1 Tuesday, 7 December 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may be seated.

7 Mr. Milosevic, you are to proceed, and the Chamber would like you

8 to proceed as expeditiously as possible.

9 WITNESS: SLAVENKO TERZIC [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Terzic, may we continue working and try and

13 be as effective as possible. And I'm going to remind you of several

14 portions from your report. And yesterday Mr. Kwon insisted upon seeing

15 from the archives and sources of the Holy Synod, which was dealt with, or

16 some of the examples. We can't go through the entire document and all the

17 archive material, it's very extensive.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I would like to draw your

19 attention, Mr. Kwon, to page 62 of the English text of the expert report,

20 paragraph 1 on page 62. We have a quote from a portion that is contained

21 in tab 32 of our documents, and it is from the Holy Synod of the -- Holy

22 Synod Assembly of the Serbian church, about a systematic genocide and so

23 on and the exodus from 1947 and 1996, and it is contained in the book

24 about Kosovo, and the text in the English translation says the following:

25 An appeal is being quoted on Good Friday, the 16th of April, 1982, which

1 was signed by 21 Serbian priests and monks. They addressed an appeal to

2 the authorities --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the LiveNote has stopped. We

4 have to await some technical help.

5 Mr. Milosevic, the LiveNote stopped when you were referring to

6 Judge Kwon's interest in page 62 of the English text.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon was interested in knowing

8 about parts of the text which referred to the Holy Archbishop Synod and

9 Synod Assembly, and I'm just going to take a few examples because it's

10 very extensive material. And as I was saying, on page 62 it says that on

11 Good Friday, the 16th of April, 1982, 21 Serbian priests and monks

12 addressed an appeal to the authorities, and the appeal states, and then

13 they go on to quote. And I'm going to read out that quotation for all of

14 you here present from the English translation of it. "[In English] It may

15 be said without exaggeration that systematic genocide is gradually being

16 perpetrated against the Serbian people in Kosovo! Because, if this were

17 not the case, what do the theses about an 'ethnically clean Kosovo' mean

18 which, regardless of everything, is being implemented without

19 interruption? Or what do the words, often repeated in villages and

20 hamlets, monasteries and churches and even in towns mean: 'What are you

21 waiting for? Move away, this is ours!'"

22 [Interpretation] And otherwise we have a footnote here, 180, which

23 indicates the source, contained in tab 32 of the exhibits, and we also

24 have something from the book dealt with by Atanasije Jevtic, The Suffering

25 of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, 1941 to 1990, on page 63. I am just

1 mentioning the ones that Mr. Terzic failed to mention yesterday. So Monk

2 Atanasije Jevtic, The Suffering of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. And

3 in the penultimate paragraph on page 63 it says the following: "The

4 destruction of Serbian churches during World War II continued after the

5 war. [In English] In March 1952, for example, the Serbian church in the

6 village of Duganjevo near Urosevac was destroyed, but the most drastic

7 case was the dynamiting and blowing up of the Serbian memorial church in

8 Djakovica on the major Serbian holiday, St. Sava's Day, in 1949. Various

9 Albanian facilities were erected on the foundations of Serbian churches

10 and cultural monuments if they were not completely destroyed."

11 [Interpretation] And then mention is made of the examples where

12 this occurred. And after that, on page 64, we have a report Bishop Pavle,

13 Patriarch Pavle in fact now but he was the Bishop Pavle in those days, of

14 the Raska-Prizren eparchy, and it's dated the 11th of May, 1962, and it

15 says the following. And it is in the middle of the paragraph, the first

16 third, for example, and his report is quoted: "[In English] The moving

17 away of Serbs, both settlers and the indigenous inhabitants from all areas

18 of the eparchy has continued this year as well, at an even more intense

19 pace."

20 [Interpretation] When he says the eparchy, the areas of the

21 eparchy, it means his eparchy where he was the bishop, and this implies at

22 all intents and purposes the entire region of Kosovo and Metohija.

23 And then there are a series of examples given later on. For

24 example, it says what in the -- in recent years has been done, after June

25 1999, in fact, and that is on page 65. And at the end of the --

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the question? It is not you

2 who are giving evidence. Try to put your -- put it into question.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. The question has to do with the series of exhibits, and I

5 formulated my question yesterday, in fact. It's a very short one, and it

6 was this, addressed to Mr. Terzic, of course: What do church sources

7 testify to in view of the fact that you yourself worked a great deal with

8 the sources found in the archives of the Holy Synod? So what do these

9 church sources testify to?

10 A. They are completely original and authentic and are the best

11 evidence of circumstances in Kosovo and Metohija. It was only the church

12 from one day to the next, from one month to the next, from one year to the

13 next that monitored the situation in Kosovo and informed the Holy Synod of

14 the Serbian Orthodox church thereof. Therefore we can say today that as

15 opposed to the state organs and the organs of power and authority and the

16 security organs, the most complete archives about those tragic events are

17 to be found in the archives of the Serbian Orthodox church.

18 And I myself in Exhibit 26, tab 26 and tab 32, the book by

19 Atanasije Jevtic and The Legacy of Kosovo, I have attached only part of

20 those archives. But if I may, Mr. President, I'd like to indicate two

21 points. The first is the letter, the appeal by 21 Serbian priests. We

22 have attached it in full in the English language so that the Trial Chamber

23 and the Prosecution does have that letter and appeal in its entirety.

24 Q. You mean the one I quoted from?

25 A. Yes, that's right, the one you quoted from. But I'd like to

1 assist the Trial Chamber and Mr. Nice himself by pointing out the fact

2 that many things that were raised -- many issued raised yesterday,

3 translations of certain portions of documents in the English language were

4 solved by the fact that they are contained in my expert report, in fact.

5 Let me just quote an example. The letter by Major John Henniker

6 is found on page 15 of my report, the English version, of course, page 15,

7 after note 61. And then the Neubacher letter about the crimes in Kosovo

8 is to be found on page 50, note 149. Next we have the Von

9 Ribbentrop-Count Ciano conversation about the Great Albanian state in the

10 Balkans will be found on page 39 and 40, and that the letter by Bedri

11 Pejani to Hitler will be found on page 53, and so on and so forth. So a

12 considerable part of the documents that I mentioned yesterday - not at all

13 of them, of course - are to be found in my expert report. And today I'm

14 going to indicate certain portions or, rather, where they are to be found

15 in my report.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I hope you heard what the witness

17 just said. I think he's trying to say you should be making more use than

18 you have of his report. Conduct your examination-in-chief on the basis of

19 his report. Let us proceed.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is what I am doing, conducting

21 my examination-in-chief on the basis of his report.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said referred to Mr. Nice's

23 intervention who said that he cannot go through all that bulk of material.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Very well. Now, Mr. Terzic, on page 1 of your report, you insist

1 upon the fact that the question of Kosovo and Metohija cannot separate --

2 be separated from the fate of the Yugoslav state as a whole and broader

3 circumstances prevailing in Europe. We have here in our exhibits under

4 tab 49, for example, a review of the Serbian Albanian relations dating

5 from 1945 to 1982, with all the documentation.

6 Tell me, please, what were the events that marked a turning point

7 in the history of the Yugoslav state during that period? But very

8 briefly, in the shortest terms, please.

9 A. Well, that is a vast topic. We could talk about it for three

10 days. But let me tell you this very briefly: The decisive event was the

11 normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union, for example, in 1955 and

12 1956. After the normalisation of relations with the USSR and the cease of

13 a foreign threat on Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led by

14 Tito, started along the road of National Communism and the decisive years,

15 which meant the start of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, was the

16 year 1962 and 1963. In 1964, at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party

17 of Yugoslavia, Tito himself for the first time came out and declared

18 himself as a Croat. Otherwise, before that, he's always declared himself

19 as being a Yugoslav, which meant that the notion of Yugoslavhood was no

20 longer the party ideology, and we can say that from the beginning of the

21 1960s -- of the 20th century, that is to say, we see the unleashing of a

22 process of political, economic, cultural disintegration of the Yugoslav

23 area and a preparation for confederalism. In the political sense, the

24 year 1966 was a turning point and the settling of accounts with the

25 security services was the turning point which meant --

1 Q. May I interrupt you at that point. Yes, you've said it was a

2 turning point, and we have here in tab 27 --

3 A. May I just quote one document from tab 49?

4 Q. Yes, go ahead.

5 A. This illustrates the mood that prevailed. It is in Serbian so I'd

6 like to place it on the overhead projector.

7 This document, as a whole, is a very good illustration of the

8 political condition prevailing in Yugoslavia in the 1960s which meant the

9 start of Yugoslavia's disintegration. And we're talking about a

10 discussion that took place in Switzerland, in Lucerne, in actual fact, in

11 1971, about the conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia. And one of the

12 organisers of this debate was the Croatian Review. The topic was Croatian

13 Freedom Days. One of the participation -- participants in that discussion

14 from Yugoslavia, for security reasons is just said to be an associate from

15 the homeland, described the events after 1966 in this way, and this is

16 what he said: "In the struggle against Rankovic --" and Rankovic was the

17 vice-president of Yugoslavia who was replaced in 1966 at the so-called

18 Brioni plenary session, and it says: "In the struggle against Rankovic,

19 we had an active triangle; Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Skopje." And he added,

20 and I quote: "The Croatian communists in the meantime received an

21 offensive ally in the form of the Albanians from Kosovo who were calling

22 for their republic and in future perhaps annexation to the mother country.

23 However, the Albanian state in itself is weak while it's ally, The

24 People's Republic of China, has not so far shown that it is prone to the

25 Croatian communists and the Croatian people in general." End of

1 quotation.

2 So that briefly is the political picture of Yugoslavia at the end

3 of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.

4 Q. I mentioned at tab 27, the exhibit there, there's several

5 documents, it's a set of documents relating to the 4th plenary session,

6 the replacement of Rankovic, the settling of accounts with the security

7 services, a report by the provincial government of the Executive Council

8 on reorganisation for state security in Kosovo and Metohija, November

9 1966, that is, an assessment of the provincial committee for Kosovo and

10 Metohija about the security services, notes about a meeting held in

11 Pristina, and all that you have taken from these archives of Serbia. That

12 was your source.

13 So were those the basic documents and basic exhibits bearing out

14 what you just said a moment ago?

15 A. Well, the substance of the matter is in the following: At the

16 so-called 4th Brioni plenum of the Central Committee of the League of

17 Communists of Yugoslavia, which was held on the 1st of July, 1966 on

18 Brioni island, which is where Tito had his residence - this was when

19 Rankovic was replaced - soon after that we saw the arrival of a radical

20 reorganisation in the state security services of Yugoslavia. The

21 consequences of that were to all intents and purposes the legalisation of

22 the Greater Albanian political concept in Yugoslavia, and a campaign was

23 launched for the investigation of so-called major deformations in the

24 state security service in Kosovo and Metohija. Deviations in that

25 service. Of course, this is a vast material but I'd like to draw from

1 that material several points.

