1 Wednesday, 12 January 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to continue your

7 examination-in-chief.

8 WITNESS: PATRICK BARRIOT [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

11 Q. [Interpretation] To the best of your knowledge - that's where we

12 broke off yesterday - America did take part in Operation Storm in which

13 over 200.000 Serbs were expelled. Lord Owen called it the greatest ethnic

14 cleansing in all the conflicts in Yugoslavia, and the mass killing of vast

15 numbers of civilians. A permanent member of the Security Council took

16 part in ethnic cleansing that started from UN protected areas and they

17 were placed under the protection by that same Security Council.

18 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... and --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

20 MR. NICE: This is already a question that is turning into a

21 statement. The first part of the question, "To the best of your knowledge

22 America did take part in Operation Storm where 200.000 Serbs were

23 expelled" is a collapse of the alleged involvement by America, if any, in

24 Operation Storm with what is said to be the overall results, and it's

25 clearly a tendentious question in the form of a statement, and the accused

1 should confine his question to something that this witness can really

2 answer.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I agree. It's not sufficiently relevant.

4 I'm not allowing it. Move on to another question.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know why Mr. Nice is so

6 nervous about all of this.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Move on to another question. I've already ruled

8 on it.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. So Colonel Barriot, yesterday we broke off when you explained

11 that, in contravention of any kind of authority given to them by the

12 United Nations, the Americans took part in Operation Storm. Tell us, what

13 do you know about that operation?

14 A. Yes, Mr. President. My answer will be a very clear one. This is

15 not an alleged participation by the United States as was underlined just

16 now by Mr. Nice. It is a proved fact, it is a proved participation on two

17 levels. On the one hand you have a direct military intervention and

18 participation because in the very first days of the Storm operation the US

19 air force had two jets coming from the Roosevelt warship that bombed Knin.

20 So this was a direct participation of the US army in the very beginning of

21 the Operation Storm, with application of securing the airspace in the

22 Krajina so that there could be an intervention by the Croat army.

23 And on the other hand you have an indirect intervention through

24 this private military company, MPRI Incorporated, which is a military

25 private company depending on the Pentagon. And these specialists

1 intervened as instructors and also as advisors of the Croat army in order

2 to carry out the Operation Storm. But we also saw instructors from that

3 company during the Storm operation in the territory of the Krajina,

4 especially in Knin. And this was stated unambiguously by Canadian

5 soldiers who were in Knin at the time.

6 Therefore, the US participation is not an alleged one. It has

7 been a direct intervention -- both indirect and direct intervention, and

8 it has been proved as well.

9 Q. Tell me, in Krajina, at the time of the conflict between the

10 Muslim forces in the Bihac pocket, according to the information I have, is

11 it correct that there were 40.000 Muslim refugees in Krajina?

12 A. Yes. I can confirm the figures. This happened during the summer

13 of 1994. The 5th Corps of the BH army in the Bihac pocket was headed by

14 General Atif Dudakovic and it launched an attack especially in the area of

15 Velika Kladusa, and it expelled up to 40.000 Muslims who were faithful to

16 Fikret Abdic. These 40.000 Muslims were expelled towards the Krajina

17 area, and they were taken in two camps which I personally visited together

18 with people, officials from the UNHCR. Bertrand Dupasquier was a

19 responsible official at the time.

20 These 40.000 people were taken in the Batnoga and Turan camps

21 where they were taken care of with a lot of humanity by the local

22 population in Krajina. The local population fed them but also looked

23 after them medically speaking; if they were wounded, if they were sick, if

24 they were women about to deliver, they were taken care of. So all these

25 Muslims were gathered in Batnoga and Turan and they were taken care of in

1 the Glina Hospital with total dedication. They were given blood supplies.

2 They were helped without any kind of discrimination. And very often the

3 few medicines, the few supplies that there were in the Glina Hospital were

4 given to the Muslim population.

5 Q. These refugees, these 40.000 Muslims who came to Krajina, could

6 they have gone to Croatia or somewhere else?

7 A. No. It was impossible for them to get out and to seek shelter in

8 Krajina or elsewhere. The only opening for them or the only possibility

9 offered to them later on was a return to the Bihac pocket early in 1995.

10 And it is precisely in the Bihac pocket that the large amount of them were

11 massacred during the Operation Storm by the 5th Corps of the BH army, but

12 also by Croat troops that had infiltrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in

13 Western Bosnia.

14 Q. Does that mean that there was a double standard involved in terms

15 of treating the Muslim population itself; those who were on Alija

16 Izetbegovic's side received support whereas those who were on Fikret

17 Abdic's side were exposed to all kinds of persecution, destruction and the

18 like?

19 A. I'm sorry, I didn't quite understand your question.

20 Q. Does that mean that the Muslims who were on the side of Fikret

21 Abdic, including these 40.000 expelled refugees, were practically victims

22 of persecution by the Muslim and Croat forces?

23 A. Yes, quite. Absolutely. In 1994, it was obvious that the central

24 authority in Sarajevo and that Izetbegovic's army was trying everything

25 possible to eliminate both Fikret Abdic and to remove all the Muslims in

1 the Bihac pocket faithful to the latter.

2 So they were exposed, and they were victims of the central

3 authority in Sarajevo, and they also fell prey to the Croat forces which

4 were intent on removing any kind of support to the Krajina Serbs, support

5 by the Muslims who were in the Bihac pocket.

6 Q. What about the authorities of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina?

7 Was it clear to them that since these Muslims had no where to go that a

8 considerable number of these people could stay on in Krajina forever?

9 A. Yes. In my view there was no problem whatsoever regarding taking

10 in the Muslims in the Krajina Republic, because even before the 5th Corps

11 was created in the Bihac pocket, it was obvious and it was frequent that

12 Muslims would come from Velika Kladusa, from that area towards Glina where

13 they were taken care of, they were looked after, and they could remain

14 very safely in that area and also in Banija.

15 Q. Tell me, Mr. Barriot, I would like to hear your comment concerning

16 a quotation that I'm going to read out to you from this so-called Croatian

17 indictment. It is count number 6. I have a revised copy only in the

18 English language, so count 6 says: "[In English] The purpose of this

19 joint criminal enterprise," [Interpretation] and previously it says:

20 [Previous translation continues] ... "[In English] joint criminal

21 enterprise. The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the

22 forcible removal of the majority of Croat and other non-Serb population

23 from the approximately one-third of territory of the Republic of Croatia.

24 That he planned to become part of new Serb-dominated state through the

25 commission of crime," et cetera.

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1 [Interpretation] Can you comment upon this? What kind of

2 enterprise could this have been if they were taking in such a large number

3 of Muslims or, rather, non-Serbs, taking care of them, not expelling them?

4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think that the question itself reveals

5 its inappropriateness. It is not for the witness to comment.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, he can comment on fact situations.

7 MR. NICE: He can -- he can give evidence of facts, but he cannot

8 give comments, and the comments that he's invited to give is a comment

9 that is for the Judges to make.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you must reformulate the question,

11 Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Barriot, the fact that you spoke of, that is to say the

14 acceptance of so many thousands of Muslims in the area of the Serb

15 Krajina, does that preclude any possibility of these authorities having

16 some kind of plan of expelling the non-Serb population from that area?

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't see how he can answer that. He can't

18 answer that question, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Maybe he will be able to

20 answer another question later on that also has to do with these

21 manipulations.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. However, before that, let us go back -- or, rather, can I just ask

24 you to be as brief as possible in your comments regarding a document which

25 is under tab 27 of the exhibits that will be introduced through you, and

1 that is an official document of the Ministry of the Interior of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated the 20th of December --

3 THE INTERPRETER: September, interpreter's correction, 2001.

4 MR. NICE: No translation, I think, has yet been provided. I'll

5 check.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. You have been given a

7 translation.

8 MR. NICE: It may be within the Crepin ones. I haven't done a

9 cross-reference. Tab 26 of Crepin I think is the same document, so we do

10 have it there.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 26.

12 JUDGE KWON: We have 27 as well in English.

13 MR. NICE: Tab 27 in Barriot is, I think, tab 26 in Crepin, and we

14 have been provided with an English translation at tab 26 in Crepin.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, we have it in English, yes.

16 Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic. You must point us to the particular

17 section in tab 26 to which you are referring.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just the last paragraph. Just the

19 last paragraph. It is in the context of what we've been discussing. It

20 has to do with an investigation based on the 11th of September, and it

21 says the document was signed by the director and the two deputy directors

22 of the service, and it was sent to the president of the Council of

23 Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that paragraph says: "The same day

24 (at 1932 hours), Interpol Wiesbaden sent us a request for a check on a

25 person called Atta who, according to their information, is said to have

1 lived in a small village called Bakotic, 8 kilometres from Maglaj in

2 1999."

3 So it's 1999. "They enclosed a copy of a photograph of Mohammed

4 Atta who was supposed to be identified by a man called Mehmet Hasanic

5 from the village of Bakotic. We forwarded the Interpol Wiesbaden request

6 to the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and so on and so forth.

7 This is a person who piloted one of the planes that hit the World

8 Trade Centre, Mohammed Atta. I assume that everybody knows about that.

9 And I showed the review conducted by Izetbegovic of an entire brigade of

10 Mujahedin near Maglaj. And this man was in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1999,

11 and this indicates that he was there earlier on as well, which shows that

12 this terrorist network was well rooted in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Could you please give us your comment about this.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. Don't ask him to give a comment. You

16 must ask a specific question.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, all right, Mr. Robinson.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is this yet another confirmation of the existence of this

20 terrorist network in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina? In this case,

21 it is directly linked to the events of 9/11.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is nothing to suggest that, Mr. Milosevic.

23 MR. NICE: That was a completely leading question in substance and

24 form. I can't keep standing to object to them, but I'm sure the accused,

25 who is now an experienced operator in this courtroom, knows the

1 difference.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yesterday you, in response to me,

3 explained how evidence of terrorism in Bosnia could be relevant to

4 specific charges. I'd like you to rehearse that, because I'm still

5 troubled by it.

