1 Wednesday, 16 February 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

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7 [Open session]

8 [The witness entered court]

9 WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, have you completed your

12 examination-in-chief?

13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is no interpretation.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I need another half an

16 hour for examination, approximately.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Half an hour? Yes. Try for 20 minutes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do my best. I will try to

19 conclude as soon as possible.

20 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Jovanovic, the period when the terrorism

22 escalated in Kosovo in 1998 and until the end, at that time you were head

23 of the Yugoslav mission at the UN?

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. Please tell us, Kosovo as an internal issue of a sovereign state,

1 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, how was that issue internationalised? How

2 did it reach the Security Council's agenda?

3 A. Kosovo reached the Security Council's agenda through the Contact

4 Group, which was established for Bosnia and Herzegovina, however in 1997

5 started looking into the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. We objected to

6 that, however, the answer was that the Contact Group could look into and

7 discuss any issue it wanted. As the practice of the Security Council was

8 to get the views of the Contact Group prior to the issue being put on the

9 agenda of the Security Council, all of these issues were discussed there

10 first and then permanent members and later on also temporary members of

11 the Security Council took into account and complied with the opinion of

12 the Contact Group, which we opposed. We protested concerning that,

13 however, they disregarded that protest of ours.

14 Q. When you lodged protests, did you point out that that was a

15 violation of the principle of the UN not to discuss internal issues of one

16 state?

17 A. Yes, we did. We expressed our opposition to that, but as I've

18 already said, the Contact Group believed it was entitled to discuss about

19 the internal issues of our country. And after that initial occasion, they

20 simply introduced it into the regular practice of Security Council through

21 the back door, and from then on it became a regular practice.

22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you as head of the Yugoslav mission at the UN

23 received numerous documents about the crimes committed by the terrorist

24 organisation called KLA against policemen, civilians, and so on throughout

25 1998 and 1999. Did you receive such information?

1 A. Yes, we did receive that information on a -- I would say a rather

2 regular basis. Based on the instructions we received from the Ministry of

3 Foreign Affairs, we would forward that information together with my

4 supporting material to the Security Council and ask that that be

5 registered as the UN documents.

6 Q. Was that done?

7 A. Yes. Whenever there was such an order, it was done in accordance

8 with that procedure.

9 Q. Did you also receive documentation of our government pertaining to

10 the NATO aggression against our country?

11 A. Yes, we did. And we applied the same procedure, because we would

12 inevitably always receive instructions to forward that documentation to

13 the Secretary-General and request that it be registered as the UN

14 documentation.

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in order to save time, I would like to point to you

16 that in tab 28 - and you gentlemen as well - in tabs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,

17 33 and 34.

18 Therefore, in tab 27 [as interpreted], we have a document entitled

19 "Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and Albania." If you turn the page, if

20 you turn the first page dated September 1998, you can see that the Federal

21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the agency that issued it.

22 JUDGE KWON: I think it's in binder 2. Tab 28.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what binder is this in; 1 or 2,

24 tab 28? Is it tab 28 or tab 27?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 28 up until 34. So tabs -- seven

1 tabs containing documents. I assume that Mr. Jovanovic has the same copy

2 as you do. I don't know if it's binder 1 or 2. It's not marked in my

3 notes.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is marked as tab 1 in my notes.

5 JUDGE KWON: In binder 2.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Binder 2 is not headed Terrorism. It's --

7 MR. KAY: Tab 30.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: It's tab 30, is it?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Tab 34 is Terrorism in Kosovo

10 and Metohija, and it contains the documents of the Federal Ministry of

11 Foreign Affairs. I suppose that in order to be as rational as possible in

12 our use of time, Mr. Robinson, we could cover all these documents now.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, these documents of the Federal Ministry of Foreign

15 Affairs, are these documents that you distributed in your capacity as the

16 Yugoslav ambassador to the UN to other officials of the UN?

17 A. Yes. This was sent to the Secretary-General, and in addition to

18 that, we also send these documents to certain members of the Security

19 Council.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Following this, from 28 until tab

21 34, first we have NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, documentary evidence, 24th of

22 March to 24th of April. And then the next one is NATO Crimes in

23 Yugoslavia, documentary evidence, 25th of April, 10th of June. Then we

24 have the next one, Terrorist Acts of Albanian Terrorist Groups in Kosovo

25 and Metohija, documents and evidence, 1st of January, 1998, to 10th of

1 June, 1999, part 1. Then we have that same title in the following book,

2 part 2. And then we have Crimes Committed by Albanian Terrorists in the

3 Territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo since the 10th of June,

4 1999, documents and evidence, part 1. And then we have that same title

5 part 2.

6 So these are all documents containing facts, photographs.

7 Therefore, this is the documentation issued by official agencies of the

8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sent to the UN and its officials via this

9 witness who was Yugoslav ambassador to the UN.

10 I ask that these seven documents be tendered into evidence. And

11 let me just note that, as Mr. Kwon said, these documents were previously

12 marked for identification. I referred to these documents during my

13 various statements and opening statement, and this witness, through his

14 official channels, forwarded these documents to various UN bodies and

15 officials. Therefore, I ask that this be tendered into evidence.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let me understand. These are

17 documents that would have been prepared by government agencies.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. These are official

19 documents. You can see that it says Ministry of Foreign Affairs here.

20 This ministry published these documents for these purposes precisely. And

21 all of these documents were transferred to UN officials by this witness

22 while he was ambassador there.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: So all information would have been collected by

24 government agencies on behalf of the government.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, by government agencies, by

1 citizens in the field. All of these documents, photographs. I don't know

2 whether photographs were taken by government agencies or perhaps by some

3 teams who were in charge of that, however, you can see the documents,

4 names of the people, photographs, events that were documented; everything

5 else that accompanied these events. You can see that there are plenty of

6 photographs here. All of the events are described as well. There are

7 many documents attached.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may the position about the production of

9 these exhibits be reserved until I've asked a couple of questions about

10 it? Unless you want to hear an argument now. I'm in your hands.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I was really doing some of your

12 work when I asked you those questions, because you really need to lay a

13 better foundation than you have done so far for the admission of the

14 documents. I've asked you how the information was collected. That's the

15 kind of questions that you need to put to the witness. How they were

16 transmitted to the witness, and then what he did with them.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I wanted to save the

18 time. The witness is very well familiar with the contents of these

19 documents. I can cover with him every book and it will take several

20 hours. However, I wanted to be as efficient as possible, because these

21 are documents issued by official government agencies. And this witness in

22 his official capacity sent these documents to the UN officials;

23 Secretary-General and other UN bodies. This is why I asked that they be

24 exhibited. If you want me to cover all of these documents in their

25 entirety, I'm prepared to do that.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic. Just by asking three or four

2 questions of the witness you can lay the foundation for their admission.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, how did you come to have these documents?

5 A. These documents were sent via diplomatic couriers or via mail. I

6 don't think we used mail because it wasn't reliable, so they must have

7 arrived via diplomatic couriers. Immediately upon receipt of these

8 documents we would forward them to the United Nations and a number of

9 officials and agencies in New York. Our aim was to inform the public,

10 which was poorly informed about the events in Kosovo and Metohija, the

11 public in the US, about the actual situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

12 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, every time you received some of these documents,

13 did you make sure that you familiarised yourself with the contents of

14 these documents?

15 A. Yes, certainly. I can't say that I studied every word of these

16 documents. However, I went over them, compared them to the photographs

17 that looked very shocking, and I could see that these documents are very

18 concrete because they listed names, last names of the victims, as well as

19 sites where these events took place.

20 Q. Even before these documents arrived, did you receive through

21 regular communication with the ministry from Belgrade information about

22 the events as they were unfolding chronologically?

23 A. Yes. We received that information as well, and we would always

24 forward it to the president of the Security Council or Secretary-General,

25 however, more often to the president of the Security Council, asking that

1 it be distributed to other members of the Security Council because all of

2 this had to do with the regular issues on the agenda of the Security

3 Council.

4 Q. These documents that you received after and the information

5 contained in them, was it in accordance with what you learned later?

6 A. I'm sure that they were in accordance, because we could compare

7 that and the information that arrived subsequently.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, should we cover now

9 each book individually?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. Judge Bonomy.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: It's necessary, I think certainly for me, to know

12 how these books were compiled and what the sources of the information in

13 them were. It's not so much what you did with them that's the issue, it's

14 how they were made up, so that we can see -- to help us to consider what

15 value to place on them if they are to be admitted.

16 Now, do you know how they were compiled?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know specifically, but it

18 was clear to me that they were collected on the basis of a series of

19 statements and stories told by the victims and investigations on the spot

20 by the competent authorities and a series of photographs taken on the spot

21 by private individuals or anybody else who happened to be there or the

22 judiciary, members of the court who took part in the investigation. So as

23 I was in New York, I can't tell you what actually happened in Yugoslavia.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: That's what I thought was the position,

25 Mr. Jovanovic. So you were effectively the postman delivering these

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1 documents and making sure they got proper attention at the New York end,

2 but you had no responsibility for actually compiling the documents

3 themselves?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. But I wasn't only a

5 postman either. I interpreted the information in my numerous meetings and

6 encounters with colleagues, members of the Security Council, and the

7 media.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You were an ambassadorial postman. Would it --

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

11 MR. NICE: My only observations in light of the material that's

12 been elicited by questions from His Honour Judge Bonomy is that in broadly

13 similar documents, "As Seen, As Told" or "Under Orders," evidence was

14 given directly to the Chamber by either the compiler or the person in

15 charge of compilation of the book who was able to speak personally and in

16 respect of the supervision of others as to the methodology of preparation

17 and therefore as to its reliability, in one or both cases the authors

18 having spoken of their methods of verifying the accuracy of the documents

19 concerned, so that this document falls into a different category.