2 First of all, Rankovic -- among Rankovic's crimes were the Prizren

3 processes. That was ascribed to Rankovic as a crime. It was -- it dealt

4 with Albanian leaders as an attempt to compromise the political cadres of

5 the Albanian nationality, because as you know at the Prizren process and

6 trial, the leadership, Albanian leadership from Pristina was found to have

7 secret connections with the clandestine Albanian organisation working for

8 Albanian intelligence.

9 Number two was the amassing of weapons; and number 3, the third

10 point was that cases were quoted of individual instances where people of

11 the Albanian nationality were harassed. So the provincial committee for

12 Kosovo, that is to say the Executive Council of Kosovo, set up working

13 groups which assessed and reviewed all these events and drew their own

14 conclusions. The conclusion was that the Prizren trial was, in fact, in

15 their opinion, a construed political process, construed by the

16 intelligence services.

17 Q. Yes. Let's slow -- slow this process down. You said yesterday

18 that there was a process of disarmament and you gave us some figures and a

19 document indicating these figures, the number of weapons used to arm an

20 entire division. Now, what about those weapons? Was that construed as

21 well?

22 A. No, of course not. I'm talking about an entire political

23 manipulation, an attempt that was made to disarm that illegal

24 organisation, to make it impotent, and to show it as being an alleged

25 settling of accounts with the Albanian minority. We have a lot of

1 documents to bear that out. I can't use them because of the shortness of

2 time, but if you will allow me to do so, I would like to say that the

3 assessment made by the commission of the Executive Council, the

4 deformations found and distortions in the security services, there are

5 some mitigating circumstances that we'll find, and that is Exhibit 27C,

6 for example.

7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask that the speakers

8 slow down. Thank you.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're being asked to slow down. That's the

10 first thing.

11 The second thing is I do not appreciate the way this is being

12 conducted as a kind of history lesson, a dialogue between the accused and

13 yourself.

14 I am interested in this: You say that the disintegration of

15 Yugoslavia started in 1960s when Tito declared that he was a Croatian. So

16 that are you then saying that the correct historical analysis was that

17 what happened in the 1990s with the break-up of Yugoslavia, the six

18 republics becoming independent states, was the culmination of a process

19 that started in the 1960s.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is precisely what I wanted

21 to say.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that the -- is that the popular notion of --

23 the popular reading of the history? Is there another reading that the

24 break-up started after Tito's death, the disintegration really started

25 after Tito's death?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know about concepts of that kind,

2 but I think that all objective archival research will show, and of course

3 I don't have time to go into all this. I'm speaking fast because you keep

4 hurrying me up, but I could of course set this out in detail.

5 In 1962 and 1963 meant a conflict between two key individuals

6 after Tito; Kardelj, a Slovene, and Rankovic who was a Serb. Now, in that

7 conflict, in that clash, Tito sided with Kardelj, and in 1964 we had a

8 Congress at which Tito declared himself as a Croat. In 1966 we had the

9 settling of accounts with Rankovic and the security service. The security

10 and intelligence service was the sole centralised service that existed,

11 that was the integrative force of that Yugoslav state. After 1966, we saw

12 the speedy disintegration of the country. In 1967 we had the first

13 amendments, in 1968 the second amendments, in 1968 the first large

14 uprising of the Albanian minority in Pristina. In 1972 the second

15 Albanian uprising in Pristina. In 1972 we saw the conclusion of the cycle

16 of amendments to the Yugoslav constitution. And in fact the 1974 Yugoslav

17 constitution laid down the confederal set-up of the country. And there's

18 a paradox there, Mr. President: The economic exchange and trade between

19 the Yugoslav republics was lower than it was between the countries of the

20 European Union at that time. So this was a principle which my colleague

21 called the principle of ethnic and national parochialism. That means to

22 say the republics became completely closed off, as did the provinces.

23 Instead of a programme for a political, economic and cultural integration

24 on the territory of Yugoslavia, what we saw was something quite different,

25 different processes which ultimately led to the tragic disintegration of

1 Yugoslavia in the 1990s. That is my concept and it can be borne out by

2 thousands and thousands of documents, and indeed that is the concept and

3 stand of my international colleagues that delve in research of this kind.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Now, let us go back to your expert report. On pages 87, 89 of the

8 Serbian version, you point out to the fact that as a result of this

9 radical change at the top of the Yugoslav state in 1966, many of those who

10 worked in Kosovo and Metohija against the Yugoslav state came to be

11 rehabilitated.

12 A. Yes. And I mentioned that in part during my reply to

13 Mr. Robinson. A larger legal organisation was uncovered, also during the

14 process of gathering illegal arms. After Rankovic was replaced and the

15 state security service fell apart, all of those who participated in

16 separatist and illegal organisations were rehabilitated.

17 There is a fact here that especially for you lawyers may seem like

18 a paradox. So the Brioni plenum was held on the 1st of July, 1966. 13

19 days after that, a meeting was held of the provincial committee of the

20 League of Communists of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, attended by

21 several leaders from Belgrade. They discussed what ought to be done in

22 order to reorganise the state security service, and then they made the

23 following conclusion, which you can see under tab 27D.

24 This is an unprecedented historical event. I will quote the last

25 sentence from the minutes of this meeting held on the 13th of July, 1966:

1 "The Prizren case to be taken out of archives and burnt." I repeat, "The

2 Prizren case to be taken out of archives and burnt."

3 Let me show you this on the ELMO.

4 Q. That's right. This is the sentence underlined in red: "The

5 Prizren case to be taken out of archives and burnt."

6 A. Everybody keeps rushing me so I apologise to the interpreters for

7 being so fast. So this case is of great value to the lawyers to show them

8 how the documents from a criminal trial are being treated. And this is

9 something that I and my future colleagues will be researching, this

10 sentence and this attitude that the Prizren case to be taken out of

11 archives and burnt. Why did they want to do that? They wanted to do that

12 in order to destroy evidence.

13 Q. All right, Mr. Terzic. In tab 29, we have something that I

14 wouldn't like to spend much time on, but let us say that this document

15 reflects the attitude of foreign diplomats in Belgrade in 1966 who

16 themselves saw just how important these events were. Is it clear based on

17 what you wrote?

18 A. The so-called Brioni plenary session was publicised in our media

19 and also in foreign media. There were many diplomats accredited in

20 Belgrade who commented upon this event. Let me just give you several

21 comments.

22 Italian Ambassador Roberto Ducci -- I'm now quoting from the

23 archives of Serbia, the documents from the archives of Serbia. So Italian

24 Ambassador Roberto Ducci believed this to be a struggle for prestige and

25 power among those who considered -- who were considered Tito's successors.

1 French diplomat -- a French diplomat including the secretary of

2 the commercial section, assistant to the military attache and so on,

3 considered the following --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, what are you reading from now? Is

5 that -- what document are you reading from?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tab 29.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 29. Yes, this is the document

8 under tab 29 that I've mentioned.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you could just try to deal

10 briefly. This is history. We just want an outline of the major

11 historical events so that the case is set in a context. That's the

12 importance of this evidence. You don't need to delve into too much

13 detail.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us continue.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I don't think there is any need to go into specific details of

17 this phenomenon. It is quite clear.

18 A. Let me just add two sentences. Tab 29. French diplomats, I

19 mentioned three of them, believed that the material from the 4th plenary

20 session which was published was intended to deceive the public and point

21 it into the wrong direction, especially since this plenary liquidated

22 Aleksandar Rankovic on a national basis. Kardelj managed to have Bosniaks

23 side with him, Chief of the General Staff, and Rankovic and Stefanovic

24 were deemed to be the people who ought to be politically disqualified.

25 And then another prognosis which is incredible says the following:

1 "Slovenia so far existed within SFRY as a federal state," which means that

2 it was in 1966, "and now it is about to leave this state. It will remain

3 within the SFRY but on the confederal basis."

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

5 MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated] ... identify the sort of

6 difficulties we're in. The witness made his own decision, overruling the

7 defendant's question to refer to an exhibit. He says that it's material

8 from the 4th plenary, and one can see to some degree that in the title,

9 but we know nothing more about this document, and we're moving at such

10 speed. Is it a minute? Is it contemporaneous note? I have no idea.

11 At the end of this exercise, I'm going to invite the Chamber to

12 say we should go through these tabs one by one, not on the basis that they

13 should be admitted but on the basis that they should not be admitted

14 because the quantity of material produced - and I've been trying to get an

15 estimate - the quantity of material produced once in English would

16 probably take a lawyer in the Prosecution's office a full month at least

17 to process for the purposes of closing submissions. Because either the

18 material has got to be looked at and dealt with properly or not at all.

19 And presumably that expenditure of resource is going to be matched by

20 somewhere in the Chambers. And we really have got, in our respectful

21 submission, to apply some restriction to the amount of material that's

22 coming in in this way.

23 I simply -- coming back to the original point, I understand from

24 the witness that this is material relating to the session. That's now all

25 I know about it.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you were to cross-examine to that effect and

2 we don't have the documentation to support it, the effect of that

3 cross-examination would be to reduce the value of the evidence. But we

4 will, Mr. Nice, at the end of this exercise, be looking at the whole

5 question of admissibility.

6 MR. NICE: Because I can't cross-examine because it's not in

7 English. That's my problem.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, exercise some discipline and

9 control. You already have a lot of evidence on the history, and the

10 purpose of this is really to set the case in a context, and we really

11 ought to be moving much quicker and coming to an end of the

12 examination-in-chief.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do my best, Mr. Robinson, to

14 use the time in the most efficient manner.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. This document under tab 29 is an official document of the state

17 security service pertaining to the reactions of foreign diplomats as was

18 monitored by the service at the time and reported by it. Therefore, it

19 has its probative value, because at the time it was produced by a

20 competent organ concerning the issues that had to do with the positions of

21 the foreign diplomats with respect to the events taking place on the

22 Yugoslav political scene at the time.

23 Mr. Terzic, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox church sent a

24 letter to President Josip Broz Tito, expressing their concern with the

25 extent of violence against the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija,

1 churches, monasteries, and the terror that was being carried out against

2 them.

3 In a document under tab 33, we can see the letters sent by the

4 Holly Synod to the president of Yugoslavia dated the 23rd of May, 1969,

5 describing all of these events that have to do with the persecution and

6 the terror and so on. I think we have this document in English as well,

7 because it is entitled Kosovo Past and Present, Review of International

8 Affairs, Belgrade, 1989. Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's right. And we're not dealing with the events which

10 took place long time ago. No, these were fairly recent events which had

11 repercussions on the events in the '90s. So this is not a very distant

12 historical context, no. These are the events that had the decisive

13 influence on the events of 1990s.

14 In accordance with the 1974 constitution, the --

15 Q. Please let us not deal with constitutional issues. We have others

16 who will deal with those issues. We now have to focus on the address of

17 the Holy Synod, this letter which exists in English. So this is a letter

18 where the Holy Synod expresses its great concern -- or, rather, let me ask

19 you: What is this letter about?