6 MR. KAY: In many respects this particular line of questioning was

7 not something I had anticipated or known about. As the Court knows, I

8 don't have instructions on it. I think the position we have here is as

9 the accused put in the question about it being -- terrorism being well

10 rooted in the region, and it is attempt by the Defence here to link the

11 established and well-rooted links with terrorism to events that were

12 taking place during the parameters of the indictment. That's been a

13 fairly consistent approach, or a very consistent approach by the accused

14 during the trial, and this is an example of -- a very well-known example

15 of the man Mohammed Atta who was held responsible, amongst others, for the

16 11th of September hijacking and terrorist incidents in the US, to show

17 that from information received he was able to be identified as having been

18 within Bosnia-Herzegovina at a particular time.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry, Mr. Kay. You had -- had you finished?

22 MR. KAY: Yes, I have.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow the questioning

24 along these lines, but it has to be fairly specific and focused. I mean,

25 ultimately we have to be satisfied about relevance to particular charges

1 in the indictment, how the question of terrorism affects the question of

2 guilt or innocence arising from the charges in the indictment. And on the

3 basis that there is some relevance in terms of the defence that you're

4 raising, we'll allow it, but we intend to monitor this line of questioning

5 very closely.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Colonel, before Mr. Milosevic asks you another

7 question, can I ask you how you came by this document?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was provided by intelligence

9 services, and I was authorised to present them because they were not

10 classified as secret by the French government.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Barriot, does this document corroborate the fact that

15 terrorism was well rooted in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. Yes, absolutely so. But before I answer this question, I'd like

17 to underline the paradox there is to be found in Mr. Nice's argument. He

18 was challenging the credibility of my testimony yesterday because I failed

19 to provide concrete information or failed to show specific links with

20 intelligence services whilst today I'm introducing evidence of the fact

21 that this terrorism is well rooted and he'd like to challenge that as

22 well. He would like me not to present these documents and me not to

23 comment on them.

24 So my answer will be this, and it will be a very clear answer.

25 This comes from the Ministry --

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1 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you answer, I should make it clear I

2 certainly don't understand Mr. Nice's position to be as you've indicated.

3 Mr. Nice has taken no objection to the production of the document. The

4 objection is to some of the questions that are posed, which are entirely

5 inappropriate. So you must understand that you're not being unfairly

6 treated by the Prosecutor here.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before the witness answers --

8 Mr. Milosevic, I'm returning to this linkage of terrorism with the charges

9 in the indictment. If you can establish that terrorism was well rooted

10 there, where does that take us in terms of your Defence?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in my introductory

12 presentation, I explained that the Western countries supported in Croatia

13 the forces of Nazism in Bosnia, in Kosovo, the forces of Islamic

14 fundamentalism and terrorism is what I said, and that is completely

15 contrary to any healthy reasoning. And everything was used and utilised

16 for the frameworks of this criminal enterprise launched against the Serbs.

17 You saw how things developed in Croatia, how they developed in Bosnia, how

18 paramilitary formations were formed in Bosnia, who took part in them. And

19 if all those are positive phenomena, then there's no need for me to go and

20 explain them. But with respect to the instructions and guidelines you

21 gave a moment ago, Mr. Robinson, I have understood it so far that it is my

22 right or, rather, the right of somebody accusing somebody of something has

23 the burden of proof and that the burden of proof is not on the accused to

24 prove his innocence, whereas you keep explaining the former -- or, rather,

25 the latter.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I'm going to stop you. Let -- let -- I have

2 stopped you, Mr. Milosevic, because the comment shows that you don't

3 understand the function of the Chamber.

4 We have a duty to admit evidence but only evidence that is

5 relevant, and that applies as much to the Defence as it does to the

6 Prosecution. And I'm having some difficulty, perhaps I'm speaking for

7 myself, in understanding the linkage between well-rooted establishment of

8 terrorism in Croatia at the time and -- in Bosnia and the question of your

9 guilt or innocence. I see it in a tangential way, but I'm still not fully

10 satisfied. Perhaps it is my own weakness. I can see some marginal

11 relevance and it is on that basis that I'd allow the question, but the

12 questioning has to be very specific and focused.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask your question now, Mr. Milosevic.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Barriot, does this represent confirmation of the assertion

17 about the well-rootedness of terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18 MR. NICE: I've stayed out of this debate as much as I can, but I

19 must suggest, with all due deference, that an appropriate approach to the

20 questioning by the accused of this or any other witness on this topic

21 could or should be limited as follows: If the existence of terrorism on

22 the territory is relevant or may be relevant, then it would be open to the

23 witness to simply produce a document such as this to show the existence of

24 the man Atta on the territory at a particular time. I note

25 parenthetically that the man Atta was present on a number of other

1 European territories over the broad period of time as well. I hope it

2 doesn't have a similar significance for those countries. His evidence,

3 however, should be limited to the fact of the presence of a terrorist on

4 the territory. He should not be allowed to be asked questions of the kind

5 that have just been asked, which are leading in substance and form and

6 have no value and are indeed really covering the territory that has to be

7 covered in due course by --

8 The only other way in which questions might be of value is this:

9 If the accused is able to ask of a witness, "Do you know of a terrorist or

10 did a terrorist show involvement in or commit one of the crimes with which

11 I'm charged," fine, obviously relevant, but it's as far as that and no

12 further.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, what about specific questions about

14 terrorist acts committed in Bosnia against Serbs?

15 MR. NICE: I can see that potentially of significance if it may

16 change the overall picture, yes, but it is, of course, a specific

17 question. Yes, I wouldn't object to that.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is merit in the points taken

19 by Mr. Nice.

20 You could ask him if he was aware of the presence of -- of

21 terrorists or of a specific person, but -- I mean, but to ask -- I'm not

22 allowing you to ask him to confirm that the paragraph establishes or goes

23 to show that terrorism was well-rooted. The document is before us, and we

24 can read it.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since Mr. Nice raised the question

1 of whether these were used against the Serbs, then I shall continue on

2 from that question.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Barriot, did the terrorists in Bosnia, were they used against

5 the Muslims in -- with the aim of placing the burden on the Serbs and

6 responsibility in accusing the Serbs of the crimes which they in fact had

7 committed?

8 A. Yes. So it will be a question in different forms. I will give

9 very clear names of Islamic terrorists. I give you the names of Kelda

10 Hubet [phoen], who was in Bosnia, and Christophe Caset, Lionel Dumont,

11 Urad Puguran [phoen]. So I have quoted specific names of people who were

12 connected to the Islamic network, so with connections with the GIA and al

13 Qaeda that operated in Bosnia against the Serbian forces and Serb

14 civilians, and also operated against French people in France.

15 I mentioned today the presence of Mohammed Atta in a Bosnian

16 village in 1994 and 1995. He was also present there in 1999. We also

17 have pictures showing the presence of Mirsad Asahawi [phoen], formerly

18 Izetbegovic in the 1990s. So these are very clear facts clearly

19 indicating that these people were not just travelling around and dropping

20 off in a hotel in Sarajevo over 48 hours. These were terrorists that had

21 gone to terrorist training camps in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the north of

22 Albania.

23 So I think things are very clear on that point. These were

24 terrorists actions. And to answer the question put by President

25 Milosevic, we have knowledge and understanding of a number of terrorist

1 acts conducted by Bosnian Muslims at the time. More specifically, attacks

2 against French Blue Helmets. Let me also mention that there were -- there

3 were 56 French Blue Helmets who died between 1991 and 1995, and two-thirds

4 of the French Blue Helmets were targeted by the Muslim snipers on the

5 orders of Mr. Izetbegovic. I think nobody can deny this.

6 Now, as far as these terrorist attacks against Sarajevo are

7 concerned, I would like to mention that all French ballistics experts on

8 the 27th of May, 1992, attack, or the Markale attack on the 5th of

9 February, 1994, as well as the attack against Markale on the 2nd of

10 August, 1994 are not due to Serb fighters but to Muslim snipers.

11 You can question what I'm saying, of course, but you can also then

12 question Lewis MacKenzie, the Canadian general; Sir Michael Rose, the

13 British officer; Jacques Longsade, who is the Chief of Staff of the French

14 army. Also you then question Pierre-Marie Gallois, the founding father of

15 nuclear deterrence in France, and a number of personalities in the French

16 government, and I can quote you further details if you so wish.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Colonel Barriot, the question you were actually

18 asked there is whether terrorists were used to attack Muslims with a view

19 to placing the blame on Serbs. Now, did you actually answer any -- was

20 any part of your answer directed to that question?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The second part has to do with

22 the explosions in Sarajevo which were conducted by Muslim terrorists

23 against the Muslim population in Sarajevo.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: What -- what information or evidence do you have

25 in answer to Mr. Milosevic's question that this was done with a view to

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1 placing the blame on Serbs? Are you in a position to address that?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, well, the Serbs were

3 accused of it.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. You must allow the witness to answer.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. So there are a whole series of

6 evidence and statements which have been provided in the wake of these

7 facts. I -- I have described them to you rather briefly. If you so wish,

8 I have all the statements of the French officials and French generals

9 regarding these facts and stating clearly that one could not accuse the

10 Serbs of these explosions, but these explosions had been conducted by --

11 at the hands of the Muslims. I can read out these statements if you so

12 wish.

13 May I --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think you have answered the question.

15 Perhaps you are not in a position to.

16 Mr. Milosevic, move on.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Just a brief digression, if I may, one question. You were in

19 Topusko, Colonel Barriot; is that right?

20 A. Yes, Mr. President.

21 Q. Did you meet someone called Slobodan Lazarevic there; and if so,

22 what can you tell us about him?

23 A. Yes, I did meet Mr. Slobodan Lazarevic on several occasions

24 because he was taken part in the briefing sessions of UNPROFOR in Glina.

25 He was a rather strange person which nobody took very seriously and who

1 spoke about a lot of things and then denied them.

2 Q. I asked you that question because he was one of the witnesses

3 presented here by the other side over there. So that's why I wanted to

4 draw your attention to that.