20 MR. KAY: Can I intervene?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

22 MR. KAY: As it's so often the right questions being asked and

23 even this witness, who may have been a postman, but he looked at the

24 material and would be able to recognise the documents. They're from

25 public documents. They're autopsy reports, they're court investigative

1 statements. It's actually better material than "As Seen, As Told" because

2 it's the official documents within the FRY system that would have been put

3 together as part of any crime scene analysis that has been compiled here

4 to produce the evidence. So they largely come from Ministry of Justice

5 reports or police reports, pathologist reports, and are based on I'm going

6 to say government. I'm looking for the relevant state department's

7 materials. And so in that context they are official documents that have

8 been put together by some agency.

9 It's a question of the right questions being asked.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to ask Mr. Milosevic just

11 illustratively to take us through some of the information in the

12 documents. Just say three or four so we can see what they are.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson. I shall be happy

15 to do so. I'd just like to draw your attention to what Mr. Nice said a

16 moment ago. This is far more important and much more valid evidence than

17 the book "As Seen, As Heard" [as interpreted] written by different

18 authors. These are official documents by the authorities who were in

19 charge of conducting investigations and establishing what had happened in

20 the field, that is to say the organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

21 and the Republic of Serbia.

22 And by way of an example, here we have one. Take a look at the

23 first book, NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, for instance, documentary evidence,

24 21st of March to the 24th -- or, rather, 24th of March to April 1999, and

25 if you look at page, for instance, page 32. It follows the photographs,

1 the set of photographs. Or, for example, after the first set of

2 photographs --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Page 32.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, you can take a look at page

5 21. After the first set of photographs. I don't know if you have the

6 photographs. You can see a human hand, a severed head of a man who was

7 killed. On page 21 you can see that this is an official document. It

8 says the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of the Interior, Secretariat of the

9 Interior in Djakovica, the dispatch number is 2583/99, the date is the

10 14th of April, 1999, Djakovica. Ministry of the Interior of the Republic

11 of Serbia is the addressee. Criminal police, HQ, police HQ, Operations

12 Centre. Well, I can read it out in English to make it easier on the

13 interpreters. It says: "Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of

14 Serbia, Criminal Police Headquarters, Police Headquarters, [In English]

15 Operations Centre Belgrade, Ministry of the Interior Headquarters

16 Pristina." [Interpretation] And then it says, "On the 14th of April,

17 1999, between 1.30 p.m. and 3.30 p.m., [In English] the criminal NATO

18 forces committed an air assault on a column of refugees --"

19 THE INTERPRETER: A little slower, please, regardless of the

20 language. Thank you. A little slower, please.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic.

22 Mr. Milosevic, you're getting carried away. You're getting excited, and

23 you're going too fast for the interpreters.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Anyway, this is an

25 official letter naming the people identified on the spot, and it says:

1 "Martin Hasanaj, Lek Hasanaj, Salji Djokaj, Skendi Djokaj," et cetera, et

2 cetera.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic. Let's move to

4 another one. I have seen this one.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. It was

6 signed by the superintendent Colonel Milan Kovacevic, secretariat

7 superintendent. So this is an official letter preceded by photographs.

8 And then if you turn the page, you will see the same thing. To

9 the Ministry of the Interior, from Pristina, et cetera, et cetera, and an

10 explanation. The document was signed this time by Colonel Milovan

11 Kovacevic. And the following document on page 25 was signed by Lieutenant

12 Colonel Milan Stanojevic, and it says what happened in the village of

13 Madanaj. 19 persons were killed, six persons wounded. And then he goes

14 on to explain what happened near the village of Meja, the Terzijski

15 bridge, the village of Meja, Terzijski bridge, and the village of Gradis.

16 Then page 26, a report on the on-site forensic technical

17 investigation, signed by forensic technicians Veselin Vesovic, Ljubisa

18 Djordjevic, Nebojsa Vuksanovic, Nebojsa Avramovic, and then an explanation

19 of what happened there, and this is followed by a set of photographs

20 pertaining to all of that.

21 I happened to open the page at page 32, the document at page 32,

22 and there, too, you can see what was going on. NATO strike on the

23 Prizren-Djakovica road. It says enclosure on-site inspection, topographic

24 map, photographic and technical documentation of the site, forensic

25 technical report, and so on and so forth.

1 Then you have some maps. And if you turn the page there to page

2 34, once again a report. The signatures. So we're dealing here with

3 these. A series of photographs next. Signatures again.

4 JUDGE KWON: And if you look at the preface, the preface was

5 written by minister of foreign affairs, and it says that it was --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Correct.

7 JUDGE KWON: "The aim of this book is to present to the

8 international public the evidence about crimes." So having read that, I

9 think Mr. Jovanovic can explain the purpose of this book and the way of

10 compilation, since you are in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though

11 you were in New York.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Jovanovic wasn't the foreign

13 minister. He was the head of the Yugoslav mission to the United Nations.

14 Before that he was the foreign minister.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The foreign minister was also a man

16 named Jovanovic but his name was Zivadin Jovanovic and he wrote the

17 preface with the intention of informing the world public who was overly

18 bombed and supersaturated with one-sided presentations of the NATO

19 aggression and the development of events over there. So they wanted to

20 inform the world public with the specific concrete findings of the

21 competent authorities so that they could gain a true picture of what was

22 happening in Yugoslavia as the result of the NATO bombing. And that

23 preface of his is something that is logical to my mind because it is a

24 book compiled by the Foreign Ministry, and he as minister said a few words

25 by way of explanation what it was all about in the preface.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you indicated earlier that you had some

3 questions to ask in relation to the admission of these documents.

4 MR. NICE: Most of them have effectively -- most of them have

5 effectively been raised by His Honour Judge Bonomy, and it seems to me the

6 conclusion that one could draw is that this witness has no firsthand

7 knowledge of the contents and was not involved directly in the preparation

8 and did not supervise the preparation of the book. That makes it

9 different from "As Seen, As Told" or from "Under Orders." It's also, of

10 course, different in that the participants in the compilation of the book

11 may be thought to have been those with an interest and not those who were

12 disinterested in the way that the contributors --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: All of that goes to weight. That's why I asked

14 him earlier -- remember I asked him if it was collected by government

15 servants of different agencies.

16 MR. NICE: Those are the points I would have sought to have

17 pressed home through cross-examination. I don't desire to take more time.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We could mark it for identity, and Mr. Milosevic,

19 and it would be then in your interest to bring a witness who could speak

20 to the manner of compilation so that we would be able to attach more

21 weight to it than we can now. Because it wasn't compiled by the

22 ambassador or under his supervision. It was compiled under the

23 supervision, no doubt, of somebody working in the Ministry of the

24 Interior. So if you were to bring that witness from the Ministry of the

25 Interior who supervised the compilation, it would enhance the weight that

1 the Chamber would be able to attach to the information and would meet some

2 of the arguments raised by the Prosecution --

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- [Previous translation continues] ... and so

5 on. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, before you make a

7 ruling, open page 56, for example, please. I don't know --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Which volume? Which volume?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The same volume. I'm taking this as

10 an example. Turn to page 56. Be so good as to turn to page 56, please.

11 I don't know which official of the ministry you need to give weight to

12 this.

13 This provides -- this sets out the investigation report "[In

14 English] Made on April 6, 1999, by Investigative Judge of the Aleksinac

15 Municipal Court relating to the bombing of Aleksinac by NATO war planes on

16 April 5, 1999, which caused the death of several persons, serious and

17 minor injuries of several persons, and extensive material damage."

18 [Interpretation] And then it says here present on behalf of the

19 Court [In English] Court Clerk, President of the Court, District

20 Attorney's office, Forensic Technician, Expert Consultants.

21 [Interpretation] And so and so forth. And then you have description of

22 the scene. And it goes on to explain which houses were targeted, who the

23 proprietors of the houses were, which streets, the street numbers of the

24 houses, and a whole page devoted to the figures, the number of houses, the

25 owners who were hit, the houses who were hit.

1 So these are documents, authentic documents, authentic reports by

2 the court organs. I assume you really don't need an official from the

3 ministry to explain any of this, how this information was gathered. These

4 are official facts and figures compiled by the courts, the police, the

5 state organs of Yugoslavia, and I can just make -- add this: Each of

6 these documents, and there are thousands of them in these books, can be a

7 separate exhibit in itself and proof in itself. If you want me to go

8 through them one by one and turn them all into exhibits, I'll be happy to

9 do so, it won't be difficult for me.

10 For example, if you look at the Aleksinac report for which

11 Mr. Nice said that the barracks were targeted whereas here we can see all

12 the houses, the residential apartment buildings in the centre of Aleksinac

13 were targeted and destroyed should be a separate subject. I don't -- I

14 didn't think that weight was given by the form it was packed up in. But

15 if you would like, I would turn all these books into thousands of exhibits

16 and then you can see for yourselves. But if you want to reject court

17 documents of what actually happened, then go ahead and do so, but then

18 that speaks of something else, doesn't it, that we're not talking about

19 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here. These are documents, court

20 documents and other documents of state organs with documents provided and

21 attached with the findings attached.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, as you said, there are thousands and

23 hundreds of documents here. Are they all official documents, documents of

24 ministry? How can you verify that? There's so many.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I'm going to turn them

1 into 1.000 exhibits and I'm going to verify all of them. That's no

2 problem whatsoever, because in the book they were published. I mean, the

3 contents of these documents. We're going to take the photocopies of these

4 documents, we're going to take the findings of experts, of forensic

5 experts, of court authorities, and we're going to exhibit all of them. If

6 you want me to do it that way, I'm going to do it that way. No problem

7 whatsoever.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, please try to understand at least my

9 concern about the way in which this is being presented. This witness has

10 told us all he obviously can about these documents, and that's fine,

11 because it's important to demonstrate that they got to the United Nations

12 and they were a representation of a case being made on behalf of your

13 country to the United Nations. But there's a large volume of material

14 here, and it's your job to present it in a form which will enable us to

15 give it the maximum weight. This is obviously important material, if you

16 can justify presenting it in a proper way.