20 A. Let me tell you. We are dealing with a completely abnormal

21 situation here in which Serbia was neither a republic nor a province and

22 the provinces were in fact republics in a province, and this led to a

23 number of problems. And this was pointed out by Dobrica Cosic and Jovan

24 Marjanovic. From one year to the next we had reactions of Serbian church,

25 Serbian intellectuals, local public, international public concerning

1 everything taking place in Kosovo and Metohija.

2 Your Honours, if you wish to have an objective assessment of the

3 events in 1990s, you have to be aware of the roots of the issue, and I

4 will tell you something about the roots. This letter of the Holy Synod

5 sent to Tito in 1969 --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... I was saying

7 it's not your role to lecture the Trial Chamber, Mr. Terzic. We would get

8 a long much -- much more speedily if you just answered the questions.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. My question was what does the Holy Synod point out to?

11 A. Very briefly. So this letter of the Holy Synod to Josip Broz Tito

12 points out to the fact that the life and property were jeopardised, that

13 violence was being committed by members of Albanian minority in Kosovo,

14 numerous examples cited, examples of destruction of property, monastery,

15 forests, destruction of tombstones, other property, and so on. And they

16 are calling upon Josip Broz Tito to give protection to the people and

17 property, as the president of Yugoslavia.

18 Q. All right. You mentioned disorder back in 1981 and the riots

19 which erupted there, following which many leaders within Yugoslav

20 political leadership gave a proper assessment of the events. Under tab 37

21 we have assessments given by the top political figures: Stane Dolanc, one

22 of the closest associates of Tito; Lazar Kolisevski, who was a Macedonian,

23 member of the Presidency of the SFRY. And we also have assessments of the

24 leaders from Serbia concerning these events in 1981.

25 Tell us, what were their assessments of the leading political

1 figures of Yugoslavia at the time? We can see that these are people of

2 different ethnic background. These are leading political figures in

3 Yugoslavia. What did they have to say about these events?

4 A. After the Albanian uprising in 1968 which had been prepared by an

5 existing illegal organisation that was very well spread out, there was a

6 mass uprising in 1981 which shocked both Yugoslav and international

7 public.

8 Now, under tab 37 we see a document where we see words of Stane

9 Dolanc, a Slovene, member of the Central Committee of the League of

10 Communists of Yugoslavia as well as Lazar Kolisevski, a Macedonian and

11 member of the Presidency.

12 Stane Dolanc said on the 6th of April 1981 at a press conference,

13 the following: "Behind this there are the most reactionary forces of the

14 world, both fascist and dogmatic which are united in this case." Then he

15 goes on to say that, "We will normalise the situation in Kosovo through

16 political means, but should it be necessary, we will not refrain to use

17 other measures as we have not refrained to use them in the past." This is

18 page 279, document under tab 37.

19 Lazar Kolisevski is even more clear. He says that it is obvious

20 that Albanian irredentists had a clear goal to annex Kosovo to Albania.

21 This is the essence of what they stated.

22 Q. All right. Kolisevski, immediately after Tito's death, was the

23 president of the Presidency of the SFRY?

24 A. Yes, he was from Macedonia.

25 Q. Yes. And it was Macedonia's turn to nominate the president.

1 All right. I would like you to say a few words about a document

2 under tab 38, which is also in English. The source for this document is

3 the document entitled Events in the Socialist Autonomous Province of

4 Kosovo, the Causes and Consequences of Irredentist and

5 Counter-revolutionary Subversion. This is the Review of International

6 Affairs, page 33.

7 We can see the statements given by top Albanian leaders at the

8 time; Fadil Hoxha, Ramiz Bula, Xhavid Nimani, and so on, who spoke about

9 the nature of this unrest in Kosovo.

10 A. Yes, certainly. The unrests in Kosovo were not caused by economic

11 reasons, as is frequently stated. And I'm going to prove this by the

12 following: If you analyse the economic situation in Kosovo, you have to

13 bear in mind that in 1912, Kosovo was the least developed province in the

14 entire South-east Europe. After 1945, thanks to the investments made by

15 Yugoslavia and especially Serbia, Kosovo was on the fast development

16 track, and it had -- it had gone through a radical change of the social

17 and economic structure. A large number of industrial plants was opened;

18 chemical, energetic, textile, leather industry plants, and so on. I'm not

19 going to go into details, but let me just say the following: Mining,

20 metal, industrial plant Trepca at the time had 27.000 workers.

21 Let me just tell you about what happened in the field of

22 education.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you. I think we've had enough on

24 that.

25 Mr. Milosevic, move on to another question.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Your Honour --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Terzic, you must follow what the Chamber

3 says. I ruled that we have had enough on that particular aspect of the

4 evidence, and the accused should move on to another --

5 MR. NICE: I'm sure Your Honours can probably see, but sometimes I

6 think your vision is obscured. The witness is actually reading prepared

7 texts, and every time he interrupts the ruling of the Court and says he

8 has something else to say, he's actually got prepared text in front of

9 him. It's neither the report nor any documents that have been served on

10 us.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if that is so, that is very

12 improper.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. Excuse me, Your

14 Honour. Mr. President, may I say something? May I be allowed to say

15 something?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you read from a text, you must let us know

17 because the general rule is that the evidence must be given unaided. And

18 that will affect the assessment of the evidence by the Chamber.

19 What are you reading from now?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can leave all these papers with

21 you. I can leave all this. I can leave it right now.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not the point.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Put them all down on the -- the

24 point I spoke about is contained in my report, page 56. It is note --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic is to refer to page 56 of the

1 report. That's the proper procedure. And you're not to read from texts

2 which are prepared without the Trial Chamber knowing.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't think it is

4 proper and in order for Mr. Nice to object in that way. I will be happy

5 to tell you where these things that I'm talking about are found in my

6 report and in the notes. This time it is on page 56 and the notes are

7 166, 167.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's quite in order for Mr. Nice to make an

9 objection of that kind because it's in keeping with the Rules of Evidence

10 followed in this Tribunal.

11 Move on to another point.

12 And you are not to read from texts unless we know what the text

13 is.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I informed the Trial Chamber

15 yesterday that I have notes which I prepared during my stay in The Hague,

16 while I've been here. But if you should so require, I am well prepared

17 to --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you're going to read from notes that you have

19 made, then you must let us know.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not reading from a prepared

21 text. I have an aide-memoire with figures, the figures that I'm quoting

22 and using. Now, if the Trial Chamber considers it improper, then I need

23 not refer to those notes.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Very well, Mr. Terzic. Not to waste any more time, tell me this,

1 please, and my question was as follows: It had to do with a position

2 taken by the leading personages of Albanian nationality. I mentioned

3 Fadil Hoxha, Ramiz Abdulji, Ali Shukrija, Xhavid Nimani - and this is to

4 be found in tab 38 - and their assessments are identical with the

5 assessments and evaluations made with the Yugoslav leadership and the

6 Serbian leadership. Is that without contest? Is that true?

7 A. Yes, and document 38 bears that out and document 38 exists in

8 English.

9 Q. Thank you. Yes, I did draw the Court's attention to the fact that

10 the document exists in English. It was published in an international

11 review, Review of International Affairs, published in 1981, and we're

12 dealing about the times we're discussing.

13 JUDGE KWON: By whom? By whom was it published, Mr. Terzic?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was published by the Institute

15 for International Economic and Political Relations which publish this

16 Review.

17 JUDGE KWON: In Serbia?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Serbia, in Belgrade, yes.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. But it was a Yugoslav journal, was it not?

21 A. Yes, it was the Yugoslav Review with headquarters in Belgrade.

22 Q. Just as the seat of the government and all governing organs in

23 Yugoslavia; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, could you just say in a few words, tell us about the

1 political concept of an ethnically pure Kosovo which -- which there was

2 the violent position of non-Albanian peoples, like Turks, Romanies, et

3 cetera, Albanisation of the non-Albanian peoples. And I would like to

4 draw your attention to tab 40 with an interview of Kadri Raufi, who was a

5 Turk. He was a politician in Kosovo, and the interview was published on

6 the 16th of March, 1984.

7 Can you tell us something about the forcible Albanisation of

8 non-Albanian people such as Turks and Romanies? And this man who was a

9 Turk by ethnicity talked about that.

10 A. Kadri Raufi was a Turk. He was a member of the provincial

11 committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo. At a meeting of the

12 provincial committee held in 1971 - and I have attached an exhibit to that

13 effect here - Kadri Raufi indicated the following: He said that just as

14 pressure was being brought to bear against the Serbs and Montenegrins,

15 although they're both Serbs but they were divided into Serbs and

16 Montenegrins at the time, that there was even greater pressure being

17 brought to bear against the Turks. And Kadri Raufi said, "I do not

18 recognise the 1971 population census because the number of Turks was

19 reduced by 53 per cent." And he goes on to say that during the population

20 census, pressure was exerted on the Turks to declare themselves as

21 Albanians. A similar pressure was exerted on the Romany and the Goranis

22 or, rather, Serbs of the Muslim faith living in Gora, the Goranis. So the

23 problem of the denationalisation of the Turks was a key problem

24 highlighted by Kadri Raufi.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Terzic. You also point to the special

1 responsibility of the political elite of the Albanian minority in the

2 escalation of this Greater Albanian chauvinism and ethnic cleansing of

3 Serbs.

4 Tell me just briefly, please: What does the memorandum of the

5 forum contain, the forum of Albanian intellectuals of Kosovo published in

6 1995?

7 A. I spoke about that yesterday. I brought it up several times, in

8 fact.

9 Q. Yes. You said it was linked with the platform for the -- of the

10 Albanian Academy of Science in Tirana.

11 A. Yes, but the memorandum was compiled in 1995, and the platform in

12 1998. The memorandum of the forum of Albanian intellectuals is a

13 completely construed document, and we can say that there is not a single

14 word of historical truth within it. It's completely fabricated. And I

15 could prove that if I went into an analysis.

16 The absurdity of it, an example of the absurdity is borne out by a

17 sentence from the memorandum on page 11 of the Serbian text, and I'm going

18 to quote just that one portion, one sentence, where it says the following:

19 The Albanians from -- Albanians from the ethnically occupied territories,

20 and there they mean Kosovo and Metohija, never enjoyed basic human and

21 national rights. The situation -- that situation prevails today, whereas

22 we saw that they had their own Academy of Arts and Sciences, their own

23 university, they had 40.000 students enrolled at them. They had 60.000

24 journals, periodicals, et cetera; they had their own radio and television.

25 So to say this, given all those facts, is the complete lack of

1 objectivity. Now, the texts referring to the Albanian Academy of Science,

2 Tirana 1998, I use in my report page 46, note 129, in English. And the

3 policy of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and Metohija but Serbian ethnic

4 cleansing of Kosovo and Metohija is referred to. And finally we come to

5 another absurd sentence.

6 Q. Mr. Terzic, I have to interrupt you there. "Ethnic cleansing of

7 Serbs," what do you mean by that?

8 A. I'm talking -- no, they say the Serbs are ethnically cleansing

9 Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija have been doing so after World War II.