5 Now, Colonel Barriot, as far as Bosnia is concerned, you were in

6 contact with Radovan Karadzic, weren't you? I assume that you talked to

7 him about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And what was the contents

8 of those talks you had with him?

9 A. Yes. I met President Radovan Karadzic on several occasions, and

10 more specifically in 1995. As I mentioned yesterday, I also published an

11 article in my book, The Murder of a People, Serbs of Krajina, and I also

12 brought along a French television crew that conducted reports on President

13 Karadzic, some of which were broadcast and others were not.

14 During these interviews with President Karadzic, we primarily

15 talked about the political situation, the overall political situation in

16 Bosnia, and we talked about the way fundamentalism was running out of

17 control, and this was a matter of great concern to President Karadzic. We

18 discussed in great detail the situation in the Bihac pocket, because he

19 felt that this was quite indicative of the tension mounting between the

20 fundamentalism movement of the SDA of Izetbegovic and the moderate

21 Muslims, on the other hand, that wanted peace with the Serbs.

22 What comes to mind more specifically here is Fikret Abdic. He

23 stressed the fact that Fikret Abdic was the man who should be entitled.

24 According to the elections in 1990, Fikret Abdic was the natural leader.

25 He mentioned assassination attempts carried out by Izetbegovic's men to do

1 away with Fikret Abdic - he was threatened on several occasions - and

2 military operations of the 5th Corps of the BH army, which was again

3 supported by the US army, because all the Muslim fighters of the 5th Corps

4 were equipped with assault rifles, M-16s, which came from the US army, and

5 this was in total contradiction with the arms embargo at the time.

6 Ever since the elections, little by little fundamentalist

7 government had done away with its Serb and Croat partners but had also

8 done away with moderate Muslims in Bosnia who, I repeat, had remained

9 loyal to Fikret Abdic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to draw your attention to the

11 fact that the interpretation into the Serbian language, if we can call it

12 Serbian at all, is very poor. I assume that we're not talking about lack

13 of knowledge but quite simply things are not being interpreted if they

14 don't -- if the interpreter doesn't feel that they need to. I noticed

15 that yesterday.

16 This is what it says in English: "Ever since the elections,

17 little by little fundamentalist governments had done away with its Serb

18 and Croat partners but had also done away with modern Muslims in Bosnia

19 [In English] remained loyal to Fikret Abdic."

20 [Interpretation] We're talking, in Serbian, I hear "integrism"

21 mentioned, and quite simply, the interpretation into the Serbian language

22 is being distorted, so please bear that in mind because I'm not going to

23 tolerate that any more. That happened yesterday and there is no sense in

24 having that continue. But let's move on.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's a terrible assertion to make about

3 the --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 MR. NICE: That's a terrible assertion to make about the

6 interpreters. And if the accused is able to identify some particular

7 either shortcoming or difference in interpretation from that which he

8 would have preferred, then he can always raise it, and he should raise it

9 in a neutral way and the interpreters could then be given a chance, when

10 matters are fresh in their memory, to deal with what he is asserting. But

11 it is quite inappropriate for him to make the sort of assertion he has

12 made about people who serve this court faithfully for several years and

13 work in extremely hard circumstances, not least circumstances made

14 difficult by the rapidity of questions and answers that they have to deal

15 with.

16 So that on this particular occasion he has said that there was a

17 reference to "integrism," as he has used the word, which hasn't been

18 reflected. I would invite the Chamber to allow the interpreters to

19 explain whether they heard the word, and if so, how they interpreted it.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. Your comments are very

21 appropriate.

22 Mr. Milosevic, your comments were ungracious and completely

23 neglect the hard work that the interpreters have done. They have worked

24 proficiently.

25 I'm going to ask you to identify the particular passage which you

1 say was misinterpreted and then ask the interpreters to comment on it. I

2 believe it was a reference you said to integrism in Serbia.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We're talking about Islamic

4 fundamentalism here, and that of course is understandable for anybody

5 following these proceedings. I don't think more than half the people here

6 could understand what the integrism --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Or "integralism," interpreter's note.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- that is something we can't

9 understand. I'm looking at the transcript and I'm listening to the

10 interpretation. So I don't see why I can't raise an objection to

11 something like that.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Of course you can. You must do so in a manner

13 that is appropriate and that reflects due consideration for the hard work

14 which interpreters have to do here. And I must say, speaking for the

15 Chamber, we find that their work is of the highest standard. This doesn't

16 mean that a mistake cannot be made now and then.

17 So that for "integrism" you're saying that the reference should be

18 to "fundamentalism"; is that it?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's what it says in the

20 transcript. I don't know what should have been said, but that's what the

21 transcript recorded, "Islamic fundamentalism" as it was translated and

22 recorded by the transcript. So I'm listening to the interpretation and

23 looking at the transcript.

24 But let's not waste time. I made the objection and I hope that

25 they will pay attention to the interpretation.

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1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I would like to say that the Chamber does not

2 approve of the manner in which you made the objection. Mr. Nice is

3 perfectly correct. These proceedings must be conducted with a decorum

4 that is appropriate to the nature of the work, the gravity of the work

5 that we are doing here, and you must show due respect to the interpreters,

6 and we will not tolerate that kind of comment. If a mistake is made, then

7 you must bring it to our attention and we will see to it that it is

8 corrected if it is to be corrected.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I ask the interpreter to comment on this

11 particular passage.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. It's the

13 interpreter of the Serbian booth. I am practically certain that -- I

14 mean, I am certain that I heard the word "integrisme" in French. The

15 English booth translated it as "fundamentalism" and I translated it in

16 Serbian as "integrism," which I consider to be closer. Mr. Milosevic was

17 not referring to the original, which was in French and which was

18 "integrism" but to the translation into English, which is just one of the

19 two translations, and ours was into Serbian and I consider it was

20 faithful. But you can, of course, check it with the witness.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have the explanation, and we will move

22 on.

23 And, Mr. Milosevic, bear in mind what I've said about the

24 attitude, your attitude towards the interpreters.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have a negative attitude to

1 the interpreters, but I expect them to conduct themselves properly.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Milosevic, I, speaking for myself,

3 consider that you owe the interpreter in this instance an apology unless

4 you dispute what she's just said to you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not only that mistake that I'm

6 objecting to. I cannot follow everything, of course. There are

7 completely incomprehensible parts of sentences, whether somebody is

8 opposed to someone or opposed to who. You can't get the gist of it, who

9 is opposed to what. And if we take a look at the tape, then I'll be able

10 to compare. I can't go into comparative linguistics now, whatever. I was

11 just doing the comparison between what I was hearing from the Serbian, in

12 the Serbian, and what was recorded in the transcript. So there are more

13 mistakes. I wouldn't have reacted if it were just that one mistake. So I

14 don't see why I would have to apologise to the interpreters, Mr. Bonomy,

15 and I of course cannot listen to the French in the original. It was not I

16 who made the mistake.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, are you accepting what the interpreter has

18 said about this matter or are you not?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With the word "integrism," yes, the

20 explanation, but not as regards the context of the whole translation, the

21 interpretation, which is, when it comes to the Serbian interpretation, is

22 quite incomprehensible at times. But whether she's going to say

23 "integrism," whether the interpreter is going to say "integrism" in one

24 way or another isn't that essential. I just hitched on that point and

25 took -- brought up that difference. But let's move on because my time is

1 moving on.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, I won't allow you

3 to make a general criticism of the interpretation in the manner in which

4 you have just done. You say that it is quite incomprehensible at times.

5 If you find that a mistake has been made, a mistake, in your view, has

6 been made, then you must bring it our attention, but it is absolutely

7 unfair and unacceptable to make a general criticism of the interpretation

8 without pointing to specific misinterpretations. That's not -- that's not

9 playing fair at all and is totally unacceptable.

10 And I'd like to say on behalf of the Chamber that we find that the

11 interpretation generally has been of a very high standard and we express

12 our gratitude to the interpreters for the work that they have done and

13 continue to do.

14 Proceed with the next question.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Barriot, we left off discussing your conversation with

17 Karadzic. Did you discuss anything else except the Bihac pocket, the

18 conflict with the Muslims, for example, and so on and so forth? Do you

19 wish to stress some important point or can we just move on?

20 A. Yes, I would like to stress two points. After these conversations

21 I had with President Karadzic, he repeated often times that the 20th

22 century had seen the emergence of an unnatural alliance of the Croatians

23 and Serbs, and he hoped that the 20th century would see an alliance

24 between the Croatians and the Serbs to fight Muslim fundamentalism in

25 Bosnia. That is the first thing I remember clearly after these

1 discussions we had.

2 Secondly, at this time we talked about the breakaway from

3 Belgrade, and I remember quite clearly when he said that this breakaway is

4 not due to us but this is no solace either. He also said often times that

5 he never received any orders from Belgrade.

6 Q. I don't understand this now. In the Serbian language, I heard

7 "secession." The word "secession" was used, whereas in the English it's

8 "the breakaway from Belgrade," according to the transcript. So I don't

9 know what "the breakaway from Belgrade" means, or the rift from Belgrade.

10 And I really can't say what the witness said in French.

11 A. Yes. I repeat what I said. In the course of these discussions

12 where a number of French journalists were present, we discussed the rift

13 or the distance between the Serbs in Bosnia and the authorities in

14 Belgrade. And what I was saying is that President Karadzic was saying

15 that in effect there had been a rift between the two and he was saying

16 that it wasn't due to him, but he was saying also that that was no

17 consolation either. He also stated that he did not receive any orders

18 from Belgrade.

19 Q. All right. You met General Mladic several times; is that right?

20 A. Yes. I met him, Karadzic, several times -- Mladic, sorry, in

21 1995, and more specifically in June 1995 in Bijeljina, in September 1995

22 in Banja Luka. And it's at that time also that I published an article by

23 him in my book and that I authorised French television crews to conduct

24 interviews of General Mladic.

25 Q. All right. I'm going to put two questions to you now that have to

1 do with talks with General Mladic and then you're going to tell me whether

2 you discussed that or not, but I'm interested in the following: Did you

3 speak more precisely about what was going on in the UN protected areas,

4 what happened in Sarajevo? Was there any mention of what was going on in

5 the eastern enclaves, in the Bihac pocket? Did you discuss these

6 important issues, if I can put it that way, or did you discuss some of

7 them, at least?