17 Now, what I need to know is how it was compiled. Because a lot of

18 it is summaries of events. They're not all official documents. Perhaps

19 the majority are, I don't know, but it's obvious they're not all official

20 documents. So we need to know how this exercise was carried out and how

21 in general we should approach our consideration of it. And all that needs

22 is a witness from one of the ministries who was responsible for compiling

23 this or supervising its compilation to come and tell us about it.

24 At the moment, all that's happening is time is being wasted in

25 relation to the evidence of an important witness who really can't add

1 anything on this particular material. So there will be a way of doing it.

2 It could even be done in writing. Either that or by a statement subject

3 to cross-examination or something of that nature. There are many ways of

4 introducing this material in the right form without taking up the time of

5 witnesses who can't really speak to it. And I need to be addressed,

6 before I'm prepared to accept that it should be admitted, to hear evidence

7 about the way in which it was put together.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are deliberating, Mr. Milosevic.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, could you take a look at tab 30, tab

13 30, page 259. On the left side, on page 258, it says that it's a report

14 on ballistic expert examination, but on page -- from page 209 [sic], there

15 are a number of paragraphs which summarise Albanian terrorist attacks. Is

16 it a summary done by whom or whether they are official documents?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just have a look, from 209.

18 JUDGE KWON: 259.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Oh, 259. Yes, 259. All

20 right. 259, then. Oh, the numbers are 665, 666, 667. Events that were

21 registered by the official authorities. But there's something wrong. It

22 cannot start from 665. And then further on -- then 664 must have been the

23 previous event. These are events that were registered by the authorities

24 in charge. This is not information from the newspaper. They are

25 supported by documents that are held by the competent agencies. So these

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1 are not summaries, these are descriptions of specific events.

2 Look at 665: "In the night of the 17th and 18th of November,

3 1998, Albanian terrorists fired several shots from automatic weapons

4 towards the garage and repair service in Pec, property of Ali Berisha,

5 born in 1934, hitting the facility with 22 bullets."

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, it's not clear from the document

7 itself who compiled this paragraph, from where. So you can call a witness

8 who is able to answer these kind of questions, which no doubt will

9 strengthen your case.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And probably one witness could cover all the

11 binders by telling us how this job was done. Otherwise, we're left to

12 fish around and try to -- and indeed we would be required to speculate to

13 some extent, which is inappropriate.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I find this very useful what you've

15 been saying now, because it's obvious that importance is not being

16 attached to substance. It is the form that counts, to give it an

17 acceptable form.

18 Mr. Kwon, you opened this book now, Terrorist Acts by Albanian

19 Terrorists and Terrorist Groups in Kosovo and Metohija, documents in

20 evidence from the 1st of January, 1998 to the 10th of June, 1999. All of

21 this information is supplied by official authorities. Then I also opened

22 the first book about NATO crimes --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the passage to which Judge Kwon

24 refers, there is nothing there to say how it was compiled. You cannot

25 yourself give evidence. I've told you that before. There's absolutely

1 nothing on that page to show where that information came from, and that's

2 the point that Judge Kwon is making, and Judge Bonomy.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well. You're going

4 to get all of these books, all of these documents as a separate exhibit

5 with court reports. There's going to be several thousand of them, and

6 then we're going to look at them, because you yourselves insist on it. I

7 assume that you're going to give me sufficient time for it.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you wish to be silly, that's your business,

9 but don't waste the time of the Court.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Behaviour like a spoiled child is quite

11 inappropriate in a forum such as this.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are discussing an important matter of the

13 weight that we will be able to attach to these thousands of pages, and the

14 point is that we will be able to attach little weight to it if we don't

15 know how it was compiled. So there's no point behaving in this silly

16 fashion. I will not tolerate it.

17 JUDGE KWON: I think court-assigned counsel or the associate can

18 assist you in this matter.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll mark these documents for identification,

21 and the Court advises Mr. Milosevic to produce a witness who can give

22 credible testimony as to how the information in these documents was

23 compiled.

24 Do you have any further questions of this witness?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I have more questions,

1 Mr. Robinson.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in paragraph 96 of the Kosovo document, it says --

4 or, rather, there is reference made to Resolution 1160 and then 1199 of

5 the Security Council. The other ones are not mentioned. I'm going to

6 read part of this paragraph out to you. It says: "In response to the

7 intensifying conflict, the United Nations Security Council passed

8 Resolution 1160 in March 1998 'condemning the use of excessive force by

9 Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in

10 Kosovo,' and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six months later, the UN

11 Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998) which stated that 'the

12 deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

13 constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.' The Security

14 Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that 'security

15 forces used for civilian repression' be withdrawn."

16 So, Security Council Resolutions about Kosovo and Metohija,

17 because this paragraph doesn't show that, do they refer to terrorist

18 activities? Do they condemn them? You were there then, you followed

19 these events. You received all these Resolutions. Tell us as briefly as

20 possible in response to my question whether Security Council Resolutions

21 about the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, do they mention terrorist

22 activities and do they condemn them?

23 A. When the situation in Kosovo was discussed and during the NATO

24 aggression, there was a total of four Security Council Resolutions. In

25 all of them, there is explicit condemnation of terrorist acts and

1 terrorism, or they call upon the Albanian leaders to do their best to have

2 such activities stopped.

3 In addition to these Security Council Resolutions, in one of the

4 Resolutions of the General Assembly terrorist activities were also

5 condemned, also, there were some reports of the Secretary-General of the

6 UN that were submitted to the Security Council that indicated terrorist

7 activities of the KLA in Kosovo vis-a-vis civilians, both Albanians and

8 Serbs.

9 Q. All right. Tell me, since you were in New York then and since you

10 followed all the reactions, was the KLA qualified as a terrorist

11 organisation; and if so, by who?

12 A. The KLA was first placed on the State Department list as a

13 terrorist organisation. In all fairness, at that time it was not known as

14 the KLA, but the terrorist groups that were operating at the time, much

15 less then than later on, were considered to be terrorist groups. This was

16 in 1997. In 1998, they were treated as a terrorist group. And I think

17 that Ambassador Gelbard, if I remember his name correctly, was the one who

18 sometime in February that year called the KLA a terrorist group beyond any

19 doubt.

20 Later on, this terrorist group or organisation grew into the

21 so-called Freedom Fighters, and during the NATO aggression they became the

22 infantry of NATO in Kosovo and Metohija and in Albania from where they

23 carried out incursions into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

24 Q. Whose perception was this that the terrorist organisation of the

25 KLA was -- became Freedom Fighters?

1 A. This was under the influence of the US government primarily and

2 NATO. They were representing this terrorist group as the so-called

3 protectors of the Albanian people that were threatened, as was said, and

4 then they were accepted as Freedom Fighters.

5 I omitted to mention that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke established

6 the first contact with them. I think this was in 1998 when he visited one

7 of their bases, crossed his legs, sat and talked to them and practically

8 legalised them in this way.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you're probably giving some of the

10 answers that I wanted, but you said that the KLA became the infantry of

11 NATO. Could you explain that? How did they become the infantry of NATO?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Soldiers of the UCK frequently

13 crossed from Kosovo to the territory of Albania and vice versa. And at

14 the time when the bombing was the fiercest in an area called Kosara, which

15 is on our territory, these UCK units attacked numerously Yugoslav border,

16 across the border, and that was followed by a synchronised NATO action

17 which targeted our soldiers who had left their shelters in order to

18 protect the borders from armed attacks. There are many statements in the

19 press about that, and this is not something that NATO kept quiet either.

20 On the other hand, the UCK soldiers were exposed to --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: The sequence of KLA attacks followed by NATO

22 bombing suggested that there was some collaboration between NATO and the

23 KLA. Is that what you're saying?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is what is stated by some

25 leaders of the UCK or KLA, as it is called. Later on, in their books they

1 wrote that the goal was to get Yugoslav Serb soldiers out to a clear

2 terrain where they would be easily targeted by NATO planes. This is what

3 was publicly stated. A lot of our soldiers were killed in the process of

4 that action.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is the basis, that is the sole basis for

6 your conclusion that there was collaboration, the sequence of KLA attacks

7 followed by NATO bombing. I mean, do you have any other evidence to

8 support what is obviously your thesis that there was some collaboration

9 between NATO and the KLA?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were several reports in

11 Western media. This is not something that was kept silent, kept quiet.

12 President Clinton, in honour of what he did for Albanians and Kosovo, had

13 a main square in Pristina named after him, and also several other places.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A monument was built in his honour

16 as well.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you were in New York at the time, so please tell

19 us, did NATO receive any kind of approval, indirect approval even, for its

20 aggression against Yugoslavia?

21 A. No. They didn't even try to get an approval because they knew

22 that one -- at least one of the members of Security Council would veto it.

23 This is why they proceeded into the action without applying to the

24 Security Council at all. Leaders of NATO countries later on tried to

25 justify this by saying that in previous Resolutions of the Security

1 Council, Chapter VII had been mentioned. However, these were very

2 unconvincing arguments, analyses that could not be supported by the

3 Charter or other documents and that were really not taken seriously by

4 anyone, even in Western countries.

5 In a series of reports issued by -- or statements given by

6 President Clinton and various other NATO and Western leaders, they always

7 availed themselves of some new arguments. They never insisted on the same

8 arguments. So that initial thesis that justified this action was not

9 acceptable even to those who advocated it initially.

10 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, based on the assessment, evaluations of foreign

11 diplomats that you came across at the UN, please tell us whether the

12 authority of the UN was destroyed as a result of this NATO action.

