can you point

15 us to where we might find such a full stenographically recorded version of

16 what is only provided by a minute for that meeting?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What tab is that, Mr. Robinson?

18 MR. NICE: The tab is --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: 19.

20 JUDGE KWON: 19.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: 19.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. Can you point us to where you --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think you're addressing the wrong

1 side, because I never had any of these documents at my disposal, and I

2 have forgotten many things.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. You have helped jog my memory. However, in the document you

6 mention I cannot find anything worthy of special attention.

7 Q. That's because you've only been provided with the minute. [B/C/S

8 on English channel]

9 Let me make it plain -- [B/C/S on English channel]

10 We looked last week tabs 20 to 26, which covered Srebrenica and

11 Sarajevo. We looked last week at tab 27, Resolution 819, at tab 28, which

12 concerned Sarajevo, and then coming to 1995, we looked at tabs 30 to 34

13 which covered Tuzla, hostages, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica, to tab 35,

14 Resolution 1004 which covered Srebrenica and hostages, to tabs 36 to 41

15 which covered Srebrenica and Zepa. Keeping your eye and mind on Zepa, can

16 we look now at tab 42.

17 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, I would ask the remaining tabs, if

18 the accused will consent, tabs 42 to 47, which are the same kind as the

19 bulk of the exhibits we were looking at on the last occasion, tab 48 which

20 is Resolution of the Security Council 1010, tabs 49 to 50, which are

21 further communications of the same type, tab 51 which is a report, and

22 then tabs 53, 54, and 57 which are further reports, might all be admitted

23 as documents containing allegations and information. Ms. Dicklich reminds

24 me that tab 48 is already in, but apart -- that's my application. Because

25 otherwise I shall have to go through, however swiftly, the exercise with

1 this witness.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, will you agree to those tabs going

4 in?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not agree, Mr. Robinson,

6 because I think that the tabs can go in if a witness is asked a question

7 about the document and provides an answer. Otherwise, it's completely

8 unacceptable. Otherwise, you can introduce as many things as you like

9 into the record without anyone understanding what the documents are about.

10 MR. NICE: I'll see if Mr. Jovanovic will help us.

11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, have you, over the weekend, had a chance to look at

12 those tabs I've referred to, being severally communications of a certain

13 type we dealt with last week and otherwise documents of the United

14 Nations?

15 A. Yes. These are well-known documents adopted by the Security

16 Council.

17 Q. And the other documents, the documents that provided information

18 to you, having reviewed them, are they indeed all documents that did

19 provide information to you of the same kind that we were looking at last

20 week?

21 A. If the question is addressed to me --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. -- I can confirm that these documents, up to the time I was there,

24 which was mid-August 1995, were documents I knew about. The documents

25 after that time are something I was not familiar with.

1 MR. NICE: Then, Your Honour, I shall have to deal with it. He

2 says mid-1995, so these --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: August --

4 MR. NICE: That's fine. In which case then we are all right, I

5 think. Perhaps they can all go in, with Your Honours' leave.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us make it clear, we're talking about tabs

7 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51 --

8 JUDGE KWON: No, not 51.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not 50?

10 MR. NICE: Yes, 50 is one as well.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: 50 and 51, 53, 54, 57.

12 MR. NICE: Yes. Those are the documents.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, those may be admitted.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm very grateful.

15 Q. And the position is this, Mr. Jovanovic: In the period of time

16 July and into August of 1995, you received repeated information from

17 different locations expressing fear for Srebrenica, fear for Zepa;

18 correct?

19 A. Yes. There's a lot of that in the documents.

20 Q. Zepa was saveable. Why didn't the accused or you or the

21 government do anything to save Zepa once Srebrenica had fallen?

22 A. I personally had no ability to influence this, but Serbia and the

23 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had for a year had no contacts with the

24 political leadership of Republika Srpska. Perhaps there was some lesser

25 channels --

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... then? If they had no contact

2 with them, why did they still pay for their officers? It was your

3 government. And people died as a result in large numbers of a funded

4 army. Why did you not withdraw payment?

