1 Monday, 14 February 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please sit.

10 WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC

11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand that there is an exhibit from the

13 previous witness, Mr. Balevic, which, for the purposes of the record,

14 should be number D274. Is that it? D274.

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I ask you to admit

17 into evidence the document proffered by Mr. Nice about what happened in

18 Kosovo Polje. Generally speaking, everything that happened when there was

19 a clash between the police and the demonstrators. I would like this to be

20 in evidence so that it would be obvious how facts are being manipulated

21 and how they are being presented upside down.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us deal with those documents presented by the

23 Prosecution during cross-examination, at a later time. Please begin your

24 examination-in-chief.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

1 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Jovanovic.

3 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

4 Q. At the very beginning could you just say very briefly a few words

5 about your career.

6 A. I was born in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 71 years ago. I have a

7 degree in law. I was in the diplomatic service for 43 years. Four of

8 those years I was the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia and then the

9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I served in several different countries;

10 in Belgium, Turkey, London, and I was ambassador to Turkey and the Head of

11 Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the United Nations. In

12 the beginning of 2001, I retired.

13 Q. You mentioned now, inter alia, that you were minister of foreign

14 affairs of Serbia. I'm going to deal with that briefly. The Ministry of

15 Foreign Affairs of Serbia, did it in any way take over any of the powers

16 vested in Yugoslavia?

17 A. No. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia just took care of

18 the interests of Serbia in the field of foreign relations, those that it

19 could develop but only within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

20 Everything else was done by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

21 Q. At that time, you were, for example, at a meeting that took place

22 in Prague in August 1991. You attended a meeting of the Conference on

23 Security and Cooperation in Europe. Could you tell me what your position

24 was there and who you represented.

25 A. This was a high officials meeting of the CSE, and the delegation

1 of Yugoslavia consisted of members of the Federal Ministry for Foreign

2 Affairs. As minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, I was attached to that

3 delegation, but I did not take part in its work, and I was not present in

4 the conference hall itself. I spent time in front of the conference hall,

5 together with journalists.

6 Q. So in a way you accompanied the delegation of the SFRY at that

7 meeting; isn't that right?

8 A. Yes. I was there in that capacity at our request but the CSE rule

9 was observed, namely that only members of the CSE could attend, and Serbia

10 was not a member, and that is why the delegation consisted only of

11 representatives of the Federal Foreign Ministry.

12 Q. Did you have the same position in Helsinki in autumn of 1991 when

13 the federal delegation went?

14 A. It was the same. This was a meeting that was at a somewhat lower

15 level. This was a meeting devoted to the so-called humanitarian dimension

16 of the CSE. I was in the conference hall at that time, but I did not have

17 the right to speak. Instead of me, it was Dr. Vladimir Pavicevic, head of

18 the delegation, who spoke.

19 Q. Vladimir Pavicevic represented Yugoslavia?

20 A. Yes. He was an ambassador, a high official of the Federal Foreign

21 Ministry.

22 Q. On the basis of everything you know, were there any collisions

23 anywhere between the functions that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had

24 or, rather, its Foreign Ministry and on the other hand the functions that

25 you exercised in Serbia?

1 A. Practically, we did not have a very notable cooperation except

2 that from time to time some documents were sent to me, but not all

3 documents, not all the time, and not the most sensitive documents. So the

4 foreign policy of Yugoslavia was exclusively pursued by the Federal

5 Foreign Ministry. Serbia was on the sidelines to a large extent.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to get the year during which

7 Mr. Jovanovic was minister of foreign affairs for Serbia and for the

8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I would find it very helpful if you

9 would include a CV of the witness, in the future, for this purpose.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon. The CV of

11 witnesses is usually provided, but there will be no problems with the CV

12 of this witness. Mr. Jovanovic was in 1991 the minister of foreign

13 affairs of Serbia, and practically, he worked within the foreign policy

14 activities of Yugoslavia, but it's best to ask him.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. When did you become foreign minister of Yugoslavia?

17 A. On the 1st and 2nd of August, 1991. And I held that position all

18 the way up to July 1992, when I was appointed minister of foreign affairs

19 of Yugoslavia in the government of Mr. Milan Panic, and I remained in that

20 position until mid-September the same year, when I resigned as foreign

21 minister in the federal government, and I again became the foreign

22 minister of Serbia. I remained there all the way up to the summer of

23 1993, when I became minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia in the government of Mr. Radoje Kontic. I held that position

25 until I went to New York to head the permanent mission of the Federal

1 Republic of Yugoslavia to the UN.

2 Q. When was that?

3 A. That was at the end of September. To be more precise, on the 19th

4 of September, 1995.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, you said you were in the

6 diplomatic service for 43 years. When did you join the diplomatic

7 service?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I joined the diplomatic service as

9 soon as I graduated from university and did -- as soon as I did my

10 military service. That was in March 1957.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would it be correct, then, to say that you were a

12 career civil servant in the diplomatic service of your country?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in order to look at the broader context of events

17 that you're going to be testifying about, tell us, please, what do you

18 know about the following: How was it that the International Peace

19 Conference on Yugoslavia was held?

20 A. The International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia came as a

21 consequence of the position taken by the European Union on the 27th of

22 August, 1991, to have this kind of conference held because the European

23 Community could help the quarreling republics of the Socialist Federal

24 Republic of Yugoslavia and could assist them in finding a political

25 solution. It is from that point of view that the European Community

1 decided to send special envoys to the representatives of all the republics

2 and to the top federal authorities.

3 As far as Serbia is concerned, this task was given to President

4 Mitterrand. He invited President Milosevic to come to Paris on the 29th

5 of August. Of course I accompanied President Milosevic, and President

6 Mitterrand represented this conference to us in a very likable way, in a

7 very benevolent way, so from his words we got the impression that this

8 conference was really supposed to give its good offices and with the best

9 of intentions, and that was all. He told us that the European Community

10 wished to offer these good offices without any ulterior motive, that

11 they wanted to bring together to the same table the representatives of all

12 the quarreling republics and to help them find a common tongue. It this

13 were to be a success, the European Community would be pleased. And if

14 not, nothing would happen. Everybody would go home as if nothing

15 happened, as if the conference never took place. At the same time, he

16 said that the conference would have an arbitration commission as an

17 auxiliary advisory body which could consist of the presidents of five

18 constitutional courts of five member states. Their opinions would not be

19 compulsory in any way or binding. They would only be of an advisory

20 nature.

21 He was trying to tell us that Serbia had nothing to fear at this

22 conference, and he pointed out that the president of that commission would

23 be Mr. Robert Badinter, who was his personal friend, and he particularly

24 pointed out, "If he is my personal friend, then --"

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.

1 Mr. Milosevic, as you know that I do not have a predilection for

2 very long narratives, so try to ask questions and elicit shorter answers.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, could you help me with one thing:

4 You said that you became the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of

5 Yugoslavia at the beginning of August 1991. This meeting was in -- on the

6 27th of August, 1991; is that correct?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 29th of August. This meeting

8 took place at President Mitterand's.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Just one correction --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: But you went as a representative of Serbia,

12 although by this time you were the foreign minister of Yugoslavia. Have I

13 got the picture correct?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You didn't.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I was foreign minister of

16 Serbia from the 1st or 2nd of August, 1991, and the minister of the

17 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is what I became only the following year,

18 in July 1992. So I was in Paris only in my capacity of foreign minister

19 of Serbia.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the transcript certainly doesn't reflect that

21 and no doubt will be corrected.

22 JUDGE KWON: So you were appointed as minister of Serbia two

23 times; in 1991 and 1993?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Once, but my position of foreign

25 minister of Serbia was not extinguished when I became federal minister --

1 federal foreign minister. So then I simply resumed my former duties

2 afterwards as foreign minister of Serbia.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you held the two posts at the same time?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In a way, but effectively I worked

6 in the first position, and the second one was in a state of freeze.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. In relation to this question put by Mr. Robinson, did you take any

9 activities while you were foreign minister of Yugoslavia? Did you take

10 any activities in Serbia?

11 A. In the initial period, that is to say between the summer of 1992

12 and September 1992, formally I was foreign minister of Serbia, too, but at

13 that time I was not exercising that function at all because, quite simply,

14 I could not attend two different government sessions, I could attend the

15 sessions of only one government. So this position of mine as foreign

16 minister of Serbia was practically in a state of freeze.

17 Q. I hope we can go on. Tell us, Mr. Jovanovic, is there anything

18 characteristic or special that you remember from that meeting with

19 President Mitterand, who advocated this conference on Yugoslavia?

20 A. President Mitterand, in addition to saying that Badinter was his

21 friend and, therefore, our friend, too, he assured us that the members of

22 that commission would be the presidents of the constitutional courts of

23 Greece, France, Britain, and Germany; that is to say that there would be

24 at least three who would be sympathetic to our cause. And he pointed out

25 that Serbia has such strong political and historical arguments that there

1 was absolutely no reason for fear that they not be upheld at the

2 conference itself. On the other hand, he pointed out that the conference

3 would only offer good offices and there would be no danger of it growing

4 into anything else.

5 Q. All right. Tell me, please, how did this develop further? As the

6 conference evolved, did it result in good offices only or something that

7 could not be called that?

8 A. Regrettably, from the very first days it abandoned that approach

9 of offering good offices only. It started behaving in an engaged manner,

10 and it was engaged at that on one side; the republics that had proclaimed

11 independence or those who were prepared to follow the secessionism of

12 Slovenia and Croatia. It is for that reason that from a conference

13 offering good offices this conference very soon started openly interfering

14 in the internal affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

15 and giving open support to the secessionist republics.