13 A. Undoubtedly it was. When I gave a speech at the UN and when I

14 compared this case to the --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

16 MR. NICE: We're not concerned, as I think Your Honour Judge

17 Robinson said yesterday, with the international community's behaviour and

18 response, and as I've said on several earlier occasions, the accused is

19 using his opportunity to ask questions as a way of advancing political

20 positions and propaganda.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Next question.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm asking the witness

23 about a speech he gave at the Security Council. Therefore, this is not an

24 academic issue --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question that you asked is whether the

1 authority of the UN was destroyed as a result of this NATO action, and

2 that is totally an irrelevant matter. So move to the next question.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well, Mr. Robinson.

4 The crimes of NATO are not relevant for you. This is just --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've cut you off.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what did you say in your speech given before the

9 Security Council?

10 A. I informed them that on the 24th, on such-and-such time, an

11 aggression against Yugoslavia had commenced, that it had no basis. It was

12 not based on anything that was written in the Charter of the UN and that

13 the Security Council was the only one that could authorise the use of

14 force against another UN member state. I gave figures about casualties,

15 and I warned that this was a heavy blow to the UN because an armed action

16 was being carried out against a UN member state without the approval of

17 the Security Council, which is the only body authorised to authorise such

18 use of force.

19 And then I said that if such an action is being allowed, then we

20 should ask ourselves who is going to be the next target. I reminded them

21 of the sad fate of the League of Nations and the case of Italy and the

22 then Abyssinia --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's irrelevant. Move on to an issue that's

24 relevant. And you should now be concluding your examination-in-chief.

25 This witness has been here from Monday. We are now at Wednesday.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please take a look at tab 17.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope, Mr. Robinson, that you will

4 not decline my request to have this exhibited.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: In which binder?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, tab 17. I have just one single

7 binder. Therefore, I can't tell you whether it's binder 1 or 2 in your

8 document. However, it's tab 17. This is a document providing the

9 definition of aggression. And in the footnote it says: "Official Records

10 of the General Assembly, the 29th session..." Therefore, this is an

11 official text --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 17?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right. And this is the

14 document that brings the definition of aggression.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Milosevic, if you wish, you could call

16 me as a witness. I was involved in the negotiations that produced that

17 definition in 1974. But do you need this?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do I need you to testify? I suppose

19 that you've already testified.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... of

21 aggression.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it is necessary to have

23 it introduced into evidence, because this institution of yours is

24 constantly declaring itself not to have jurisdiction over the crimes

25 committed by Western powers in the territory of Yugoslavia so you should

1 change the name of the institution.

2 MR. NICE: May I make some observations. I think the accused is

3 going far too far. We divide up the two things that have happened

4 recently. Were it to be relevant for the Chamber to consider the

5 definition of aggression, that would be a public document that wouldn't be

6 to be produced in the course of these proceedings. It would simply be

7 available.

8 Second, the accused's questioning and his attitude to the Court is

9 a matter that the Court, in our respectful submission, could view very

10 seriously. Freedom of expression granted to an accused representing

11 himself is one thing; to be contemptuous of the Court is entirely

12 something else.

13 Now, we recognise that this accused has no respect for the Court -

14 he's made that clear - and may be untroubled by any sanctions of a

15 conventional kind that the Court could impose on him, but we also

16 recognise that this accused now understands that the Court has the ability

17 to curtail the amount of time in which he may present his case, and it

18 would be our submission that the Chamber could start the process of

19 considering docking time, reducing time when the accused behaves as

20 offensively to the Chamber as he has started to do today.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll not admit this. Every

22 student in law, international law, knows about the definition of

23 aggression. It is something that you can refer to in your closing

24 address, if you wish.

25 If you do not have any more questions, I will terminate your

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1 examination-in-chief.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have several more questions.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not several more.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Jovanovic --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you continue to ask questions that are not

7 relevant, I'm going to terminate your examination-in-chief, so bear that

8 in mind.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. I suppose

10 that it is relevant what is stated in count 99.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I will read it out, Mr. Jovanovic, the very end of this paragraph.

13 It pertains to Rambouillet, and the last sentence goes as follows:

14 "Despite intensive negotiations over several weeks, the peace talks

15 collapsed in mid-March 1999."

16 Are you familiar with these intensive negotiations which collapsed

17 in mid-March 1999?

18 A. Yes, I am familiar with them based on my following of the

19 Rambouillet peace process while I was in New York and based on the reports

20 we regularly received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Based on

21 that, I know that there were in fact no negotiations at all, rather,

22 mediating activity on behalf of members of the Contact Group, Ambassador

23 Hill, and so on. And there were no contacts between the representatives

24 of the UCK and our delegation. No agreement was reached on that score.

25 Just one agreement was reached, and that was the agreement reached by

1 representatives of non-Albanian ethnic communities in Kosovo and our

2 government. Everything else cannot be called an agreement but, rather,

3 some contacts and documents signed by members, representatives of the UCK

4 and representatives of the Contact Group.

5 Q. You as an experienced diplomat, what do you say about the

6 statement here that the peace negotiations collapsed in mid-March 1999?

7 If the peace negotiations collapsed, then how come these agreements were

8 reached?

9 A. That's precisely what I tried to explain. They collapsed because

10 no agreement was reached between main sides, main parties invited to

11 negotiations. The only agreement that was reached, this so-called interim

12 agreement on peace and self-government in Kosovo is the agreement signed

13 by the representatives of the Albanian side. And this agreement was

14 witnessed by several members of the Contact Group. However, this is not

15 an agreement either in political or legal sense.

16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, just one more question to you. You have vast

17 experience. You spent many years in foreign service. So please tell us,

18 do you know something about the International Crisis Group? Just say yes

19 or no.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What do you know about the International Crisis Group? Very

22 briefly, please, because we're about to finish.

23 A. What I know has to do with us, Kosovo and our region. This group

24 in that respect was and remained quite active, and it took positions which

25 were practically always against the interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia and

1 favoured the idea of independent Kosovo and Metohija, or at least its

2 breaking away from Serbia and Yugoslavia. They mentioned or brought up

3 several arguments in favour of that, which is not surprising, because the

4 founder of that group, Mr. Morton Abramowitz who, inter alia, was an

5 advisor and then -- advisor to the Albanian leaders in Rambouillet, showed

6 bias and prejudice in that respect.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. I have no further questions.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Nice, we'll just take the break

9 now.

10 MR. NICE: Certainly, Your Honour. I was wondering if I might

11 just have two minutes of Your Honours' time after the witness has

12 withdrawn. Nothing to do with the substance of his evidence but it may be

13 helpful if I explain something.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, you may leave now. We're going to

15 take a break.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 MR. NICE: Your Honours, just this: Recently we've seen, of

18 course, the calculation of time that's passed so far where we, in

19 accommodation with procedural matters, exceeded the two-thirds period of

20 time. We've also now received a list of witnesses from the accused. That

21 causes me considerable concern for the following reason: By my

22 calculation and assuming we're able to keep to the two-thirds limit, the

23 list of witnesses would take us I think to June, or thereabouts. That's

24 my calculation. And yet, although there are some crossover witnesses,

25 he's still dealing with Kosovo. I am concerned for the following reason

1 that I set out in earlier argument and indeed in writing, that in the

2 Prosecution's case, when given time limits, the accused habitually asked

3 questions that seemed not to be the point until towards the end of the

4 allotted time and then would raise clearly relevant matters, almost

5 compelling the Chamber to grant him an extension of the time limit. I've

6 expressed the concern that he may take the same attitude generally in

7 relation to the conduct of his defence.

8 With that in mind, I'm as determined as I can be to accomplish

9 cross-examination briefly. Thus, for example, the latest proposal that

10 I've put in place for this witness, to make documents available to the

11 witness ahead of cross-examination, which I hope - we'll have to see - may

12 speed the process. Inevitably with witnesses like this where we can't

13 approach them surgically, we don't have a detailed statement, if we are to

14 deal with all the evidence they give coming completely as a surprise for

15 the most part and the case that we have to put, the two-thirds time limit

16 would not be possible.

17 I'm going to be selective. Again I've heralded this before, and

18 necessarily so, with this witness and indeed with all witnesses, and I

19 would simply ask the Chamber's understanding of that, where I seek to put

20 in exhibits comparatively swiftly and recognising the fact that I will not

21 be able to put all of my case to such a witness as this as the Rules

22 require me to do. I'll be selective.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, that's a matter for you, Mr. Nice.

24 The Chamber is concerned about the use of time, and it's a matter which we

25 have under consideration, and we'll be issuing an order shortly in

1 relation to the matters that are relevant to that issue. But we are very

2 concerned about the use of time.

3 We will take the break now for 20 minutes.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

8 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm going to ask you no questions about the content

9 or substance of the white books, but we've seen the very detailed way in

10 which they are prepared with resources you've described. Can you tell me,

11 please, is there a similar document of research into the killing and

12 expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo?

13 A. Of course there is but they're not documents that came to me, nor

14 did I further those documents to anybody else. Those documents were

15 written by the people and the organisations which were mostly favourably

16 disposed towards the Albanians and --

17 Q. I'm going to cut you short. Your government's resources were

18 deployed, as we can see, to prepare a detailed analysis of what it was

19 said was done against them.

20 You all knew of the allegations made about expulsion and killing

21 of Kosovo Albanians, who Serbia regards, as you will tell us, equal

22 citizens with Serbs.

23 Can you tell us, please, why there was no similar analysis

24 prepared in respect to the killings and expulsions?

25 A. As far as I know, in the white books there are a lot of names of

1 Albanians and other non-Serbs who were the victims of different terrorist

2 action in Kosovo and Metohija. So this isn't only the protection of

3 Serbian victims but all the victims of the KLA.

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. And the Yugoslav authorities were able to do so more and better

6 than others because they were on the spot, and they had access to

7 firsthand information.

8 Q. Very well. Can you just help us so that we can research it.

9 Which book are we going to find the evidence of the killing of the Kosovo

10 Albanians, which of the white books are we going to find evidence of the

11 killing of Kosovo Albanians by Serb forces, please?