5 A. The Croatian army in Bosnia was also financed by the Republic of

6 Croatia and nobody noticed anything. On the other hand, we kept drawing

7 attention publicly to the fact that protected areas were not to be taken,

8 not only Srebrenica and Zepa but others as well, Sarajevo and the others.

9 That was our standpoint that we kept repeating. We constantly kept saying

10 this should not be done. The facts indicate that the influence of the

11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the leadership in the Republika Srpska

12 was not sufficient to prevent this.

13 MR. KAY: Can I just go back to the tabs while we're reasonably

14 proximate to it.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

16 MR. KAY: The witness's answer was that the documents until the

17 middle of August 1995 were documents he had been aware of. Tab 51 is

18 dated the 30th of August, 1995; 53, 9th of November, 1995; 54, 27th of

19 November, 1995; and 57 is the 21st of December, 1995. Was it the Bench's

20 intention to rule that in although it was outside the parameters of the

21 witness's answer?

22 MR. NICE: Your Honour --

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, I notice the witness said these are

24 well-known documents adopted by the Security Council. Line 14, page 54.

25 MR. KAY: I understand there are objections to postman, which we

1 have had as an issue raised in the context of this witness's evidence, and

2 I'm afraid that's exactly what the Bench would be doing with this witness

3 as he is being used by the Prosecution. It would be the same issue, to

4 the same effect, and that is my concern.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I make just one obvious point?

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: He did say he was aware of them as well-known

8 public documents.

9 MR. KAY: It may be that he was aware of them, but what that goes

10 to is a completely different matter. I think it needs some care looking

11 at. He wasn't actually accepting them in his evidence, if one goes back

12 into it.

13 MR. NICE: Can I help, to save time? The witness was the

14 representative of Yugoslavia in New York at the United Nations. If he's

15 not aware of these documents, I have no idea who is supposed to be.

16 MR. KAY: It's the same issue with the white book, though, with

17 respect.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not really the same.

19 MR. KAY: That is a well-known document. The volumes of the white

20 book is a well-known public document in Yugoslavia that he received and

21 passed into the UN system. There is no difference here between what the

22 Prosecution is trying to achieve and what the accused was attempting to

23 achieve.

24 Now, there should not be any greater credibility given to the

25 documents of one party at the expense of the other.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: So your submission is that all the documents

2 dated after -- is it August 1995?

3 MR. KAY: Yes, if there is to be consistency on the matter.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the white book is a different matter.

6 The accused was attempting to introduce it as evidence of the truth of

7 those allegations of mistreatment and crimes, and we held that it could

8 not be treated in that way at this time. We marked it for identity. We

9 needed evidence as to how it was compiled.

10 Here the witness is saying that he was aware of these as they were

11 public documents. I mean, he was, after all, a senior figure in his

12 government, working at the United Nations.

13 MR. KAY: He wasn't at the UN, though, for those particular tabs.

14 Those are outside his stewardship. He was until mid-August 1995, and

15 those four tabs I've pointed out --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: My understanding, Mr. Kay, is that he goes to the

17 United Nations in 1995 until 2000, and what you've got is moving in

18 mid-August from being a domestic minister to the United Nations where he

19 then represented Serbia and -- the Republic of Yugoslavia at that stage.

20 MR. KAY: Would it be helpful if the foundation was set? The

21 trouble is in doing things so quickly in such a large scale, one has to

22 keep track of what is actually going in. I don't know if that commends

23 itself to the Bench.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I'll ask Mr. Nice to just lay a foundation

25 for those last four tabs.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, when did you arrive at the United Nations as the

3 representative?

4 A. I arrived there, if I remember well, on the 17th of September,

5 1995, or perhaps the 18th.

6 Q. The documents we've been looking at, we've been speaking about,

7 are reports to the Secretary-General focused on Yugoslavia dated the 30th

8 of August, the 2nd of November, the 9th of November, the 27th of November.

9 I may have included one that's already in. Are those documents you had a

10 duty to read in your capacity as the representative of your country?

11 A. I naturally did have that duty. However, that was after the fact.

12 As I wasn't present at the mission of Yugoslavia in New York, I had to

13 read it subsequently because it arrived on the 30th of August.