16 Finally, the conference ended in a dictate, in a

17 take-it-or-leave-it form. The federal units, the republics that did not

18 accept this dictate, those that wanted to preserve the Socialist Federal

19 Republic of Yugoslavia were punished. Sanctions were imposed against

20 Yugoslavia, and that was the beginning of a long path that Serbia and

21 Montenegro -- rather, Yugoslavia had to take over the next ten years. It

22 was constant isolation and ultimately bombs.

23 Q. Let's just go back to one thing, Mr. Jovanovic. What about the

24 meetings of the expert groups that were established then, especially where

25 you took part in this directly? What do you know about this?

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1 A. At first we had meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. First

2 two groups were formed and later on a third one. They dealt with

3 constitutional matters, economic matters, and human rights issues. As for

4 foreign ministers' meetings --

5 Q. Can you tell us specifically which two groups and which three

6 groups?

7 A. The third -- the first one was foreign ministers. This was a

8 plenary meeting. And after that there was a group for constitutional

9 matters and a group for economic matters. A few weeks before that, a

10 group for economic questions was set up. These were expert groups, and

11 foreign ministers meetings were of a political nature. I attended only

12 meetings of foreign ministers. And in the work of these groups, it was

13 obvious that there was a total divergence between the republics that

14 wanted to preserve Yugoslavia and that wanted to resolve the crisis in

15 Yugoslavia peacefully and, on the other hand, the republics that rejected

16 this legalist approach and insisted on the right to secession. It was

17 Slovenia and Croatia that figured most prominently in this effort, whereas

18 Bosnia and Macedonia for a while had an ambivalent position. But as the

19 conference progressed, they became closer and closer to the positions

20 upheld by Croatia and Slovenia.

21 Q. Very well. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Now, do you happen to

22 remember the first meeting, the first plenary session in The Hague, on the

23 7th of September, 1991?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At that meeting, if I may be allowed to explain, the heads of

1 delegations presented their platforms, their positions and views about the

2 work of the conference, and you, in your capacity as President of Serbia,

3 presented your own views in a speech that was not a very lengthy one but

4 which contained the principled stands and positions and legalistic

5 positions necessary and indispensable for resolving the Yugoslavia crisis.

6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in your binder, tab 3, you have my speech there,

7 the one that I delivered at The Hague Conference on the 7th of September,

8 1991.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gentlemen, I have provided it in

10 both the English and the Serbian versions.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And in view of the fact that you yourself were fully informed of

13 the problems at hand --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, where are we to find it in the --

15 tab 3?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is tab 3. And you have

17 exhibit description here, tab 3, Statement by the President of the

18 Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, the Conference on Yugoslavia.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Well, let me ask you questions and then you can answer, several

22 questions with regard to the positions and stands taken. And I should

23 like to ask you to comment and respond.

24 At the very beginning, I am going to quote, actually, the first

25 paragraph. It says: "The Yugoslav crisis, which is the reason for the

1 convening of this Conference, is the result of a unilateral secessionist

2 policy, first of Slovenia and then of Croatia. By so doing, they have

3 jeopardised the Yugoslav constitutional order."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, please, was that absolutely clear or can you confirm that or

6 challenge it as a fact?

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is he being asked; whether it was a fact

8 that you made that statement, or whether it was a fact that the Yugoslav

9 crisis, which is the reason for the conference, was the result of a

10 unilateral secessionist policy of Slovenia and Croatia?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Precisely that, Mr. Robinson. I

12 assume we're not challenging that I --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're also asking him to say whether -- why

14 that secessionist policy of the Yugoslav constitutional order was

15 jeopardised. I wouldn't allow the latter question.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, how did the Yugoslav crisis come about?

19 A. The Yugoslav crisis was caused by the gradual, slow, and then

20 measures which came to a head taken by Slovenia and Croatia to secede, to

21 break away from Yugoslavia on one side, and in a violent manner. They did

22 this, especially Slovenia, over longer period of time. It lasted some

23 five years before the Conference on Yugoslavia was actually held. And the

24 upshot of it was, came in 1991 - 1990 and 1991 - when successively measure

25 were made for unilateral secession by amendments of the constitution,

1 illegal arming, and the proclamation of sovereignty first and independence

2 second. And it was these measures that rocked Yugoslavia and brought into

3 question its constitutional order, because Yugoslavia never prevented the

4 right to self-determination and secession for anyone but this was always

5 linked with the rights and interests of the other republics making up

6 Yugoslavia and general stability and peace in the country. So these

7 republics could have succeeded through a constitutional channel and

8 peaceful channels but they did not want to do that because that would have

9 then constituted secession, whereas they wanted to break away in the form

10 of disassociation and the disbanding of Yugoslavia. Now, unfortunately,

11 they have an enormous support from certain members of the European

12 Community, particularly Germany and Austria on one hand and on the other

13 side the Vatican too.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, bear in mind we already have

15 evidence on this question.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am bearing that in mind,

17 Mr. Robinson, but Mr. Jovanovic was a direct participant in the events and

18 knows the facts very well, the facts that relate to the development of the

19 Yugoslav crisis.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And in September, that is to say the beginning of September 1991,

22 was it contentional at all that secession had already at the time led to a

23 conflict and bloodshed?

24 A. Unfortunately, that's what happened, yes. First in Slovenia and

25 then in Croatia where the new authorities in Croatia immediately

1 proclaimed a political war against the Serb people in Croatia, provoking

2 the Serb people, dismissing people from their jobs, engaging in selective

3 killing and selective storming of the police force in areas that were

4 populated by a Serb majority, and that led the Serb people in Croatia --

5 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... very much or at

6 all, I hope, with this witness's evidence. I've been provided with a 65

7 ter summary that is so general I have no real idea of the detail of what

8 he's going to be speaking about, but for the avoidance of any doubt or

9 uncertainty, I don't expect to be cross-examining on generalities of the

10 kind he's just given, speaking of crimes and dismissing people from their

11 jobs, unless he's going to give direct evidence about it himself, which I

12 rather doubt. It's a matter for the accused if he wants to spend his time

13 eliciting evidence of this kind, but it doesn't seem to me that it's very

14 helpful to the Chamber.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, I certainly for one am increasingly

16 concerned about the way in which the accused is utilising the time

17 available to him to deal with matters which don't have a direct - direct -

18 bearing on whether he was criminally responsible in any way for the crimes

19 that may or may not have been committed during the period that we're

20 concerned about, and this sort of tit-for-tat exchange about who started

21 it all seems to me to take us nowhere in answering the question that we

22 really have to answer at the end of the day.

23 MR. NICE: And Your Honour, obviously I echo that, but more

24 materially, I think this witness's experience does cover the time and does

25 cover events and meetings which may be material in due course in

1 cross-examination, and that's what I'll be focusing on --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed.

3 MR. NICE: -- but I can't deal with this sort of material.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have heard the observations of

5 Mr. Nice, also the remarks of my brother Judge Bonomy. Much of this

6 evidence is repetitive and may not be directly relevant to the charges. I

7 have no doubt that the witness can give evidence that is vital and

8 important to the matters at hand, so you must move to an area of the

9 information available to him which is more directly relevant. But I will

10 not allow any further questions on these matters that you have -- that

11 have been raised. They are not sufficiently relevant.

12 JUDGE KWON: And before going further, in tab 3, we have two

13 versions of your statement, one being with some editorial notes, taking

14 out only phrases or inserting some phrases, the other one being a clean

15 version which seems to be a translation of the Serb version. How are they

16 different and who was it that put some English editorial notes?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I shall have to take a look

18 first.

19 JUDGE KWON: If the witness can help us.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These changes in the English text

21 were done by me. That is my handwriting. And the following version is

22 the version in Serbian compiled by Mr. Milosevic. So this was done for my

23 own needs, for me to be able to know exactly what was uttered, and what

24 was uttered is what you have in the Serbian version, the Serbian language.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honours may want to know, if it's not apparent

1 already, that what appears in my tab is the second version, with ERN

2 number ending 5341, is the document already produced as 776. Your Honour

3 is obviously ahead of me on that.

4 JUDGE KWON: As noted here.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you.

6 Mr. Milosevic, move to another subject area within the witness's

7 knowledge and that is directly relevant to the charges in the indictment.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this witness is

9 testifying about what actually happened, and as far as the indictment is

10 concerned, everything there is completely unfounded. Now, I can ask the

11 witness a question and say what he knows about it all and move on, so he

12 needn't testify at all. But I would like us to clear matters up here so

13 that you can see the truth about what actually took place.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in paragraph 3 of this speech of mine, I quote

16 here: "No one is challenging the right of the Croatian people to

17 self-determination." Is that what it says? So was that the position

18 taken by Serbia at the time in 1991, September, in The Hague, that nobody

19 questions or challenges the right of the Croatian people to? It says:

20 "This policy culminated in unilateral proclamation of Croatian

21 independence, which thus the right of the Croatian people to

22 self-determination, which no one challenges or denies, has been abused in

23 the legal acts of the Croatian government to the detriment of that same

24 right of the Serbian people to self-determination."

25 So was that the key problem, the crux of the matter that was

1 raised, and it was clear -- clearly presented to the conference in The

2 Hague on Serbia's part?

3 A. Yes. That was the key problem in the Yugoslav crisis, because the

4 constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guaranteed equal rights

5 to self-determination to all the constituent nations of Yugoslavia, and

6 this position was expressed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of

7 Croatia and the new authorities in Croatia amended the constitution

8 hastily and deprived the people in Croatia the rights of a constituent

9 peoples and reduced them to the status of a minority. Therefore, this

10 position taken in the speech is a position of great importance because it

11 emphasised and reiterated once again the fact that the proper approach to

12 the right or equal right of all the constituent peoples in Yugoslavia, the

13 right to self-determination, would enable us to solve the Yugoslav crisis

14 in a legal, democratic manner. The new Croatian authorities abused the

15 right to self-determination that they had, and nobody challenges that

16 right, as was set out here, and at the same time it challenged the right

17 of the Serb people.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, I'm stopping you.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you have scheduled six

21 hours for this witness. At the rate that you're going and on the basis of

22 the kind of questions that you're asking and the subject areas of the

23 question, I think you will take 12 hours to conclude.