12 A. I'm talking about the killing of Kosovo Albanians by the terrorist

13 organisation the KLA, and their names can be found there. Now, as far as

14 the killing of Albanians by the police or army, they were killed in the

15 fighting, in battle, and they were members of the KLA mostly. If there

16 were civilian casualties in those conflicts anywhere, then that was

17 regrettable, but it was not the aim of the operation to --

18 Q. Last question on this topic, broad topic. Serbia has known since

19 the late summer of 1995 of allegations about Srebrenica. Has it ever used

20 its resources to prepare a report like the report in the white book

21 dealing with the deaths of all those people in Srebrenica? Has it? And

22 if not, why not?

23 A. Well, you know that from the 4th of August, 1994, a cease-fire --

24 or, rather, a cessation to all economic and other relationships with

25 Republika Srpska were set into motion, and so an insight into what

1 happened there was very limited and small. So the fact -- this fact and

2 this situation went on to the Dayton process up until the time when the

3 leadership of Republika Srpska accepted that President Milosevic should

4 speak on behalf of all of them at Dayton. Up until then, access to

5 information and the possibility of influencing the situation in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina at all was for us very limited.

7 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... what if any inquiry of the

8 scale of the white book has been done for Srebrenica? None?

9 A. I can't know that because I wasn't in the country at the time. I

10 was in New York. And on the other hand --

11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, is that a serious answer? You in New York dealing

12 on a daily basis with allegations made about the former Yugoslavia, about

13 Serbia, about Montenegro, you wouldn't know, you couldn't know whether a

14 proper inquiry into Srebrenica had been conducted?

15 A. Srebrenica is on the territory of another state. That's where

16 it's located. And that territory was placed under some kind of

17 protectorate after the Dayton agreement. And international armed forces

18 came in, and they continued to be in authority there, in charge of

19 analysing and investigating and managing that state. We didn't have any

20 organs ourselves or the possibility of inspecting and analysing anything

21 and arriving at evidence in that country on the basis of which we would be

22 able to compile a book later on.

23 Q. So you did know that no such book had ever been made.

24 A. I haven't heard about it. Perhaps it was made, but I never heard

25 of one being in existence.

1 Q. I hope you had an opportunity since yesterday to look at some of

2 the documents, or indeed all of the documents, provided to you in the

3 files. Have you been able to do that?

4 A. I have to say that yesterday I agreed to take on those documents,

5 believing them to be few in number. However, I was given two large books

6 like two Bibles, and it is impossible for one man to even leaf through

7 them let alone read through them in such a short space of time. But

8 despite that, I did do my best to become acquainted with their contents,

9 and I noticed that there were a lot of records and minutes from the

10 meetings of -- and sessions devoted to the coordination of foreign policy.

11 The document is a secret one, and I personally am not prepared to discuss

12 it until I have been lifted from keeping the -- the ban from keeping state

13 secrets is lifted, until it was waived.

14 Q. That was an observation you made almost immediately yesterday when

15 you were confronted with the possibility of being asked to look at

16 documents. Was that an answer you came prepared to give?

17 A. No, because yesterday's answer was to the Honourable President of

18 the Trial Chamber, and I asked whether there were any state secrets in the

19 document. I was assured that there were not. But when I looked at the

20 text I saw that a considerable portion of the text were minutes or records

21 from meetings of the Council for Coordinating Foreign Policy, which in

22 other words, were documents of high state sensitivity, top secret.

23 Q. These documents, Mr. Jovanovic, I must tell you have been provided

24 without complaint by the government for use in these proceedings without

25 any protective measures. I'm going to ask you questions about passages of

1 those documents, and I'm going to ask you to answer them.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honours, it is an extraordinary proposition that

3 this witness should now claim some limitation on giving evidence without

4 having given advance notice, but we'll see how we go.

5 Q. Before I come to those documents, Mr. Jovanovic, just this: There

6 are about four topics, or three topics, and that's all I want to deal with

7 with you.

8 The first topic is the authority of the accused.

9 The second topic is crimes or apparent crimes that were committed

10 and the knowledge that was gained by you and by the accused of those

11 crimes.

12 The third topic is this, and I'll put it in the form of a

13 question: It's right, as all these documents show, that throughout the

14 period of negotiation and throughout the wars a prevailing ambition of all

15 of you, the accused and you and other Serbs, was to achieve, in the end, a

16 state where all Serbs could live together; correct?

17 A. That is completely incorrect, an incorrect approach, an incorrect

18 thesis, and more even incorrect conclusion. Why? Because from the

19 beginning we made efforts to preserve Yugoslavia, the kind of Yugoslavia

20 that existed before the crisis. And when the crisis came about, we did

21 our best to preserve at least those parts of the republic that had not

22 come out in favour of independence. So this was an ongoing continuous

23 process. And when they came out in favour of independence, that is to say

24 Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, when they gained international

25 recognition, even before that and in the declaration adopted together with

1 the constitution, we expressly stated that we had no territorial

2 pretensions and claims on those territories.

3 Q. You see, I've described this for the purposes -- using a neutral

4 term. I'm not going to use "Greater Serbia" for the moment or "All Serbs

5 in one state." I'm saying this was a prevailing ambition.

6 In light of your answer, please tell me this: Did you personally,

7 genuinely, seek for a multi-ethnic arrangement regardless of any

8 domination by or co-existence with Serbs? Is that what you sought

9 personally?

10 A. You mean Bosnia-Herzegovina or the whole of Yugoslavia?

11 Q. The whole of Yugoslavia.

12 A. Our position was one of principle and firmly based on the

13 constitution and its provisions and the free determination of all the

14 nations that formed the first country, which was the country of the Serbs,

15 Croats, and Slovenes. So what was important for us was that this common

16 state was the best for all, because all of us were there together, and all

17 of us were great.

18 When they started leaving, they became small and depended on

19 others and faced a series of problems that this brought with it.

20 Q. Given that the former Yugoslavia was going to disintegrate, did

21 you have any personal desire to see a migration of ethnicities back to

22 their mother countries so that you could have ethnically pure or

23 ethnically dominated states? Did you, Mr. Jovanovic?

24 A. We could not have desired that, even if people thought so, because

25 Serbia itself was multi-ethnic. And after the break-up of Yugoslavia, it

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1 is the sole republic that remained multi-ethnic to the end. And our sole

2 aim was to preserve that state because it suited everybody best and was

3 best able to solve the problem of having all people live in one state and

4 not in a number of separate states.

5 This is a natural position, a very humane one, so it cannot be

6 challenged, and people can't say that we had ambitions at appropriating

7 anything or forcing anybody to do anything.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, files provided to the Chamber and the

9 witness and the accused yesterday have the same tab numbering system. The

10 difference being that, of course, in the witness's, and the accused's

11 indeed volumes, existing exhibits were included whereas it was only

12 additional or new potential exhibits that were included in Your Honours'

13 binders. So when I refer to, for example, tab 15, as I now do, it's a

14 document not in your volumes. It's an existing exhibit, and I'm going to

15 ask the witness, please, if he would be so good, as he may have looked at

16 these documents and become familiar with them, to take the volume of his

17 documents and go to tab 15, at page 89.

18 I'd ask Mr. Nort, the usher, please, to display what is page 92

19 and then 93 on the overhead projector.

20 This is the --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Which one?

22 MR. NICE: It's the shorthand notes for the Council for

23 Harmonisation held on the 9th of January of 1993.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Are there copies for the Trial Chamber?

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we discussed this in advance, and it

1 seemed preferable, given the volume of material and given that of course

2 the Chamber may have been working on its own versions of these documents,

3 simply to identify them.

4 Q. Now, what we're looking at here, Mr. Jovanovic, is the shorthand

5 notes from something called the Council for Reconciliation on the Stands

6 of State Policies. That's the way it's described. On the 9th of January.

7 I needn't take you to cover page although we can see that, apart from

8 yourself, it was presided over by Dobrica Cosic, the accused was present,

9 as was Mr. Bulatovic, Mr. Djukanovic, Mr. Krajisnik, General Mladic, and

10 others.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I should first like to address the

12 Honourable Trial Chamber and remind them that these documents are of a

13 very sensitive nature, and that I have not received a waiver from

14 disclosing state secrets. If I was able to receive guarantees from the

15 Trial Chamber that I would not be persecuted by -- prosecuted by my

16 government, I could answer and respond to them, but I'm afraid that

17 someone in my government might criticise me for responding or that I might

18 be legally prosecuted for doing so.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just remind us of the history behind

20 this exhibit. It was exhibited --

21 MR. NICE: The history behind this exhibit is that it was -- this

22 particular one was provided voluntarily in answer to a request by the

23 state, Serbia and Montenegro, without any suggestion of restriction on its

24 use. And further, just to deal with the witness's observation, waivers

25 are required for state and military secret, and this document is in fact

1 headed "Strictly confidential." But even if there were any argument about

2 there being state and military secret contained within it, that is clearly

3 waived by the provision.

4 Serbia and Montenegro knew perfectly well that these documents

5 were for public use. Indeed, nothing could have been clearer because they

6 took a slightly different view in relation to another series of documents

7 and indeed have obtained rulings from the Chamber which reflect their

8 limited concern, which was a concern of a state nature. It's never been

9 suggested that individuals can't be allowed to speak about them.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Through which witness was this tendered?

11 JUDGE KWON: Lilic.

12 MR. NICE: Yes, Lilic.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Lilic. He had a waiver.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

15 MR. NICE: Yes, he had a waiver. He was the first one with a

16 waiver. He produced them, but he didn't discuss them. We looked at one

17 passage of one of them with him, and the reason he didn't discuss them was

18 all to do with want of time. But --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: But he had a waiver in respect of --

20 MR. NICE: All documents.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- which would have included this one. Which

22 would have included this.