14 Q. Let's just have a look, shall we, since the point is taken by my

15 learned friend Mr. Kay, at tab 55. It was produced last time. And we'll

16 lay on the overhead projector the first page in which the second line of

17 the second paragraph -- next page, please. Sorry. The next page.

18 Second line of the second paragraph reads: "In view of the

19 shortcomings of the report of the Secretary-General of the 27th of

20 November, 1995..."

21 Now, we know you said last week that somebody else wrote this

22 report for you, but you seem to have indicated that you've read the

23 report. Had you?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, I would

25 like to reiterate that I challenged the claim that this document was sent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 to the right address. It was sent erroneously to the president of the

2 Security Council. It was intended for the Russian representative.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

5 A. Please. Please. I would like to confirm this once again.

6 Mr. Nice, last time you challenged my credibility, and you did it with an

7 emphasis, and I would like to protest against that. I would like the

8 Court to ask, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, my associates to

9 provide statements, namely Dragan Zupanjevac, Dragana Filipovic, and Petar

10 Tasic [phoen]. These are my associates who can confirm that my

11 instructions were not to send it to the president of the Security Council

12 but to the head of the Russian mission, and afterwards everybody confirmed

13 that they were precisely my instructions that were misunderstood by my

14 deputy. Therefore, this should not be seen as a document reflecting my

15 position or the position of Yugoslavia.

16 Q. Are you going to repeat what you said last time, that you barely

17 read it and that somebody else wrote it for you, or are you going to

18 accept that this is your text?

19 A. Once again, let me reiterate. As the session of the Security

20 Council was to be held and it was to be devoted to Srebrenica, the head of

21 the Russian mission asked us whether we had information. As I didn't have

22 any information, I officially asked for the information. I was provided

23 nothing. I pressed for it. And it wasn't until just prior to the

24 beginning of the Security Council session that I received information from

25 the Government of Republika Srpska. I personally did not agree with what

1 was stated there. It didn't seem trustworthy. So I asked my deputy to go

2 through it and to see whether there was anything there that could be sent

3 to the head of the Russian mission. I was convinced it was sent to the

4 Russian mission and not to the president of the Security Council. As I

5 said, it was erroneously sent to the Security Council and I regret that

6 deeply, and I would ask the Honourable Chamber to verify this with the

7 people whose names I just gave to you.

8 Q. I simply haven't the time to deal with much of what you're saying

9 but let's just go to the point I was asking you to look at. "In view of

10 the shortcomings of the report ... of the 27th of November 1995 and

11 insufficient evidence on the alleged violations of humanitarian law and

12 human rights, particularly with regard to the areas of Republika Srpska,

13 we are very much concerned that members of the Security Council will not

14 be in a position to fully ascertain the situation ..." Do you accept

15 authorship or responsibility for those lines? Yes or no.

16 A. I do not accept --

17 Q. Okay, very well.

18 A. -- because this was written by my deputy.

19 Q. Let's go back to 54, then, and let's look at it since you insist

20 on taking that line. 54 is the report referred to of the 27th of

21 November, 1995. And we'll look at it on the overhead projector. And

22 we'll put page 2 on. And we'll look at paragraph 5, Mr. Jovanovic.

23 You're very concerned about whose -- who sent what and to whom,

24 but now please look at paragraph 5. This report records "Thousands of

25 people still remain unaccounted for." Paragraph 6 says, line three: "...

1 a total of 8.000 tracing requests." Paragraph 7 says, "... ICRC has

2 limited access to the prisoners." Paragraph 8 says, "Based on all the

3 available information, it would appear that at least 3.000 but less than

4 8.000 people from Srebrenica are still missing."

5 Well, we know that the RS has admitted to 7.000 deaths. Tell us,

6 did you as representative of your country at the United Nations read this

7 report dealing with, as we now know, 7.000 killings? Did you?

8 A. I read this, naturally. However, I did not have confirmation that

9 it had indeed been done to 7.000 people. I was shocked by the figure.