24 This particular matter that he's dealing with, secession and so

25 on, while not irrelevant is a matter on which we already have evidence.

1 At this stage I would almost say it is close to being peripheral to the

2 central issues in this case. So deal with the matter quickly. You're

3 going round and round and round in circles, and you're consuming a lot of

4 time. Get to the point very quickly and bear in mind, as I said, we

5 already have evidence on this matter.

6 You have a specific in number of days in which to present your

7 case, and you must utilise your time more prudently. It is not the most

8 efficient use of the Court's time, and that is the point.

9 We have heard evidence from several witnesses on this question,

10 and I never thought this witness was coming here to give more evidence on

11 this issue. So if you have to deal with it, if you want to deal with it,

12 since it is your case, then deal with it, but deal with it very shortly,

13 very quickly and move on to something that is more central and more

14 directly relevant to the issues that we face on the basis of the

15 indictment.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. Let me

17 just finish what I was saying.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I'm just going to quote a portion and then ask you a question, ask

20 you why I quoted that. The question I wish to ask you, in fact, is this:

21 Was it Serbia -- was Serbia a participant in the conflict? And before you

22 answer, I'm going to read what I said on the occasion, and then you'll be

23 able to correct me or agree or explain what this was all about, because

24 this is what it says here, that: "The authorities were demonstrating by

25 armed attacks, demonstrating sovereignty and independence by constant

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1 armed attacks on the territories inhabited by Serbs. Over 100.000

2 refugees from Croatia to Serbia are a direct effect of this policy. On

3 the other hand, there is no single Croat who fled from Serbia to Croatia

4 because of national discrimination. Evidently, it is the actual Croatian

5 government which has forced the Serbs in the Republic of Croatia to

6 organise and defend themselves in order to prevent the repetition of

7 genocide performed by the former Independent State of Croatia during the

8 Second World War.

9 "Since the Serbs in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina

10 and Slavonia and Baranja and Western Srem, being one part in the armed

11 conflicts in Croatia, and according to the documents signed in Belgrade, a

12 participant on equal footing in cease-fire monitoring, I deem the presence

13 of their legitimate representatives in the procedure initiated today not

14 only necessary but actually indispensable."

15 So let me repeat my question to you now: Was Serbia a participant

16 in the conflict, and what was the essence of the strivings made for the

17 representatives of SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, SAO Krajina, to

18 become included into the work of the conference?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I just make my position clear on this before

20 it's answered: I regard any answer that's given to this question as

21 valueless because it's the most leading question, I think, that's ever

22 been addressed in the course of this trial; an absolutely pointless way of

23 conducting this examination.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please answer my question, which was: What was the

1 role of Serbia in that conflict? The most general question that I can put

2 to you.

3 A. Serbia was not involved in any way in armed conflicts in Croatia,

4 for two reasons. The first reason is a factual one: Serbia did not have

5 its own army. The only armed force in Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav

6 People's Army.

7 The second reason is that the federal organs had competencies over

8 the federal army, and Serbia could only have the political influence to

9 the extent that it participated in the federal government and it

10 represented only one-sixth of the federal government. The parties in the

11 conflict were Croatian paramilitary units and the military formations of

12 Serbs in Croatia. This can be seen in the various agreements and appeals

13 where precisely these parties are called upon to implement cease-fire.

14 There was one agreement between President Tudjman and General Kadijevic

15 dated 22nd September, 1991, if I remember correctly, and such an agreement

16 is a direct result of the understanding of the situation, namely, that the

17 parties to this conflict are Croatian paramilitary formations and Yugoslav

18 People's Army, and the military formations of Serbs in Croatia also figure

19 in that context.

20 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. Mr. Jovanovic, take your case, for

21 example. You are the minister of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia retaining

22 the status as a minister of Serbia. Can you not say that Republic of

23 Serbia has a say in relation to the matter of Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia in one way or another, given your situation?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me make a

1 clarification. At the time, I was only foreign minister of Serbia. It

2 wasn't until one year later that I became foreign minister of Yugoslavia.

3 The events in Croatia unfolded only in 1991 because the Vance-Owen Plan

4 came into being in 1992 -- or, rather, the Vance Plan.

5 As I said, Serbia could have a political say in the same share

6 that was allotted to other federal units, not more and not less. Even in

7 the Main Staff of the Yugoslav army, Serbia was the least represented

8 republic. It had only a few generals out of a total of 16 generals. So

9 we cannot, based on this, draw a conclusion that Serbia had an influence

10 that was at all relevant in what was going, especially in what was going

11 on in Croatia.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Now that we're dealing with this topic, Mr. Jovanovic, you

14 participated in the meeting which took place in Igalo on the 17th of

15 September, 1991. We can see that in tab 2, Statement by Lord Carrington,

16 The Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, and The Minister of

17 National Defence at Igalo, Yugoslavia, on 17 Sep 91."

18 Please be so kind and explain to us the following -- we have this

19 document in Serbian here as well. Please explain to us what was the

20 course of that conversation, that discussion, and what was the role of the

21 president of Serbia within that conversation and within this agreement as

22 a whole? You were a direct participant.

23 A. Lord Carrington called that meeting because he was concerned,

24 seeing that the conflict in Croatia was intensifying. Therefore, a text

25 was drafted which was supposed to be signed by warring parties, namely

1 President Tudjman and General Kadijevic. When he asked President

2 Milosevic to sign it as well in view of his political standing and

3 influence that he had, he later on agreed to insert into text "under

4 political and not only military influence." Therefore, at the request,

5 special request of Lord Carrington and after the insertion of this text,

6 President Milosevic agreed to sign this as a sign of support to peace and

7 cease-fire in Croatia. He did not do that representing any warring side

8 but as a political personality who wanted to add his weight to

9 establishing peace.

10 Q. All right. Let us take a look at tab 5, which is a report of the

11 Conference on Yugoslavia. This is a foreign document.

12 Could you please explain to us, what is this document about?

13 This is a document I received from the other side. Therefore, the

14 document provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I suppose of the

15 Netherlands, which at the time was the country presiding the European

16 Community.

17 A. I first have to take a look at this, because this must be a

18 document from The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, but there were a number

19 of such documents. Therefore, I need to take a very brief look at this,

20 with the Court's indulgence.

21 As far as I can see, this is an appeal sent by the Presidency of

22 the SFRY to reach cease-fire agreement in Croatia.

23 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, is this a document coming from one of the European

24 ministries of foreign affairs, informing about the Conference on

25 Yugoslavia?

1 A. Yes. This seems to be a document of the foreign affairs of the

2 Netherlands, which produced this document to be used by the chairman,

3 Mr. Van den Broek.

4 Q. Very well. In relation to what you just explained about the

5 agreement in Igalo, please take a look at the bottom of the first page of

6 this dispatch. I will quote just three lines: "[In English] The

7 collective Presidency of SFRY and President Tudjman, in the presence of

8 President Milosevic, agree to give the following instructions to their

9 respective forces immediately."

10 [Interpretation] Therefore, the collective Presidency of

11 Yugoslavia and President Tudjman. And then it says, "in the presence of

12 President Milosevic..." So who agreed here to issue instructions to their

13 forces?

14 A. What is repeated here are precisely the words uttered in Igalo.

15 So this document repeats what was stated in Igalo and later implemented in

16 the agreement between Tudjman and General Kadijevic as representatives of

17 the warring sides in the cease-fire agreement. Just like at Igalo,

18 they're counting on the presence of President Milosevic. At Igalo they

19 did that for his political influence. And based on this, we can see who

20 the warring sides are, and also see that the presence of President

21 Milosevic was needed in order to show his support for peace and in order

22 to make it more binding on the warring sides. So I don't see any

23 difference between this text here and the text from Igalo.

24 Q. It says here "collective Presidency of Yugoslavia and President

25 Tudjman..." Therefore, they agreed to issue instructions to their forces.

1 Are there any forces of Serbia that need to be given instructions? Which

2 are the warring sides here?

3 A. No. There are no military forces in Serbia. Serbia did not have

4 any military forces. But as is known, what we are dealing with here are

5 the Croatian forces, the JNA, and the Serbs in Croatia who organised

6 themselves in order to defend themselves. And those were ad hoc

7 established units.

8 Q. Very well. Please take a look at the following page, which deals

9 with the plenary session. This is the well-known session at which Serbia

10 did not accept the Carrington document. This document here explains it

11 very briefly, although we have my speech from that session.

12 It says here: "President Milosevic made a formal reserve [In

13 English] on the first chapter of the proposed text of the Chair since the

14 paper started from the premise that an internationally recognised state

15 should be abolished."

16 [Interpretation] Therefore, what was this all about,

17 Mr. Jovanovic? This is a question that has been put here frequently. You

18 were present at this occasion, so you have everything you need to have in

19 order to explain this.

20 A. The conference was called in order to preserve Yugoslavia, as the

21 European Community in its declaration dated the 8th of August, 1991,

22 stated that precisely. So this was not a conference that was supposed to

23 be fatal to Yugoslavia. This is why this is the cornerstone for

24 everything else that was to happen afterwards. They are starting from the

25 premise that Yugoslavia must disappear, and instead of Yugoslavia, there

1 should be new republics constituted. This was a way to avoid calling

2 secession a secession. They opted for calling this process a

3 disintegration of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this political position was

4 later implemented through the opinion of Badinter's commission, veiled

5 under the legal veil.

6 President Milosevic insisted on this position here because he

7 believed that they needed to discuss everything else contained in this

8 paper. Without that, there was nothing else to discuss.