23 MR. NICE: Probably, yes.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay?

25 MR. KAY: Waivers, of course, go to the individual, and the point

1 that arose during the Prosecution case, if I can say this to assist the

2 Trial Chamber, as this developed and Lilic became a witness, it was clear

3 that he would be revealing matters that would otherwise be considered in

4 terms of a government to be confidential state secrets. And to avoid any

5 personal issue, great steps were taken to enable him to testify on such

6 matters but with a waiver that was personal to him.

7 The waiver, of course, doesn't go in relation to the use of the

8 document. The waiver relates to the individual. And that should be

9 something that is considered in relation to this witness.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question then is whether there is anything in

11 the document which would expose the witness to criminal charges and in

12 respect of which a waiver would be needed.

13 MR. KAY: We won't know that until we get to a position where such

14 an issue arises.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: How could that issue possibly arise in relation to

16 a document that was willingly released by the government of the country?

17 MR. KAY: The document may be released without condition, but if

18 the answers of the witness refer to matters outside the document as a

19 result of the question, then of course there may be an area there that

20 would be properly categorised as state secret.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: But that issue has got nothing to do with the

22 document. That's a broader issue about whether the witness should have

23 got a waiver before coming to give evidence.

24 MR. KAY: That's right. That's why I'm raising it, so that the

25 Court is aware, so to speak, of the full issue. Mr. Nice has addressed

1 you in relation to the document, but the issue that also has to be

2 considered is the position of the individual. And I raise this having

3 been involved with these matters myself some months ago in relation to the

4 production of witnesses.

5 MR. NICE: Can I just make a point? This is a fully public

6 document. People have had access to this document and been able to print

7 it publicly, if they had wanted to, for months or it may be years. And of

8 course -- my learned friend overstates it in his analysis of sensitivity

9 in any event. It's only state and military secrets, I think, that are

10 covered in any event.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's a public document, is it?

12 MR. NICE: It's not a public document; it is by virtue of being in

13 this trial because publicly filed documents can be obtained by anyone.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, we have attended to the concern

16 that you have expressed, but in our view nothing arises in this document

17 that would expose you to the danger you have identified, so answer the

18 question.

19 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

20 Q. If Mr. Nort has the bottom of page 92 on the overhead projector,

21 we see a contribution at the foot of that page, please, Mr. Nort, further

22 up - thank you - from yourself. And you say this: "As far as the name is

23 concerned, despite the resistance they've been offering against the state,

24 I have the feeling that that possibility has not been laid out. I think

25 we should insist in Geneva that everybody has the right to call himself by

1 the name that suits him," this is for context, Mr. Jovanovic, "unless we

2 cannot all be called confederal units, which would be the maximum. All

3 the more so if it is completed by guarantees that we're going to give them

4 concerning human rights. We must clearly, comprehensively and generously

5 guarantee them that the enclaves within the provinces, that is to say

6 within the confederal unit, would be fully protected and that the refugees

7 would have the right to turn and be compensated for the destroyed

8 property, et cetera."

9 Thus far very good sentiments. But I want you now to read on what

10 you said:

11 "It will not work out because the natural migration towards the

12 mother country would follow. Nobody has ever paid the war reparation

13 anywhere, so I'm sure it will not happen here either. However, we have to

14 make the comprehensive and generous gesture. Therefore, we must give a

15 guarantee at the humanitarian aspect. We must guarantee that the

16 non-existential creation called Bosnia would be held in such

17 non-existential condition for many years. That should divert fears that

18 the creation of Greater Serbia is ahead."

19 What you're revealing there is that what you say in public is one

20 thing, and it doesn't interfere with your underlying ambition that states

21 should be joined up -- Serb states should be joined up in due course. Am

22 I right?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to repeat what I said

24 to the President of the Honourable Trial Chamber. I was given assurances

25 that I would not have to face any unpleasantness when I went back to my

1 country, but I did not receive personal permission to comment documents of

2 top state importance. Mr. Lilic received a waiver himself personally. I

3 have not.

4 I honour this Trial Chamber very much and your assurances, but I

5 don't know whether they will be sufficient for my government to let me say

6 what you would like to have me respond to.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: But there is nothing in the answer that you could

8 give to this question that could expose you to any danger. It's really a

9 straightforward question.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that is true, and I don't mind

11 answering, but this is a question on the -- based on a document which is a

12 state secret. It was provided to the Court because the Court asked for

13 it. But had I been told beforehand that I would be discussing this --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

15 MR. NICE: I'm very aware of the consumption of time. I've made

16 my position clear. I'm giving this witness the chance to comment on

17 matters that go directly to his credit. If he chooses not to do so, I'm

18 going to move on because I see the clock ticking. He doesn't want to

19 answer.

20 Q. Could we go, please, to your tab 16, Mr. Jovanovic, and perhaps --

21 A. No, I'm not afraid of answering. I can answer you, but I wanted

22 to give that caution. I don't want to have any repercussions when I come

23 home. I'm not sure they'll turn a blind eye to it. And I see no

24 difference between what was said here and what we strove for, because this

25 was preparation for negotiations and discussions in Geneva, as far as I

1 understand it. I haven't been able to read the whole text, just the

2 portion read out by you.

3 And in Geneva, they will be discussing different types of

4 organisation for the three communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina stemming from

5 the confederal one and down to the cantonal ones. And we're discussing

6 what could be the maximum aim of the Bosnian Serbs. And of course those

7 who always opted for remaining in a joint state adhered to the maximum

8 goal; that is to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina should become a

9 confederal state.

10 So we reviewed this question in different ways. We looked into

11 the ways and means, and we wanted to quell them and tell them they would

12 not be separated from a joint state.

13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, that's a long answer but what I directed your

14 attention to was the reference to natural migration, to no one paying for

15 war reparation, having to make a gesture and guaranteeing the

16 non-existential creation called Bosnia for years to avoid people worrying

17 about Greater Serbia.

18 My suggestion to you is that that reveals what your real ambition

19 was. Am I not right?

20 A. No, you're not right, not at all right, because it was contrary to

21 what was said. It says here that we should insist upon the humanitarian

22 aspect and allow people freely to decide where they're going to live. So

23 not to quell them but to allay their fears. And as this Greater Serbia

24 seems to be the bogeyman which was proliferated and fear instilled in

25 people, this is precisely the reason why we wrote this down or said what

1 we said.

2 Q. Your tab 16, please, Mr. Jovanovic. And if you'd be good enough

3 to turn in it to page 19. And in the English version, if --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just be of assistance to what

7 Mr. Jovanovic said? Mr. Jovanovic said to use the term "odvratiti,"

8 "deter," and he repeated the term that he used and that is said in the

9 minutes and transcript. Last page, page 89.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, exhibit number?

11 MR. NICE: For the forthcoming -- oh, yes. Your Honour is

12 absolutely right. Can -- of course we don't have to -- the one you've

13 just been looking at was --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, I can get it in the index.

15 MR. NICE: Was Exhibit 469, tab 40. The present one is 469, tab

16 39.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, let me just -- it was a correction that

18 you were making, Mr. Milosevic?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to inform you that

20 Mr. Jovanovic used the same term he used, which was "odvratiti," "to

21 deter," and not "quell" or "calm."

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's true. In the English

23 translation it says to calm or quell, whereas I said "odvratiti," meaning

24 "deter."

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. The next exhibit, 469, tab 39 -- tab 39 but in your bundle tab 16,

3 Mr. Jovanovic, page 19.

4 Now, this meeting was on the 21st of January. Where were these

5 meetings typically held? It doesn't say. Were they held at Dobranovci or

6 Belgrade or where?

7 A. I can't remember exactly. I do remember one in Belgrade and I

8 think I attended meetings in Belgrade alone, but quite possibly I might be

9 mistaken in that.

10 Q. Again, the usual attendees including Karadzic and Mladic,

11 Krajisnik, various other people but we haven't time to go through that in

12 detail. On page 19 this is your contribution, Mr. Jovanovic. Starting at

13 the second paragraph: "Therefore, the territorial link with Serbia --"

14 JUDGE KWON: Make sure the witness is following.

15 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes.

16 Q. It's your page 19, and the second paragraph, starting with the

17 word "therefore," or starting with the concept "therefore."

18 "The territorial link with Serbia and Montenegro, in other words

19 with Yugoslavia, has to be ensured in an indisputable way which is not

20 transitory. But, what is more important is to make the territory that we

21 get nationally homogenous as soon as possible, but not by means of ethnic

22 cleansing and so on. Ethnic cleansing are -" and the translation is

23 "palm-offs. So we should give the peacetime process of exchange of

24 inhabitants, in other words, migration and immigration, which will flow.

25 What is important is that life in that future Bosnia becomes impossible

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1 and that everybody understands that individually, that they rush off to

2 their original provinces. This is a strategic goal to which we should

3 aspire, and which should be achieved.

4 "Once this has been achieved, as the democratic party would say

5 - 'It is ripe.' It has not been ripe for them, but it should be so for

6 us. Everything else is then a matter of technique, including the break-up

7 of Bosnia into three parts.

8 "But, if they were to prevent that, then the whole idea would be

9 brought into question. If on the contrary, freedom of movement would

10 bring freedom of settlement and the mixing of the composition of the

11 population to our disadvantage, then this what has been gained would

12 gradually erode and we would basically lose everything in the future.

13 Therefore, this should be a goal: Not to change the topic of discussion

14 to the fact that a large number of Serbs have stayed on in foreign

15 provinces. We should grasp the territories capable of functioning and

16 then encourage the migration of our peoples in the direction of our

17 provinces and others toward theirs.

18 "How to do that, that is the thing to be wise about? But, this

19 should be, in my opinion, our guiding thought. If this could be achieved,

20 it could be so as soon as a couple of years time."

21 Now, Mr. Jovanovic, I go back to my original questions. Tell us,

22 please, candidly: The ambition was by one means or another to ensure that

23 all Serbs lived together in a single unit. Yes or no.