8 A. Yes, we did. I spoke with General Mladic on the one hand about

9 the general military situation prevailing in Bosnia, and then we talked

10 about the security zones, especially about Sarajevo, and then about the

11 eastern enclaves. Of course, we also spoke about Srebrenica. So I'll say

12 yes, we mentioned all the issues you have just mentioned.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it is of course perfectly open to

14 you to call General Mladic as a witness.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If you intend to arrest him on the

16 basis of his being a witness here, then I certainly do not want to call

17 him.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just saying it's a matter for you, but you

19 could call him as a witness in your Defence.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for this, Mr. Robinson.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not at all.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You mentioned a minute ago that you talked about Srebrenica. You

24 said a few minutes ago that you saw him in September 1995 in Banja Luka;

25 is that right?

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1 A. Yes, I can confirm this.

2 Q. Tell me, then, what was it that you found out about what happened

3 in Srebrenica?

4 A. I shall be very clear as to the unfolding of these events. I can

5 state that I have this information directly from General Mladic.

6 On the one hand, I can stress once again, because General Mladic

7 would insist on this very often, that Srebrenica should have been a

8 demilitarised zone as early as 1993, but it wasn't at all. It sheltered

9 an entire division of the BH army. The troops under Naser Oric spread

10 terror around Srebrenica in the Serb villages for several years, from 1992

11 to 1995. Naser Oric's militia killed 1.500 to 2.000 people in the area.

12 Everybody remembers the Kravica village massacre during the Orthodox

13 Christmas in 1993.

14 General Mladic would often speak about the massacre by Naser

15 Oric's militia in the area in order to account for the resentment and the

16 fear of the Serbs towards the militia, his militia. And General Mladic

17 mentioned often that these forces were found in a zone protected by the UN

18 which should have been demilitarised.

19 As to the Srebrenica events, General Mladic would insist on the

20 events that took place just before the Srebrenica battle. He would insist

21 on the fact that whilst the UN, the UNHCR had recommended to

22 Mr. Izetbegovic that the women and the children should be evacuated and

23 sent somewhere safe because there might be an attack by the Serbs, but

24 Sarajevo very decidedly refused to do so, refused to evacuate women and

25 children until July 1995.

1 General Mladic also insisted on the fact that it was the Sarajevo

2 government that had ordered Naser Oric to withdraw and to withdraw his

3 staff from the town of Srebrenica before the attack.

4 So there was an obvious decision and deliberate intention not to

5 defend the town and not to ensure the safety of its inhabitants. He

6 insisted a lot on that.

7 Now, regarding the events that took place in July 1995, this is

8 how the events unfolded as was related by General Mladic: During the

9 attack or the battle that occurred on the 11th of July, 1995, there were

10 some 40.000 inhabitants in Srebrenica. Twenty-five thousand of them were

11 mainly women, children, old people, and they surrendered to the forces of

12 General Mladic. These 25.000 civilians were never in danger. They were

13 transported towards Kladanj and towards Tuzla in Muslim territory, and

14 nothing, nothing was -- no harm was done to them.

15 Out of these 25.000 people, there were about 750 men that were

16 held prisoners because their identity was to be checked and it had to be

17 checked that none of them was suspected of crimes against Serbs in the

18 area. Out of these people, 500 were not suspected at all. They were

19 released, and they were able to go towards Kladanj and Tuzla.

20 Two hundred and fifty of them were held back because there was

21 suspicion against them. They were suspected of crimes against the Serbs.

22 They were detained in Zvornik and Batkovic, and it is probable that out of

23 these people there were some summary executions because some Serbs

24 recognised some of the authors of some crimes in their villages, but

25 according to General Mladic, no more than hundred summary executions took

1 place out of this group of people.

2 Regarding the actual battle that took place in the night of the

3 11th to the 12th of July, 1995, in the surrounding woods, some 15.000

4 Muslims, armed Muslims, came out of Srebrenica in that night of the 11th

5 to the 12th. This figure was confirmed by Naser Oric himself. And out of

6 these 10 to 15.000 men, they were confronted in the woods in the night

7 with General Mladic's army, who expected a ferocious battle against

8 well-armed Muslims. So of course there were fights during the night. The

9 Serbs, conducted by General Mladic, lost over 500 men, and the armed

10 Muslims lost some 1.500 to 1.800 men.

11 So this is what actually happened in Srebrenica on the 11th and

12 the 12th of July.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: This narrative is just too long, and it's not an

14 acceptable way of receiving evidence. You must ask -- ask another

15 question and get a specific answer to the question. To have the witness

16 speak for five, ten minutes is just -- it's not -- I don't even remember

17 the question that he's answering. And we have discussed this before. I

18 want questions asked, and I want short answers where that is possible. Of

19 course some answers will be longer than others.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's just the way you put it,

21 Mr. Robinson; "whenever possible." I think that my question was quite

22 appropriate, the one I addressed to Colonel Barriot: "What was it that

23 you found out from General Mladic about Srebrenica?" He is a person who

24 talked to General Mladic in September 1995, and he briefly related what he

25 learned from him about the events in Srebrenica and that's all. And I

1 don't see anything inappropriate in that.

2 There are no facts on the basis of which I could put brief

3 questions to him that would only entail yes or no answers. I simply asked

4 him what he found out from General Mladic and that's what he related to

5 you.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not yes or no answers. Not necessarily yes or no

7 answers, but an answer which takes five to ten minutes doesn't help

8 because it's difficult to digest. It's difficult to understand.

9 So you are in charge of your examination-in-chief. After he has

10 spoken for a short time, two or three or four sentences, you must

11 intervene, come in again with another question. That's the way I would

12 like the evidence to be given. I'm not in support of what is called the

13 narrative approach to evidence where witnesses speak forever. It does not

14 conduce to an understanding of the evidence. So please ask another

15 question and let us have an answer to it.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Colonel Barriot, what you said, would that be the gist of the

18 explanations that General Mladic gave to you in relation to what happened

19 in Srebrenica?

20 A. No, no. I'm sorry, Mr. President, regarding something as serious

21 as Srebrenica, regarding the talks that were long, it would be absolutely

22 abnormal to be reduced to three minutes of explanation to relate

23 discussions that took place over several hours and something as tragic and

24 as important as the battle in Srebrenica. I insist.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: It is not for you to insist. That's totally out

1 of order. You will answer the question in the way that I have directed or

2 not at all. Do I make myself clear?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely. I insist on the need to

4 answer the questions, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: It is not for you to insist on anything. It's

6 not for you to insist on anything.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will answer the question in the way that it

9 was asked and along the lines that I have suggested. I don't want a

10 narrative of five to ten minutes which is difficult for anybody to

11 understand.

12 Mr. Milosevic, you are leading the witness. You come from a

13 system in which this is not the practice. Examination-in-chief and

14 cross-examination are not part of the civil law system. In this part of

15 the case we are following an adversarial system.

16 If you follow Mr. Nice when he's examining in chief, he does not

17 allow a witness to speak for five, ten minutes. That's the way I want it

18 to be done and that's the way it will be done while I'm presiding here. I

19 will not allow answers that roam far and wide and last for five, ten

20 minutes, because that's not helpful. So if you want him to relate what

21 his understanding of what happened in Srebrenica, do it in bits and

22 pieces. I will not allow a narrative of five, ten minutes from the

23 witness.

24 You have assumed responsibility for examining in chief, and you

25 must do it in accordance with the procedures that the Chamber approves.

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1 If you want more from him on Srebrenica, he can give more, but I don't

2 want him to speak for five, ten, 15 minutes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: I have to make one comment on this, though. I've

4 -- or I understand that question quite differently, I think, from the

5 witness. Mr. Milosevic seemed to me to be making the point that all the

6 witness had done was give the gist of the account that Mladic gave him,

7 that obviously the account would be much lengthier, but the gist was all

8 that was necessary for the purposes of the trial, and the witness, instead

9 of simply saying yes to the question embarked on a long -- or sought to

10 embark on a further narrative that was quite unnecessary.

11 So the fault at the moment seems to me to lie with the witness.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put a specific question and let us have a

13 specific answer.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. How long did your conversation with Mladic last then in September

16 1995, as you said, when you met with him?

17 A. We spent several hours speaking together in the Banja Luka

18 barracks, and President Milan Martic was there, along with other people,

19 but there was also a French television crew which took part in part of the

20 discussion, not in all of it.

21 Q. And did the French television crew take part in that portion of

22 the conversation when you talked about Srebrenica?

23 A. The French television crew were there mainly to interview General

24 Mladic regarding the fact that the French pilots had been taken prisoners

25 and to talk about the terms for their release, but they also mentioned

1 Srebrenica. But the French crew were not there at all the meetings and

2 discussions.

3 Q. Tell me, during that conversation that you had, did General Mladic

4 give any other explanations as to how come a number of prisoners of war

5 were killed in Srebrenica? Did you talk about that?

6 A. Yes. He mentioned the possibility indeed of some executions,

7 there again because there was so much hate accumulated between the Serbs

8 and the Muslims in the area that it was inevitable for some executions to

9 take place, because the Serbs of the area recognised some Muslim militia

10 of Naser Oric who had massacred their families. So obviously it cannot be

11 doubted that there were some settlements of accounts, but never was any

12 order given for a massacre or the execution of prisoners by him. That is

13 obvious. That cannot be doubted at all. And he also insisted chiefly on

14 the fact that Srebrenica was a strategic objective. He attacked

15 Srebrenica in order to neutralise Naser Oric's militia, not at all in

16 order to eliminate the population of Srebrenica.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot, when you say that "never was there

18 any order given for a massacre or the execution of prisoners by him. That

19 is obvious. That cannot be doubted at all," is this what was related to

20 you by General Mladic or is that your own assessment?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was stated. He was quite

22 sort of adamant about it. There was no single execution of a prisoner.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're relating what he said to you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. That's

2 precisely what I wished to ask the witness, is this exactly what General

3 Mladic said to him.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So it was General Mladic who said to you that there were

6 absolutely no orders to execute prisoners. That's what he said to you in

7 that conversation?