10 Q. Yes, but that is contained in the memorandum of the Albanian

11 Academy of Science, right?

12 A. Yes, right, and I quote this in my own report on page 46, note

13 128. And just one sentence, if I may. An absurd sentence. This is what

14 it says: "In addition to the mass exodus under the pressure exerted from

15 Belgrade, their numbers continued to grow," and then they say 90 per cent.

16 So what kind of cleansing can there be if their numbers have increased by

17 90 per cent?

18 Q. Well, those are all notoriously well known facts. Let's move on

19 now.

20 In your report on pages 103 and 104, you illustrate and speak

21 about the situation in Kosovo, the drastic events that came to pass there,

22 the killing of Danilo Milincic in 1982 at the threshold of his house by an

23 emigre from Albania, the attack on a man called Martinovic in 1985. So

24 why are these cases characteristic? You mention them in your report. Why

25 are they so characteristic and pertinent?

1 A. Let me caution the Trial Chamber and Mr. Nice again. I do speak

2 about that in the English language, in the English version of my text, on

3 page 65. Note 188. So it is page 65 of my report, note 188.

4 Now, in a series of killings and violence, these cases were

5 drastic. Let's take the case of the Milincic family. In 1941 they were

6 immigrants from Albania. They arrived in 1941 or, rather, immigrants

7 arrived from Albania in 1941 and forced the Milincic family out of

8 Samodreza where there is a famous Serbian Orthodox church. This was in

9 1941. In 1960, father of Danilo Milincic was killed on his own property

10 in Samodreza. He was killed by a pistol and the perpetrator never

11 uncovered.

12 In 1982, his -- the son of Slavoljub was killed, Danilo Milincic

13 was violently killed by an immigrant from Albania by the name of Ferat

14 Mujo at the threshold of his house. So in the drama of my -- one family,

15 the Milincic family, you see the entire drama of a nation played out in

16 Kosovo and Metohija.

17 Now, the case of Djordje Martinovic is a morbid case. It's

18 terrible case and I don't wish to refer to it here and now.

19 Q. Very well. We have to hurry along. In tab 44 we have an article

20 by Milovan Djilas, and it was published in the Wall Street Journal in 1985

21 about the events in Kosovo and Metohija. Now, what was Djilas writing

22 about there?

23 A. I looked -- tried to find this on the Internet, the original text

24 by -- written by Wasa Turner [phoen], but I didn't succeed so I'm using

25 the Serbian version of the text, which was published by Dobrica Cosic in

1 his book called Kosovo. But Djilas is indicating a major problem of

2 exodus, of people leaving the area. And I'd like to quote one sentence

3 from the Wall Street Journal. Let me just find it, please. That will

4 take me a moment.

5 It is page 52. Page 52 of that text.

6 Q. [No interpretation]

7 A. [No interpretation] I've found it. It is page 44 or -- rather,

8 tab 44, page 52. Tab 44, page 52.

9 In the Wall Street Journal of 1985, Djilas says, among others -

10 and Milovan Djilas was a leading Yugoslav dissident, very popular in the

11 West, and he says among other things the following: "In recent times the

12 Albanians are buying up Serb land, paying enormously high prices. The

13 authorities do not know or are pretending not to know where the money's

14 coming from for all this. Very often it is paid in foreign currency. So

15 it is not being clandestinely brought in from Albania alone but from the

16 countries of fundamental Islam, because the Muslims in Yugoslavia, which

17 includes 1.700.000 Bosnians and most of the Kosovo Albanians, are to serve

18 as a fulcrum, as a point of support for Islam in Europe."

19 Of course Djilas's assessments are borne out by David Binder in

20 his text that appeared in The New York Times in 1982 and 1987, and I have

21 attached excerpts from a book with David Binder's quotations, but I do

22 believe that we have these excerpts in English, that the passages are in

23 English.

24 Q. Very well, Mr. Terzic. Now, tell me something about this: In tab

25 45, we have a petition signed by 5.016 inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija,

1 sent to the highest authorities in Yugoslavia and Serbia in December 1985.

2 It was later signed by over 80.000 Serbs. According to these facts and

3 figures, I can see that this was published, Kosovo Past and Present, in

4 the Review of International Affairs, published in Belgrade, and that it

5 too exists in English.

6 So what were the problems that were highlighted here? The

7 signatures of the petition, what do they refer to?

8 A. Mr. President, it was the petition that you mentioned at the

9 beginning of today's working day, and I don't want to dwell on it but it

10 was a petition signed by 5.000 or-odd citizens, 2.016, later signed again

11 by 80.000 inhabitants. It was sent out in 1985 with demands by citizens

12 set out in 15 points. I'm not going to go into all these 15 points, but

13 point 2, the second requirement is that they want Serbia to be a normal

14 state like all the other republics; point 5, that all emigres from Albania

15 should be sent home, and they came in on the 6th of April, 1941, that they

16 should be sent back. They consider that there were 260.000 of these

17 emigres that came in from Albania. The sixth point was to annul all the

18 purchasing contracts for land after World War II. Point 7 states that the

19 expelled Serbs should be returned to Kosovo and Metohija, and one of the

20 points calls for the fact that from the organs of authority in the

21 autonomous province all the leaders of the uprising should be expelled

22 from those organs of government.

23 I have to say that in the Serb society, there was a great

24 reaction. Why should young Albanians who had taken part in the mentioned

25 uprisings be members of these organs of government? The Serbian

1 intellectuals condemned the arrest of the Albanian young people who were

2 arrested. The Serb intellectuals condemned this.

3 Q. You were one of the signatories of a letter written by Yugoslav

4 intellectuals, there were 221 of them, at the beginning of 1986, and you

5 supported the citizens' petition, did you not, in your own letter?

6 A. Yes, I was one of the signatories of that letter and we have it in

7 tab 46 on page 84 -- 844. So it is tab 46, page 844. I was one of the

8 221 signatories. They included prominent writers, the present minister,

9 Mr. Draskovic, Pavic, Cosic, Matija [phoen], Deskovic [phoen], Simovic,

10 leading writers and intellectuals. But the essence of it was this: What

11 we requested was that the leadership of the province of Serbia and

12 Yugoslavia should take radical steps to change the situation in Kosovo and

13 Metohija, and in the letter we indicate the process of exodus, the

14 violence going on in Kosovo and Metohija, and everything else I have

15 talked about before this Trial Chamber. But I should like particularly to

16 draw your attention to one paragraph from that letter. I think it is a

17 very important paragraph and I hope you won't say that I am reading from

18 documents prepared in advance.

19 Q. Well, the letter is an exhibit. So you can quote however much you

20 like.

21 A. It is Exhibit 46, tab 46. Here we have the letter. And I'm going

22 to quote from that now. I think the letter is extremely important.

23 Q. Without the introduction, Mr. Terzic. Just quote the passage you

24 want to quote from.

25 A. I'm quoting from the part which speaks of our attitude towards

1 Albanians. I'm quoting: "The Serbian people in their liberation wars

2 always fought for Albanians as well, extending generous financial aid from

3 1945 until today, showing thus that they cared about the freedom, progress

4 and dignity of the Albanian people. We point out that we do not wish evil

5 or injustice upon the Albanian people and we are committed to their

6 democratic rights, seeking equality for Serbian and other peoples in

7 Kosovo, among them the Albanian people as well.

8 "We condemn all injustices that have ever been committed by the

9 Serbs against Albanian people."

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Terzic. Under tab 47, we have quite an extensive

11 overview of sources which all pertain to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo

12 and Metohija from 1945 until 1990. Would you please point out only the

13 most important elements. We have documents marked as A, B, C and D. We

14 have Serbs and Albanians as authors here, including Sinan Hasani, an

15 Albanian who at one point was the president of the Presidency of

16 Yugoslavia.

17 A. To be brief, let me summarise the results of scientific and

18 scholarly research of the figures of Serbs who left Kosovo and Metohija in

19 the period between 1945, 1990. This can be found under 47A, B, C, and D.

20 In accordance with the research committed by famous demographer

21 Professor Milovan Radovanovic, in the period between 1945 until 1989,

22 1990, a total of more than 250.000 Serbs left Kosovo and Metohija, moved

23 out. You can find this on page 383 of document marked 47A. I will show

24 this on the ELMO. So more than 250.000 Serbs left the area, mostly under

25 pressure.

1 According to the research of a colleague of mine, Branislav

2 Krstic, another historian who is not a demographer like Professor Milovan

3 Radovanovic, in the period between 1961 to 1991, more than 140.000 people

4 left the area. So in the period of 20 years only, Marina Blagojevic and

5 Ruza Petrovac from the Serbian Academy of Sciences conducted a research

6 between 1985 and 1986, establishing that within 20 years between 1961 and

7 1981, more than 85.000 Serbs moved out from the area. I mentioned this in

8 my report on page 51 of the English version.

9 And now something about the extent of the ethnic cleansing. That

10 is mentioned in the book of Mile Nedeljkovic, who is an ethnologist, and

11 this is under tab 47D. He, among other things, pointed out that between

12 1961 and 1971, so in ten years only, more than 230 villages in Kosovo and

13 Metohija were ethnically cleansed. And then between 1981 and 1991, so in

14 the space of only ten years, a total of 150 Serbian villages were cleansed

15 in 26 municipalities. He lists several examples here, and just to be

16 illustrative, I would like to give you several examples. English version,

17 page 51, note 156. I will give you just a few examples to illustrate what

18 that process looked like.

19 For example, in the village of Petrovac near Kosovska Mitrovica,

20 in 1961 there were 460 Serbs and 0 Albanians. Twenty years later there

21 were 36 Serbs and 800 Albanians. In the village of Orno Brdo, near Istok,

22 in 1961 had 664 Serbs, 11 Albanians. Twenty years later that same village

23 had only 22 Serbs and 576 Albanians -- I'm sorry, 963 Albanians. Village

24 Raka, near Urosevac, in 1961 -- page number is 223, 224 --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: We've had enough. We've had enough of that.

1 We've had enough of that. Move on to another topic now.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I would like to point out that one of the documents under tab 47

4 you omitted to mention, and this is a document which we're bringing here

5 in English because it's been published in the Review of International

6 Affairs, and that is precisely the article authored by Sinan Hasani,

7 president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia up until May 1987, entitled

8 Chauvinist and Separatist Organisations in Kosovo and Their Links with

9 Foreign Centres.

10 A. Yes, that's in the book entitled Kosovo Past and Present.

11 Q. What are his main conclusions, but very, very briefly. Not more

12 than half a minute, please.

13 A. The essence of conclusions of Sinan Hasani indicate that there

14 were several illegal separatist terrorist organisations in Kosovo and

15 Metohija. He lists their number, quotes their goals, mentions Adem Demaci

16 as one of creators, founders of one of the organisations, I think in 1961,

17 and he believes that these organisations rely on the one hand on the

18 original principles of the Prizren League and on the other hand on the

19 official policy of Enver Hoxha.