24 A. First of all, in the translation it says that this is the break-up

25 of Bosnia. The original says the breaking of Bosnia into three parts. So

1 it remains as a state, but it consists of three cantons. So that's quite

2 different.

3 And this was done in such a way so as to deter any kind of

4 thinking that would lead to violent solutions or something that would be

5 violent resettlement of the population. Bosnian Serbs should be deterred

6 from such thinking, and they should believe the laws of life that they

7 would regulate themselves. They would do what suited the people -- what

8 would suit the people in the Bosnia that would come, without so-called

9 ethnic cleansing, and the population would move to the areas where they

10 wished to live, of course pursuing an economic policy that they would --

11 Q. In my original questions, of course I said nothing about violence,

12 I said nothing about immediacy. I said was there an ultimate objective?

13 I used a different word. You denied all of those things and denied

14 wanting to live in a single Serb or essentially a mono-Serb state. Can

15 you explain to the learned Judges, please -- and it's at page 19, where

16 you say that: "Life in the future Bosnia should become impossible and

17 that everybody has to understand they have to rush off to their original

18 provinces, and that's a strategic goal." Can you explain that to us so we

19 can fit it with your evidence.

20 A. That is what would happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina irrespective of

21 Serbia and Montenegro. That is to say, in a future Bosnia-Herzegovina as

22 an independent state, there would be these three ethnic entities or,

23 rather, entities in accordance with agreements that would be reached, and

24 one ethnic people would be a majority and each of them respectively.

25 This is not a pledoyer for grabbing Bosnia and attaching it to

1 Serbia.

2 Q. I want you to -- I'm going to ask you one more question and we'll

3 move on, but before I ask you the question, I want to -- if Mr. Nort would

4 put page 20 on the overhead projector and the foot of page 20.

5 Immediately, almost immediately after your contribution at this

6 meeting with Mladic, Karadzic, and all the others there, Karadzic said

7 this: "I think that this which Jovanovic is --" have you found it? I'm

8 so sorry. It's about in your -- it may be 20 or it may be 21. And it's

9 Radovan Karadzic saying: "I think this which Jovanovic is talking about."

10 Do you have that?

11 A. I see that, yes.

12 Q. "I think that this which Jovanovic is talking about, has already

13 happened to a huge extent. There was fifty-fifty of us in Zvornik. The

14 number of inhabitants of Zvornik is now the same, approximately 50.000,

15 and they are all Serbs. More than 24.000 Serbs from Zenica and Central

16 Bosnia have arrived and stopped in Zvornik: If only Serbia would help us

17 by not accepting refugees which it does not have to accept ..."

18 Now, he was describing massive ethnic movements to achieve Serb

19 domination of an area, wasn't he? Yes or no.

20 A. That is the position that Mr. Karadzic was presenting, and I have

21 nothing to do with that.

22 Q. Then we come back to my last question to you about your own

23 contribution in a meeting attended by all these individuals. At the foot

24 of page 19, and it will be -- sorry, I should have checked myself. In

25 your case it is at page 20, third paragraph, and then it's about four

1 lines down.

2 This is you speaking, Mr. Jovanovic: "Therefore, this should be

3 the goal: Not to change the topic of discussion to the fact that a large

4 number of Serbs have stayed on in foreign provinces; we should grasp the

5 territories capable of functioning and then encourage the migration of our

6 people in the direction of our provinces, and others towards theirs."

7 Explain to me, please, and to the Judges how your proposition

8 differs from what Karadzic has just described or was about to describe?

9 A. I'm sorry, I haven't found the exact passage. What's the page?

10 Is it 19 or 20?

11 Q. It's, I think, 20, and I think it's the third paragraph, beginning

12 "Ali ako ..."

13 A. Yes. This is a view of a peaceful development in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not violence and not by exerting physical force over

15 other persons. This is a way of allaying the fears of the Bosnian Serbs

16 that they would not remain a minority in their entities, that life would

17 take its own course. And some people would go to their own entities, and

18 other people would come to other entities.

19 Q. So it's --

20 A. These remarks are aimed at allaying the fears of the Bosnian Serbs

21 and that they should not worry that they would be outvoted in their own

22 cantons.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just in order to be fair to the

1 witness, since we are now on page 20 of the Serb version of this

2 paragraph, the interpretation that I heard here, and it's in the

3 transcript towards the top of page 20, when he mentions ethnic cleansings,

4 I heard Mr. Jovanovic saying ethnic cleansing should be abandoned as such,

5 and what he said here was -- what it says in the text here is "ethnic

6 cleansing is something that is being planted." "Ethnic cleansing is

7 something that is being planted." That's what it says. And in the

8 interpretation I heard that it is being given up on, as if he thought that

9 it was a good thing and that it was being pursued and then should be given

10 up.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Exactly.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I didn't see that in the transcript, but perhaps

13 it has gone. Anyhow, thanks for the explanation, Mr. Milosevic.

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. You see, now that you have acknowledged that what you said in that

16 meeting was to the effect I suggested, the position is quite simply this,

17 Mr. Jovanovic: You didn't tell the truth when I asked you about your

18 personal intentions right at the beginning of the questioning, did you?

19 Because you didn't acknowledge that you had personally the desire to see

20 ethnic migration of this kind or anything like it.

21 A. No. That's what I'm saying now, and I never thought any such

22 thing. It was a question of preventing ethnic cleansing and forcible

23 transfers of population from one area to the other. And what is indicated

24 here is to turn to life itself, life in the future and that life would

25 take its course and determine who is going to live where.

1 I stand by what I said, that I was always opposed to any kind of

2 physical action against the free will of the population in any area.

3 Q. My suggestion to you is that you shared an identity of interest

4 with the Bosnian Serbs and were prepared to defend them in their actions.

5 True or false?

6 A. I was prepared to defend their right to self-determination and a

7 free and equitable life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What Bosnia would look

8 like depended on them and others who lived there. I was opposed to

9 physical action that could mean ethnic cleansing or another kind of

10 violence that would be carried out in any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 MR. NICE: The next passage of evidence must start in private

12 session in accordance with the Court's ruling.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session.

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23 [Open session]

24 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are we? We should be in private now, too, for

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14 [Open session]

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, from sources of information, did you, at tab 20,

17 paragraph 7, learn of condemnation of the conduct of the Serbian side in

18 respect of events that had then happened?

19 A. We learned about that from this dispatch, from this cable, and

20 also from --

21 Q. Don't identify --

22 A. I apologise, yes. So we learned from public statements condemning

23 the conduct of Bosnian Serbs.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may the exhibits I propose to produce,

25 with leave of the Chamber, be given an exhibit number and then we can deal

1 with them tab by tab.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. What is the exhibit number?

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be 826, yes.

4 MR. NICE: Thank you. And I ask that tab 20 be admitted.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. Can we go to tab 21, please, Mr. Jovanovic, and if you would be

8 good enough, please, to look at the first page and the paragraph 1, second

9 paragraph. Was there information about the Bosnian Serb paramilitary

10 forces being required to cease attacks on Srebrenica and the SFRY to stop

11 supplying Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces with weapons and military

12 equipment? Just yes or no, please.

13 A. Yes. That is requested here. All I know is that President

14 Milosevic himself attacked -- condemned attacks on Srebrenica and thought

15 that was impermissible. As for the other issues of military nature, I

16 really wasn't kept abreast of that. I wasn't informed about that, so I

17 can't tell you anything specific. But I can say that we helped. We

18 provided moral assistance and material assistance to our people in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 Q. In the English version of tab 21, at page 3, at the top of that

21 page, and in your version, Mr. Jovanovic, at the top of the second page,

22 were the Bosnian Serbs condemned for attempting to evacuate civilians from

23 Srebrenica and from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

24 A. What is your question, please?

25 Q. Did you learn information to the effect that the Bosnian Serbs

1 were condemned for attempting to evacuate civilians from Srebrenica and

2 from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

3 A. Based on this information, there is a mistake here where it says

4 to evacuate civilians, because that town was not taken. It was only

5 attacked. As I said, this attack was very severely condemned by us, by

6 Mr. Milosevic, and that was conveyed to the leadership of Republika

7 Srpska, and they were asked to seize it immediately.

8 Q. Page -- page 3 for you, Mr. Jovanovic, and page 5 in the English.

9 Just over halfway down the English page, and halfway down your page,

10 Mr. Jovanovic. Second sentence of the paragraph. Did you receive

11 information that the Serbian leadership had given assurances to the

12 Russian officials that their army would not enter the town? Did you

13 receive such information?

14 A. Only based on this document. As for the situation on the ground,

15 I really wasn't informed. I didn't follow that closely.

16 Q. Very well. You understand, Mr. Jovanovic, the questions are about

17 the information coming to you and they're limited to that at this stage.

18 MR. NICE: Tab 21, with your leave, Your Honours.

19 Q. Tab 22, please. And of course the Chamber can see the dates as we

20 move through, but ...

21 Tab 22, please, Mr. Jovanovic, and it's the first page for you and

22 it's the third paragraph for the English readers.

23 With the proclamation of Sarajevo as a protected zone, did you

24 learn information that the Bosnian Serbs were warned to withdraw their

25 forces to a certain distance to avoid threatening the zone?

1 A. We received that information through this document, but apart from

2 that, I wasn't informed about other developments. I know that --

3 Q. Very well.

4 A. -- the shelling of Sarajevo was something that was constantly

5 condemned by our government.

6 Q. Page 2 in the English, and I think it's the end of page 1 for you,

7 Mr. Jovanovic. And in the English, it's the third line.

8 Did you receive information of an official kind that ethnic

9 cleansing and any sort of partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina was being

10 condemned?

11 A. Yes. Based on this document, we condemned it too. We condemned

12 any kind of ethnic cleansing, and we supported the unity of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not its disintegration. At the same time, we worked

14 with other international representatives on constitutional principles for

15 creating Bosnia as a confederation or --

16 Q. Sorry.

17 A. -- another form of state.

18 Q. Tab 22, if you please.

19 Tab 24 comes next. Tab 23 is void. Tab 24, the Chamber will

20 observe the details at the top. The distribution list is similar.