8 A. Yes, yes. I can confirm that again. I can support what I said

9 totally.

10 Q. All right. There is no need to go through it again. All right.

11 Now we are briefly going to deal with your stay in Kosovo. In

12 June 1998, you were in Pristina. Please tell us in the briefest possible

13 terms what the situation was like when you came to Pristina then. Can you

14 describe the situation to us?

15 A. Yes. I shall be very brief. I arrived in Pristina in July 1998,

16 or June 1998. The situation was then very tense because it was

17 practically impossible to just walk about in the streets of Pristina

18 together with Serbs, because the Serbs felt that they were threatened.

19 I met at length Rector Radivoj Papovic. I had long conversations

20 and discussions with him, and I then told him I wished to go to the

21 southern area in Kosovo. I wanted to go to Pec and Decani in particular.

22 Rector Papovic said I should not do that, I should not go through Kosovo

23 because the roads were blocked by the KLA on the one hand but also because

24 two Croat generals of Albanian origin, Ademi, Ceku notably, were in the

25 area and they had all reasons to have resentments towards the Serbs in the

1 -- towards the representatives of the Krajina Serbs.

2 Q. Tell me, Colonel Barriot, when did you go to the south of the

3 province? After that, you did go to Pec after all, didn't you?

4 A. Yes, indeed, I did. In July and August already I went towards the

5 southern area in Kosovo, and I had in my pocket a letter by Patriarch

6 Pavle. He had asked me to support and aid the Pec hospital because there

7 was a lot of fighting in the area. The hospital was overwhelmed, and

8 Patriarch Pavle thought it was useful to send me to Pec so that I could

9 help the hospital doctors look after the wounded. So I went to Pec in

10 July and August 1995 -- 1998, sorry.

11 Q. All right. Now I'm going to read a brief quotation to you now

12 from this so-called Kosovo indictment, and then I'm going to put a

13 question to you.

14 That's count 87 for you gentlemen. It says here:

15 "[In English] In late 1990 and 1991, thousands of Kosovo Albanian

16 -- of Kosovo Albanian doctors," [Interpretation] and so on, "[In English]

17 dismissed from their positions."

18 [Interpretation] Now it says that Albanians -- or, actually, you

19 were in the hospital and doctors were referred to. You were dismissed

20 from your own job. Tell me, what kind of medical staff did you find

21 employed at the Pec hospital when you arrived there?

22 A. I wasn't aware of such a statement. It's hard to believe it.

23 Indeed a large part of the medical staff and paramedical staff in the Pec

24 hospital were of Albanian origin, so I couldn't tell you exactly what the

25 ratio was but one thing was certain; there are more Albanian doctors and

1 nurses than Serb doctors and nurses, and that was the case in the Pec

2 hospital where I worked for several weeks in 1998.

3 And there were so few Serb doctors that in the summer of 1998,

4 medical teams had to come from Serbia or from Kragujevac in Kosovo in

5 order to help me and to bring additional assistance, because there were

6 very few Serb doctors and nurses at the time.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just in the interest of accuracy,

8 paragraph 87 reads: "Throughout late 1990 and 1991, thousands of Kosovo

9 Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police, and civil

10 servants were dismissed from their positions." I think you stopped at

11 "doctors."

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did because I did not consider

13 this witness to be competent to give answers in relation to the others. I

14 quoted this so that I could compare it to the situation that he found at

15 the Pec hospital as far as the medical staff is concerned, to compare it

16 with this position contained here. Because it is asserted here that in

17 1990 and 1991 Albanians were dismissed from their jobs, and he was there

18 in 1998, and now he says that the majority of the medical staff, the

19 majority of the doctors, the majority of the nurses, of all staff, were

20 Albanians. So this is just one of the falsehoods contained here, and

21 there's really no point even commenting on it. This could not happen in a

22 single civilised country, to put these kind of things on paper, but paper

23 will suffer anything, won't it.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Barriot --

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1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are now at the time for the

2 break. And in future you must avoid comments of that kind.

3 We will break for 20 minutes.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the accused.

8 Thank you.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Colonel Barriot, a moment ago you were talking about the facts

11 which had to do with the structure of the hospital staff. Just tell us

12 briefly, what about the patient make-up? What was the structure of the

13 patient composition?

14 A. So as I was in the Pec hospital in the summer of 1998, there were

15 essentially two kinds of injured people. There were on the one hand a

16 great number of Serbs that were coming in every day, whether they were

17 civilians or members of the police forces that had been injured and had

18 been wounded by bullets.

19 And there was a second category of wounded people. These people

20 were Albanians, generally speaking moderate Albanians that had been beaten

21 up by members of the KLA because of their friendly attitude vis-a-vis the

22 Serbs, either because they had had a drink with them or because they had

23 showed signs of friendship towards the Serbs. So these people were -- had

24 generally been beaten up. They had broken limbs, broken jaws due to --

25 because they had been hit with some sharp objects.

1 Q. As you yourself are a humanitarian worker and officer and were

2 there for a significant period of time, if I can say so, tell us, please,

3 what was the situation like with respect to the rights of the Kosovo

4 Albanians, for instance?

5 A. Yes. I can testify to the fact that I -- I was in the -- working

6 for the patriarch of Pec. I was working on a daily basis in the Pec

7 hospital, and I moved around on foot in the town, and I went to the market

8 every day. I also went or drove around the whole region by car. We went

9 to Decani and that entire area.

10 So what I can say is that I have at -- I have never witnessed any

11 violent attitudes on the part of Serbs or the Serb forces vis-a-vis the

12 Albanians. And the presence of Serb forces in Pec at the time was minimal

13 and was not something which was particularly striking at the time.

14 What I can also say is that the Albanians, the Kosovo Albanians,

15 were never discriminated, as far as I could see. And they spoke Albanian.

16 And when I went to the market or I went to march and I said "avijenje"

17 [phoen], "good-bye" they picked me up in a rather aggressive way and said

18 to me that I should say goodbye in Albanian, in the Albanian language. We

19 saw the flourish of a number of the Albanian flags, the black eagle

20 against a red background. We saw this on a number of houses. Also in the

21 streets you could see people handing out posters and leaflets calling for

22 the independence of Albania.

23 So I think it is quite clear that the situation in the summer of

24 1998 in this particular region, I can say there was no discrimination or

25 no violence carried out at the hands of the Albanian population on the

1 part of the Serbs or carried out by the Serb forces.

2 There were a number of newspapers around. It was very easy to

3 find newspapers in the Albanian language. It's much easier to find

4 Albanian newspapers than it was to find Serbian newspapers. There were

5 hardly any Serbian newspapers, as a matter of fact, to be found.

6 Q. Do you have any knowledge about the activities of the KLA during

7 that period of time, and how would you characterise those activities if

8 you do have knowledge of them?

9 A. Yes. I knew that the UCK had mistreated a number of people, and

10 these mistreatments were of different kinds. There was, on the one hand,

11 people had been attacked, there had been ambushes laid against the Serb

12 police forces, and this resulted in a number of deaths. There had been a

13 number of Serb people had been abducted, particularly in the centre of

14 Kosovo, in the central region of Kosovo. Some villages had been

15 completely burnt down and the Serb people had been expelled from these

16 villages.

17 So we saw a surge of violence at this time, and this was conducted

18 by the KLA militia. I would call these terrorist attacks since -- insofar

19 as these people targeted civilians primarily, whether they be Serb

20 civilians or the refugees from the Serb camps in Krajina.

21 I visited a number of centres where the refugees had been placed,

22 and they were savagely attacked by the KLA militiamen. This violence was

23 not only targeted at Serb civilians but also at moderate Albanian

24 civilians when the latter had not been involved or were not part of the

25 separatist movement of the KLA.

1 Pec is close to the border -- is on the border with Albania. Pec,

2 Levubinje [phoen]. There is a lot of drug trafficking on these borders

3 and the Serb forces were trying to counteract this arms and drug

4 trafficking which was crossing the border at the time.

5 Q. Is that all you know about the activities of the Serb forces and

6 security forces at that time or do you know something more? What were the

7 activities, to the best of your knowledge? What kind of activities were

8 in force by the Serb forces and security forces of Serbia and Yugoslavia?

9 Q. What I do know as regards the activity of the Serb forces at the

10 time is that these Serb forces were responding or retaliating to the

11 attacks and the ambushes. So this was very clearly targeted and in line

12 with the violence against them. It was aimed at protecting the civilian

13 population. As I said, not only the Serb civilians but the non-Albanian

14 minorities like the Romas and the moderate Albanians in Kosovo. The Serb

15 forces therefore were protecting the civilians and were retaliating to the

16 KLA attacks on a case-by-case basis and were trying to counteract these

17 groups being infiltrated on the border with Albania.

18 Q. Did you have any personal contact with a compatriot of yours and

19 your colleague, Bernard Kouchner, for instance, and do you know anything

20 about his involvement in the events in Yugoslavia?

21 A. Yes. Bernard Kouchner is a colleague of mine. I met him

22 personally in 1991 because he sent me to Kurdistan, the Iraqi part of the

23 country, and I had a close contact, personal contact with him.

24 Now, as regards his approach to the Yugoslav conflict, I believe

25 that he clearly demonstrated that he took sides, because the two

1 associations he created would be Medecins du Monde and Medecins Sans

2 Frontieres which are two associations which sided quite clearly and did

3 not respect the neutrality which such organisations should respond to. In

4 other words, these organisations which were created by Kouchner, which

5 were to protect the Muslims in Bosnia and also sided with Kosovo in

6 Albania and totally disregarded the suffering of the Serb people during

7 this war.

8 I also believe that Bernard Kouchner, who was administrator of

9 Kosovo, I think went well beyond the scope of the 1240 UN Resolution which

10 granted him his mandate. He ordered the expulsion of the last Serbs still

11 remaining in Kosovo. I think Bernard Kouchner probably left the same

12 souvenir as Kurt Waldheim in the mountains of Kozara left. So he went

13 beyond his mandate, and as we saw what happened in March of 2004, the UN

14 mission fell short of its requirement and could not prevent the expulsions

15 of the last Serbs remaining in Kosovo.