20 Q. All right. Mr. Terzic, we have heard here several times that the

21 Serbian myth of Kosovo can to a certain extent be blamed for the alleged

22 plight of the Albanians. Is Kosovo part of Serbian mythomania or is it

23 the key essence of the Serbian cultural and national identity? And to be

24 as brief as possible, tell us, how can we in that context interpret the

25 anniversary of 600 years since the Kosovo battle? This anniversary was

1 celebrated in 1989. Was that celebration discriminatory with respect to

2 any nation, especially Albanians?

3 A. I know that this issue was discussed at length before this

4 Tribunal. The celebration of 600 years anniversary in 1989 was the first

5 celebration of an anniversary of Kosovo battle held at a time when the

6 country was free, if we could consider Kosovo to have been free in 1989.

7 I believe that in the future we will be able to celebrate this event in

8 truly free circumstances.

9 Under tab 48, I have a document, an entire book which I

10 photocopied. The book is entitled Kosovo Day, published by the Committee

11 for Celebrating the Day of the Kosovo Battle in Britain, commemorating the

12 Kosovo battle. Namely, in the Second World War, in Great Britain they

13 officially celebrated St. Vitus's day, which is the day of the Kosovo

14 battle, the 28th of June. This book speaks of the commemoration of this

15 battle in Britain.

16 On page 11 of this book, we can see who were the members of this

17 committee headed by Lady Cowdray, Lady Grogan, Lady Paget, and another 16

18 renowned university professors and so on. The committee met in the

19 residence of Lady Cowdray. A number of gatherings were organised, church

20 services at which the Bishop of Canterbury spoke as well, the Archbishop

21 of Canterbury.

22 I also attached an excerpt from the book of Mrs. Vickers, speaking

23 about the fact that in 1980 in the United States the battle of Kosovo was

24 commemorated in New York in a church, in a church service where the

25 speakers compared the fate of the Serb people with that of the Jewish

1 people. Which means that the entire civilised world always considered the

2 day of the Kosovo battle not to be only a great day in the Serbian history

3 but in the history of entire Christian Europe.

4 Q. Mr. Terzic, on page 49, 50 of your expert report you draw a

5 parallel between the status of Albanian minority in Yugoslavia and the

6 status of the Serbian minority in Albania.

7 Please tell me very briefly, was there any reciprocity there?

8 A. This is a unique, unprecedented case in Europe. There are no

9 similar cases nor have there ever been any. There was an Albanian

10 minority -- there was a Serbian minority living in Albania. There were

11 50.000 of them. They had absolutely no rights. Dr. Jovan Bojevic, in

12 1991, published a book in Titograd, today's Podgorica, about refugees from

13 Albania in 1991. I think that there were about 1.670 refugees. Refugees

14 from Albania. So this is a book, the book that I'm quoting, in the

15 English version report on page 31 and 32, where he speaks about the fact

16 that their names had been Albanised, that in their identity papers they

17 were declared to be Siptars, not Serbs, that their churches and their

18 graveyards had been destroyed so therefore they had no rights. On the

19 other hand, the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia had its own autonomy, own

20 state, the Academy of Sciences, its own university, radio, television, and

21 so on. So this shows that there was absolutely no reciprocity whatsoever

22 there.

23 Q. All right. Under tab 50, we have a document in English, Yugoslav

24 Forum for Legal Rights and Remedies for Citizens in Kosovo, 3rd of March,

25 1989, Kosovo Past and Present, Review of International Affairs, 1989.

1 Therefore, the Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights points out in early

2 March 1989 that the human rights in Kosovo are jeopardised by this Great

3 Albanian movement. Please tell us what this document speaks about, but

4 very briefly.

5 A. President of that forum, Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic, renowned

6 fighter for human rights who was the president of this forum, points out

7 to the fact that the rights of Serbs, Montenegrins, and other

8 non-Albanians were limited, violated, points out to the fact that the

9 secessionist movements violates the rights of all non-Albanians, also

10 points out to the fact that there is a need to have trials being concluded

11 as fast as possible. He generally speaks about the violation of human

12 rights in Kosovo and Metohija. This is the essence of this document

13 attached here in English.

14 Q. All right. What do the facts on the repression of the

15 anti-Yugoslav separatist activity in Kosovo from '81 to '89 point out to?

16 I would like to point out document under 51, which is also in English and

17 is entitled Facts on the Repression of the Anti-Yugoslav Separatist

18 Activity in Kosovo 1981 to 1989. This was also published in Belgrade in

19 1989, so we're basically concluding our discussion of that period.

20 A. Very briefly: This document shows that in the period between '89

21 and '89 [as interpreted], a large -- nine large illegal separatist

22 organisations were uncovered, 94 illegal separatist terrorist groups were

23 uncovered, several illegal political parties such as the

24 Communist-Leninist party or the Marxist-Leninist group of Kosovo, or the

25 Liberation Front of Kosovo in 1981, '84. But I would like to point out

1 that only in March and April of 1989 there were 100 assaults carried out

2 against Serbs and Montenegrins only in a few days in 1989, which is a

3 shocking fact. The security organs at the time publicised the fact that

4 in Kosovo and Metohija there were 58.162 weapon permits issued. Out of

5 those, 27.000 were pistol permits, and that was sufficient to arm several

6 divisions in Kosovo and Metohija which could have been used to achieve the

7 goals of the separatist movement.

8 Q. Since you are an historian who has been dealing and researching

9 this area of Serbia for a long time, please tell us, what does the term

10 "historical Kosovo" mean and what is the essence of the Pan-Illyrianism

11 as the historical basis for this Greater Albania project?

12 A. I hope you will not take it against me that we are going back to

13 history because we're not really dealing with history, we're dealing with

14 an actual reality.

15 Q. Mr. Terzic, please answer my question without justifying your

16 answer.

17 A. Today in Kosovo or, rather, today in the Balkans, the so-called

18 historical Kosovo is being established. I'm quoting this on page 46 of

19 the English version of my report after note 131. So page 46. Historical

20 Kosovo is being construed. The one that never existed. There is not a

21 single fact mentioned in any single book except in this platform stating

22 that historical Kosovo ever existed. It is being linked to the old

23 province of Dardania which had its centre in Kosovo and now they're using

24 it as a fact to justify this historical Kosovo. Historical Kosovo shows

25 aspirations towards territories of neighbouring countries. They state

1 here that there is this so-called proper Kosovo, the current autonomous

2 province of Kosovo, and then there is the other Kosovo, including Presevo,

3 Bujanovac, and Medvedje, and then there is the North-west Kosovo,

4 including parts of Montenegro, and then there is the so-called Southern

5 Kosovo including Kumanovo, Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Debar.

6 The centre of this historical Kosovo, according to them, ought to be in

7 Skopje, since the centre of the old province of Dardania allegedly was in

8 Skopje. Since allegedly the centre of the old province of Dardania was in

9 Skopje.

10 So this historical Kosovo is linked to Kosovo Vilajet, however,

11 the Kosovo Vilajet that existed from 1878 to 1912, which at the time

12 encompassed only part of that area.

13 In the Kosovo Vilajet, according to the research done by Dr.

14 Peuker, which I mentioned yesterday, in 1912 Serbs and Slavs constituted

15 the majority. I think that 450 or 460.000 Serbs and Slavs lived there,

16 and 430.000 Albanians. Had Albanians had majority in Kosovo Vilajet, then

17 the journal which was published in Prizren in Turkish and Serbian would

18 not have been published in Turkish and in Serbian but, rather, in Turkish

19 and Albanian.

20 This goes to show that the Serbs had majority in Kosovo Vilajet in

21 the seven -- in the '70s of the 19th century.

22 Q. Finally, Mr. Terzic, I would like to ask you this: You're an

23 historian and you study European history. How do you assess the support

24 extended by the leaders of the Western countries, including NATO, to the

25 Albanian separatist movement, and how can we make a link between the

1 projects of Greater Albania with the events that existed between the two

2 world wars, the project of Greater Albania as it was known there -- then,

3 and the statements given by Count Ciano and so on?

4 A. The events of 1990s open up a number of fundamental issues. First

5 fundamental issue is: Does the West accept secession of ethnic groups or

6 national minorities, and will every ethnic group or national minority in

7 Europe, such as Basques, Corsicans, inhabitants of Northern Ireland, and

8 so on, so is every ethnic group going to seek foreign military

9 intervention in order to resolve their issues? This is one of the

10 fundamental questions in the modern history of Europe.

11 In the second issue is that in Kosovo we did not really deal with

12 the violation of human rights of Albanian minority. I hope I was clear

13 enough in showing that this had nothing to do with resolving Albanian

14 autonomy. As Henry Kissinger in his reports dated the 12th October 1998

15 stated, that issue could only be resolved through an autonomy given from

16 one village to the next, not by dealing with the status of the autonomy of

17 Kosovo because the autonomy in Kosovo has to resolve not only the rights

18 of Albanians but also the rights of the Serbs.

19 And third point is that NATO, in its aggression against

20 Yugoslavia, or through its aggression through Yugoslavia, violated a

21 number of international treaties and committed a crime against the Serbian

22 nation as a whole and against Yugoslavia and thus created fertile ground

23 for new crisis. From the time NATO arrived in the territory in Kosovo and

24 Metohija instead of multi-ethnic society and multi-ethnic tolerance, we

25 have a conclusion or final steps in the process of ethnic cleansing.

1 Since NATO forces arrived, more than hundred and fifty Serb

2 monasteries and churches have been destroyed. Serbs are not allowed to

3 speak their own language in that territory. So what kind of an

4 intervention was this? I think this was a great defeat for Europe, a

5 defeat of European civilisation, European culture, and European system of

6 values. I hope -- I believe that future research will support my

7 arguments.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Terzic. I have no further questions.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this list of exhibits that I

11 have already submitted to you be admitted into evidence, please. We've

12 gone through all of it.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll admit the expert report now, and we'll give

15 a ruling when we return from the break on the admissibility of the other

16 documents.

17 MR. NICE: Your Honours, when Your Honours come back, you may be

18 assisted if you bring your own copy of your Exhibit 508, the report of

19 Audrey Budding.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have kept that. We're now going to

21 break for 20 minutes.

22 THE REGISTRAR: May I give the number to the expert report?

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, give the number.

24 THE REGISTRAR: D259.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: When we get back, we'll sort this out. We'll

1 break now for 20 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

5 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

6 Q. Mr. Terzic -- or Dr. Terzic, your report, does it contain a single

7 remark favourable to Albanians or Kosovo Albanians? Does it?

8 A. Yes, of course.

9 Q. Give me some examples, please, so I can just remind myself.

10 A. In several places. I referred to what the Albanians had in Kosovo

11 and Metohija; scientific institutions, cultural institutions, periodicals,

12 newspapers, companies. And in several places I pointed out the fact that

13 Yugoslav-oriented Albanians and Albanians loyal to the Yugoslav and

14 Serbian state were exposed to pressure.

15 However, I must say that I myself have had contact with

16 Albanians --

17 Q. You may not have understood my question. When I asked you

18 something favourable about Albanians and you're saying they have

19 newspapers and things like that, why is that favourable to them? You're

20 not saying it's favourable to them that they're literate and they can

21 read, are you? What's favourable about their having newspapers? I don't

22 understand it.