9 We kept insisting on the position that, yes, some republics can

10 avail themselves of their right to self-determination. However, what was

11 a problem, that that same right to self-determination was denied to Serbia

12 and Montenegro and to Serbs living in Croatia. So that was the key issue.

13 And this was the key reason for what happened afterwards, namely the

14 intensification of Yugoslav crisis and conflict in Croatia. It introduced

15 Yugoslav people to new conflicts.

16 We insisted on the position that those republics who wished to do

17 so could leave Yugoslavia as a joint state. However, there had to be a

18 proviso; namely, that those republics and nations which wished to stay in

19 Yugoslavia as their state, which would be a legal successor and which

20 would be -- which would have international -- status of an international

21 subject, should be allowed to do so.

22 So this initiative started by Lord Carrington was not seen through

23 its end, no. An end was put to it, an end that was to the detriment of

24 those republics and nations who wished to stay in Yugoslavia. As a result

25 of that, consequences ensued which can be felt to this day.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, what do you mean when you say that

2 the same right to self-determination was denied to Serbia and Montenegro?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that because the right to

4 self-determination does not contain only the right to secession. It has

5 its internal and external aspect. Therefore, it contains also the right

6 to remain in the common joint state. As the survival of Yugoslavia --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: You're distinguishing Serbia and the position of

8 Serbia and Montenegro and its rights from those of any other republic.

9 Now, what was the difference? I quite accept that you take the view that

10 Croatia had no right to secede. Does it follow that Serbia and Montenegro

11 would have no right to secede either? So what is the difference you're

12 trying to make or identify between the positions of these two republics --

13 or indeed three republics, rather?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because Serbia and Montenegro

15 proposed a joint amendment, specifying that those republics who wished

16 could remain in Yugoslavia as a joint state.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You either don't understand the question or you're

18 not answering it.

19 You seem to be suggesting there's some difference in the status of

20 Serbia and the status of Montenegro from that of Croatia that was

21 prejudicial to these two republics, and I may have misunderstood you, but

22 I was trying to clarify the point.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is it -- Mr. Jovanovic, before you answer, is it

24 that you're saying that Serbia and Montenegro wanted the right to remain

25 as the FRY, as the legal successor, and that right was denied, was being

1 denied?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely that. That was a

3 legitimate right that they had. Lord Carrington kept challenging that and

4 denying that to the very end. He used to say, "You, Serbia and

5 Montenegro, can create a new statement. You can call it Yugoslavia, even,

6 but it has to be a new state."

7 With your indulgence, Your Honours, I would like to remind you of

8 a meeting that took place between Prime Minister Panic and Prime Minister

9 Major and Junior Minister Hurd in London. I was present there as well.

10 We explained the same issue to them. We insisted on legal succession and

11 the status of international subject that was to be granted to FRY, and

12 Mr. Douglas Hurd stated the following: "You can have your arguments, but

13 you must, you must accept our position." And this was the verdict that

14 was taken with respect to the existence of Yugoslavia and legal secession.

15 Unfortunately, this position was taken by other members of the EU and then

16 adopted by the Security Council, and this explains precisely the suffering

17 that we had to endure for the following ten years within the UN and within

18 the international community as a whole.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not sure if it explains that. That may be an

20 overstatement. But continue, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The next paragraph in this same telegram says - I quoted the

23 preceding one to you before - I am saying that this abolishes Yugoslavia,

24 and they explain it very briefly here. "[In English] President Milosevic

25 indicated that a final decision on the future arrangements between the

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1 Yugoslav components could only be taken by the Yugoslav peoples..."

2 [Interpretation] Was that something special?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do we need to go over this again?

4 Aren't you beating this point to death?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. If that is

6 sufficient -- well, I wanted to go through these dispatches because they

7 confirm the truthfulness of that which I'm saying.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, for the sake of time, can I remind you

9 that we have -- we dealt with exactly the same tab when Professor Avramov

10 was here. This exhibit was admitted into evidence already. Its number is

11 778.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have that in mind, but I also have

13 in mind that Mr. Jovanovic was present and that he can give truly

14 authentic explanations.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

16 Q. Please, Mr. Jovanovic, could we now have a look at tab 6. That is

17 also a report from the seventh plenary session.

18 JUDGE KWON: Which is Prosecution Exhibit 779.

19 MR. NICE: I believe so, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: As usual, Judge Kwon is ahead.

21 MR. NICE: On this occasion it was because we were temporarily --

22 we had temporarily surrendered our binder with the record. We've now got

23 it back.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. On the first page, where it says that the meeting is attended by

1 the presidents of all the republics and by Mr. Mesic and Mr. Tupurkovski

2 from the Federal Presidency; and Ante Markovic, Prime Minister; and

3 Loncar, foreign minister, also attended on behalf of the federal

4 government.

5 Now, towards the end of this last paragraph on this page, it says

6 -- or, rather, Lord Carrington explains that he condemns the attacks on

7 Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and then he says -- he said, Lord Carrington, "[In

8 English] ... President Tudjman had given assurances that the blockade on

9 the JNA barracks would be lifted as undertaken on October 18th."

10 [Interpretation] So as Carrington says here, Tudjman promises to

11 lift the blockade of the barracks.

12 Do you know what the main problem was at that time in the conflict

13 between the JNA and the Croatian forces?

14 A. The main problem in the conflicts throughout Croatia was the

15 decision of the new Croatian government to place military facilities, that

16 is to say barracks, under full blockade, to deny them water and food and

17 other assistance, and to compel them in this way to surrender or, rather,

18 to render them incapable of carrying out their duties. That is something

19 that not a single army in the world would allow itself to do, but

20 President Tudjman precisely did that in order to provoke the JNA and, as

21 he explained later, to have a war and in this way attain the independence

22 of Croatia. Regrettably, that was the case in Vukovar and in other towns,

23 and various agreements concluded between President Tudjman and General

24 Kadijevic in relation to cease-fires and lifting the blockade of these

25 military barracks were not observed because that did not suit President

1 Tudjman. He knew that only by extending the conflict it would be easier

2 and faster for him to attain independence. After all, Chancellor Kohl and

3 Minister Genscher persuaded him of this through their own statements that

4 the continuation of hostilities would speed up the recognition of Croatia

5 as an independent state.

6 Q. This entire conflict in Croatia between the JNA and the Croatian

7 forces, is there any mention of Serbia at all? Does Serbia figure in this

8 at all?

9 A. It cannot be seen anywhere and it is not mentioned anywhere except

10 in the words of condemnation uttered by President Tudjman. Of course and

11 it is in his interest to portray things differently.

12 Q. All right. Now that we're dealing with this document, that is to

13 say tab 6, that is a very long dispatch, it has to do with many issues,

14 and I cannot really deal with all of that, but I would like to draw your

15 attention to page 4. All these events were mentioned here. This is

16 paragraph 2.3: "[In English] President Milosevic (Serbia).

17 "President Milosevic indicated that he had asked -- that he had

18 asked General Kadijevic and Vice-president Kostic if it was true that JNA

19 was shelling the city of Dubrovnik. They said that this was untrue.

20 Whatever the situation was, he, Milosevic could not accept the shelling of

21 Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

22 [Interpretation] Do you remember all of this that had to do with

23 Dubrovnik, generally speaking, and my position and the position of Serbia

24 in relation to what was going on there?

25 A. I remember that this was discussed and that you made this

1 statement or, rather, the assurance -- that you gave these assurances that

2 Serbia had nothing to do with Dubrovnik and that it cannot condone its

3 bombing.

4 In addition to that, there were several statements made by Serbia

5 condemning the shelling of Dubrovnik. For example, the Serbian government

6 made a statement. The Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia

7 also condemned that action. I think that I had also made a statement to

8 that effect.

9 So as far as Serbia is concerned, there were no indications

10 whatsoever that Serbia was behind that or that it could have any interest

11 in it.

12 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I again just clarify something. If you were

14 being assured that there was no attack or bombing by the JNA of Dubrovnik,

15 what was it you were condemning?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] President Milosevic says in this

17 statement, "And if there is indeed shelling of Dubrovnik, he wishes to

18 point out that Serbia does not condone that and does not stand behind it."

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm going to quote this once again so that it would

21 not be unclear. The second part only. I asked whether it was correct,

22 and the answer was no, that it was not correct. "[In English] Whatever

23 the situation was, he, Milosevic, could not accept the shelling of

24 Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

25 [Interpretation] Our attitude towards that was totally clear, not

1 ambivalent at all, and it says so here. That is what is written here.

2 After all, Dubrovnik is --

3 MR. NICE: I hesitate to --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a comment that you're making,

5 Mr. Milosevic. I imagine that you adduced this evidence saying that it

6 goes to your state of mind, that you had a state of mind, but that's for

7 us to evaluate.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 MR. NICE: Your Honours. Your Honours, while I'm on my feet,

10 having risen to object to the last question, I just draw to your attention

11 something that I had in mind to mention to you a few minutes back where

12 the witness made very sweeping observations about Chancellor Kohl and

13 Minister Genscher and about how they persuaded Tudjman to continue

14 hostilities. It's not likely to be something I'm going to have the time

15 or inclination to deal with myself, and I'm not here to defend politicians

16 or government ministers of any country, nevertheless it may be that in

17 material that is largely, in my submission irrelevant, if a statement like

18 that is going to be made, it ought to be supported by detail.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we hear the submission.

20 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you heard Mr. Nice. What do you know about the

23 then-activities and the relations that were established between the new

24 Croatian authorities and Germany and other political factors in Europe?

25 A. The new Croatian authorities had very close contacts, and they

1 enjoyed very strong support in their policy of secession from several

2 politicians from different countries. I mention two politicians from

3 Germany but Austria was there, especially its minister Alois Mock. Then

4 Cardinal Sodano of the Vatican, and the Pope himself. I think that this

5 was on the 17th of August that in Pecs in Hungary he stated that the

6 aspirations of Croatia for independence are legitimate. This was before

7 the beginning of the Conference on Yugoslavia. So this was the Conference

8 on Yugoslavia, not against Yugoslavia.