21 This is information coming to you from elsewhere, but it was

22 information about the key significance -- sorry, it's page 1 of the

23 English, the first substantive paragraph; and it's in the Serbian,

24 likewise the first substantive paragraph.

25 Did you receive information about the symbolic significance of

1 Sarajevo being of the essence to Bosnia-Herzegovina? Without it, its

2 identity or its sovereignty being lost?

3 A. We learned, based on this document and also based on the

4 discussions we had with international representatives. At the same time,

5 this was our position. We were constantly opposed to the shelling. In

6 Dayton, Mr. Milosevic put this into practice by saying that the entire

7 Sarajevo ought to belong to Bosniaks, to the Muslim part of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina.

9 Q. I'm going to divert from the particular topics of the documents

10 just for one or two questions because they come at the right sequence.

11 Who was paying for the Bosnian Serb army, Mr. Jovanovic?

12 A. I'm not aware of that. I did not deal with military issues in any

13 way, nor was I informed about it.

14 Q. You were a foreign minister. You were later the representative at

15 the United Nations. You obviously followed this trial. You've spoken

16 extensively about this Tribunal, and we may have time to look at that.

17 Are you telling the Chamber that you have no idea whether Serbia assisted

18 financially with the Bosnian Serb army?

19 A. I know that we provided material including financial assistance to

20 the Bosnian Serbs in all aspects of their lives. Now, as for the salaries

21 of officers, I don't know about that specifically. I heard that that was

22 the case. I heard it not only at this trial but in other places as well,

23 although I have no information myself about that.

24 Q. When did you first hear about it then?

25 A. Not that long ago. I didn't know about that earlier.

1 Q. You see, what I want you to help us with is this: If there was

2 such condemnation of the attack on Sarajevo, why wasn't the supply line of

3 money and offices simply cut off by this accused? Can you help us?

4 A. We as the parent state could not abandon our people to their fate.

5 We could not allow them to die of hunger. This is something similar to

6 what Croatia did with respect to Herceg-Bosna. Therefore, to cut the

7 assistance would have been inhumane.

8 However, on the 4th of August, 1994, we did something similar to

9 that, although the ban did not apply to assistance in terms of food,

10 medication, and clothing.

11 Q. Does your last answer mean that you understood and knew at the

12 time that the Bosnian Serbs were getting military assistance in the form

13 of officers, money, and armaments? Yes?

14 A. I did not have any firsthand information about that. All I had

15 were things I heard from other people about financial assistance. I did

16 not have any other information, nor was any information to that effect

17 provided to me.

18 Q. Do you accept -- you see, you told us that the accused condemned

19 the years of attack on Srebrenica. You speak of humane assistance. What

20 about the humane problems of the thousands of Muslims who were killed in

21 Srebrenica? Can you help us with why support wasn't cut off when it could

22 have been?

23 A. If you refer to the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, or perhaps you're

24 referring to the attacks on Srebrenica in 1993, I'm not quite sure. If

25 you're referring to Srebrenica in 1995, then that was an atrocious

1 massacre. As far as 1993, as far as I know, Srebrenica did not fall then.

2 It was only under attacks. And naturally, in the course of those

3 attacks there were casualties on both sides.

4 President Milosevic, the governments, both the federal and

5 republican governments condemned attacks on those protected areas. I have

6 to say that the protected areas were never clear as a concept, and they

7 were never really demilitarised. First in Srebrenica, because there were

8 cases there that Muslim soldiers stormed Serb villages and committed grave

9 crimes there. Therefore, the concept of protected areas wasn't clear

10 enough.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're past the time for the break. I should say

12 that the tabs and the index are to be under seal.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. And I think -- had I already

14 produced tab 22? If not, may I do so?

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

16 MR. NICE: 24. Thank you.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are adjourned for 20 minutes.

18 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, when we broke, I think you were seeking

21 the admission of --

22 MR. NICE: Tab 24.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- tab 24. The Court deputy wasn't certain about

24 it.

25 MR. NICE: Thank you to Your Honour and the Court deputy. Your

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13 English transcripts.

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1 Honour, I'm going to miss tab 25. It's a document we've looked at with

2 another witness.

3 Q. Tab 26, please, Mr. Jovanovic, and it's a short document for you

4 to look at. It's the first paragraph in each version. Did you receive

5 information about 120-millimetre projectiles being fired on Sarajevo from

6 Bosnian Serb positions, followed by UN overflights?

7 A. I did not. I was not kept abreast of information of that nature,

8 of military nature.

9 Q. Very well.

10 MR. NICE: If Your Honours will perhaps be good enough to look at

11 the second page, document in English.

12 Q. And if the witness would be good enough to look at the second page

13 of his. Thinking back, please, Mr. Jovanovic. This information came to

14 you, didn't it?

15 A. It did, but I'm afraid that at the time, I was not in the country.

16 I had a long tour of African countries. But even had I been present, had

17 this information reached me, this would not have changed anything because

18 this was just one of numerous informations -- information that came in

19 from various sources discussing the situation in Bosnia.

20 Q. You can confirm that this information came into the Foreign

21 Ministry and was available to the government? Yes?

22 A. Certainly, if this is marked here.

23 MR. NICE: Exhibit 26 -- tab 26.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

25 MR. NICE: May we lay on the overhead projector briefly tab 27.

1 Your Honours, just give me one minute.

2 Q. The next document is -- the document on the overhead projector we

3 see goes back, and it has its relevance really now. This is dated the

4 16th of April of 1993, and it's a Resolution of the Security Council.

5 Do you recall this Resolution, please, Mr. Jovanovic?

6 A. I can't say precisely, because this was 15 years ago and there

7 were many such Resolutions.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I know that the Security Council followed very closely the

10 situation and adopted various documents about the situation in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina.

12 Q. Is what we see here under the heading "Taking note," is that "the

13 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro should immediately

14 in pursuance of its undertaking take all measures within its power to

15 prevent the commission of the crime of genocide." Do you remember that

16 extraordinarily strong decision being taken in respect of your country?

17 As foreign minister, you must have been aware of it.

18 A. Yes, certainly I was familiar with this dispatch, although I can't

19 remember when it was adopted exactly.

20 Q. And under the heading "Concerned," do you see a reference to

21 "concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary

22 units"? Do you remember that concern being expressed?

23 A. As far as I know, concern was frequently expressed, not only on

24 that occasion. That became quite a regular practice, to mention these

25 forces in such documents and to condemn their conduct.

1 Q. And before I return to the sequence of information material that

2 we've been covering, just tell me this: As foreign minister for Serbia or

3 of the Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro or Yugoslavia, there

4 could be no justification in 1991, could there, for the accused to

5 establish paramilitary forces himself? Could there?

6 A. I am not familiar with any paramilitary forces established that

7 year in Serbia.

8 Q. Were you aware of forces that came to be known as the Red Berets?

9 A. I am familiar with them, but I have to say that it was not until

10 my return from New York that I became familiar with their names. Prior to

11 that, I did not follow their activities, nor did I know them under that

12 title. As far as I know, they were created much later.

13 Q. This is going to be a matter for the Trial Chamber to decide. If

14 paramilitary forces were established by this accused in 1991 and used

15 outside Serbia and Montenegro, were you ever informed of that, you as a

16 member of the government?

17 A. As far as I know, these forces were not established in 1991 but

18 later, in 1996 or around that time. On the other hand, I've already said

19 that I was not kept informed about any military issues, nor did I follow

20 those issues closely.

21 I know for a fact that there were no paramilitary formations in

22 Serbia in 1991 except those belonging to various political parties, and

23 those formations acted under the control of the JNA.

24 Q. Tell me, as foreign -- looking back at the screen and seeing that

25 in April 1993 the United Nations reaffirmed -- under "Reaffirming the

1 sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the

2 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," you as foreign minister, does that

3 mean that you owed duties in relation to this sovereign state in your

4 capacity as a foreign minister?

5 A. Certainly. And we confirmed that through documents and early

6 statements and also in all of our contacts with international

7 intermediaries. We confirmed that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

8 ought to be constitutionally structured as an independent state, and we

9 never challenged that identity or independence of that state.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Jovanovic. Should you, as

11 a foreign minister with those duties, have been informed of the military

12 activity, if any, of Serbia through paramilitaries or otherwise on that

13 foreign state? Should you?

14 A. I don't know whether there were such activities. I don't think

15 there were, because Serbia was not a party to a war, nor did it send its

16 army --

17 Q. You've told us you're a life-long diplomat. You've been a

18 politician for several years as well. Please tell the Chamber: If one

19 state sends military forces to another state, is that something of which

20 the foreign minister and the Foreign Ministry needs to be aware? Yes or

21 no.

22 A. I don't know that Serbia sent its army or parts of its army to

23 another state.

24 Q. And I have barely time to wait for the answers. We'll move on --

25 if they're not going to be given.

1 We'll move on, please, to tab 28. And again, did you receive

2 information -- second paragraph on the first page of each version. Did

3 you receive concern expressed about the prevention of the formal

4 functioning of Sarajevo airport, the suspension of humanitarian aid, a

5 result of efforts by Bosnian Serbs? Did you?

6 A. I probably received it if I was in Belgrade at the time, but let

7 me stress once again, because of the interruption of all economic and

8 political relations with Serbia and Yugoslavia at that time, we didn't

9 have any contacts, and we weren't able to exert any serious influence.

10 Q. Tab 29 I don't have time to deal with in detail. I may, I

11 suppose, come back to it.

12 Just help us: On the 5th of May, 1995, where were you? You tell

13 us you were out of the country at the beginning --

14 A. Yes, probably. Well, I was during the summer absent during the

15 summer. I can't from this point in time remember where I actually was. I<