23 A. Actually, I didn't understand your question, then. What does

24 "favourable opinion" or "unfavourable opinion" mean in your view? I was

25 referring to historical facts here. I was not talking about liking or

1 disliking.

2 Q. You've spoken throughout of the Albanians being the aggressors and

3 never being the victims of the Serbs, haven't you?

4 A. No, that's not correct.

5 Q. Well, you tell us about the degree to which they were victims of

6 the Serbs, please.

7 A. I think your question is a very one-sided one. I am speaking

8 about a very complex problem of Kosovo and Metohija. I did not talk about

9 Serbs on the whole as totally innocent victims. I talked about the

10 showdown with the Kacaks after the second -- after the First World War, in

11 the period between 1918 and 1924, and I said that there were innocent

12 victims among the Albanians when the police forces fought the Albanian

13 Kacaks, the renegades. So I did not disregard it.

14 Q. Give us an idea, measured against the hundreds of thousands of

15 Serb victims you've pointed to, how many Kosovo Albanian victims are we

16 dealing with in this particular incident?

17 A. What period are you referring to; the incident after the First

18 World War?

19 Q. The one you've just been telling us about. I asked you to give us

20 examples of where the Albanians or Kosovo Albanians had suffered at the

21 hands of the Serbs, and you said that there were the innocent victims

22 amongst the Albanians when the police forces fought the Albanians Kacaks,

23 the renegades. So I said how many victims then?

24 A. Your suggestions are very leading questions in terms of pointing

25 to Albanian victims only, but I have been talking about conflicts that

1 involved victims and casualties on both sides. Nevertheless, I'm going to

2 give a precise answer to your question.

3 Yes. So this was an action that was carried out in 1923. I beg

4 your pardon. It was carried out on the 10th of February, 1924, during the

5 arrest of Mehmet Konjuh, a Kacak who had barricaded himself in a fortress

6 for all practical purposes.

7 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... to the question: How many

8 victims?

9 A. Six Albanians were killed.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, let's have another example, please, of Albanians

11 suffering at the hands of Serbs, because you explain that you're telling

12 us about the many-sided and thus many-victims-sided consequences of

13 hundreds of years. Tell us about other Albanian victims of Serbs, or were

14 there none?

15 A. I think that you are putting questions in the wrong way,

16 completely - it's not for me to say - but this is a conflict between the

17 Albanians and Serbs.

18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Court will correct me if I'm

19 wrong. Before I ask the next question, let me ask you this: Do you know

20 the difference between giving evidence and arguing a position? Do you?

21 A. I must say that this is the first time I appear in a courtroom.

22 Actually, the second time.

23 Q. Second time -- you've given evidence here before.

24 A. Please, may I say this: This is the second time that I am in a

25 courtroom. Both times was in the International Criminal Tribunal in The

1 Hague. I had never been in a court of law before that ever. I'm not an

2 accused person here. I'm an expert witness.

3 Q. Do you understand the difference between giving evidence and

4 arguing a cause?

5 A. I do not.

6 Q. No. I didn't think so. Forgive me. That was a comment. I

7 shouldn't have made it.

8 Let's go back to the answers you were giving. We got to six

9 victims of Serbs. Can you please point in your report or in your evidence

10 to times or places where you have identified any other Kosovo Albanian or

11 Albanian victims of Serbs?

12 A. No. This does not have to do with the conflict between the

13 Albanians and the Serbs. This is a conflict that had to do with the

14 resistance of some Albanians to the legal Yugoslav and Serb state after

15 the First World War. In addition to the six casualties I mentioned, I

16 will refer to others. Between in 1918 and 1923 a total of 52 Kacaks were

17 killed, that is to say renegades who fought against the Yugoslav state,

18 and they acted violently against the law enforcement agencies. Any state

19 in the world would apply force in that situation. So 52 Kacaks were

20 killed --

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Terzic, so that we can

22 see how fairly balanced your view of the suffering has been. Any other

23 identifiable, in numbers or rough numbers, Kosovo Albanian victims of the

24 Serbs? How about in the 1990s or the 1980s? Any then?

25 A. Basically I don't understand your question.

1 Q. Very well. How about in 1945 or --

2 A. May I give you an answer?

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. May I? I don't understand your question. I think that it is a

5 leading question. You're asking me to count casualties among the Serbs

6 and Albanians. Albanians were equal citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia and

7 enjoyed all the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution. Only those

8 Albanians - I hope that you will allow me to finish this answer - only

9 those Albanians who opposed the law enforcement agencies were victims and

10 casualties.

11 As far as I know, during the demonstrations in 1981, during this

12 uprising, rebellion, about 20 Albanians were killed, but also tens of

13 policemen were killed. So in the conflicts, both sides had casualties.

14 Among the policemen there were Serbs, Albanians, Turks, and others. They

15 were policemen. I did not count only the Serbs, and I did not count only

16 the Albanians.

17 Q. And after the demonstrations in 1981 and up and until the bombing

18 campaign in --

19 A. This had to do with an uprising.

20 Q. Did it. We'll review that perhaps later. Between whatever

21 happened in 1981 and 1999 when the bombing began, do you accept that there

22 were any Albanian victims of Serbs in the territory of the former

23 Yugoslavia? Do you?

24 A. Yes, there were victims among those Albanians that took part in

25 violent action against Yugoslav security forces and Yugoslav citizens.

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1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... is that your position,

2 Mr. Terzic, so that we can understand your point of view? No other

3 Albanian victims apart from those who merited expulsion or death because

4 they had themselves taken violent action?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness is an historian. His

8 report is entitled Kosovo and Metohija in the 20th Century, and then it

9 says "political, ideological, demographic, and civilisational coordinates

10 related to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the southern areas of

11 Serbia." He did not deal with individual incidents except when quoting

12 documents in which reference is made to certain individual incidents. I

13 believe that it is wrong to ask the witness to work on statistics now.

14 As far as statistics are concerned, there are books of the

15 Yugoslav authorities, and I handed them in here, and then it became

16 obvious that Albanians and Serbs and Turks and --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I've heard your objection, and I

18 have to overrule it. I think the witness is perfectly capable of dealing

19 with the question. It falls within the subject matter of his testimony.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. I'm not going to deal with -- well, you've got the chance to

22 answer the question as you didn't answer it. And your position is that

23 there were no Albanian victims apart from those who merited expulsion or

24 death. Is that your position, please, Mr. Terzic, and then we'll move on.

25 A. Please. I'm testifying about a period of 300 years. I am

1 testifying about the historical problems involved in this long period of

2 time. I am not a researcher who investigates specific victims in the

3 field. I know that there were victims among the participants in the

4 uprising against the Yugoslavia law enforcement agencies. These were

5 violent clashes and I don't know whether there were innocent victims

6 involved. Probably there were, but I don't know. I did not research

7 that. I researched political, ideological, demographic, civilisational,

8 ideological problems that held to the crisis. Questions of this nature

9 are for my colleagues who are lawyers and investigators and criminal

10 experts.

11 Q. You ended your evidence in the only other case in which you've

12 given evidence with the observation that the Security Council was but a

13 tool in the hands of the politicians of the United States of America and

14 the European Union when it brought about the intervention in the former

15 Yugoslavia, in Kosovo. Is that still your view, as a matter of interest,

16 that the Security Council is but a tool in the hands of the United States

17 of America and the European Union?

18 A. Yes, that is still my view, and I respect the legal organs of the

19 United Nations. I'm not a lawyer, of course, but I believe that there is

20 an established procedure for engaging armed forces under the auspices of

21 the United Nations. The aggression against Yugoslavia was illegal from

22 the point of view of international law. The use of military force in an

23 internal conflict resolving the problem of a minority is an absurdity and

24 it can lead to even greater problems throughout the world if it is

25 applied.

1 Q. I'm just dealing with some general points at the moment. You --

2 forgive my not looking at you at the moment. Your observation was about

3 Bosnia, I'm reminded, not about Kosovo. But I'm looking for the comment

4 you made yesterday about Kosovo becoming a centre of drug trafficking and

5 crime and one thing and another. Perhaps you'd just like to explain that

6 since you're an historian and you volunteered this opinion.

7 A. I volunteered this opinion because this is a very significant

8 problem, a very significant problem in terms of the fate of Europe and the

9 world. There is ample evidence, and we read about this every day, that

10 Albanians are in charge of a large portion of drug trafficking in Europe

11 and the United States. The international forces in Kosovo and Metohija

12 have exact figures of the quantities of drugs, arms, and white slaves that

13 are in Kosovo and Metohija. They have exact information about the

14 Mujahedin who are in Kosovo and Metohija right now. Recently a German

15 newspaper wrote about a hodza from Prizren who himself said that he worked

16 for the German --

17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... at the beginning whether

18 there was anything nice you'd like to say about Kosovo Albanians, you

19 characterised them quite broadly as criminal, and I'll come back to that

20 in my next question, but is there in fact anything good you've got to say

21 about Albanians? You've characterised them in this way now as criminal.

22 Is there anything good you want to say about them?

23 A. Please, no. Please do not put words into my mouth. I did not say

24 that. Do not put words into my mouth. I'm not speaking in general terms

25 now about all the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija. I'm talking about

1 problems and certain things that happened amongst the Albanian minority.

2 There are a certain number of Albanians who I know personally. I

3 can tell you that, as a student, for a year I lived in a students'

4 dormitory with an Albanian. I had an Albanian roommate. Then -- sorry.

5 A colleague from Pristina --

6 Q. One point --

7 A. I'm not --

8 Q. One point, please --

9 A. I'm sorry, I'm not -- I'm sorry. I am not saying that the

10 Albanian minority is the same thing as drug traffickers. I want to be

11 very clear on that.

12 Q. Just dealing with the observation you offered yesterday about

13 drugs and crime, historian or no, you can confirm that on the release of

14 countries from the shackles, if they were shackles, of communism, many

15 countries, Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro, have all developed extensive

16 criminal fraternities, haven't they? Serbia not least with its so-called

17 Mafia. Montenegro, of course, with its famous dependence on international

18 trafficking in cigarettes illegally.

19 A. I didn't understand the question.

20 Q. When countries throw off the shackles of communism, they

21 frequently find themselves generating or having to live with, at least in

22 the short-term, extensive new criminal classes, often described as the

23 Mafia in both Russia and Serbia.

24 A. I hope, Mr. Nice, that you do not intend to link the Mafia only to

25 Serbia and Russia. Regrettably, the Mafia is an international problem,

1 and they have a high degree of solidarity amongst themselves.