9 As for the relationship between Germany and Croatia, they were the

10 closest possible along all lines; not only political, also in terms of

11 intelligence.

12 As for what Mr. Nice said, that is not something that is unknown

13 because these are statements that were made in public. I can also add

14 that two days before Croatia was declared independent country, the 25th of

15 June, 1991, that Minister Genscher asked the members of the European

16 Community to recognise a Croatia that will soon declare its independence.

17 So even before its declaration of independence, he was advocating its

18 independence. And Chancellor Kohl, about 10 days later, at a meeting of

19 the European Community, I think it was in Strasbourg, he raised the issue

20 of recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. So that was in

21 July. And the Conference on Yugoslavia started on the 7th of September.

22 If there was goodwill to have this conference held in order to preserve

23 Yugoslavia, then these statements favouring the independence of Croatia

24 and Slovenia should not have been made. As a matter of fact, the CSE in

25 its declaration from August the same year, 1991, asked for the

1 preservation of Yugoslavia and for meeting all legitimate interests and

2 requests of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, not only some of them.

3 There are also other confirmations to that effect, that the

4 aspirations of Slovenia and Croatia for independence were strongly

5 supported even before the conference. For example, Cardinal Sodano --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you have answered the question. What is

7 the CSE? What is the CSE in your reference to a declaration from August

8 of the same year?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] CSE is the Conference on Security

10 and Cooperation in Europe. It is nowadays calls the OSCE. Then it was

11 called the CSCE. It became an organisation, OSCE, and it worked

12 hand-in-hand with the European Community at the time. Together they

13 expressed their interest in resolving the Yugoslav crisis --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: May I observe that I don't think you did answer the

15 question. The question was about persuading Croatia to continue

16 hostilities.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have now come to the time for the break. We

18 will break for 20 minutes.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, take a look at tab 41 now, please, and look at what

24 it says there. It says "JNA-Croatia Cease-fire Agreement of September the

25 22nd."

1 We're not going to go into all the details but it says: "Federal

2 Defence Ministry Announcement," and then it goes on to say: "Pursuant to

3 the statements signed at Igalo on 17 September [In English] 1991, an

4 arrangement was made with the leadership of the Republic of Croatia at

5 1150 hours today to adopt and proclaim mutual orders for an absolute

6 cessation of fire --"

7 JUDGE KWON: I wonder where we -- what tab?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's tab 41.

9 JUDGE KWON: It's in binder 1.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: And, Mr. Milosevic, proper decorum requires that

11 you don't proceed with the question until you are sure the Judges have

12 found the section in the document in the particular exhibit, because we

13 have to follow it.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, while that's being done, I observe without

15 making a position one way or the other that we had pursued a policy of

16 producing exhibits as they're dealt with. I have no objection to the

17 existing exhibits -- sorry, the exhibits that have already been referred

18 to being produced but it looks as though if we're going to be jumping

19 about the binder it might be prudent to deal with them one by one.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thanks for reminding. I think we had

21 actually determined that we would proceed to admit the exhibits on an

22 individual basis.

23 Those that have already been referred to, does the court registrar

24 have a record of them?

25 JUDGE KWON: We can give a separate exhibit number to the whole

1 binder.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, a number for the entire binder.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D275.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So we have that exhibit number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: D275 for four binders.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: For the four binders.

7 THE REGISTRAR: And I will keep a record of each tab.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the accused.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, at the beginning, it says this: "The Federal

14 Secretariat for National Defence," and it says: "Pursuant to the

15 statement signed at Igalo on [In English] 17 September 1991, an

16 arrangement was made with the leadership of the Republic of Croatia," et

17 cetera. [Interpretation] And then it says that there should be an

18 absolute cessation of fire. Then the Croatian representative Tudjman

19 orders that all attacks should be suspended, National Guard Corps and MUP,

20 and that they would establish normal supplies of water, electricity, food,

21 et cetera.

22 And then he goes on to say, in the Croatian part: "[In English]

23 After the implementation of this agreement on a genuine cease-fire,

24 negotiations will be commenced on the discharge of all the obligations

25 stemming from the agreement signed in Igalo on 17 September 1991 and on

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13 English transcripts.

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1 the disengagement of the armed forces of SFRY and the Republic of

2 Croatia."

3 [Interpretation] So who are the parties? Then we have the

4 implementation of the Igalo agreement. Who are the parties in the

5 conflict according to agreement? What can you see on the basis of this

6 agreement?

7 A. We can see that the parties in conflict, on the one hand you have

8 the JNA, and on the other the military formations of the Republic of

9 Croatia. But I think this can be seen in all the other agreements on

10 cease-fire and cessation of hostilities because they were the ones to

11 conclude such agreements. And this is the realisation of a previous

12 agreement that was reached and signed in Igalo upon which Lord Carrington

13 insisted. And I've already explained that at the time President

14 Milosevic, at his insistence, signed the agreement and gave his support to

15 peace in view of the political influence he wielded as president of one of

16 the republics.

17 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was this agreement ever implemented

18 or not?

19 A. Unfortunately, it was not realised because the JNA was truly

20 interested in saving its military personnel, to pull them out of the war

21 danger, whereas that was not in the interests of the other side. And I've

22 already explained that it was their interest to prolong the hostilities in

23 expectation of speeding up the process of recognition for Croatia on the

24 part of other states, third countries.

25 And if the Honourable Trial Chamber will allow me to answer Judge

1 Bonomy's question, it was erroneously understood that I said that German

2 politicians asked for the promulgation of hostilities. All I wanted to

3 say was what was said by Chancellor Kohl, for example, when he threatened

4 to recognise Croatia if the hostilities persisted, and that is the message

5 that can be understood as a message to the JNA and a message to President

6 Tudjman as well. Minister Genscher, in the course of that summer, made

7 public statements to the effect that a single day of promulgation of armed

8 conflicts in Croatia would make Croatian independence come closer. That

9 was also a message to the JNA but it was also encouragement to the

10 Croatian side, that they could expect speedy recognition if the

11 hostilities went on for any length of time.

12 Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now, since this follows on

14 from what we were discussing, see a videotape, a tape between Tudjman and

15 Kadijevic. It's an intercept, actually, in tab 35. Intercept between

16 General Kadijevic and Tudjman. I don't know whether it has been

17 translated properly. We interviewed a witness - I don't want to mention

18 his name now - however, in view of the fact that Mr. Jovanovic was at

19 Igalo himself and contacted President Tudjman and General Kadijevic, he

20 will be able to tell us that the tape is authentic and the event.

21 May we have the tape played, please. It is an audiotape of a

22 conversation between President Tudjman and General Kadijevic.

23 [Audiotape played]

24 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Hello, good morning.

25 "Is the general there?

1 "Yes, he is.

2 "Would you put him through, please."

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not seeing it on the video. It's a tape?

4 It's audio.

5 MR. NICE: What we don't have, at least what I haven't yet located

6 is the -- well, tab 35 --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 35 is headed "... Cross-examination of Milan

8 Babic."

9 MR. NICE: I think we're probably going to find a form of

10 transcript in what was read into evidence.

11 JUDGE KWON: From some eighth or ninth lines, "Intercept played"

12 and we have the transcript.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that the transcript states

14 that the interpreters said on the occasion they did not have the text and

15 that the sound was very bad. And we say that again today.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, can the text be passed on to the

17 interpreters?

18 THE INTERPRETER: We do have a text, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Well, let it be played.

20 [Audiotape played]

21 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Hello. Good morning.

22 "Good morning.

23 "The president is here.

24 "Put him through, please.

25 "Is the general there?

1 "Yes, he is.

2 "Would you put us through, please.

3 "Yes, go ahead.

4 "Hello?

5 "Hello?

6 "Hello. Yes.

7 "Franjo?

8 "Yes.

9 "Good morning.

10 "Morning.

11 "What's the result?

12 "Well, I don't really know. I don't know what was definitely

13 decided.

14 "I can't hear you very well. Can you speak up, please.

15 "Listen, as I was saying, I don't know what is definitive.

16 "Hello? Yes.

17 "They said that peace would be established there.

18 "Where? Hello?

19 "They were discussing Sibenik, but then news came that the planes

20 were bombing again during the night.

21 "THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters seek the Court's instructions.

22 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] What?

23 "They asked for his -- tendering his resignation, but he said he

24 -- you had agreed to that.

25 "No, I didn't talk to him at all. Leave Markovic alone.

1 "Well, do what you like.

2 "Fire was opened at Sibenik once again this morning, and in other

3 places there was sporadic gunfire, but it was very intensive in Sibenik,

4 and I don't want to beat about the bush any more or the underhand role

5 played by anybody, including Markovic. He says that you and I and

6 Milosevic, as he put it, the hooligans or something to that effect, that

7 they should be hanged, and they shouldn't be the ones to create peace,

8 that he would create peace, because he blames everybody else for the fact

9 that his policy fell through. So I'm not talking about that. That's got

10 nothing to do with it. If you did anything along those lines, then you

11 did so wrongly.

12 "I didn't know anything about that. And Markovic was defeated

13 because he's a charlatan. He doesn't know anything about anything. He's

14 an ignoramus and he failed all the tests and always sought to blame

15 somebody else for his wrongdoings. But let's get back to what we were

16 discussing. Can peace be established or not? I don't have time to wait.

17 I can't wait any longer. If you can stop the firing, the firing that's

18 still going on in Sibenik. And secondly, can you deblock the barracks,

19 the military barracks? If you can, do so by 12.00. If that is done,

20 Franjo, than after that, tomorrow, we can agree to carry on the process we

21 started at Igalo. If you cannot do that, then the two of us will not talk

22 to each other any more. So that's quite clear.