16 I also question the honesty of Mr. Kouchner. I think it's -- he

17 is an unnatural result or combination between the political situation and

18 the army.

19 I'm sorry. I just wanted to say that it is because of

20 Mr. Kouchner that we don't know today whether the hospitals are there to

21 protect patients or armed militia. We don't know whether ambulances are

22 transporting patients or arms. And during this war, in 1993 in

23 particular, we discovered large stashes of weapons under the Medecins Sans

24 Frontieres humanitarian aid packages which were designed for the Muslim

25 enclaves, the same way we discovered in Kosovo in the ambulance rocket

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1 launchers belonging to or destined to the KLA. I think this is something

2 which Mr. Kouchner was largely instrumental in and led to the lack of

3 neutrality of the NGOs.

4 MR. NICE: I'm more than a little concerned about the nature of

5 this extended answer. Let me make it straight away clear: Of course I

6 have no interest here to serve in defending anyone who happens to be

7 named, but it is one thing for the witness to give evidence of facts, he

8 appears to be able to do, of discovering items in particular vehicles or

9 places, but it's another entirely for him to be allowed to say the sort of

10 things that he's saying at page 39, line 21, and to make assertions about

11 the honesty of a public servant.

12 I repeat, I have no role to defend the person but there must

13 surely come a time when unless it is absolutely and clearly relevant, this

14 sort of comment should not be tolerated.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We hear the submission, Mr. Nice.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Tell me, Colonel Barriot, do you have any knowledge about the

18 support that the terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija received?

19 A. Yes. These KLA terrorists in the Kosovo-Metohija region were

20 supported by a number of factions. On the one hand they were, of course,

21 supported diplomatically by Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke in the

22 region. Let me remind you that when Richard Holbrooke, in the autumn of

23 1998, went to Kosovo, Osama bin Laden was actually in the Northern Albania

24 at the time. They were supported, likewise, by William Walker and all

25 American diplomats. They were also supported by Croatian generals of

1 Albanian origin, General Rahim Ademi and Agim Ceku were present in the

2 region. Agim Ceku was charged with coordinating the movements of the KLA.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes.

4 MR. NICE: Again, with such extraordinary wide-ranging

5 allegations, none of which is our function to defend necessarily or to

6 deal with, might it be at least helpful if the witness identified the

7 piece of paper or the precise source of his knowledge for some of these

8 assertions that he's making. Because otherwise, and we know what's going

9 to happen, the assertions will be picked up because they are attractive

10 fodder for certain types of media outlets, particularly in the former

11 Yugoslavia, and they will be given a prominence they simply don't deserve,

12 which may be unfair on those named and may of course not reflect properly

13 the way this case is being conducted.

14 I made an observation in a recent filing that there may be reason

15 to be concerned about the accused using his opportunity to ask questions

16 and to elicit evidence turning into a propaganda exercise of a kind that's

17 irrelevant to the trial but potentially harmful in the future, and I would

18 invite the Court to be cautious about allowing the sort of rein that this

19 witness is taking in making the sort of broad assertions he's just made,

20 linking all sorts of names without identifying his source material.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a matter that you could take up in

22 cross-examination, and the position that I've taken or the doubt that I've

23 expressed about the relevance of terrorism doesn't apply to this part of

24 the case. It relates to the Bosnia part of the case. I don't see the

25 relevance. But here the KLA is definitely relevant, and if he has

1 evidence of support for the KLA, I would think that that is relevant

2 evidence. It is, of course, open to you to refute it.

3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not necessarily challenging that, and

4 of course there's the opportunity in cross-examination, but when one sees

5 the artful, it may be, linking of high-profile names together in

6 consecutive sentences and drawing broad conclusions, I would invite the

7 Chamber to be cautious.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I understand your concern, but I think

9 there is a basis here for the -- for that kind of evidence.

10 JUDGE KWON: But I'd like to emphasise to the witness to make his

11 evidence more specific. Let me give you an example. You said in an

12 earlier answer, "On the one hand they were --" yes, this is it. You said,

13 "Let me remind you that when Richard Holbrooke, in the autumn of 1998,

14 went to Kosovo, Osama bin Laden was actually in Northern Albania at the

15 time. They were supported, likewise, by Mr. William Walker and all

16 American diplomats."

17 It is an overly general statement without any specific comments.

18 It's nothing to the Chamber. So Mr. Nice is referring to this overall

19 generality in his submission. Then Mr. Milosevic should pursue more

20 specificity from the witness.

21 Bearing this in mind, please proceed.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Colonel Barriot, on what basis did you observe that Holbrooke and

24 the rest of the people you mentioned lent support to the KLA or, rather,

25 the terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohija, and what do you know -- but,

1 never mind. That will be my next question. Answer this one first,

2 please. What was the basis for you to make your observations?

3 A. Yes. On the one hand, when I talked about Srebrenica earlier on

4 and I gave details, I was told I was too slow, and when I try to be more

5 concise and just talk about what is essential, I'm told I'm too detailed.

6 So I shall go into this in detail.

7 As far as General Agim Ceku is concerned, he was a general who was

8 in charge, or one of the senior people in charge of the Operation Storm

9 against the Serbs in Krajina. At the time he was responsible or running

10 MPRI, and I -- he was in charge of the armed branch of the KLA in 1999.

11 He was appointed chief of the operations in Kosovo, and he was appointed

12 by the Americans. I think these are very clear facts which took place at

13 the time.

14 As far as William Walker is concerned --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down a

16 little.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot, the interpreters are asking you to

18 slow down. I know you're eager to give the evidence, but speak more

19 slowly so that the interpreters can follow.

20 And bear in mind that the question you are answering, what is the

21 basis for you to make your observations, it's the question of support.

22 What is the evidential basis for saying that these high-ranking Americans

23 were supporting the KLA?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the basis of the information I

25 got from French and foreign intelligence services at the time I was there.

1 So I believe that I retrieved firsthand information as regards this

2 particular case.

3 I should also like to emphasise that transmission equipment was

4 provided by the KLA, by the French intelligence and German intelligence

5 services. So diplomatic, military and material support was given by the

6 Western intelligence services, and this was given to the KLA.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Do you know anything about the crimes of Ceku in Croatia?

9 A. Yes. Yes. If I may and if I still may -- still may quote some

10 names, Agim Ceku was a member of the Croatian forces who conducted the

11 massacre in the Medak pocket in 1993 with Janko Bobetko, and together with

12 Ceku there was also Ante Gotovina and General Mirko Norac, so these

13 generals were responsible for the invasion and attack on Krajina and

14 Operation Storm in August 1995, and they also were guilty of crimes

15 against civilian populations in Krajina. And as far as Rahim Ademi, he

16 went from Krajina to Kosovo and there is great reason to believe that he

17 was involved in the Klecka massacre in the summer of 1998.

18 Q. Let's stay with Ceku for just a moment. His crimes in the Medak

19 pocket, I assume, were something that was -- people knew about. How do

20 you explain the fact that despite a clear knowledge about the great crimes

21 committed by Agim Ceku, he himself was nominated commander of the Kosovo

22 Protection Corps when the United Nations took over control of Kosovo in

23 1999?

24 A. I think that all this is very clear. This has to do with the

25 connections with the Americans, with the United States, because during

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1 Operation Storm, he was one of the main people in charge. He was there,

2 establishing contact with MPRI, and he held the same position in Kosovo,

3 where he was in charge of coordinating the movements of the KLA together

4 with Military Professional Resources Incorporated was also present in

5 Kosovo and Macedonia. And I would like to stress this.

6 Ante Gotovina also said that if ever he were to be captured, he

7 would talk about everything he knew about the connections between the

8 Croatian forces, MPRI, the US army and what happened in Krajina in August

9 of 1995. I think Mr. Ceku knows enough about all of this and will

10 probably never be called upon.

11 Q. At the end of 1994, Colonel Barriot, you wrote a letter to your

12 paper Le Monde. What was the contents of that letter and what was the

13 response you got?

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we come to that, because I can't

15 quite see how a letter to Le Monde is likely to be relevant and its answer

16 less so, I should perhaps respectfully draw to your attention that the

17 accused indicated he was going to take, I think, an hour and a half with

18 this witness. He's already taken two hours and 40 minutes. We've made

19 the point before and we don't resile from it that it is substantially a

20 matter for the accused how he either uses or it may be wastes the time

21 available to him, but if the Chamber is concerned about the relevance or

22 marginal relevance of some of this evidence, it may be it would want to

23 have in mind the fact that the time limit has already been getting on for

24 doubled.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Some of the time was taken up, Mr. Nice, in legal

1 argumentation about the relevance of evidence, matters raised by the

2 Chamber itself. So I'd like to take account of that.

3 JUDGE KWON: But have we limited the time for examination in chief

4 in this case?

5 MR. NICE: No, we haven't limited it. It's just his own

6 indication. He's set his own budget, and I just draw to your attention

7 he's almost doubled his time. Almost.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: That will not be lost on Mr. Milosevic. He

9 attends to these matters very carefully, I know.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Let me repeat that question. You wrote a letter to Le Monde.

12 What did it contain, and what was the answer?

13 A. Yes. This letter is important because it clearly shows the state

14 of mind at the time and how the media reacted at the time.

15 In 1994, let me repeat, this was a time when there was fighting in

16 the Bihac pocket between the governmental forces of Sarajevo, the 5th

17 Corps of the Bosnian army, and the moderate Muslims of Fikret Abdic. I

18 was worried about this and I sent a letter to Le Monde to underline the

19 suffering and persecutions the moderate Muslims were suffering from, those

20 that were loyal to Fikret Abdic. Let me just quote one sentence of this

21 very well known French paper. "We cannot share your interpretation

22 between Fikret Abdic and Irakovic [phoen] who was acting in the name of an

23 essential government in the face of a threat of secession." The media

24 always took sides or took the side of the government in Sarajevo in the

25 same way as they took sides for the government in Zagreb against the

1 people who were wanting to secede. But in Kosovo, when the Albanians

2 found themselves in the identical situation, they were then supported. So

3 it's a double-standard system which I think clearly is indicated in this

4 letter.