2 I'm not denying the fact that there were quite a few bad things

3 that had to do with communism, but I don't think that the Mafia came as a

4 solution afterwards. It is a complex international problem, and it is a

5 major historical phenomenon from the point of view to the extent to which

6 it affects political structures. So the extent to which drug traffickers,

7 white slavers attract --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: The essence of the question, Mr. Terzic, was

9 whether you would agree that criminality, as evidenced in drug trafficking

10 and other acts, are not peculiar to Albania.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I cannot say it is

12 peculiar to Albania. You see, I'm not an expert in drugs or in drug

13 traffickers, but I do follow what is being written, and all leading

14 international experts, like for example Mr. Marko Nincevic, who as part of

15 the world organisation that fights against drug trafficking says that

16 Kosovo became a black hole in terms of drug trafficking, the black hole of

17 Europe.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... did you, as an expert witness

20 giving evidence within your expertise, it was appropriate for you to say

21 that yesterday, did you?

22 A. I repeat once again: I did not come here to testify about drug

23 routes. There are many people who know much more about this than I do.

24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... to the question. But I'm

25 going to ask you a different question, and it's this: We've --

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honour, may I

2 answer the question that Mr. Nice has put to me?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the question?

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. The question was: Did you think it appropriate as an expert

6 witness to venture the opinion about the Kosovo Albanians as criminals

7 that you did yesterday?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, answer it.

9 A. Please. I did not talk about all Albanians as criminals. I

10 refuse that, and this is being put into my mouth. I am saying that drug

11 trafficking was used as a basis for economic activity, and I referred to

12 the interview given by Milovan Djilas to the Wall Street Journal. And in

13 1985, he pointed out that problem in that interview of his.

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. You came here yesterday, when you came and were giving evidence

16 yesterday, to support this accused with a one-sided account, utterly

17 favourable to the Serbs and utterly unfavourable to the Kosovo Albanians,

18 didn't you, Mr. Terzic? That's been your objective. That's what you've

19 done for a day and a half, and we're going to explore it in detail.

20 That's my suggestion to you.

21 A. I'm sorry that I cannot agree with your assessment. I believe

22 that it is very one-sided and very partial.

23 Q. Let's look at a few things about your report, your expertise, and

24 your history. You were a schoolteacher initially?

25 A. At first I was a professor at a high school for two years, and for

1 a while I worked at the University of Novi Sad, but I spent most of my

2 career at the Historical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and

3 Arts.

4 Q. Dealing with Serb history and Serb matters, yes?

5 A. Serb and Balkan. I'm a Balkanologist first and foremost. My

6 doctorate has to do with Balkan problems and Greece.

7 Q. And the expertise that you presumably claim in light of the report

8 you've prepared is expertise in politics, history, ideology, and

9 demography, or only one of those?

10 A. I don't know what the history -- the science of history is as far

11 as you're concerned, but it's a very complex discipline. It has to do

12 with the historical, cultural, and demographic development of a -- and

13 social development of a group. It is a very broad interdisciplinary

14 science. I am trying to follow a modern concept of the science of

15 history.

16 Q. Well, then a modern concept to the science of history no doubt

17 requires you to look widely for your sources. In these exhibits - and I

18 have to tell you I haven't gone through them, I haven't had time, there's

19 so many of them - but in these exhibits, have you drawn on anything from

20 the Albanian Academy of Science and Arts? Because there is one.

21 A. Yes, of course. I hope, Mr. Nice, that you read my expert report

22 very carefully and you saw that in several places I quoted Albanian

23 sources. Inter alia, I mentioned several times here the platform of the

24 Academy of Sciences of Albania from October 1998. I quoted my colleague

25 Ali Hadri, the main historian from Kosovo and Metohija. Bajram Akif, my

1 colleague from Pristina. I quoted some other Albanian historians from

2 Kosovo, too. So I did take into account the results of Albanian

3 historiography.

4 Q. Have you got any of their papers in these exhibits?

5 A. Certainly.

6 Q. Which ones?

7 A. I'll find them straight away. In the expert report.

8 Q. In the exhibits that we've got?

9 A. Yes, of course. Among the exhibits we have Exhibit number 8, and

10 probably some others. Exhibit 8 is there for sure. Wait a moment,

11 please. I have to find the list, the list. I'll tell you exactly now.

12 So Exhibit number 8, the memorandum of the forum of Albanian

13 intellectuals, the platform of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, and the

14 map of a Greater Albania. Then Exhibit number 13. Then Exhibit number

15 14, written by an Albanian woman, a communist from Kosovo and Metohija. I

16 think her name was Nimani. That's number 14.

17 Q. I'm concerned really with learned papers from the Academy of

18 Albania.

19 A. Please, please. I insist upon saying that I used the platform for

20 resolving the Albanian question by the Albanian Academy of Science and the

21 whole of the scientific elite of the Albanian Academy of Science worked on

22 that; from Tirana, from Pristina, and from Macedonia, and they say so

23 themselves in the platform. And the platform was tab 8. So I used that

24 source and handed it over in its entirety. And that is the basic source,

25 the main source. The forum of the memorandum of the Albanian

1 intellectuals along with some maps that I quoted in my report, and I state

2 that I use my colleague Ali Hadri and Bajram Akifi and several other

3 Albanian historians in my report in addition to these exhibits found in

4 the tabs.

5 Q. Let's turn to the Kosovo Academy. You seemed outraged in your

6 report that before the 1990 constitution abolished, or under the 1990

7 constitution, the Academy of Sciences was abolished. You seemed outraged

8 that Kosovo should have such an academy. You mentioned it twice in your

9 report, I think, if not three times. Certainly twice.

10 First of all, why were you so outraged that Kosovo should have an

11 intellectual forum of its own?

12 A. My answer is simple: Big countries, rich countries, have only one

13 Academy of Sciences. France, for example, has just one Academy of

14 Science.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... rule of nature or is that a

16 rule of law or what?

17 A. Please. I should like to ask the President -- well, the problem

18 is a serious one. It is of a scientific nature and of an economic nature.

19 Big countries such as France, the enormous country that Russia is, they

20 only have one Academy of Sciences. National minorities, as far as I know,

21 nowhere in the world, absolutely nowhere in the world - and I'd like to

22 ask Mr. Nice to quote me an example if they do - have academies of

23 sciences. In Belgrade we have the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences,

24 founded in 1842. It was not rational within the frameworks of a single

25 republic, the Republic of Serbia, that you should have three academies of

1 sciences; the Serbian Academy of Sciences, the Vojvodina Academy of

2 Sciences, and the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Kosovo. That's one

3 point.

4 On the other hand, it's a scientific approach. Should a

5 relatively underdeveloped province, Kosovo and Metohija, within the

6 frameworks of Serbia, did it have a sufficiently qualified scientific

7 elite to found an Academy of Science in the first place as the highest,

8 top level scientific institution? I consider that it did not.

9 Q. I see. This underdeveloped country was simply not clever enough

10 and should have come along and had its interests represented in Belgrade

11 under the umbrella of Serbia; is that right? Is that what you're saying?

12 A. No, that's not what I wish to say, but you wish to lend political

13 import to what I'm saying and explaining to you. What I want to say is

14 something else.

15 It was rational, economically and scientifically speaking, that in

16 Serbia you should have just one, a single Academy of Science. I'm not

17 entering into any political reasons. Every Albanian who through his

18 scientific work proves that he is able to be a member of the academy

19 should have been a member of the academy, that is my position, regardless

20 of whether he's an Albanian, a Romanian, a Serb or whatever. A large

21 number of Serbs, high quality Serbs, never became members of the Serbian

22 Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in the Serbian Academy there are indeed

23 members who are not Serbs themselves, so it would have been logical to

24 expect that the scientific work of Albanian intellectuals, if they

25 warranted it, should have been members of the Serbian Academy because the

1 Serbian Academy is not a national Serbian Academy. We have had members

2 who were Hungarians, Jews, and other nations too.

3 So I'm quoting the examples of much more developed countries and I

4 quoted the example of France, for example. So a great country like France

5 just has one Academy of Science. So I'm talking about the scientific

6 value and worth of the academy and its members. I don't mean by that to

7 say that in Kosovo there were no scientists who had high ranking

8 scientific qualifications. I personally -- I'm not an expert to delve

9 into them all, but I'm saying in principle, this is my principle position.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

11 A. You're trying to put words into my mouth and to say that I

12 consider that Albanians were not clever enough to become members of the

13 academy. That is your own personal position and your own personal

14 explanation, not mine.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice said something. It's at

17 the top of the page on our screens, top of the transcript. It's gone off

18 our screens, in fact, but he said, "So you consider that this

19 insufficiently developed country was not sufficiently clever to have," et

20 cetera, et cetera. First of all, Kosovo is not a country, let's get that

21 quite clear. Kosovo is an autonomous region, an autonomous province.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, those are comments. If you wish,

23 you may raise them in re-examination, but you can't make comments like

24 that at this stage. The witness answered the question, and we should

25 proceed now, Mr. Nice, to another topic.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. I'm still on a few general topics but I just -- and I'm not going

3 to deal with the history very much before 1960s, but just back to one

4 thing on the overall history of victims before I forget it.

5 What did happen and how many people suffered in Drenica in 1945 or

6 1946? How many Kosovo Albanians suffered and at whose hands in 1945 and

7 1946?

8 A. I know what you expect me to say. You expect me to say how many

9 Albanians suffered at the hands of the Serbs, but the problem here is of a

10 different nature, and you must understand one thing; the context of the

11 events. We're talking about the end of World War II. There is fighting

12 going on between the forces of the Hitler coalition and the anti-Hitler

13 coalition forces. The vast majority of the Kosovo Albanians took part

14 within the forces of the Hitler coalition. After the withdrawal of German

15 forces from the territory of Yugoslavia, a portion of those forces who

16 were in the 21st SS Division and within the Kosovo Regiment was mobilised

17 into new units, and they refused to move towards the Srem front where a

18 battle was taking place between the Red Army and the German forces. And

19 there was a classical rebellion on the part of 10 to 15.000 armed

20 Albanians, the vestiges of the Ballista Nazi forces from World War II. So

21 we're not talking about the peace-loving Albanian population here. It was

22 a rebellion at the rear of the front against the Hitler coalition. So it

23 was not the Serbs, it was Josip Broz Tito himself, who was a Croat and was

24 a Supreme Commander and obliged to set up a provisional military

25 administration and to withdraw 39.000 troops from the Srem front to stifle

1 the -- and put down the uprising, the rebellion. So it was a military

2 conflict in the area of Kosovo and Metohija between the forces the 2nd

3 Prizren League, who allegedly wanted to defend Kosovo as they said, and

4 the forces of the anti-Hitler coalition.

5 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... ask you for your assistance

6 as an historian because we have evidence from General Klaus Naumann and

7 General Clark that the accused, with Mr. Sainovic said that a solution

8 would be found in spring 1999, and when asked what he meant by a solution,

9 he said we'll do the same as we did in Drenica in '45 and '46 when we got

10 together and shot them -- "shot them all," I think. Does that make sense

11 to you, that answer, that a solution would be the same or could be the

12 same as in 1945 or -6 to get them together and shoot them all? Is that

13 what happened?