23 "Yes. You know what? Maybe we should try to -- or, rather,

24 before we meet we could do this by fax, confirm this both because of

25 Croatia, to confirm a written truce, which means an agreement that would

1 deal with the army in the way that suits sovereign Croatian authorities.

2 And it's also in the interests the army, to protect the interests of the

3 army, to protect the lives of the members of the army.

4 "So does that mean, Franjo, that you place the second point first

5 and the first second or vice versa?

6 "No. We have agreed with the wise old man Carrington as to the

7 order of how things should be done. So if we continue along those lines,

8 we can continue to negotiate. If not, then we can break off all contacts.

9 "What are we going to do if we can't achieve that?

10 "Well, if things get worse in Sibenik -- well, I can guarantee

11 that not a single bullet will be fired, but let them cease their fire. We

12 have a deadline up until 1000 hours. So let the fire stop. Let there be

13 the deblocking by 12.00 noon and we'll continue the conversation tomorrow.

14 A solution must be found. If you agree to that. If you're not capable of

15 doing that, then say so. If you don't want to do it, then that's it.

16 We'll each go our own ways and see what happens. Then there will be a

17 disaster.

18 "Of course there will.

19 "I'm doing this for the last time. This is my last effort, and I

20 state with great responsibility, a responsibility that I bear, and you

21 also bear a great responsibility. We must try to avoid the worst. You

22 can avoid it by fulfilling each of these points, freeing each of the

23 barracks because the army will not fall. Today is a turning point, and

24 Veljko, I'll do what I can to stop this, to effect a cease-fire in Sibenik

25 by 12.00 noon. And let them provide us with food, water, and free passage

1 by 12.00 noon and then we can sit down to the negotiating table tomorrow,

2 and all possibilities are open. Now, if we can't find a solution, then

3 we'll go back to war, and you know what that means.

4 "Well, I think it will be terrible. This would be disastrous, and

5 I think we will be able to find a solution at the negotiating table. If I

6 didn't believe that, then I wouldn't have talked to you three times. And

7 I do believe that we'll be able to find a solution.

8 "Let's try, and let's try and avoid the worst, because it would be

9 a catastrophe, great destruction. So let's have a cease-fire. Stop the

10 firing in Sibenik, Franjo. Order a cease-fire, Franjo. Or if you're not

11 able to do that -- well, you can do what you like. If Letica is there,

12 well, he's worse than that man Spegelj that made things much worse. You

13 can do what you like. Not only him. Everything's like that.

14 "You said that Ljubicic hadn't returned either; is that right?

15 "Yes, but Ljubicic is not -- Grubisic is not Letica. I know that

16 he didn't come back. That's up to him. When he left, I knew he wouldn't

17 come back. And that's his business. It's his face that is on the line.

18 So we can conclude that it's a general mood.

19 "Well, if there is a general mood for war, then okay, go to war.

20 All I'm asking you for is a cease-fire, nothing more than that, what we

21 signed for, and then we can negotiate later on, nothing else.

22 "Very well.

23 "So you give it some thought, think about it, whether we can find

24 a way out of all this. So let there be an absolute cease-fire by 1000

25 hours. Absolute cease-fire so that people can continue living. They must

1 be given water. Otherwise, I'm going to tender my resignation. Well, not

2 me, but you are. So don't let them die like that. I would not allow them

3 to die in that way. And everything that Ante Markovic is preparing --

4 "Yes, it's a dangerous business that business.

5 "He's a son of a bitch and you know that very well. He came to

6 see me many times and I told you about that many times. So we must get

7 the better of those two and then we've solved the situation; right?

8 "Yes.

9 "Because he wasn't there when the signature was required because

10 nobody took him seriously. Nobody has any respect for him and that's it.

11 "Okay. Goodbye."

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise, but they were not able

13 to read the text as it stood.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, did you recognise General Kadijevic's voice?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. General Kadijevic said he was talking to Tudjman for the third

18 time that night and was advocating an absolute cease-fire. That's

19 something that we were able to hear on the tape; right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, was that respected? Was the agreement respected? Did they

22 abide by the agreement that was signed in Igalo through the mediation of

23 Lord Carrington?

24 A. From this conversation we can see that it was not respected and

25 that there a roundabout intention to avoid it and to continue the

1 hostilities, and that is why later on a new agreement was reached on the

2 cessation of hostilities. I think that was on the 1st of September or

3 thereabouts. But of the 13 or 14 cease-fire agreements, the total number

4 of cease-fire agreements, as far as I know that's how many there were, and

5 as far as I know all of them were interrupted due to the Croatian side.

6 Q. And what can we see from all these elements here, everything we

7 heard? What are the -- what were the parties to the conflict over there?

8 A. That's quite obvious, because the two parties in the conflict

9 discussed, had a conversation and dealt with the military situation on the

10 ground, in the field. Nobody else could have resolved that situation

11 because they had the power and authority over the armed forces that were

12 there in the field. Nobody else was mentioned on either side.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but

14 let us just consider the admission of the audio tape, because we're

15 dealing with the exhibits individually.

16 Mr. Nice, let's hear from you.

17 MR. NICE: There was, of course, no written version of the first

18 part of the tape which covered assertions about an important witness, Ante

19 Markovic, in some detail. And as to the balance of the intercept, the

20 transcript was very imperfect. No complaints. It was simply obviously

21 being read out by the accused in cross-examination from some document.

22 The accused should probably have in mind that intercepts produced

23 by the Prosecution have been according to a pretty clear form or formula,

24 namely questions and answers carefully divided up and transcribed, and it

25 may be appropriate for the accused and those assisting him to have this

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1 tape properly transcribed in full.

2 That would be my only observation. I don't object to its

3 admissibility.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: It had been marked as D62 for identification.

5 MR. NICE: Yes. It's already in as an exhibit, I think, whatever

6 it is, D62, but what we really need is a proper transcript of it.

7 I'm grateful, of course. Your Honours will have seen that Judge

8 May asked for a transcript on the second page, a third of the way down.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters in the English booth rendered a

11 simultaneous interpretation of the tape as they heard it. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... for the tape

13 to be transcribed.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I ask for --

15 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters made a note.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I said we'll renew the order made by Judge May

17 for the tape to be transcribed.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, could I have clarification of the

19 date of the interception of that communication.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know the date exactly, but

21 it must be immediately after the meeting at Igalo, because General

22 Kadijevic says "This is the third time that we're talking about this," in

23 order to have this implemented.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not sure if the observations by the

25 interpreters working for us today reflect any sensitivity that I might

1 have been dissatisfied with what was provided. I was, of course,

2 extremely grateful to the interpreters here for what they provided, no

3 complaints of them at all, simply noting that for good order we really

4 need a written version, prepared at more leisure, but I understand the

5 difficulties and I'm grateful for what they did.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: They did very well in the circumstances.

7 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we've covered several conferences. We've heard

10 explanations of the reasons for the conflict that erupted, the cease-fire

11 agreements, and we also saw the reports of the Dutch ministry on the

12 events taking place at the conference as well as the agreements between

13 the JNA and Croatia.

14 So now, having all those facts in mind, I will read out to you

15 item 6 -- or, rather, count 6 from Croatian indictment, which reads as

16 follows -- I hope that you have count 6. That's on page 2 in Serbian

17 version. It says: "Slobodan Milosevic participated in the joint criminal

18 enterprise," and then it explains various paragraphs and says: "The

19 purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was to remove by force Croatian

20 and other non-Serb population from approximately one-third of Croatian

21 territory."

22 Please pay attention to what's coming: "The territories which

23 under his plan were to become part of new Serb state under the domination

24 by perpetrating crimes" and so on.

25 Mr. Jovanovic, these events, this series of events, including

1 cease-fire agreements and events reflecting the situation in Yugoslavia at

2 the time, does all of that confirm or deny this claim, or to be more

3 precise, what plan, either plan created by myself or by Serbia, does it

4 deal with? Was there a plan to remove the Croat and other non-Serb

5 population from the approximately one-third of Croatian territory?

6 A. I was not aware of such plan ever, and I don't think that such

7 plan existed. Based on the facts that we heard, I don't think that one

8 can conclude that there was such a joint criminal enterprise to achieve

9 those goals.

10 Moreover, it could be said that President Tudjman wanted not only

11 to achieve independence by means of war but also wanted to get rid of the

12 extra population, meaning Serbs, in Croatia by means of war. After the

13 victorious operation called Storm in which several thousands of Serbs

14 perished and which represented the greatest ethnic cleansing --

15 MR. NICE: Objection. It's quite interesting to observe that the

16 answer now being given is to a question that wasn't asked. It came out

17 with remarkable facility, but it was not asked.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it wasn't asked, but it is still evidence.

19 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can Mr. Jovanovic continue or need I

21 put some additional questions to him?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... and short

23 answers.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Therefore, based on all the events that we covered very

1 superficially in your testimony so far, who was involved in the conflict?

2 Who was the victim? Who fought? Who perished? What was the origin of

3 refugees and so on? Therefore, I put this question to you and read out

4 this count of indictment, and based on that, please tell me, was there any

5 plan on the Serb part to expel Croat and non-Serb population or did

6 something else happen there?

7 A. All facts point to something quite contrary, not what is stated in

8 the indictment. Back in The Hague in September, at the time you stated

9 that until that time, several thousands of Serbs fled from Croatia to

10 Serbia, not only in the towns but also in other parts of Croatian

11 territory where their lives were threatened. The conduct of Croat

12 authorities had a very clear goal, namely to intimidate Serbs and to

13 encourage them to flee. This mass expulsion, this mass exodus of Serbs

14 culminated in the Operation Storm. President Tudjman, shortly after that,

15 said in a gathering that Serbs will not constitute more than 3 to 5 per

16 cent of Croatian territory ever in the future, which shows that this was

17 an additional goal of Croatia in addition to achieving independence.