10 But as I said before, things need to be confirmed from several sources.

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... turns out to be true. Let's

12 go back to your letter since - I beg your pardon, the letter you

13 inadvertently signed, at tab 55, shall we. Can we put that on the

14 overhead projector again. Don't let me beat about the bush,

15 Mr. Jovanovic: You're trying to mislead this court and you're not telling

16 the truth.

17 You were prepared to pen --

18 A. I protest. I apologise, Mr. Nice, but you have no right to call

19 me a liar. I've sworn to tell the truth and what I'm saying is an

20 absolute truth. I would ask the Court to verify this information with the

21 persons whose name I gave to you and they will be able to confirm whether

22 I'm telling the truth or not.

23 Q. Page 3, please. Page 3, please. Let's just look at something.

24 The end of this paragraph, on the very page where you put your signature,

25 has Miroslav Deronjic. Now, you've heard of him, haven't you? Haven't

1 you?

2 A. I heard of him. I think that he was tried here or something like

3 that. But prior to that, no, I never heard of him.

4 Q. Who was informed that they did not find any substantial evidence

5 to confirm the alleged crimes on mass graves. That was the sort of

6 material you were relying on in your statement against the body of the

7 detailed report by the United Nations. And if we go back through the

8 pieces of information that I've dealt with very briefly, you'd already

9 learnt about the aerial photographs produced at the United Nations by

10 Madeleine Albright, hadn't you?

11 A. I will say once again: The information that was erroneously sent

12 to the Security Council was neither my position or the position of

13 Yugoslav government. That was information provided by the Government of

14 Republika Srpska, and it's stated very clearly at the very beginning of

15 that unfortunate report. And let me reiterate once again: It was sent to

16 that address erroneously.

17 On the other hand, what was shown by Madam Albright I cannot

18 comment on that. I wasn't present at the Security Council at the time but

19 I have to admit that she was quite strict when it came to Bosnian Serbs

20 and Serbs in general and that her words could not always be relied upon.

21 Q. So is this the position --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a minute. Since the witness has

23 on two occasions asked the Court to verify what he has said today, it

24 should be made clear that that is not a matter for the Court but for the

25 accused.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Almost my last question, Mr. Jovanovic, is this, in light of your

3 persisting in the answers you're giving: On this occasion the words of

4 the RS were good enough for your government. Is that because the acts of

5 the RS were the acts of your government?

6 A. This is a ludicrous conclusion. This document which was sent

7 erroneously clearly indicates that that was information provided by the

8 government of Republika Srpska. It doesn't state anywhere that it was

9 provided by the government of Yugoslavia. So you cannot draw those

10 conclusions.

11 Q. One last matter for detail that I ought to cover with this witness

12 before he goes.

13 In the course of your evidence, Mr. Jovanovic, you said in an

14 exchange with this accused that a letter was -- on the 15th of February

15 and in the version I've got it's page 25 and 26 of the then-transcript.

16 You said of -- you were asked about a letter sent to Alija Izetbegovic,

17 and you answered a question about that, and you said you informed

18 Mr. Izetbegovic that you'd sent a similar letter to General Mladic with

19 similar contents. So you were speaking of two letters sent by the accused

20 to Mladic and Izetbegovic, and those letters were dated, you will

21 remember, on or about the 1st of August of 1995.

22 Now, I don't have a version that I can lay before you at the

23 moment of those letters, but just confirm a couple of things for us. They

24 were both in English, weren't they?

25 A. I'm not sure. However, I didn't write them. Those letters were

1 written by President Milosevic. Now, whether they were in English or in

2 Serbian, I don't know. Why would they be in English? Maybe they were in

3 English.

4 Q. Precisely. I'm going to suggest to you that perhaps you do know.

5 But by the 1st of August, with the flow of information coming to this

6 accused, he needed to set up a smokescreen of innocence and to detach

7 himself from Mladic and from what had happened in Srebrenica, and that's

8 why he wrote letters designed to present himself in a falsely favourable

9 light in English. Isn't that right?

10 A. This is your conclusion. You keep trying to sell a claim that has

11 no value.

12 Mr. Milosevic already for a year had no contact with their

13 political leadership. Therefore, he could not influence t