14 A. Please. I'm very sorry that you're taking a very serious

15 situation, a great battle at the end of World War II, and simplifying it

16 in such a banal way. We're not talking about the fact that the

17 peace-loving population was gathered together and killed. It was

18 classical fighting in the military sense. On the one side you had the

19 armed vestiges of the Ballista Nazi forces from World War II, and the

20 National Liberation Army on the other. So they were large-scale battles,

21 military battles in which the soldiers of the Yugoslav army were killed

22 but so were the soldiers on the other side, and I think I said that about

23 850 soldiers belonging to the Yugoslav Liberation Army had been killed and

24 about 650 members of the Ballista forces had been killed, but that several

25 thousand Ballistas surrendered. So the fact that -- so what you say that

1 they were rounded up and killed is not true. That is construed and

2 fabricated, because historical facts do not bear that out.

3 Q. I was simply reading you the words in evidence from two witnesses,

4 coming from the accused and/or from Mr. Sainovic.

5 A. And Mr. Klaus Naumann in German sources, in fact, was able to

6 check out these facts and figures because German sources could testify

7 very authentically about all that because the leadership of the 21st SS

8 Division, for example, and the leadership of the Kosovo Regiment withdrew

9 together with the Germans from the territory of Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Mr. Terzic, you have not yourself ever become an academician or

11 have you?

12 A. No. I was a candidate but I did not become a member, no.

13 Q. It's obviously important for any fact finder or historian to know

14 about the source to which he turns and to see whether that source has any

15 vulnerability to bias. Help us, please: Were you at one time a senator,

16 maybe an honourary senator, in the Republika Srpska?

17 A. No, I was never a deputy, a -- in any parliament, in the

18 parliament of any state.

19 Q. Were you approached to fulfil such a role? Did you fulfil any

20 role in relation to Republika Srpska's government? Did you?

21 A. In the Republic of Serbia people said I should put my name forward

22 os a deputy on several occasions but I didn't want to because I'm a

23 scientist. I delve into scientific research and not politics.

24 Q. Absolutely. Have you ever been an advisor to the man Seselj?

25 A. I had expected you to ask me that question. No, that is not true.

1 I was never an advisor to the man Seselj.

2 Q. Why had you expected me to ask you? Has it been published that

3 you were?

4 A. Well, there exists an internal political intrigue of that nature

5 linked to a proposal that was made in the Serbian parliament by the

6 foreign minister to test the national identity of Mr. Seselj and his

7 ethnic origins.

8 Q. You must have been appalled when you heard, along with the rest of

9 the world, of the scale of death and misery caused in Srebrenica in 1995.

10 Yes?

11 A. Of course that is a great tragedy, and as a man, as a human being,

12 I am appalled by that.

13 Q. Did you realise from a very early stage where responsibility for

14 that suffering was being allocated? Mladic indicted? Yes? Republika

15 Srpska implicated?

16 A. I knew what part of the international and world media were saying

17 but I read other opinions, too, and I personally did not research that

18 situation. For me as an historian, I always go to the source. So I did

19 not study the question of Srebrenica, I went to the primary source, and I

20 didn't have any primary sources on the basis of which to make my

21 assessments. I heard both sides. For me to make a relevant evaluation

22 and assessment I would have to have sources on the basis of which I could

23 make up my own mind. But, yes, I am sincerely sorry that it happened, and

24 I'm sincerely sorry for the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a country. I

25 think it was a tragedy for all its peoples.

1 Q. Can you look at the declaration you signed, then, with all those

2 reservations about going to sources, in June of 1996.

3 MR. NICE: English version for the overhead projector, B/C/S

4 version for the witness.

5 And if the usher could very kindly put the English version on the

6 overhead projector. Mr. Terzic's -- sorry. Mr. Terzic's papers will have

7 to be removed, I think. Make sure we've got the right page, it ends in

8 600 at the top, 0600.

9 Q. This is a declaration. We'll just run through it. "Supporting

10 the international community efforts for establishing permanent and long

11 lasting peace," et cetera. Then it says at the top: "Highly appreciating

12 Dr. Radovan Karadzic's exceptional contribution to the peace process and

13 the reputation he enjoys among all Serbs.

14 "We, the signatory Serbian intellectuals, come out with the

15 following

16 "Declaration:

17 "Demanding that The Hague Tribunal criminal charges brought

18 against Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Republic of Srpska, be

19 repealed."

20 I'm not going to read all the paragraphs, but if we go perhaps to

21 paragraph 2: "Attempts to exclude Dr. Radovan Karadzic from the political

22 life of Republic of Srpska in the period of its stabilisation, putting

23 into effect the Dayton agreement regulations and the Paris Treaty, are

24 directly aimed at ruining Serbian people interests and represent the

25 attack against the democratic processes on the territory of the former

1 Yugoslavia, especially on the territories where the Serbs have lived for

2 centuries.

3 "3. Bringing up criminal charges against Dr. Radovan Karadzic,

4 the President of the Republic of Srpska because of the alleged war crimes,

5 has not been grounded on facts, considering that as far back as on June

6 the 13th, 1992, Dr. Radovan Karadzic passed the Order about the

7 international war right application in the Republic of Srpska Army of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, later Republic of Srpska. Having done this, the

9 Republic of Srpska completely accepted the international treaty

10 regulations ..."

11 Can we go to the next page, please. There's a lot of it but I'll

12 try and take it briefly.

13 You set down, for example, at paragraph 6: "The President of the

14 Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, neither gave a single order nor passed any

15 other document on the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina that

16 could have inflamed hatred, called for or encouraged genocide or ethnic

17 cleansing of the war enemies, the Muslims and the Croats."

18 And then at paragraph 9: "Bearing in mind the illegality of The

19 Hague Tribunal, its groundless accusations and its bringing criminal

20 charges against the President of the Republic of Srpska, Dr. Radovan

21 Karadzic, which have not been founded on facts but obviously motivated by

22 political and other goals, we request that the brought charges against the

23 President of the Republic of Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, be revoked in

24 the interests of strengthening and stabilising peace and vital

25 interests ..."

1 And we see under the signatures first, as a matter of interest, a

2 former witness, Professor Dr. Avramov. We see you at number 11,

3 Dr. Terzic; and we see at number 4 on the right-hand side Milorad Ekmecic;

4 10, Vasilije Krestic.

5 How were you able, as a disengaged, non-political historian, to

6 put your name to this document, please, Mr. Terzic?

7 A. Mr. Nice, I should first of all like to note that you probably

8 know that I am testifying here about Kosovo and Metohija, and I shall be

9 happy to answer your question.

10 As an intellectual, as an historian, as an historian analysing

11 historical processes in bygone centuries, it was clear to me that the

12 Yugoslav civil war or, rather, that the -- all parties were involved in

13 the Yugoslav civil war, both the Serbian, the Croatian, and the Muslim.

14 And the fact that steps were taken exclusively against Serb leaders in

15 Republika Srpska, in Republika Srpska Krajina, in the Republic of Serbia

16 proper, of all the political leaders, military leaders, for me was

17 absolute proof of bias and prejudice on the part of the international

18 community and this Tribunal as well.

19 I consider that if the international community wished to see

20 justice and reconciliation take place, then it must have an equal position

21 and attitude towards all the conflicting parties. I don't see that either

22 the president of Croatia or the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina or any

23 other leaders were indicted. It was only Serb leaders who were accused

24 and indicted and this to me was proof of selective justice, biased

25 justice, and the one-sidedness of the International Court, and that is why

1 I signed this declaration.

2 Q. You haven't answered the question, you see, really. It may be why

3 you signed the declaration, but it's not an answer to the question.

4 Because you signed this declaration, just as you signed your expert

5 report, and my question was to you: How were you able to put your name to

6 this document when we'd seen -- the question I asked, but when we look at

7 the facts that I related to you, how are you able to sign your name to

8 facts of which you could have had no knowledge? How could you say that

9 Dr. Karadzic neither gave a single order nor passed any other document

10 that could have inflamed hatred or called for or encouraged genocide? How

11 could you have said that as a serious historian?

12 A. The co-signators of this declaration are people who are prominent

13 experts of international law, including Mrs. Smilja Avramov, my colleague

14 Mr. Cavoski, and there are others; Academician Jovicic, who died, and so

15 on. So we have prominent international law experts here. And I

16 completely stood behind their assessment and evaluation. That's one

17 point.

18 On the other point, insistence made by international

19 representatives that the Serbs were the aggressors in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

20 that the Serbs were the aggressors in Croatia, for me was proof of

21 absurdity and the irony of history, because the Serbs in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Orthodox Serbs, although most of the Muslims are of

23 Serb origin and converted to Islam, but Orthodox Serbs for centuries made

24 up the majority of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I can provide

25 you with exact figures. From 1910, for example, until 1948, 44 per cent

1 of the population --

2 Q. I don't think this is an answer to the question, but if you feel

3 you can add something to --

4 A. Please.

5 Q. If you feel you can add something to how you were able to sign

6 your name to factual assertions and you want to add to it, please do so.

7 A. I was not informed or was not aware of a single document which

8 would testify to the fact that Radovan Karadzic personally committed any

9 crime. We were discussing the political assessment of the struggle of the

10 Serb people led by Radovan Karadzic. I did not agree, and I still do not

11 agree with the fact that the Serbs were aggressors in their own republic,

12 and that was the crux of the matter.

13 Q. All right. Let's go to the crux the matter. We've got to try and

14 look at the history simply. Serbia's been in the making since, what,

15 1804? Is that a reasonable date to start with?

16 A. First of all, I should like to thank you for the suggestions of

17 looking at history simply, but that's just not possible because history is

18 a highly complex science and a complex process. History, if you're

19 talking about Serbia, the first Serbian state in the Balkans was founded

20 in the 8th century. Later on, it developed. There were first four Serb

21 states; Raska, Zeta, Montenegro, Bosna, and Hum, or Herzegovina. Those

22 were four regions. Of course, later on it developed, and in the 15th

23 century or, rather, the 14th century, Serbia had a large kingdom in the

24 Balkans. It was called the Empire of Tzar Dusan, Emperor Dusan, with its

25 headquarters in Prizren.

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... so we can at least make a

2 start. What happened in 1884?

3 A. Yes, of course. In the 15th century, the Serbs came under Turkish

4 rule, and let me remind you, and I have to do so, that the Serbs reached

5 Vienna and Budapest. At the end of the 17th century, the Turks were at

6 the doors of Vienna.

7 Q. Dr. Terzic, I think the Court will be grateful for an answer to my

8 question because I'm trying to confine your evidence to what is likely to

9 be most valuable to the Chamber. What happened in 1804?

10 A. Very well. In 1804, the first liberation revolution took place in

11 the Balkans. The Serb revolution. The great German historian Ranke

12 wrote a capital book, Die Serbische Revolution, published in Hamburg in