5 On the one hand you had to support Sarajevo against Fikret Abdic,

6 Tudjman against the Serbs in Krajina, but on the other hand, when there

7 was not, to support Belgrade against Albanian secessionist. I think

8 double standards were applied all the time during this war and the three

9 moments, important moments in this war.

10 Q. Colonel Barriot, just a few short questions. You looked at the

11 effects of different types of weapons professionally. To what extent was

12 the -- were the weapons used by NATO created an effect on the civilians or

13 had an effect on the civilians? How did it affect the civilians and the

14 possibility of them staying in their own homes and houses or deciding to

15 flee?

16 A. Yes. I shall be very brief. This is my speciality, and I can

17 spend days talking about it. Different weapons were used by NATO, and

18 these hit civilians. What comes to mind is the fragmentation bombs or

19 cluster bombs which were used in the sites of Kosovo, and we know full

20 well that these cluster bombs don't explode instantly, and when they

21 don't, they operate like anti-personnel mines and had killed a number of

22 children in the sites of Kosovo. Graphite bombs, which led to power cuts

23 in hospitals which resulted in a number of deaths in hospitals,

24 particularly in the reanimation centres and for newly-born children.

25 Uranium 238, which led to the contamination of the ground and the whole of

1 the food chain, which would probably lead to a number of cancer -- cases

2 of cancer and malformation.

3 What comes to mind also is the bombing of chemical industrial

4 sites. When you destroy with a standard bomb a chemical industrial site,

5 you contaminate the environment for a number of decades. So the Pancevo

6 complex was destroyed, the Novi Sad refinement was destroyed, Kragujevac

7 Zastava site was destroyed, Bor complex were destroyed also. There were

8 thousands of tonnes of chemical products, sulphur dioxide, a number of

9 extremely toxic products were released in great quantities, in tens of

10 thousands of tonnes, which will lead to very adverse effects for the

11 people living there.

12 All these attacks were not aimed at the Serb forces because they

13 were not hit, but these targeted primarily civilians and are, therefore,

14 crimes against humanity.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're a man of many parts, Colonel Barriot.

16 Colonel, I was saying that you're a man of many parts. You're a doctor,

17 you're an expert in arms, and now you're a lawyer. I see you have

18 characterised this as a crime against humanity. That's a matter for the

19 Chamber. So I'll thank you to avoid legal characterisations which are a

20 matter for the Chamber.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Barriot, in view of the operations that you could assess

23 professionally, what was their effect on the general feeling among the

24 population, namely, in terms of deciding whether they would stay at home

25 or whether they would flee their homes? I'm talking about Kosovo and

1 Metohija where the bombing was intensive, 24 hours every day, round the

2 clock.

3 So the point is, how could this affect the citizens in terms of

4 them deciding whether they're going to stay at home or whether they're

5 going to flee? How did this affect civilians?

6 A. Yes. Before answering your question --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you answer that, could you provide us with

8 the basis for your giving an answer of this kind? Were you present or is

9 this answer going to be on the basis of information that you received?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I'd like to say that I

11 was in Serbia in March and April of 1999, so I can say that I got -- I saw

12 these bombs coming down. I was in Belgrade at the time of the bombing. I

13 saw with my own eyes the destruction of the radio television building in

14 Serbia. I saw the destruction of the Chinese embassy as well as a number

15 of -- the Pancevo complex and a number other civilian buildings. I was

16 there, on the one hand. I was also in contact with a number of Serbian --

17 Serb doctors, and I received their reports. Let me remind you that I've

18 just written a book on arms systems.

19 I would also like to say that when I -- what I said was not of a

20 legal nature but of a medical nature. When I talk about crimes against

21 humanity, I'm talking in medical terms and not in legal terms.

22 So to answer President Milosevic's question, of course the

23 civilian population was never warned and the children in Kosovo who would

24 played in the fields cannot be warned that there are cluster bombs around.

25 In the same way, the farmers in Kosovo who drink the milk and eat their

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1 salads do not know and cannot detect 238 uranium in the ground. In the

2 same way, when the NATO military conducted investigations, they were

3 wearing very heavy protected suits, whereas people were never warned and

4 never protected in any way and were never told about the risks that they

5 were incurring.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Colonel Barriot, now I'm going to talk about the entirety of your

8 experience that you gained over a rather long period of time in the

9 territory of the former Yugoslavia. In terms of everything you saw in

10 Krajina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, in the Federal Republic of

11 Yugoslavia, in Kosovo and Metohija, does that correspond to what you could

12 find in the media of your country and other Western countries and in the

13 statements, public statements made by statesmen in your countries?

14 A. No, not at all. There is a total split, and I indeed think of the

15 fact that I have, through the many years I experienced that, a good

16 overview of the situation. What was hidden from the public opinions in

17 those countries is the fact that in Croatia, in Bosnia, and in Kosovo the

18 Serbs were not at all aggressors but, on the contrary, were in a state of

19 legitimate self-defence in the face of an aggression.

20 Vukovar did not start in November 1991 with the fall of the city.

21 It started in August of that year, starting with the abuse by Mercep's

22 militia. Srebrenica did not start either in 1995. It started in 1992,

23 and it started with the aggression by Naser Oric's militia. So there is a

24 distinction that was made between the first initial aggression and the

25 response, whilst the Serbs only responded. I showed it for Bosnia and

1 Kosovo. The Serbs tried to answer and to face a threat by terrorists, by

2 fundamentalists often coming from abroad. So the hands of the Serbs were

3 tied in their backs so they could not exert their right to self-defence.

4 That's what I noted. And I insist on saying that many military and senior

5 officers made the same observations. I'm not going to quote again all the

6 books written by generals, by foreign generals, on the topic which confirm

7 my interpretation.

8 Q. And the last question I'm going to put to you during this

9 examination, Colonel Barriot: What is your general conclusion on the

10 basis of your experience?

11 MR. NICE: I completely fail to understand how a question like

12 that can be of any value to this Chamber.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite so, Mr. Milosevic. Ask another question.

14 That question is -- just doesn't make any sense at all.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Thank you, Colonel Barriot. I have concluded my questions.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, I was handed over from you a bundle of

19 documents which I guess you'd like to present as evidence. However, among

20 them you dealt with only two tabs of it. Can I take it as you are going

21 to present only two of them as evidence? Am I right in so understanding?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have in mind the fact that these

23 documents are self-explanatory, because these documents confirm the

24 presence of the witness at the sites that he spoke of, testified about.

25 It seems to me that no comment is necessary. Therefore, I ask that all

1 these exhibits be admitted into evidence although I did not invoke many of

2 them because many of them just have to do with establishing the presence

3 of the witness at certain particular sites, and also the references that

4 are taken as a basis for his competence.

5 I should like to draw your attention to the following: As for

6 both witnesses, the tabs coincide. I have sent a note to that effect. So

7 therefore, what I ask for is that they all be admitted.

8 JUDGE KWON: Even so, no, speaking for myself, I don't think it is

9 a proper way to present the written documents as evidence. Unless it is

10 put to the witness I'm not inclined to admit any of them. So even if it

11 is time-consuming, you have to put every document to the witness in order

12 to introduce them as evidence. So if there's any documents that you'd

13 like to produce other than tabs 4 and 27, you have to put to the witness.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, with all due respect for

15 what you've said just now and which is, in principle, correct, and I'm not

16 denying that, I think that the documents are self-explanatory.

17 Look, for example, at the letter of the chief of police. The --

18 I'm dealing with them in order. Now I've -- well, you've got only the

19 front page of the book, but Mrs. Del Ponte said yesterday that she had

20 read these books. Then you have a certificate that was signed by General

21 de Lapresle in relation to the UNPROFOR medal that was conferred upon

22 Mr. Barriot. Then the letter of Milan Martic under number 4. And then

23 number 5 is the certificate of Air Travel Croatia. And then number 6 is

24 certificate of employment as medical staff at Glina Hospital. And then

25 number 7 is report -- and so on and so forth. All of these are documents.

1 I did not want to waste time introducing each and every one of

2 them through the witness and showing them to the witness and so on. These

3 are documents that have their own headings, their substance, their

4 content, and they attest to the presence of the witness in the area and

5 all the knowledge he could have gained while in the area.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, in the Prosecution case, your practice

7 was to simply refer to them and then you had a number of tabs.

8 MR. NICE: I think typically -- I'm so sorry.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Even if you didn't put them to the witness.

10 MR. NICE: Typically documents will be dealt with individually.

11 From time to time, documents were dealt with compendiously, but their

12 being dealt with in that way was always explained and a foundation for

13 their being produced in that way was laid with the witness. There are no

14 doubt some exceptions to the general rule and we know there were some

15 other exhibits that were produced, for example, collections of exhibits

16 that were produced on the basis of production through, for example,

17 compulsion to the state concerned and then commentary by the OTP in the

18 form of a filing.

19 Our position, as advanced in the recent filing that's been made

20 available to the accused and that I hope he has read, as he must do if

21 he's going to conduct the case as if counsel, is that that's the practice

22 that should now obtain and that only exhibits properly relied on or

23 identified should burden the Trial Chamber, and indeed the OTP, from this

24 stage onwards.

25 Now, in relation to this particular witness, that would mean that

1 only the two tabs should be produced, and the accused will not be

2 inconvenienced by this, because if -- because he's been able to adduce the

3 evidence, either as to generality or detail, without reference to these

4 documents. If the detail is challenged, it will be open to him in

5 re-examination to say, for example, well, it's been challenged that you

6 weren't present at X, Y, and Z on this particular date; do you now produce

7 this document? By this method we will keep to the necessary minimum the

8 number of documents that burden the record.

9 To allow documents to go in without being relied on or referred to

10 is an inappropriate process and one we would resist.