18 Q. What you just stated, is it related to the speech of Franjo

19 Tudjman at a rally in Zagreb where he stated there would be no war had

20 Croatia not wanted one? We've already seen this speech of his on a tape

21 here. Do you remember him uttering those words, "There would be no war

22 had Croatia not wanted one but we decided that was the way to achieve our

23 goals"? Can you tell us what goals he referred to?

24 A. Yes. I remember that. And it is a bit unusual that President

25 Tudjman so openly admitted that he favoured the war option in order to

1 achieve his goals.

2 What I tried to do was to show that he had several parallel goals.

3 Independence was one goal, and then the other goal was to get rid of a

4 large number of Serbs. And the events showed us in precisely what way he

5 worked on achieving this.

6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, all right, let us go back to the Conference on

7 Yugoslavia. In tab 25, we have a letter by the vice-president of the

8 Presidency of Yugoslavia sent to the chairman of the Conference on

9 Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington. This is a long letter which mentions that

10 the Presidency of Yugoslavia on its session held on the December -- on 8th

11 of December, 1991, examined the opinion of the Arbitration Commission sent

12 by the conference secretary to the members of the Presidency and that it

13 reached certain positions.

14 Would you please elaborate on those positions.

15 A. As far as I can remember, this letter represented a challenge to

16 this thesis from the second document of Lord Carrington to the effect that

17 Yugoslavia ceased to exist and that it was in the process of

18 disintegration and that therefore federal units had to be taken care of by

19 placing them under a roof of newly independent states. And this letter

20 states the facts showing that Yugoslavia still exists because more than

21 half of its population continues to live in that country and that it is

22 only the peoples of Yugoslavia who by way of referendum can decide whether

23 their joint state can continue to exist. This was not an issue to be

24 decided by any international forum.

25 Furthermore, it states that Serbia and Montenegro, as well as

1 Serbs living in other republics, remain loyal to their country, to their

2 state which would continue to exist and that they do not wish to leave it,

3 nor did they ever express a wish to break away.

4 Further arguments --

5 Q. All right. You don't have to interpret the entire letter. The

6 letter is quite long. Please tell us, does it show an orientation towards

7 conflict or an orientation towards peace? Does it favour violence or

8 peace?

9 A. This shows positions which favour a peaceful political, democratic

10 solution, not a continuation of unilateral secessionist acts on the part

11 of any republic. Prior to this -- I think that just prior to this the

12 European Community urged all Yugoslav republics to seek independence

13 without mentioning Yugoslavia, because they had already erased Yugoslavia

14 from the political map of the Balkans in Europe.

15 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic. In relation to this appeal sent by the

16 European Community to the republics in Yugoslavia to opt for independence

17 and to choose that path, we see under tab 27 a letter of yours. It is

18 stated here that this is a letter sent by Minister Jovanovic, minister of

19 foreign affairs and that that was in connection with the urging to seek

20 independence. Please take a look at this letter. It's in tab 27.

21 A. I've found it.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I hope that you have

23 this letter as well.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. So this is a reply sent by Serbia following this appeal to seek

2 independence, and it's stated here Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign

3 Affairs, Belgrade. This was sent on the 23rd of December, 1991 to Hans

4 Van den Broek, minister of foreign affairs in the Netherlands who at the

5 time -- or, rather, the Netherlands at the time chaired the European

6 Community.

7 Since this is your letter, Mr. Jovanovic, I think it would be

8 wiser for you to explain what this letter pertained to and what positions

9 it expressed.

10 A. This letter is not simply a response to the offer extended to

11 Serbia to seek independence and to seek recognition as a newly independent

12 state, but it rather summarises our basic principles and positions in

13 relation to the Yugoslav crisis.

14 In this letter, I immediately highlighted the fact that Serbia had

15 a statehood and was internationally recognised back at the Berlin Congress

16 in 1878 and that Serbia invested its statehood into the Kingdom of

17 Yugoslavia when it was established, which enabled this newly created

18 country to be internationally recognised, and that it had never occurred

19 to Serbia nor did it ever express a wish to break away from Yugoslavia,

20 therefore, this appeal, this urging sent to Yugoslavia was sent to the

21 wrong address. Serbia did not want it.

22 In addition to that, I pointed out to the abuse committed by the

23 conference and the European Community, because they abused the process.

24 They abused various good proposals and turned them into a dictate which

25 broke apart a state that was a founding state of the League of Nations, of

1 the United Nations, and which was a leading country in the nonalignment

2 movement at that time.

3 In addition to that, I pointed out that Serbia remained loyal to

4 all of its international obligations, committed to its international

5 obligations, human rights, and that it would continue legal continuity and

6 maintain its status of an international subject even after the secession

7 of other republics.

8 I also pointed to his attention that despite of all the troubles

9 that Serbia experienced at the Conference on Yugoslavia, despite the fact

10 that it supported the implementation of Vance's plan in Croatia, that it

11 supported Cessation of Hostilities Agreement concluded in Geneva, despite

12 all of that, contrary action was taken by other factors. Therefore, this

13 is a summary representing all the positions adhered to by us at the

14 conference and showing our opposition to the principle or to the situation

15 where somebody wanted to bring our country to an end.

16 The right to self-determination was denied to some nations in

17 Yugoslavia --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic. Are you finished? Because what

19 we really wanted was --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mostly yes, I am finished.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... letter. And

22 in future, try to keep your answers as short as possible.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Very will. We can proceed. Mr. Jovanovic, in cross-examination

25 of one of the previous witnesses, Mr. Nice produced a report here saying

1 that he had received that report from a ministry. This is one of the

2 Dutch ministries. We can find that document in tab 4. You see that this

3 is Conference on Yugoslavia, Summary of Developments.

4 I'm not going to cover the entire document, Summary of

5 Developments, because it starts from the first opening of the first

6 plenary session, and then the second, the third, and so on. However, let

7 us now focus on what Mr. Nice tried to prove through this document,

8 namely, item 5, paragraph 5 --

9 MR. NICE: Prosecution Exhibit 812 for cross-reference purposes.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Paragraph 5, which was quoted here states as follows: "In the

13 margins of the Fourth plenary, a meeting was held on the 4th of October

14 chaired by minister -- by the minister for foreign affairs of the

15 Netherlands, assisted by Lord Carrington and Ambassador Wijnaendts,

16 between Croatian President Tudjman, Serbian President Milosevic, and

17 minister of defence General Kadijevic." [Interpretation] And then it goes

18 on to explain that Mr. Nice said that at the time, at this meeting which

19 was in the margins of the fourth plenary session, as is stated here,

20 actually accepted Carrington's plan. This is what he informed the press

21 about, so this was nothing secret.

22 It says here: "A statement was read out subsequently by the

23 Netherlands minister at a press conference, reflecting the agreement of

24 the Yugoslav parties involved..."

25 Now, about what? Then it goes on to say: "This included the

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1 principle that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the

2 perspective -- [In English] of recognition of the independence of those

3 republics in Yugoslavia wishing it," [Interpretation] and then there's a

4 comma there, and then it says, "[In English] at the end of a negotiating

5 process conducted in good faith and involving all parties."

6 [Interpretation] Therefore, could it be said that I gave here a

7 prior consent consenting to Carrington's proposals if we take the entire

8 sentence into account, especially this part that comes after the comma,

9 "at the end of the negotiating process conducted in good faith and

10 involving all parties"?

11 A. In my view that cannot be defended, that position, because this

12 paragraph says quite the opposite. It says that independence can be

13 granted to those republics who wish it, which does not exclude the

14 possibility that some republics would want to remain in Yugoslavia as a

15 common state. And that was essence of the conflict between us, our

16 delegation, and Lord Carrington on the other hand, who wanted simply to

17 support the secession but not the possibility for Serbia and Montenegro to

18 remain in Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia to have legal continuity.

19 In addition to that, it is stated here that recognition would come

20 at the end of negotiating process if it is conducted in good faith and if

21 it involved all parties. This good faith, as we were able to see, was not

22 abided by, was not implemented, because negotiating was soon succeeded by

23 dictate and a conclusion that Yugoslavia was in a process of

24 disintegration and that the only act that needed to be done was to give

25 independence to all of its federal units.

1 It is mentioned here that there should be no unilateral change of

2 borders, towards the bottom. Recognising that there could be no

3 unilateral changes of internationally recognised borders in Yugoslavia,

4 because those were the only borders. The internal borders were internal

5 administrative lines.

6 So this text both in its substance and its form cannot be accepted

7 or seen as acceptance of Lord Carrington's proposal in relation to the

8 solution to Yugoslav crisis.

9 Q. All right. Now I would like you to pay attention to a very brief

10 passage that continues. It's the last one in item 5, and it reads as

11 follows: "[In English] As a first step, it was agreed that

12 representatives of the Serbian communities in Croatia should be invited to

13 meet the conference coordinator and the deputy chairmen to discuss

14 possible future arrangements."

15 [Interpretation] What does this passage mean, Mr. Jovanovic?

16 A. In my opinion, it means two things. First, that Serbs in Croatia

17 were compelled to defend themselves, and that is why they were one of the

18 parties to the conflict. And the other thing is that they were the victim

19 of the policy and right to self-determination, because as I said, that

20 right was reserved only for Croats, not for the Serb people there as well.

21 Therefore, the proposal put forth to the conference to invite the

22 representatives of the Serb community in Croatia to join the process of

23 negotiations is something that is positive and that reflects the

24 legitimate interests and aspirations of the Serb people in Croatia.