11 We should also observe that although we've been provided with

12 translations more recently today - and Ms. Dicklich is correcting the

13 record as I go along - there are still, I think, four, tabs 9, 11, 14, and

14 17, that either are not translated or for which we have yet to be provided

15 with translations, and many of the others that were translated have been

16 translated only recently so that it hasn't been possible for us to give

17 any particularly detailed consideration to them.

18 So in our submission just the two tabs, maybe more in

19 re-examination if they become relevant.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll consider the matter.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice, you are, of course, right that

23 the documents should be produced through the witness, but in the interests

24 of fairness to the accused and in view of the approach that I knew you

25 took in some cases, I'm going to allow the accused - Mr. Milosevic, listen

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1 carefully - to just go through very quickly with the witness each tab,

2 just to cite to the witness the title, and he can just say yes or no. The

3 Prosecutor did that, so we'll allow you to do the same.

4 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear the speaker.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I assume that you have this set of documents in front of you. Do

8 you have all the tabs as presented? Now you do have it before you.

9 So number 1 is the front page of the book, The Assassination of a

10 People. Is that your book?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Just say yes or no, please. Then number 2 is Our Testimony on

15 Serbia. Again, is that your book?

16 A. It is.

17 Q. Three, certificate signed by General Lapresle awarding the

18 UNPROFOR medal to you. Is that a document that confirms that fact?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. Then number 4, decision signed by --

21 JUDGE KWON: That's been dealt with. Go to number 5.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Number 5, certificate of air travel in Croatia, 1994. Is that

24 yours?

25 A. Yes, it is.

1 Q. Number 6, certificate of employment as medical staff of Glina

2 Hospital.

3 Seven -- is that all right?

4 Eight, medical work performed at Glina Hospital. That was number

5 8. So there were these two reports. Are both yours?

6 A. Yes, they are.

7 Q. Number 9, letter of acknowledgement for assistance rendered at

8 Glina Hospital.

9 Number 10 also. Is that all right?

10 A. Yes, absolutely.

11 Q. Eleven, report on travel in Krajina forwarded by Association

12 Krajina, humanitarian association.

13 Twelve also.

14 Thirteen, Topusko hotel invoice; 14, [In English] Report on travel

15 in Bosnia and Krajina in June 1995; 15 accreditation for reporting

16 purposes provided by the Republika Srpska of Bosnia to a team of

17 journalists of French TV channel FR3 in 1995 and 1996; 16, authorisation

18 to participate in the Vidovdan ceremonies in Bijeljina, in 1995; 17, text

19 written by General Mladic, Bijeljina, June 1995. Then Banja Luka hotel

20 invoice, March 1996.

21 JUDGE KWON: Pausing there. Let's go to number 17. Is that

22 handwriting by General Mladic?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is.

24 JUDGE KWON: He wrote that for you?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, he did. I can confirm this.

1 He wrote it for me in June 1995 in Bijeljina.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. The dedication says, "For peace and friendship, I would like for

4 France to think of us the way we think of it." Then there's a signature

5 and then the 28th of June, 1995. Is that right? Okay. All right. I've

6 already gone through the rest.

7 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. If we go back to number 14. We have text

8 only in B/C/S, but you confirm this. You understand the Serbian language

9 or you can read this? What is this? If you could tell us what this is.

10 Number 14.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you have in mind the text by

12 General Mladic?

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. No, no, no. Number 14 is certificate on travel, Republika Srpska.

15 A. No. I do not speak or I don't understand the Cyrillic alphabet,

16 but I know what it is about. I know the dates and the circumstances of

17 the travel, especially with the passports and the number plates.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Eighteen and 19 we've dealt with already.

22 Twenty is Pristina, a hotel invoice too.

23 Then 21, text by Rector Papovic, who you refer to, 1998.

24 Twenty-two is letter of recommendation by [In English] His Grace

25 Luka, Bishop of Western Europe for a mission in Kosovo.

1 [Interpretation] Then 23, mission letter for Kosovo issued by

2 Patriarch Pavle in June 1998.

3 Then 24, [In English] Confirmation of presence in Kosovo issued by

4 the Pec police in August 1998.

5 [Interpretation] Twenty-five --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the witness should be indicating

7 yes or no to these.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's nodding his head. Yes, I mean,

9 we are saving time a bit.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Then tab 25, [In English] Letter of acknowledgement from

12 Patriarch Pavle on receipt of a text on Krajina; 26, letter from French

13 national TV channel antenna 2 on the release of French hostages; 27,

14 Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communications section for relations with

15 Interpol. [Interpretation] That is what we quoted from. That was not

16 challenged in any way.

17 Then 28 is a CD-ROM film, The Unit of El Mujahedin; and 29,

18 photographs of terrorists. That's all we have there?

19 JUDGE KWON: I don't understand what the CD-ROM is.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. You don't have to admit

21 that because we haven't shown it. So this was it.

22 JUDGE KWON: We don't have 29 either.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, you don't have it. You don't

24 have it. I don't have it either. I just have it on my list.

25 JUDGE KWON: I noticed --

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So now we've gone through all of

2 this, haven't we?

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice was on foot, yes.

4 MR. NICE: I was only on foot to say we don't have the CD-ROM

5 either and we know nothing about it, nor the following photographs either.

6 As to the first two tabs, of course they are only the cover sheets of the

7 documents concerned and that's all that's being admitted, as I understand

8 it.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes, yes.

10 Well, we'll admit these documents as -- what's the next number?

11 THE REGISTRAR: D270.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: D270. D270.

13 Well, that's your examination-in-chief, so we move now to the

14 cross-examination.

15 Madam Prosecutor.

16 MS. DEL PONTE: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Cross-examined by Ms. Del Ponte:

18 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Barriot, first of all you call Mr. Milosevic

19 "Mr. President." Can you tell me why, because you know he is no longer

20 president. He has not been a president for many years now.

21 A. Yes, this is a rule in France. You always call somebody

22 "President" when that somebody has been the president of a republic, out

23 of respect. It's just out of courtesy, French courtesy.

24 Q. What is your current job?

25 A. I'm presently a specialist doctor for hospitals and I do lecture

1 in several schools of medicine and in various ecoles speciales,

2 specialised schools, and I'm part of an expert group working on weapon

3 systems and terrorism.

4 Q. But you're also a doctor.

5 A. Yes. My initial speciality is anaesthetics and emergency care, so

6 I currently practice as an anaesthesiologist and also for primary care,

7 emergency care.

8 Q. Yesterday you spoke about the job that you had as the official

9 representative of the Serbian Republic of Krajina. You opened that office

10 in Paris, and you showed in the documents the decision by President Milan

11 Martic to this effect. What I'm interested in is the following: Why did

12 you want to open this office? Did you think of this yourself or was the

13 idea from somebody else?

14 A. It's a joint idea. It emerged at the same time. I made the

15 proposal and it was accepted by President Milan Martic and by his

16 advisors. So it can be said that this was a joint project which gradually

17 emerged. It didn't come about in June 1995, it took several months to

18 come about in 1994 and 1995.

19 Q. So through the links of personal friendships you had President

20 Martic, through discussions with him, that's how the idea came about?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And how long did it exist, this office?

23 A. It was officially inaugurated in June 1994 --

24 THE INTERPRETER: 1995, interpreter's correction.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- but it never closed. It's true

1 that as of August 1995, because Krajina had been invaded by the Croatian

2 forces, therefore it was not really possible any longer to maintain a

3 representation of the RSK as such, but I remained a representative of the

4 Krajina Serbs, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, in order to maintain the

5 representation and to keep looking after the RSK Serb refugees, especially

6 in Kosovo. When I met with Karadzic and Mladic, I represented the Krajina

7 Serbs.

8 Q. Did you have any trouble with the French government? If I

9 understood you properly yesterday, you said that this was the reason why

10 you gave up your military career in the French army.

11 A. Yes. I was punished by the minister of defence, Jean Chevenement,

12 at the time, and Mate Granic lodged a complaint, the Croatian foreign

13 affairs minister, so I was arrested for several days. I was criticised,

14 but it was because I did not comply with the duty of silence.

15 Q. That we've known since yesterday.

16 A. It's not because I failed to respect the army or because of any

17 non-compliance or for lies, it was only because I had told the truth, but

18 the truth should not have been told.

19 Q. You were in the former Yugoslavia as a doctor for the UNPROFOR.

20 That was your official position, and that lasted three months. That's

21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. But as to the other visits you paid, two-, three-week-long visits

24 every two or three months, that was on a private basis?

25 A. Yes. It was as a private individual. I was no longer within the

1 UNPROFOR. It was as a part of a humanitarian organisation, basically the

2 Krajina humanitarian organisation funded by Bucan and Teleobjectif founded

3 by Marica Mathei.

4 Q. So you were interested in the former Yugoslavia and facts relating

5 to it as early as in 1994?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Because before you were not interested?

8 A. No. The only experience I had in the Balkans before that was a

9 mission to Albania in 1991.

10 Q. In 1991. And who for?

11 A. I was in Tirana when there was some kind of an insurrection in

12 Tirana. So I had been dispatched to foreign embassies, and I was the only

13 Western doctor present then, and I looked after the Albanian insurgents

14 that had sought refuge in various foreign embassies. There were many

15 thousands of them. I looked after them for several weeks, and I took some

16 of them, several back to France. Several thousands of them were welcomed

17 back in France.

18 Q. It can be said that as to the facts mentioned in the indictment

19 against Milosevic regarding Croatia for the periods of 1991, 1992, you

20 were not on the ground.

21 A. I've just made a mistake regarding the date of my mission to

22 Albania.

23 Q. Yes. We do have the relevant documents we were provided with.

24 A. Yes. That was in 1990, July.

25 Q. Right. July 1990.

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. I can see that. So '80, '82 you were in Paris, '90 you were in

3 Albania and you were in Iraq in '91.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In other words, you were not present at the time of the Croatian

6 indictment against Milosevic. You were not in Croatia.

7 A. No, I wasn't.

8 Q. Just for my own sake and for the Judges' sake, can you tell me

9 this: We heard Ms. Eve Crepin, but I saw in the Belgrade press from th