25 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic. We don't have time to deal with this

1 entire summary of developments.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm anxious not to deny the accused the

3 opportunity to deal with a matter that we've advanced as important and he

4 plainly finds important himself, but that last matter of interpretation by

5 a witness on a document was extreme really in -- was extreme, it may be

6 thought, and I just don't see how it can assist to have the three lines

7 there interpreted as broadly as it was by this witness.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We may see it as a non-sequitur.

9 MR. NICE: It's up to the accused how he spends his time, I

10 suppose.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you know that the Yugoslav leadership addressed three questions

13 to Lord Carrington that were actually addressed to the Badinter

14 Commission? What was the fate of these three questions, and do you

15 remember them, by any chance?

16 A. I do remember them although some of them are a bit lengthy so

17 perhaps it would be better if I read them out. These three questions were

18 the following: Was there secession in Yugoslavia, and is it allowed

19 according to international law? That is one thing. The second is: Is

20 the right to self-determination a subjective right, the right enjoyed by a

21 people or by a republic or, rather, by a territory? And the third

22 question was about the so-called internal boundaries. According to

23 international law, can they be considered international boundaries?

24 Q. All right. So you know what the questions were, those that were

25 addressed to Lord Carrington or, rather, to the Arbitration Commission

1 through the chairman of the conference.

2 Did the chairman of the conference forward these questions to the

3 Arbitration Commission or did he rephrase them?

4 A. He rephrased them. And how can I put this? He changed the order

5 of questions. He put the question related to secession first, and that

6 was not the case originally. And he rephrased the others in such a way

7 that they lost quite a bit of their original meaning, and they were rather

8 leading questions in respect of the Arbitration Commission.

9 If the Honourable Trial Chamber allows me, I can read these

10 rephrased questions. They are quite lengthy, so I could not quote them

11 from memory.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I read them out?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: What document are they in, would we find these

15 questions?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking the witness about this.

17 These questions are contained in numerous documents. I haven't presented

18 them here specially. I don't think I did.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By your leave, Mr. President, Your

20 Honour --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... which you

22 say operated to the detriment.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the way it was.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are you reading from?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am reading the questions that I

1 got out of two books, because we do not have any archives. They are now

2 in a ministry that is not accessible to us, so this is from the book of

3 Professor Smilja Avramov and the book of Professor Milenko Kreca,

4 Badinter's Arbitration Commission. That's the title of the book.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. We have that in tab 11, Milenko Kreca's book. It was exhibited

7 here. Tab 11.

8 Please go ahead, Mr. Jovanovic.

9 A. As for our question that had to do with secession, whether

10 secession is a legally permissible act from the point of view of the UN

11 Charter and other relevant documents, Lord Carrington rephrased that as

12 follows: "Serbia believes that republics that proclaimed independence or

13 wished to proclaim their independence or sovereignty have left or will

14 leave the SFRY, which would otherwise continue to exist. Contrary to

15 that, other republics believe that this is not secession but, rather, that

16 this is disintegration or the breakdown of the SFRY as the result of the

17 will of these republics. I asked the arbitration to look at this question

18 so that I could formulate an opinion or recommendation that might be

19 useful."

20 So that has to do with the question related to secession. It can

21 be seen here -- please go ahead.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question should have been?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question was phrased by us in

24 the following way: "Is secession a legally permissible act from the point

25 of view of the UN Charter and other relevant regulations?"

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you say that this reformulation was to the

2 detriment --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the detriment, yes, because in

4 the reformulation, the Badinter Commission was not asked the question

5 directly whether secession is a legally permissible act from the point of

6 view of the UN Charter and other documents. And this was done

7 intentionally, because the answer would have had to be that secession is

8 not a permissible right from that point view. And then in the

9 reformulated --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, are the questions posed not a matter of

11 public record?

12 MR. NICE: Well, we're having some difficulty about that, because,

13 for example, the source that the accused, I think, has relied on at tab 11

14 comes from somebody who's a participant and who fills the document with

15 commentary, and I'm not yet in a position to accept the accuracy of the

16 way things factually are recited by that author.

17 As to other matters, I'm not sure quite what it is that the

18 witness says he's reading from that is otherwise not available to him from

19 a ministry. If he identifies the prime source from which he's reading, it

20 may be that I'll be able to agree on things. I hope so.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: He's told you he's noted down what the contents of

22 two books which have stated what happened, but are the documents that

23 passed in the course of this inquiry of the commission not public

24 documents that are available?

25 MR. NICE: They're not literally public documents. They certainly

1 should be available and we should be able to find them, and this should be

2 a matter of agreement, I think. You've had a number of documents on this

3 commission in any event. But I'm afraid I haven't been able to track this

4 down immediately while I've been sitting here.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: But are you challenging the accuracy of the

6 questions? You're not?

7 MR. NICE: Not yet in a position. I'll deal with it when I can.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. So that's the first question that you say

9 was reformulated to the detriment of Serbia. What's the next question

10 which was reformulated? Give us the original version and then the

11 reformulation.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. The original version is:

13 "Who is the title holder of the right --"

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down.

15 The interpreters do not have the text and he's reading.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you please read more slowly so the

17 interpreters can follow because they don't have the text.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm going to repeat it. "Who is the

19 titular to the right to self-determination from the point of view of

20 international law, a nation or a federal unit? The right of a people to

21 self-determination, is it a subjective collective right of a people or is

22 it a right enjoyed by a territory?" That is the original question.

23 The rephrased question reads as follows: "The Serb population

24 from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a constituent people in

25 Yugoslavia, do they enjoy the right to self-determination?"

1 The third question --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you explain to us how in your view that

3 operated to the detriment of Serbia, the reformulation.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is detrimental because the right

5 to self-determination in all international legal documents is formulated

6 as the right of a people, a nation, not a territory, and the question

7 asked the Arbitration Commission to give an unequivocal answer to that.

8 With the rephrased question, the Serb population in Croatia and

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina is practically in advance turned into a minority, not a

10 constituent people, although the question says, "As a constituent people

11 do they enjoy the right to self-determination?" That was done because a

12 concept had already been made to protect the so-called internal borders as

13 future internationally recognised borders. Therefore, the Serb people who

14 lived in those two republics could not exercise their right as a

15 constituent people. They could only expect protection as a minority.

16 The third question --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... and that

18 will be the last, although there --

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last one, yes.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the point

21 that you're making.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last question: "The demarcation

23 lines between the constituent part of the federal state (provinces,

24 cantons, states, countries, republics and the like) are borders from the

25 point of view of international law."

1 The rephrased question reads as follows: "According to

2 international law, the line of delineation between Serbia and Croatia on

3 the one hand and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand can be

4 considered to be borders." In our conviction, the Arbitration Commission

5 was in this way given a suggestion to consider internal delineation lines

6 to be borders from the point of view of international law.

7 So finally, one of the opinions of the Arbitration Commission was

8 that internal boundaries were boundaries from the point of view of

9 international law, invoking a decision of the International Court of

10 Justice in The Hague in relation to the Burkina Faso-Mali case concerning

11 a border that was drawn by colonial forces, colonial powers, and --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The possidetus juris doctrine.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But that rule pertained to all

14 former colonial territories in Latin America and in Africa precisely to

15 avoid conflicts and unnecessary casualties. But that only has -- that

16 only pertains to colonial territories where colonial power was exercised.

17 But Yugoslavia was not such a case. It was the result of agreement

18 reached amongst equitable peoples, and it could not be treated the same

19 way the way borders in former colonies were treated.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, returning to Judge Bonomy's concern, I

22 observe that the witness has not only spoken of the change in formulation

23 of the questions but has been specific, certainly in relation to the

24 second question, that this was done with a purpose. Now, if I know by

25 whom it is said the change was effected, then I can make direct inquiries

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13 English transcripts.

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1 of the person before the conclusion of this witness's evidence, both to

2 establish the change and also to see what might be said about the purpose.

3 I observe that the defendant's -- the accused's witness list

4 includes Mr. Badinter.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Nice, the suggestion is Lord

6 Carrington altered the terminology before submitting the matter to the

7 commission.

8 MR. NICE: If that's the point, I can probably contact him

9 directly.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's my understanding.

11 MR. NICE: If that's clearly what's being said, and as to the

12 purpose, I'll deal with it.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in relation to what

15 Mr. Nice just said, may I just state two facts. The letter containing the

16 questions was sent to the chairman of the conference, Lord Carrington, by

17 the Yugoslav leadership. Lord Carrington forwarded the questions,

18 rephrased in such a manner, to the Arbitration Commission. So there is no

19 doubt about any of that. Mr. Jovanovic has just explained this.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did he have the power to rephrase the question?

21 Was that within his authority? Was it understood that it was a matter for

22 him to ultimately decide on the phrasing of the question? Mr. Jovanovic?

23 I'm not asking you. Let the witness, who was there.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We objected to Lord Carrington

25 because of what he did, in the belief that he should have informed us at

1 least beforehand about his intention to change the question, which would

2 own be natural if there were any kind of fair play. But his answer was

3 that, as chairman, he had the right to rephrase the questions. That was

4 not an answer that we found satisfactory because this was then a right of

5 subordination that was involved, and it was not true negotiations then.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, have you read the book by Milenko

7 Kreca which deals with these things, which is tab 11? Does the book deal

8 with such rephrasing of questions? If yes, could you lead us to the point

9 -- to the parts which deal with that matter?

10 MR. KAY: Page 28.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, is it on page 28 we can see matters that

13 are dealt with?

14 MR. KAY: Yes, mentioning the changing there in relation to the

15 second question, I think it is.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see.

17 MR. KAY: You'll see in the second paragraph, if I can just assist

18 the Court: "Lord Carrington, acting as chairman ... asked the Commission

19 to reply to what he described as 'the following question put by the

20 Republic of Serbia.'"

21 The question is set out, and the